President George W. Bush
Oral History Project

Briefing Materials

Stephen J. Hadley

October 31, 2011 - November 1, 2011

Prepared by Bryan Craig, Senior Researcher
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Presidential Oral History Program

MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED OR CIRCULATED
**STEPHEN J. HADLEY NEWS TIMELINE**

*Prepared by Bryan Craig*

*Miller Center, University of Virginia, 09/06/2011*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Stephen J. Hadley receives his J.D. from Yale Law School. <a href="http://www.usip.org">link</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>1974-1977</td>
<td>Hadley serves on the National Security Council (NSC) under President Gerald Ford. <a href="http://www.usip.org">link</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>1986-1987</td>
<td>Hadley is a counselor on the Tower Commission. <a href="http://www.usip.org">link</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>1989-1993</td>
<td>Hadley serves as assistant secretary of defense for international security policy under Paul Wolfowitz and Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney. <a href="http://www.usip.org">link</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>1993-2001</td>
<td>Hadley is a partner in the law firm of Shea and Gardner and a member of the Scowcroft Group. <a href="http://www.usip.org">link</a></td>
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<td><strong>September</strong></td>
<td>On the 23rd, Bush delivers a military policy speech at the Citadel. He focuses on the dangers of the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile technology, and advocates for an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense system. <a href="http://www.citadel.mil.edu">link</a></td>
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<td><strong>November</strong></td>
<td>On the 19th, Bush gives his first foreign policy speech at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. He states, “China is a competitor, not a strategic partner,” attacks Russia for its alleged nuclear proliferation and the Chechen War, and asserts that the U.S. will help Taiwan defend itself. (<em>The Washington Times</em>, 11/20/1999)</td>
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On the 24th, Bush announces he wants to disarm unilaterally a number of U.S. nuclear weapons, avoiding joint negotiations with Russia. (*The New York Times*, 05/24/2000, 05/26/2000)

**September**


**Oct.-Nov.**

In an interview with *The New York Times*, Rice states that Bush plans to tell NATO that the U.S. should not continue to participate in the peacekeeping mission in the Balkans making it a European responsibility. When Lord Robertson, NATO’s general secretary, calls Hadley, Hadley reportedly tells Robertson that the U.S. would not unilaterally leave the Balkans. (*The New York Times*, 10/21/2000, 11/01/2000)

**November**

On the 8th, Hadley, Cheney, Wolfowitz, I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, David Addington, Terry O’Donnell, Rob Portman, Kathleen Shanahan, and Michael Boskin watch Bill Daley’s announcement that Gore will request hand recounts in Florida. (Cheney, pp. 290-291)

**December**


On the 21st, Bush announces Hadley will be deputy national security adviser, serving under Rice. Hadley will chair the Deputies Committee of the NSC. (*The Washington Post*, 12/22/2003)

**2001**

**January**


Within a week of the inauguration, Rice meets with National Coordinator for Counterterrorism Richard Clarke to discuss terrorist threats. She decides to keep Clarke and his staff intact, but remove some of its domestic security functions and downgrades the position from reporting to principals to deputy secretary level. It is part of a reorganization of the NSC, which Hadley helps refine, to create a smaller group focusing on defense strategy, missile defense, and international economics. (Bumiller, p. 144; Richard A. Clarke, *Against All Enemies*, New York: Free Press, p. 2004, pp. 230-231; *The Washington Post*, 02/10/2001)

On the 25th, Clarke sends Rice a memo on a strategy (from December 2000) to use military action against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. He also asks her and Hadley for a principals meeting to review al-Qaeda threats, but Rice
reportedly wants a policy review and tells Clarke that the deputies should meet first. (Clarke, pp. 230-231; Bumiller, p. 142; George Tenet, *At the Center of the Storm*, New York: Perennial, 2007, p. 143)

**February**

On the 2nd, Hadley and Secretary of State Colin Powell meet with Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic about Djindjic’s government wanting more time to decide how to hold Milosevic accountable for war crimes. Congress set a deadline of March 31st for Milosovic to be turned over to the International War Crimes Tribunal, while Djindjic wants a Serbian trial first. (*The Washington Post*, 02/03/2001)

On the 8th, Bush announces a review of the nation’s nuclear arsenal. It is considered a first step toward unilateral cuts and a missile defense shield. (*The New York Times*, 02/09/2001)

On the 16th, the U.S. launches air strikes against military communication targets deep in Iraq. (Bumiller, pp. 144-145)

**March**

CIA Director George Tenet gives Hadley a memo outlining expanded CIA authority to go after Osama Bin Ladin, asking Hadley for the NSC to develop the policy side of it. The memo is returned to Tenant the next day without any action, because Hadley does not want the NSC to carry it out until the policy review is done. (Tenet, pp. 143-144; Jane Mayer, *The Dark Side*, New York: Doubleday, 2008, p. 21)

**April**

Hadley runs a deputies meeting on terrorist threats with Clarke, Wolfowitz, CIA Deputy Director John McLaughlin, and Deputy Secretary of State Armitage. According to Clarke, at the end of the meeting, Hadley wants to focus on al-Qaeda now and look at other terrorism issues later. Because al-Qaeda is in Afghanistan, Hadley reportedly tells the group to examine Afghan and Pakistan policy. (Clarke, pp. 231-232)

A stand-off ensues with China over a seized American spy plane and its crew. The White House demands “the prompt and safe return” of the crew members and the plane; the crew is released by the 11th. It is reported that Hadley, Rice, Powell, Armitage, Libby, and Wolfowitz constituted a “Chinese crisis team.” (*The Washington Post*, 04/13/2001)

On the 4th, Bush delivers a speech on the Middle East. The speech tries to strike a balance between asking Israel to stop settlements and military excursions in the occupied territories and urging Arafat to stop using terror as a weapon. Cheney, Powell, Rice, Karen Hughes, Mike Gerson, and Hadley reportedly work on the speech with Bush. (*The Washington Post*, 04/06/2002)

**May**

On the 1st, Bush delivers a speech on missile defense. He argues for a new missile defense system that would intercept missiles early in flight, using land and sea-based weapons, while reducing nuclear weapons. He also advocates replacing

On the 11th, Hadley and Wolfowitz visit Moscow to begin discussing a missile defense system. They begin to sketch out a proposal for more U.S. aid to Russia, the U.S. purchasing Russian-made S-300 missiles, and joint antimissile exercises, in return for scrapping the 1972 ABM treaty. (*The Washington Post*, 05/12/2001; *The New York Times*, 05/28/2001)

On the 12th, Bush orders a comprehensive review of American intelligence capabilities. The assessment is designed to consolidate programs, reduce bureaucratic rivalries, and streamline acquisitions in the intelligence community. Tenet leads the project in consultation with Rice. (*The Washington Post*, 05/12/2001)


*June*

On the 16th, Bush meets Putin for the first time, in Slovenia. They focus on economic ties, regional issues, Chechnya, and missile defense. Bush stresses the importance of building effective missile defense capabilities to protect against countries like Iran and North Korea. (*The Washington Post*, 06/16/2001)


*July*

On the 10th, Rice meets with Tenet, Hadley, and Clarke to get an update on al-Qaeda threats against U.S. facilities. Tenet believes there will be an attack in the coming weeks or months. According to the 9/11 Commission, Hadley tells Tenant that Wolfowitz thinks the threats are just a deception, but Tenant states the reports are convincing. Rice tells Hadley to get the March CIA request approved to expand its authority to find and kill Osama bin Laden and deploy the Predators. (Tenet, pp. 144, 151-153; Bumiller, p. 158; *The 9/11 Commission Report*, p. 259)

On the 13th, the deputies meet to discuss Iraq. Hadley wants to put the issue of no-fly zones on the Principals Committee’s agenda. Both Hadley and Wolfowitz reportedly favor going after targets that would weaken Iraq’s military in the no-fly zones. However, General Richard Myers argues principals should not choose targets. Armitage and Libby state they should keep Iraq off the president’s agenda and focus on the policy paper. Hadley says he has prepared one, but it needs to be revised to emphasize strategy, not tactics. (Douglas J. Feith, *War and Decision*, New York: Harper, 2008, pp. 206-208)
On the 27th, Clarke tells Rice and Hadley that the spike in intelligence has stopped and the near-term attack has been postponed. However, Clarke tells them an attack will happen. (*The 9/11 Commission Report*, p. 260)

On the 27th, Hadley, Wolfowitz, and Armitage meet with Israeli diplomats and defense officials to discuss Iraq, Iran, and other Israeli long-range threats. The meeting occurs several days after Israel fired missiles at leaders of a radical Palestinian faction. (*The Jerusalem Post*, 08/19/2001; *The New York Times*, 08/28/2001)

*August*

Hadley begins an annual tradition of joining Bush at his Crawford Ranch in Texas, so the president has a national security aide with him on his summer vacations. (Bumiller, p. 189)

On the 1st, the deputies present the principals a top-secret paper entitled “A Liberation Strategy” on Iraq. It outlines options to empower the Iraqi opposition. This reportedly leads to a discussion of possibly using U.S. military action. (Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, p. 21)

*September*

On the 11th, Hadley is in an NSC meeting at the White House when planes strike the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. He joins Rice in a teleconference with principals, and tells Cheney he should move to the Presidential Emergency Operations Center. (Robert Draper, *Dead Certain*, New York: Free Press, 2007, pp. 135, 143; Clarke, p. 3; Cheney, p. 4)

On the 12th, Hadley reportedly meets with the Deputies Committee to work on defining the goal of the War on Terror for Bush to use in a speech. They suggest the “objective should be defined as eliminating terrorism as a threat ‘to our way of life,’ and proposed adoption of a comprehensive strategy that would use all elements of national power: diplomatic, intelligence, financial, military.” (*The Washington Post*, 02/28/2002)

On the 15th, Hadley attends a war cabinet meeting at Camp David. Bush is briefed on a plan to find al-Qaeda members and to remove the Taliban from power. Because Afghanistan might prove difficult, Rice asks about alternative military campaigns if the Afghanistan invasion is unsuccessful, and Wolfowitz mentions Iraq. However, Bush focuses on Afghanistan. (Bumiller, pp. 165-166; Bush, p. 189)

On the 21st, Bush receives a President’s Daily Brief saying there is no link between Iraq and al-Qaeda or between Iraq and the 9/11 attacks. The brief is read by Cheney, Rice, Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Hadley. (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB326/)

October

On the 7th, the war in Afghanistan begins. Rumsfeld is reportedly frustrated by the obstacles the Special Forces are facing to get into Afghanistan, as compared to the CIA teams already in place. Rice, Powell, and Hadley reportedly encourage Rumsfeld and Tenet to coordinate both CIA and military functions in Afghanistan. (Bradley Graham, By His Own Rules, New York: Public Affairs, 2009, pp. 302-303; Woodward, Bush at War, pp. 246-247)

On the 11th, Hadley and Rice visit Tenet at Langley for a briefing on Afghan operations. Tenet reportedly argues that the U.S. needs a political strategy for the southern tribes to withdraw support from the Taliban, one of which should be that the new Afghan government must treat all factions and tribes fairly. (Woodward, Bush at War, pp. 225-227)

November

On the 13th, following discussions with White House lawyers and Cheney, Bush signs a military order authorizing the Department of Defense to hold and prosecute foreigners designated by the president as suspected terrorists. The order authorizes suspects to be tried in military tribunals, with convictions coming from a two-thirds vote of the tribunal members and appeals. Rice and Hadley are reportedly not consulted. (The New York Times, 10/25/2004; The Washington Post, 01/05/2005)

On the 14th, Jalalabad surrenders. On the same day, the Deputies Committee holds a meeting to discuss the Taliban’s ongoing losses. Hadley asks how the U.S. should handle a Taliban surrender and cease-fire. Wolfowitz responds that the military mission against al-Qaeda is not over, so a cease-fire would be premature. (Feith, p. 133)

2002

Early in the year, Hadley begins twice-weekly “Deputies Lunches” to discuss Iraq. Attendance is restricted to Armitage, Under Secretary of State Marc Grossman, Wolfowitz, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith, General Peter Pace, Libby, McLaughlin, and a single NSC staffer. (Feith, p. 237)
January  Rice and Hadley review a draft of Bush’s State of the Union speech with the phrase “axis of evil” in it. The two reportedly think the phrase could be explosive if Bush only mentions Iraq, so they recommend adding other countries to the rogue list like North Korea and Iran. According to Woodward, Gerson and Hadley draft an explanation why Iran is part of this axis: “Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people’s hope for freedom.” (Woodward, Plan of Attack, p. 90; Bumiller, pp. 173-174)

February  On the 1st, Hadley receives a phone call from Tenet about Pentagon officials involved in a $25 million program to overthrow the Iranian government using Manucher Ghorbanifar, who was involved in the Iran-Contra Affair. Hadley sends Tenet a memo written by Defense Department consultant Michael Ledeen arranging a meeting with Iranians who opposed the present regime, and reporting that they wanted to work with Pentagon officials rather than CIA personnel. Hadley and Rice take steps to stop Ledeen from scheduling any more such meetings. (Tenant, pp. 312-314; The New York Times, 12/07/2003)

May  In the first week of May, Hadley is reported to be involved in reviewing the legislation for the Department of Homeland Security, primarily drafted by Tom Ridge, Andrew Card, Mitch Daniels, and Alberto Gonzales. (Burke, p. 203)

Summer  It is reported that Hadley is in charge of interagency policy planning for Iraq. Hadley establishes the Executive Steering Group run by Frank Miller, the NSC staffer for defense. (Feith, pp. 275, 360; Woodward, Plan of Attack, p. 321)


On the 24th, Bush publically supports an independent Palestine state and calls for the Palestinian people to replace Arafat. Rice and Hadley advise Bush to give the speech. (Bush, p. 404; The Washington Post, 06/25/2002)

August  On the 6th, Rice instructs Hadley to revise a document on goals and strategy for Iraq. The document stems from Rice’s own “Liberation Strategy for Iraq” and other deputies’ work. The deputies reportedly want the new work to reflect the U.S. intent to make Iraq a democracy, but allow the Iraqis create it, not to have the U.S. impose institutions or laws. (Feith, pp. 282-286)

On the 30th, Hadley and the deputies review Rice’s draft, “Ultimatum to Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Regime,” outlining not just Saddam’s stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, but the tyrannical nature of Saddam’s rule, his support for terrorism, regional instability, and “Iraq’s WMD capability and infrastructure.” The paper also asserts that the final result of Saddam’s fall should be a “pluralistic, democratic, representative government.” (Feith, p. 304)
The White House releases the National Security Strategy of the United States, outlining the Administration’s strategy on preemptive war. Philip Zelikow is the document’s principle author, with Hadley and Rice contributing to the draft. (Mann, p. 331)


On the 6th, Bush, Hadley, Rice, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Powell, Tenet, and Card meet to discuss the president’s meeting with British Prime Minister Tony Blair on building international support for aggressive action against Iraq. (*The Washington Post*, 09/08/2002)

On the 9th, Nicolo Pollari, Italy’s chief military intelligence officer, reportedly meets with Rice and Hadley. Two days later, White House speechwriters are reportedly told that the NSC has “new intelligence” on Saddam’s attempts to buy uranium in Africa. (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB330/)

On the 14th, Hadley conducts a deputies meeting with an agenda entitled “Why Iraq Now?” According to Tenet, National Intelligence Officer Bob Walpole tells Hadley that WMD should not be used to justify a war, because North Korea is well ahead of Iraq on its program. (Tenet, p. 319)

On the 16th, Hadley is briefed about a Defense Department report on the CIA’s link between al-Qaeda and Iraq. The report points out that CIA analysts are filtering their data and using terminology to advocate their own agenda. Feith argues the report is “intended simply to raise questions and provoke thought, not dictate any conclusions.” (Feith, pp. 264-268)

On the 20th, Bush asks Congress for authorization to use “all means he determines to be appropriate, including force,” to oust Saddam. It is reported that the resolution is drafted by Hadley and Timothy Flanigan, deputy to Gonzales, and while it draws on the congressionally approved resolutions against Iraq in 1991 and 1998, its primary justification is “anticipatory self-defense,” which officials describe as “the right of the United States to attack a country that it thinks could attack it first.” (*The New York Times*, 09/20/2002, 09/23/2002)

Hadley leads a group of NSC officials to work on in-depth plans for a post-Saddam Iraq, focusing on humanitarian relief, refugees, and long-term reconstruction plans for “education, health, water and sanitation, electricity, shelter, transportation, governance, rule of law, agriculture, communications, and economic policy.” By January 2003, Bush creates the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (OHRA) based in the Pentagon. (Bush, pp. 248-249)
October
On the 5th, Tenet reportedly calls Hadley instructing him to remove language in
Bush’s Cincinnati speech about Saddam’s attempts to buy uranium in Niger.
According to Tenant, both Tenant’s executive assistant and a senior CIA analyst
send Gerson, Rice, and Hadley follow-up memos. (Tenet, pp. 449-450)

December
On the 14th, Iraqi opposition leaders meet in London. It is a meeting that Hadley
proposed setting up as early as the spring. Because of reported bickering and
jockeying between Iraqi groups, the meeting was delayed. (Feith, pp. 242-243,
379)

On the 16th, the White House issues National Security Presidential Directive 23
on ballistic missile defense. Arguing that there are leaders who see WMD as
weapons of first choice, the U.S. must “make progress in fielding a new triad
composed of long-range conventional and nuclear strike capabilities, missile
defenses, and a robust industrial and research development infrastructure.”
(http://www.fas.org)

2003

January
On the 24th, Hadley asks Walpole for information on what Saddam would need to
build nuclear weapons. According to Tenet, Hadley only asks for an excerpt from
a larger Iraq National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). Bush’s State of the Union
speech includes a paragraph from this excerpt about Saddam’s apparent
procurement of Niger yellow-cake. Tenant argues this paragraph is out of
context. (Tenet, p. 371)

On the 25th, Libby gives a lengthy presentation on the newest intelligence against
Saddam to Rice, Hadley, Armitage, Wolfowitz, Gerson, Rove, Hughes, and
Bartlett. He shows satellite images of objects being dug up, moved, and reburied.
While it is unclear what the material is, Libby says it fits the pattern of WMD
concealment. They discuss who should make a public case against Saddam. Rice
and Hadley reportedly support Powell. (Woodward, Plan of Attack, pp. 289-291)

February
Hadley and Feith work out a dispute between State and Defense over candidates
in the OHRA. Initially, all the candidates came from State. Rumsfeld reportedly
wants to make sure the best candidates are chosen regardless of department,
upsetting State officials and Powell, while straining deputy relations. The
dispute’s effects continue to damage relations between State and Defense. (Feith,
pp. 387-388)

On the 5th, Bush, Hadley, Rice, and Ari Fleischer gather to watch Powell’s speech
to the U.N. on setting a deadline for Iraq. It is reported that Hadley led the NSC’s
efforts as an information clearinghouse for Powell on the evidence against
Saddam. (Bumiller, p. 200; Karen DeYoung, Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell,
02/09/2003)
March
On the 19th, Hadley and the rest of the NSC is with Bush as the president gives the order to begin Operation Iraqi Freedom. Hadley is part of a meeting with Bush on whether to bomb a bunker at Dora Farm, a complex where they believe Saddam is located. Bush agrees to the air strike. Hadley is the primary person communicating between General Myers and Rice as the bombing takes place. (Bumiller, pp. 207-210)

April
Hadley has the Deputies Committee work on the organization chart for the U.S. administrator for Iraq and how it relates to the Iraqi government. (Woodward, *State of Denial*, p. 177)

On the 30th, Elliott Abrams and Hadley visit Jerusalem to meet with Ariel Sharon to discuss Arab-Israeli negotiations. They all take a helicopter flight over Jewish settlements in Gaza and the West Bank to look at possibly halting and dismantling some of them. (*The Washington Post*, 05/11/2003; *The New York Times*, 05/21/2003)

May
On the 9th, Rumsfeld sends a memo to the NSC entitled “Principles for Iraq--Policy Guidelines.” It specifies that the coalition will support Bush’s vision for a free Iraq and oppose Saddam’s old enforcers, including Baath party members. (*Survival*, August/September 2008, p. 24; http://www.rumsfeld.com)

On the 12th, Jay Garner sends Hadley a memo stating that the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) will pay all former Iraqi government employees, except those in the uniformed military and intelligence services. (*Survival*, August/September 2008, p. 25)

On the 16th, L. Paul Bremer issues his de-Baathification order. Rice and Hadley are reportedly not consulted on the order. (Woodward, *State of Denial*, p. 197)

On the 22nd, Bush and the NSC reportedly meet to discuss the proposal to create a new Iraqi army and dissolve Iraq’s security forces. (*Survival*, August/September 2008, p. 26)

July
On the 6th, Joseph Wilson IV, a former ambassador and career foreign service officer, claims he was sent by the vice president’s office to investigate Saddam’s attempt to purchase uranium in Niger. He charges that the statement made in Bush’s State of the Union speech about Saddam’s attempt is false and that the Administration knew it before the speech. Hadley and NSC spokesperson, Anna Perez, work with Tenet on a response to Wilson’s charges. Both reportedly agree to share the responsibility for the words used in the speech, but say the intelligence behind the words is sound, and deny Wilson was sent to Africa by the vice president’s office. (Rove, pp. 318-322; Tenet, pp. 458-460)

On the 11th, Rove e-mails Hadley, stating, “Matt Cooper called to give me a heads-up that he’s got a welfare reform story coming. When he finished his brief heads-up, he immediately launched into Niger/isn’t this damaging/hasn’t the President been hurt? I didn’t take the bait but said, if I were him, I wouldn’t get
TIME far out in front on this.” Two years later, prosecutors in the Valerie Plame affair would investigate Hadley’s role and use this e-mail as evidence that Cooper talked with Rove about Wilson and his wife Plame. (Rove, pp. 358-360)

On the 13th, Rice appears on Face the Nation. She asserts that the controversy about Saddam’s attempt to procure uranium from Africa is overblown, arguing that the CIA had cleared its inclusion in Bush’s speech. (The New York Times, 07/13/2003)

On the 21st, Gerson calls Hadley to say he found two memos from the CIA regarding Bush’s October 2002 Cincinnati speech on Iraq. It warns them that the evidence on an Iraqi effort to obtain African uranium is weak. (Rove, p. 326)

On the 22nd, Hadley takes the blame for not removing the uranium language in light of CIA warnings and offers his resignation. Bush declines the resignation, but agrees Hadley should make a statement, which he does on the 23rd. (Rove, pp. 326-327; The New York Times, 07/23/2003)

August

Hadley reportedly talks with people who had worked with Blackwill to see if he would be a good candidate to become NSC’s coordinator for strategic planning for Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan. He is hired. By the end of the month, Blackwill tells Rice there are not enough troops and no military strategy to defeat the growing insurgency, and that the coordination between the NSC and the cabinet is broken. Rice and Hadley agree with Blackwill’s recommendation to make the NSC, not the Pentagon, the center of Iraqi rebuilding. (Woodward, State of Denial, pp. 240-241; Bumiller, p. 221-223)

November


December

The President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board concludes that the White House made a questionable claim in the State of the Union address about Saddam’s effort to purchase uranium in Africa. (The Washington Post, 12/24/2003)

2004

Feb.-Apr.

On February 18th, Abrams, Hadley, and Assistant Secretary of State William Burns travel to Israel to discuss Sharon’s plans to pull settlers and soldiers out of parts of the occupied territories as well as building a security fence to protect Israelis from Palestinian military groups. They would travel to Israel two more times before Bush and Sharon meet on April 14th. (The Washington Post, 02/18/2004, 04/16/2004)

March

Hadley is present with Rice, as Frank Miller briefs them on his weeklong trip to Iraq. Miller reports that the CPA is running the clock out before they give
sovereignty to the Iraqis in June, while the Iraqi ministers are not much help. (Woodward, *State of Denial*, pp. 294-295)

**May**


On the 21st, Bremer, Rice, Blackwill, and Hadley discuss the security issue in Iraq. Bremer recommends deploying one or two divisions for up to a year to help stop a growing insurgency. Bremer says Rice and Hadley made “few comments.” (Bremer, pp. 357-358)

**July**

Abrams and Hadley travel to the Middle East to meet with Sharon and Palestinian Prime Minister Ahmed Qureia. The meetings come as Sharon is having difficulty selling his withdrawal plan to the Labor Party and Israel at large. Later in the month, Israel alters its original plans for a security fence because of a court order requiring Sharon’s Administration to decrease potential hardships on Palestinians. (*The Associated Press*, 07/12/2004, 07/26/2004)


**November**

After Bush’s re-election, it is reported that Hadley is considering stepping down, and he urges Bush to select a new national security team. Bush asks Hadley to take over as NSC adviser when Rice moves over to State. Bush makes the announcement on the 16th. (Woodward, *State of Denial*, pp. 363-364, 366)

**2005**

**January**

Hadley begins to serve as national security adviser. He chooses J.D. Crouch, who served in the Defense Department, as his deputy. (Donald Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown*, New York: Penguin, 2011, p. 631)

On the 2nd, Rumsfeld and General Myers reportedly confront Hadley at the annual Alfalfa Club dinner, saying the NSC is broken. Rumsfeld says Myers has a long list of things to get done. Hadley responds he has been waiting for that list for four months, and once he has it, he will work on those issues. (Woodward, *State of Denial*, p. 379)

On the 6th, Rumsfeld sends Hadley a memo about developing a government-wide policy on the detainee issue, as Rice, Gonzales, and William Haynes face confirmation hearings. (http://www.rumsfeld.com)
February  Hadley tells Rice that Bush is open to economic incentives for Iran to stop its nuclear program. It is seen as an important step because any European incentive offer would not be taken seriously without U.S. support. (Bumiller, pp. 258)

March  On the 4th, Hadley meets with U.N. special envoy to Lebanon, Terje Roed-Larsen, about Syria leaving Lebanon. (The New York Times, 03/05/2005)

On the 4th, Rumsfeld writes a memo to Hadley about the need for the Afghans to take over policing duties from the U.S. armed forces. Several months later, Rumsfeld assumes responsibility for training the Afghans. (Rumsfeld, p. 686)

April  Bush’s Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States finds America’s intelligence agencies were wrong about Saddam’s weapons programs and recommends radical reorganization of the “dysfunctional” agencies. Frances Townsend and Hadley are assigned to work with the FBI, CIA, and Pentagon to achieve some reorganization by June 30th. (The New York Times, 04/11/2005)

May  Reports surface that North Korea has removed fuel rods from a nuclear reactor, either to test a weapon or build one. On the 15th, Hadley says, if the North Koreans test a weapon, “action would have to be taken” although he does not specify what type of action. (The New York Times, 05/16/2005)

June  Seeking to quell tensions with U.S. allies and anti-American demonstrations abroad, State Department Counselor Philip Zelikow, acting Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England, Rice’s senior adviser, John Bellinger, and Rumsfeld’s chief aid for detainee issues Matthew Waxman draft a memorandum proposing a new approach to U.S. policy concerning the detention, interrogation, and prosecution of terrorism suspects, including closing the Guantanamo Base. The memo reportedly angers Rumsfeld because he did approve it before it went to Rice. Rice sends the memo to Hadley, who schedules a NSC meeting to discuss the issue. (Mayer, pp. 317-318)

On the 21st, Senator Chuck Hagel (R-NE) asks Bush if he speaks to anyone outside his inner circle who might disagree with him about Iraq. Bush reportedly responds that Hadley is the person who talks to other people, but Bush says talking to others is good advice. Hadley invites Hagel to talk with him and the NSC staff, but, after the meeting, Hagel is reportedly unsatisfied that anything is being done to improve the decision-making process. (Woodward, State of Denial, pp. 399-400)

On the 30th, Bush announces a $1.7 billion aid package to Africa to combat malaria and improve education. Hadley states the Bush Administration now spends $4.3 billion a year on Africa and that would increase to $8.6 billion in five years. (The Washington Post, 07/01/2005)
**July**

On the 18th, Rice, Hadley, R. Nicholas Burns, and John Rood work on last minute details of a deal with India to receive U.S. civil nuclear energy technology but remain outside of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty. A statement is expected by Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that afternoon. (Glen Kessler, *The Confidante: Condoleezza Rice and the Creation of the Bush Legacy*, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2007, p. 59)

On the 29th, Uzbekistan tells U.S. officials that the U.S. may not use their airbase. Rumsfeld writes to Hadley that “we are getting run out of Central Asia by the Russians,” and we need an Administration policy for Central Asia and the NSC to help guide it. (Rumsfeld, p. 636)

**August**

Antiwar activist Cindy Sheehan, whose son was killed in Iraq, leads a protest in Crawford, vowing to camp out near Bush’s ranch until the president meets with her. Deputy Chief of Staff Joe Hagin and Hadley meet with Sheehan on the 6th in an effort to defuse the situation, but she refuses to leave. (*The New York Times*, 08/07/2005)

**September**

On the 2nd, Hadley joins Bush, Card, Rove, Michael Brown, Governor Kathleen Blanco (D-LA), New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin, and other officials aboard Air Force One at the New Orleans airport after Hurricane Katrina. Card, Hadley, and Harriet Miers, Bush’s general counsel, work on a plan for the federalization of relief efforts, but Blanco rejects the proposal. (Draper, pp. 332, 334; Rove, p. 443)

On the 19th, China announces that North Korea will abandon its nuclear weapons program in exchange for financial incentives. The deal is a product of Rice and Christopher Hill’s negotiations in bilateral talks with North Korea since July, which is a shift in policy. Rice is in constant contact with Bush and Hadley during the process. However, by October, North Korea announces its first nuclear test. (Kessler, pp. 80, 83-84, 87)

On the 26th, Hadley finishes a trip to Turkey, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. He urges both Pakistan and Afghanistan to coordinate better in hunting down al-Qaeda and Taliban fugitives. (*The Washington Post*, 09/27/2005)

**October**

On the 23rd, Hadley meets with Putin in Moscow to discuss various issues, including exerting more pressure on North Korea and Iran to stop their nuclear weapons programs. Russia is selling civilian nuclear technology to Iran and opposes any U.N. sanctions. (*The New York Times*, 10/24/2005)

**Nov.-Dec.**

Hadley works with Senator John McCain (R-AZ) on a torture ban. At first, the Bush Administration was opposed, but facing overwhelming congressional pressure, Hadley opens negotiations in mid-November. Hadley fails to get immunity for covert operatives in the final bill. The Detainee Treatment Act is

December

On the 5th, Hadley joins Bush, Card, and Principle Deputy Director of National Intelligence Mike Hayden in a meeting with The New York Times publisher Arthur Sulzberger, Jr. and Editor Bill Keller about stopping the paper from running a story on the Terrorist Surveillance Program. Hayden and Rice successfully stopped the paper from running a similar story in 2004, but Bush fails in this attempt. (Bush, p. 176)

2006

February

Hadley and Deputy National Security Adviser Meghan O’Sullivan work on the issue of repairing Iraqi oil pipelines destroyed by insurgents. They devise repair units called Strategic Infrastructure Battalions, composed mostly of Iraqi tribal forces that live near the pipelines. U.S. and regular Iraqi units will be embedded to give support. The plan also includes physically strengthening the pipes, running secondary pipelines, weeding out corruption in the oil and electrical ministries, and improving intelligence coordination. (Woodward, State of Denial, p. 443)

On the 6th, Rumsfeld writes Hadley about the lack of attention the global War on Terror strategy is getting in NSC meetings. Hadley had reportedly received similar notes from Rumsfeld in the past, to which Hadley responds that attention has been given to this issue. (Graham, pp. 595-596)

On the 26th, Iran and Russia announce a tentative deal for a joint uranium enrichment project where Russia would enrich Iran’s uranium. Hadley responds, “It’s too soon to say. In any of these arrangements, the devil is in the details.” (The Washington Post, 02/27/2006)

March

On the 2nd, Rice, Hadley, and Bush visit India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. (The New York Times, 03/02/2006)

On the 7th, as Democrats call for an investigation into the National Security Agency’s surveillance program, Senate Republicans announce they have brokered a deal with the White House that improves oversight, but allows eavesdropping for 45 days without a warrant. It is reported that Cheney, Miers, and Hadley are involved in the deal. (The New York Times, 03/09/2006)

On the 16th, an updated overview of U.S. national security strategy is made public. It stresses self-defense and a host of issues including preemptive strikes. In a speech to the U.S. Institute of Peace that day, Hadley states, “The president believes that we must remember the clearest lesson of Sept. 11—that the United States of America must confront threats before they fully materialize.” (USA Today, 03/17/2006)
April

Bush is considering replacing Rumsfeld. He asks for a show of hands among his aides, and it is reported that Rice, Card, Bolten, and five others vote to remove him. Hadley, Rove, and Bartlett vote no. Bush does not remove him. (Bumiller, p. 298)

May

On the 8th, Rice and Hadley present Bush with a new strategy for the Iranian nuclear program issue. Negotiations have stalled. Iran takes advantage of the divisions between the U.S. on one side, and Russia and Europe, who were not motivated to press for more sanctions, on the other. It includes the U.S. and Europe negotiating with Iran on a package of incentives, but if Iran refuses to stop the program, sanctions will be imposed. (Bush, pp. 416-417; Kessler, pp. 196-205; Bumiller, pp. 288-290)

Spring-Fall

As the violence increases in Iraq, Hadley reviews the strategy and whether the U.S. has enough troops on the ground to abate it. He sets up an NSC Iraq team, with Crouch, O’Sullivan, Bill Luti, Brett McGurk, Peter Feaver, and General Kevin Bergner. Hadley gets reports on military and political developments every 24 hours, meets with outside experts, and gives Bush articles written by commanders in the field. On the State Department side, Hadley keeps Rice informed about his review, and she agrees to lend State’s Iraq coordinator David Satterfield to Hadley’s group. Hadley also works with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Pace, who also has been reviewing the current strategy, to explore the idea of a surge. (Bob Woodward, The War Within, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008, pp. 55-56, 160-161, 175, 264-266; Bumiller, pp. 299-300; Bush, pp. 363-364, 371, 376)

June

To prepare for Bush’s surprise trip to Iraq, Hadley meets with the president at Camp David on the 12th. Hadley provides the president with figures on how the violence is escalating. The principals also cover what is driving the current level of violence. Eliot Cohen, a scholar at Johns Hopkins, talks about the need to change commanding generals, and Fred Kagan from the American Enterprise Institute argues for population security with a smaller number of additional troops focused in key areas. Hadley reportedly says a strategic review is difficult at this meeting since Bush’s mind is already “half-way to Baghdad.” (Woodward, The War Within, pp. 10-12; Stephen Benedict Tyson, Political Science Quarterly, 2010, p. 572)

On the 13th, Bush travels to Iraq with Bartlett, Hadley, Bolten, Hagin, and Tony Snow. (The Globe and Mail, 06/14/2006)

Hadley joins Bush on a two-day European trip to discuss trade, Iraq, and Iran, where the possibility of talks between Iran and the U.S. are still on the table. (The Washington Post, 06/21/2006)
July-Sept. Gonzales and Hadley negotiate with Senators John Warner (R-VA), McCain, and Lindsey Graham (R-SC) of the Armed Services Committee on White House-proposed legislation to create new rules for bringing terrorist suspects to trial. The proposal, created after the Supreme Court struck down the tribunal system in place at Guantanamo Bay, would maintain the military commission procedure for prosecuting suspects, but includes provisions to expand rights for defendants, while mitigating risks to national security. It also includes guidelines for CIA interrogators that will not challenge the Geneva Conventions. *(The New York Times, 07/26/2006; The Washington Post, 09/27/2006)*

July On the 12th, Hezbollah commandos in Lebanon cross the border and abduct two Israeli soldiers, sparking an Israeli military campaign. Hadley and Rice listen in on phone conversations between Bush and Arab leaders as Bush warns Israel not to topple the Lebanese government and focus on Hezbollah, the “real culprits.” *(Kessler, p. 215)* Rice would successfully work on a cease-fire over the next month, keeping constant contact with Bush and Hadley. *(Kessler, p. 222)*

September An informal White House group is reportedly formed to discuss the future of Iraq and how to handle Rumsfeld’s ouster. The group includes Hadley, Bolten, Rove, and Bartlett. *(Bumiller, p. 300)*

On the 27th, Hadley attends a dinner at the White House with Bush, Rice, Cheney, Hadley, Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf, and Hamid Karzai. *(Bush, pp. 215-216)*

October According to Bush, Bush’s friend, Jack Morrison, suggests Robert Gates to replace Rumsfeld. Bush calls Hadley to contact Gates to see if he is interested in the job. *(Bush, p. 93)*

Hadley meets with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in Baghdad to assess Maliki’s attempts to control the violence. *(Bush, p. 373)*

Bush, Rice, and Hadley hold talks with China’s state councilor, Tang Jiaxuan, over U.N. sanctions against North Korea for testing missiles in July. They move ahead with strict financial sanctions and an arms embargo. *(The Washington Post, 10/13/2006)*

November On the 8th, Hadley reports his visit to Iraq in a classified memo, which is later leaked to the press. Hadley states either Maliki is ignorant of what is going on in the streets of Iraq, or he does not have sufficient capabilities to turn the tide of violence. *(Woodward, The War Within, p. 206)*

On the 9th, Bush, Hadley, Rice, and Cheney meet about strategy in Iraq. Cheney argues that with the recent events like the Republican loss in the recent elections, the Democrats pressing for a troop withdrawal from Iraq, and U.S. public opinion
for the Iraqi war dropping, the Iraqis might perceive the U.S. would leave Iraq. (Cheney, pp. 444-445)

On the 17th, the Crouch group meets with Hadley to go over the State Department’s memo that argues for a pullback of U.S. troops. Hadley reportedly states, “You have got to give the president the option of a surge in forces. He will want to see it, and he’ll want to know what it means.” (Woodward, The War Within, pp. 233-235)

On the 26th, Hadley attends an Iraqi strategy meeting with Bush, Rice, Crouch, Rumsfeld, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, and others as part of a sweeping internal review. Crouch suggests accelerating the transfer of security responsibility to the Iraqis and a troop “surge” to increase security. Rice is still skeptical about a surge working, while Hadley reportedly supports a surge. (Woodward, The War Within, pp. 244-245; The Washington Post, 11/15/2006)


December

On the 6th, the Iraq Study Group, which interviewed key figures such as Hadley, Bush, Rice, and Cheney, releases its findings. Its primary recommendations include a pullback of U.S. forces over the next fifteen months, an amnesty program for insurgent fighters, a “diplomatic offensive” toward Israel-Palestine negotiations, and high-level talks on Iraq with Iran and Syria. Hadley rejects the plan to talk with Iran and Syria and to set any deadlines for reducing U.S. troops. (Woodward, The War Within, pp. 314-315; The Washington Post, 12/07/2006, 12/15/2006)


On the 13th, Bush, Cheney, and Hadley visit with Gates and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Reportedly, the chiefs do not fully support a troop increase and are worried where they will get the five brigades for the surge, plus ten more for military personnel rotation. However, Bush argues that Iraq has to take priority. (Woodward, The War Within, pp. 286-289; Tyson, Political Science Quarterly, 2010, p. 575)

On the 15th, Bush announces his support for a surge, in an NSC principals meeting. (Tyson, Political Science Quarterly, 2010, p. 575)
January
On the 10th, Bush announces on live television the surge of five brigades, or about 20,000 troops, to Iraq. (http://www.cnn.com)

February
North Korea agrees to close its main nuclear reactor in exchange for $400 million in fuel and aid. Rice calls Hadley and Bush about the deal. Bush agrees to it and the U.S. enters into bilateral talks. (Kessler, p. 239; Bumiller, pp. 306-307)

On the 2nd, Hadley holds a press conference on the release of the new NIE for Iraq. The report states, “…the persistent weakness of the security forces…and all sides’ ready recourse to violence are collectively driving an increase in communal and insurgent violence and political extremism.” (http://www.dni.gov) Hadley argues the report helps explain why a change in strategy was needed. (CQ Transcripts, 02/02/2007)

April
Hadley develops a proposal for a “war czar” that would meet daily with military commanders and U.S. ambassadors in Iraq and Afghanistan, coordinate with Hadley, and report directly to Bush. The person would hold a deputy national security adviser title. In May, Lt. General Douglas Lute is hired. (The Washington Post, 04/13/2007, 05/16/2007)

Hadley meets with Cheney and two Israeli officials. The Israelis show them photographs of a North Korean built nuclear reactor in al-Kibar, Syria. The two would meet in small group meetings to discuss how to respond. In September, Israeli planes destroy the reactor. (Cheney, pp. 465-468, 472)

May
On the 4th, Crouch announces his departure from the NSC. James Jeffrey is named as deputy national security adviser. (The Washington Post, 05/05/2007)

June
Hadley sends O’Sullivan to Iraq to investigate the still increasing violence. (Woodward, The War Within, p. 364)

On the 4th, Hadley travels with Bush on a European trip to the G-8 summit. (CQ Transcriptions, 06/04/2007)

On the 11th, Hadley makes his second trip to Capitol Hill in two days to talk with Republican Senators, urging them not to implement the Iraq Study Group recommendations. (http://www.politico.com)

On the 26th, Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), the ranking Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee, publically breaks with the Bush Administration by stating that Bush must change the present strategy on Iraq. Hadley meets with Lugar and other members of the committee to contain any political damage. (The New York Times, 06/27/2007)

July
It is reported that Bush, Cheney, and Hadley conduct a video conference with Maliki every two weeks. (The New York Times, 07/25/2007)
On the 15th, Hadley meets with Warner and Lugar after a mixed status report is presented on Iraq. The report marks advances in eight “benchmark” areas, especially in military areas, but inadequate progress in eight others. *(The New York Times, 07/16/2007)*

**September** On the 3rd, Bush, Rice, Gates, and Hadley arrive in Iraq on their way to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Australia. (http://www.cnn.com)

On the 11th, General David Petraeus testifies at an Armed Services Committee hearing, stating that by July, troops should be down by 130,000. Hadley explains, “What General Petraeus talked about was not a timetable; it was an expectation that if progress on security continues, he will be able to make some adjustments and drawdowns.” *(The Washington Post, 09/24/2007)*

On the 27th, Bush and Hadley meet with Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi to help pressure the Burmese government to stop its crackdown on protestors. *(The Washington Post, 09/27/2007)*

**November** On the 27th, Bush and Rice hold a peace conference at Annapolis with Israeli and Palestinian leaders. Hadley states, “We have said from the very beginning, and the president made clear, that it is the parties themselves that have to make the peace.” *(The New York Times, 11/27/2007)* They pledge to begin negotiations to reach a possible peace treaty by the end of 2008. *(The Washington Post, 11/28/2007)*

**December** On the 3rd, intelligence reports are released that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003. Hadley admits that Bush knew about this either in August or September, after he gave a speech in October saying a nuclear-armed Iran could cause World War III. Hadley states, “On the one hand, it confirms that we were right to be worried about Iran seeking to develop nuclear weapons. On the other hand, it tells us that we have made some progress in trying to ensure that that does not happen.” *(The Washington Post, 12/04/2007)*

On the 27th, Pakistani opposition leader, Benazir Bhutto, is assassinated. The next day, Bush meets with Cheney, Rice, Gates, Hadley, and military officials to examine how the assassination affects the War on Terror in the region. *(The Washington Post, 12/29/2007)*

**2008**

**January** On the 9th, Bush and Hadley visit Israel to try to advance the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Hadley says Bush plans to “encourage the parties to get after it, to stay focused. He will hear from the parties on where their negotiations and their discussions are.” *(Federal News Service, 01/09/2008)*

**April** Hadley joins Bush at a NATO summit and a meeting with Putin. Russia agrees to help develop a missile defense plan with Europe, and NATO agrees to send more troops to Afghanistan. *(The Washington Post, 04/07/2008)*
May

Hadley joins Bush on a Middle East tour (Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt), Bush’s second tour to the region in five months in the hopes of continuing the peace process. (*The New York Times, 05/19/2008*)

June


On the 26th, North Korea releases some information on its nuclear program and allows access to program personnel. Bush pledges some economic sanctions and a pledge to remove them from the terrorist list. Hadley states, “We appreciate the declaration…That said, we have some concerns that will be addressed as part of this verification and monitoring process….” (*Federal News Service, 06/26/2008*)

Cheney, Rice, and Hadley conduct a series of meetings running into the fall about North Korea’s reluctance to fully disclose its program. By the end of the year, negotiations come to a standstill.  (*Cheney, pp. 485-488*)

July

Rice, Bush, Cheney, and Hadley meet to discuss Iran. Rice recommends talks, and they reportedly support her plan. On the 19th, Rice sends Undersecretary William J. Burns to Geneva to talk with Iran’s chief negotiator and other European envoys. Rice also meets with North Korean’s foreign minister, Pak Ui-chun, in another round of six-nation talks. Although both talks were positive, but inconclusive, these overtures are reportedly another sign of a shift in policy to a more diplomatic solution. (*The Washington Post, 07/17/2008, 07/19/2008, 07/20/2008*)

August

Fighting breaks out between Russia and South Ossetia, Georgia. Rice visits Georgia on the 15th to help facilitate a cease-fire agreement and keeps Bush, Gates, and Hadley informed. (*The New York Times, 08/16/2008; NBC News Transcripts, 08/16/2008*)

November

The national security team completes a strategy review of Afghanistan calling for more resources and emphasizing counterinsurgency. Cheney says Hadley gives this report to President-elect Barack Obama’s transition team.  (*Cheney, p. 500*)

December

On the 13th, Hadley travels with Bush to Iraq to visit the troops and celebrate Iraq’s ratification of the Status of Forces agreement. (*Federal News Service, 12/13/2008*)

2009

January

On the 21st, Hadley leaves the White House. He becomes senior adviser for international affairs at the United States Institute of Peace.  (*http://www.usip.org*)
TIMELINES

- Stephen J. Hadley News Timeline, prepared by Bryan Craig, Miller Center, University of Virginia, 09/06/2011.

- Timeline of the Bush Presidency, prepared by Justin Peck and Bryan Craig, Miller Center, University of Virginia, 04/30/2010.

SELECTED WRITINGS AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY STEPHEN J. HADLEY


- Stephen J. Hadley, “President Bush’s National Security Adviser, Stephen Hadley, Discusses the President’s Address to the Nation on Iraq,” *Meet the Press*, NBC, 01/14/2007.


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL


- Dana Millbank, “Down to the Nuts and Bolts at NSC; Deputy Adviser Stephen J. Hadley Says His Job, and Agency’s, is to ‘Facilitate’ Foreign Policy,” *The Washington Post*, 07/25/2001.


KEY ISSUES AND EVENTS ON NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

2000 Election

Missile Defense


2003 State of the Union Speech
• George Tenant, At the Center of the Storm (New York: Perennial, 2007) pp. 449-475.


Colin Powell’s UN Speech on Iraq

Middle East


Detainee Interrogation


**India**


**North Korea**


**Iraqi Politics**


**2002 Post-Saddam Hussein Plans**


**Iraq Strategy Review and Surge**


Joining the Administration

- When did you first meet George W. Bush? Who was your initial point of access to him? What were your early impressions of him?
- What was your involvement in the 2000 presidential campaign? Discuss the process Governor Bush went through to prepare for dealing with foreign policy issues as a candidate. Who were the key actors in this process?
- What were the major decisions the foreign policy team had to make during the campaign?
- What did you do during the recount period after the disputed election? What were the primary decisions you had to make during the transition period? Did you have a voice in naming the other members of the incoming foreign policy team?

National Security Council

- Discuss your appointment as deputy national security adviser. What did President Bush want from his NSC? Did you model your offices on the experience of any of your predecessors in this job?
- Discuss how the NSC was organized, focusing especially on the changes you and Condoleezza Rice made in the NSC structures employed by the Clinton White House. Why were these changes made? Which innovations worked well? Not so well?
- What specifically was your portfolio on the NSC staff? Were there any significant turf disputes at the outset within the national security making apparatus?
- How did you communicate foreign policy options and advice to the president? Did the president prefer particular briefing formats before making decisions? Did he rely on you to be a policy advocate? To be actively engaged in policy implementation? Discuss the president’s decision-making style.
- Discuss the NSC’s interaction with other major White House offices (Legislative Affairs, Communications/Speechwriters, OMB, etc.). [deal with for both terms]
- Discuss your relationship with other executive departments (State, Defense, Justice, etc.). What were the challenges in coordinating policy among an accomplished group of foreign policy principals? Assess the role of the deputies in this administration. [deal with for both terms]
- Discuss your relationship with the vice president and his staff. Assess the role they played in the development and execution of foreign policy in the 43rd presidency. Describe the relationship of the president and the vice president.
- Provide your account of the following: the Hainan Island incident; the run-up to 9/11; your experience on 9/11 and the immediate responses; the Afghan War; run-up to the Iraq War, including “16 words” incident/Bush’s 2003 State of the Union; the execution of the Iraq War; Detainee Treatment Act and the Military Commissions Act; the domestic front in the war on terror; the 9/11 Commission, etc.
- Reflect on the challenges of focusing on actionable intelligence in an environment where threats are a constant presence. What was your role in reforming the intelligence agencies (Homeland Security, etc.)?
Describe the process that produced the decision to invade Iraq.

Assess Dr. Rice’s tenure as national security adviser. How do you respond to critics of the first Bush term who assert that the administration was beleaguered by a flawed national security process?

Discuss the changes made in the national security team in the second Bush term. In retrospect, were there mistakes made in personnel assignments in either the first or second term? Discuss your own elevation to the post of national security adviser.

Did you make any significant changes in the way the NSC did business after you became national security adviser? Did Dr. Rice’s posting to the State Department create any complications for you in taking over her old job?

Foreign Policy Issues

Discuss the extent to which the Bush administration was committed to multilateralism versus unilateralism. Did this change over time?

Comment on your efforts to create consensus with other nations and within the White House over actions in Afghanistan and Iraq and supporting Pakistan.

What was your involvement with post-war Iraq planning? How were you able to transfer aspects of the post-war Iraq policy from the Defense Department? What advice did you give to the president and key officials as events in Iraq deteriorated? Describe the process that produced the troop surge.

What was your role in withdrawing from the ABM Treaty and the Moscow Treaty? Describe President Bush’s relationship with Putin, and the diplomatic process to develop a missile defense system and end the Russo-Georgian war.

Tell us about Bush’s decision to support openly a Palestinian state and the replacement of Yasser Arafat. Describe your role in the “road map,” Annapolis conference, Israel’s unilateral withdrawal, and stemming the violence in Gaza. How did the election of Hamas affect US policy?

Discuss your role in policy toward nuclear programs in Iran and North Korea.

Describe your role in the nuclear deal with India. Tell us about breaking away from the “hyphenated relationship” with Pakistan, and assess the administration’s relationship with Pakistan during your tenure.

Discuss your travels with President Bush. Describe his style of face-to-face diplomacy with foreign leaders.

The Bush Presidency in Retrospect

What were the chief strengths and weaknesses of the Bush administration in the realm of foreign affairs? How would you rate the president as a strategic thinker?

What features of the Bush administration were misunderstood by the press? How should the Bush administration be viewed by future historians? What is the legacy of President Bush’s foreign policy?

Evaluate President Bush as a world leader. How did foreign diplomats and heads of state view Bush? Were there any common misconceptions?