

*Some of the vital issues that the roundtable on Africa might tackle include evaluations of the health of democratic governance in the region and the role of the United States in buttressing democratic regimes. Will the devastating costs of the pandemic as well as soaring food and fuel prices raise the likelihood of mass migration, domestic unrest, terrorism, and intra-state conflict? To what extent will the region's quest for political stability and economic development enable the growth of China's influence in the region? How might US policy provide a realistic alternative by advancing both development and democracy in the region?*

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## American Foreign Policy in Africa in the Era of Strategic Competition

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On December 13-15, 2022, President Joseph Biden will host leaders from Africa for the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit. The decision to hold this summit highlights the enduring and perhaps increasingly important role that Africa plays for U.S. national interests. Africa's relevance to U.S. foreign policy is further suggested by the White Houses' August 2022 release of a *U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa* and statements from U.S. officials to include Secretary of State Antony Blinken who argues that "Africa will shape the future—and not just the future of the African people but of the world."<sup>i</sup>

President Biden released a list of objectives for the summit, to include: "new economic engagement; reinforce the U.S.-Africa commitment to democracy and human rights; mitigate the impact of COVID-19 and of future pandemics; work collaboratively to strengthen regional and global health; promote food security; advance peace and security; respond to the climate crisis; and amplify diaspora ties."<sup>ii</sup> We can synthesize this list into three buckets that focus discourse on what role Africa plays in broader U.S. national interests:

1. The U.S. seeks to advance its economic interests in Africa.
2. The U.S. seeks to compete with Russia and China in Africa.
3. The U.S. seeks to mitigate the regional and international impact of transnational threats from Africa.

While this paper highlights U.S. interests and challenges on the continent, it concludes with the caveat that though the United States has a stake in Africa, its relative weight globally suggests it should be approached as an important but perhaps not yet vital consideration for U.S. foreign policy.

### (1) Economic Interests – Africa's Vast Potential, for Better or Worse

Africa has significant economic potential, driven by a combination of demographic shifts, natural resources, and its embrace of free trade. The scale of Africa's population growth is vast: by 2025 the United Nations predicts there will be more Africans than Chinese people in the world.<sup>iii</sup> Nigeria alone is projected to become the third most populous country in the world behind India and China (and notably more populated than the United States even though it is only slightly bigger than twice the size of California).<sup>iv</sup> Nigeria is not alone – of the 54 countries comprising Africa, 28 are projected to more than double in population by 2050.<sup>v</sup> This population

growth could serve as an engine for economic prosperity within Africa and offer a large consumer markets for U.S. products.

This great potential is also the source of great concern. High populations can support economic growth; alternatively, they can translate to increased levels of poverty and famine if productivity and state capacity cannot keep up. Unlocking Africa's economic potential requires political stability and consistent economic policies that ensure market access for the international community – however, as discussed below, democratic backsliding, abrupt disruptions through coups, and general underdevelopment of state capacity and infrastructure lead to uncertainty for investors.

From the U.S. perspective, the opportunity cost of lost market value should lead to fingers crossed that Africa would trend positively toward meeting its economic potential – the international community will win if Africa wins. Alternatively, failure in Africa may be costly for the United States in terms of foreign aid; about 32 percent of U.S. aid goes to countries in Africa,<sup>vi</sup> and the United States is the biggest donor of aid to Africa.<sup>vii</sup> Failed economic sustainability will place the United States in the difficult position of needing to provide ever-increasing resources to address Africa's crises or allow mass human suffering in the absence of self-sustaining economic growth.

Like demographic shifts, natural resources may be a blessing or curse for African countries. In some cases, they provide a source of wealth for states to build upon, while in others they motivate corruption and drive internal conflict.<sup>viii</sup> Diamonds, for example, have been associated with civil war in Africa as they provide rents for corrupt and repressive governments and provide a source of wealth to fund ongoing insurgent operations.<sup>ix</sup> However, other natural resources such as timber, water, battery minerals (more below), gold, etc. can drive internal conflict as well. Natural resources may drive civil war when they provide a motivation to rebel (otherwise poor rebels can become wealthy by seizing natural resource sites and have little opportunity cost to taking up arms against a government which is otherwise leaving them destitute), and then the means to sustain the rebellion through profiting off the looted resources.<sup>x</sup>

The United States has a direct interest in securing access to Africa's natural resources. In 2019, almost \$406 billion worth of minerals were mined on the continent, which include vast amounts of oil, timber, diamonds, gold, coltan and bauxite.<sup>xi</sup> "Africa's exports of crude oil to the United States in 2007 exceed those in the Persian Gulf."<sup>xii</sup> Perhaps most pressing is the high demand for rare earth minerals needed to produce batteries for mass consumer products such as cell phones and electric vehicles. Africa has large deposits of key minerals such as lithium, nickel, and cobalt – at a time when demand for these minerals will outstrip the global supply. The United States needs to maintain access to these key resources, making Africa an important pillar for both U.S. commercial interests and in the effort to transition from fossil fuels to electricity.

U.S. and other external actors' efforts to secure natural resources can be deleterious to African governments and citizens, devolving to a form of neo-colonial extraction: "the accelerated shift to batteries now threatens to replicate one of the most destructive dynamics in global economic history: the systematic extraction of raw commodities from the global south in a way that made developed countries unimaginably rich while leaving a trail of environmental degradation, human rights violations, and semipermanent underdevelopment all across the developing world."<sup>xiii</sup> Particularly in the context of strategic competition, discussed in the next section, the race for natural resources risks challenging traditional U.S. values as espoused in the liberal international order.

The challenge for the United States in Africa is converting its economic potential into economic prosperity, both for Africans and for the United States. The 2022 National Security Strategy suggests this is a priority for the current administration, stating: “The continent’s booming population, vital natural resources, and vibrant entrepreneurship, coupled with the African Continental Free Trade Area, have the potential to drive transformative economic growth.”<sup>xiv</sup> However, without more effective policies and mobilization of this economic potential, the same drivers of potential growth can lead to increasing poverty, corruption, civil conflict, and externally driven exploitative economies that benefit powerful foreign countries but leave Africa underdeveloped.

## **(2) Strategic Competition with China and Russia in Africa**

The 2022 Biden/Harris administration National Security Strategy outlines competing with China and Russia as the top global priority.<sup>xv</sup> This competition will extend to Africa where the United States will seek to expand its relative influence vis-à-vis Russia and China with multiple objectives in mind, to include securing U.S. economic and commercial interests, advancing U.S. values and upholding the western based liberal international order, securing diplomatic alignment with African states in international organizations such as the United Nations, and in some cases the United States will simply seek to impose costs on its strategic competitors by challenging them on the periphery, in Africa. If the Cold War offers insight into how competition between great powers will play out in Africa, we can anticipate it will become a peripheral but important competition space in the broader global context.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States competed for influence and access across Africa. At its most tense moments, this competition manifested in a host of proxy conflicts which included the direct and indirect intervention of Soviet and U.S. military personnel, along with their non-African partners such as Cuba – these interventions helped drive violent and costly wars in countries such as Ethiopia/Somalia and Angola.<sup>xvi</sup> However, today as then the push for influence often manifests in more benign forms than proxy warfare, to include the provision of economic or military assistance<sup>xvii</sup>, the opening of new embassies (more than 320 embassies were opened in Africa in the 2010s)<sup>xviii</sup>, influencing media narratives through media outlet control or disinformation operations on the continent<sup>xix</sup>, and deploying other instruments of national power to curry favor or secure leverage with African leaders.

There may already be a “new scramble for Africa” taking place.<sup>xx</sup> The first “scramble” references European colonizers’ efforts to claim large swaths of land and exploit natural resources across the continent. The new scramble directly pits U.S. interests against those of Russia and China across Africa. However, the United States is not competing in Africa for competition’s sake, but instead acts based on four core interests that are directly challenged by Russia and China: securing economic advantage, promoting U.S. values, securing diplomatic alignment in international organizations, and seeking to impose costs on its rivals “on the cheap” by supporting proxy forces across the continent.

First, the United States seeks to secure commercial and economic interests as already outlined above. Some commercial opportunities may be zero sum between external actors, and positive relations with African leaders can set conditions for favorable business and investment terms for the United States. For example, the United States finds itself increasingly competing for access to critical and finite natural resources. Perhaps the most salient example of U.S./Chinese competition for rare earth minerals is cobalt in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In 2016, China purchased one of the world’s largest cobalt mines in the Congo and now

controls 60 percent of global cobalt reserves.<sup>xxi</sup> Control of strategic supply chains for battery minerals, like control of oil during the 20<sup>th</sup> century, can hold geopolitical significance for the United States in an era of increasing strategic competition.

Second, the United States seeks to promote its values in Africa. Upholding the liberal international order, which rests on concepts such as free trade, democratization, human rights protections, and multilateral organizations – is a core component of U.S. grand strategy.<sup>xxii</sup> The 2022 National Security Strategy emphasizes that, “the foundational principles of self-determination, territorial integrity, and political independence must be respected, international institutions must be strengthened, countries must be free to determine their own foreign policy choices, information must be allowed to flow freely, universal human rights must be upheld, and the global economy must operation on a level playing field and provide opportunity for all.”<sup>xxiii</sup>

However, the western-led liberal international order is under duress in Africa, perhaps most prominently indicated by the phenomenon of democratic backsliding across the continent. Democratic backsliding (defined as “the state-led debilitation or elimination of the political institutions sustaining an existing democracy”)<sup>xxiv</sup> advanced in 2019 according to Freedom House, with freedom scores decreasing in 22 African countries.<sup>xxv</sup> The character of this backsliding is less often abrupt through coups (although there has been a slate of coups in countries such as Mali, Chad, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Sudan in the past couple years)<sup>xxvi</sup>, but also, “more by small, steady chips at democratic norms and institutions.”<sup>xxvii</sup> For embattled African leaders, or those whose tenure may be threatened by democratic practices, Russia and China offer an authoritarian alternative to the U.S. model which deliberately builds in restraints on leader actions through democratic processes and imposing moral constraints on domestic repression or control of media narratives. Chinese President Xi Jinping has been explicit that China offers a “new type of political party system” ready for export.<sup>xxviii</sup> China has taken steps to promote this alternative political system to leaders in Africa through initiatives such as sponsoring African politicians to visit China for training.<sup>xxix</sup> The liberal international order will need to compete with China’s model, and the more transactional partnership offered by Russia, in the new era of strategic competition.

Third, U.S. influence with African leaders can translate to influence in international organizations such as the United Nations. Scholars often employ United Nations voting patterns as a quantifiable indicator of shared interests or political closeness between states.<sup>xxx</sup> The fact that Africa constitutes one of the largest regional voting groups at the United Nations is highlighted in the first paragraph of the August 2022 *U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa* published by the White House, indicating the Biden/Harris administration is well aware of this dynamic.<sup>xxxi</sup> The United States, Russia, and China may seek to curry favorable voting patterns from African partners through establishing positive ties. In a recent example of how Russian influence may damage U.S. interests beyond the continent, General Stephen Townsend (Commanding General of U.S. Africa Command) testified, “It was troubling to me that half of the continent’ did not vote to condemn the Kremlin for its invasion of Ukraine in a March 2 U.N. vote. Many African nations abstained from the vote, which Townsend described as ‘biding their time.’”<sup>xxxii</sup>

Fourth, the United States may seek to impose costs on Russia and China by disrupting their objectives. The United States can entangle its competitors (or vice-verse) in costly African imbroglios as a form of disruption or to provoke over-extension; imposing costs and provoking overextension are historical objectives for proxy warfare.<sup>xxxiii</sup> In the words of James Resenau, great powers may seek to, “test each other’s strength and contest each other’s influence through

involvement in the internal wars of small neutral nations.”<sup>xxxiv</sup> If done successfully, supporting a combatant in a civil war may offer a “low cost” means to impose costs on another third-party, without needing to become directly involved in the conflict. While some may caution against competing in Africa for the sake of competition, the prevalence of proxy conflicts in Africa and around the world, during the Cold War and today, suggests that imposing costs may be a motivation for some interventions. Importantly, the desire to impose costs does not need to be mutually exclusive from economic, values, or diplomatic motivations to compete.

### **(3) Transnational Threats in and from Africa**

The desire to mitigate threats posed by transnational threats such as terrorism, contagious civil wars that tend to cross borders into neighboring countries, and contagious diseases that threaten the world, has led to repeated intervention into Africa by the United States and its western allies. In an increasingly globalized world, what happens in Africa may not stay in Africa. The negative externalities associated with terrorism, civil war, pandemics, climate change, and other forms of human tragedy are increasingly capable of crossing borders both within Africa, and to the United States and its allies.<sup>xxxv</sup> While transnational threats emanating from Africa may not be the United States’ number one source of concern, they nonetheless often serve as a chief challenge for America’s allies and require attention, even if as a peripheral but important concern. As just a few examples of the many more transnational threats the United States needs to keep a finger on, we can consider terrorism, climate change, and pandemics.

#### ***Terrorism & Civil War***

At a time when the United States is transitioning from a primary focus on terrorist threats to strategic competition, U.S. counterterrorism commitments in Africa are declining. Under the euphemism of “optimization”, the United States has sought to reduce its military footprint and investments across the continent.<sup>xxxvi</sup> Nonetheless, the threat of terrorism and negative externalities from civil wars endures. In the realm of terrorism, both the Islamic State and al-Qaeda have burgeoning branches across Africa ranging from Somalia, to Mozambique, to Mali. These affiliates have attacked western interests in Algeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Kenya, and Somalia – and plotted direct attacks against the United States and its European allies.<sup>xxxvii</sup> In addition to direct attacks on U.S. interests, instability caused by internal conflict and violent non-state actors can drive refugee flows and damage U.S. economic interests within African countries. Six of the top ten refugee crises in 2022 are emanating from conflicts in Africa.<sup>xxxviii</sup> Many refugees fleeing conflict in places such as Libya, West Africa, and the Horn of Africa end up in Europe.<sup>xxxix</sup> A particularly concerning characteristics of civil wars in Africa is that if left unchecked they have potential to expand regionally; transnational linkages often lead civil wars to become a geographic contagion as violence spills over from country to country.<sup>xl</sup> This phenomena, which has many second-order negative impacts for political and economic stability on the continent, can be observed in the Lake Chad Basin where Boko Haram operations in the border regions between four states, and in the Sahel where internal violence which was concentrated in Northern Mali is now threatening the Gulf of Guinea littoral states.<sup>xli</sup> Civil wars and terrorist groups in one country lead to negative consequences more broadly which puts pressure on the United States to intervene militarily.

### *Climate Change*

The impacts of climate change and resource scarcity in Africa are catastrophic, even as developing countries are the least equipped to mitigate climate change's negative effects.<sup>xlii</sup> In Africa specifically, the most vulnerable populations are the hardest hit by climate change.<sup>xliii</sup> Climate change in Africa is driving resource scarcity, which in turn sets conditions for internal conflict, interstate war, refugee flows, terrorism, and humanitarian crisis. In addition to climate change driving instability in Africa, the United States will also be impacted by how Africa manages its own natural resources, particularly as the expansive Congo Basin rain forest is a source of important biodiversity and oxygen generation at the global level.

Lake Chad provides just one of many examples of how climate change is exacerbating the drivers of instability and humanitarian crisis in Africa. Lake Chad, which sits at the intersection of four countries (Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon), has reduced by 90 percent since the 1960s, depriving the region of a critical source of water.<sup>xliv</sup> This in turn has resulted in food insecurity, introduced shock to traditional economies, and set conditions for the rise of violent non-state actors, most prominently Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa.

Concerns over water scarcity are also driving interstate tension on the continent; for example, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which allows Ethiopia to control the Nile's water flows to Egypt downstream, is driving tensions between the two countries which, at its worst, could escalate to armed conflict.<sup>xlv</sup> On the other hand, climate change and certain economic activities such as palm oil plantations and logging that lead to deforestation may reduce the capacity of the Congo Basin's rain forest, the second largest in the world, from being able to absorb carbon dioxide.<sup>xlvi</sup> The negative impact of climate change and deforestation within Africa impact countries around the world.

### *Infectious Disease*

As the Covid 19 pandemic makes clear, international borders hold little stopping power for the spread of infectious disease. Regions with underdeveloped health care systems and poor sanitation serve as incubators for disease onset and mutation. The emergence of infectious diseases is associated with multiple factors that are overrepresented in Africa: "microbial adaptation and change, human susceptibility to infection, climate and weather, changing ecosystems, human demographics and behavior, economic development and land use, international travel and commerce, technology and industry, breakdown of public health measures, poverty and social inequality, war and famine, lack of political will and intent to harm."<sup>xlvii</sup> Out of a combination of humanitarian concerns, and concerns about regional and international spread of diseases, the United States sometimes intervenes against infectious diseases in Africa. As one example, from 2014-2016 an Ebola outbreak quickly spread from Guinea to both neighboring Sierra Leone and Liberia, and then continued to other regional countries and as far away as the United States and the United Kingdom; the outbreak ended up costing 11,325 lives.<sup>xlviii</sup> However, according to some forecasts the crisis could have caused well over one million deaths and much more economic and social damage without international intervention, to include U.S. military intervention, which helped mitigate the spread of Ebola and its further mutation.<sup>xlix</sup> The United States government and private donors are also involved in resources counter HIV campaigns and combating the spread of Malaria. The U.S. is the largest donor to address infectious diseases around the world with an annual budget totaling \$12.2 billion, of which a large portion goes to Africa.<sup>1</sup>

**The Values/Interests Paradox for U.S. Policymakers in Africa: Wagner Group Case Study**

A brief case study captures how economic interests, strategic competition, and concerns about transnational threats can overlap in Africa. It also highlights the fundamental challenge; a values/interests paradox exists where the United States may have to choose between promoting its values to African partners or sidelining its values in the name of competing with China or Russia. Addressing this paradox will likely characterize U.S. bilateral engagements in Africa into the foreseeable future.

China and Russia are expanding their military footprint in Africa; for China this includes establishing its first overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017 and the deployment of Chinese-national United Nations peacekeepers in countries where China has significant economic investments.<sup>li</sup> Russia's military expansion includes "signing military deals with at least 19 countries since 2014 and becoming the top arms supplier to the continent."<sup>lii</sup> An additional component of Russia's military activity is the deployment of private military contractors from the Wagner Group to countries such as the Central African Republic, Libya, Sudan, and recently in Mali. In exchange for military support, African leaders often concede access to lucrative mineral rights or allow Russia to establish military bases in country.<sup>liii</sup> According to Raphael Parens at FPRI, Wagner has a three-tier approach to Mali: 1) "it conducts disinformation and pro-government information warfare strategies"; 2) "secures payment for its services through concession in extractive industries"; 3) Wagner supports (and participates) in the country's military operations.<sup>liv</sup>

Wagner Group support to Mali has presented a particularly robust challenge to the United States and its ally France as it may have provided the impetus for France's withdrawal from Mali in 2022.<sup>lv</sup> France, with both logistics and intelligence support from the United States, had initially helped Mali turn back a significant insurgent threat in 2013-2014 through *Operational Serval* and then continued to support Mali with counter-terrorism operations through *Operational Barkhane*.<sup>lvi</sup> However, France and more broadly the west's support to countries like Mali is often viewed as frustrating for African leaders due to conditionality placed on aid; western donors often push for reforms on matters such as good governance.<sup>lvii</sup> The Wagner Group's support is more transactional without concern for how the country governs, potentially providing an appealing alternative for African states. In the case of Mali, the military junta who took over in 2022 demanded France withdraw, at the same time expanding support from Wagner.<sup>lviii</sup> Extrapolating more broadly across the continent, "From the African point of view, Russia offers a strategic alternative to America's global hegemony, China's economic diplomacy, and the lingering influence of Africa's former colonial masters."<sup>lix</sup>

This presents a key challenge for the United States to reconcile in the age of strategic competition in Africa: how will it appeal to African leaders while at the same time advancing its core national interests of democratization and human rights protections? The 2022 National Security Strategy is recalcitrant on the U.S. commitment to promoting its values, stating with regard to Africa specifically that, "We will also press partners about human rights, corruption, or authoritarian behavior, and deepen partnerships with countries that make progress toward more open and democratic governance."<sup>lx</sup> While the weight of this challenge will vary from country-to-country, United States policymakers need to approach their engagement in Africa with the values/interests paradox in mind.

## Conclusion

Africa has significant potential; however, it remains to be seen whether the potential is positive or instead will lead to calamity both on the continent and beyond. This article has laid out three key areas where the United States has interests in Africa, to include Africa's potential as an economic engine for prosperity; Africa's role in broader strategic competition with China and Russia; and the importance of addressing transnational threats that may originate in Africa but have regional or global impacts. For each of these interests, it has identified a challenge. The drivers of Africa's economic prosperity may also drive instability. Strategic competition in Africa may challenge U.S. values and lead to over-extension if not managed carefully. And transnational threats are persistent but may be sidelined in an era where U.S. foreign policy is focused on strategic competition. U.S. foreign policy toward Africa will need to address these challenges.

However, we should not overstate Africa's relative significance in the context of broader U.S. national interests, nor the implications on the United States of whether it meets its potential positively or trends toward failure. For example, economically Africa has great potential, but also represents only a small portion of U.S. economic interests. Africa only accounts for about three percent of the world's GDP.<sup>lxi</sup> From 2019 to 2020, trade with sub-Saharan Africa constituted less than one percent of all U.S. trade globally.<sup>lxii</sup> And despite its strong potential, U.S. businesses approach it with skepticism and therefore reticence to invest. Even the potential for the most catastrophic success or failure in Africa should be weighed against its posture compared to other regions.

The same goes for competition with China and Russia; Africa matters, but not as significantly as the regions of East Asia where China is expanding its influence, or East Europe and the Middle East where Russia is exerting hard power politics to include its 2022 invasion of Ukraine. In the context of strategic competition, Africa remains an important but peripheral theater of competition – not the main show. In terms of transnational threats ranging from terrorism to infectious disease, they can be largely geographically contained with relatively small U.S. investments. While the U.S. effort to counter Ebola had an important impact, it was not a resource intensive investment either monetarily or politically for the government. As for terrorism, it is true that terrorism has spread in Africa over the past decade, as recognized by U.S. government officials.<sup>lxiii</sup> However, terrorist organizations in Africa are often oriented around local grievances and do not hold international ambitions, presenting a question of whether it is a core U.S. national interest to intervene against a terrorist group or within a foreign civil war when the United States' people and assets are not under imminent threat.<sup>lxiv</sup>

The conclusion is that while the United States does hold national interests in Africa and faces challenges to those interests from a combination of state actors, non-state actors, and geopolitical phenomena – any policy decisions and resource commitments must balance Africa's relative significance against other regions around the world.



### Suggested Readings

Tricia Bacon, Austin Doctor, and Jason Warner, “A Global Strategy to Address the Islamic State in Africa,” International Center for Counter-Terrorism, June 29, 2022, at <https://icct.nl/publication/a-global-strategy-to-address-the-islamic-state-in-africa/>.

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- <sup>i</sup> [U.S.-Strategy-Toward-Sub-Saharan-Africa-FINAL.pdf \(whitehouse.gov\)](#)
- <sup>ii</sup> [Statement by President Biden on the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit - The White House](#)
- <sup>iii</sup> [The new scramble for Africa | The Economist](#)
- <sup>iv</sup> [Nigeria'll be world's 3rd most populous country by 2050 | TheCable](#)
- <sup>v</sup> [Nigeria'll be world's 3rd most populous country by 2050 | TheCable](#)
- <sup>vi</sup> [US Foreign Aid by Country 2022 \(worldpopulationreview.com\)](#)
- <sup>vii</sup> [AID STATISTICS AT A GLANCE TO AFRICA \(oecd.org\)](#)
- <sup>viii</sup> Lujala, et al. (2010). "Valuable Natural Resources in Conflict-Affected States." *Adelphi Papers*, 50:412. 121-136.
- <sup>ix</sup> Lujala, et al. (2005). "A Diamond Curse? Civil War and a Lootable Resource." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 49(4). 538-545 and 559-560.
- <sup>x</sup> Collier, Paul. "The Market for Civil War." *Foreign Policy*. May/June 2003. 40-45.
- <sup>xi</sup> [Natural resources of Africa. Water, forest, land, mineral. \(ecoplanet777.com\)](#)
- <sup>xii</sup> [http://www.eia.doe.gov/oil\\_gas/petroleum/info\\_glance/petroleum.html](http://www.eia.doe.gov/oil_gas/petroleum/info_glance/petroleum.html).
- <sup>xiii</sup> As battery metals take on a strategic significance in many ways similar to the central role long played by oil, it will be very hard for developing countries with significant resources to keep their development trajectories from being hijacked by geopolitics.
- <sup>xiv</sup> [Biden-Harris Administration's National Security Strategy.pdf \(whitehouse.gov\)](#), p.43.
- <sup>xv</sup> [Biden-Harris Administration's National Security Strategy.pdf \(whitehouse.gov\)](#)
- <sup>xvi</sup> Bienen, Henry. "Perspective on Soviet Intervention in Africa". *Political Science Quarterly* Vol. 95, No. 1 (Spring, 1980), pp. 29-42 (14 pages)
- <sup>xvii</sup> [Countering Terrorism While Competing with Great Power Rivals: Mutually Reinforcing, Not Mutually Exclusive - Modern War Institute \(usma.edu\)](#)
- <sup>xviii</sup> [The new scramble for Africa | The Economist](#)
- <sup>xix</sup> [China Ramps Up Efforts to Control Media Narrative in Africa - Africa Defense Forum \(adf-magazine.com\)](#)
- <sup>xx</sup> [The new scramble for Africa | The Economist](#)
- <sup>xxi</sup> [Green Energy's Dirty Secret: Its Hunger for African Resources \(foreignpolicy.com\)](#)
- <sup>xxii</sup> Ikenberry, John. 2011. "The Rise of the American System." In *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American System*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Person, Robinson, and Smith FIR, pages 237-259.
- <sup>xxiii</sup> [Biden-Harris Administration's National Security Strategy.pdf \(whitehouse.gov\)](#)
- <sup>xxiv</sup> Bermeo, N. "On Democratic Backsliding". *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 27, no. 1, Jan. 2016, pp. 5-19.
- <sup>xxv</sup> [Freedom in the World 2020: A Leaderless Struggle for Democracy \(freedomhouse.org\)](#)
- <sup>xxvi</sup> [Coups in Africa: Why they don't spell the end of democracy - BBC News](#)
- <sup>xxvii</sup> [The quiet symptoms of democratic backsliding in Africa | The Hill](#)
- <sup>xxviii</sup> [Xi Jinping says China's one-party, authoritarian system can be a model for the world \(qz.com\)](#)
- <sup>xxix</sup> [China is training Africa's next generation of leaders \(qz.com\)](#)
- <sup>xxx</sup> [Data and Analyses of Voting in the UN General Assembly | Request PDF \(researchgate.net\)](#)
- <sup>xxxi</sup> [U.S.-Strategy-Toward-Sub-Saharan-Africa-FINAL.pdf \(whitehouse.gov\)](#)
- <sup>xxxii</sup> [AFRICOM: China, Russia Expanding Influence in Africa - USNI News](#)
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