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Bertrand russell power pdf

Bertrand Arthur William Russell (1872–1970) was a British philosopher, logician, essayist and social critic. He was best known for his work with mathematical logic and analytical philosophy. Together with G.E. Moore, Russell is commonly known as one of the main founders of modern analytical philosophy. Together with Kurt Gödel, he is regularly considered one of the most important loogies of the 20th century. During his long career, Russell also contributed to a wide range of topics, including the history of ideas, ethics, political and educational theory, and religious studies. General readers have benefited from his many popular writings on a wide range of topics. Marked by controversy - including expulsions from both Trinity College, Cambridge and City College, New York - Russell was awarded the Medal of Merit in 1949 and the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1950. Russell was also known for his many anti-nuclear demonstrations and campaigns against Western involvement in the Vietnam War, and he remained a prominent public figure until his death at the age of 97. Bertrand Arthur William Russell (1872–1970) was a British philosopher, logician, essayist and social critic. He was best known for his work with mathematical logic and analytical philosophy. Together with G.E. Moore, Russell is commonly known as one of the main founders of modern analytical philosophy. Together with Kurt Gödel, he is regularly considered one of the most important loogies of the 20th century. During his long career, Russell also contributed to a wide range of topics, including the history of ideas, ethics, political and educational theory, and religious studies. General readers have benefited from his many popular writings on a wide range of topics. Marked by controversy - including expulsions from both Trinity College, Cambridge and City College, New York - Russell was awarded the Medal of Merit in 1949 and the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1950. Russell was also known for his many anti-nuclear demonstrations and campaigns against Western involvement in the Vietnam War, and he remained a prominent public figure until his death at the age of 97. The key to the human nature Marx found in wealth and Freud in sex, Bertrand Russell finds in power. According to him, power is the ultimate goal of man and is in many ways the single most important factor in the development of any society. In the late 1930s, when extremist ideologies were tearing Europe apart and the world was on the brink of war, Russell set out to discover new science to understand the traumatic events of the day and explain those who would follow suit. The result was Power, a remarkable book that Russell considered one of the most important of his long career. rejection of desire Russell shows how political enlightenment and human understanding can lead to peace - his book is a passionate call to mind independence and a celebration of the instinctive joy of human life. Power: New social analysis cover of first editionAuthorBertrand RussellCountryUnited KingdomLanguageEnglishSubjectSocial philosophyPublisherAllen & UnwinPublication date1938Media typePrint (Hardcover and Paperback)Pages328 Power: A New Social Analysis by Bertrand Russell (1st imp. London 1938, Allen & Unwin, 328 ed.) is a work of social philosophy written by Bertrand Russell. For Russell, power is the ability to achieve goals. Russell, in particular, has in mind social power, that is, power over people. [1] The volume contains several arguments. However, four themes play a key role in the overall work. The first theme given in the analysis is that the lust for power is part of human nature. Secondly, the work emphasises that forms of social power are different and that these forms are fundamentally interlinked. Thirdly, Power requires organizations to usually communicate with certain types of people. Finally, the work ends by arguing that an arbitrary ruler can and should be silenced. Throughout the work, Russell aims to develop a new method for developing the entire social sciences. For him, all the subjects of social sciences are only the study of various forms of power – mainly economic, military, cultural and civic – (Russell 1938:4. [2] In the end, he hoped that social science would be solid enough to capture the laws of social dynamics that would describe how and when one form of power would change to another. (Russell 1938:4–6) As a secondary goal of the work, Russell wants to counter the one-reason narratives of social power, such as the economic determinism he has caused Karl Marx. (Russell 1938:4, 95) [3] Work The new social analysis examines at least four general issues: the nature of power, forms of power, the structure of organisations and the ethics of power. The nature of power Russell's view of human nature, like that of Thomas Hobbes, is somely pessimistic. Russell says the desire to empower himself is unique to human nature. In addition to Homo sapiens, no other animal, he says, is able to be so dissatisfied with his plot that they should try to collect more goods than meet their needs. The impulse to power, as he calls it, will not arise unless basic desires have been tolerated. (Russell 1938:3) Then the imagination confuses and motivates the actor to gain more power. Russell thinks that the love of power is almost universal among men, even though it draws different shadows from person to person. A person with great ambitions may become the next Caesar, but others may be content to rule the home. (Russell Philosophy was one of Russell's subjects This impulse to power is not only explicitly present in the leaders, but sometimes implicitly in those who follow. It is clear that managers can pursue and benefit from the implementation of their own agenda, but a genuinely cooperative company, followers seem to benefit from the leadership's achievements. (Russell 1938:7–8) In highlighting this point, Russell explicitly rebukes Friedrich Nietzsche's infamous master-slave morality claim. Russell explains: Most men don't feel the qualifications needed to lead a group to victory in themselves, and are therefore looking for a captain who seems to have the courage and finesmancy needed to achieve supremacy... Nietzsche accused Christianity of inculcub slave morality, but ultimate virtue was always the goal. Blessed are the humble because they inherit the earth. ' (Russell 1938:9, emphasize his). The existence of implicit power, he explains, is the reason why people are able to tolerate social inequality for a long time (Russell 1938:8). However, Russell quickly discovers that invoking human nature should not come at the cost of ignoring the extraordinary personal temperaments of those seeking power. After Adler (1927) – and to some extent, playing nietzsche – he distinguishes individuals into two categories: those who are rude in a particular situation and those who are not. Russel tells us that the love of power is unlikely to be based on the Freudian complex (that is, father's heartburn, mother's lust, drive toward Eros and Thanato (love and death drives that form the basis for all people, etc.), but rather a sense of justice created by extraordinary and deep-rooted self-confidence. (Russell 1938:11) Imperious person thrives due to both mental and social factors. For example, imperious usually have internal confidence in their own competence and determination, which is relatively lacking in followers. (Russell 1938:13) In reality, imperiousness may or may not have genuine skill; Rather, the source of their power may also arise from their hereditary or religious... (Russell 1938:11) I have serious doubts as to whether the men who will become pirate chiefs are the ones full of their father's retrospective terror, or whether Napoleon in Austerlitz really felt avenged by Madame Mère. I don't know anything about Attila's mother, but I suspect she spoiled a little sweetheart who later found the world annoying because it sometimes resisted her whim. (1938:11) Bertrand Russell (1938:11) Non-imperious persons include those who submit to the ruler and those who withdraw completely from the situation. A confident and competent leadership candidate can withdraw from a situation where he or she lacks to challenge a particular authority, to be timid because of temperament, simply there are no means of acquiring power by conventional methods, are completely indifferent to power issues and/or curbed by a well-developed sense of duty. (Russell 1938:13–17) Thus, while an imperious speaker tends to favor a passionate audience over a sympathetic one, a timid speaker (or subject matter) has the opposite preference. The irritable speaker is mainly interested in a crowd that has given more rash emotions than reflection. (Russell 1938:18) The speaker tries to create two layers of faith in his crowd: a superficial layer in which the power of the enemy is magnified so that great courage seems necessary, and a deeper layer with a firm conviction of victory (Russell 1938:18). Instead, timid detectives seek a sense of belonging and reassurance that seems to be one of those crowds, all of which feel alike (Russell 1938:17). When someone has a crisis of confidence and is in an appalling situation, they tend to behave in a predictable way: firstly, they submit to the rule of those who seem to have more authority over the most essential task, and secondly, they surround themselves with a mass of people with equally low confidence. People are therefore resigned to the regime of the leader in a kind of urgent solidarity. (Russell 1938:9–10) [4] [5] Forms of power At first, Russell is interested in classifying different ways in which man can have power over another – what he calls forms of power. Forms can be divided into two: the effect on individuals and psychological types of effects. (Russell 1938:24.27) [6] To understand how organizations work, Russell explains, we must first understand the basic methods by which they can exercise power at all – that is, we need to understand how individuals are persuaded to adhere to some authority. Russell divides forms of influence into three very common categories: the power and coercion of the lures, such as all conditioning and group compliance of the operators, and the power of propaganda and/or habit (Russell 1938:24) [7] To explain each form, Russell gives pictures. The power of sheer force is like tying a rope around a pig's belly and lifting it on top, ignoring its screams. The power of attraction is performed by two things: either conditioning, such as circus animals trained to perform this or bringing the trick to the public, or the conceding of a group, such as when a sheep leader is dragged in chains to follow the rest of the flock. Finally, the power of propaganda is reminiscent of using a carrot and grabbing the behavior of a donkey in the sense that the donkey is convinced that actions (following a carrot, avoiding a stick) would be more or less beneficial. (Russell 1938:24) Russell makes the distinction between traditional, revolutionary and naked forms of psychological influence. (Russell 1938:27) These psychological types overlap in some respects with forms of influence: for example, naked power can be reduced simply to coercion. (Russell 1938:63) But the other types are separate analysis units and require separate treatments. Naked and economic power When power is used in the absence of other forms, it is called naked power. In other words, naked power is a ruthless use of force without the will or the attempt to consent. In all cases, the sources of naked power are powerless fears and goals of the powerful (Russell 1938:127). As an example of naked power, Russell recalls the story of Agathocles, the son of ceramics who became a tyrant of Syracuse. (Russell 1938:69–72) Russell argues that naked power arises within the government under certain social circumstances: when two or more fanatical creeds fight for government and when all traditional beliefs have degenerated. The period of naked power can end with foreign conquest, the creation of stability, and/or the rise of a new religion (Russell 1938:74). The process by which an organization achieves sufficient prominence to be able to exercise naked power can be described as a three-step rule (Russell 1938:63). According to this rule, what begins with fanaticism for a crowd will eventually produce conquest through naked power. In the end, the concession of the isolation population turns naked power into a traditional force. Finally, once traditional power has taken hold, it begins to suppress dissent by using naked power. For Russell, economic power is along the same lines as the power of conditioning. (Russell 1938:25) Unlike Marx, however, he stresses that economic power is not a priority, but is based on a combination of forms of power. According to his report, the economy depends to a large extent on the functioning of the law, in particular property law; and the law is largely a power of opinion that cannot be fully explained by pay, labor and trader. (Russell 1938:95) Ultimately, Russell argues that economic power is achieved by the ability to defend one's own territory (and conquer other lands), own materials for the cultivation of resources, and be able to meet the requirements of others on the market. (Russell 1938:97–101, 107) The power of opinion (and above) in Russell's model, power over the religions and habits of individuals is easy to miscalculated. He argues that, on the one hand, the determinists of the economy had underestimated the power of opinion. On the other hand, however, he argues that the case is easy to make, that all power power to opinion: Armies are useless unless soldiers believe in why they are fighting... The law is impotent unless it's usually followed. (Russell 1938:109) Yet he acknowledges that military force can cause opinion, and (with a few exceptions) the thing that first gives an opinion on power: we therefore have a kind of sight: firstly, pure persuasion leading to the conversion of a minority; force shall then be used to ensure that the rest of the Community is exposed to the right propaganda; and finally, the genuine belief of the vast majority that makes the use of force superfluous again. (Russell 1938:110) It is not entirely true that persuasion is one thing and strength is another. Many forms of persuasion - many of which accept - are actually a kind of force. Think about what we're going to do with our kids. We don't tell them: Some people think the earth is round, and others think it's flat. When you grow into a father, you can, if you like, examine the evidence and form your own conclusion. Instead, we say, The earth is round. When our children are old enough to examine the evidence, our propaganda has shut their minds... (1938:221) Bertrand Russell (1938:221) Thus, while power over opinion can be done by force or without power, the power of faith is created only after a strong and convincing minority has voluntarily adopted a creed. The exception is Western science, which apparently rose in cultural appeal despite being unpopular with the founding forces. [8] Russell explains that the popularity of science is not based on public respect for reason, but is entirely based on science producing technology and technology producing the things that people want. Similarly, religion, advertising and propaganda all have power because of their links to the wishes of their audience. Russell's conclusion is that reason is very limited, although precise, influencing people's opinions. Reason is only effective when it appeals to desire. (Russell 1938:111–112) Russell then inquires about the power that the power of reason has in the community, as opposed to fanaticism. It seems that the power of reason is that it is able to increase the likelihood of practical things succeeding through technical efficiency. The price of allowing reasoned research is the tolerance of intellectual dissent, which in turn arouses skepticism and dims the power of fanaticism. On the other hand, it seems that the Community will be stronger and more united if there is broad agreement within it with certain religions, and a reasoned debate is rare. If these two opposing conditions both have to be fully exploited for short-term profits, it would require two things: firstly, that both the majority opinion (through strength and propaganda) and, secondly, that intellectual class (through reasoned discussion). In the long run, however, religion tends to provoke fatigue, light skepticism, outright disbelief, and finally apathy. (Russell 1938:123–125) An example of war-time propaganda, Russell is acutely aware that power seeks to unite in the hands of a minority, and no less when it comes to taking over opinion. [9] The result is systematic propaganda or a state propaganda monopoly. Perhaps surprisingly, Russell avers that the consequences of systematic propaganda are not as serious as one might expect. (Russell 1938:114–115) A true monopoly of opinion leads to careless arrogance on the part of leaders and indifference to the welfare of controlled power and credibility on behalf of a governed government towards the state. In the long run, the net result is: [delaying] the revolution, but making it more violent when it comes. When only one doctrine is officially allowed, men are not allowed to practice thinking or weighing options; only a great wave of passionate rebellion can eliminate orthodoxy; and for the opposition to become wholehearted and violent enough to achieve success, it seems necessary to deny even what was true in the dogma of the government (Russell 1938:115). Instead, the cunning propagandist of the modern state allows dissent so that false established opinions have something to react to. In Russell's words, lies need competition to maintain their energy. (Russell 1938:115) Revolutionary versus traditional power Among psychological types of influence, we have a difference between traditional, naked and revolutionary power. (Naked power, as stated earlier, is the use of coercion without the use of legitimacy.) With a traditional administration, Russell has in mind the ways in which people invoke the power of the custom to justify political governance. In this sense, traditional power is psychological rather than historical; because traditional power is not entirely based on commitment to linear historical religions, but rather on mere manners. Nor does traditional power have to be based on real history, but must be based on an imagined or fabricated history. So he writes that both religious and secular innovators – at least those who have been most successful – have, where possible, appealed to tradition and done everything possible to minimize elements of novelty in their system. (Russell 1938:40) The two clearest examples of traditional power are king power and cleric rule. Russell traces both historically to specific roles that served some activity in early societies. The priest resembles a tribal medicine man thought to have unique powers of swearing and healing at his disposal (Russell In most modern modern priests rely on charismatic authority based on religious social movements that have been more effective at capturing power than those religions that lack iconic founders (Russell 1938:39–40). The king's history is harder to study, and the scholar can only speculate on their origins. At least at the war seems to have progressed to the power of kings, even though warkmaking was not the king's original mission (Russell 1938:56). When forms of traditional power end, creeds usually change accordingly. If traditional religions are not suspected without alternatives, the traditional authority will increasingly rely on the exercise of naked power. And when traditional creeds are completely replaced by alternatives, conventional power generates revolutionary power (Russell 1938:82). Revolutionary power differs from traditional power in that it appeals to the popularity of the people, who plead for some creed, and not just for the people to say yes or get used to. Therefore, for a revolutionary, power is a means of being decided, and the end is some kind of creed. Regardless of his intentions, the power of the revolutionary seeks either to turn back into a naked force or a traditional force over time (Russell 1938:82). The revolutionary has at least two particular problems. Firstly, the transformation back into naked power occurs when revolutionary power has long existed without reaching a solution to its central conflict. At some point, the original goal of the creed is usually forgotten, and thus the fanatics of the movement change their goals and strive for sheer domination (Russell 1938:92). Secondly, the revolutionary must always deal with the threat of counterrevolutions, and therefore he has a dilemma: since revolutionary power must, by definition, think that the original revolution was justified, it cannot logically claim that all subsequent revolutions must be evil (Russell 1938:87). It is also possible to move to traditional power. Just as there are two kinds of traditional power - priest and king - there are two kinds of revolutionary power, namely the Lucky Soldier and the Divine Conqueror. Russell classified Benito Mussolini and Napoleon Bonaparte as lucky soldiers and Adolf Hitler, Oliver Cromwell and Vladimir Lenin as divine conquerors (Russell 1938:12). The power that the power of reason has in the community, as opposed to fanaticism. It seems that the power of reason is that it is able to increase the likelihood of practical things succeeding through technical efficiency. 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Revolutionary power differs from traditional power in that it appeals to the popularity of the people, who plead for some creed, and not just for the people to say yes or get used to. Therefore, for a revolutionary, power is a means of being decided, and the end is some kind of creed. Regardless of his intentions, the power of the revolutionary seeks either to turn back into a naked force or a traditional force over time (Russell 1938:82). The revolutionary has at least two particular problems. Firstly, the transformation back into naked power occurs when revolutionary power has long existed without reaching a solution to its central conflict. At some point, the original goal of the creed is usually forgotten, and thus the fanatics of the movement change their goals and strive for sheer domination (Russell 1938:92). Secondly, the revolutionary must always deal with the threat of counterrevolutions, and therefore he has a dilemma: since revolutionary power must, by definition, think that the original revolution was justified, it cannot logically claim that all subsequent revolutions must be evil (Russell 1938:87). It is also possible to move to traditional power. Just as there are two kinds of traditional power - priest and king - there are two kinds of revolutionary power, namely the Lucky Soldier and the Divine Conqueror. Russell classified Benito Mussolini and Napoleon Bonaparte as lucky soldiers and Adolf Hitler, Oliver Cromwell and Vladimir Lenin as divine conquerors (Russell 1938:12). The power that the power of reason has in the community, as opposed to fanaticism. It seems that the power of reason is that it is able to increase the likelihood of practical things succeeding through technical efficiency. 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children think: Here's some material I can manipulate... All this, for anyone with a natural affection for young people, is terrible; Just as we teach children to avoid destroying motoring if they can, we should teach them to avoid destroying cruel fanatics... This is the task of liberal education: to give an idea of the value of things other than supremacy, to help create wise citizens from a free community, and to combine citizenship with freedom in individual creativity, so that people can give human life the brilliance that some few have shown they can achieve (Russell 1938:251). Historical context Power (1938) is written in the mind towards the political grievances that ruined the headlines of the day. The work appeared on the brink of The Second World War and contains more than one sharp reference to the dictatorships of Nazi Germany and fascist Italy, as well as one reference to the neo-German Czechoslovakians. (Russell 1938:147) When his remarks deal with topical issues, they are often pessimistic. Although people hate each other, exploit each other and torture each other, until recently they have respected those who preached a different way of life. (Russell 1938: 204; weighting added) As Kirk Willis pointed out Russell's prospects in the 1930s, he was rejected by the foreign and domestic policies of successive national governments, as well as the victory of totalitarian regimes on the continent and the seemingly inevitable march into the war brought in their wake... Hoping that war could be avoided, and convinced that such a Europe-wide conflict would mark a new dark era of barbarism and bigotry, Russell gave voice to his despair in which agglomeration of peace? (1936) – not so much a reasoned defence of appeasement as an expression of defeat. (Russell 1938:xxii-xxiii) Ultimately, Russell hoped, through his new analysis, to teach others how arbitrary power was tamed. He hoped that a stable world government would eventually be born, made up of sovereign nation states and would dissuade nations from war. In this context, this claim was made years after the dissolution of the League of Nations (and years before the founding of the United Nations). Also many times during work, Russell also mentions his desire to see a kind of socialism take root. This was true for his reasons, at a stage in his career where he was convinced of the credibility of kiltasosalism. (Snowmobile 1994; Russell 1918) Critical reception at Russell, famous and epistemologist, had many side interests in side interests politics and social philosophy. The paradigmatic public intellectual Russell wrote prolifically on the latter subjects to a wide and receiving audience. As one scholar writes: Russell's prolific output spanned the entire spectrum of philosophical and political thinking, and he has probably been read more widely in his lifetime than anyone else in philosophy history (Griffin:129). However, those working in social sciences have neglected his writings in political philosophy. From the point of view of many commentators, Power: A New Social Analysis has not proved to be an exception to this trend. Russell later commented that his work fell quite flat (Russell 1969). Samuel Brittan and Kirk Willis, who wrote the foreword and introduction to the 2004 edition (respectively), both noted a lack of relative success in work (Russell 1938:viii, xxiv–xxv). One of the reasons why power may be more vague than texts competing in political philosophy is that it is written in a historical style that is not guaranteed by its own theoretical objectives. Willis noted that in retrospect, part of the responsibility for its poor reception... It's on the book itself. In fact, a work of political sociology or political theory does not provide a comprehensive new social analysis or fashionable new tools for social research that apply to the study of power at all times or places (Russell 1938:xxv). Willis's review, written more than half a century after the original writing, is in some respects a gentler way of formulating the immediate reception of work. One of Russell's contemporary wrote: As a contribution to social science... or government research, the volume is very disappointing... In this pretentious volume, Russell shows only the most superficial knowledge of progress in the study of social phenomena or in any specific field of social research, either through research techniques or aggregated materials or developed interpretations... It seems doubtful that the author knows what is happening in the world of social science. (Merriam, 1939) In fact, the foreword to the work openly states: As usual, those who look at the docty opinions in Russell's statements will find a few. (Russell 1938:x) However, some other modern reviews were more positive. George Orwell reviews Russell's book in The Adelphi. Orwell praised the first half of the book, saying: The most interesting part of Mr. Russell's book is previous chapters in which he analyzes different types of power - priestly, oligarchic, dictatorial, and so on. Orwell, however, criticized the second part of the book. Orwell argued that Russell did not make a convincing case for creating a rational and tolerant society, but I hope that the present state will: Things aren't going to last. Orwell suggested that it did not prove that the slave society to which dictators are targeting is unstable. Orwell concluded his review, praising Russell's writing, and said Russell basically had decent intelligence, a kind of intellectual chivalry that is far less common than sheer wit. (Orwell 1998: 313-314) Other researchers, such as Edward Hallet Carr, also found some use. (Carr 2001:131) Russell is routinely praised for his analytical handling of philosophical questions. One (Griffin:202) quoted commentator notes that in the 45 years before Strawson's On Referring was published, Russell's theory was practically immune to criticism. There is no similar phenomenon in modern analytical philosophy. However, power and many of his later works of social philosophy are not manifestly analytical. Rather, it is a series of degrees in semi-original subjects with narrative dominated by historical illustrations. Brittan, however, underlined the strengths of the presenting study by pointing out that it can be understood as an enjoyable rum throughout history, partly anticipating a part of the history of 1945 Western philosophy, but more extensively (Russell 1938:vii). In his autobiography (1967–1969), Russell summed up the effects of Power, a new social analysis: In this book, I thought that the area of freedom was still desirable, even in a socialist state, but this field must be redefined rather than liberally defined. This doctrine I still have. The doctoral thesis in this book seems important to me, and I hoped it would attract more attention than it has done. Its purpose was to overturn both Marx and classical economists, not on the basis of detail, but on the basis of their common basic assumptions. I believe that power, not wealth, should be a basic concept of social theory and that social justice should consist as much as possible of equalisation of power. As a result, state ownership of land and capital was not progress unless the state was democratic, and even then only if methods were developed to curb the power of civil servants. Part of my doctoral thesis was taken and popularized in Burnham's managerial revolution, but otherwise the book fell quite flat. However, I still believe that what it has to say is very important if the evils of totalitarianism are to be avoided, especially under socialist rule. [14] Notes, however, that it makes sense for him to talk about power to things and people. Modern industrial technology, for example, improves people's ability to process a wide range of materials. (Russell 1938:20) ^ This four-part design of social power is somewhat reminiscent of the AGIL Paradigm of the sociologist Talcott Parsons. ^ However, this attribute is very Marx's scientists. See, for example: (Hodges, 1980). ^ There is no hasty solidarity in Russell's work. It is placed here to be given a name for a separate concept. ^ Despite the fact that hasty solidarity is one of the foundations for organisational cohesion, Russell stresses that it is not its only basis. He argues, for example, that economic organisations and internal government bureaucracies flourish despite and not because of an external danger. (Russell 1938:10) ^ The latter class is one to which Russell never gives a name, and refers only to a very necessary separation or resignation (Russell 1938:27). ^ A more generally recognised work in social sciences is a study by France and Raven (1959) on the basis of power. ^ Not all historians of science may be perplexed by this opinion. See, for example, the work of Pierre Duhem, who suggests that certain parts of the Galileo facility were in fact better guaranteed by scientific caution than by Galileo's scientific prudence. ^ The trend of hierarchies from equality organisations is sometimes called the Iron Age of sociological literature oligarchy. ^ These protected remarks contradict C. Wright Mills' later, bolder remarks: Power is not about a man. Wealth is not at the heart of the person of the wealthy. Celebrity doesn't belong in any personality. Celebration, prosperity and power require access to large institutions. (Mills 1956, mentioned in Andrews in 1936) ^ In recent years, however, fertile scholarship has claimed that all power is ultimately tied to social exchange. Social theorists such as Linda Mrom have developed the almost economic addiction theory of power, originally formulated by Richard Emerson. This branch of research tries to explain power in addiction relationships that depend on the hedonic forces of punishment and reward. ^ Russell uses the term tacrat in this format. His naming convention has not been repeated here because Russell uses the term in a special sense to describe not only the religious state, but also Stalinist Russia or any totalitarian state (Russell 1938:152). ^ This is explicitly intended as one possible argument against utilitarianism, although Russell does not consider it decisive. ^ Russell, Bertrand (1967–1969). *Autobiography*, Chapter 12: Later Years of Telegraph House. 432. References adler, Alfred (1927). *Understanding human nature*. Unknown: Garden City Publishing. ISBN 1-56838-195-6. ASIN B000FFTGRI, ISBN 0-7661-4263-9 Andrews, Robert; Biggs and Mary Seidel and Michael. et al. (1996). *Columbia's bidding world*. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 0-231-10518-5. Archived from the original on 22 April 2009. Carr, E. 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