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ABOUT THE REVIEW

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Dear Reader,

The efforts of the cadets, officers, and faculty members that have made this edition of Report possible have been commendable. On behalf of us all, it has been an honor. To our authors, editors, and advisor, thank you for your support and contributions to Report.

In 2022 the uncertain tides of 2020 gradually receded to reveal a familiar shore. Familiar but not the same. And as we all return to ‘life as normal,’ we here at Report are reminded that history is not cyclical. Just like the Earth, we do not revolve and return to the same point. We are pushed ever forward, gaining wisdom through experience and hindsight. We hope too to gain wisdom through history.

And on this, the 120th anniversary of West Point’s founding, we, the editors, would like to turn your attention to our founder, Thomas Jefferson. Ever the philosopher, student, administrator, and penman, we write this letter in the confidence that we are fulfilling (if not unpredictably) Jefferson’s ultimate vision for the United States Military Academy. On the topic of history, he once wrote:

History by appraising them of the past will enable them to judge the future; it will avail them of the experience of other times and other nations: it will qualify them as judges of the actions and designs of men; it will enable them to know ambition under every disguise it may assume; and knowing it, to defeat its views.¹

We feel that Thomas Jefferson’s thoughts on the value of the study of history are as important to us as they were for his contemporaries. Thank you for your support of cadet publications and Go Army, Beat Navy!

Sapienta Per Historiam,
William Hogan
Editor-in-Chief

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Dr. Mayer, what has your career as a professor looked like and where has it taken you?
“My career as a professor began when I was on active duty and mulling over options for the short, medium, and long terms. I decided to shift to the Army Reserve and enter the history Ph.D. program at the College of William and Mary, which would allow me to combine a never-ending interest in history, a desire to research and write, and a calling to teach. Reserve duty also worked well with grad school and an academic career, especially when I was able to use my research and teaching skills in military assignments. What I learned over the years certainly informed what I could and did do at the USMA this past year as the visiting Ewing Chair of Military History.”

Do you think there is a difference between how history is taught here at West Point and at other institutions you have taught at?
“The similarities and differences are intriguing and offer a way to evaluate institutional and personal priorities. History is a skill-based as well as content-rich discipline, and I’ve always taught the methods of research, writing, and analysis along with the narratives and sources that make History. How much and how deep, of course, depended on the level of the course and abilities of the students. A continuing issue at all schools, including at West Point, is how to balance skills and content. I have found that here as elsewhere the balance is difficult in the limited time available. We all keep working on it! Content knowledge in History is essential not just as a building block for continuing studies but also to use as context for participating in and decision-making as an active citizen in a republic based on democratic principles. Furthermore, the skills learned and applied in historical endeavors are essential to other fields and work including in the Army: I certainly used them as an intelligence officer.

What I’d like to emphasize is not so much how History is taught here but why it must be taught and why it is worth learning. History, like writing, is a form of code: it serves to communicate with and to understand each other within a culture, between cultures, and beyond the present. We must learn the code to be able to share and use stories to
find connections beyond such basic human ones as birth, food, and death. Doing History also fosters self-discipline (if you properly do the research and writing in a timely manner and plowing through the details like footnotes as well as reveling in interesting stories), self-criticism (evaluating and revising your own work), and the ability to critically evaluate public, professional, and personal events and actions. History promotes self-knowledge as well as shared knowledge.

History is not just storytelling; it is also a matter of creating and always evaluating and revising those stories. A possible analogy might be pulled from the fiction of *Jurassic Park* (yep, applying an old movie). To resurrect dinosaurs, enterprising (demented?) scientists take ancient DNA and fill in the helix holes with that from modern descendants to create new animals that are very like but not exactly the same as those that once roamed the earth. Historians use the evidence of the past, evaluations from other sources, plus their own assumptions (modern “DNA”), to build and present bygone peoples. When the evaluations or assumptions don’t fit or properly animate, historians try and try again. OK, so that may be a clunky analogy—which proves that you shouldn’t argue by analogy.”

**As a professor, have you noticed a difference between cadets and students you’ve taught at other institutions?**

“I did not see much of a difference between plebes here and freshmen elsewhere. Students in their first year of college generally come from similar high school experiences but with varied levels of preparation and motivation. That shows in the first assignments whether here at the USMA or in civilian schools, but how students progress appears a bit different. USMA requires plebes to attend class and pay attention (well, mental and physical presence are two different things) as an external discipline to help create self-discipline. Civilian schools are not as directive and therefore not all students develop the discipline as quickly. Those incentivized by scholarships and professional goals tend to develop faster, which may be the connection to cadets—and which is definitely seen by the time cadets hit their Cow and Firstie years. Cadets certainly have the incentive to succeed, for graduation guarantees entrance to a profession. Another difference is that a person has to be careful asking seniors at other schools about “what’s next” as they stare down graduation, but that’s not an issue with Firsties who readily talk about BOLC and first assignments. Huzzah!”
As a veteran yourself, why do you think the study of history is important for Army officers and military professionals?

“I’ve mentioned some of the more concrete reasons before, but another big one is that studying history helps you avoid tunnel vision when looking at the present: it provides context. Studying history is also a reminder to be careful when making short-term decisions for they will likely have long-term consequences. But let me get a little more metaphysical here. West Point talks about the “Long Grey Line,” but what about the greater military community? The study of history helps in the questioning, understanding, and formation of identity and community. That includes understanding when, where, how, and why the Army and its members fit into the history of the nation. The military community may be defined horizontally, as it were, in terms of the present members but also vertically or in multiple dimensions in that today’s military community incorporates the past community and will inform the following one and its members—you—are part of that!”

As a final question, what advice would you give to West Point history majors who are about to graduate?

“Keep reading history, don’t stop now just because you don’t have an exam on it. Reading history, visiting historical sites, and attending historical conferences or other events all are part of self-education, which is a life-long challenge and reward. Just think—the longer you live, the more history for you to read and to make.”
Gender Roles on the American Frontiers

Ramsey Rouabhia

The American frontiers during the nineteenth century have been a great source of contention in historical communities for decades. The time period’s rapidly changing gender roles and perceptions have been hotly debated for much of the latter half of the twentieth century through today. With the rise of discussion of gender in historical debate, eyes are shifting to the gendered dynamics of the frontier on the American West to try to explain the development of gender roles. Much attention has been granted to women’s history on the western frontier, where the general consensus is that women largely transported traditional, eastern gender norms and roles with their movement to the West. This idea is not unchallenged though, some historians have countered this and argued that a new and unique female frontier emerged in the West during the late nineteenth century. Men’s history of the frontier has taken on a similar theme in recent years—historians generally agree that the definition of masculinity has changed from early settlement of the West through the late 1880s and 1890s to account for changing perceptions of violence and ruggedness. Historians generally agree that masculinity in the early nineteenth century was defined by the aforementioned violence and ruggedness, while masculinity’s definition by the turn of the century no longer valued errant violence. The debate over femininity is rather contentious, while discussions of masculinity appear to have found some consensus.

Johnny Faragher and Christine Stansell built a narrative in their article, “Women and Their Families on the Overland Trail to California and Oregon, 1841-1867,” of women on the frontier that supports the notion that women largely did not have a unique place on the frontier. They claim that women often were forced to move westward by excited husbands and sometimes fought, even violently, against moving their families. To Faragher and Stansell, there was little room on the frontier for women. Women moving to the West fought to maintain their separate societal spheres, and thus, femininity did not meld well with the nature of the frontier. In contrast to what Faragher and Stansell have argued defined femininity on the frontier in the nineteenth century, Lucy Jane Bledsoe

argues in her article, “Adventuresome Women on the Oregon Trail,” that women took on an active and unique role on the Oregon Trail from approximately 1840 to 1867. Whereas Faragher and Stansell argue that the Oregon Trail left little place for women but as followers to their husbands, Bledsoe counters that the Trail offered many new opportunities for women to achieve various degrees of independence. She begins by citing the major flaws in the aforementioned historians’ argument. First, she argues that they ignore “powerful influence of personal experience”—meaning women’s reality was not perfectly in-line with ideal “female behavior.” Second, these historians fail to account for the changing concept of domesticity. Bledsoe argues that the ideology could change to include much of the trail experience. Third, these historians exclude the experiences of the exceptions. Many women simply did not conform to ideal female behavior.

Bledsoe then goes on to describe what she sees as the female role on the Oregon Trail. By mainly analyzing journals kept by women along the Trail, she is able to explain that women were involved in changing the frontier with traditional female roles, traditional male roles, and entirely new roles which the trail movements necessitated. These three role-sets included cooking, baking, guiding, driving, pitching tents, loading and unloading the wagons, and participating in decision-making. The female role rapidly expanded along the Oregon Trail, she explains, as husbands died in skirmishes with Indians or accidents, and as the workload simply grew beyond what men alone could handle. Bledsoe makes a strong argument to explain how certain women’s roles on the Oregon Trail complicated the notion that women were generally “dragged” to the West by their husbands and maintained their traditional, eastern gender roles throughout the journey. However, Bledsoe fails to adequately challenge and negate the arguments presented by Faragher and Stansell. Her evidence is scant—limited to diaries and journals which tell the stories of a number of women on the first order of magnitude. Although they also cite evidence from diaries and journals, Faragher and Stansell heavily lean on the works

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2 Ibid.
4 Ibid., 23.
5 Ibid., 25.
6 Ibid.
of other women’s historians and scholars, such as Catherine Beecher, expanding their relative number of source-women to roughly an order of magnitude greater than the number of women examined by Bledsoe. In addition, Bledsoe fails to address the role of women beyond the trail movements, an area of dynamic gender roles which Faragher and Stansell do address. They contend that the end of the Trail, for both men and women, was “a land where they could renew their domestic mission.” This explains that, in general, women and men who moved onto the western frontiers did so intending on transplanting eastern ways and traditions onto the frontier. In summary, although challenged by Bledsoe who claims that women had a prominent, expanded role on the Oregon Trail, Faragher and Stansell provide a strong argument that women on the Overland Trails to Oregon and California maintained a limited sphere of their own. Although exceptions certainly exist, as cited by Bledsoe, the reigning trend on the Overland Trails was for women to remain in the female sphere.

In some areas, Bledsoe actually supports Faragher’s and Stansell’s argument more than she negates it. Of note is her aforementioned description of women’s roles on the frontier. Bledsoe argues that the conditions of the frontier necessitated women taking on traditionally male or “unladylike” roles. This point was first raised by Faragher and Stansell who cite women collecting buffalo dung (known as chips) for fuel, driving wagons and livestock, making bullets, and standing guard against Indian threats. Faragher and Stansell explain that these roles did not create a new niche for women to fill on the Overland Trail, as Bledsoe claims, but rather created additional chores for women to complete. They argue that these new tasks that women took on remained nested in the “expectation that work was divided along gender lines.” So, while Bledsoe does bring up a significant amount of evidence to show that women experienced and sometimes enjoyed an expanded role, she does not successfully negate Faragher and Stansell who effectively assert that the female and male spheres remained segregated and interactions between them did not change, despite the changes in labor within each sphere. They write that “By midjourney, most women worked at male tasks. The men still retained

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7 Faragher and Stansell, “Women and Their Families on the Overland Trail to California and Oregon,” 152.
8 Ibid., 161.
9 Ibid., 155.
10 Ibid., 156.
dominance within their ‘sphere.’”\textsuperscript{11} Women, although frequently working traditionally male jobs, remained subordinate to men along the trail. Bledsoe does offer evidence of women taking on leadership roles or even commanding men on the trail, however, she does state that in these cases, “women were considered unladylike when they spoke up or took control of a situation.”\textsuperscript{12} In the cases where women did break their subordination to their husbands and other men on the trails, they did so only in extremis situations, according to the evidence which Bledsoe provides. \textsuperscript{13} In summary, although examples of independent women on the trail exist, they are rare. Bledsoe does provide the historical community with well-researched case studies of women on the trails; however, she does not effectively negate Faragher and Stansell’s claim that women maintained a separate, traditional female sphere on the Overland Trail. Faragher and Stansell’s point of view certainly holds up against the evidence and argument that Bledsoe brings, and remains the “industry standard” of women’s role on the Overland Trails.

The role of women on the frontier cannot be examined only along the trails that led women there. Women experienced very dynamic roles on the American frontier, as written by Nancy Taniguchi in “Weaving a Different World: Women and the California Gold Rush.” Although Taniguchi extensively writes about Indian and Hispanic women’s experiences, this paper will continue to focus on the experiences of women who settled from the Eastern United States—“Yankee” women. The early female settlers to California, Taniguchi writes, entered either “traditional or new labor categories largely determined by the desires of the women themselves.”\textsuperscript{14} She finds that settlers, relatively later in the settlement process, transplanted eastern societal values and gender norms. This process was generally attributed to men, she argues.\textsuperscript{15} Taniguchi’s examples of the early expanded roles of women in California include prostitution, acting, and theatre management. She focuses on the roles played by certain women, such as Ah Toy, a Chinese immigrant who found success as a prostitute; Lola Montez, who earned fame as a dancer and

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., 157.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 25.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
actress; Lotta Crabtree, another actress who was mentored by Montez; and Sarah Kirby, the first female theatre manager. These non-traditional female roles, Taniguchi explains, were largely driven by the demand which the high proportion of men living in California created—there simply was an off-balanced supply-and-demand system that women began to fill. However, by 1953, “the force of female moral suasion overruled the world of vice,” and women began to recreate their traditional, eastern roles. Women in nineteenth century America derived their social power in moral suasion—the idea that women are society’s moral compass; the force which contains the volcanic, uncivilized nature of men. As such, Taniguchi claims, women sought to regain their value and power through domesticity by running boardinghouses and organizing religious institutions. Both Catholic and Protestant organization quickly took place in California right after the initial waves of miners settled. In short, Taniguchi’s narrative tells that Yankee California women entered the frontier in unique, non-traditional roles, yet frontier society quickly cordoned women off to their traditional spheres that the eastern United States relegated them to.

Taniguchi’s narrative fits with and is complimented by both Faragher and Stansell’s and Bledsoe’s Overland Trail narratives. Bledsoe’s concept of unique roles developing for women on the Trail certainly is supported by the early phenomena in California of women taking on new jobs as independents. In addition, the “separate spheres” narrative of Faragher and Stansell seems to have quickly displaced the new and unique roles that women found themselves in. Based on the three of these articles, accounts of the role of women on the frontier do not particularly change between trail accounts and settlement accounts. In both cases, while some historians find multiple accounts of prominent, independent women, the majority of accounts that exist tell of women who lived in an eastern, segregated sphere of society.

Although slightly outside of the time frame of this paper, it is helpful for perspective to examine Women in Kentucky by Helen Irvin. Chapter one, “The Settlers,” discusses the settlement pattern of women in the Kentucky frontier in the 1770s through 1790s. Irvin reports very similar findings as Bledsoe does. She explains that “some women came to Kentucky on their own,” and that “many young, unmarried women… had

16 Ibid., 153-156.
17 Ibid., 157.
18 Ibid., 157-162.
ventured to risk themselves in Kentucky.”\textsuperscript{19} She also discusses women who took on independent careers as shop and tavern owners.\textsuperscript{20} Irvin argues that women settlers in Kentucky played an integral role in the Anglo settlement of the state and region, living in rough settlements as members of families and as single, independent women. These claims fit mostly with the narrative that Bledsoe and, to some degree, Taniguchi build. In general, Irvin makes claims that fit with the “independent settler women” narrative which seems to clash with the “subordinate settler women” narrative that Faragher and Stansell have written about. The different region and time frame that Irvin writes about complicates comparison to some degree, however, that Irvin is a contemporary of Bledsoe, Faragher, and Stansell tells us that the historical community viewed various gender frontiers holistically in narrative forming.

The role of men on the American frontier is more consistently explained among historians than the role of women. Historians generally agree that the definition of masculinity generally valued independence, ruggedness, and connection to the natural world in the early frontiers. In his article, “The Mountain Man as Jacksonian Man,” William Goetzmann argues that Mountain Men, whom he defines as 19\textsuperscript{th} century fur trappers who mostly worked for large fur companies, were an embodiment of the Jacksonian values of the time period—the presidencies of Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren.\textsuperscript{21} Although Goetzmann does not explicitly mention gendered notions of masculinity, his article is riddled with gendered undertones which fall in line with other historians’ definitions of the male gender role and masculinity. He explains that there are three senses where the comparison of the Mountain Man to Jacksonian Man are important—first, he says, is the “incredible rate and the surprising nature of social and economic change in the West.”\textsuperscript{22} Second is that the “Mountain Man looked to the future and the development of the West.”\textsuperscript{23} His third and final point explains that the Mountain Man “were most eager to see to it that such [a settler’s] future was guaranteed by the institutions of the United States Government which must be brought West.”\textsuperscript{24} In short, Goetzmann

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\textsuperscript{19} H. D. Irvin, \textit{Women in Kentucky} (The Kentucky Bicentennial Bookshelf, 2009), 14.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 14-15.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 413.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 414.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.
\end{flushleft}
implicitly argues that the link between the legendary, rugged Mountain Man and the common Jacksonian Man exists in the second word of either phrase. Both the Mountain Man and the Jacksonian Man relentlessly pursue “Settlement, security, stability, enterprise, free enterprise, a government of laws, which, in the words of Jackson himself confines ‘itself to equal protection, and as Heaven does its rains, showers its favors alike on the high and the low, the right and the poor,’ all of these shaped the Mountain Man’s vision of the West and his role in its development.” The list of values which both Jackson and the Mountain Man sought fit cleanly in the generally-accepted definition of masculinity on the American western frontier during the nineteenth century. As such, Goetzmann implicitly provides a definition of masculinity in his article within his interpretation of the relationship between the Mountain Man and Jacksonian America.

Jacqueline Moore, writer of “’Them’s Fighting Words’: Violence, Masculinity, and the Texas Cowboy in the Late Nineteenth Century,” seeks to define masculinity within the scope of Texas cowboys. She finds that in the early days of the cowboy in about the early 1860s, among working class men, saloon drinking, and therefore, drunken violence, was a prime mark of masculinity. Upper class men saw drinking as a “barrier to manhood” and chose to avoid it. Texas, over time, began to form a definition of masculinity which left little room for violence. By the 1890s, the cowboy’s appearance, demeanor, and habits were frequently degraded by journalists for his perceived lack of morals. This marked a shift in Texas’s society where masculinity’s definition valued “civilized and restrained” forms of violence to maintain the peace in society. The ideal man, by the 1890s, was the professionally-dressed breadwinner—no longer was he a rugged cowboy. Moore’s definition matches well with Ryan Dearinger, author of “Violence, Masculinity, Image, and Reality on the Antebellum Frontier,” who discusses the relationship between honor, violence, and social class. On the antebellum midwestern frontier, Dearinger finds that masculinity primarily was defined by duel culture. A refusal to duel was considered unmanly and dishonorable. This nests well with the early Texan definition

25 Ibid., 415.
27 Ibid., 54.
of masculinity brought by Moore, who explains that an aptitude towards violence characterized masculinity there. This definition of masculinity lingered on to the Alaskan frontier, through at least the 1990s, in fact. Sine Anahita and Tamara Mix, in “Retrofitting Frontier Masculinity for Alaska’s War Against Wolves,” argue that notions of violent masculinity perpetuated Alaska’s pursuit of wolf population control for decades. In addition, they introduce the concept of man as a familial protector or provider to help explain Alaska’s wolf campaign. This pulls the Alaskan frontier all the way back to Goetzmann’s Jacksonian Mountain Man, whose aim was to settle and conquer the West for his children’s children. Drawing from these four writers, the definition of masculinity on the frontier has a general historical consensus. In the antebellum frontier, masculinity was defined by ruggedness and violence. As the frontier “civilized,” masculinity shifted away from wild ruggedness toward civil professionalism.

Among historians focused on women’s history on the frontier, two main camps emerge. The first argues that a significant number of women contributed to the frontiers as independents, entering into new roles and unique opportunities previously unavailable to them in the East. Bledsoe and Irvin fall squarely into this camp, both arguing that this phenomenon took place on the Oregon Trail and the settlements of Kentucky, respectively. The second camp argues that the majority of women became tied to traditional gender roles at some point in their lived upon moving West. Faragher and Stansell argue that this took place along the movements to California and Oregon. Taniguchi lends to both camps, yet mostly falls in the latter. She argues that a significant number of women found themselves in independent and new roles at the beginning of California’s Anglo settlement, yet Anglo-Californian society quickly developed to mirror that of the eastern US. Women, in order to preserve their societal power, rebuilt the eastern gender roles that granted them moral suasion.

Masculinity’s definition has a stronger consensus among historians. Most historians agree that masculinity changed throughout the nineteenth century, shifting from a definition which valued violence, ruggedness, and Jacksonian independence, to one which made less room for fighting. Works by Moore, Dearinger and Goetzmann help us understand antebellum masculinity, while both Moore and Anahita and

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Mix help build a narrative of masculinity as it underwent changes toward the end of the Turnerian frontier.

Works Cited


The Unified Exception: The Success of Post-War Ethnic Integration in Bosnia’s Brčko District

Mark Grujic

Introduction

The modern state of Bosnia and Herzegovina is best known for the horrific events that transpired as Yugoslavia descended into chaos in the 1990s, a time of brutal conflict between nationalist factions which reached its climax in ethnic cleansing. This period of war between rival ethnic groups created deep divides in the fabric of Bosnian society, and the reconstruction of a modern, functional state was only brought about with immense effort on the part of the international community. Yet almost thirty years later, true social and political integration continues to be an elusive goal. Much of the state’s governing powers remain in the hands of entities that correspond to Bosnia’s ethnic groups, and the widespread phenomenon of ethnically segregated schools persists to this day.\(^1\) However, far greater levels of cohesion and unity than those seen throughout the country at large are today present in Bosnia’s multiethnic Brčko (roughly pronounced “burch-koh”) District, a situation perhaps best exemplified by Brčko’s status as Bosnia’s only region to have achieved a universally integrated school system.

In fact, Brčko is the only part of Bosnia to have integrated all public institutions to operate on the basis of a fully multicultural model.\(^2\) Residents across all ethnic groups have shown high levels of support for these institutions, and the district likewise has experienced high levels of refugee return coupled with markedly low levels of post-war ethnic violence.\(^3\) In this article, I contend that the roots of this disparity between Brčko and Bosnia at large lie in the nature of the distinct peacebuilding process that Brčko underwent, specifically the decisions of international administrators to exclude ethnocentric factions and aims starting with the early years of the peacebuilding process. In doing so, I focus on the impact

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of the internationally directed policy to delay substantive districtwide elections until 2004, which mitigated the influence of local nationalist sentiments in the building of sustainable, inclusive institutions in Brčko. Furthermore, I go on to examine the process by which Brčko’s schools were integrated in the face of local nationalist opposition to highlight the effective use of calculated noncollaboration in pushing forward a policy that today serves as a cornerstone of a unified Brčko. Central to this argument is the notion that Brčko did not vary from other regions of Bosnia to an extent which would have accounted for its integrative success, a point to later be established.

A Shared Homeland

The decisions that culminated in the unique and successful administration of Brčko were shaped by the events that transpired throughout the Bosnian War, a conflict between the three constituent ethnic groups in Bosnia. Although these groups—Croats, Serbs, and Bosniaks—share the common language often referred to as Serbo-Croatian, they are regarded as distinct peoples on the basis of little else but religion. Croats largely identify with Catholicism, Serbs with Eastern Orthodoxy, and Bosniaks, at times simply referred to as Bosnian Muslims, with Islam. Severe ethnic conflict before the Yugoslav Wars did characterize the region in periods including World War II, which saw the systematic killings of hundreds of thousands of Serbs. Yet the almost fifty years which followed this period of chaos saw nationalist ideas brutally suppressed under the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Historically, Bosnia was not regarded as belonging to any one of these peoples but rather as a land its constituent peoples shared. No ethnic group formed a majority in Bosnia, nor was the region cleanly divided along ethnic lines. Peoples were widely dispersed throughout the entirety of Bosnia, and in only a quarter of Bosnian municipalities was there an ethnic group that made up over seventy-five percent of the population.

Bosnia’s ethnic makeup thus made for a highly divisive issue when

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it came time for the region to decide its fate amidst secessionist movements throughout Yugoslavia and war in Croatia. At the start of 1992, the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), Bosnia’s ethnic Serbian party, proclaimed an autonomous Serbian republic later to be known as the Republika Srpska (RS). Backed by the Yugoslav government in Belgrade, the RS came to control about seventy percent of Bosnia’s territory in a three-way civil war between Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks.8 Brčko at this time fell under RS control and was subject to ethnic cleansing of non-Serbs in the downtown area. This took place in large part through forced relocations in line with the atrocities wrought throughout the rest of Bosnia, stopping short of the massacres which occurred in certain locations like Srebrenica. Brčko occupied a strategic position as part of a narrow corridor which connected the western and eastern portions of the RS and was therefore highly contested throughout the course of the war. The city remained in Serbian hands until the formal end of the war, the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) in late 1995.9

At Dayton, it was agreed that the territory of Bosnia would consist of a single state split into two separate entities—the aforementioned Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a Bosniak-Croat state agreed upon by its two ethnic groups in 1994. The Office of the High Representative (OHR) was tasked with ensuring the civilian execution of the DPA. The office derived its authority from the consent of the Dayton signatories and its major officials were appointed by the United States and the European Union. Though OHR was not officially a body of the United Nations, the Security Council endorsed the responsibility of the High Representative, which further granted the international administration legitimacy.10 The wartime governing structures of the entities were largely left intact, and within the entities, the preexisting elite were granted broad discretion over their internal affairs,11 reflecting a focus on a pragmatic end to the conflict over the establishment of a strong federal government able to protect regional minorities and

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8 Moore, Peacebuilding in Practice, 44.
11 Zupečević, Merima, and Fikret Causevic, Case Study: Bosnia and Herzegovina. Centre for Developing Area Studies, September 2009, 11.
promote positive interethnic relations. However, it was expected that substantial reform would eventually come about from within, and the Dayton constitution thus included provisions that allowed for measures to easily strengthen the central government.\footnote{Bildt, Carl. “Bosnia to War, to Dayton, and to Its Slow Peace.” ECFR, 2021.}

Yet a significant, perhaps the greatest, point of contention in the Dayton negotiations was the post-war territorial status of Brčko, the Bosnian Serbs wanting a contiguous territory in part motivated by secessionist aims, and the other ethnic groups unwilling to empower the RS as such. The Agreement was only signed when both parties decided to commit to solving the question of Brčko via international arbitration within one year’s time.\footnote{Moore, Peacebuilding in Practice, 50.} Although it ended up taking well over a year to achieve a final decision, it was the model of governance that emerged from these arbitration proceedings that permitted Brčko to enjoy its relative success in the years to come. The American lawyer Roberts Owen, a man who drafted a great deal of the DPA, was selected to direct the arbitration process. He was in large part responsible for the stipulations of the 1999 Final Brčko Award, which gave the district full autonomy from the entities and placed the region directly under the control of Bosnia’s federal government. This decision reflected an aversion toward empowering either of the entities due to noncooperation on the part of the entities regarding refugee returns\footnote{Bieber, Florian. “Local institutional engineering: A tale of two cities, Mostar and Brčko.” International Peacekeeping 12 (2005): 426.} and a controversial election in parts of Brčko then held by the RS.\footnote{Moore, Peacebuilding in Practice, 69.} The OHR position of the Brčko International Supervisor, established to administer the district when arbitration was pending, was charged once more with governing the district.

The international administration was specifically tasked with creating multiethnic, democratic institutions in the region, in stark contrast to the approach taken at the statewide level where ethnic autonomy was largely preserved. To achieve these lofty aims, the Supervisor was granted comprehensive authority to reshape the structures of government in Brčko and even implement policy decisions unilaterally,\footnote{Jeffrey, Alex. “Building State Capacity,” 215.} powers which would have been risky to wield over Bosnia at large given potential entity backlash and the fragile nature of the peace in the region. Fear of entity encroachment in Brčko further pushed the international community to
institute a strong authority in the district. The role of Supervisor was one which numerous individuals would come to hold in the years to follow. Certain officeholders like Henry Clarke today stand out as especially successful, as will be seen, but nonetheless the early Supervisors were largely consistent in their aims and methods.

**Brčko’s Election Moratorium**

In seeking to establish a functional multiethnic democracy, those who held the role of Supervisor in the years immediately following the Final Brčko Award opted not to immediately hold elections, but instead delayed District elections until October 2004, wary of vesting authority in a political system rife with hardline nationalism, extreme polarization, and widespread corruption. Rather, they wished to wait for the emergence of non-ethnocentric political parties compatible with such a democratic system. Should the Brčko administration have followed the example of their national-level counterparts and have implemented elections early on, it is likely that Bosnia’s nationalist parties would have prevented the District’s collaborative, multiethnic institutions from coming into being as early as they did, if at all. This aversion toward empowering local governing structures in Brčko was expressed in a 2001 OHR publication that cited the District as a place where local authorities sought to act “as absolute monarch of the residents, their will, and property.” It was not simply the case that nationalism and distrust ran deep in Bosnian society—politicians further sought to leverage these tensions and anxieties for party and individual gain, often through the obstruction of unifying reforms.

Such an instance of partisan obstructionism at the federal level was covered in a special report by the United States Institute of Peace which discussed a 2006 attempt to codify a package of constitutional amendments. The package in question would have granted much-needed power to the Bosnian federal government. It was blocked by a nationalist Bosniak party, the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina, which sought to improve its share of the vote in the upcoming election.

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19 Zupcevic, Case Study, 11.
cynically framed the reforms as an internationally backed conspiracy to consolidate RS powers. However, in an early post-war Brčko, unelected politicians had little to gain from pandering to nationalist sentiments within their community. In fact, their positions were almost entirely contingent on the goodwill of the Supervisor, who had the power to terminate members of the Assembly at will. Therefore, even nationalists in the Assembly were incentivized to cooperate across ethnic lines and rarely raised an issue over smaller political decisions.\(^\text{21}\) OHR throughout all of Bosnia likewise reserved the right to fire any elected official, which it did rather often in early post-war years.\(^\text{22}\) However, the lack of elections in Brčko necessitated that the region’s politicians had to actively maintain the Supervisor’s favor to stay in power rather than merely avoid deeds that would have been perceived as overtly and sufficiently harmful to the peacebuilding process.

This delay thus played a significant role in allowing measures like a singular District administration undivided along ethnic lines to be implemented in Brčko, a complex task which entailed the unification of the District’s police, judicial, and education systems.\(^\text{23}\) These processes would have at the very least encountered far greater opposition should radical, elected Bosnian officials have been empowered to shape post-war restructuring processes. Throughout the rest of Bosnia, similar federal-level attempted reforms, many of which were relatively moderate and attempted later after the war than those in Brčko, were met with vehement nationalist opposition at every step. Elections would have also served to grant nationalist politicians electoral legitimacy and reaffirm the polarized power structure shaped by wartime political parties heavily at odds with one another.\(^\text{24}\) The successful establishment of these unified institutions in Brčko in turn helped to create the framework for the District to enjoy a functional multietnic democracy when elections were eventually held. Amidst a lack of territorial decentralization, ethnic groups were barred from the possibility of acting unilaterally within their own jurisdictions to pass necessary measures, further incentivizing interethnic collaboration.

All the while, in the absence of elections, international officials in

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Brčko sought to empower and create working relationships with moderates in the region who found themselves more willing to transcend ethnic divides and implement meaningful reforms. Figures who were willing to break from extremist agendas and the dominant nationalist parties in the region enjoyed protection from the supervisory administration when they charted independent, moderate courses, as was seen in the cases of Mio Anić and Ivan Krndelj, former members of the nationalist Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ). These local Croatian elites were supporters of a multiethnic administration and helped to prevent the HDZ from establishing influence within the primary local black market. In retaliation, the party sought to remove them from their posts, but OHR prevented this from taking place.

In creating the conditions whereby figures like Anić and Krndelj were able to achieve and maintain positions in power, politicians in Brčko who represented an alternative to the entrenched nationalist parties had a chance to prove themselves to the people before the eventual reassumption of elections. Supervisor Henry Clarke in fact stated that he was finally persuaded to call for the reinstatement of elections in 2004 after witnessing the results of a 2002 public opinion survey which showed that the District’s multiethnic institutions had achieved broad support among the general populace. His analysis proved correct, as the first District election resulted in a multiethnic coalition led by the moderate, multiethnic Social Democratic Party (SDP) at a time when moderates struggled to break into the political scene throughout the rest of Bosnia in the face of weak public support and opposition from the dominant nationalist parties. As a sign of further success, the mayorship of Brčko has since been held by Serbs, Bosniaks, and Croats alike, with transitions of power having been peaceful and overall uneventful.

The institution of elections early on in Brčko would not have afforded residents an opportunity to witness the viability of a multiethnic model before choosing their leaders and may have led to a situation similar to that seen in the Bosnian city of Mostar—where early elections bolstered the authority of Croat nationalist figures and weakened the standing of Bosnian moderates. To this day, feuds between nationalist parties continue to dominate the politics of Mostar. At the same time, it is

27 Clarke, “Brčko District.”
important to note that nationalist parties throughout Bosnia frequently had to deal with scandals which served to earn them the disdain of local residents, yet this alone was not sufficient to bring about political moderation and multiethnic collaboration. In the case of Mostar, a scandal attributed to the nationalist Party of Democratic Action (SDA) merely served to further empower the HDZ in the region.29

The favorable situation to emerge in Brčko was thus by no means inevitable nor attributable to factors inherent to the region, but rather a result of intentional measures on the part of OHR to stymie nationalist influence. There is little evidence to suggest that Brčko differed from the rest of Bosnia in a way which would have directly accounted for its profound eventual integration. Brčko did have high levels of pre-war Yugoslavism, that is, a sense of feeling of belonging to a greater Yugoslav nation rather than a sense of identification with a more specific ethnic group, but other regions with even higher levels of pre-war Yugoslavism were unable to overcome nationalist-driven divides in the way Brčko was.30 For instance, the region of Tuzla, which in the 1991 Yugoslav census had a three times greater share of citizens who identified primarily as Yugoslavs than was seen in Brčko, continues to have ethnically segregated schools into the present day. Furthermore, the aforementioned, relatively moderate SDP had a far stronger hold in Tuzla than it did in Brčko before the outbreak of war, a vote share of 30.72% versus 15.41%. Brčko was hardly predisposed to fare any better with ethnic reconciliation by virtue of the pre-war sentiments of its residents. Nor was it the case that OHR allocated a disproportionate sum of funds to the strategic district, with Brčko having received only $70 million in international aid by 2006 out of $16 billion given to Bosnia at large, less per capita than many cities, Mostar included.31

Likewise, the events that transpired in wartime Brčko were sure to have created deep ethnic divides, just as was the case in Bosnia at large. Brčko was one of the first regions in Bosnia to experience violence and ethnic cleansing. In May 1992, under the pretext of ensuring a contiguous Bosnian Serb territory, Serb authorities violently drove non-Serbs out of the downtown area, and a subsequent joint effort on the part of Croats and

29 Moore, Peacebuilding in Practice, 94.
31 Moore, Peacebuilding in Practice, 5.
Bosniaks to retake the city led to years of trench warfare.\textsuperscript{32} A \textit{New York Times} article from 2003 sought to depict the ensuing devastation years after the DPA, noting that over 9,000 houses had been destroyed as a consequence of the war, the town’s port and food-processing plants were in shambles, and land mines could be found throughout the surrounding fields.\textsuperscript{33} Brčko’s wartime past was contentious and dark, certainly not any less so than in Bosnia as a whole, but residents of the district were aided in one key respect to overcome their differences in a way that eluded the rest of their nation—a strong, fundamentally nondemocratic government willing to bypass divisive nationalist politicians in order to achieve integrative aims.

\textbf{Educational Integration in Brčko}

The positive impact of such conduct on the part of OHR is perhaps nowhere more evident than in the means by which the Supervisor brought an end to the segregated school system in Brčko. Continuing into the present day, Bosnian students often learn in separate settings on the basis of their ethnic group, impeding equitable distribution of educational resources and preventing valuable interethnic socialization which has the potential to foster positive attitudes toward multiethnic collaboration. Studies have in fact shown that ethnic attitudes are established early on in childhood with preestablished prejudices, whether positive or negative, tending only to strengthen over time.\textsuperscript{34} Ethnic groups in Bosnia also have broad jurisdiction over designing their own curricula, preventing a valuable opportunity to foster tolerance toward other groups.\textsuperscript{35} While children are invariably be influenced by their household environments and the views of family members, deliberately integrative curricula can work toward integrative ends by various means, including developing linguistic tolerance and fostering inclusive citizenship. Moreover, multiperspectivity in the classroom has been proven an effective means of cultivating tolerance and understanding alternative viewpoints. Yet children who attend segregated Bosnian schools are often subject to heavily biased teachings which pass existing tensions down to younger generations.

\textsuperscript{32} Moore, \textit{Peacebuilding in Practice}, 46.
\textsuperscript{34} Šarančić, “Multiethnic Schools,” 21.
\textsuperscript{35} Šarančić, “Multiethnic Schools,” 22.
It is thus no wonder that Supervisor Henry Clarke pushed for school integration with the fervor that he did, opting to impose total integration by means of a Supervisory Order when the Brčko Assembly found itself unwilling to pass a law that would have done as such. In a later speech, Clarke himself cited the value of the sweeping powers granted to him, as well as that of the firm and explicit mandate given by the Final Brčko Award to create a single, integrated school system. He found that such a mandate enabled him to mobilize all resources and means possible to bring such an objective about while also empowering him to overrule the Assembly, whereas the broadly nonspecific nature of OHR’s mandate over Bosnia as a whole often hindered progress toward solving contentious issues. For reasons previously established, a strong mandate in firm opposition to the existing political order would have been a far riskier task were it to have been implemented throughout all of Bosnia.

At the same time, this certainly does not mean that the realities of Brčko enabled the Supervisor to exercise unrestrained power in bringing about reforms. A previous attempt in 2000 imposed by Supervisor Gary Matthews failed when it sparked mass protests in October, forcing local schools to close until the changes were reversed. This prompted Clarke to engage in extensive dialogue with residents before his own later attempt, something which proved key to his eventual success. He met with citizens, educators, and officials alike, organizing over thirty public forums to achieve local support. Although the Assembly continued to stand defiant, by the time the new measure was imposed in 2001, integration was able to proceed with minimal public backlash.

Clarke’s approach to integration thus served to highlight a gap between Brčko’s politicians and everyday residents in the extent to which either group was willing to cooperate with international authorities. Invaluable public support was eventually achieved, yet at the heart of nationalist obstructionism were regional politicians who had much to gain from undermining OHR, individuals with whom Clarke could only collaborate up to a point. In an address to teachers in the region in the period following school integration, Clarke made note of the deliberate politicization of ethnic divides and in a later speech discussed the

36 Clarke, “Brčko District.”
37 Clarke, “Brčko District.”
38 Moore, Peacebuilding in Practice, 122.
presence of Assembly politicians who sought to obstruct educational reform in order to discredit the international reform process to their own gain.\textsuperscript{40} Given the nature of the post-war Bosnian political system, even the absence of elections was at times insufficient to secure collaboration with the nationalist elite, and thus bypassing local authorities was in certain situations the only means of recourse. The priorities of OHR were not irreconcilable with those of the Bosnian people but ultimately with those of nationalist political figures. Indeed, by 2004 it was found in a poll that almost ninety percent of District residents agreed with the notion of integrated education at a time when school integration remained a distant impossibility at the national level.\textsuperscript{41}

Integration efforts with respect to Bosnia as a whole were rendered distinctly less forceful due to two factors: a greater ability for nationalist officials to push back against educational reforms at the federal level and a widespread belief by federal-level administrators that Bosnians would need to assume ownership over their own peacebuilding process. National-level educational reforms were not dominated by OHR initiatives but undertaken in conjunction with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Union, and other regional organizations. Two major internationally directed approaches to reform were ultimately taken, with the goal in mind to depoliticize education and strengthen social cohesion within the state.\textsuperscript{42} While these methods were far more cautious and moderate in their ambitions than the total integration spearheaded in Brčko, both were still met with intense nationalist opposition. Furthermore, each effort was severely undermined by the sheer influence that the dominant nationalist politicians of Bosnia were allowed to exercise in the design and implementation of these reforms.

The first of these reforms was a system of school boards in part meant to promote interethnic cohesion at the local level and allow the community, as opposed to nationalist politicians, a greater say in educational policymaking.\textsuperscript{43} Yet the very same politicians whose influence the measure was meant to erode went on to occupy most of the seats on the newly established boards. The reform served to create the semblance of power distribution while allowing nationalists to continue to obstruct

\textsuperscript{40} Clarke, “Brčko District.”
\textsuperscript{41} Moore, \textit{Peacebuilding in Practice}, 73.
\textsuperscript{43} Komatsu, “Institutionalist perspectives,” 523.
educational integration and retain control over matters such as curriculum development. The other means of promoting a more integrated and uniform system of education was a more recent, national-level Education Agency meant to serve as a venue for dialogue and cooperation between Bosnia’s thirteen regional ministers of education. Yet in many cases, these ministers were the same individuals who oversaw heavily biased, ethnocentric curricula within their respective regions and actively maintained segregated systems of education. The views of these ministers differed to the extent that they even found themselves in disagreement over the very purpose education should serve in the country. It is expected that only the most modest of measures might come out of the Agency in the foreseeable future, such as cooperation over the teaching of noncontroversial subjects like math.44

In both of these national-level cases, established nationalist figures were integrated into the various apparatuses established to undermine their influence in policymaking. Bosnian officials were only willing to accede to requests for toothless reforms which kept them in power, and as such, more ambitious attempts to collaboratively unify curricula, textbooks, and learning environments have all ended in failure.45 Although such opposition to integrated education was shown to not necessarily have been a fundamental part of the Bosnian consciousness, the only complete instance of educational integration was brought about in Brčko, where nationalists were cut out entirely from the decision-making process and excluded from the ensuing institutions. Any national-level educational reforms passed over the following twenty years have been modest in nature, and true federal-level integration of schools continues to seem a long way off. In the current situation, full integration at the national level would require the broad consent of Bosnia’s nationalist politicians, figures who have little to gain from such a measure.

The issue of educational integration thus serves to highlight two quite distinct approaches taken by international administrators in Brčko and in Bosnia at large, with the heavy-handed measures taken by OHR to cast aside the objectives of nationalist politicians in Brčko ultimately seeming to have made all the difference. In seeking collaboration with figures who had every incentive to obstruct unification efforts, international administrators ultimately prolonged the peacebuilding

44 Komatsu, “Institutionalist perspectives,” 527.
45 Šarančić, “Multiethnic Schools,” 36.
process at the national level indefinitely. Meanwhile in Brčko, the Bosnian War has begun to fade into memory, especially to a younger generation that has known nothing but a fully integrated District. In 2003, a year before elections were reinstated in Brčko, a former OHR official accounted for the region’s success story in remarking that “ninety percent of the success of Brčko District… has been because there is no democracy here.”\textsuperscript{46} For the District to flourish as it did, the polarized and self-serving political system that emerged in wartime years had to be restrained in order to allow for an integrated, democratic society to emerge. While it is indeed the case that the policies imposed within this single town could hardly have been enacted in an identical manner throughout Bosnia at large, the “miracle” at Brčko nonetheless helps to demonstrate the value of calculated unilateralism in peacebuilding and discredits the notion that a broken system can always fix itself.

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“The Grave of Cold British Steel” – How the Lessons of the Boer War Shaped British Tactics in 1914

Max Komhetscher

In 1914, in the face of a massive German offensive, the British Expeditionary Force proved crucial in defeating the Schlieffen Plan. The BEF did this in spite of the fact that the British army had not faced another well-trained and disciplined European enemy since the Crimean War over fifty years before. Yet the “Old Contemptibles,” as the BEF became known, not only held the line but eventually stopped the advance of the German First Army on the Marne.¹ This was all the more surprising since the same British army had been humiliated in Second Boer War (1899-1902) little over a decade before. The forces of the world’s foremost imperial power were humbled by “a backward, penniless, intransigent Transvaal Republic” in countless battles and skirmishes which proved Boer battlefield tactics far outclassed those employed by British regulars.² The improvements in battlefield performance by the British army between 1902 and 1914 were the direct result of these costly lessons learned on the South African veldt, which led to new tactical doctrine and training methods being widely adopted across the British Army. The new infantry fire tactics, battlefield maneuver formations, and techniques for the employment of artillery crucial to the success of the British Army in 1914 can be traced directly to the Boer War and the reforms that it initiated.

As the 1880s progressed, it became apparent that the Boer Republics of Transvaal and the Orange Free State held a vast wealth of untapped mineral resources, leading to increasing imperial ambitions in the area by British colonists and authorities in South Africa. British officials began massing troops on the Transvaal border during the summer of 1899. The Boers did the same, and after the British refused an ultimatum to withdraw, thirty to forty thousand Boer militia, armed with modern rifles

and artillery, invaded British-controlled Natal on October 11th, 1899, beginning the Second Boer War. The Boers quickly cut British supply lines and besieged or occupied most settlements in northern Natal. The first major battle of the war, fought on October 20th at Talana Hill, showed just how little the British had progressed tactically since the Crimean War. A force of 4,000 British infantry and cavalry under Lieutenant-General Symons, supported by 18 field guns, found their path to reinforce the main British base at Ladysmith blocked by 3,500 Boers with 7 field guns. At 7 am the British infantry broke camp, formed lines, and marched headlong into the Boer line without using cover or firing as they advanced. After the death of General Symons in the bloody assault, the Boers finally withdrew from the hill around 11:30 am. The British artillery, with no system to communicate with their infantry after the battle began, interpreted the end of the firing as a lull in the fighting and began bombarding the recently captured hill, forcing the infantry to withdraw. By the end of the day the British gained a pyrrhic victory, taking 500 casualties, as opposed to fewer than 150 Boers.

Two months later, the British suffered three major defeats during the week of December 10th through the 17th at Magersfontein, Stormberg, and Colenso during the attempted relief of Kimberly and Ladysmith. In these battles, 15,000 British regular soldiers were repeatedly beaten by just 6,000 to 7,000 Boer defenders. At Magersfontein, thirty-one British guns spent two hours conducting the largest bombardment since Sebastopol on the Boers, but only inflicted three casualties due to poor communication with forward elements about the location of the enemy. This bombardment was followed by a failed nighttime bayonet attack that resulted in 900 casualties after daybreak left the British exposed at point blank Boer rifle range. In all the British suffered 2,800 casualties, nearly twenty percent of their total engaged force, during “The Black Week” compared to only 350 for the Boers. Fear of the Boers battlefield prowess quickly led to the British adopting a more cautious tactical approach. Winston Churchill, at the time a cavalry officer, illustrated this in his description of the council of war held on January 22nd, 1900 before the Battle of Spion Kop. The options discussed by the council were to “withdraw again,” or to “attack Spion Kop by night, rush the Boer

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4 Ibid., 46-66.
5 Pemberton, *Battles of the Boer War*, 119.
6 Ibid.
trenches with the bayonet” and dig in before dawn.\(^7\) The British commanders felt that a daytime battle, even with a greater than two to one numerical advantage and superior artillery, would be suicidal. This feeling was proven correct when the 4,500 troops who took Spion Kop during a night assault at 04:00 on January 23\(^{rd}\) were forced to withdraw by 20:00 the same day after taking 1,300 casualties.\(^8\) The British artillery performed even more poorly, with 3,000 shells causing a total of 2 Boers killed.\(^9\)

Luckily for the British, after Spion Kop their resources and numerical superiority finally began to make itself apparent and by the end of February Ladysmith was relived and the conflict descended into a guerilla war that would last another two years. Col. John Blake, a West Point graduate turned Boer commando, stated the British dilemma perfectly. Unlike in the past fifty years when the British faced “hordes of unarmed and defenseless negros,” in colonial wars, in this war they fought “The Boer with a Mauser in his hand.”\(^10\) Though this is certainly an oversimplification of Britain’s colonial conflicts, it does make a fair point. Fighting the poorly armed native populations of Africa and Asia, British technical superiority and discipline proved enough to win easy victories. But when faced by a determined enemy with modern weapons and the ability to use them effectively, British tactics were no longer adequate, and indeed proved counterproductive. The Boer War became “the grave of cold British steel,” as bayonet charges and mass linear tactics, once the pride of Britain’s disciplined infantry, resulted in horrendous casualties, while the field artillery showed repeatedly that lacked the fire control systems or the technical capabilities necessary to support the infantry on a modern battlefield.\(^11\) Fighting the poorly armed native populations of Africa and Asia, British technical superiority and discipline proved enough to win easy victories. But when faced by a determined enemy with modern weapons and the ability to use them effectively, British tactics were no longer adequate.

To address the tactical deficiencies laid bare by the Boer War, the British Army quickly began the development of new tactical doctrine. The

\(^10\) Ibid.
\(^11\) Ibid., 73.
Field Regulations: Combined Training were published in 1902 as a quick fix, followed by the definitive British pre-WWI doctrinal document, Field Service Regulations: Part I Administration, Part II Operations, and Musketry Regulations, all published in 1909. These documents made significant changes to pre-Boer War doctrine. Infantry fire tactics were one of the major reforms addressed, as the Boer War gave countless examples of the deadly effectiveness of modern rifles. Prior to the war, British field doctrine and training relied heavily on massed volley fire, recommending its use from the maximum rifle range of 1,500 yards to 800 yards with individual fire only acceptable within 500 yards of the enemy. The 1909 Field Service Regulations radically changed this, with the maximum acceptable range of rifle fire doubled to 2,800 yards, with “effective” range being set at 1,400 yards, and volley fire not even earning a mention. This was because the volume of accurate fire produced by individual soldiers and the need to find cover were now considered crucial to winning firefights rather than massed volleys. Firefights, in turn, were now considered the decisive action of a battle and therefore needed to be won before a close quarter assault was launched. The Field Service Regulations of 1909 stated that “The essence of infantry tactics consists in breaking down the enemy’s resistance by the weight and direction of its fire,” showing the shift in British tactics definitively away from the bloody pre-fire superiority assaults of the Boer War. To support new fire tactics, the British army vastly increased the ammunition available for target practice and developed pop-up and moving targets which led to the British army becoming by 1903, in the words of one commentator, “a better shooting force than the army of any Continental power.”

With the emphasis on long distance firefights came new open order battlefield formations. For the attack, widely dispersed skirmishers, using cover and concealment to close with the enemy, replaced the antiquated pre-Boer War massed columns and three-rank line formations that led to

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12 Risio, Building the Old Contemptibles: British Military Transformation and Tactical Development from the Boer War to the Great War, 1899-1914, 6.
13 Ibid., 44.
15 Risio, Building the Old Contemptibles: British Military Transformation and Tactical Development from the Boer War to the Great War, 1899-1914, 44.
16 Field Service Regulations ... 1909. (Reprinted, with Amendments, 1914), 19.
massive losses when facing modern rifles and artillery. In battle the infantry was expected to “endeavor to gain superiority of fire. This will involve a gradual building up of the firing line in good fire positions.” The concept of the firing line as something dictated by “good fire positions” rather than the dimensions of the assault formation was a major step forward for British tactics. It not only limited casualties by allowing troops to use the best cover available for fighting positions, but it also allowed for increasing initiative by small units and individual soldiers to fight the enemy as they saw fit. For the defense it was also emphasized that “concealment and cover from fire are important factors in defensive operations” and “the influence of ground upon the effect of fire must be one of the first considerations; in selecting a position.”

In addition to infantry tactics, the artillery capabilities of British army were subject to great reform before WWI. The British artillery had even less combat experience than the infantry in the years prior to the Boer War, leading to an even more embarrassing performance. New guns and howitzers for the field and heavy artillery were introduced immediately following the war, but new tactics had a longer and more uneven evolution. Based on Boer War experiences, the Field Service Regulations of 1909 recognized that howitzers were “specially adapted for the attack of shielded, guns, or of an enemy behind cover, or in entrenchments” which led to an increase in their number and employment. New doctrine also recognized the limitations of preliminary bombardment due to “the invisibility which smokeless powder confers” on the modern battlefield, making target acquisition much more difficult. Instead, “the artillery must usually limit its action to preparing to support the infantry as soon as occasion demands it.”

The new focus on the synchronization of artillery and the infantry increased the resources available to commanders’ efforts to win fire superiority and greatly increased the role of artillery in British battlefield tactics. The range considered “effective” for British artillery was, like that of rifle fire, greatly increased after the Boer War in response to the power of modern small arms fire. Pre-Boer War doctrine stated that artillery fire of over 1,800 yards should avoided and early in the war British artillery

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18 Risio, Building the Old Contemptibles: British Military Transformation and Tactical Development from the Boer War to the Great War, 1899-1914, 26.
19 Field Service Regulations ... 1909. (Reprinted, with Amendments, 1914), 141.
20 Ibid., 147.
21 Ibid., 15.
officers often brought their batteries into battle at nearly point-blank range. As casualties mounted, the British artillery was placed beyond both the effective rifle range of the Boers and the ranges trained before the war, decreasing effectiveness even further. After the Boer War, the Field Service Regulations of 1909 radically increased the effective range for the use of field artillery to 4,000 yards and that of heavy batteries to 5,000 yards, the maximum ranges set at 6,500 yards and 10,000 yards respectively, and called for less concentrated gun placements. The main British artillery training range at Salisbury Plain was also extended from 1,500 yards in 1897 to 4,000 yards in 1904 in recognition of the need for longer range fire.

Between the end of the Boer War and the beginning of the Great War, longer engagement ranges, greater focus on fires training, more dispersed formations, an emphasis on cover and concealment, and increasing initiative at lower echelons revolutionized the outdated British artillery and infantry tactics of the pre-Boer War era. Through the shock of finally experiencing a modern battlefield in the Boer War, the British army had revolutionized and reformed its tactics to meet Continental European standards.

The first test of these new tactics against a modern opponent would come during the critical month of August 1914. Britain declared war on Germany on August 4th, and by the time the first units of the British Expeditionary Force, made up entirely of regular British units, reached the French port of Le Havre on August 13th the Battle of the Frontiers was already well underway. Nearly five million French, German, and Belgian soldiers were already engaged as the mere one hundred thousand men of the BEF’s four divisions entered the fray. The BEF advanced into Belgium to the left of the French Fifth Army to meet the German advance. On August 22nd, the BEF took up positions to the north and west of Mons, Belgium for their first major battle of the war. The infantry firepower of

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22 Jones, From Boer War to World War: Tactical Reform of the British Army, 1902-1914, 123.
23 Field Service Regulations ... 1909. (Reprinted, with Amendments, 1914), 17.
24 Jones, From Boer War to World War: Tactical Reform of the British Army, 1902-1914, 123.
26 Risio, Building the Old Contemptibles: British Military Transformation and Tactical Development from the Boer War to the Great War, 1899-1914, 82.
the British devastated the numerically superior attackers of the German First Army. As one BEF soldier stated “Our rapid fire was appalling even to us, and the worst marksmen could not miss, as he had only to fire into the ‘brown’ of the masses of the unfortunate enemy, who on the fronts of our two companies were constantly reinforced at the short range of three hundred yards. Such tactics amazed us.”27 This situation, the British utilizing excellent cover and rapid fire against German units fighting doggedly in massed formations, sounds eerily similar to Talana Hill and other Boer War battles. The Battle of Mons, however, became a mere holding action as the British quickly were forced to fall back when the retreat of the French Fifth Army opened their flanks to German envelopment. This retreat was described by Boer War veteran and BEF Commander-in-Chief Field Marshal Viscount French as extremely skillful, as the artillery “could be seen bursting well over the enemy lines and holding his advance completely in check,” while the infantry fought “with great determination and tenacity” as they withdrew from “well chosen and situated” firing positions.28 Certainly, the British performance at Mons was not perfect, but as their first battle in nearly sixty years against a European power it was an excellent start. Against infantry odds of up to four to one and facing an enemy with superior quality and quantity of artillery, the British had held their own, inflicting between two to five thousand casualties against the Germans at the cost of sixteen hundred British troops.

The BEF began following the French armies in retreat, but turned at Le Cateau on August 26th to deliver a blow to the Germans that mirrored the British doctrine more perfectly and successfully than any other battle the BEF fought. In the words of British artillery officer Major Arthur Corbett-Smith, the BEF hunkered down in “as much cover as the men could make for themselves by digging,” as the Germans “came on in their usual masses” with little effort to establish fire superiority. These efforts were halted by firing lines that devastated German mass attacks until the assaulting regiments “almost ceased to exist.” Whatever Germans remained were thrown back by British counterattacks were the infantry rushed forward from position to position as the artillery “put a curtain before them.”29 This level of fire control and infantry-artillery coordination had been unthinkable during the Boer War. Unfortunately, a failure to

27 Ibid., 83.
distribute orders to retreat to all units at the end of the day led to large numbers of British troops being capture at the end of the day, marring this otherwise impressive display of tactical prowess. Through these battles and delaying actions, however, the British had done their part in delaying the German advance long enough for the awaited French counterattack to develop. On September 6th the French Sixth Army began its counterattack and by September 7th the BEF had turned to join the advance against the Germans. The tide had turned.

Over the course of the sixteen days between the landing of the BEF at Le Havre and “The Miracle on the Marne” the BEF had marched over 240 miles, sustained 15,000 casualties, and fought several major battles and countless skirmishes against Europe’s preeminent land power. In this campaign, the British regular army had proven itself man for man to be the equivalent of and even superior to any Continental army, a far cry from the army that had been badly bloodied by two upstart Boer republics just over a decade prior. The battles of Talana Hill, Spion Kop, Magersfontein seem small in comparison to titanic clashes of August 1914, but the taste of modern battle that the British army had gained in the Boer War enabled it to see the need for tactical reform. It is likely that without these reforms, the BEF would have gone into Belgium woefully unprepared for modern warfare and collapsed under the weight of the German offensive. Instead, utilizing new infantry and artillery tactics that emphasized mobility, cover and concealment, firepower, mutual support, and initiative, the BEF bent but did not break as it was pushed across France, despite several defeats by superior German forces. The British regular army had proven itself the tactical equal of its rivals in 1914, something it could not have done without the defeats and reforms born of the Boer War.

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32 Ibid., 155.
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From Superfortress to Poseidon: Strategic Nuclear Delivery Systems of the United States of America from 1945 to 1972

Seanan Lee

Introduction

After the delivery of “Little Boy” and “Fat Man” on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, the world’s focus quickly turned from conventional armaments to nuclear weapons. Four years, one month, and thirteen days after “Trinity,” the United States’ first nuclear test, the Soviet Union detonated their first nuclear device code-named “First Lightning”. With United States’ monopoly on nuclear weapons a thing of the past, the two countries began a massive build-up of nuclear armament, beginning in the early 1950s to the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Agreement on May 26, 1972. Not to fall behind the two major powers of the Cold War, the United Kingdom, France, and the People’s Republic of China also became nuclear states in 1952, 1960, and 1964 respectively.¹ During this time, rapid technological advancements saw the change in the United States Armed Forces’ principal strategic nuclear delivery systems evolve from piston-powered Boeing B-29 Superfortress into ballistic missiles launched from nuclear-powered submarines that can remain under the ocean waves for months on end. With the transition from mutually assured destruction to flexible response, nuclear delivery systems also adapted with the change in mindset to prevent a limited nuclear exchange from propagating into a full-scale nuclear war.

Propeller-driven Bombers

The first nuclear weapons were delivered by the four-engine Boeing B-29 Superfortress bombers developed between 1942 and 1944. The aircraft was flown with an eleven-man crew, from the airplane commander, copilot, navigator, to the three gunners tasked with defending the aircraft from enemy interceptors.² The nuclear bomber variants of the Superfortress reduced their suite of defensive armament and used the

additional payload for increased range and bomb-carrying capacity. The nuclear-weapons compatible B-29s were initially given the codename “Silverplate” until May 1947, when newly introduced strategic bombers such as the Convair B-36 Peacemaker and Boeing B-50 Superfortress would collectively be referred to under the new codename, “Saddletree.” The introduction of newer, more powerful bombers relegated the original B-29 Superfortress – equipped with less-powerful Wright R-3350 Duplex-Cyclone radial engines – to non-nuclear missions, and it will be used extensively during the Korean War against North Korean ground forces and infrastructures.

The B-36 Peacemaker, with its 10,000 nautical miles intercontinental range, could deliver any nuclear weapons in the United States nuclear arsenal at the time. However, its introduction was plagued with technical challenges and alleged irregularities during its procurement process. The choice of using six Pratt & Whitney R-4360 Wasp Major radial engines and four General Electric J47 turbojet engines to power the behemoth bomber posed tremendous technical challenges for both engineers and aviators alike. The Pratt & Whitney engines were prone to in-flight fire due to the design choice of placing the radial engines in a pusher configuration rather than the more conventional tractor configuration, posing “difficulty with the propellers and inability to cool the engines.” Those very same radial engines were proved to be more successful when fitted onto the B-50 Superfortress in the conventional tractor configuration.

Aside from technical challenges, the B-36 also faced backlashes due to the high cost of the program. The newly independent United States Air Forces – separated from the Army under the National Security Act of 1947 – advocated for a 70-group peacetime air force to serve as primary

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6 *Investigation of the B-36 Bomber Program: Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services*, 10.
means of deterrence against Soviet aggression. After the massive build-up of the Army Air Forces between 1942 and 1945, the number of aircraft in service plummeted due to the demobilization following Germany and Japan’s surrender, reaching a low of 38 groups in June 1947. The Air Force wishes to have “55 groups in full operational status by June 30, 1948, 66 groups by June 30, 1949, and 70 groups during the 1950 fiscal year and thereafter.” The B-36 Peacemaker, being the crown jewel of the Strategic Air Command’s nuclear strike fleet at the time, consumed a large part of $1.9 billion appropriated for aircraft procurement during the 1948 fiscal year. An announcement from the White House made in December 1948 would limit the size of the Air Force in the 1949 fiscal year to be 48 groups, but the Air Force would already have 59 groups activated at the time.

**Revolt of the Admirals**

The heavy emphasis on the built-up of strategic bombers as the nation’s sole means of nuclear deterrence sparked outrage throughout the Navy on April 23, 1949, when the construction of the aircraft carrier USS United States (CVA-58) was canceled, five days after her keels were laid. The United States was the first post-war aircraft carrier design, and its unique all-flat deck design allowed for the effective operations of the Lockheed P2V Neptune patrol aircraft as an interim seaborne nuclear bomber before the introduction of the North American AJ Savage, a dedicated nuclear bomber. As a result of the cancellation of the project, Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan and Under Secretary of the Navy W. John Kenney resigned within months of each other and led to major backlashes within the Navy against Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson, who was a strong supporter of the B-36 Peacemaker project. Johnson, who served as the Assistant Secretary of War before the outbreak

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7 Ibid., 15.
8 Ibid., 16.
of the Second World War, was a strong believer in strategic airpower even before coming into office as Secretary of Defense. He replaced James V. Forrestal, who was an advocate for the USS *United States* as he was the Secretary of the Navy before he was appointed the first Secretary of Defense.

The Congressional inquiry on the B-36 project was a response to an anonymous document, later known to be authored by Cedric R. Worth, a civilian employee of the Department of the Navy, with the support of Commander Thomas D. Davies. Worth authored a nine-page document “detailing particular facts or rumors relating to the B-36 procurement program… a ‘billion-dollar blunder’ whose procurement continued only because Secretary Johnson and Air Force Secretary W. Stuart Symington had personal financial stakes in its production.”

By the end of the month-long Congressional inquiry, the committee discovered “not one scintilla of evidence… that would support charges that collusion, fraud, corruption, influence, or favoritism played any part whatsoever in the procurement of the B-36 bomber.” Worth, formerly the special assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Navy for Air, and later to the Under Secretary of Navy, was later dismissed from his employment by the Department of Navy as a result of the incident. However, the House Armed Services Committee affirmed the importance of all branches of the Armed Forces and deterred any desires from the Army and Air Force to eliminate the Navy and Marine Corps as branches of service. Advocates for the idea include General of the Army Omar Bradley and Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson, and Johnson was quoted with the following in December 1949:

> There’s no reason for having a Navy and Marine Corps. General Bradley tells me that amphibious operations are a thing of the past. We’ll never have any more amphibious operations. That does away with the Marine Corps. And the Air Force can do anything the Navy can do nowadays, so that does away with the Navy.

Johnson’s optimism would quickly be proven to be misplaced, as less than a year later, the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division would spearhead Operation Chromite, an amphibious invasion of Inchon to recapture the South Korean capital city of Seoul as a part of the United Nations Command during the Korean

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12 Ibid.
13 *Investigation of the B-36 Bomber Program: Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services*, 33.
Jet Bombers and Around-the-Clock Readiness

By the early 1950s, the Air Force’s B-36 Peacemaker fleet would be supplemented by the Boeing B-47 Stratojet and later the Boeing B-52 Stratofortress all-jet bombers. The straight-wing, piston-driven Peacemaker could no longer effectively penetrate Soviet air defense due to its slow speed, but while the B-47 Stratojet cruises at over twice the speed of the Peacemaker, it lacked the intercontinental range and required aerial refueling provided by the Strategic Air Command’s Boeing KC-97 Stratofreighter tanker fleet for any missions within the Soviet Union. The B-52 Stratofortress entered service in 1955 and is still a vital part of the American nuclear triad today, over 60 years from its first operational sortie. On September 1, 1962, Strategic Air Command would enter the supersonic age with the introduction of the Convair B-58 Hustler at Bunker Hill Air Force Base (now Grissom Air Reserve Base) in Indiana. However, the Hustler’s reign would be short, with the final aircraft retired in 1970 due to the shift towards low altitude penetration rather than high-altitude, high-speed flights the Hustler was designed for. The immense operating cost of the fleet, three times higher than the Stratofortress, and the difficulty in maintaining the state-of-the-art lightweight construction also contributed to the Hustler’s early retirement.

Beginning in 1960, the U.S. Air Force began deploying B-52 bombers armed with free-fall thermonuclear weapons on 24-hour continuous airborne alert missions under the codename “Chrome Dome”. The bomber, supported by Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker tanker aircraft, would depart from airbases in the contiguous United States, and take one of two routes that will bring them near Soviet airspace. The first route “stretched south across the Atlantic to a refueling over the Mediterranean Sea [and the] other was a northern route tracing a big box around Canada with a crucial late air refueling near Alaska.” With at least 12 armed

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15 Ibid., 49.
bombers airborne at any given time and the long duration of the missions, it was a matter of time before accidents would occur. The first crash of the Chrome Dome missions occurred a week after General Thomas S. Power’s – Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Air Command at the time – public announcement of the missions near Goldsboro, North Carolina on January 23, 1961. It was caused by structural failure of the right-wing, and one of the two bombs on board shattered upon impact, sinking its nuclear core into the soggy farmland and never to be seen again. Five of the eight crew members bailed out safely before the crash, but one did not survive the landing, and two died in the crash. Less than two months later, on March 14, 1961, another B-52 crashed near Yuba City, California due to fuel exhaustion. On January 13, 1964, turbulence caused a B-52’s vertical stabilizer to shear off and damaged the left horizontal stabilizer, rendering the thermonuclear bomb-laden aircraft uncontrollable and crashed onto a farm in Savage Mountain, Maryland.\textsuperscript{19} In both instances, both thermonuclear weapons on board were accounted for, and none of them detonated, unlike the later incidents in Spain and Greenland.

The introduction of Boeing LGM-30 Minutemen I and II intercontinental ballistic missiles in October 1962 and January 1966 allowed the Air Force to scale back the Chrome Dome missions to four airborne alert aircraft, one-third of the original fleet size.\textsuperscript{20} Even with the reduced airborne alert fleet, accidents continued to occur, with a B-52 bomber colliding with a KC-135 tanker just off the coast of Spain on January 17, 1966, and another B-52 crashing on the sea ice in North Star Bay, Greenland on January 21, 1968, after an uncontained cabin fire. Unfortunately, the conventional explosives on the Mk.28 thermonuclear bombs detonated in both instances, leading to radioactive contamination of the surrounding areas.\textsuperscript{21} After the crash near Thule Air Base, Greenland, continuous airborne alert of nuclear-armed strategic bombers was suspended due to declining public perception, the increasing size of land-based and seaborne ballistic missile inventory, and the growing involvement of U.S. Armed Forces in Southeast Asia. As the number of sorties skyrocketed for Operation Arc Light – the conventional bombing campaign of Viet Cong targets in South Vietnam – Strategic Air Command was forced to divert resources to those missions, and the Command’s

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 56.
\textsuperscript{21} Grant, “The Perils of Chrome Dome,” 57.
ability to maintain the bomber fleet’s continuous nuclear alert suffered as a result. For instance, on November 12, 1969, 38 percent of the regular bomber alert force and 27 percent of the required tanker alert force were not on alert due to aircraft availability and crew shortages, and some units remained below a one-to-one aircraft-to-aircrew ratio due to the strain on personnel from the Southeast Asian bombing campaigns. The need for safer nuclear deterrence – without causing radioactive contamination on allied soil – forced the advancement of intercontinental ballistic missile technology, as they could be positioned in the U.S. mainland and be relatively free of geopolitical influences.

Introduction of Ballistic Missiles

Technological advancements during the Second World War within Nazi Germany produced the first practical cruise missile and ballistic missile under the Vergeltungswaffen banner. After the surrender of Germany, Operation Paperclip brought over 1,700 scientists and engineers who once worked for Hitler’s regime to the United States after they have been screened and included no “ardent Nazis” or “alleged or confirmed war criminals.” Those scientists included Wernher von Braun, who led the development of the V-2 ballistic missile and would later be famed for his work on the Saturn V rocket. At the beginning of the 1960s, the United States fielded three types of ballistic missiles for strategic deterrence. The Douglas PGM-17 Thor, the first deployable intermediate-range ballistic missile in the U.S. arsenal, was only deployed in limited numbers – 30 at its peak – due to its vulnerability. Thor, alongside the Chrysler PGM-11 Redstone short-range ballistic missiles and the Chrysler PGM-19 Jupiter medium-range ballistic missiles, required the use of liquid propellant and a lengthy fueling procedure, making them unattractive as weapons of deterrence. Furthermore, all the preparation work before launch must be

done above ground, a difficult task after a Soviet first strike. Second-generation ballistic missiles such as the Convair CGM-16 Atlas and the Martin HGM-25A Titan I were stored in underground silos and raised to the surface for launch, thus protecting the missile and personnel against radiation and shrapnel in the event of a Soviet first strike. Nevertheless, the Royal Air Force Bomber Command operated 60 Thor missiles to supplement the V bombers – the Avro Vulcan, Handley Page Victor, and Vickers Valiant – before the proposed Anglo-American Douglas AGM-48 Skybolt air-launched ballistic missile would enter service.25

The Italian and Turkish Air Forces would also operate the Jupiter missile, much to the dismay of the Soviet Union. Despite its limited strategic deterrent abilities, the deployment of medium-range ballistic missiles to states bordering the Soviet Union was one of the contributing causes to the Cuban Missile Crisis, as the Soviets now felt the need to place strategic weapons in the Americas. Many of the obsolete ballistic missiles, such as the Thor, Redstone, and Atlas, would be converted into orbital launch vehicles following the introduction of more sophisticated and longer-range ballistic missiles. The Boeing LGM-30 Minuteman and Martin LGM-25C Titan II, entering service in 1962 and 1963 respectively, saw another evolution in missile technology as they could now be launched directly from within their silos, safeguarding United States’ abilities to launch a land-based second strike against the Soviet Union.26 Beyond the improved survivability provided by the Minuteman and Titan’s hardened silos, the Minuteman also utilized solid propellant rather than liquid propellant, making near-instantaneous launches a reality. The improved guidance systems on the Minuteman allowed for the missiles to operate without ground control during flight and using air bearing rather than ball bearings enabled the continuous operation of the guidance system, a requirement for launches with short notice.27 With the introduction of Minuteman III in 1970, it marked another major technical advancement as up to three multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles could now be fitted to a single missile, essentially tripling the number of deployable

27 Ibid., 13.
Air-to-Surface Missiles and the Skybolt Crisis

Following the 1960 U-2 incident and the capture of Francis Gary Powers over the Soviet Union, altitude alone was proven to be insufficient to protect Strategic Air Command’s bomber force against Soviet surface-to-air missiles and interceptor aircraft. The North American Aviation AGM-28 Hound Dog air-launched cruise missile, entering service in September 1960 – four months after the incident – provided a temporary solution to the dilemma. The turbojet-powered Hound Dog, carried by B-52 Stratofortresses, could attack Soviet ground targets beyond the range of surface-to-air missiles, thus increasing the survivability of the bomber fleet. It was intended as a stop-gap measurement before the Skybolt air-launched ballistic missile would enter service, but it would ultimately remain in service until 1977.\textsuperscript{28} The actual replacement for the Hound Dog, the Boeing AGM-69 Short Range Attack Missile, would not be available until 1972, and it enhanced Strategic Air Command’s ability to suppress Soviet air defense as it could be carried by aircrafts as small as the General Dynamics FB-111A Aardvark.\textsuperscript{29} While the development of land-based ballistic missiles and air-launched cruise missiles were relatively successful, the Anglo-American Skybolt project would be plagued with technical challenges and ultimately sparked a crisis between the two governments.

The Skybolt was meant to be Britain’s replacement for the aging Thor missiles, and it would supersede the V bombers in providing the United Kingdom her independent nuclear deterrence. The Skybolts were to be fitted on the Avro Vulcan bomber and would replace all other nuclear-armed missiles in service such as the rocket-powered Avro Blue Steel Mk. 1 in Royal Air Force service. The independent developed de Havilland Blue Streak medium-range ballistic missile was intended as the replacement for Thor, but the Blue Streak program, together with the upgraded ramjet-powered Blue Steel Mk. 2, would be canceled to preserve funding for the procurement of Skybolts.\textsuperscript{30} While the missiles themselves would be imported, Royal Air Force would retain sole control of the missiles, unlike the Jupiter missiles deployed to Italy and Turkey. Prime

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 85.
\textsuperscript{30} McCourt, Britain and World Power Since 1945, 94.
Minister Harold Macmillan defended the project in 1960, claiming the arrangement would be “independent in the sense that it will be our property. The warhead will be manufactured by [the United Kingdom] and will be under our sole control.” In exchange for the missiles, the United Kingdom would provide facilities at Holy Loch, Scotland, as a refit and crew turnover site for U.S. Navy’s Lockheed UGM-27 Polaris-armed ballistic missile submarines. The agreement also allowed for American participation in the ground-breaking Hawker Siddeley P.1127 vertical take-off and landing jet fighter project.

With the Polaris ballistic missiles being a viable alternative for Skybolts in U.S. service, domestic support for the air-launched ballistic missile dwindled. Combining the lack of political support with technical challenges, such as the need for an additional star tracker system which increased cost and numerous failed launch tests, the program’s continued existence became questionable. During President John F. Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan’s December 1962 meeting at Nassau, The Bahamas, an agreement was made to terminate the Skybolt program, and instead the British would receive Polaris missiles in its place. Kennedy initially offered the stop-gap Hound Dog cruise missile in its place, but Macmillan refused and demanded the Polaris, which Kennedy reluctantly agreed to. The deal also stipulated that the Polaris would be “assigned to NATO under normal circumstances but would be available for independent British use in instances of ‘supreme national emergency’”. With the Nassau Agreement came the Polaris Sales Agreement and British Naval Ballistic Missile System, which transferred the United Kingdom’s strategic nuclear deterrence from the Royal Air Force to the Royal Navy following the commissioning of the four Resolution-class ballistic missile submarines.

Carrier-Borne Bombers

After the cancellation of the USS United States, the U.S. Navy adapted existing surface ships and submarines to prove the Navy’s ability to carry out nuclear deterrence against the Soviet Union. As a stop-gap measure, P2V Neptune patrol aircraft were retrofitted with jet-assisted
take-off equipment and deployed onboard the Midway-class aircraft carriers. The Neptune would be the largest aircraft deployed on carriers until that point, and as a proof of concept, trial takeoffs were made from USS Coral Sea (CVB-43) carrying dummy nuclear bombs. However, due to its enormous size, landings on carriers would not be possible, and the crews were instructed to land at friendly nations after delivering their payload, or ditch in the ocean and be rescued by helicopters or flying boats. The 75,000 lb. Neptune would soon be replaced by the 51,000 lb. AJ Savage, an aircraft designed from the ground up to be a nuclear bomber. The Savage, with its straight-wing design and mixed piston and jet power, was a conservative design, especially when compared with other North American products from the same period such as the B-45 Tornado all-jet bomber and the F-86 Sabre swept-wing jet fighter. However, that allowed the Savage to be operational merely two years after the order was placed. It still turned out to be too large and cumbersome to operate from most aircraft carriers in service even with the reduced weight and folding wings when compared with the Neptune. The Savage could be carried on board the modernized 30,000-ton Essex class with reinforced flight decks and on the larger 45,000-ton Midway class, together with the recently commissioned 60,000-ton Forrestal class. It would soon be replaced in service by the fully turbojet-powered Douglas A3D Skywarrior, the heaviest aircraft to be regularly operated on aircraft carriers, weighing in at 82,000 lb. at maximum takeoff weight.

The Skywarrior was designed to deliver a 10,000-pound nuclear device, have a 2,000 nautical miles combat radius, and it “would permit taking off from a carrier in one ocean, completing a mid-continent bombing mission, and continuing to a waiting carrier in an opposite ocean”. The twin-engine Skywarrior would go on to have a long and successful career in the Navy, serving until the end of the 1991 Gulf War in secondary roles.

However, the original engine – the Westinghouse J40 – “could not produce the thrust necessary to meet the forecast performance” and would later be replaced by the Pratt & Whitney J57. The elimination of ejection seats due to weight limitations would prove to be a fatal flaw to the design and would earn the aircraft a rather unflattering nickname, “all three dead”, a spoof on the Skywarrior’s designation, A3D. The chief designer, Ed Heinemann, favored the escape tunnel system as seen on the Douglas F3D Skyknight in place of ejection seats as it results in a 3,500 lb. weight saving. The decisions would ultimately be costly as the escape tunnel would not function properly in a dive, at low altitude, nor during takeoffs and landings. The Skywarriors would transition into an electronic warfare aircraft and tanker aircraft following the introduction of the North American A3J Vigilante supersonic bomber, but in an ironic twist of fate, the Vigilante would be retired a full decade before the Skywarrior due to its lack of versatility. The A3J Vigilante, the last of the Navy’s strategic bomber, is capable of sustained flight at Mach 2 thanks to the pioneering “stores train” bomb bay design and its powerful General Electric J79 engines. Rather than using a conventional bomb bay, an Mk.28 thermonuclear bomb – similar to those carried on B-52s – would be attached to two auxiliary fuel tanks and be pushed out of the bomb bay from behind, eliminating the need for drag-inducing pylons and external payloads. The design allowed for supersonic bomb delivery, but no nuclear devices would ever be fitted to the Vigilante due to the introduction of the Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles as the primary means for seaborne nuclear deterrence.

The commissioning of the USS Forrestal (CVA-58) marked a new era for aircraft carrier development. Aircraft carriers, now with angled decks and steam catapults, which enabled simultaneous takeoff and landings of ever-heavier aircraft, are far more efficient than ever before. Older vessels of World War II design, such as the Essex class and Midway class would receive similar upgrades to allow them to be the backbone of the Navy’s fleet for decades to come. The improved Kitty Hawk class and the one-off USS Enterprise (CVA(N)-65) continued the evolution of carriers, and the nuclear-powered Enterprise allowed for expanded

39 Dixon, “Douglas' A3D Skywarrior-Known as the 'Whale'-was Created in Response to a Tough Design Challenge,” 12.
40 “Advertisement: (North American Aviation)” (Newsweek 60, no. 18, 1962) 74-75.
41 “Fifth Forrestal-Class Carrier Ordered from New York Shipbuilding for $119,841,034” Marine Engineering (1953-1956) 60, no. 12, 1955) 98.
munitions and aircraft fuel storage as the need for heavy oil storage is greatly reduced.\textsuperscript{42} However, the aircraft carrier-bomber pairing would soon be declared obsolete as the Navy’s principal form of nuclear deterrence following the commissioning of USS \textit{George Washington} (SSB(N)-598), the first U.S. nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine. The task of nuclear deterrence transitioned from the surface fleet to the submarine service. Unlike aircraft carriers, ballistic missile submarines can remain under the ocean waves for months on end and be instructed to launch their deadly payload by ground-based or airborne command and control centers.\textsuperscript{43}

**Submarine-launched Missiles**

Before the commissioning of the \textit{George Washington}, USS \textit{Tunny} (SSG-282) and USS \textit{Barbero} (SSG-317) of World War II vintage were converted into cruise missile submarines. The duo would be armed with the subsonic Chance Vought SSM-N-8A Regulus cruise missiles equipped with nuclear warheads, pending the commission of the dedicated diesel-electric \textit{Grayback}-class and the nuclear-powered USS \textit{Halibut} (SSGN-587), armed with the supersonic SSM-N-9 Regulus II. The Regulus was comparable to the Air Force’s Martin MGM-1 Matador cruise missiles, and it was proposed to both services that the programs be combined to reduce defense spending.\textsuperscript{44} Those efforts would be in vain due to differences in operational requirements, but both missiles’ service would be short-lived as they lacked the range of ballistic missiles. The Matador would remain in service between 1952 and 1962, with the Regulus I in service from 1955 to 1964. The Regulus II program was terminated in 1958 in favor of the Polaris program, as Polaris could be launched while submerged, a trait neither variant of the Regulus possesses.\textsuperscript{45}

The \textit{George Washington}-class and all other U.S. ballistic missile submarines until the \textit{Ohio}-class would be equipped with sixteen

\textsuperscript{42} Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, \textit{Tour of the U.S.S. "Enterprise" and Report on Joint AEC-naval Reactor Program: Hearing before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Congress of the United States, Eighty-seventh Congress, Second Session ..., March 31, 1962., 1962, 4-5. \\
\textsuperscript{43} Peace... Is Our Profession: Alert Operations and the Strategic Air Command, 1957-1991, 23. \\
\textsuperscript{44} Kenneth P. Werrell, \textit{The Evolution of the Cruise Missile} (1985) 114-115. \\
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 110-111.
submarine-launched ballistic missiles, initially with Polaris and later with Lockheed UGM-73 Poseidon missiles. Before the commissioning of the *George Washington*, the Polaris system was tested onboard USS *Observation Island* (EAG-154), a converted *Mariner*-class merchant ship.\(^{46}\) Despite the missile’s limited range at 1,200 nautical miles for the A-1 variant, the enhanced survivability of the Polaris-armed submarines made the project lucrative as it safeguards United States’ second-strike capabilities. Admiral William F. Raborn claims the Navy is “confident these [*George Washington*-class] submarines are going to be very safe and secure in NATO controlled waters” but advocated for the development of the A-3 variant with 2,500 nautical mile range as “the Soviets are going to put a prodigious effort to try to counter them.”\(^{47}\) In 1960, the Navy proposed the construction of 45 Polaris-armed ballistic missile submarines and 5 submarine tenders to support the fleet, with later ships (i.e. *Ethan Allen*-class and beyond) being clean-sheet designs rather than inserting a section containing the Polaris missiles into the existing *Skipjack*-class attack submarine design like the *George Washington*-class.\(^{48}\)

Ultimately, the number of American ballistic missile submarines would be limited to 41, totaling 656 ballistic missile launchers on nuclear-powered submarines because of the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Agreement. Additionally, the treaty would also limit Soviet Union’s seaborne ballistic missile capabilities to 740 ballistic missile launchers on nuclear-powered submarines.\(^{49}\) Older land-based missiles – such as the Titan I – must be retired before the construction of any additional ballistic missile submarines under the one-way mix concept, and any replacement submarines could only commence sea trials after the older type was decommissioned and began dismantling.\(^{50}\) The U.S. Navy’s ballistic missile submarines fleet would colloquially be known as “41 for Freedom”, and while the U.S. Navy has a smaller number of launchers, they would retain strategic superiority as NATO forces continued to


\(^{47}\) *Naval Reactor Program and Polaris Missile System*, 3-4.

\(^{48}\) *Naval Reactor Program and Polaris Missile System*, 5, 8.

\(^{49}\) Committee on Armed Services, *Full Committee Hearings on the Military Implications of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Agreements (1972)* 15076.

\(^{50}\) *Full Committee Hearings on the Military Implications of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Agreements.*, 15089.
control the majority of the Atlantic and Pacific, with the Soviet Navy’s ocean access limited to a handful of chokepoints. Advancements in multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles and penetration aids, made available to the Navy with the introduction of Poseidon in 1971, allowed for a single missile to strike multiple targets, further lowering the need for additional launchers.\(^{51}\)

**Cuban Missile Crisis**

United States’ nuclear forces would be put to the test after President Kennedy’s announcement about the quarantine around Cuban waters due to the presence of Soviet ballistic missiles on the island nation on October 22, 1962. The naval quarantine prevents any additional arms shipments to Cuba, and he demanded the removal of the missiles already delivered. While the Navy was busy deploying aircraft carriers, destroyers, and patrol aircraft around Cuban waters, Strategic Air Command went on 24-hour operations, with all leaves canceled and nuclear-armed B-47 bombers dispersed to secondary airfields.\(^{52}\) Two days after the announcement of the quarantine, Strategic Air Command increased its alert status to Defense Condition Two, with all aircrafts ready for takeoff on six hours’ notice, while all other services and commands remained at Defense Condition Three. During the thirteen-day Cuban Missile Crisis from October 16 to October 28, over 90% of the United States’ strategic nuclear forces were at the ready, with 1,436 bombers, 145 ballistic missiles, and 916 tankers for aerial refueling made available at the height of the alert.\(^{53}\) Additional B-52s were placed into airborne alert beyond the scheduled Chrome Dome missions, and land-based ballistic missiles were fueled and raised out of their silos into launch positions.\(^{54}\)

The Navy also deployed all the eight available *George Washington*-class and *Ethan Allen*-class ballistic missile submarines towards their deterrent patrol areas, and the anti-submarine forces began locating Soviet

\(^{51}\) Ibid., 15107.


attack submarines approaching Task Force 135. Task Force 135, comprised of the carriers USS Enterprise and USS Independence (CVA-62), was cruising off the northwest coasts of the Bahama Islands pending the command to begin attacks on Cuba. However, the Task Force would be overshadowed by destroyers dropping Mk. 64 Practice Depth Charges on Soviet submarines attempting to signal them to the surface. One Soviet submarine, the Foxtrot-class B-59, considered the depth charges as an act of American aggression and came close to launching nuclear-armed torpedoes at its presumed attacker. Low-altitude reconnaissance flights conducted by Air Force McDonnell RF-101 Voodoos and Navy Vought F8U Crusaders provided the Executive Committee with more information about Soviet and Cuban deployments, but they were met with fierce anti-aircraft fire, and “the possibility that a plane might be shot down by anti-aircraft fire or by a Cuban MiG was not far from Kennedy's mind.” On October 27, an Air Force Lockheed U-2 piloted by Major Rudolf Anderson, Jr., was shot down by a Soviet SA-2 Guideline surface-to-air missile, and tension rose once again as plans were drawn up for retaliatory strikes by Air Force or Navy fighter-bombers against the responsible surface-to-air site and ballistic missile launchers.

Following the withdrawal of Soviet ballistic missiles and bombers from Cuba and Kennedy claiming an American victory, Strategic Air Command returned to normal alert posture on November 20, and the naval quarantine would end on the same day as well. Despite the heightened tension and increased number of sorties, Strategic Air Command maintained a perfect flight safety record during the Crisis. After the Crisis ended, the now obsolete Jupiter missiles deployed to Turkey and Italy were withdrawn the year after. Officially, the missiles were withdrawn as the newer Polaris and Minuteman missiles were more effective but later declassified documents indicated that the withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles was a part of the deal made between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev. Similarly, the Royal Air Force’s Thor missiles would be returned to the U.S. in 1963, replaced by Royal Navy’s Polaris-armed

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55 The U.S. Navy and the Cuban Missile Crisis. 137-138.
56 Ibid., 149.
57 Ibid., 135-136.
58 Ibid., 170-171.
60 The U.S. Navy and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 59-60.
ballistic missile submarines in its strategic deterrence role.\textsuperscript{61}

Guaranteeing a Second-strike

With the Soviet Union’s increased first-strike capabilities, the need for airborne command posts and alternative means to safeguard United States’ second-strike capabilities became an utmost priority. Beginning in 1962, a handful of B-47 bombers were converted into EB-47L communications relay aircraft by fitting additional communications equipment on board, and they would form the first iteration of the Post-Attack Command and Control System.\textsuperscript{62} These aircraft would work in conjunction with ground-based infrastructures and airborne command posts, with the airborne command post operating under the codename “Looking Glass” as it would mirror operations at air force bases. In addition to the airborne command and control structure, three Blue Scout Junior rockets – and later Minuteman II ballistic missiles – were modified to carry “UHF recorders with a prerecorded force execution message that could be transmitted to all units within line of sight of the rocket's apogee flight.”\textsuperscript{63} The Boeing AN/DRC-8 Emergency Rocket Communications System would preserve Strategic Air Command’s ability to retaliate against a Soviet first strike, in the event of the destruction of all ground-based communication systems. With the introduction of the larger and longer-range Boeing EC-135C aircraft fitted with more sophisticated communication equipment, they would assume both “Looking Glass” and communications relay missions, and the EB-47Ls would be phased out. The retirement of B-47s and KC-97s would also mark Strategic Air Command’s transition from a bomber-centric force to a missile-centric force. On April 21, 1964, the amount of intercontinental ballistic missiles equaled the number of bombers on ground alert, and with the increasing intensity of the war in Southeast Asia, the bomber alert force would steadily decline in number, gradually replaced by ballistic missiles stored in hardened silos.\textsuperscript{64} In May 1967, the Airborne Launch Control System entered service, allowing the airborne command posts to directly issue

\textsuperscript{61} McCourt, *Britain and World Power Since 1945*, 100.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., 11.
\textsuperscript{64} Peace... Is Our Profession: Alert Operations and the Strategic Air Command, 1957-1991, 23.
launch commands to the land-based Minuteman missiles through both onboard communication systems and the Emergency Rocket Communications System.\(^{65}\)

With the B-47 dispersal program proven to be a success during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the program was revived in 1968 for B-52s and KC-135s. The program would disperse bombers and tankers over a large number of airports – both military and civilians – during periods of increased tension, as it reduced the likelihood of a first strike disabling a large portion of the alert force and allowed for more aircraft to be airborne within a given time.\(^{66}\) While at Strategic Air Command airbases, aircraft would be parked on the herringbone-shaped “Christmas tree” alert aprons, and aircrew on alert missions would be housed in the adjacent Readiness Crew Building, colloquially known as the “mole hole”. The Readiness Crew Building included billeting and living quarters, and each alert apron would contain nine aircraft parking spots, but while dispersed to secondary airfields, none of those amenities would be available. On a typical day, up to one-third of all available Strategic Air Command aircraft would be ground alert duties, with them “[parked] at the end of runways, bombs loaded, and crews nearby ready to take off within 15 minutes.”\(^{67}\)

In the case of a scramble – quick mobilization of the alert aircraft –, aircrew would run out of the “mole hole”, and either run or drive towards their aircraft and prepare the aircraft for immediate departure. Bombers and tankers would use minimum interval takeoff procedures to get airborne in a matter of seconds, and the Strategic Air Command Commander Support Aircraft, carrying generals and their staff, would also be launched to join the already airborne “Looking Glass” aircraft.\(^{68}\) In addition to airborne alerts and ground alerts at bases scattered across the United States, B-47 bombers and KC-97 tankers were forward deployed to the United Kingdom, Spain, and Morocco on 90-day tours under the codename “Reflex”. Overseas bases allowed for further dispersion of the bomber fleet and complicate Soviet targeting, but the program would be short-lived,

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\(^{65}\) Ibid., 27.

\(^{66}\) Ibid., 28.


lasting only between 1957 and 1966 due to a multitude of reasons. The retirement of the antiquated Stratojet and Stratofreighter fleets, combined with the shift from bomber-based to missile-based deterrence and the United States’ increasing commitment to the Southeast Asian conflict all contributed to the termination of airborne “Chrome Dome” and forward deployment “Reflex” alert missions.

Conclusion

Throughout the first three decades of American nuclear weapons development, its delivery system constantly evolved to reflect technological advancements and the need to safeguard the nation’s second-strike capabilities. Beginning with the piston-powered B-29 Superfortress, there would be many iterations before arriving at the nuclear triad we know today with strategic bombers, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, and ballistic missile submarines. The Navy’s first Atomic Age aircraft carrier, USS United States, would be canceled before its commissioning, but the Strategic Air Command’s bomber fleet would lose its prominence as the principal form of nuclear deterrence following the commissioning of the Polaris-armed USS George Washington ballistic missile submarine. The Navy’s surface fleet would also go from operating the interim P2V Neptune patrol aircraft to the dedicated A3J Vigilante as nuclear bombers, traveling twice the speed of sound. During these three decades, the Strategic Air Command would operate aircraft ranging from the twin-engine FB-111A Aardvark to the ten-engine B-36 Peacemaker. After trials with numerous other platforms such as the free-fall nuclear bomb, cruise missiles, and air-launched ballistic missiles, silo- and submarine-launched ballistic missiles would be proven as the definitive forms of nuclear deterrence.

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“The Eyes of the World Are Upon You:” International Organisations and the Suez Crisis

Asa Breuss-Burgess

Introduction

Gamal Abdel Nasser savored the moment: it is 26 July 1956 and he has just announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal. The thousands packed into Alexandria’s Mohammed Ali Square are ecstatic.¹ This bold and highly contingent decision marked the beginning of the Suez Crisis, a complex mixture of war and diplomacy that tested the 1950s international system. Despite intense disagreement and violence, the crisis eventually reached a peaceful (if not uncontested) resolution. In this study, I will pursue a comparative analysis of international organizations (IOs) in order to understand their role in bringing the conflict to a close. Beginning with a narrative and historiographical background, the purpose of this section is to demonstrate how the introduction of new primary and secondary material can help us to understand this role and, consequently, enrich scholarship on the Suez Crisis.

The crisis itself can be divided into three phases. First, after Egypt nationalized the Canal, a period of diplomatic deliberation ensued between Britain, France, the United States, and Egypt, which failed to bring about the international control of the Canal. Second, as planned in the clandestine Sèvres Protocol of 24 October 1956, an Israeli invasion of Egypt commenced on 29 October. Two days later an Anglo-French force intervened on the pretext of ‘police action’ to protect international shipping. Hostilities ended with a ceasefire on 6 November. Third, a withdrawal period began, which entailed intense diplomatic pressure on Britain, France, and Israel as well as the stationing of UN Peacekeepers (UNEF) in Egypt. UNEF supervised the withdrawal of troops, the clearing of the Canal, and the keeping of the peace on the Israeli-Egyptian border. British and French personnel evacuated by 22 December and the last Israeli troops left Egypt on 12 March 1957.

Each of the crisis’ protagonists regarded their vital interests to be at stake as they entered the crisis. President Nasser felt compelled to nationalize the Canal in order to fund the Aswan High Dam project, the cornerstone of his plan for Egypt’s socioeconomic development. The West had withdrawn funding for the dam over fears of Soviet influence in Cairo; thus, by nationalizing the canal, Nasser could both enrich Egypt and capture an important symbol of both the old imperialism and contemporary Western influence. Indeed, Britain had maintained a Protectorate over Egypt between 1882 and 1922 as well as a massive military base in the canal zone primarily to protect what a young Anthony Eden once called the “swing-door of the British empire.” Regarding the 120-mile waterway as essential to communications, trade, and (increasingly) oil-supply, Britain and France had together owned most of the shares in the Canal Company.

The imperial powers could not accept that Nasser, who lambasted the French presence in Algeria and the British-led Baghdad Pact, would have control over a strategic interest that British leaders still regarded as their “jugular vein.” Israel, constantly under threat from its numerous hostile neighbors and cross-border Fedayeen raids, was also unsettled by the fervently anti-Zionist Nasser. For these reasons, the botched British-French-Israeli operation had attempted to precipitate Nasser’s downfall and restore international control to the Canal.

Broadly speaking, three waves of writing on the Suez Crisis can be identified. The first of these was the publication of personal memoirs by contemporaries of the crisis, which, from the late 1980s, a second wave of scholars used alongside newly accessible archival material to structure a lively academic debate. This literature generally applied what one might

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4 Ibid., p. 22.


6 For memoirs, see: A. Eden, Full Circle: The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden (London,
call a diplomatic history approach; to simplify somewhat, it draws on national archives to understand nation states and relations between them. Consequently, it has understood the resolution of the Suez Crisis as a product of Britain and France’s inability to withstand American pressure to withdraw.\(^7\) Since the turn of the century, however, historians have emphasized the importance of non-state actors in the crisis as a whole.\(^8\) This third wave of historiography gives us strong historical and theoretical reasons to look at the crisis’ resolution from a different angle. Instead of treating IOs as epiphenomena, the idea emerges that they played a significant part in the course and resolution of the crisis.

International relations theory provides us with analytical tools that help to understand the role of IOs in history. I will draw inspiration from Abbott and Snidal’s argument that IOs effect agency through their ability, first, to centralize diplomatic engagement in a single, stable forum, and second, to remain independent.\(^9\) I will also draw on Barnett and Finnemore’s idea that their “control over technical expertise and information” gives them a special role in making international norms.\(^10\)

International historians have also used the English School concept of international society to incorporate the underappreciated agency of IOs.\(^11\) International society is an ideal type historical category that

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\(^7\) For diplomatic histories, see: D. Kunz, ‘The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis’ (Ph.D thesis, Yale University, 1989); Kyle, Suez; Louis and Owen (eds), *Suez 1956*; W. S. Lucas, *Divided We Stand: Britain, the US and the Suez Crisis* (London, 1996).


“comprises actors and institutions of numerous types, both state and non-state” to understand how rules, norms, and institutions structure state relations.\(^{12}\) It aids this study of IOs first, by giving us a way of relating state and non-state actors to rules and norms, and second, by helping to harmonize the multiple strands of historiography in play. Still, my conclusions on the agency of IOs in the crisis’ resolution will be more a contribution to than a completion of an international society approach to the Suez Crisis, which will require in-depth investigation into multiple state and non-state archives.

To understand IO agency, I will focus on the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Though other IOs — notably the World Bank — played a role, these three organizations embodied the three central loci of multilateralism during the crisis: diplomatic cooperation (UN), international monetary stability (IMF), and humanitarian aid (ICRC). While my comparative methodology certainly adds complexities, this type of analysis will, I hope, allow me to make new and insightful conclusions about both the collective role of IOs and their place in the wider international society approach.

I will proceed as such: in the first chapter, I will investigate the aims of IOs. In the next chapter, I will outline their operations and assess the degree to which each organization achieved its stated aims. Across both chapters, I will compare their aims, operations, and outcomes. In my final chapter, I will discuss how my research changes our understanding of the course and resolution of the Suez Crisis.

I will explore an underutilized body of archival material from the ICRC, IMF, and UN to address the questions I have outlined. The ICRC reported its aims and operations in the *Revue Internationale de la Croix-Rouge* (hereafter *RICR*) whereas the IMF and UN employed press releases. Meeting minutes and resolutions from the UN Security Council and General Assembly also elucidate the organizations’ activities. IMF press releases were infrequent and relatively uninformative, so I draw on the Executive Board Series, composed of internally circulated documents that

appeared before Executive Board Meetings. Whereas the RICR and the UN documents I am using were immediately available to the public, much of the IMF material was strictly confidential. The RICR was mainly of interest to ICRC delegates, other humanitarian organizations, Red Cross societies, and the organization’s sponsors; whereas UN Secretariat documents, meeting minutes, and resolutions were generally addressed to “the world”, which, perhaps vaguely, we can take to mean the international community. Though I rely on self-reporting by officials from each organization, which lends itself to the presentation of activities in a positive light, I approach the sources critically and with reference to other primary and secondary sources. In this way, it becomes possible to appreciate the agency of IOs in the history of the Suez Crisis.

‘Nothing Ventured, Nothing Gained’: The Aims of International Organizations

Three central consequences of the Allied victory in 1945 characterized the 1950s international order. First, a superpower confrontation between the American-led West and the Soviet-led East permeated all areas of geopolitics. The rapid proliferation of nuclear weapons made the prospect of this incipient Cold War turning hot particularly frightening. Second, the power and legitimacy of European imperialism was quickly falling away. Especially after the Bandung Conference (1955), anti-colonial movements and post-colonial states increasingly challenged European political, economic, and ideological domination. Third, several international organizations, including the UN and IMF, were set up after 1945 to preserve the postwar peace. Despite the intensifying East-West Cold War confrontation and North-South contestation over decolonization, states continued to engage with multilateral institutions through the 1950s. Sequentially, I will locate the mandate of the ICRC, the IMF, and the UN in this international order before outlining their articulated aims at the Suez Crisis and concluding with a comparison of these aims.

The ICRC

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The ICRC was founded in 1863 “to protect and assist people affected by war.” Though technically a private Swiss association, the ICRC was mandated by the 1949 Geneva Conventions — international treaties governing armed conflict — to inspect the treatment of civilians, prisoners of war, and the wounded. Its role as the centerpiece between various national Red Cross and Crescent Societies and in the 1949 Geneva Conventions was justified with specific reference to the organization’s neutrality. Indeed, in a series ‘Les Principes de La Croix-Rouge’, published between August 1955 and May 1956, the ICRC declared that “La Croix-Rouge agira sans faveur ni prevention à l'égard de quiconque” in its endeavor to realize “buts universels et, par certains aspects, supranationaux.” Thus, the organization’s mandate implies that its humanitarian role at Suez would be to implement the Geneva Conventions as a “specifically neutral and independent institution.”

By the time the Suez Crisis arrived, moreover, the ICRC badly needed to prove its worth: since 1945, it had not only lost major portions of its funding, but also the confidence of governments on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Its failure to expose the Holocaust and the wholesale abuse of Soviet prisoners during the Second World War as well as its supposed anti-communist biases during wars in Korea and Indochina had especially harmed its standing in the East, though relations had improved somewhat since 1945.

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16 Ibid., p. 5.
Moving from the general to the particular, ICRC delegates had identified specific risks for the humanitarian management of conflict in the Middle East; an ICRC delegate who toured the region between January and May 1956 noted “l’absence de preparation pour le temps de guerre.” Furthermore, in Autumn 1956, the ICRC would at the same time be stretched to address humanitarian issues arising from the Hungarian Revolution. As the first interstate war where the ICRC was tasked with implementing the untested 1949 Geneva Conventions, the Suez Conflict was expected to test the ICRC.

The ICRC articulated specific aims prior to its involvement in the Suez Crisis that corresponded closely to its general mandate. On 2 November, it released the following radio broadcast: the ICRC “a prié les Gouvernements des pays impliqués dans le conflit…à assurer l'application des quatre Conventions de Genève.” In addition, the ICRC announced that it was “prêt à assumer les tâches prévues pour lui par les Conventions de Genève”, which have been outlined. Overall, an analysis of the ICRC’s mandate in international law and its press releases ahead of the Suez Crisis suggests that it aimed to mitigate the effects of war on civilians, prisoners of war, and the wounded by means of the neutral allocation of aid and by coordinating the efforts of various national societies.

The IMF

The IMF was set up in 1946 technically as part of the UN Economic and Social Council, but in effect operated as a fully independent organization. During the 1940s, a consensus formed among economists that one key failure of the post-1919 world order had been the resort to manipulative currency practices in the 1930s, which had led to autarky, economic stagnation, and (indirectly) war. The IMF was set up to prevent

24 “Ready to assume the tasks laid out for it by the Geneva Conventions.” Ibid.
25 Ibid., p. 661.
a regression to capital controls by resolving balance of payments issues through technical advice and temporary credit support.\textsuperscript{27} Thus, it is possible to conceive of the IMF’s formally economic role as consciously related to the maintenance of the post-1945 peace; the June 1956 Annual Report’s reference to the organization’s “obligations to the international society” supports this view.\textsuperscript{28} In practice, member states, who pooled resources in the Fund, could request withdrawals of ‘tranches ’ of their ‘quota’ when problems arose. This process protected the stability of the Bretton Woods international currency system, which governed monetary exchange outside of the Soviet bloc. Before 1956, however, the Fund had not made any major interventions in the international monetary system.

The most revealing feature of the IMF’s aims at the Suez Crisis is that they were never publicly announced. The absence of press releases related to the crisis was not surprising given the organization’s functions as articulated in the Articles of Agreement. The Articles mandated the IMF “to promote international monetary cooperation”\textsuperscript{29} and “to facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade.”\textsuperscript{30} Given the technical, jargon-laden focus on economics in the Articles, it is unsurprising that political neutrality was a tenet of the IMF.\textsuperscript{31} Article 12 states that “the Managing Director and the staff of the Fund, in the discharge of their functions, shall owe their duty entirely to the Fund and to no other authority.”\textsuperscript{32} Thus, the IMF presented itself as a technocratic institution with technocratic goals.

There was, however, one private reference to the Fund’s aims with regard to the Suez Crisis at an Executive Board meeting in September 1956. When Egypt’s request to withdraw its gold tranche was accepted, the IMF acknowledged that the crisis might crop up in the press; thus, it was noted that “if the press raised any questions on [the dispute over the Canal], the management would reply that the transaction was of a routine nature

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., pp. 3-18.
\textsuperscript{29} Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (adopted 27/12/1945), 2 UNTS 39, Art. 1 (i).
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., Art 1(ii).
\textsuperscript{32} Articles, 2 UNTS 39, Art. 12, section 4, (c).
and consistent with Fund rules and practice.” It appears, then, that the IMF was committed to discharging its functions apolitically and intended to treat any incidental involvement in the crisis as routine. In sum, IMF documents suggest that the organization sought to perform its normal function as guarantor of international monetary stability and, by consequence, to remain as neutral as possible.

The UN

The United Nations was established in 1945 as the world’s premier multilateral organ “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” Though by 1956 its membership contained a large majority of the planet’s population, Cold War divisions within the Security Council and disputes about decolonization in the General Assembly had circumscribed its grandiose collective security ambitions. Especially after disputes between the West and East over the use of the UN mandate in the Korea, many feared that the organization would repeat the sorry demise of the League of Nations. Appointed in 1953, however, Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld had worked to win the trust of the Warsaw Pact countries and the Global South in order to develop collective security in the absence of Security Council consensus.

The UN Charter laid out shared principles that national representatives and UN officials were obliged by international law to serve. Article 1 defined the fundamental purpose of the UN: “to maintain international peace and security.” Enshrining the “principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members”, the Charter commits signatories to only engage in self-defensive wars. Though UN organs all worked under these shared principles, our assessment of the organization’s aims must distinguish between the UN as diplomatic forum — the Security Council and the General Assembly — and the UN as international diplomat and civil servant — the Secretariat.

34 Charter of the United Nations (adopted 24 October 1945), 1 UNTS 16, Preamble.
35 MacQueen, Peacekeeping, p. 61.
36 Ibid., p. 68.
37 Charter, 1 UNTS 16, Art. 1.
38 Ibid., Art. 2.
The two UN diplomatic forums never expressed unanimous ‘aims’ because of intense disagreement between member states, but did pass resolutions that indicate where consensus could be found. The one substantive resolution passed by the Security Council during the crisis, SCR/118, preceded the invasion of Egypt and formed part of Britain and France’s deceitful “agenda within an agenda”, which merely set the stage for invasion. On 31 October, moreover, the Security Council deferred the crisis to the General Assembly, noting a “lack of unanimity of its permanent members.” Thus, the Security Council professed collective aims either disingenuously or not at all.

Invoking the ‘Uniting for Peace ’Resolution for the first time, an Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly set three goals: a unilateral ceasefire, the withdrawal of invading troops, and the restoration of free navigation to the Canal. On 2 November, GAR 997 “[urged] as a matter of priority that all parties now involved in hostilities in the area agree to an immediate ceasefire”; it passed with an overwhelming majority, but not unanimously.

Even if the General Assembly was only a diplomatic organ, it could authorize the Secretariat to take action in the pursuit of its goals — the setting up of UNEF, for example. Mandated by the General Assembly, Secretary-General Hammarskjöld’s aims would then be aligned with those of the Assembly as well as the Charter. Although Article 97 of the Charter describes the Secretary-General as "the chief administrative officer of the Organization”, Dag Hammarskjöld expressed an intention to use his position to broker peace. For example, on 13 October 1956, a Secretariat press release indicated a desire to facilitate “a just and peaceful solution to the Suez problem.” In addition, Hammarskjöld personally emphasized

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44 For example, see UNGA, ‘Resolution 998 (ES-I)’, 4 November 1956, UN, A/RES/998(ES-I).
45 Charter, 1 UNTS 16, Art. 97.
his aspiration to “discretion and impartiality” in his role.\textsuperscript{47} In sum, the Secretariat aimed to restore peace with a special focus on remaining neutral.

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To conclude, the ICRC, the IMF, and the UN Secretariat expressed different specific aims, but shared a commitment to neutrality and the service of their core values. Interestingly, the ICRC, IMF, and UN presented humanitarianism, monetary stability, and peace as neutral, universal goals. This presentation of neutrality and universality fits nicely into the wider discourse of twentieth century internationalism, which is defined as “values which were supposed to be valid to all people at all times…everywhere.”\textsuperscript{48} These commonalities, moreover, strengthen the case for considering IOs collectively in the wider question of the international society approach to the Suez Crisis. As the dispute over the Suez Canal entered its militarized phase, then, the ICRC, the IMF, and the UN Secretariat aimed to go about protecting those affected by war, ensuring monetary stability, and promoting peace as neutral parties.

‘Acting Neutral’: The Operations of International Organizations

Now for the action: in this chapter, I will examine primary and secondary accounts of what IOs did after the beginning of hostilities on 29 October and outline the outcomes that had emerged by the end of the crisis the following Spring. By referring these outcomes back to the aims I described in the last chapter, it becomes apparent that IOs for the most part achieved their articulated goals: atrocities were, by and large, avoided, monetary stability maintained, and the \textit{status quo ante bello} restored. By looking at the actions of each organization sequentially and then comparatively, I will analyze the processes employed by IOs in the realization of their aims. With this in hand, it will become possible to assess the collective contribution of IOs to the resolution of the Suez Crisis, which will be the focus of the next chapter.

\textsuperscript{47} UNSC, ‘751th Meeting’, 31 October 1956, UN, S/PV.751, pp. 1-2.

The ICRC

Today, our popular memory of the Suez Crisis (if such a thing exists) tends to forget the extreme threat to human security that it precipitated. That threat was all too apparent to the ICRC, however. Accounts of the organization’s intervention in this “short but intensive war” show that: it effectively supervised the implementation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, recording very few violations; it coordinated the allocation of its own aid supplies reserves alongside those of other national Red Cross and Crescent societies; and it maintained neutrality in the eyes of states during its activities. These outcomes can be attributed to three core activities: diplomacy, information gathering, and coordination.

Upon the outbreak of hostiles on 29 October, the ICRC’s first response was to push for the application of the Geneva Conventions. After the ceasefire came into effect on 6 November, however, the ICRC went about ensuring that civilians, the wounded, and prisoners of war received proper treatment and humanitarian aid; negotiating the repatriation of prisoners; and organizing the departure of Jews fleeing persecution in Egypt.

The ICRC’s supervision and diplomacy ensured the near universal adherence to the new Geneva Conventions. On 2 November, it issued a radio broadcast reminding all parties in the conflict the contents of the Conventions. One day prior, it had used its diplomatic positions to receive guarantees from Anthony Eden that Britain would adhere to the Conventions, even though they had not yet been ratified. Similarly, given the ambiguous position of UNEF in international law, the ICRC worked to receive a guarantee from Dag Hammarskjöld on 4 December 1956 that the UNEF would “observe the principles and spirit” of international humanitarian law if it had to use force. Hammarskjöld’s guarantee, which notably did not constitute a legal adherence to the Conventions, shows how

49 For a generic if surprisingly accurate ‘popular’ account, see The Crown, dir. Philip Martin, (TV Series, 2017), Season 2, Episodes 1-3.
51 Bugnion and Perret, Budapest to Saigon, pp. 63-82.
52 CICR, ‘Conflit de Suez’, pp. 659-60.
53 Bugnion and Perret, Budapest to Saigon, p. 68.
54 ‘Letter from the UN secretary-general to the ICRC president’, 4 December 1956, ICRC Archives, B AG 201 139-001 quoted in Bugnion and Perret, Budapest to Saigon, p. 79.
the interests of different IOs sometimes conflicted. Despite this ambiguity, however, the ICRC used its diplomatic position to ensure that all parties in the Suez conflict would in principle adhere to the Geneva Conventions.

This diplomatic position allowed the ICRC to negotiate and supervise the reciprocal transfer of prisoners. By the time the ceasefire had come into effect, Israel held some 5600 Egyptian prisoners with France and Britain in possession a further 400. Conversely, Egypt captured one Frenchman, who died unavoidably soon after detainment, and four Israelis. The ICRC was essential for organizing the repatriation of 48 seriously injured Egyptians held in Israel on 18 November; flights between Egypt and Israel had been banned since 1949 and no diplomatic relations existed between the two countries. Using its position as Israel’s protecting power to negotiate with Egypt, it had organized the final repatriation of all prisoners by 5 February. Especially in view of the difficulties faced repatriating prisoners after the 1947-9 Palestine War, the ICRC’s formally neutral diplomatic position appears to have facilitated dialogue between Egypt and Israel that would otherwise have been impossible.

Except with regard to the maltreatment of Israeli prisoners in Egypt, ICRC accounts suggest that the organization’s formal neutrality and the special ability of its personnel to gather information allowed it to minimize violations of the Conventions. Newly established delegations in Alexandria, Port Said, and Tel Aviv secured permission to inspect prison facilities and the administration of occupied zones. In the occupied Sinai, Dr. Louis-Alexis Gailland spoke to prisoners in Israeli, British, and French captivity, securing the release of those imprisoned unjustly. Throughout the period of their captivity, “il [Gailland] peut se rendre compte de la

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58 CICR, ‘Le rapatriement’, p. 163.
61 CICR, ‘Conflit de Suez’, p. 661.
situation d'environ cinq mille prisonniers.” 62 On the other side of the ceasefire line, however, Egypt initially prevented the inspection of Israeli prisoners. Eventually, on 14 December a list of Israeli prisoners and 474 Britons interned in Egypt was provided, which the ICRC relayed to the Central Agency for Prisoners of War. 63 Despite ICRC inspections, it was reported on 27 January that Israelis had been beaten and even tortured in captivity. 64 After further investigation, the ICRC received the almost certainly disingenuous reply from Egypt that the Israelis had fought amongst themselves. 65

Thus, the ICRC ultimately depended on the cooperation of states. The maltreatment of Israeli prisoners suggests that we cannot entirely accept the assertion in the March 1957 *Revue Internationale* that “pendant leur captivité tous les prisonniers ont été assistés, en Israël et en Égypte.” 66 Still, there is nothing to suggest that this was not mostly the case. In sum, even if it could not prevent any violations of the Geneva Conventions from occurring, it is possible for the most part to accept the ICRC’s assertion that the Suez Crisis “demeure très caractéristique de l’accomplissement des tâches du [CICR] dans le cadre des Conventions de Genève.” 67

The attitude of the belligerents to the ICRC suggests that its formal neutrality made it more trustworthy than various national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, which helped it to both gather information on humanitarian conditions and allocate humanitarian aid. From the start of the conflict, “un fonds spécial de secours aux victimes des événements est immédiatement ouvert;” the ICRC was better placed than national Red Cross societies to allocate this aid. 68 For example, on 10 November, the Egyptian Red Crescent tried to gain access to the heavily damaged Port

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65 Bugnion and Perret, *Budapest to Saigon*, p. 73.
66 “During their captivity all prisoners in Israel and Egypt were supported.” CICR, ‘L’activité du Comité International dans le Proche-Orient’, *RICR*, 39/459 (1957), p. 158.
68 “Special aid funds [were] immediately opened up to the victims of the events.” CICR, ‘L’action du Comité’, *RICR*, 38/456, p. 732.
Said; only one ambulance of supplies was permitted entry, and only for one day.\textsuperscript{69} Access was again denied them on 26 November.\textsuperscript{70} In contrast, ICRC delegate Maurice Thudichum was able to enter Port Said on 12 November and negotiate the passage of a large freight train of cargo across the ceasefire lines on 16 November.\textsuperscript{71}

It is clear that Britain’s understanding that the ICRC was neutral was a condition for this; on 10 November, the British army had told Egyptian Red Crescent personnel that groups entering Port Said “should consist of neutral and not (repeat not) Egyptian personnel.”\textsuperscript{72} Consequently, by the time the Egyptian Red Crescent was given full access to Port Said on 12 December, the ICRC had long been running regular convoys of aid.\textsuperscript{73} Egypt also perceived the ICRC to be neutral; despite great suspicion of European encroachment in Egypt, the organization’s European delegates were given free reign to inspect Port Said after the British-French withdrawal.\textsuperscript{74} Thus, because “‘neutrality ’was...achieved more easily by the ICRC than by the various national societies”, the ICRC provided aid where other actors could not.\textsuperscript{75}

The ICRC’s position as an international aid agency allowed it to coordinate national Red Cross societies and to convert the international community’s solidarity with Egypt into concrete aid commitments. By February 1957, forty-seven national Red Cross societies had answered the ICRC’s call three months earlier for aid to be sent to Egypt.\textsuperscript{76} For example, Denmark and Italy donated planes for the ICRC to transport the wounded out of Israel. ICRC inspectors in occupied areas were able to distribute vaccines and other supplies, including juice, games, and cigarettes.\textsuperscript{77}

\textsuperscript{70} Moeller, ‘Humanitarian Engagement’, p. 141.
\textsuperscript{72} ‘That a request was made by two Red Crescent vehicles, containing Egyptians, to proceed to Port Said and inquires if General Burns could be approached on the Subject’, 10 November 1956, TNA, JE 1094/90, fo. 371/1118906 quoted in Moeller, ‘Humanitarian Engagement’, p. 141.
\textsuperscript{73} CICR, ‘L’action du Comité’, \textit{RICR}, 38/456, p. 734.
\textsuperscript{75} Moeller, ‘Humanitarian Engagement’, p. 142.
According to reports from ICRC delegates, the organization worked “en liaison étroite” with other aid agencies such as the UN Relief and Works Agency. This ability to transcend ceasefire lines and coordinate permitted ICRC delegate De Traz to transmit some 71,113 letters through the conflict zone. By the RICR’s own account, the ICRC’s coordination was efficient; faced with the task of allocating aid to Egyptian prisoners "Tout le réseau Croix-Rouge est alerté, et les démarches se succèdent." A letter sent from the Egyptian Red Crescent to the ICRC in mid-November suggests that it was also effective: “Nous désirons vous exprimer notre profonde gratitude pour l'aide généreuse que vous nous avez apportée en ces jours troublés.”

Thus, the ICRC for the most part achieved the goals it set for itself during the Suez Crisis. With the notable exception of the treatment of Egyptian prisoners, its sources indicate that it was able to inspect the treatment of prisoners and civilians, ensuring the adherence of the combatants to the Geneva Conventions in the process. Through information gathering and diplomacy, it was also able to delegate aid in ways that were not available to other organizations. Through this examination of the ICRC’s functions, moreover, an interesting observation emerges: its neutrality in the eyes of states gave it special access. The construction of neutrality, it appears, was essential to the ICRC’s achievement of its goals.

The IMF

To understand the IMF’s role in the resolution of the Suez Crisis, I will assess how far the IMF maintained international monetary stability as well its neutrality. I will pursue my investigation by evaluating the extent to which the Fund approved loans according to its own rules during the crisis. With this in mind, I will assert that the Fund prevented a calamitous rupture in the international monetary system and maintained a significant though not unqualified degree of neutrality by allocating aid according to

80 “The whole Red Cross network is alerted and the messages are passed along.” CICR, ‘L’action du Comité’, RICR, 38/456, p. 733.
81 “We want to express to you our deep gratitude for the generous assistance that you have provided us with in these troubled days.” CICR, ‘L’action du Comité’, RICR, 38/456, p. 731.
the rules of the international monetary regime and producing technical economic information. Viewing the conflict as just another economic factor on its balance sheet, the organization avoided involving itself in politics. Even if the United States did use its disproportionate voting power in the IMF as leverage over Britain, I will seek to understand the operations of the IMF on its own terms. Overall, I find that when confronted with questions relating to the crisis, the Fund worked almost entirely according to ‘business as usual’.

During the diplomatic phase of the Suez Crisis, the archives do not suggest that IMF officials were much preoccupied with the dispute, even when dealing with requests from its main protagonists. On 21 September, the Egyptian government made a request to draw its gold tranche. Noting that “in recent months the payments position has been complicated by international developments,” the loan was rapidly approved on 22 September as a normal response to a short-term trade imbalance.82 In any case, it was rare for a gold tranche withdrawal to be denied. Business as usual with Egypt.

It took longer for IMF staff to approve a French stand-by arrangement for its gold and first credit tranche, which it requested on 11 October. Delays arose because of concerns over the Franc’s par value and the size of the withdrawal, but not over France’s involvement in the Suez Crisis.83 Staff were of the opinion that France’s massive current account losses were a result of “temporary factors”, including the import demands of the booming postwar economy, a bad harvest in 1956, and the intensifying war in French Algeria.84 Indeed, Suez was not mentioned in any of the multiple staff reports which were considered at the 17 October Executive General Meeting where the stand-by agreement was approved.85 The 18 October press release announcing the arrangement did not mention any political concerns.86 Staff analysis recommended its approval on the basis that the balance of payments issue would be temporary. France was

86 18 October 1956, IMF, PR/243.
able to withdraw funds allocated by the stand-by arrangement as normal between February and June 1957. Business as usual with France.

When war broke out in the Middle East the IMF moved more cautiously, albeit still according to its normal rules. Tranche withdrawals were designed to ease short-term pressures on balance of payments, rather than to support “large and sustained” outflows of capital — such as a protracted war. The continued presence of Israeli troops in Egypt complicated its request for a first credit tranche withdrawal on 25 January 1957; staff analysis noted that “the full impact of [the Suez] crisis on the Egyptian economy cannot yet be assessed.” Still, on 4 February the withdrawal was approved on the basis that difficulties had arisen from the loss of dues from the closed Canal and sanctions imposed by Britain and the US the previous summer. Business more complicated, but again business as usual with Egypt.

As a result of the Suez Crisis, discussions between Israel and the Fund on increasing its quota and setting a par value for the Israeli pound were stalled; the matter was removed from the 31 October Executive Board Meeting agenda because of the invasion of Egypt. However, despite the continued presence of Israeli troops in Egypt, consultations continued from December to February, culminating in a long report in February 1957 on the economic situation in Israel; the report steered clear from sensitive policy matters, referencing the “international situation” only once. Israel’s quota was increased on 27 February to $7.5 million and on 6 March the Fund recommended that Israel’s par value be set at 1.80 Israeli Pounds to the dollar all while boots were still on the ground in Egypt. Despite Israel’s recent transgressions in Egypt, its request on 15 May 1957 for a gold and credit tranche was also dealt with largely apolitically. The staff consultation document presented to the Executive Board, explained Israel’s large trade deficit with reference to increased immigration from Poland and Hungary; the words immigration and immigrant are together

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87 Boughton, ‘Northwest of Suez’, p. 5.
89 ‘Minutes of Executive Board Meeting’, 4 February 1957, IMF, EBM/57/5, pp. 2-3.
91 ‘1956 Consultations - Israel’, 5 February 1957, IMF, SM/57/12, p. 16.
92 ‘Minutes of Executive Board Meeting’, 27 February 1957, IMF, EBM/57/10, p. 15.
mentioned 11 times, whereas Suez is only (indirectly) referenced once. Thus, the loan was approved, again for economic reasons. Business more complicated and temporarily delayed, but almost as usual with Israel.

No precedent existed in the Fund’s history for resolving the problem brought by Britain in December 1956. The crisis of confidence in Britain precipitated by the Suez dispute created a massive speculative pressure on the sterling that almost forced the British government to devalue and/or impose capital controls. It was thought that Britain’s reserves needed to remain above $2000 million to maintain a stable parity of $2.80 to the pound, so their collapse from $2405 million in late July 1956 to $1965 million at the start of December alarmed the British government. Bank of England director C.F. Cobbold had already been warned in October by Commonwealth central bankers that “a further devaluation of sterling would mean the end of the sterling area.” Not only was the sterling area considered to be a binding force in the Empire and the Commonwealth, it also ensured to a large degree the stability of the Bretton Woods exchange system, financing over 50% of global transactions. Thus, the importance of “the continued existence of the sterling area to the British government in 1956 cannot be over-emphasized.”

Naturally, Britain began seriously considering an IMF withdrawal request in November alongside relief funds from EXIM and the delay of lend-lease repayments due to the US and Canada. When Chancellor of the Exchequer Macmillan informed Cabinet on 6 November that the US would not allocate this aid so long as Britain maintained operations in Egypt, a sense of crisis grew. Indeed, the IMF’s weighted voting system gave the United States disproportionate influence over the allocation of funds. As a consequence, Diane Kunz argues that in this position Britain had “complete and utter dependence” on US support for its continued presence

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93 Use of the Fund’s Resources - Israel’, 13 May 1957, IMF, EBS/57/26 (Supplement 1).
97 Ibid., p. 152.
98 Ibid., p. 230.
in Suez because to continue Britain needed money that only America could release from the IMF.99

Diplomatic histories have conclusively demonstrated that the US used its leverage in the IMF, alongside other bargaining chips, to force a British withdrawal from Port Said by threatening to block a tranche release.100 It does not follow, however, that the IMF failed to approach the British loan request neutrally when it arrived or, indeed, that the Fund ever contravened its rules. In fact, if we look at the way that the IMF handled Britain’s request — rather than the way that the US threatened to handle the IMF — it becomes clear that its decision making conformed to the normal technical approach. On 7 December, British Director Lord Harcourt made a request for the release of Britain’s gold and first credit tranches ($561.47 million) with its remaining quota available on standby ($738.53 million) for reasons, in his own words, entirely “consistent with the provisions of the Fund Agreement.”101

It would be the technical recommendations of IMF staff and not American geopolitical interests, it appears, that decided the approval of this massive tranche release. The Executive Board was presented with a background material document that noted the “improvement in the situation, both internally and externally” of Britain’s 1955 trade deficit into a surplus in 1956.102 Staff analysis concluded that “reserves were influenced not only by the United Kingdom’s trading position but also by its role as banker and by the international use of sterling.”103 During the Executive Board Meeting itself, executive director F.A. Southard remarked that “if the Fund did not act to bolster such a key currency as sterling…all members would regret it and…the consequences would be serious”104 because of its status as reserve currency. The Fund granted Britain support because it recognized that the sterling’s problems resulted from a speculative attack rather than from fundamental problems with the British

99 Ibid., p. 246.
104 ‘Executive Board Meeting’, 10 December 1956, IMF, EBM/56/59, p. 3.
Report, 87

economy. It applauded Britain, furthermore, for avoiding the introduction of trade controls.105

Case by case, IMF internal documents suggest that the organization operated according to its own rules during the Suez Crisis. Even if Executive Board documents were available to top officials in member countries’ central banks, which incentivizes the presentation of impartiality, I find that the willingness of the IMF to deal with Israel while it sustained troops in Egypt suggests that it was not so extensively influenced by the US, who at the same time vehemently sought an Israeli withdrawal in the UN. Still, Kunz presents the IMF as a just another instrument of the American economic leverage.106 Indeed, she goes as far as to describe Britain as an American “client state” because of its reliance on IMF aid.107 However, Kunz’s view likely stems from her reliance on British-American diplomatic correspondence; in ‘The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis’, which is nearly 400 pages long, she references IMF sources just once.108 Relating IMF documents to secondary material, in contrast, demonstrates that it is inappropriate to see the Fund merely as another weapon in America’s economic arsenal. Thus, we must circumscribe Kunz’s argument. Instead, “the IMF was able to act upon [loan requests] without becoming embroiled in the crisis.”109

Turning to outcomes, it appears that the technical information and neutral decision making effected by the Fund mitigated the short to mid-term monetary problems associated with the Suez Crisis. The 1957 annual report “found it encouraging that difficult internal adjustments had been made with considerable success, and that it had proved possible, with the assistance of the Fund, to avoid a reintroduction of the restrictive practices [in Europe].”110 Indeed, after the announcement of the IMF package, staff analysis found that “speculative pressures [on the sterling] virtually ceased.”111 Despite the role of direct US aid in reviving the sterling, Boughton argues that “a much larger multilateral package would have to be assembled to end the crisis, and the IMF was the institution that was

105 Ibid.
107 Ibid., p. 5.
108 See footnote in ibid., p. 279.
110 De Vries and Horsefield, The International Monetary Fund, i, p. 441.
best placed to do so.”¹¹² The pound retained its exchange rate with the dollar until 1967. In February, an Executive Director noted that “the current balance of payments was better than one would have thought possible some months ago.”¹¹³

Thus, the IMF maintained the stability of the international monetary system during the Suez Crisis. Even if its decisions affected the diplomacy of the crisis, it has been shown that they were by and large formulated according to a neutral application of the Articles of Agreement. Like the ICRC, then, the IMF could perform its functions in no small part because its neutrality was credible. Its unprecedented achievement in keeping countries financially buoyant and open for trade in this time of crisis is captured in the Business Week headline of 30 March 1957: “IMF wins over the skeptics.”¹¹⁴ It had put its technical powers to effective use in a testing time for the international monetary system.

**The UN**

Though the UN had been involved in the first, diplomatic phase of the Suez Crisis, its operations began in earnest after Israeli tanks rolled into the Sinai Peninsula.¹¹⁵ With the military conflict in motion, the organization’s aim became the restoration of peace with a full withdrawal by all the belligerents. In fact, a ceasefire was declared within a fortnight of the Israeli invasion and the full withdrawal of foreign troops from Egypt completed inside six months; however, it is necessary to draw direct causal links between the UN’s intervention in the conflict and the outbreak of peace. The UN effected four key processes: it set international norms and directly encouraged states to follow them; it solved technical problems; it shaped interstate diplomacy by creating a neutral forum for debate; and it created the world’s first peacekeeping force, which acted as a physical extension of its diplomacy.

The UN acted as the primary shaper of norms during the Suez Crisis, a position that proceeded from the “strength of its [near] universal

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¹¹³ IMF, EBM/57/10, p. 11.
“membership” and its status as the premier diplomatic organ in world politics.116 Crucially, the UN Charter commanded what Weiss calls “international legitimacy.”117 Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions were the main vehicle by which the UN made normative pronouncements over the crisis. From the outset of the crisis, belligerents attempted to frame their actions in terms of the normative mandate of these resolutions. Indeed, even though Britain and France ended up completely transgressing the principles of SCR/118 both countries presented their invasion as a ‘police action’ to protect international shipping — i.e. in terms broadly consistent with the Charter.118

Unfortunately for Anthony Eden and Guy Mollet, however, deliberation at the UN affirmed the opposition of most states to the invasion. The First Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly passed Resolution 997 on 2 November, which called for a ceasefire, withdrawal, and clearance of the Canal. These demands were repeated in motions passed on 4, 7, and 24 November.119 After the British-French withdrawal, Israel was pressed further through motions on 19 January and 2 February.120

Though some countries (notably Australia), voiced their support for the British-French ‘police action’, the General Assembly, overall, conclusively condemned the tripartite aggression with large majorities in the General Assembly.121 On 3 November, the Egyptian representative rebuked Britain and France’s “false pretext of separating the Egyptian and Israel armies until a solution has been found to the Suez Canal question.”122 In an address on 7 November, the delegate for Ceylon noted that, “the Assembly, by its resolution [GAR 997], rejected in unmistakable terms the explanation that their [Britain and France’s] action was a ‘police action’; it was an invasion, a military operation conducted against Egypt. In those

117 Ibid., p. 1227.
119 UN, A/RES/997(ES-I); UN, A/RES/998(ES-I); UNGA, ‘Resolution 1002 (ES-I)’, 5 November 1956, UN, A/RES/1002(ES-I); UNGA, ‘Resolution 1120(XI)’, 24 November 1956, UN, A/RES/1120(XI).
circumstances, they have no legal or moral right to remain there.”123 Thus, the role of the African-Asian bloc in admonishing the imperial powers is especially important.124 Britain and France had attempted to prevent this by framing their invasion as a ‘police action’, which demonstrates a key diplomatic dimension of the Suez Crisis: UN norms mattered.

The diplomatic operations of the Secretariat were also crucial in the UN’s pursuit of peace, facilitating consensus-building deliberation on the General Assembly Floor as well as behind the scenes. On 29 October, Secretary-General Hammarskjöld convened private meetings with American, British, French, and Soviet diplomats to discuss the situation.125 Working with Canadian Foreign Minister and committed UN advocate Lester Pearson, he led backroom discussions from 2 November that helped to distil the principles of UNEF, which would replace British-French ‘police action’.126 Pearson and Hammarskjöld’s plan for UNEF was approved on 7 November with 64 votes in favor, 12 abstentions, and none against.127 While it was important that the superpowers accepted the idea, the independent diplomatic action of the Secretariat was essential. Between 16 and 18 November, Hammarskjöld opened talks in Cairo to secure Nasser’s approval, spending seven hours alone on 17 November to sway his doubts about the inclusion of Canadian forces — whose head of state was the Queen of England — in the operation.128 Nasser’s acceptance of foreign UNEF troops on Egyptian land depended on his trust in Hammarskjöld. Later in the crisis, Hammarskjöld brokered talks over the opening of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, which had been blocked since 1950.129 When Egypt agreed to their opening, the last Israeli troops left Egypt.

123 UN, A/PV.567, p. 124.
124 Ibid., p. 106; UN, A/PV.563, p. 59.
127 UN, A/PV.567.
To understand the agency of the Secretariat, we also have to appreciate its use of what I call ‘hard diplomacy’ — diplomatic process that bolsters verbal negotiations with action on the ground. The Secretariat’s status as a neutral, international body allowed it to provide the technical aid needed to clear the several ships scuttled in the Suez Canal at the start of the invasion. Whereas Britain and France argued that their own engineers would be needed, Hammarskjöld organized an alternative pool of technical expertise, which was accepted because it was not deemed to undermine Egypt’s sovereignty. As a result, France and Britain lost an important justification for their continued presence in Egypt. The United Nations began work in mid-December and the Canal was in full working order by 10 April 1957. The UN’s provision of neutral, technical aid, then, both resolved a material problem created by the Suez Canal — the blocking of a major seaway — and increased diplomatic pressure on Britain and France to withdraw.

A more impressive example of the UN’s ‘hard diplomacy’, however, is the formation of UNEF. By establishing a peacekeeping force that was neutral and "fully independent of the policies of any one nation", the security of the Suez Canal could be assured without undermining Egyptian sovereignty. With the first UNEF troops entering Egypt on 15 November to supervise the Egyptian-Israeli truce, the basis for British-French occupation began to evaporate. Indeed, the forceful appeals of GAR 1121 for the three invading countries to withdraw emphasized the presence of UNEF. Furthermore, General Burns, the Commander of UNEF, coordinated with Israeli commanders to increase the speed of their withdrawal from the Sinai, which, excluding a band of forces on the Gulf of Aqaba, was complete on 15 January. By February, UNEF troops numbered around 6000, forming a mediating band on the Egyptian side of the ceasefire line. Though only mandated to act in self-defense, these forces were a physical embodiment of the UN’s mandate for peace as Dag Hammarskjöld emphasized in a radio address to his soldiers: “You are the frontline of a moral force which extends around the world…Your success can have profound effect for good, not only in the present emergency, but

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133 MacQueen, Peacekeeping, p. 73.
on future prospects for building a world order of which we may all one day be truly proud.”

In sum, the UN was an active participant in the restoration of peace in the Middle East. First, the UN set norms that carried real weight due to the organization’s near universal membership and commitment to high ideals. Second, the UN’s body of international civil servants in the Secretariat facilitated diplomatic engagement between states, especially through the personal work of Dag Hammarskjöld. Third, this diplomatic engagement was bolstered by ‘hard diplomacy’, including technical aid and UNEF.

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Overall, international organizations were active participants in making their articulated goals happen. Interestingly, despite their varying aims and institutional designs, there were remarkable similarities between the operations that each international organization used in the pursuit of its goals. The IMF, ICRC, and to some extent the UN were very active gatherers of technical information. Furthermore, the ICRC and UN facilitated diplomacy between different entities, acting both as diplomatic agents and forums of dialogue.

This overlap in function can explain apparent clashes between organizations; in an address on World Red Cross Day, Dag Hammarskjöld noted that “when…the United Nations arranged and carried out the transfer of prisoners of war, the International Committee of the Red Cross lent valued assistance.” The ICRC claimed credit for supervising the same operation — such contradictory reporting was rare, but it demonstrates the extent to which overlapping interests could lead to conflict. While the IMF 1956 Annual Report noted that the UN and IMF “have worked

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134 ‘UN Pamphlet on UNEF’, 1 March 1957, UNA, S-0313-0002-12, p. 17 quoted in Tudor, ‘Blue Helmet’, p. 64.
together in close association, whenever their interests required it”, there is
no evidence they *actively* cooperated during the Suez Crisis.\(^{138}\)

Still, IOs employed common processes in a way that allows us to
consider their role in the resolution of the Suez Crisis collectively,
strengthening the argument for an international society approach. Most
importantly each of these international organizations sought to embody
neutrality in the eyes of states both as an end in itself and as a means to
achieving their goals, presenting their actions through a discourse of
internationalism.\(^{139}\) Thus, the humanitarian, monetary, and diplomatic
rules and norms promulgated by the ICRC, the IMF, and the UN
respectively held weight because they were deemed to be neutral.

A Crisis for the World?

It is clear that international organizations were deeply involved in
making the history of the Suez Crisis. Yet in some ways this conclusion
begs more questions than it answers. In this chapter, I will argue that the
similarity of the processes effected by IOs and the analogous way that they
constructed neutrality in the eyes of states necessitate certain adjustments
to the historiography. Most importantly, international organizations must
be central to how we understand the course and resolution of the militarized
phase of the crisis. Though IOs were not always the principal shapers of
events, their status as neutral actors with internationalist aims allowed them
to exert an important agency that has hitherto been overlooked.
Furthermore, the similarity of the processes that they employed supports
the application of the international society approach to the Suez Crisis. I
will close with some tentative research recommendations for future
scholarship into the crisis

International organizations were at the center of Suez Crisis from
the first shots fired in the Sinai Desert on 29 October 1956 to the reopening
of the Canal on 10 April 1957. Though they achieved their articulated
goals, the role of states in this process remains to be fully examined.
Indeed, most histories of the Suez Crisis have understood international
organizations merely as instruments of states; however, this ignores the

\(^{138}\) IMF, SM/56/43, p. 141.

\(^{139}\) E. Muschik, ‘Managing the World: The United Nations, Decolonization, and the
Strange Triumph of State Sovereignty in the 1950s and 1960s’, *Journal of Global
way that IOs shaped norms, which directed state power. The UN is of primary importance here. For example, the United States exerted diplomatic and economic pressure on Britain, France, and Israel to withdraw in a large part because the UN had laid bare the way that the invaders’ actions violated international norms, which jeopardized the West’s position in the Cold War. On 8 November, acting Secretary of State Herbert Hoover Jr. raged that “if the British and French had stayed out of Egypt and the Soviets had nonetheless moved against Hungary, they would have been ruined in the eyes of the world.” Indeed, both Macmillan and Eden’s memoirs make reference to the extreme pressure exerted on Britain at the UN. Reflecting on the crisis, Sir Charles Keightley, Commander in Chief of the British forces, concluded “the one overriding lesson of the Suez operation is that world opinion is now an absolute principle of war and must be treated as such.”

In sum, “the UN…established norms of government but did not rule.” For just this reason, British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd had attempted to cast Britain’s invasion in terms of “an international policing role”, reflecting on 8 November that Britain “have heartily welcomed the idea of sending a United Nations force to the area to take over the responsibilities which we have felt bound to shoulder.” A similar narrative of the crisis is repeated in Eden’s memoirs. By consequence, the establishment of UNEF necessitated a French-British withdrawal. Thus, norms coming from the UN exerted agency on state action.

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145 Tudor, ‘Blue Helmet’, p. 61; UN, A/PV.567, p. 112
146 Eden, Full Circle, pp. 522-27.
It has been noted that international organizations pursued courses of action unavailable to states. Paradoxically, the unique ability of the ICRC to supervise the implementation of humanitarian law and the IMF to maintain monetary stability has led their influence in the crisis to be overlooked. Given the preoccupation of diplomatic historians with state action, it is unsurprising that the historiography has ignored the several problems that states did not face because of IO activity. For example, although the US aid helped to ease pressures on the sterling, it could not have resolved Britain’s balance of payments problem alone. Furthermore, the ICRC’s unique position in the supply of aid to civilians, prisoners of war, and the wounded prevented human disasters and public relations difficulties for the invading powers, which were explicit concerns of British commanders in Port Said. The impact of these two organizations does not appear in the state archives precisely because they were successful.

Reflecting on this point, one might model the agency of IOs, then, along a continuum between ‘stage-setting’ — the ICRC’s preemption and mitigation of humanitarian problems — and ‘actioning’ — the deployment of UNEF. Each IO shaped the crisis in both of these ways, with the UN engaging in the most actioning, the ICRC in stage-setting, and the IMF somewhere in between.

Across both of these processes, though, the construction of neutrality by IOs was a means to achieving their goals and an end in itself. Indeed, as research of their aims has shown, the neutral promotion of universal values was central to the internationalist mandates of the UN, the IMF, and the ICRC. Still, the realization of these goals during the Suez Crisis depended to some extent on the support of the two superpowers, the USA and the USSR. For example, they both supported the intervention of a UN peacekeeping force because each wanted to bring about a British-French withdrawal without facilitating the intervention of the other superpower. Still, though it was important that American and Soviet diplomats accepted the idea, the UN occupied a unique position as an international organization designed to serve internationalist goals in the

formation of an *international* peacekeeping force. Though the IMF acted according to its own rules in approving the massive rescue package for Britain, its approval was by then in the USA’s interests as Britain had already committed to withdraw from Port Said. In addition, circumstances at Suez did not present the ICRC with difficult questions on how to remain neutral that were faced in other conflicts.\(^{151}\) Thus, if by their own accounts IOs operated as neutral actors, this depended to some extent on favorable background conditions.

Overall, I contend that this study has bolstered the importance of international society as an object of analysis in international history. I have not pursued such an analysis outright, but rather have drawn inspiration from it and examined one facet of building a more holistic, international understanding of the Suez Crisis. By examining the aims and operations of IOs, I have shown that they pursued similar aims and generated influence in comparable ways. Indeed, they often interrelated in their functions. For example, the UN and ICRC jointly managed the transfer of prisoners in the Sinai peninsula. In addition, they sometimes exerted a joint influence of states, even unintentionally. For example, the flight on the sterling was to a large degree motivated by Britain’s weak position at the UN, which pushed Britain into the hands of the IMF.\(^{152}\) The main point, however, is that the internationalist, neutral aims of IOs were realized through some combination of diplomacy, information gathering, technical aid, and normative influence, which are processes I have identified through primary research. This suggests that in an international society approach to the Suez Crisis individual IOs ought to be examined together.

In sum, this study impels the historian to approach the Suez Crisis — and indeed international history — more holistically. In 2008, Scott Lucas noted that “various collections from 1991 have tried to represent Suez as a multi-national affair, only to run the risk of merely re-scripting the historical play with more actors.”\(^{153}\) What this study has sought to show is that future research should seek to understand the crisis in terms of international society, a singular category that brings all of these actors — and the historiographies they bring with them — together.


\(^{153}\) W. S. Lucas, ‘Conclusion’ in Smith (ed.), *Reassessing Suez*, p. 239.
My research throws up other future areas of exploration into the Suez Crisis. Most importantly, the Suez Crisis must be recognized as an important moment in the history of the organizations themselves. Indeed, the way that IO officials discussed the crisis reveals a palpable sense of their ‘making history’ for their respective organizations; the wording of instructions from the ICRC to its delegates shows the importance attached to the first implementation of the 1949 Conventions. As early as 10 December 1956, moreover, IMF Executive Director Pinto posited that the sterling rescue “would establish a new phase in the Fund's existence.” The Fund lent $500 million more during the crisis than it had cumulatively since its foundation; the IMF’s own official history aptly described its involvement as “a turning point for the Fund.” Later histories have suggested that its massive increase in intervention “put it on the map as an episodic international lender” able to manage major crises. For the UN, the formation of UNEF was the “huge leap forward in scale and ambition” of conflict resolution that “drove an expansion of UN functions from predominantly deliberative to actively interventionist.” Its ability to manage crises without Security Council consensus was also significant. The importance of the Suez Crisis in the development of the UN was as apparent then as it is now; on 24 November, the Belgian representative noted “I believe we are going through a crucial phase in the life of the United Nations.” Thus, the Suez Crisis is almost as important for understanding the history of IOs as they are to understanding it.

In addition, historians should build on this study to revisit state archives with international society in mind and perhaps new material will become useful. It will be important to study how different actors shaped norms and other features of international society. Furthermore, the interaction between normative rhetoric in foreign relations and domestic policy ought to be addressed. In view of postcolonial approaches, further study should go into the Eurocentrism lurking behind the ability of IOs to construct of neutrality. Perhaps this study of the the Suez Crisis begs more questions than answers, but it is certainly a start in the right direction.

154 Bugnion and Perret, Budapest to Saigon, p. 80.
156 De Vries and Horsefield, The International Monetary Fund, i, p. 426.
158 MacQueen, Peacekeeping, p. 67; Tudor, ‘Blue Helmet’, p. 38.
On 4 November 1956, Omar Loufti, the Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations appealed to the sovereign nations of the world, “The solution of the problem is in your hands. The eyes of the world are upon you. Yours is a great responsibility.” Several states responded to his call for support, but the resolution of the problem to which he referred — the Suez Crisis — could not have happened in the way that it did without the intervention of international organizations. Acting in ways that states could not, the ICRC, the IMF, and the UN together shaped the course of the crisis and contributed significantly to its conclusion. This study has shown that states did not underestimate their influence; neither should history.

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160 UN, A/PV.565, p. 80.
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Theses

The Lessons We Choose: The U.S. Army and Indifference Toward the French Indochina Experience

Kevin Moore

The sound of a bugle halts bereted soldiers walking along a dusty road. Their officers, riding atop a nearby jeep, survey the surrounding landscape as their pristine, white képis shine in the sun. Only moments later, every man in the convoy lies dead, overrun by a horde of khaki-clad Viet Minh soldiers who extend their defeated enemy no quarter. This scene, featured in the first two minutes of We Were Soldiers, depicts the ambush of French Mobile Group 100 in 1954, and represents a rare reference to a forgotten war. The narrator, reflecting on the story he is about to divulge, utters a seemingly insignificant phrase followed by an open-ended question; “To tell this story, I must start at the beginning. But where does it begin?”1 This phrase, though merely a sidebar to the plot, is emblematic of the First Indochina War. Despite this modern pop culture rectification, the Americans who stood the most to gain from French experiences neither listened nor cared to take heed of those who came before them.

The disruption of the traditional balance of power by the Second World War caused a ripple effect across the world. Colonial empires were no longer able to project the same amount of power on their overseas possessions, allowing nationalist movements to take root and create distance with their former masters. Despite the French commitment to the cultural crusade of mission civilisatrice, the people of French Indochina inevitably sought to regain control over their land despite internal divisions over how to accomplish this goal.2 The states of Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina, collectively known as Vietnam, became a battleground where 21,000 men—more than six percent of the French Expeditionary Corps—sustained fatal wounds, alongside staggering numbers of their Viet Minh

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1 Randall Wallace, We Were Soldiers, (Hollywood, California: Paramount Productions, 2002), 0:01:01.

adversaries.\textsuperscript{3} Even with France’s political and military deterioration in the face of growing Viet Minh strength, few outside of France or Indochina took notice of the war until 1954. By May, France had been evicted from Indochina at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, and the United States stood poised to take its place to stem the rapid growth of communism in Southeast Asia.

Though rarely studied in depth, the First Indochina War was an inflection point early in the Cold War. As France’s influence in the region waned in the face of a unique blend of communism and nationalism, the United States saw it increasingly necessary to buttress the war effort and eventually intervene on behalf of South Vietnam. Though this transition took place over the course of nearly fifteen years, the United States Army was woefully unprepared for the type of war it was about to face. It spent millions of dollars on advanced technology, countless hours studying counterinsurgency case studies, and developed new doctrine to revolutionize the pace of battle using helicopters. However, it failed to do one of the simplest things possible: learn from those that fought a similar war only a decade prior. The following study sought to answer a simple question: how did the United States Army view the French experience in the First Indochina War? The resulting research exposed a pattern of American indifference to relevant lessons that could have been gained from the conflict. The three-stage pattern, beginning in 1950, displays the gradual acceptance and implementation of French lessons learned in Vietnam, only becoming a significant effort after it was too late and largely ignoring lessons beyond the tactical level. The following paper will examine the United States Army’s shifting evaluation of the French experience in Vietnam between 1950 and 1969, analyzing the reasons for and ramifications of its failure to accept relevant lessons.

Before reviewing the historiography of the First Indochina War and its American reputation, it is important to understand the various phases of this pattern. Between 1950 and 1969, members of the U.S. Army gradually ascribed more value to French lessons as the American role in Southeast Asia expanded. The first period spans from the beginning of major

\textsuperscript{3} Thomas C. Thayer, “Patterns of the French and American Experience in Vietnam,” in \textit{The Lessons of Vietnam} (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977), 23. For comparison, the average American death rate was only around 1.8\%, which is the difference between one in fifty-five chance of dying for U.S. soldiers versus a one in fifteen chance for the French. Though exact casualty statistics on the Viet Minh side are unknown, estimates range from 175,000 to 365,000 killed in battle.
American involvement in Indochina in 1950 to the assumption of the burden of responsibility following the departure of the French Expeditionary Force in April of 1956. During these years, the Army saw the French experience as little more than an absolute failure, displaying indifference towards the potentially valuable lessons from the conflict. The second period spans from the American assumption of responsibility in 1956 to the absorption of the Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) into Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), in 1964. This amalgamation and the coinciding troop increases signified a marked increase in the size and scope of the American mission. The Army’s focus on developing generally applicable counterinsurgency doctrine made it more willing to consider the value of French experiences around the world during this period, though these were rarely specific to Vietnam. The final period picks up in 1964 and ends as the United States began troop withdrawals in 1969. At this point, the U.S. Army and associated institutions finally began to ascribe definite value to the French experience in Indochina by implementing tactical lessons specific to Indochina. This pattern has significant implications for both the history of the U.S. Army and its future as a learning organization.

A review of relevant literature is foundational to an understanding of the First Indochina War and its reputation within the U.S. Army. With English language scholarship relatively rare during the war, Dr. Ellen Hammer became one of the first to write on the subject, publishing *The Struggle for Indochina: 1940-1955* in 1955. She studied the conflict in Indochina from the Japanese occupation during World War Two to the signing of the Geneva Accords in 1955, analyzing the political environment. Unlike most writing of the time, Hammer focused on the agency of Vietnamese individuals in Indochinese affairs, rather than treating them as bodies acted upon by European forces. Equally rare, Hammer utilized a significant amount of Vietnamese language sources, allowing her to build a more comprehensive picture of the preconditions to the First Indochina War. As the first popular study on the First Indochina War, *The Struggle for Indochina* was the preeminent reference for many Army publications throughout the late 1950s. It remained the most popular source until the work of Bernard Fall came to the forefront in the next decade.

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While Dr. Hammer’s work dealt primarily with the conflict’s political side, many of the most influential books focused on French Army’s military experiences. Dr. Bernard Fall, a well-known journalist and scholar, wrote the most influential of these: *Street Without Joy: The French Debacle in Indochina*. As the result of doctoral research, Fall made multiple trips to Indochina in the final years of the war and accompanied French Union troops into combat. His goal was to illustrate the futility of conventional French Army forces carrying out the style of warfare that was necessary to pacify Indochina. This critical focus made his work significantly more appealing to the military reader than political and cultural analyses like Hammer’s. The consistent tone of forewarning in Fall’s writing is particularly relevant to this topic. Concluding *Street Without Joy*, he wrote, “… perhaps this is a good epitaph…for the Americans who will now have to follow in [French Soldiers’] footsteps.”

Though not explicitly mentioned in the purpose, the tone and timing of *Street Without Joy* in 1961 served as a warning to the United States to back out before it was too late. *Street Without Joy* was the go-to book for members of the Army who sought to better understand the Vietnamese operating environment, especially since it was written in English. Among the first writers to highlight the French experience and subsequent American disinterest, Fall deserves a prominent spot within the historiography of the First Indochina War.

During the years of full-scale U.S. involvement, scholarship was largely limited to studies conducted internally by the military, government, and associated think tanks, such as the RAND and BDM Corporations. These studies were classified until years after the war and thus do not fit the typical definition of historical scholarship, but are important nonetheless. The next significant body of literature emerged in the decades after the American withdrawal. Facing the shock of defeat and a military identity crisis, many authors sought to build a body of lessons on what went wrong for the United States. *The Lessons of Vietnam* was the

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6 LTG (R) Hal Moore wrote about reading *Street Without Joy* prior to deploying to Vietnam in *We Were Soldiers Once…and Young*. The USMA Library’s collection also supports my assertion, which has more than seventeen copies of *Street Without Joy*, many of which were bound in the mid-1960s as the American effort in Vietnam rapidly expanded. *Hell in a Very Small Place* (1966), Fall’s book on the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, also served as popular reading for officers heading to Southeast Asia.
7 Relevant examples of these studies are discussed on pages 12-13.
product of a colloquium on “The Military Lessons of the Vietnamese War” held at Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1973 and 1974. One of the most relevant papers was “Patterns of the French and American Experience in Vietnam,” by systems analyst Thomas Thayer. His quantitative analysis of the First Indochina War deduced various lessons that the U.S. military overlooked, and served as the basis for his later book, War Without Fronts: The American Experience in Vietnam.\(^8\) Though frequently technical, Thayer provides an unvarnished review of why the U.S. failed to achieve victory. Another important work during this period is Andrew Krepinevich’s The Army and Vietnam. While Krepinevich focuses on the Army’s unpreparedness for counterinsurgency, his work often delves into the sluggish learning process that occurred in various professional circles, including military journals and higher education.\(^9\) Krepinevich’s topic is closely related to the discussion of Army learning that this paper will engage in.

In the early 2000s, the U.S. Army’s newest identity crisis precipitated even more literature reexamining the Vietnam War. As the nation became embroiled in the counterinsurgency operations of Iraq and Afghanistan, policymakers and scholars alike scrambled to draw relevant lessons from the past. This trend spurred the publication of U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations, 1942-1976, the second volume of the Army’s official history on counterinsurgency. Andrew Birtle, a historian with the Center for Military History, discusses multiple cases of American involvement in small wars, such as advisory efforts in Greece and the Philippines, as well as direct action in Korea and Vietnam.\(^10\) Birtle analyzes the lessons the Army learned in each of these cases, how these lessons were incorporated into doctrine, and how they were utilized in future conflicts. Similar to The Army and Vietnam, this book is relevant because of its analysis of how the Army learned from the French during its advisory efforts in the First Indochina War. Though its

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\(^9\) Andrew F. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988). This period is also when most of the Army’s official histories of the Vietnam War were first published, though they rarely took a strong stance on lessons of the war.

scope is broader than Krepinevich’s, it contains a high level of detail. Birtle made use of a variety of Army internal sources, such as the Army War College’s student papers and archives, that are otherwise unavailable.\textsuperscript{11} \textit{U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations, 1942-1976} is a valuable resource for anyone researching the topics of counterinsurgency or learning within the Army.

Though more recent histories of the Vietnam War often drew attention to international actors, there is also a variety of scholarship that takes another look at American actions. Such is the case with former Department of History instructor Gregory Daddis’ \textit{Westmoreland’s War}. Daddis challenges the traditional notion that General William Westmoreland was responsible for the United States’ flawed strategy in Vietnam, and argues for a more comprehensive view of the man and the situation. Specifically, Daddis sought to combat the simple characterization of William Westmoreland, along with the conclusion that attrition drove every aspect of the U.S. effort in South Vietnam.\textsuperscript{12} To accomplish this, Daddis examines the institutional culture of the Army leading to and throughout the war, discussing the development and study of counterinsurgency doctrine. His insights on the Army War College’s curriculum and operations were particularly relevant to this study. \textit{Westmoreland’s War} is a valuable reconsideration of a key figure in the United States Army and the institutions that supported him. In contrast, Cold War scholar Frederik Logevall’s \textit{Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s Vietnam} used the First Indochina War to contextualize America’s conflict years later. Logevall’s study detailed the Vietnamese anticolonial struggles against the French, while also discussing high-level American decisions that set the stage for the future. \textit{Embers of War} is a comprehensive discussion that can serve as good background familiarization with the First Indochina War and the decisions that led America to Vietnam.

America’s ever-expanding role in Indochina began in earnest in 1950 with the initiation of major military assistance efforts. Following reports of waning French control, Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall

\textsuperscript{11} With the COVID-19 Pandemic, there was no opportunity to visit the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) to conduct research. Additionally, there are no student papers from my time period (1950-1969) available digitally, and the USAWC library could only provide bibliographies on the subject.

approved the establishment of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Indochina (MAAG). The interservice group’s purpose was to supervise the flow of American military aid to the French with its modest authorized strength of 128 men, despite a much smaller initial roster. 13 Though consequential in hindsight, the creation of MAAG was far from groundbreaking in 1950; Korea had the world’s attention, and Indochina was just one of multiple MAAGs established throughout Asia, including Thailand and Taiwan, followed later by Laos and Cambodia. In addition to supervising the French receipt of World War II surplus, the advisory group served in an evaluative function. In what they called “end-use visits,” the MAAG Army section’s members visited French and allied units in the field, observing how well they took care of the American-supplied equipment. 14 These maintenance reports were simply an accountability method, ensuring that U.S. dollars were not being thrown away as a result of French neglect. However, these visits also came with a secondary purpose: while inspecting equipment upkeep, advisors also made status reports assessing the morale, readiness, and training level of each unit. 15 Though originally intended for logistical oversight, MAAG’s role included an analytical component, determining the efficacy of the French and Vietnamese armies. Thus, the officers and non-commissioned officers of MAAG began the foundational process of ascribing value to the French experience in Vietnam.

Initial perceptions of the French experience were mixed. At the lowest level, American soldiers saw their European counterparts in a positive light. French combat leaders were lauded for their personal courage, quality training, and gained credit for their extensive combat experiences against the Viet Minh. 16 These reviews came from U.S. advisors who served alongside junior French officers and they demonstrate the primary attributes American soldiers value: courage and competence. Similarly, later end-use visits reflected proficiency in a variety of support

15 Ibid., 22.
branches. French artillerymen, engineers, and medical personnel consistently received reviews that described them as “excellent” and “exceptionally good” at their tasks. These evaluations indicated a degree of admiration and respect for the abilities of Frenchmen as soldiers. These officers and support personnel met the American criteria for first-rate soldierhood, and thus gained the respect of their advisors. American soldiers saw value in the experiences of their European counterparts because they were experienced, competent at their jobs, and courageous.

In contrast, views of French strategy and the higher echelons that crafted it were hardly complimentary. For much of the war, French plans revolved around the occupation of static, fortified positions as bases from which to launch operations. Despite early success under Marshal Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, these positions quickly strained the French Army, immobilizing 120,000 to 140,000 troops in small groups at these isolated strongpoints. Naturally, this strategy lent itself to a more passive, defensive posture, which was frequently the subject of American rebuke. French plans were deemed to be lacking in aggression and plagued by excessive caution, causing their failure, “to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.” Evident in echoes of this statement by other senior leaders, Americans wholeheartedly believed that French failures were due to passivity and idle posture. Unlike the perceptions of junior soldiers, these plans were seen as cowardly and militarily unsound. Accordingly, American officers made attempts to steer French strategy in what they thought to be a more acceptable direction, though they were rarely successful. On this relationship, one French journalist said that, “…American officers also tried to supervise strategy; but after a few fruitless brushes with a high command that was ferociously attached to its prerogatives, they decided to leave it entirely to the French.”

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French neither requested nor accepted American counsel and saw the U.S. strictly as supervisors for the provision of matériel, exacerbating the contentious relationship. French and American conceptions of successful strategy were ultimately incongruent, leading to friction between the two groups and early dismissal of the upper echelons of the French Army.

Despite the importance of the MAAG mission in forming the U.S. Army’s understanding of Indochina, it was not a particularly desirable assignment. Rather than looking forward to tours of duty in Vietnam, officers often considered it a hardship and tended to prioritize escaping unscathed over building rapport with foreign armies.\(^{21}\) Unsurprisingly, officers returning from MAAG reflected little faith in the utility of their experiences. Rather than writing about his deductions as a senior infantry officer in the MAAG Army Section, Lieutenant Colonel Jacob Riley decided to mull over the definition and origins of the corps echelon.\(^ {22}\) Similarly, Major Eugene Camp, an infantry officer assigned to MAAG, won a monthly *Military Review* award not for writing about his experiences in Indochina, but for the article he wrote on the Duke of Wellington.\(^ {23}\) Though these men do not deserve rebuke merely for their desire to research topics of traditional military history, their actions are revealing. They saw more educational value for military professionals in these subjects than they did in their nation’s growing struggle against communism in the jungles of Vietnam. Beyond an awareness of operational security or humble aversion to telling war stories, these officers probably did not want to write about their experiences because they would not be of interest to the readers and that the experiences provided little value.

Just like Lieutenant Colonel Riley and Major Camp, the Army’s centers of professional military education demonstrated little interest in the French experience in Indochina. Beginning in the interwar period, the *Military Review* served as the consolidation of significant military articles from around the world by the staff of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. During World War II, the publication transformed into a professional military journal intended to serve as a monthly review of military literature, but also a

\(^{21}\) Mark M. Boatner, “The Unheeded History of Counterinsurgency,” *Army* 16, no. 9 (September 1966): 35.


center of critical thinking and analysis.\textsuperscript{24} With its central role in the Army’s learning processes, \textit{Military Review} serves as an indicator of trends in the Army’s collective thinking and what it sees as valuable for its leaders. Between 1952 and 1958, French experiences in Indochina received incredibly scarce coverage. Only thirteen articles published in \textit{Military Review} during this period incorporated lessons from the First Indochina War.\textsuperscript{25} The majority were foreign military digests, written by officers of allied nations for their respective professional publications before being pasted into \textit{Military Review}.\textsuperscript{26} These articles were far from the center of attention, tucked into the rear sections of the journal and reprinted months or even years after their original publication date. Four of the remaining articles, and likely the most informative and salient, were written by the well-known journalist Bernard Fall as he sought to warn the United States of its impending mistakes. The remaining articles written by U.S. Army officers during this period were inconsequential at best, with only one directly studying the French experience.\textsuperscript{27} At the field-grade officer level, few students of war were interested in gleaning lessons from their French counterparts.

Moving further up the ranks, the Army War College (AWC) represents an important institution of U.S. Army higher education. Intended to groom officers who will soon assume senior leadership positions, the college seeks to educate its students on thinking at the strategic level. In 1951, around twenty percent of the Class of 1952 was assigned to study American policy in Southeast Asia, with several students writing individual papers on the army’s response to revolutionary warfare.\textsuperscript{28} This represented a forward-thinking use of intellectual resources

\textsuperscript{25} Digging through the Combined Arms Research Library’s \textit{Military Review} archives will reveal more than 13 articles, but many of these articles mention Indochina in name only without providing any valuable content or discussion. I selected articles that contained discussion of the topic more than a mere passing reference or allusion.
\textsuperscript{28} Daddis, \textit{Westmoreland’s War: Reassessing American Strategy in Vietnam}, 27.
within the Army community and demonstrated at least some attempt to prepare for future conflicts. However, despite the pertinence of the ongoing French experience in Indochina, the topic received minimal coverage. Retired Colonel Bruce Palmer was one of the members of the Class of 1952 assigned to study Southeast Asia. He remarked that their report merely made broad conclusions about potentially fighting in Vietnam, with little reference to the French other than a critique of the American decision to permit their return to colonial rule.\footnote{Bruce Palmer, \textit{The 25-Year War America’s Military Role in Vietnam.} (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2014), 2-3.} Though studies of the strategic landscape of Southeast Asia were certainly important, they would be remiss without a discussion of ongoing French efforts in Vietnam. France had been fighting the Viet Minh for nearly six consecutive years by 1951, and there is no excuse for a senior military institution to ignore a clear, compelling, and current case study.\footnote{For a discussion of practical reasons why these lessons may have been ignored by those at CGSC, see Martin, “Dien Bien Phu and the Future of Airborne Operations.”} In total, out of nearly 1700 papers written by students at the AWC between 1951 and 1960, only four handled the First Indochina War and one examined the way the Viet Minh fought.\footnote{George C. Herring, “The Legacy of the First Indochina War” (The Second Indochina War, Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1986), 34.} In sum, there was a blatant lack of interest in Indochina from the students of the AWC throughout the 1950s. In combination with the sentiments of the Command and General Staff College, few rising officers in the U.S. Army assigned significant value to French experiences fighting the Viet Minh.

Beyond disinterest at the Army War College, a variety of factors contributed to an antagonistic American outlook on the French experience in Vietnam. Foremost, the American attitude towards colonialism was a major sticking point. Traditionally, Americans have harbored a “general tendency to perceive colonialism at first hand as backward and immoral.”\footnote{Dennis E. Showalter, “Dien Bien Phu in Three Cultures,” \textit{War & Society} 16, no. 2 (October 1, 1998): 99, https://doi.org/10.1179/072924798791201363.} As a nation that prided itself on democratic values and predicated much of its Cold War strategy on self-determination, colonialism was uncompromisingly wrong and antithetical to the American way of life. Furthermore, America proudly displayed its anticolonial sentiments. Mirroring President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s sentiments, Americans were and always have been quick to point out the American Revolutionary

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\footnote{Bruce Palmer, \textit{The 25-Year War America’s Military Role in Vietnam.} (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2014), 2-3.}

\footnote{For a discussion of practical reasons why these lessons may have been ignored by those at CGSC, see Martin, “Dien Bien Phu and the Future of Airborne Operations.”}

\footnote{George C. Herring, “The Legacy of the First Indochina War” (The Second Indochina War, Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1986), 34.}

War and our revolutionary spirit, displaying them as symbols of our ideals.33 Thus, even at the lowest levels of interaction, Americans exhibited a distaste for what they believed was a morally repugnant French cause. These objectionable ideals were not easily divorced from the practical lessons of the First Indochina War in the American mind.

Beyond the American feeling of moral superiority, the United States wholeheartedly embraced a presumption of French military incompetence. Despite earning the respect of MAAG advisors, the French Army was still seen as unskilled in dealing with issues in Indochina. In many ways, this came from a flawed understanding of the conflict by U.S. officers and policymakers. Even after years of an established American presence, many leaders in both the military and civilian spheres severely misunderstood the war, assuming that, “poorly armed guerillas, even in swamps and jungles, shouldn’t be too difficult to beat.”34 Thus, a significant amount of officials believed in an oversimplified concept of the war the French were fighting. This unsophisticated view of the conflict led many to make sweeping generalizations that only convinced more Americans of French inferiority. On an early familiarization mission, General Graves B. Erskine viewed a defensive position he considered substandard and later remarked that, “They had a brigadier in command of the area who…couldn’t make a decent corporal.35 Statements by influential leaders such as Erskine influenced other American officers to adopt generally weak views of French capabilities, leading to the lack of perceived value in French experiences.

Alongside perceptions of the French, the U.S. Army had other concerns outside of Southeast Asia. After the Korean War dominated the first three years of the 1950s, the United States remained concentrated on the threat of war against the Soviet Union. *FM 100-5: Field Service Regulations: Operations*, one of the Army’s foundational doctrinal publications of the 1950s, reflected this focus. The manual stressed the importance of maneuver and taking the offensive, while treating atomic weapons like normal munitions.36 This expectation of war in Europe

remained throughout the Cold War and develop as atomics became more prevalent. Under President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s New Look Policy, the Navy and Air Force took priority, creating an identity crisis for the Army. Developments in nuclear weapons technology, including multimegaton warheads, led to the prioritization of B-52 bombers and ballistic missile submarines as more powerful tools of diplomacy than columns of armor and infantry. Thus, the Army struggled to redefine its role and adapt to the atomic battlefield. Attempts to maintain the relevance of the Army were a significant concern of its upper leadership. Upon becoming Chief of Staff, General Maxwell Taylor exclaimed that, “the Army is burning its military textbooks to clear away the old and make room for the new…” Taylor saw radical change as necessary to secure funding and purpose for the Army in the years ahead. All of these factors ensured that Academic discourse in the United States Army was dominated by discussions on atomic warfare and conflict with the Soviets for years to come. The result was a professional environment where it was more desirable for officers to study conventional or atomic warfare than small “brushfire” wars.

All of these factors contributed to a starkly indifferent U.S. Army. Americans of all levels were hesitant to study the French experience because, after all, they lost. Army Colonel Mark Boatman summarized this phenomenon best, describing it as, “a supercilious attitude that there is little for us to learn…After all, we have never lost a war!” Though written sarcastically, Boatman’s statement was remarkably common. Not even the most experienced senior leaders in the United States Army were impervious to this arrogance. General William Westmoreland, the commander of the U.S. effort in Vietnam, was later quoted at a press conference undercutting his predecessors, exclaiming, “Why should I study the lessons of the French? They haven’t won a war since Napoleon!” Whether Westmoreland meant it or not, his statements carry

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38 Maxwell Taylor, address, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, June 18, 1957, in Linn, *Elvis’s Army*, 87. Though this speech is one year beyond the range of the first period, it epitomizes the struggles faced by the army when trying to reinvent itself. Taylor’s statement would be manifested in the reorganization into pentomic divisions. These formations were intended to remain dispersed to avoid enemy targeting, reflecting the belief that tactical nuclear weapons would be commonplace in wars of the future.


40 A variety of sources cite this quote, though nearly all lead back to its use by Thomas Thayer. In his 1973 paper, *Patterns of the French and American Experience in Vietnam*,
weight. Not only are they considered representative of the broader Army, but his mindset also seeped down to lower commands and influenced their thinking. Each of these factors combined to form what Dr. W. Scott Thompson termed “…peculiar American conceits of the moment.” 41 In essence, Thompson argued that the United States had a unique sense of invincibility leading up to Vietnam, causing it to ignore France’s experience. The nation that had never lost a war certainly had nothing to gain from one that could not seem to win in the 20th century, nor would it be threatened by anyone with less firepower and technology. Between 1950 and 1956, the U.S. Army was ultimately indifferent towards French experiences due to perceptions of French incompetence due to their defeat, American anticolonial attitudes, and the Army’s diverging interest in fighting the Soviet Union.

Following the exit of French forces in 1956, the American role in Vietnam increased in both size and character. The rapid French withdrawal pursuant to the Geneva Accords of 1954 left a vacuum in the defense establishment of South Vietnam. Though the United States remained committed to Vietnam, it did not initially intend to fill the gap itself. Redesignated as Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam (MAAGV), American advisors sought to build the local capacity of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). MAAGV took efforts to reorganize the ARVN command structure, improve training programs, and educate Vietnamese officers. 42 These efforts kept the American commitment relatively low while building organic Vietnamese capacity to fight for itself and maintain the viability of its government. Though the role of MAAGV was different than it had been under the French, its advisors

Thayer notes that origin of this quote was “a four-star general.” (p. 22) Later on in a 1998 interview, journalist and former Army officer David Hackworth attributed the phrase to General William Westmoreland. In No Sure Victory, Gregory Daddis cites Thayer’s use of the quote in War Without Fronts, which merely states the phrase but does not credit it in any way, leading to Daddis’ broad characterization of the origin as “one American.” (p. 32) In Prelude to Tragedy, George Tanham accredits the quote to “a senior officer.” (p. 175) It is likely that the phrase was a common jab among officers at their French counterparts. Furthermore, the presence of two sources that reasonably point to Westmoreland as the origin, and no contradictory sources, I attribute this quote to General William Westmoreland.

still stayed out of direct combat and leadership of local troops. However, by 1960, U.S. government officials determined that the Republic of Vietnam’s military was inadequate in dealing with the emerging insurgency and required a revamped counterinsurgency plan to aid its struggling military.\footnote{Ibid., 20.} Though the U.S. Army exhibited a mild interest in counterguerrilla warfare during the early 1950s, the 1960s brought a realistic demand for this knowledge with the broader context of President John F. Kennedy’s Flexible Response strategy. Beginning around 1956, the U.S. Army embarked on a path to develop generally applicable counterinsurgency doctrine based on both current and past campaigns from around the world, a new stage in their evaluation of the French Indochina experience.

Along with the increased demand for counterinsurgency doctrine, the late fifties and early sixties featured a variety of developing insurgencies around the world. Just as in Indochina, Britain and France sought to reestablish their rule over several other colonies lost during World War II. The Malayan Emergency, beginning in 1948, was a major interest of the Army during this period. With the close of the decade, the success of the British counterinsurgency effort drew more attention than ever. By 1960, the Army was distributing copies of the British Manual \textit{Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya} to its schools to aiding in crafting doctrine.\footnote{Birtle, \textit{U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942-1976}, 162.} Despite the unique nature of the situation in Malaya, the Army saw great value in British practices and began to base its doctrine off of them. Overall, Americans were far more willing to accept lessons from the British experience in Malaya. Additionally, unlike Indochina, the British successfully achieved their objectives, and Americans, “naturally gravitated toward winners, like the British, rather than losers.”\footnote{Ibid.} It is much easier to see the value in methods that were successful rather than those that featured the stain of defeat, especially considering American “peculiar conceits” of invincibility at the moment. Thus, Army officers continued to look for successful counterinsurgency campaigns throughout the world.

Given the obvious differences from Indochina, the Army was far more willing to digest and distribute lessons gained from Algeria as it was a successful, ongoing effort. One of the most salient examples of this is the French doctrine of \textit{la guerre revolutionnaire}, which was the result of a
concerted effort by the French Army to learn from its mistakes in Indochina and consolidate lessons for future conflicts.\textsuperscript{46} Though many of these lessons were derived from experience in Indochina, they were specifically oriented toward application in the ongoing counterinsurgency in Algeria. As the French experienced success against the National Liberation Front with this doctrine, the United State gained a heightened interest. Despite this doctrine only gradually emerging within France between 1956 and 1961, the U.S. Army moved with uncharacteristic speed in acquiring and translating French texts, such as issues of the \textit{Revue Militaire d’Information}.\textsuperscript{47} Though texts are of limited use if they are not read, the act of translation represents a shift in the Army’s evaluation of French experiences. Lessons gained from Algeria were not seen as the products of an incompetent, ineffective army, but rather generally applicable tenets of counterinsurgency that could be applied throughout the world. Though this only developed as a byproduct of the Army’s sudden counterinsurgency craze, it represents a notable shift in the Army’s ascription of value to French experiences.

The Army’s tangential interest in French experiences as part of the counterinsurgency craze was also reflected at the Command and General Staff College. Despite indifference to the counterinsurgency fad throughout much of the fifties and early sixties, \textit{Military Review} gradually adapted. A study of the journal’s contents revealed that after a spike in insurgency-related articles in 1962, coverage remained consistently around ten percent of total articles.\textsuperscript{48} Considering the reactions of the rest of the Army, \textit{Military Review} demonstrated considerable restraint in writing about counterinsurgency. However, given the requirements of Kennedy’s Flexible Response strategy, which placed more emphasis on being able to fight small wars, Army leadership and the staff at the CGSC felt increasing pressure to incorporate counterinsurgency lessons. In 1962, \textit{Military Review} published a selected bibliography of sources on guerrilla warfare that had been featured in the journal in the previous six years. Out of the sources listed, nearly one-fifth were written about French experiences, with more than half of those about Indochina.\textsuperscript{49} Though the bibliography was a hasty stopgap measure by the journal to fill the shortage of topical materials

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\begin{itemize}
  \item Thompson, “Lessons from the French in Vietnam,” 47.
  \item Krepinevich, \textit{The Army and Vietnam}, 41.
\end{itemize}
}
with past literature, it demonstrated an increase in the perceived utility of French experiences. Rare articles that were previously hidden within issues, obscured by discussions on nuclear warfare and countering the Soviets, took center stage. The interest of JFK and the Army in counterinsurgency led to increased willingness to see value in French experiences, as is evident with Military Review.

Though French wars never occupied a central role in most US professional military education programs, many took steps to expose their students to French experiences. Several offered opportunities to meet and converse with experts. Then Lieutenant Colonel Paul Aussaresses, a French liaison officer with service in Algeria and Indochina, often spoke at the Infantry and Special Warfare Schools regarding his counterinsurgency efforts against the National Liberation Front (FLN). Aussaresses’ discussions focused on counterinsurgency at the junior level with officers who would actually be on the ground carrying out the army’s plans. Bernard Fall, one of the foremost experts on the French action in Indochina and an outspoken critic of American policy in Vietnam, frequently spoke at higher military institutions. Though his lectures at the Naval War College in 1964 are well known, the only records of him speaking at Army institutions come from lectures at the Special Warfare School and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. At the Industrial College, Fall discussed the insurgency in Algeria with smaller portions on Indochina, answering questions at the conclusion. When asked about whether his warnings have been heard in the Department of Defense, Fall responded, “…I do not know how high up…I have spoken with quite a few Army generals. But how much of this will ‘stick’ I don’t know…”

Though Fall was able to break through to the students in the audience at the Industrial College, his response indicates that his warnings continued to fall on deaf ears at the highest levels. Furthermore, Fall’s relegation to speaking to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces is revealing. Despite his expertise, the message on Indochina was not significant enough to warrant speaking to the Army War College. Though the counterinsurgency trend during the late 1950s and early 1960s made the Army more willing to learn from French experiences in Indochina, they

were only valuable as additions to the counterinsurgency repertoire that the United States sought to build.

The year 1964 was an inflection point for the United States in Vietnam. For two years, both the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam (MAAGV), and Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), had operated parallel command structures with frequently overlapping responsibilities. With the support of important officials, including General Maxwell Taylor and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, MAAGV was absorbed by MACV, eliminating a significant dual channel within American military authority in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{52} Thus, the unified chain of command in Vietnam created a much more fluid decision-making process and signified the primacy of a different American mission moving forward. On top of the provocation of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident and subsequent reprisals by both sides, the stability of South Vietnam was precarious at best. With South Vietnam losing the equivalent of one battalion and one district capital a week, and around half of South Vietnam in Communist hands, the situation had become dire.\textsuperscript{53} With the rapid deterioration of the situation, President Johnson and General Westmoreland saw no other options but to fill the gap, deploying U.S. troops to Vietnam in significant numbers. The United States went from having a total force of 23,300 members of its military in Vietnam in 1964, to nearly 385,300 only two years later.\textsuperscript{54} Thus, 1964 marked the beginning of a massive transformation in both the American mission and footprint in Vietnam. The role of the U.S. Army had fundamentally changed from advising to direct combat operations and demanded specific lessons to inform how it fought, signifying a shift into the third phase in the U.S. evaluation of the French Indochina experience.

Throughout the course of American involvement in Vietnam, the RAND Corporation played an important role in guiding and informing American decision-making. Despite sending officials to both Vietnam and Paris to write research reports on the First Indochina War in the late 1950s,


RAND reports had the most influence between 1965 and 1967.\textsuperscript{55} Covering a variety of topics, these reports were intended to aid the United States in any imaginable way and at every level. With the role of the Army on the ground rapidly expanding, RAND quickly began to translate helpful documents from the French experience in Vietnam into English. Victor Croizat, a former Marine liaison to the French Army in Indochina, made translating an official French “lessons learned” document one of his first actions as a RAND civilian employee in 1967. It included Viet Minh force structures, diagrams of popular ambush tactics used against French columns, and a variety of other tactics, techniques, and procedures.\textsuperscript{56} The document, though lengthy, would have been extremely useful for adapting forces on the tactical and operational levels to Vietnam with tested methods learned by the French. Later that year, RAND was commissioned to write a research memorandum dealing with supply by porters. \textit{Porterage Parameters and Tables} analyzed various facets of human logistics, including food requirements, trail capacities, and throughput in various conditions, claiming that, “[Though] the importance of porterage has been a recurrent and disputed issue in American military planning, as small scale conflicts have occurred in underdeveloped areas…it would be a mistake to dismiss porterage as trivial…”\textsuperscript{57} Taking clear lessons from the underestimation of Viet Minh logistical capabilities by the French at Dien Bien Phu, the U.S. Army understood that the movement of supplies by porters across remote trails was a vital element of North Vietnamese logistics. Each of these RAND reports represents a tacit acknowledgment that the French experience in Vietnam was valuable and held utility for


\textsuperscript{56} Victor J. Croizat, \textit{A Translation from the French Lessons of the War in Indochina, Volume 2}, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1967), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM5271.html. Supposedly translated in 1955 by US Far East Command, but Croizat, in a letter to BDM Corporation later wrote that, “This information was available and remained available through all the intervening years until I made a translation of Volume II. I recall specifically bringing the existence of French lessons to the attention of General Paul Harkins [Then CDR of MACV]. But, he like so many others, found the British lessons from Malaya far easier to read…” in Letter from COL Croizat to Mr. J Angus MacDonald, Sept. 11, 1979.

\textsuperscript{57} J. W. Higgins, “Porterage Parameters and Tables,” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1967), iii. RAND also took part in interesting studies on the use of bicycle by army forces, including an interesting section on the Viet Minh use of modified Peugeot bicycles for logistics during the Battle of Dien Bien Phu. See R. S. Kohn, “Bicycle Troops” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1965), 22.
ongoing American efforts.

Beyond practical lessons drawn by RAND reports, the Army also took limited steps to formally operationalize French lessons. Throughout much of the First Indochina War, French expeditionary forces sought to take advantage of the waterways that dissect the Vietnamese coast. To do so, they formed naval assault divisions, frequently referred to as Dinassauts, composed of army infantry under the operational control of the French Navy.58 These forces, though useful as a means to cover much of the important Mekong and Red River Deltas, had a variety of shortcomings. When not conducting operations, Dinassaut squadrons used fixed operational bases on land, while also rarely operating in groups larger than “a company and five or six assault craft.”59 These factors made the French riverine force highly vulnerable to attack when not conducting operations, with the use of small forces often impeding greater command and control. Though French Dinassaut troops did not play an imperative role in the First Indochina War, the lessons of their experiences were highly valuable to American soldiers years later.

In 1969, the U.S. Army decided to use French tactics to solve its problems in the Mekong Delta. Similar to French Dinassaut troops, a portion of the 9th Infantry Division (ID) was redesignated for riverine duty, working with a Navy task force to experiment on moving troops throughout the delta via gunboat, titled the Mobile Riverine Force.60 The leaders of the 9th Infantry Division undertook a diligent study of their French allies when creating the Mobile Riverine Force. Instead of imitating the Dinassauts, these officers identified weaknesses of the French units and sought to remedy them in the American force. While Dinassauts utilized a fixed base on land, the 9th ID took advantage of landing ships, tank, (LST) to create mobile barracks ships to house soldiers and sailors when operating in the delta.61 This eliminated one of the major vulnerabilities


60 “9th Infantry Division Methods of Operations and Tactics” in Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942-1976*, 385. The riverine force concept was titled the Mobile Afloat Force, but for clarity I will use the final name: Mobile Riverine Force.

61 Fulton, *Riverine Operations, 1966-1969*, 27. For a good image of these ships, see page 28 of the same source.
that French riverine soldiers experienced, improving the effectiveness of U.S. Army forces. Additionally, American riverine units fixed issues with force structure and control. The Mobile Riverine Force generally operated in larger groups featuring more firepower, while also taking advantage of organic helicopters to facilitate command and control.62 These improvements built directly on French lessons learned from their experiences in the First Indochina War. The riverine doctrine developed by the 9th Infantry Division using Dinassaut experience was not valuable because of its broad suitability for counterinsurgency operations, but due to its specific applicability in the local tactical context of Indochina.63

The U.S. Army was not the only arm of MACV under William Westmoreland seeking to learn from French experience. The Battle of Khe Sanh, the five-month siege of a Marine Corps base in the Quang Tri Province, spurred one of the most serious studies of French lessons throughout the entire war. Displaying eerie similarities to the demise of the French fourteen years earlier, American military leaders and government officials vowed not to witness, “…another damn Dinbinphoo.”64 As the situation deteriorated, the American Air Force supposedly rounded up every living French general involved in Dien Bien Phu and flew them to a command post established in Saigon.65 Not only did this likely demand a significant amount of money and effort, but it also required acknowledging that the French were a valuable resource worth taking advantage of. U.S. Air Force Major General George Keegan wrote that using sand-table models, the French survivors detailed what was wrong, highlighting how to suppress anti-aircraft artillery for the airlift and the imperatives of using

62 Ibid., 187.
63 Another compelling adaptation made by U.S. forces in Vietnam was the implementation of “square” battalions. Following a review of Army organization in the ARCOV report, the Army decided increase the number of rifle companies in an infantry battalion from three to four. Similarly, French “Far East” battalions were organized with four rifle companies to allow three to maneuver with one in reserve. Despite the similarities, the ARCOV Report did not claim any connection to the French, and thus it is unclear whether there is any relation. See “Evaluation of U.S. Army Combat Operations on Vietnam (ARCOV),” (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1966), Texas Tech University Vietnam Archives, 2-II-51 and Victor Croizat, A Translation from the French Lessons of the War in Indochina, Volume 2, 221.
napalm to stop enemy tunneling.\(^{66}\) Given the tumultuous nature of Franco-American relations in the 1960s, it would have been easy for the U.S. military to believe that it could succeed on its own. However, the willingness to find and solicit the skills of former members of the French Army in Indochina demonstrates the extent to which the U.S. evaluations of the French experience improved between 1964 and 1969. Pushed by exigency, the United States sought the counsel of those it had previously ridiculed.

While MACV implemented French lessons over in Vietnam, the Army’s intellectual centers took heed back in the United States. Various military journals, including *Military Review* and *Army*, began to run articles that critiqued Army thinking in the Vietnam War thus far. Colonels Charles Biggio and Mark Boatner III, graduates of the Army War College Class of 1966, published articles highlighting the similarities between the First and Second Indochina Wars, hoping to spur further interest in the subjects going forward.\(^{67}\) Biggio’s article is a comprehensive review of French efforts to defeat the Viet Minh. He covers a variety of lessons on the characteristics of upper leadership down to proper responses to popular Viet Minh tactics, highlighting their applicability for U.S. forces.\(^{68}\) The article was a relevant primer on the preconditions of the Vietnam war that would allow any military reader to understand the similarities between the situations. In contrast, Boatner’s article was more academic in nature, challenging the leaders to learn from the French experience before the U.S. became too deeply ensnared in Vietnam.\(^{69}\) Though neither of these articles may have sparked significant discourse on the First Indochina War, they are indicative of a greater shift in the values of the Army. They represent a trend toward acknowledging definite prejudices against the French experience, and the understanding that their lessons could apply directly to ongoing operations. Between 1964 and 1969, the U.S. Army ascribed greater value to the French experiences of the First Indochina War for the specific lessons that had the immediate potential to improve the

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\(^{67}\) See also Donn A. Starry, “La Guerre Revolutionnaire,” *Military Review* 47, no. 12 (February 1967): 61-70. He was a member of the same class that published one year later.


\(^{69}\) Boatner, “The Unheeded History of Counterinsurgency,” 36.
Vietnamese victory in the First Indochina War was a watershed moment in the Cold War. It was perhaps the first significant instance of a developing country, perceived to be inferior to its adversary in countless ways, defeating an established European power in decisive fashion. However, France’s eviction from the region did not spell the end of conflict in Indochina. Instead, it left a vacuum that the United States felt increasingly drawn into by the growing tide of communism. Despite advising the French in Indochina for at least five years and working alongside them for several more, the United States Army saw little value in their experiences. During and immediately following the advisory period, the U.S. Army was indifferent to the lessons of its French counterparts, allowing anticolonial ideals, conceited attitudes, and divergent ideas of future warfare to obscure the value of these experiences. Following the exit of French forces in 1956, the focus of American advisory efforts shifted to the South Vietnamese Army. During this period, the U.S. Army’s fixation with the development of a broad form of counterinsurgency caused it to consider global experiences, including the French war in Algeria and British experience in Malaya. Finally, the expansion of the American effort in 1964 changed the types of lessons the United States valued. Rather than the sole preoccupation with a generally applicable form of counterinsurgency, the Army sought to learn from and implement the specific lessons of the French Army during the First Indochina War.

In determining what to study and write about, we implicitly rank the past, assigning value to those experiences deemed useful and neglecting those left by the wayside. This is an inevitable process due to the limits of time and resources. However, it also is easy to become comfortable with familiar lessons and believe that they serve as adequate preparation for any situation. This fallacy has led many a nation into disaster, and is something the United States is all too familiar with. The lessons we pick reflect what we value at the present time—they are not necessarily the most important or relevant to new situations and problems. Such is the issue that arises when we pledge allegiance to an unchanging “canon” of lessons and topics, applicable at all times and in every situation, without forethought or diligence; it dooms us to a narrow conception of the possibilities that lie in the future. It is essential to build a curriculum not just from those situations that are familiar and interesting, but also those that have been continually relegated to the dustbins of
history: the losses, the “strange” cultures, and the downright boring. Each has a place in the development of an understanding of history that is comprehensive, complex, and truly useful. If we truly wish to embrace the motto *Sapientia per Historiam*, we cannot limit the boundaries of our curiosity to the lessons we choose.
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The Fight for Supremacy and the Course of German History: The Battle of Königgrätz as a Contributing Factor in German Unification

Cody Mitchell

Since the earliest accounts of the nineteenth-century German unification, historians have clashed over the explanation of this momentous event. This discussion has given rise to a rich set of historical literature dealing with the factors that aided in the formation of modern Germany. While many factors were involved in the formation of the German nation-state and German national consciousness, recent scholarship has highlighted that the two did not emerge simultaneously. Rather, the political, economic and military unification in 1871 preceded the full development of German national identity – what Hughes calls a ‘spiritual’ unification.¹ Among the many factors that aided in Germany’s political development were the German Wars of Unification. This work seeks to contribute a perspective on the role of the Battle of Königgrätz (and, consequently, the Austro-Prussian War) in this process and to locate it as a factor in the context of the broader historical framework. Hence, for the purposes of this work, German unification refers to the political, military and economic unification that occurred in 1871. To contextualize the discussion, it briefly outlines both the main origins and causes of the war and provides a synopsis of the major event of the war: the Battle of Königgrätz. Furthermore, it seeks to establish that this battle conclusively decided the outcome of the war. In the second part, the key implications of the Prussian victory for the eventual unification of Germany are explored. Firstly, it detects several immediate consequences of the war and the eventuating peace treaties. Secondly, it recognizes a number of longer-term effects that stemmed from the Prussian victory. Consequently, it identifies both indirect, long-term consequences and immediate outcomes with implications for the unification. In the final section, the paper acknowledges several crucial considerations regarding the broader historical debates and cautions against any over-emphasis on the factors analyzed in the essay. Due to the constraints of length, a full treatment of this dimension cannot be provided. Nevertheless, brief mention is made of

¹ Michael Hughes, Nationalism and Society (London: Edward Arnold, 1988), 144.
the relationship between the Austro- and Franco-Prussian Wars and of the broader historiographical debate over the formation of the German nation-state. On this basis, this study contends that the Battle of Königgrätz and the wider Austro-Prussian War had important long- and short-term consequences for the political unity of Germany. Most meaningfully, it brought greater clarity to the potential future scope of a German nation-state by excluding Austria and establishing Prussian hegemony. It also laid significant groundworks for the Franco-Prussian War that was to play a substantial military role in later developments. Hence, this essay argues that, although perhaps not a primary factor, the Prussian victory over Austria did have significant ramifications for German unity.

The lead up to the commencement of hostilities in 1866 is complex and has historical causes extending back centuries. For this work, a short overview will suffice. The chief cause of the war was the extended rivalry between Prussia and Austria, and, as Carr has observed, this was fed by numerous constitutional, ideological, economic and military factors and circumstances.² It had become clear that this rivalry prevented any realistic unification outcome between the two states. As Freidjung explains, neither Prussia nor Austria were willing to accept a unified Germany ‘except as leader’, and it was this intense competition that eventually ended in war.³ In Bismarck’s words: ‘There is no room for both of us’.⁴ However, this German rivalry was not a new development. Carr points out that a degree of tension had existed between the powers even during the time of Frederick the Great, who had fought repeated wars against Austria to retain the province of Silesia.⁵ Earlier in the nineteenth century, there had also been disagreements and political and economic conflicts between the two states.⁶ Between October 1864 and June 1866, however, the tension in the

⁴ Quoted in Carr, The Origins of the Wars, 58.
⁵ Ibid, 90.
rivalry ascended to new heights. 7 By mid-1865, Helmuth von Moltke could state that, ‘[w]ar with Austria sooner or later is probably…not to be avoided’. 8 As Craig explains, the Austro-Prussian conflict was merely the ‘culminating event in a rivalry that began’ in the seventeenth century, or, as Carr places it, in the mid-eighteenth century. 9 A broad range of factors combined in the fifties and sixties to, as Carr says, ‘confer a new intensity on the old rivalry’. 10 After the Second Schleswig War of 1864, in which Austria and Prussia invaded the Danish duchies of Schleswig-Holstein, disputes arose between the two German powers over the rulership of the duchies. 11 Austria and Prussia had previously decided to settle the Schleswig-Holstein question without reference to the Federal Diet of the German Confederation; however, as neither could agree, Austria referred the matter to both the estates of Holstein and the Federal Diet. 12 In response, Prussia occupied Holstein. When, on 14 June, the majority of the Diet approved a motion by Austria requesting the mobilization of the federal troops, Prussia declared that the federal constitution had been breached and declared war on Saxony, Hanover and the Electorate of

Hesse. Consequently, Hesse asked for federal states to provide military support to those states that were under attack, and Austria agreed to do so. Prussia, who along with Austria and Saxony had been mobilizing for some time now, interpreted this as an effective declaration of war by Austria.

When the fighting began, the superiority of Moltke’s tactics and the Prussian army soon became apparent. Apart from the defeat of General Bonin’s force at Trautnau by Ludwig von Gablenz, the Prussians experienced no significant setbacks. This was contrary to the expectations throughout France and in the diplomatic circles in Austria. For years now, Moltke had been anticipating and planning for a conflict with Austria, and the Prussians now used their sophisticated railway system to great effect in mobilizing their forces. Moltke had organized the Prussian army into three formations: the First Army, under Prince Frederick Karl; the Second Army, under the Prussian Crown Prince Frederick, and the Elbe Army under General Herwarth von Bittenfeld. Advancing aggressively, the Prussian force successfully drove the Austrians and Saxons (under Ludwig von Benedek) to the defensive. On 2 July, the First Army encountered Benedek’s entire force along the Bistritz River between Sadowa and Königgrätz, and Prince Karl resolved

14 Carr, The Origins of the Wars, 134.
15 Carr, A History of Germany, 103-104; Carr, The Origins of the Wars, 134.
17 Carr, A History of Germany, 105; Craig. The Battle of Königgrätz, 5-6; Ann E. Pottinger, Napoleon III and the German Crisis, 1865-1866 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), 82-86.
19 Dawson, The German Empire, i, 236.
to attack, supported by Herwarth’s Army, in the morning.\textsuperscript{21} Meanwhile, the Second Army, which was still some distance away, was ordered to attack Benedek’s right flank.\textsuperscript{22} After a morning of brutal fighting in which neither army obtained a clear advantage, the first of the Crown Prince’s formations appeared on the battlefield and engaged the weak, disorganized Austrian flank.\textsuperscript{23} Despite desperate counterattacks, the Austrian army was forced to retreat to avoid encirclement.\textsuperscript{24} Covered skillfully by their cavalry and artillery, the bulk of the Austro-Saxon force was able to avoid capture and retire toward the fortress-city of Königgrätz.\textsuperscript{25} Despite the escape, the outcome was what Holborn calls a ‘shattering defeat’ for Austria.\textsuperscript{26} While only 22,000 prisoners were taken from the Austrian force, their casualties were far higher than those of the Prussians and, after their disorganized retreat, few units had the capacity or appetite for further fighting.\textsuperscript{27}

Although it was not the last clash during the 1866 war, Königgrätz was undoubtedly the decisive battle. According to Conze, the other encounters ‘pale in significance’ when compared with it.\textsuperscript{28} As Craig points out, after Königgrätz, there was ‘no real doubt’ about the outcome of the war; the Austrian army had been shattered.\textsuperscript{29} In fact, Craig goes so far as to claim that the decision for German unification itself was made ‘on the battlefield of Königgrätz’.\textsuperscript{30} As noted above, the Austrian losses were severe, in part due to their old-fashioned tactics of charging \textit{en masse} against Prussian breech-loading needle guns (although the effect of this

\begin{thebibliography}{30}
\bibitem{21}Craig, \textit{The Battle of Königgrätz}, 84-85.
\bibitem{22}Freidjung, \textit{The Struggle for Supremacy}, 230-231.
\bibitem{23}Brose, \textit{German History}, 333-334; Craig, \textit{The Battle of Königgrätz}, 133-137 and 139-140.
\bibitem{24}Freidjung, \textit{The Struggle for Supremacy}, 233-234; Wagner, \textit{The Campaign of Königgrätz}, 139-146.
\bibitem{25}Carr, \textit{The Origins of the Wars}, 137; Craig, \textit{The Battle of Königgrätz}, 152-161;
Dawson, \textit{The German Empire}, i, 237-238; Holborn, \textit{A History of Modern Germany}, 186.
\bibitem{26}Ibid.
\bibitem{27}Craig, \textit{The Battle of Königgrätz}, 161-162 and 165-167.
\bibitem{28}Werner Conze, \textit{The Shaping of the German Nation} (London: George Prior Publishers, 1979), 52.
\bibitem{29}Craig, \textit{The Battle of Königgrätz}, 166.
\end{thebibliography}
was greatly exaggerated in many contemporary observations of the war). The smaller Saxon army had lost fifty-five officers and 1446 men, while the Prussian army lost just 359 officers and 8794 men. In a telegram to his wife after the battle, King William himself recognized the totality of his victory: ‘Complete victory over the Austrian army won today in eight hour battle... Losses of enemy and trophies not yet counted, but significant’. The Austrians also recognized this and immediately sought an armistice with the victors, although it was quite some time before this transpired. At that time a staunch opponent of Prussia, Baroness Spitzemberg lamented that ‘Austria [had] perhaps never before suffered such a frightful defeat’ as it did at Königgrätz. As Freidjung wrote rather melodramatically in his magisterial work *The Struggle for Supremacy in Germany*, after Königgrätz, ‘the war was at an end, for more than an army had been defeated’ that day. The battle had devastated the Austrian army and effectively ensured the outcome of the war; it was, in Carr’s words, ‘the turning-point of the war’.

With the signing of the preliminary Peace of Nikolsburg (26 July) and the later Peace of Prague (23 August) came several significant immediate outcomes for the unification of Germany. Perhaps the most momentous direct consequence of the 1866 war, as reflected in the treaties,
was the total exclusion of Austria from Germany. In Schulze’s words, the Battle of Königgrätz put Austria ‘out of the power-game’. From the start, Prussia made clear that it would not allow Austria to be a part of the German Confederation or any reformed version of it. In signing the post-war treaties, Emperor Franz Josef I agreed to the dissolution of the old German Confederation and Austria’s exclusion from the new organization of Germany. Hence, the conflict between the Grossdeutsch and Kleindeutsch models of a united Germany was definitively resolved in favor of the latter. In Taylor’s words: ‘The defeat of Austria broke down the balance which had existed in Germany ever since...the sixteenth century’. Königgrätz had struck a fatal blow at the prestige of Austria within Germany and across Europe, leaving Prussia the supreme German state. In Craig’s words, the battle had ‘solved the long-vexed German question’, and this it did in Prussia’s favor. With the anticipated creation of the new North German Confederation, Prussia would attain hegemony in the north and center of Germany as well as significant influence over the southern states. Furthermore, the treaty permitted the annexations by Prussia of not only Schleswig-Holstein but the Kingdom of Hanover, Electoral Hesse, Hess-Hamburg, Nassau and Frankfurt, significantly increasing her influence and power. As Taylor puts it so provocatively, the Battle of Königgrätz was effectively ‘[t]he conquest of Germany by Prussia’. Ultimately, along with the exclusion of Austria from Germany,

42 Friedjung, The Struggle for Supremacy, 246.
43 Anon., “Preliminary Peace of Nikolsburg”; Brose, German History, 334-335; Craig, The Battle of Königgrätz, 167-170; Pottinger, Napoleon III and the German Crisis, 181.
45 Craig, The Battle of Königgrätz, 170.
46 Anon., “Preliminary Peace of Nikolsburg”; Conze, Shaping of the German Nation, 55; Craig, Germany, 6-7; Friedjung, The Struggle for Supremacy, 271; Hughes, Nationalism and Society, 121; Schultz, The Course of German Nationalism, 95.
48 Taylor, The Course of German History, 110.
the creation of the North German Confederation and the increase of Prussia’s power were factors conducive to the later unification of Germany under Prussia.

Nevertheless, the War of 1866 had consequences extending beyond the immediate aftermath. One of the most obvious was its effects on the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. Prussia’s war against France was ultimately a more significant factor, *per se*, in the production of a German nation-state. However, the 1866 war had several implications of importance in bringing about the Franco-Prussian War and in ensuring its outcome. Firstly, along with the reforms mentioned above, Prussia succeeded in confirming several important military alliances with the south German states. Between 13 and 22 August, Bismarck concluded military treaties with Bavaria, Baden and Württemberg under which they promised to place their military forces under Prussian command in the event of war.49 These alliances were coupled with a second factor, namely, an increase in anti-French sentiment across Germany. Even in Prussia, the Austro-Prussian War was initially intensely unpopular, but when news of the first Prussian victories reached Berlin, the public began to view the war more positively.50 Even before the news of the decisive victory at Königgrätz, the elections to the Prussian Landtag had seen massive swings to the Conservatives. While the Liberals lost forty-five seats and the Progressives lost sixty, the Conservatives gained a massive one hundred and fourteen seats, enabling them to control the lower house with the support of just nine Old Liberals.51 Many historians have argued that the Battle of Königgrätz signaled the end of the liberal nationalist movement as a capable, independent force in Prussia.52 As Conze argues, the battle opened the door for greater cooperation between the liberals and the Prussian government.53 Furthermore, Carr argues that the victory

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53 Conze, *Shaping of the German Nation*, 55.
awakened a national feeling in ‘wide sections’ of the North German population.\textsuperscript{54} This coincided with the rising anti-French sentiment in the south, which was spurred on by the genuine post-war threat of French intervention.\textsuperscript{55} Whether, as Carr suggests, this same national feeling was kept ‘on the surface’ until the Franco-Prussian War is less obvious.\textsuperscript{56} Clearly, however, when war broke out between France and Germany, this sentiment re-emerged with significant strength. It aided greatly in maintaining the unity, against a common enemy, of the combined forces of South and North Germany.\textsuperscript{57}

Finally, while the Franco-Prussian War did not inevitably follow that of 1866, the outcome of the Austro-Prussian War provided an international context conducive to it. Prussia’s military performance at Königgrätz had alarmed the French government, which frantically sought to improve its military situation.\textsuperscript{58} Prussia, on the other hand, in light of its new-found status in Germany and, consequently, in Europe, tended to be more diplomatically assertive and less inclined to act peaceably.\textsuperscript{59} For example, in the peace talks following the Battle of Königgrätz, Bismarck refused to agree to French annexations; something Brose suggests made war with France more likely.\textsuperscript{60} Among others, both of these factors added to the international tension leading up to the Franco-Prussian War. Without the heightened diplomatic and military strain in Europe, the Franco-Prussian War may not have transpired quite so readily. Hence, while certainly not rendering it unavoidable, the 1866 war made the likelihood of a Franco-Prussian War greater.\textsuperscript{61} Furthermore, the decisive nature of the Prussian victories against Austria, coupled with the rapidity of Prussia’s early victories against France, discouraged Austria from joining with them, something that, according to Stürmer, many prominent

\textsuperscript{54} Carr, \textit{The Origins of the Wars}, 139; Carr, “The Unification of Germany,” 91.
\textsuperscript{55} Carr, \textit{A History of Germany}, 105; Carr, “The Unification of Germany,” 91; Pottinger, \textit{Napoleon III and the German Crisis}, 166-167 and 188-189; Holborn, \textit{A History of Modern Germany}, 188.
\textsuperscript{56} Carr, \textit{The Origins of the Wars}, 202.
\textsuperscript{59} Holborn, \textit{A History of Modern Germany}, 208.
\textsuperscript{60} Brose, \textit{German History}, 335; Freidjung, \textit{The Struggle for Supremacy}, 295-300.
Austrians actively supported. Bismarck suggested that this was his reason for providing such agreeable terms to Austria in the post-war treaties:

…we had to avoid leaving behind in [Austria] any unnecessary bitterness of feeling or desire for revenge… If Austria were severely injured, she would become the ally of France and of every other opponent of ours…. 

In other words, Bismarck hoped to avoid causing any more anti-Prussian resentment in Austria than was necessary to exclude it from a reformed Germany. Hence, the post-war treaties did not require Austria to make any significant territorial surrenders. While it is imperative to avoid attributing too significant a role to the Prussian victory of 1866, it is clear that it resulted in various significant long-term consequences for German unity.

It is essential, at this point, to place the role of the Battle of Königgrätz and the Austro-Prussian War into perspective alongside other factors involved in the German unification. While it did have important implications, these were often indirect or of relatively minor significance. For example, in terms of military factors, the role of the Austro-Prussian War is quickly overshadowed by that of the Franco-Prussian War that immediately preceded political unification. Breuilly, for instance, while mentioning the outcome of the Austro-Prussian War as a step toward final unification, attributes the 1870-1871 war with the substantial military role in the unification. Therefore, particularly with regard to its implications for the French war, the Austro-Prussian War only indirectly influence the course of the unification. As mentioned above, it aided in forming an international context more conducive to the Franco-Prussian War that

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64 Holborn, *A History of Modern Germany*, 188.

65 Ibid.

would eventually spark the unification. The Austro-Prussian War also eliminated Austria from the Confederation and increased Prussia’s influence in Germany. Once again, however, the effects were indirect. Prussian hegemony in Germany did not directly lead to unification but rather nudged Germany in that direction. As Schulze argues, the Prussian victory over Austria led to greater clarity over what was to eventually comprise Germany; it was a practical step toward unification.67 To different degrees, one must also take into account the various other factors that contributed to resolution of the German question. In this field, much work has been done to critique past scholarly treatments of the factors leading to both political unification and the development of nationalism.68 Many recent scholars have also attempted to better balance the extent to which factors like, among others, German nationalism, Prussian military reform, industrialization, various economic and social currents, and Prussian particularism influenced the eventual unification.69 Hence, while the Battle of Königgrätz and the War of 1866 provide important insights into the groundwork for German unification, they must be understood in their broader context, and their impact must not be over-stated.

In conclusion, this essay has explored the complicated relationship between the War of 1866 and the eventual political unification of Germany

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in 1871. After reviewing the historical context, examining the numerous short- and long-term consequences and placing the war as a factor of unification into the context of the wider historiographical debates, the work concluded that the Austro-Prussian War clearly had some important impacts on the unification of Germany. Of particular significance are outcomes like the Austrian exclusion from Germany and the reorganization of the Confederation under Prussian leadership. Due to the lack of scholarship on the subject, however, it is impossible to draw definite conclusions concerning the longer-term effects of the war on national identity and the development of nationalism in Germany after political unification. As suggested in the introduction to this work, scholars like Breuilly and Hughes have suggested that, although the political and military union of Germany under Prussian leadership was achieved in 1871, it was much later before a real ‘spiritual’ unification took place.70 Alongside other factors, the wars of 1866 and 1870-1871 were responsible for the political, economic and military unification of Germany, but, inevitably, the development of a national consciousness took much longer. A historical treatment of this subject would be hugely beneficial for understanding the enduring effects of the war, if any, on German national development. There is also a distinct lack of up-to-date scholarship treating, explicitly, the implications of the Austro-Prussian War for political unification, although this is treated indirectly in some depth in works like Carr’s The Origins of the Wars of Unification and older volumes like Craig’s seminal work, The Battle of Königgrätz.71 Ultimately, this work hopes to have contributed a valuable overview of the major implications that the 1866 war had for the German unification.

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70 Breuilly, “The national idea in modern German history,” 12-21; Hughes, Nationalism and Society, 128-149.
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Zombies Zoning for Zionism: The Effect of an Inherited Ottoman Land Reform System on British Mandatory Palestine

Jacob Foster

After the end of the First World War, the British were granted a mandate over Palestine by the League of Nations. This gave them the challenge of managing both Zionist immigration to what they had acknowledged as a “Jewish Home,” as well as the resistance to Zionism by Arab residents, particularly landless tenant farmers. Upon receiving this mandate, they inherited a complex Ottoman legal structure governing the land they now controlled. In some areas, such as criminal and commercial law, British authorities quickly made meaningful legal changes, that, however, was not the case for land use. Ottoman legal norms surrounding land use, which were already proving insufficient in the face of existent Zionist immigration, went largely unreformed by the British during the first half of the Mandate, leading to growing instability in the Mandate.

Laws regulating land use and ownership in Ottoman Palestine had seen dramatic legal changes in the decades preceding the First World War and the end of Ottoman rule. The most influential law to reshape land ownership in Palestine was the 1858 Ottoman Land Code. This law had sought to increase the revenue of the central government, reduce foreign influence, and increase the development of underutilized lands as part of the broader period of reform known as the Tanzimat. These reforms formalized much of the land in Palestine as Miri or a type of ostensibly public land that was effectively private land (but could revert to being purely public land under certain circumstances). Miri landholders were private individuals who held the land for long periods of time, even across generations. Landholders could sell or lease the land, or have it used by tenant farmers. The land, however, could revert to total public

1 Tom Segev, One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs under the British Mandate, (Picador: London, 2001), 33
control under a variety of circumstances, for example, if the land fell into disuse, it could revert to total public ownership.⁴ Acquiring the initial right to develop this land also required an expensive permit, or often enough, a bribe.⁵ ⁶ The land code also created the designations of Mawat (dead land) Matruka (abandoned land) which were more conventional public land, held exclusively by the state with no easy way to be developed.⁷ The land code also formalized private ownership of land labeled as Mulk which mostly consisted of urban areas and the developed land (orchards and fields) surrounding them. Miri was largely held by large rural landholders who had tenant farmers on their property with few rights, whereas Mulk land was largely owned by small independent farmers or urban dwellers, it was especially concentrated in the highlands.⁸ ⁹ While not all land fell under these four categories (there are more minor categories and subcategories not listed here), most did and the Ottoman land codes would play a large role in shaping both the human geography of and conflicts within the British Mandate of Palestine nearly a century later.

While there were clear Ottoman legal norms, they were not the only legal precedents that would shape the approach British Mandate of Palestine (from here on referred to as the British Mandate) took to legislate and regulate land use. The Palestine Mandate, the legal document which offered the framework for and basis of the British Mandate from 1922-1948 offered clear, if unspecific, legal guidance for land use. Of note are articles 6 and 11:

(6) The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish agency… close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes...(11) The Administration of Palestine

⁴ Ibid., 228.
⁵ Ibid., 224.
⁶ Ibid., 235, 241, 249.
⁷ Ibid., 223, 224, 227.
⁸ Ibid., 227, 228.
shall take all necessary measures to safeguard the interests of the community in connection with the development of the country, and, subject to any international obligations accepted by the Mandatory, shall have full power to provide for public ownership or control of any of the natural resources of the country or of the public works, services and utilities established or to be established therein. It shall introduce a land system appropriate to the needs of the country, having regard, among other things, to the desirability of promoting the close settlement and intensive cultivation of the land.  

The obligations of the British Mandate on land use—as laid out in the Palestinian Mandate (the legal document) - instructed the British administration to facilitate Jewish settlement on “State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.” This is an English translation of the land categories of Mawat and Matruka under the Ottoman Land Code of 1858. This clear reference seemingly implies that the Palestinian Mandate’s to land use, especially regarding Jewish immigration, was going to be premised on the preexistent Ottoman legal framework. Article 11 lays out the goals of British land administration. These unspecific goals are like those of earlier Ottoman land reform (indeed most land reforms generally have similar goals) such as encouraging development of land. Even the more secular goal, however, of achieving more intense development likely aligned British economic goals with encouraging Zionist immigration because of the increasing agricultural productivity associated with new Zionist settlements. The Palestinian Mandate does not explicitly restrict the ability of the British to modify existing legal norms in Palestine, but it does treat these existing norms as the basis of British obligations in the region.

The Palestinian Mandate introduced the assumption that the British would maintain the preexisting Ottoman system of land organization and sale. The Ottoman status quo, however, had been breaking down prior to the arrival of the British and would only do so further under their stewardship. Among the Arab inhabitants of Palestine there was a clear
class division with the majority of Palestinian Arabs with many residing as independent farmers but a smaller but more prominent set of wealthy (often absentee) landowners.\textsuperscript{12} While independent farmers were resistant to sell to Zionist purchasers, the absentee landowners were less reluctant to sell to the better financed Zionist interests. Under the late Ottoman administration, from 1878 to 1908, Jewish settlers would purchase 400,000 dunams of land from private Arab landholders, almost. This land, however, consisted primarily of large tracts of land held by absentee landholders in the lowlands (as opposed to the highlands which were mostly owned by the resident farmers).\textsuperscript{13} Jewish land purchases consisted primarily of \textit{Miri} land. This established a deeply worrying disconnect between those who paid the price of Jewish land acquisitions (evicted Arab tenants) and those who reaped the benefits (Arab landholders). The economic benefits were so great to the landlords that even prominent Arab nationalists would happily sell large swathes of land to Zionist settlers.\textsuperscript{14} Independent of the issues of justice surrounding land sales by often absentee landlords, these land sales served to create an acute political problem. The disconnect between economic incentives for landholder and practical consequences for tenants was inherent in the Ottoman system of land use and the creation of a class of landless Arabs would be a large source of instability in Palestine that would only grow under the British Mandate.

This problem was only exacerbated under the British Mandate. While the Palestinian Mandate implied that Jewish land purchases would be enabled through the sale or leasing of public lands, this would not prove to be the case, as Jewish land purchases continued to be primarily facilitated by absentee landlords rather than the sale of public lands. \textit{Miri} land continued to be more easily purchased under the British Mandate than \textit{Mulk} land -- as evidenced by how Arab villages could remain under Arab ownership even while the rural lands around them that they depended on were sold to Jews.\textsuperscript{15} A 1921 land ordinance prior to the start

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item Talal Asad, “Class Transformation Under the Mandate” \textit{Middle East Research and Information Project}, (1976) 3.
\item Morris, \textit{Righteous Victims}, 37.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
of the British Mandate when the region was under a new civilian administration removed area limitations on land sales until they were reintroduced in 1940, greatly expanding the degree to which Arab landholders could sell land.\textsuperscript{16} Arab land sales were further incentivized by the British introducing a land tax which while only a small source of revenue in the British Mandate, had a disproportionate impact on the independent farmers and led to a further concentration of Arab lands in the hands of absentee landowners.\textsuperscript{17} This exacerbated absentee landholders continuing to sell land and evict their tenants, with Arab landholders selling one million dunams of land between 1920 and 1940.\textsuperscript{18} Arab landholder sales remained the nearly exclusive focus of Zionist land acquisition organizations as attempts to privatize public lands (despite the intentions of the Palestinian Mandate) proved sluggish and bogged down by financial, political, and legal concerns. Salt concessions in the Dead Sea and surrounding lands, whose sale was authorized under Sections 12 and 13 of the Palestine Order-in-Council of 1922, was subject to lengthy political debate, even reaching the halls of the British Parliament. This was partially due to concerns that Ottoman land disputes that predated the mandate could cause expensive legal troubles, demonstrating again Britain’s heavily reliance on preexisting legal norms.\textsuperscript{19,20} Even though the Palestinian Mandate called for the British Mandate to sell \textit{Mawat} and \textit{Matruka} land to Jews, the British Mandate failed to become the primary seller of land when compared to Arab land holders. When the British Mandate replicated the Ottoman land use system it also replicated the crises of landless Arab tenant farmers. The British Mandate failed to sell meaningful quantities of public lands to Zionist purchasers allowing for demand to instead fall almost exclusively on absentee Arab landholders and the burden of eviction on their tenants. The British Mandate not only


\textsuperscript{17} Asad, “Class Transformation Under the Mandate,” 5.


\textsuperscript{20} The Palestine Order in Council. ECF: The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict an Interactive Database https://ecf.org.il/media_items/1468.
failed to implement intended reforms or modify the land use laws to changing circumstances, but at times exacerbated the problems with innovations like the rural land tax that fell disproportionately on rural Arab tenants.

This crisis of Arab landlessness was worsened by a legal system whose strength lay in its ability to resolve intracommunal rather than intercommunal conflicts. The Palestinian Order-in-Council of 1922 (a colonial ordinance) granted the High Commissioner the authority to establish land courts to adjudicate land ownership disputes. This is one of the few ways in which land use laws in the British Mandate would differ from those of the prior Ottoman administration. Adjudicating land disputes had previously been done by religious courts (whose powers otherwise mostly remained intact), but under the British Mandate land disputes were now to be resolved by an entirely new system of secular courts. This change, however, was more minor than it may seem as these courts, would still rule based on precedents set in the previous era of religious courts. These new secular British courts, however, were often worse at consistently enforcing the precedents they sought to uphold than the previous Ottoman ones had been. Adherence to prior Ottoman land use precedents proved somewhat difficult because there was no authoritative text of Ottoman law in French, English, or Arabic - the three languages of the Mandate. The situation was made yet worse by the fact these courts, despite their essential role, lacked the prestige of even a district court in the eyes of colonial judges. Palestine was already an unpopular destination and finding qualified judges proved a challenge. Land courts also suffered from severe backlogs; in its first year, the land court established in Jaffa had decided only 66 of the 260 cases entered. The courts adjudicating intercommunal land disputes struggled mightily and throughout the 1920s and the need for reform was readily apparent. This desperate demand led to a 1927 plan to radically reform the land courts to be more like those used by the British Empire in Sudan (considered a better model of British administration). The Sudanese style

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22 Bunton, “Inventing the Status Quo” 49
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid., 37.
25 Ibid.
code, however, wasn’t published until 1935. While the British Mandate eventually shifted away from the Ottoman legal norms regarding land use in a key way with the adaption of a new code, it was only done more than halfway through the life of the British Mandate, and after the old Ottoman codes had shaped more than a generation of conflict.

The inefficacy of the British land courts and their ability to apply Ottoman precedent during the first half of the mandate had a sizeable destabilizing effect. British lawmakers were aware of the crisis of landless Arabs but were handicapped in their ability to affect meaningful reform by the legacy Ottoman legal framework that was at play. Even though the problem was clear, change was slow in part because the same problems that destabilized land administration in the British Mandate also impacted the reform process. In addition to uncertainties surrounding land ownership from a deeply flawed legal system there were also issues such as fraudulent deeds, unsurveyed land, and the fact that there existed some 15 categories of public and private land the proportions of which were unknown. Even in 1936, one legislator described making laws to further regulate land in the British Mandate as being done with “almost complete uncertainty.” The uncertainty made crafting legislation difficult but the issue of a growing landless Arab class necessitated legislation. Four times the British Parliament introduced land ordinances designed to protect Arab cultivators whose land was sold by absentee landlords; in 1926, 1929, 1933, and 1934 but the problem persisted. The British administrators and parliament were aware of the issues regarding landless Arab tenants but were trapped by the uncertainty and instability of the Ottoman land policy. The conflict between Zionists and Palestinians took shape under Ottoman rule but it was those same Ottoman rules that shaped and governed that conflict even during the British Mandate.

26 Bunton, “Inventing the Status Quo” 38, 39, 42, 45.
29 Ibid.
The British largely adopted the pre-existing legal norms of the Ottoman Empires when it came to land use policy. These norms were assumed or upheld in early legislation in the British Mandate and were revised slowly and with great difficulty. These Ottoman legal norms, however, had already had meaningful inefficacies emerge during the late Ottoman administration and these only worsened during the British Mandate, undermining the stability of the mandate. The British mandate maintained difficult to enforce precedent till the mid-1930s, offered only stop gap legislative solutions to address tenant rights, and left the mismatched incentives of land sales on Miri land largely unchanged. The British Mandate’s land policy was built on the back of Ottoman era legal norms and in doing so internalized a large source of instability in the framework of their Mandate, instability that was worsened by the broad and conflicting goals of the British mandate.
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