Beginning in 2017, the current U.S. administration released a series of documents informing the world and domestic audience of its strategic priorities, objectives, and threats. Though the articulation of an “America First” posture generated fear (and to some extent excitement) of a U.S. retreat from global leadership, the narrative allows for collaboration with strategic rivals where possible, as much as it pronounces the importance of maintaining strategic alliances and partnerships. In terms of Africa, U.S. posture persists in the same vein as in previous administrations, grounded in the global concerns of terrorism and violent extremism, pandemics, humanitarian needs and natural disasters, transnational crime, trafficking, and maritime security. More recently, U.S. policy has begun to articulate Africa as the newest great power strategic battleground as China and Russia exert increasing influence. However, this competition framing elides the agency of the African states and people. Africans choose their partners more than they are coerced into cooperation, and have the capacity to solve transnational problems through African-led mechanisms. With a fast-growing population and emerging marketplaces, those that call Asia the present center of global financial activity should prepare for the African future.

To better position U.S. strategy for current and future challenges—in particular for the continent-wide trends heralding fragility and instability as much as opportunity—domestic political conversation about Africa should highlight African perspectives and potential, and the myriad ways African priorities align with U.S. principles, and can open up new opportunities for U.S. companies and partners. The American public tends to be poorly informed about world affairs in general, and Africa is no exception. Africa in the media is largely portrayed in stereotypical and highly inaccurate ways. These false assumptions and stereotypes have the potential to harm business prospects in Africa, which would impact both American and African interests. If the U.S. is to secure its primacy as an economic powerhouse and continue to wield influence at both the bilateral and multilateral levels, planning for ongoing strategic engagement with African states and institutions should be a priority. It is incumbent upon legislators, business leaders, and government officials to shift the domestic perception of Africa as an enduring basket-case, and create a unified approach to linking engagement with Africa and U.S. national interests. Africa is not a zero-sum enterprise. As this paper will demonstrate, America’s role in managing the complex relationships and dynamics on the continent benefits the U.S. taxpayer by enhancing global security and can continue to directly benefit U.S. citizens by seeking to capitalize on emerging opportunities. Leaving the continent to China, Russia, and others will only make it more difficult for the U.S. to lead in the future and will curtail U.S. enterprises from opportunities to benefit from the vast potential presented by strong African states. Furthermore, much more than economic considerations are at stake the United States should view African progress in democratization as squarely supportive of not only America’s interests but its values as well.

**Contemporary U.S. Engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa**

The tools of U.S. power when engaging foreign states—be they partners, allies, or rivals—are numerous, but typically categorized as Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economics (DIME). Contemporary U.S.-Africa engagement, though generally pursued across the spectrum, has over time concentrated on the use of Military approaches to the minimalization of Diplomacy, Information, and Economics. This shift is as much due to changing conditions on the ground—and perhaps elements of institutional myopia as the U.S. national security architecture focuses on instability rather than the pockets of stability and opportunity—as it is to domestic political priorities towards investing in foreign aid, interagency appropriations and priorities, and the transnational nature of terrorism and health threats. At a time when the rest of the world is leaning into Africa, the U.S. is paradoxically taking a “back seat” where it used to be the leader. Operating from the backseat, a
position consistent with isolationist positions articulated by a war weary and globalization leery American public, might actually result in an acceleration of dynamics and geopolitics that will leave America in a reactive, less beneficial posture than benefiting from a role in the economic and political driver’s seat.

U.S. engagement in sub-Saharan Africa endured its most dramatic shift in focus following the 1998 bombings of the embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Prior to 1998, the majority of U.S. activities in Africa prioritized health, development, democratization, and economic liberalization. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, what was once a narrowly defined region of interest became intertwined with U.S. national security concerns at the global level in a way it had not been since the Cold War. The U.S. response was to focus on counterterrorism, security cooperation, and strengthening the capacity of states to respond to evolving and expanding threats presented by violent extremist organizations and their international supporters. The establishment of USAFRICOM in 2007 was a clear signal that Africa was now a strategic military priority. The U.S. military footprint has expanded rapidly across the continent, from bases in Djibouti and Niger, to logistical supply points, enduring train and equip missions, partner capacity building, and special operatives in the hunt for terrorists across the Sahel. The expansion of security cooperation as the primary bilateral engagement with African states, though necessary to achieve short term security goals, has been problematic, as states with the potential for predation turn U.S. resources supplied for counterterrorism against civilians and political opposition.

Human security and development (health, food, sanitation, etc.) have long been U.S. priorities for engagement on the continent. U.S. aid to Africa nearly quadrupled from $1.2 billion in FY2006 to $6.9 billion in FY2011. Between FY1999 and FY2009, the United States provided over $10.1 billion to East and Central African countries and an estimated $2.2 billion to Southern Africa countries, cementing its status as the leading donor of assistance to Africa. During the 2014 Ebola crisis, the U.S. deployed thousands of troops to support pandemic response, as another example of U.S. commitment. In 2010, the U.S. introduced the “Feed the Future” initiative to address food security for vulnerable populations, as well as the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI) to support emerging leaders across the continent. In 2014, the U.S. held an African Leaders Summit, signaling the U.S. government’s desire to start a new era in the U.S.-Africa relationship, based on mutual respect and shared goals for the future. Although security concerns drive the core of contemporary engagement, the U.S. has long worked to foster economic growth and public-private partnerships through several mechanisms including the 2000 African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the 2013 “Power Africa” initiative.

Despite a plethora of U.S. initiatives, summits, funding assistance and bilateral support, a perception remains that the U.S. not only neglects or disregards Africa, but “never really made a concerted effort to develop its economic relations with the continent.” Unlike other assistance partners, the U.S. tends not to broadcast its contributions, preferring to allow local partners to be perceived by the populace as providing support—this strategy helps weaker states achieve legitimacy with populaces getting used to the idea that government provides services. However, taking a back-seat approach allows others (like China) to highlight their presence and contributions as though they are the only actor present. The complicated perception of U.S. contributions to African states only strengthened with the current administration’s announcement in 2017 to slash foreign aid to African nations (and others). The decision came in spite of the consensus within domestic and international development and security institutions that a stable Africa is a necessary bulwark against the spread of transnational threats, and impossible to achieve without continued U.S. assistance. The move to cut funding was ultimately dropped after a bipartisan outcry from Congress, on the grounds that the decision violated the constitutional role of legislators in determining budget priorities—notably, while some legislators were against the move because of the importance of relationships with recipient countries and benefits of
utilizing assistance to offset security challenges resulting from poverty and underdevelopment, there was less resistance to the central premise of the administration that it no longer supported foreign assistance.\textsuperscript{17} Regardless of the path chosen and the domestic political rationality behind decision-making, there is much work to be done to reaffirm the U.S. role in Africa and create a coherent internal and external narrative for its engagement.\textsuperscript{18} The specter of great power competition and the emergence of China as a major player provides bipartisan impetus for the U.S. to recast its role on the continent, which nevertheless must be tempered with a realistic understanding of the new strategic context.

**Competition and Collaboration in Context**

With the return of great power competition to the apex of the U.S. national security priority list\textsuperscript{19}—previously held by the threat of global terrorism—the domestic political discourse on U.S.-China relations has become the lens for policymakers to understand challenges to U.S. interests in Africa. When it comes to Africa, the preoccupation with great power competition dynamics oversimplifies complicated, enduring international relationships and rational strategic choices by African states regarding their littoral neighbors to the north and east. The focus on competition as the frame for all engagement limits options for whole-of-government approaches to U.S.-Africa policy (important in that it creates diverse points of access and engagement with African leaders in government and business), makes it difficult to identify existing goal alignments or opportunities for collaboration with strategic rivals, and reduces the space for the U.S. to contribute to positive norm-creation bilaterally and multilaterally. However framed, a clear-eyed understanding of what rivals and partners do and do not do in Africa is critical to identifying where U.S. engagement would be most impactful. In that vein, understanding what issue areas African states choose to pursue with U.S. rivals and partners is equally important. Placing competition and collaboration in context will aid policymakers in developing a holistic strategy for engaging African states and other international and regional actors.

**Competition**

*China:* U.S. policymakers often characterize China’s involvement in Africa as coercive and transactional. Through the expanding Belt and Road Initiative, China has invested in 56 African states and territories focusing on infrastructure, extractives, and recently on deep water ports on the east and western coasts. As investment increases, so have concerns that China will leverage the sovereign debt of African states to compel support for Chinese priorities on the continent and in the international arena.\textsuperscript{21} Though frequently deployed in administration statements about Chinese activities in Africa, this kind of “debt trap diplomacy” has yet to manifest in practice.

Of equal concern for U.S. policymakers should be the ways China has deployed soft power initiatives to complement their economic activities. As far back as the 1950s, China has brought young African leaders, bureaucrats, students, and business people—much like the contemporary Obama Administration YALI program—to Beijing to participate in technical training on party organization, politics, and cultural exchange.\textsuperscript{22} In 2000, China hosted the first Forum on China-Africa Cooperation,\textsuperscript{23} bringing the political leaders of the 54 African nations to Beijing. In 2018, African participation at the FOCAC was higher than at the United Nations General Assembly, in what could be viewed as a milestone in the Africa-China relationship, but more broadly an indication of the waning of Africa’s relationship with the West.\textsuperscript{24} Chinese citizens have immigrated to the continent in droves, seeking economic opportunity and providing additional cultural touch points between the nations.\textsuperscript{25} These and similar developments prompted fears that China seeks to export its governance model to vulnerable countries in the Global South. However, in the African case the impact on domestic governance norms is largely overstated.\textsuperscript{26} Prioritizing long-term economic agreements over short-term conditional, aid focused arrangements and engaging political leaders and African youths confer China’s view of Africans as
equals in partnership. From an African perspective China is demonstrating a level of commitment and whole-of-government (and society) focus absent from any other bilateral relationship.

Russia: Russia (formerly the USSR) has historically been involved in Africa through the lens of great power conflict and proxy warfare. During the Cold War, Africa was a battleground for the ideological fight of capitalism vs. communism, the U.S. vs. the USSR. In retrospect, Soviet involvement in Africa was as much part of the global conflict with the U.S. as it was self-interested on an economic and security basis. This posture is reflected in contemporary Russian involvement in Africa.27 Rather than the instigator of insecurity or self-interested opportunist, Russia is, from the African perspective, a legitimate and rational partner.

Since 2014, Moscow has signed 19 military cooperation deals in sub-Saharan Africa, including with the Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan, and Madagascar.28 While the U.S. might view these agreements as a threat to partnership with African states or markets, they are a manifestation of the long history of arms trade between Russia and the continent. Choosing Russian arms is a rational choice – the proliferation of Russian weapon platforms stemming from the Cold War and beyond means that, for the African countries that relied on them for decades, American systems are more expensive, harder to maintain, and less compatible with other platforms (see, Chinese). In the case of CAR, Russia was the only available choice to procure weapons and other military support after the UN sanctioned the state for human rights abuses during internal conflict. CAR approached Russia directly, with little evidence that there was a prior offer on the table. Where American security cooperation focuses on professionalizing, training, and equipping regimes, the freely traded weapons from Russia29 make forming influential bilateral relationships on a purely military basis alone a challenge for U.S.-Africa policy.

Red Sea and Gulf Dynamics: Russia and China are of specific interest to U.S. policymakers, conducting concerning activities on the continent, but it is the historical and enduring relationships with the Gulf States and other regional neighbors that present the greatest potential for spoiling, or supporting, U.S. strategic objectives. Clientelism—a political-economic approach coercive and exploitative in nature—characterizes the dominant form of interaction between Africa and the Gulf, particularly in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea region. In exchange for financial flows, Gulf states seek to shape policy preferences and the leadership and governance styles of their littoral neighbors. Albeit long-term, these relationships are inherently based in distrust, and do not enhance the agency or opportunity for self-determination desired by African nations. For example, the outcome of Post-Bashir Sudan, an arena where invested U.S. leadership and engagement could strongly impact the end state, is left to the machinations of Sudan’s neighbors—particularly Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. Despite a clearly articulated desire for civilian democratic governance by grassroots protestors, resolution of the crisis has been brought to a standstill as a result of the parochial interests of external actors, and their support for the Sudanese military.30 The role of key mediator, traditionally played by the U.S., is absent. The numerous security challenges and complicated regional and continental bilateral relationships in the Horn of Africa/Red Sea, beg for U.S. attention and engagement.31 Given the number of U.S. assets and trade-based relationships in the region, instability can have a direct impact on lives and incomes.

Collaboration

U.S. engagement in Africa with peers and rivals, though currently framed through competition (or political absence, as in the case of the Red Sea littoral), rests on a foundation of frequent collaboration, both at the bilateral and multilateral levels. The military complexes in Djibouti, representing at least five extra-regional nations.32 are a hub for maritime cooperation in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. European Union nations, U.S., China, and regional navies have in the past conducted anti-piracy exercises with a shared goal of
protecting the high volume of global trade passing through the area. It is in this space that the most frequent
U.S.-China collaboration occurred, and where the most beneficial norm creation could be possible. Both
countries have held bilateral counter-piracy exercises to promote “partnership, strength, and presence.”33

Similar security issues in West Africa also brought the two nations together. Beginning in 2011, the U.S. State
Department and Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs held bilateral consultations focused on “learning each
other’s priorities in their respective African policies and the new issues in their cooperation with Africa.”34 In
the change of administrations, the opportunities for such conversations have dwindled,35 likely impacting the
trend for future collaboration outside of strict security issues. Holding China at arms’ length in the region
means the U.S. has less visibility on their goals and objectives, or ability to set and guide precedent on Chinese
interactions at the bilateral level and as an emerging regional power. Looking ahead, the US should consistently
criticize aggressive Chinese behavior in Africa (the incident where China targeted U.S. air assets with lasers is
a notable event in this regard),36 but also seek to embrace opportunities for constructive coordination with
China on shared interests when possible.

Opportunities for Strategic Engagement

Given the historical and contemporary strategic context, and forecasts for the future of the continent,37 what
are opportunities for a revitalization of U.S.-Africa engagement? First, the U.S. must move beyond an
expectation of relationships, and demonstrate the enduring value of its investments, especially non-military.
For African states, there is no such thing as a preferred partner, or single partner strategy—and the question
remains as to why the U.S. believes such a thing should exist. Though much of the discourse focuses on
instability and fragility, several African states are emerging as mature, stable markets with the potential to drive
global economic growth. Accordingly, they seek mutually beneficial relationships that respect African
priorities and support states in reaching them.

The U.S. must respond in turn by shifting its engagements from crisis response and stabilization to
strengthening local markets and supporting African initiatives. The U.S. comparative advantage is democracy
and institutional strengthening,38 two areas that Africa’s youths have already demonstrated their willingness
to mobilize for change. Where entrenched political elites fear the impact of demographic change—most
recently manifesting in the grassroots movements toppling governments in Sudan and Algeria—the U.S.
should capitalize on the momentum and opportunity to be a key player in the development of new norms of
governance and democratic transition on the continent. The U.S. will not be able to compete with sweetheart
infrastructure deals or simply delivering arms. To better position itself to meet the challenges and
opportunities of U.S.-Africa partnerships, the U.S. should focus on humanitarian assistance, principled
development, and demonstrating long-term commitment to peace and prosperity by facilitating democratic
maturity and economic development/diversification. Focusing on these areas is consistent with the pillars of
our national security strategies, will create opportunities for state-funded and private sector organizations, and
open up a new frontier for American cultural and economic exchange and engagement.

Second, the U.S. cannot look at Africa in isolation, or its partnerships with other countries solely as threats to
U.S. national interests. Africa and Africans bear agency, not just at the state-bilateral level but also regionally.
The African Union (AU), though with challenges, is a positive example of a multilateral African organization
that has positively contributed to the development of shared norms and expectations of state behavior on the
continent. The U.S. should prioritize engagement with the African Union Peace and Security Council for
continent-wide diplomatic action, particularly around issues of civilian protection, human rights, and conflict
resolution. Other regional mechanisms are also ripe for engagement, from both a technical support and
economic policy perspective. Given evolving discussions on a continent wide free trade agreement, the eight
regional economic communities could present an opportunity to further shared goals. African states also have intergovernmental organizations that could be key to resolving regional challenges, such as the Lake Chad Basin Commission. Intergovernmental organizations can be an avenue to problem solve at the technical rather than political level, and further strengthen the efficacy and roles of African civil service professionals. Historic trust deficits and competition at the bilateral level within regional neighborhoods present the opportunity for the U.S. to serve as a neutral arbiter in supporting regional agendas on development, infrastructure, and other transnational issues like climate change, resource scarcity, or the continued threat of terrorism.

Investing in additional and deeper soft power engagement in Africa—without sacrificing counterterrorism and other security priorities—will require an increasing flow of funds to the U.S. Department of State, Agency for International Development (USAID), and grants for academic and civilian exchange programs. More importantly, achieving U.S. goals in Africa will require a change in narrative among domestic audiences and lawmakers in their understanding of the purpose and benefits of U.S. non-military activity abroad, and a coherent interagency strategy to achieve soft power goals. False assumptions and stereotypes have the potential to harm business prospects in Africa, which would impact both U.S. and African interests.

Past U.S. policies and programs in Africa benefitted from bipartisan support in Congress. A paradigm shift in U.S. strategic engagement with Africa can still be consistent with “America First” narratives of the current administration. Private sector expertise can serve a critical role in supporting efforts to strengthen African physical and digital infrastructure, creating jobs and deepening non-governmental relationships. Similarly, the U.S. can benefit from leveraging USAID’s regional trade and investment hubs more to strengthen U.S. commercial engagement on the continent.” Finally, increasing scholarship opportunities for African students, student exchange opportunities through programs such as Fulbright, and expanding Peace Corps programs could lay the groundwork for positive future engagements between Americans and Africans, demonstrating the value of cultural exchange and shared principles between peoples.

Conclusion

Framing the strategic relevance of Africa in terms of near peer competition is reductive, eliding opportunities for engagement and collaboration where they exist—both with our African partners and strategic rivals. China’s growing role on the continent, though a legitimate global security concern, can be an opportunity to coordinate and collaborate in developing a secure and stable Africa, to the benefit of all parties. Given the numerous historical relationships and equities articulated through bilateral and regional venues, it is in the best interests of all states to work together in the support and creation of strong, African-led multilateral mechanisms and venues to address shared threats. The U.S. is uniquely suited to contribute to Africa’s continued development as a strategically critical region. By utilizing a full spectrum of capabilities, the U.S. has greater potential to achieve its strategic objectives and secure an enduring role as a key diplomatic and economic partner to African states.

Endnotes

1 U.S. national security documents articulate the objectives and priorities of the U.S. Government, to domestic and foreign audiences alike.


9 U.S.-U.S.S.R. competition extended to Africa, where decolonization process provided opportunity to influence the newly birthed independent African states. The global clash of ideologies took place in Africa as much as it did Asia and Latin America.


12 Cite US-Africa Leaders summit USIP 2014: “some criticized the summit, saying that it was seen as “giving a pass to corrupt leaders who have failed their own people,” but others thought that it symbolized a well-deserved “recognition of the importance of Africa in global economics, trade, investment and global security.”


26 African elites are experts in state capture and cooptation—they have little to learn from the Chinese to this regard, and any offered authoritarian technologies/methodologies could only make the indigenous model more efficient, not more Chinese.
29 Security cooperation between the U.S. and partners is subject to numerous regulations, including Leahy Vetting. The term “Leahy law” refers to two statutory provisions prohibiting the U.S. Government from using funds for assistance to units of foreign security forces where there is credible information implicating that unit in the commission of gross violations of human rights (GVHR). See, the U.S. Department of State Leahy Fact Sheet. “Leahy Fact Sheet - United States Department of State.” U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State, n.d. https://www.state.gov/leahy-fact-sheet/.


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