President George W. Bush
Oral History Project

Briefing Materials

L. Paul Bremer III

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Presidential Oral History Program

MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED OR CIRCULATED
1963  L. Paul “Jerry” Bremer receives a B.A. from Yale University. (http://www.notablebiographies.com)

1964  Bremer receives a Certificate of Political Studies from the Institut D’Etudes Politiques of the University of Paris.

1966  Bremer earns an MBA from Harvard University. (http://www.harrywalker.com)

1974-1976  Bremer is executive assistant to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. (http://www.notablebiographies.com)

1976-1979  Bremer is deputy chief of mission at the U.S embassy in Oslo, Norway.

1979-1983  Bremer is executive secretary of the Department of State.

1983-1986  Bremer serves as ambassador to the Netherlands. (http://www.harrywalker.com)

1986-1989  Bremer is ambassador-at-large for counter-terrorism. (http://www.harrywalker.com)


1999-2000  Bremer serves as chairman of the Bipartisan National Commission on Terrorism. The report warns that, while the number of terrorist incidents has decreased, the number of casualties per attack has increased. Also, religiously motivated groups, like Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda, present a new challenge for intelligence agencies. (http://www.harrywalker.com; http://www.historycommons.org)


2002  


2003  

March  On the 19th, Bush gives the order to launch Operation Iraqi Freedom.
April

Plans to form a national government in Iraq are delayed in favor of a U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) that will oversee reconstruction efforts. According to Bremer, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, Vice President Dick Cheney’s chief of staff, approached him to become its director. The CPA reports to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. (Karen DeYoung, Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006, pp. 465-466; Bremer, My Year In Iraq, pp. 7, 40)


On the 16th, General Tommy Franks, CENTCOM commander, issues “Freedom Message” which outlaws the Baath Party and creates the Coalition Provisional Authority. (Paul Bremer III, Ambassador Paul Bremer Timeline, 08/19/2012)

On the 17th, General John Abizaid, Deputy Commander CENTOM, reports that not a single unit of the Iraqi Army is left intact anywhere in the country. (Bremer Timeline)

May


On the 6th, Bush hosts Bremer at one on one luncheon at White House to discuss objectives and strategy for post-conflict Iraq. Bremer tells Bush about RAND study and need for more troops. The president replies that the Administration is working to get more countries to contribute troops. On the political goals, Bremer says reaching the goal of representative government in Iraq will be more of a marathon than a sprint. Bush responds it is his policy “to take the time necessary” to achieve that goal. On the next day, Bush announces Bremer as special envoy to Iraq. (Bremer Timeline)

On the 8th, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Doug Feith attends a Principals meeting to discuss the Iraqi Interim Authority (IIA) plan. Bremer is also in attendance. Secretary of State Colin Powell reportedly says the president wants to take time with implementing the IIA, countering Feith and Rumsfeld’s thoughts about moving as quickly as possible. (Doug Feith, War and Decision, New York: Harper, 2008, p. 439)

On the 9th, Feith meets with Bremer. Feith organizes briefings for him on the Pentagon and interagency work on Iraq over the last year. They discuss the IIA plan and de-Baathification. Feith gives him a draft of CPA Order no. 1 (De-Baathification of Iraqi Society) and Order no. 2 (dissolution of Iraqi army). Feith reportedly wants to issue the de-Baathification order immediately, but Bremer
says he wants to wait to review it when he gets to Iraq. (Feith, pp. 423, 428; Bremer, *My Year in Iraq*, pp. 39-40)

On the 9th, Bremer sends a memo to Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Feith about the future of the Iraqi military. He recommends dissolving Saddam Hussein’s army and security and intelligence services. (Bremer, *My Year in Iraq*, p. 54)

On the 9th, after a full NSC discussion of the Administration’s desired political process in Iraq, the President says this will take a long time and adds that the U.S. will take the time necessary to produce a credible political process. (*Bremer Timeline*)


On the 12th, Deputy NSC Advisor Stephen Hadley receives a memo stating that the CPA will pay all former Iraqi government employees, except those in the uniformed military and intelligence services. (L. Paul Bremer III, *Survival*, August/September 2008, p. 25)

On the 13th, Rumsfeld sends a memo to the National Security Council (NSC) entitled, “Principles for Iraq-Policy Guidelines.” It specifies that the coalition will support Bush’s vision for a free Iraq and eliminate the remnants of Saddam’s regime. The memo also says, “The transition from despotism to a democracy will not happen fast or easily. It cannot be rushed.” (*Bremer Timeline*; http://www.rumsfeld.com)

On the 14th, CPA National Security Advisor, Walter Slocombe, reports on his consultations in London May 12-13. He says if any British officers think they should reassemble the old army “they did not give any hint of it in our meetings and in fact agreed with the need for vigorous de-Baathification especially in the security sector.” DFID offices noted that demobilization of the Iraqi military is a fait accompli. (*Bremer Timeline*)

On the 15th, Bremer meets with the CPA’s Governance Team that includes Ryan Crocker, Roman Martinez, and Meghan O’Sullivan to review CPA Order no. 1. It prohibits the top 1% of party members from working for the Iraqi government. The top three layers of management in every ministry and affiliated corporations would be reviewed for connections to the Baath Party. Any full members would be removed from office. CPA officials can also grant exceptions on a case-by-case basis. Bremer also tells his staff that the CPA needs more time before giving the Iraqis power to govern, in order to incorporate more indigenous Iraqis, not just exiles, into the government. (*Bremer, My Year in Iraq*, pp. 40-44)

On the 16th, Bremer announces the CPA will begin de-Baathification. CIA Director George Tenet and Rumsfeld say that the NSC Principals should have discussed it in-depth. NSC Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Tenet, and Hadley are reportedly not consulted on the order. (*Bremer, Survival*, p. 29; Bob Woodward,
On the 16th, Bremer meets with the Iraqi Leadership Council to tell them that Iraqi governance will be done incrementally. (Bremer, My Year in Iraq, pp. 48-49)

On the 18th, Bremer approves a simplified four-grade pay scale for Iraq’s civil service workers. He would later approve more funds for health care, raise doctor and teacher salaries, order vaccines for children, and rehabilitate schools, water and electrical systems, telecommunications, and ports. (Bremer, My Year in Iraq, pp. 67, 69)

On the 19th, Bremer sends Rumsfeld a memo outlining CPA intentions to dissolve security entities. Bremer notes that the CPA lacks employee rosters so that pay will have to be delayed. (Bremer Timeline)

On the 20th, in a telephone conference call with Bush and NSC principals, Bremer briefs on the ongoing discussions Slocombe has had with Defense, JCS, and the British about disbanding the Iraqi army. (Bremer Timeline)

On the 20th, Wolfowitz calls Bremer to say that Paddy Ashdown, former high commissioner for Bosnia, has warned Defense about holding elections too soon, as was done in Bosnia. (Bremer Timeline)

On the 21st, Rumsfeld sends a memo to Feith stating, “We need to lay a foundation for self-government. The way to get a non-theocratic system is to go slowly….we should not rush to elections.” (Bremer Timeline; http://www.rumsfeld.com)

On the 22nd, Bush and the NSC reportedly meet to discuss the proposal to create a new Iraqi army and dissolve Iraq’s security and intelligence forces. Bremer states that nothing is left of the old army due to mass desertion. The next day, Bremer announces the dissolution. It notes the CPA’s intention to pay former members of the army and says that members of that army, up to the rank of colonel, will be welcome to apply for positions in the new army. Rice argues the NSC was discussing the issue and the discussion was not “a request for permission to issue the order.” (Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor, New York: Crown, 2011, p. 238; Bremer, My Year in Iraq, p. 57; Bremer, Survival, August/September 2008, p. 26; Tenet, p. 387; Bremer Timeline)

On the 29th, Bremer warns the president about “Iranian-sponsored Islamic extremism.” (Dobbins, p. 82)

On the 22nd, Bremer sends a memo to Rumsfeld in which he outlines the proposed plan to move first to a constitution and then elections. Rumsfeld tells Bremer he has “no opinion” on the plans. (Bremer Timeline)
On the 22nd, Bremer’s gives his first report to Bush through Rumsfeld: “I have relaunched the political dialogue with Iraqi leaders. My message is that full sovereignty under an Iraqi government can come after democratic elections, which themselves must be based on a constitution agreed by all the people. This process will take time.” *(Bremer Timeline)*

On the 23rd, Bush responds to Bremer’s report and states, “You have my full support and confidence. You also have the backing of our Administration that knows our work will take time. We will fend off the impatient…” *(Bremer Timeline)*

On the 23rd, Bremer sends another memo to Rumsfeld, which describes in detail the plans for an interim Iraqi administration. It notes that we need to broaden the small unrepresentative group of exiles our government has been talking to. The report describes the process of writing a new constitution, leading to elections that “might be held about a year from now”. Bremer asks for his views, but he gets no response. *(Bremer Timeline)*

On the 29th, Bremer writes a memo to Rumsfeld outlining how long it will take to hold elections because of the lack of “a duly ratified constitution, electoral laws and voter registration regulations” necessary “to hold legitimate democratic elections here.” *(Bremer Timeline)*

June

On the 2nd, Bremer tells Rumsfeld that he plans to move forward with the IIA in the next five to six weeks. The memo also notes that there is agreement among the Iraqis from across the spectrum “that a new constitution must precede a national election.” Rumsfeld agrees with this timeline as he wants to move quickly to give the Iraqis a role in governance. *(Rumsfeld, p. 511; Bremer Timeline)*

On the 4th, Bremer meets with Bush, Rice, Powell, and Chief of Staff Andy Card in Qatar. Bremer reviewed the proposed political process again, and, in response to a question from Powell, said that in the best case we might get a constitution and more or less democratic elections within a year. But, Bremer cautions, it would be difficult to pull it off in that time frame. Bremer also asks Card to help him with the slow bureaucratic response from agencies like the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the State Department’s Agency of International Development to speed up the funding process. *(Bremer, *My Year in Iraq*, pp. 70, 114; Bremer Timeline)*

On the 17th, Rumsfeld forwards to Bremer a memo sent to him by Paddy Ashdown in which Ashdown states his concern that we not move too quickly to elections in Iraq, as he says had been done in Bosnia. He emphasizes that the move to democracy will take time: “plan on a decade, not months or years.” *(Bremer Timeline)*

Bremer attends an NSC meeting by video teleconference. He states his concern about the reduction of U.S. forces amidst a rising Baathist-jahadi insurgency. *(Bremer, *My Year in Iraq*, p. 105)*
On the 19th, the CPA sends a lengthy cable to the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State describing a meeting with UK Ambassador Sawers and Bremer held with 25 Iraqi politicians the previous day at which the two diplomats described our plan for the political process. “Once a draft constitution was agreed, it could be submitted to the Iraqi people for a referendum which would set the stage for elections and a sovereign Iraqi government. The length of this process would depend on the Iraqi people.” (Bremer Timeline)

On the 22nd, at the World Economic Forum in Jordan, Bremer outlines the political process being followed in his public speech. He also briefs UN Secretary General Kofi Annan on the plan in a private meeting. (Bremer Timeline)

July

On the 3rd, a CPA press release repeats sequence of steps for Iraqi political process: “Within two weeks, the new Iraqi Governing Council will be established. And shortly thereafter, we will launch the process to write a new Iraqi Constitution. This will be your new constitution: written by Iraqis, debated by Iraqis and approved by Iraqis. It will not be written by Americans or British or anyone else. Once a new constitution has been approved, Iraq’s new Government will be chosen by Iraq’s first democratic, free and fair elections. At that point, the Coalition’s job will be done.” (Bremer Timeline)

On the 3rd, Bush, Bremer, and Prime Minister Tony Blair review the political and economic plans in a telephone call. Bush states, “We are in it for the long haul.” (Bremer Timeline)

On the 4th, Bremer sends Rumsfeld a draft strategic plan called “A Vision to Empower Iraqis.” Security is the top priority. The other goals include economic growth, transition of power, restoring basic services, improving education and housing, and building a welfare safety net. Rumsfeld believes Bremer’s ambitions go beyond the limited scope of the U.S. military. The plan also states that the CPA would “encourage the Iraqis to write as quickly as possible a modern constitution embodying democratic and individual rights and the rule of law… the constitution will then be ratified, elections held for a sovereign Iraqi government at which point the coalition relinquishes sovereignty.” (Bremer Timeline; Bremer, My Year in Iraq, pp. 115-116; Rumsfeld, p. 513)

On the 7th, Bremer announces a new Iraqi currency. He also sends a memo to Rumsfeld telling the secretary that the OMB procedures are preventing a quick rehabilitation of Iraq’s economy. (Bremer, My Year in Iraq, pp. 77, 114)

On the 7th, the First Battalion of the new Iraqi army enters training. (Bremer Timeline)

On the 11th, Bremer conducts a radio broadcast to the Iraqi people reiterating the steps in the political process. The remarks are cabled to Defense, State, NSC, and the CIA. (Bremer Timeline)

On the 13th, the CPA appointed, 25-member Governing Council is announced. It includes members of all Iraqi factions but is predominantly made up of Shiite Muslims and prominent exiles. (The New York Times, 07/13/2003)
On the 13th, Bremer writes a memo to Rumsfeld conveying the names and authorities of the Governing Council and outlines, again, the political process of getting a constitution, followed by a referendum, and then elections, which will lead to the dissolution of the CPA.  (*Bremer Timeline*)

On the 16th, Bremer sends a report to Bush via the Secretary of Defense.  It states, “In the coming days, I will try gently to nudge [the Iraqis] to begin preparations for a Constitutional Convention.  We would like to see this set up in September.  Once that body writes and the Iraqis approve a constitution, there can be elections for a sovereign Iraqi government.  At that point, the civil responsibilities of the Coalition will terminate.  With lots of luck and Coalition encouragement, we could have elections in a year.  But I won’t hold my breath.”  (*Bremer Timeline*)

On the 22nd, Saddam’s sons, Qusay and Uday, are killed during a U.S. military raid.  (Bremer, *My Year in Iraq*, p. 114)

On the 22nd, Bremer attends a NSC deputy-level meeting in Washington, D.C., where the CPA’s strategic plan is discussed.  (Bremer, *My Year in Iraq*, p. 117)

On the 23rd, Bremer outlines the political process to a large audience of journalists and others at the National Press Club.  (*Bremer Timeline*)

On the 23rd, Bremer attends an NSC meeting with Bush and Cheney.  Bush reportedly asks how much money Bremer would need for continuing Iraq’s reconstruction.  Bremer responds with the figure of $5 billion.  Bush also approves the strategic plan, which is sent to every member of Congress.  (Bremer, *My Year in Iraq*, pp. 119-120)

On the 23rd, the final version of the strategic plan is submitted to all 535 members of Congress specifying that the CPA would “encourage the Iraqis to write as quickly as possible a modern constitution embodying democratic and individual rights and the rule of law…The constitution will then be ratified, elections held for a sovereign Iraqi government at which point the coalition relinquishes sovereignty.”  (*Bremer Timeline*)

*August*

The Governing Council names a constitutional Preparatory Committee of Iraqi lawyers who are to recommend back the council by September 30th the best method for choosing an Iraqi body to write a constitution.  This formula is arrived at with the intention of not contradicting Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s June fatwa insisting that the constitutional convention be directly elected.  (*Bremer Timeline*)

On the 4th, Rice informs Bremer that it will be difficult for the U.S. to convince Europe to support a new UN resolution calling for international troops in Iraq.  They also discuss supplemental money.  A week later, Bremer sends Rumsfeld a memo requesting $20 billion.  (Bremer, *My Year in Iraq*, p. 125)

On the 8th, Bremer and his staff discuss police training.  The country would need at least 40,000 officers, but Iraq does not have a training facility.  (Bremer, *My Year in Iraq*, p. 128)
On the 14th, a U.S. helicopter accidentally knocks over a religious banner in Sadr City, unleashing protests and riots. It is part of an overall increase in violence. Bremer sends Rumsfeld a memo about the need to stop Sayyid Muqtada al-Sadr. According to Bremer, Rumsfeld tells him not to arrest al-Sadr until further operational questions are answered. However, Rumsfeld states he was simply asking questions, not stopping Bremer from arresting al-Sadr. (Anderson, p. 163; Bremer, My Year in Iraq, pp. 135, 136; Rumsfeld, p. 538)

On the 19th, a suicide bomber strikes the UN headquarters in Baghdad, killing 23 members. The UN evacuates all non-essential personnel. (http://www.cfr.org)

On the 20th, Bremer attends the NSC meeting by teleconference. Bush approves Bremer’s requested $20 billion appropriation. Bremer also argues that he needs a higher quantity and quality of counterterrorist intelligence in Iraq. (Bremer, My Year in Iraq, p. 143)

On the 22nd, a Zogby poll shows 92% of Iraqis oppose participation of any Baathists in the government. (Bremer Timeline)

On the 30th, a car bomb explodes in Najaf, killing 126 people and a top cleric, Muhammed Baqir al-Hakim. (http://www.cnn.com)

On the 31st, the CPA Governance Team meets with Bremer to review the Governing Council’s list of proposed cabinet officials. O’Sullivan and others on the CPA team criticize the fact that each of the 25 Iraqi council members chose one minister, not broadening the Council’s political base. (Bremer, My Year in Iraq, p. 149)

September

On the 4th, Rumsfeld visits Iraq to assess the reduction of American forces in the country. Rumsfeld emphasizes that the building of Iraq’s own security force must be expedited. Bremer is concerned about the Pentagon’s urgency, as his experts say they would need at least a year to train the force professionally. (Bremer, My Year in Iraq, pp. 156-157, 162)

On the 5th, the CPA sends a cable to the Defense Department, NSC, and State with the text of Bremer’s upcoming The Washington Post editorial on the seven step process. (Bremer Timeline)

On the 5th, Bremer gives a speech, which is cabled to Washington, to the Iraqi people. He outlines the process: “Step One: Establishing a Temporary Iraqi Government; That step was taken two months ago when the Governing Council was created; Step Two: Deciding How to Write a Constitution; Step Three: Iraqis Begin to Run the Country; Step Four: Iraqis Write a New Constitution; Step Five: Ratifying the Constitution; Step Six: Electing a Government; Step Seven: The Coalition Authority Ends; How long will these seven steps take? I cannot say, but the process I have described is in your hands.” (http://www.usembassy.it)

On the 7th, Bush addresses the nation on the War on Terror, including Iraq, reporting that the Governing Council will set up a plan for drafting a constitution.
and hold elections. Bremer consults on the drafting of the speech. The president plans to ask Congress for $87 billion for the War on Terror and work on a UN resolution to create a multinational force in Iraq. (Bremer, My Year in Iraq, p. 157)

On the 8th, Bremer publishes an editorial in The Washington Post, stating that the CPA will not dissolve until a constitution is ratified and elections are held. CPA administrators tell Feith these goals could take at least two years to achieve. Rumsfeld reportedly has no advance knowledge of the editorial, but he begins to review the Pentagon’s strategy on when to hand over authority to the Iraqis. Rice is not consulted either about the editorial, and she talks to Bush about how the NSC can communicate more frequently with Bremer. (Feith, p. 453; Rice, p. 242; Rumsfeld, p. 524)

On the 10th, Bremer and the Governance Team discuss the Preparatory Committee’s desire for the constitutional convention to be directly elected. Bremer and his staff agree that Iraq is not prepared for elections because the country has no electoral law, national political parties, or constituency boundaries. (Bremer, My Year in Iraq, p. 164)

On the 13th, Bush gives a radio address that outlines Iraq’s political process: “The Council has selected a committee that is developing a process through which Iraqis will draft a new constitution for their country. Day-to-day operations of many government tasks have been turned over to ministers appointed by the Governing Council. And when a constitution has been drafted and ratified by the Iraqi people, Iraq will enjoy free and fair elections, and the coalition will yield its remaining authority to a free and sovereign Iraqi Government.” (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu)

On the 13th, Rumsfeld tells Bremer in a telephone call that he thinks the CPA should move immediately to give sovereignty to the Iraqis. When Bremer disagrees, Rumsfeld asks for a memo stating his objections. Bremer sends a memo to Rumsfeld which lays out the rationale for the political process that has been followed since May. Bremer’s memo says that granting the Iraqis sovereignty without a constitution “risks the failure of that process.” Rumsfeld writes Bremer back the same day saying: “I agree with your memo and will send it to POTUS and members of the NSC. You are on the mark.” (Bremer Timeline)

On the 15th, during Powell’s visit to Iraq, he endorses the seven step process in a meeting with the Governing Council and encourages them to help carry it out quickly. (Bremer Timeline)

On the 22nd, Bremer comes to Washington to discuss Iraq strategy. Rumsfeld and Bremer meet for two days. Rumsfeld asks Bremer about dismantling the CPA before a final constitution is adopted by the middle of 2004. Bremer says the Iraqis are not ready. However, Bremer is willing to discuss an earlier transition
because the Iraqis are pressuring him for it. (Bremer, *My Year in Iraq*, pp. 170-171; Feith, p. 459; Rumsfeld, p. 525)

On the 22nd, Bremer testifies before the Senate Appropriations Committee as some members question the $20 billion for infrastructure projects. He testifies nine times over four days, including before the Senate Armed Services Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee. Some Democrats protest that they never saw the Strategic Plan, and others argue it was inadequate. (Bremer, *My Year in Iraq*, pp. 172-173; USA Today, 09/23/2003)

On the 24th, Bremer meets with Bush and the first lady at the White House. Bremer updates the president on governance, security, and the Pentagon’s concern about troop rotation and reduction. (Bremer, *My Year in Iraq*, pp. 174-176)

Rice chairs the Iraq Stabilization Group to help the NSC coordinate Iraqi reconstruction policy. (Rice, p. 242)

October

On the 2nd, Bremer discusses with Rumsfeld a new military order to recruit 30,000 police officers in 30 days by putting men through a three-week training course. Bremer says this will create an ill-trained force. (Bremer, *My Year in Iraq*, p. 184)

On the 2nd, the Iraq Survey Group releases their interim report. They have not found any evidence of WMD, one of the reasons for the U.S. invasion of Iraq, but they did find laboratories for chemical and biological weapons. (http://www.cia.gov)

On the 6th, *The New York Times* runs an article about the Iraq Stabilization Group. This is the first time Bremer has heard about it. (Bremer, *My Year in Iraq*, pp. 188-189)

On the 10th, Muqtada al-Sadr’s militia attacks a patrol of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Sadr City. Bremer wants to prevent al-Sadr from entering the city, but Wolfowitz reportedly refuses to support al-Sadr’s arrest. Violence escalates during the fall and winter. (Bremer, *My Year in Iraq*, pp. 190, 192)

On the 24th, Wolfowitz travels to Iraq for a three-day visit. The purpose of his visit is to assess reconstruction and security in Iraq. The visit includes a trip to an Iraqi Civil Defense Corps trainee classroom. During his visit, insurgents attack the Al Rasheed Hotel, where Wolfowitz is staying. Although uninjured, he appears shaken as he talks to reporters after the incident. (*The Associated Press*, 10/24/2003, 10/26/2003)

On the 28th, the NSC Principals meet about alternative timelines for returning sovereignty, with Defense pressing to leave ASAP. Bremer demurs. Card tells Bremer some in Washington are “gaming” him. Bremer tells Card he will be frank with the President: ceding sovereignty to the Iraqis too soon would “make the president’s vision of Iraq difficult if not impossible.” Bremer says he recognizes taking more time there might cost Bush the election, but history will be the only long term judge of America’s efforts in Iraq. (*Bremer Timeline*)
On the 29th, at the private meeting with Bush and the NSC, Bremer repeats the points he made with Card the day before about the need to stay the course. Bush says we will. (Bremer Timeline)

**November**

On the 4th, Bremer and the Governance Team discuss a new political plan, focused on the idea of an interim constitution, which would later be known as the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL). The CPA would help the Governing Council draft a document by March 1, 2004 that would protect individual rights, set authorities for the transitional government, and have a sunset provision to end at a certain date. National elections could be held as soon as possible for a national assembly, followed by another election to create a body to write a permanent constitution. He hopes to end CPA control by June 30, 2004. However, Bremer and the CPA election experts do not believe elections could be held by the next summer, so a caucus to elect a national assembly could be held to keep the transition on schedule. (Bremer, *My Year in Iraq*, pp. 213-217, 224; Woodward, p. 264)

On the 10th, Bremer asks O’Sullivan and Martinez to talk to Ahmed Chalabi. Chalabi is opposed to early national elections because, reportedly, he is not very popular among Iraqis and prefers an expansion of the Governing Council, rather than elections. (Bremer, *My Year in Iraq*, p. 217)

On the 11th, Bremer travels to Washington to talk with the NSC Principals on Iraq’s growing insurgency and the new political plan. They debate direct elections vs. a caucus and agree to send the plan to Bush for consideration the next day. Bush decides to go forward with the caucus plan. (Bremer, *My Year in Iraq*, pp. 224-228)

On the 15th, the CPA and the Governing Council agree to the governance plan. (Bremer, *My Year in Iraq*, p. 231)

On the 16th, Bremer and O’Sullivan discuss the negative response by Dr. Adel Mahdi of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (SCIRI) Party for the new plan. Mahdi is concerned the Governing Council will cease to exist after a sovereign government is established. He is also worried about the make-up of the provincial council that would help select caucuses. (Bremer, *My Year in Iraq*, p. 234)

On the 27th, Bush visits Iraq. After meeting the troops, the president meets with representatives of the Governing Council and tells them he stands behind the November 15th agreement and helped they would implement it quickly. (George W. Bush, *Decision Points*, New York: Crown Publishers, 2010, p. 265; Bremer Timeline)

**December**

On the 6th, Rumsfeld visits Iraq. Rumsfeld tells Bremer that Rice is in charge of all “political matters.” Rumsfeld is skeptical of the effectiveness of this new arrangement because, in the past, the NSC has not helped to resolve issues on Iraq. (Bremer, *My Year in Iraq*, p. 245; Rumsfeld, p. 528)
On the 14th, Saddam is captured. The next day Bremer tells Rice, and Bush calls Bremer. Later in the day, Bremer sends a report to the NSC, and Bremer participates in the NSC meeting by videoconference. (Bremer, *My Year in Iraq*, pp. 252, 256, 264; http://www.cfr.org)

2004

**January**

On the 16th, Bremer attends an NSC Principals meeting at the White House. They discuss the potential problem if Sistani still demands direct elections and the UN’s role in the governance plan. Bremer learns about detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib before he meets with Bush. (Bremer, *My Year in Iraq*, p. 279)

On the 19th, UN and CPA officials meet an Iraqi delegation that includes Adnad Pachachi, Abdul Aziz Hakim, Mohsen Hamid, Chalabi, and Hoshyar Zebari in New York City. The delegation goes to Washington to meet with Bush the next day. Bremer and O’Sullivan brief Bush before the meeting. (Bremer, *My Year in Iraq*, p. 282)

**February**

The Governance Team works with the Governing Council to write the TAL. (Bremer, *My Year in Iraq*, p. 282)

**Mar.-Apr.**

Bremer tries to convince the Governing Council to bring in the UN special envoy, Lakhdar Brahimi, to help develop a process to choose an interim government. The council suspects Brahimi is a Sunni Arab nationalist. Brahimi comes to Iraq but threatens to resign several times (he resigns in June). Bremer also continues to face resistance from Sistani and insurgencies by the Mahdi army, under al-Sadr, in the cities of Najaf, Kufa, Kut, Sadr City, and other southern cities. (Bremer, *My Year in Iraq*, pp. 310-311, 315)

**March**

Rice sends Frank Miller, the NSC’s senior director for defense policy, to Iraq to get the latest information. He reportedly never meets with Bremer but observes that the relationship between Bremer and General Ricardo Sanchez is dysfunctional. Miller reports to Rice and Hadley that the CPA seems to be unresponsive to Iraq’s needs. (Woodward, pp. 289-290, 292, 294)

On the 31st, four Blackwater contractors are killed in Fallujah, starting Operation Vigilant Resolve. (Rumsfeld, pp. 532-538)

**May**

As the Fallujah and Mahdi’s crises continue, Bush agrees to Bremer’s suggestion of a differentiated policy: revolve the Fallujah crisis by negotiation and use military force (the Anaconda strategy) against Mahdi’s forces. (Bremer, *My Year in Iraq*, p. 354)

On the 13th, Rumsfeld visits Iraq to discuss the detainee situation. Bremer and Rumsfeld agree to compensate the victims, put Iraqi police observers in detention centers, and determine a faster way to process detainees. Bremer tells Rumsfeld that he is not optimistic about the situation in Fallujah. (Bremer, *My Year in Iraq*, pp. 352-353)
On the 18th, Bremer writes a memo to Rumsfeld recommending the deployment of two additional divisions to Iraq. Rumsfeld tells Meyers to consider the request. Myers later states he has enough troops in the region. (Rumsfeld, pp. 661-662; The Washington Post, 01/13/2006)

On the 21st, Bremer, Rice, Robert Blackwill, and Hadley discuss the security situation in Iraq. (Bremer, My Year in Iraq, pp. 357-358)

On the 31st, Bremer and the Governance Team review the candidates for president of Iraq. The Kurds prefer Ghazi al-Yawar, but the CPA plans to offer the presidency to Pachachi, with the support of the Governing Council. Rice tells Bremer that either Pachachi or Ghazi is acceptable. However, Pachachi turns it down. Ghazi accepts at the last minute before the announcement of the new government is made. (Bremer, My Year in Iraq, pp. 375-376)

June

On the 28th, the CPA ceases to exist when the appointed interim government, headed by Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, takes over.

October

On the 4th, Bremer gives a speech to the Council of Insurance Agents and Brokers. He states that the decision to invade was correct, but the U.S. did not deploy enough troops and should have contained the violence and looting immediately after Saddam’s fall. (The Washington Post, 10/10/2004)

December


2006

Bremer publishes his book.

2007

February

On the 6th, Bremer testifies before the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee as it investigates the Administration’s past spending on Iraq. (The Washington Post, 02/06/2007)
TIMELINES

• L. Paul Bremer III News Timeline, prepared by Bryan Craig, Miller Center, University of Virginia, 06/11/2012.

• Timeline of the Bush Presidency, prepared by Justin Peck and Bryan Craig, Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia, 04/30/2010.

SELECTED WRITINGS AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY L. PAUL BREMER III


SPECIAL ENVOY TO IRAQ/CPA DIRECTOR


KEY ISSUES AND EVENTS AS SPECIAL ENVOY/CPA DIRECTOR

The White House and Bremer


CPA

Bremer’s Seven Point Plan
Joining the Bush Administration

- Discuss briefly your career path leading up to 2003. What were the major turning points in your professional biography? What did they teach you about international relations, defense policy, and terrorism?
- When did you first meet George W. Bush? Who was your initial point of access to him? What were your early impressions of him?
- Discuss your appointment to the Homeland Security Advisory Council. What role did it have in developing policy? How involved was Bush in the council’s activities?

CPA Director & Special Envoy to Iraq

- Discuss your appointment as CPA director and special envoy. Were you appointed to both positions at the same time? Did you have any conversations with President Bush about his expectations for these jobs?
- Describe your major duties as CPA director/special envoy. Whom did you work most closely with at the CPA?
- How active was Bush in the policy-making process of the CPA? How often did you talk with the president?
- How frequently did you meet with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld? On what occasions would you typically meet with him? Describe the content and style of your interactions with him. Describe Rumsfeld’s operating style. Tell us about your relationship with Paul Wolfowitz, Doug Feith, and other key Pentagon officials. With whom did you work most effectively at Defense?
- When did you first learn about the Iraq Stabilization Group? When did you begin your daily discussions with Condoleezza Rice as part of this group? How effective was Rice and the group in helping you with the CPA’s mission?
- Describe CPA’s relationship with the NSC, OMB, and other White House agencies. How effective was the interagency process? When did you need to talk directly to President Bush and what results did you see from those talks?
- Tell us about your relationship with Colin Powell and Richard Armitage. How effective was State in aiding reconstruction efforts in Iraq, and on what issues did State and Defense clash?
- Characterize your working relationship with members of Congress.

Iraq

- Describe Iraq as you first experienced it. In what ways did your initial experiences in postwar-Baghdad confirm or challenge your expectations?
- What were the main policy issues that you confronted upon arrival in Iraq in 2003, and how did you conceive of your primary objectives?
- What elements of the ORHA did you find successful? Which failed? How closely did you work with Jay Garner?
- In what ways did the CPA improve the U.S.’s ability to oversee postwar reconstruction?
• In your view, which Iraqi political, economic, and security issues were most essential to achieving progress that satisfied American objectives, and how effectively did U.S. policy help to resolve those issues?

• Tell us about the process that produced CPA orders number one and two? How often were you in communication with the White House on these two policies?

• Characterize your views on Ahmed Chalabi and his roles in rebuilding Iraq’s government and economy.

• Comment on your role in the initial efforts to create an Iraqi national government. What were the strengths and weaknesses of the Iraqi Governing Council? Were you and the Pentagon on the same timeline for Iraqi governance, and how did you reach an agreement for a June 2004 deadline? Describe the process that you and the White House used to finalize the TAL governance plan.

• Tell us what led to your September 2003 Washington Post editorial.

• Discuss the detainee issue, especially at Abu Ghraib.

• How effective were the U.N. and other international actors in Iraq? Did the White House support those efforts?

• What are the key success stories, failures, or missed opportunities from this time?

• How did the mounting domestic criticism of President Bush’s Iraq policy, and the forthcoming 2004 election, affect the president’s approach to decision-making?

**The Bush Presidency in Retrospect**

• How did Middle Eastern officials—particularly Iraqi leaders—view George W. Bush? Were there any common beliefs or misconceptions?

• What were the chief strengths and weaknesses of the Bush administration in foreign affairs? How would you rate the president as a strategic thinker?

• What features of the Bush administration were misunderstood by the press? How should the Bush administration be viewed by future historians? What is the legacy of President Bush’s foreign policy?