UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY
WEST POINT

MINUTES

UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY BOARD OF VISITORS

ANNUAL MEETING - October 9, 2026

West Point, New York (In Person)

1. DESIGNATED FEDERAL OFFICER'S REMARKS

Colonel Khanh Diep, USMA Chief of Staff, opened the 2026 annual meeting at 9:04 am and identified Mr. David Nagle as the Designated Federal Officer. She stated that the Board operates under Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 7455; is an advisory board subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act; and is sponsored by USMA on behalf of the Department of the Army. She noted that the meeting was open to the public, that members of the public could submit written statements but could not speak from the floor, and that the proceedings were being recorded for preparation of summarized minutes.

2. CHAIRMAN'S REMARKS

Chairman Representative Steve Womack called the meeting to order, welcomed the members and public, and reiterated that the Board advises the President on matters pertaining to USMA but is not in the chain of command. He acknowledged public submissions and recognized Dr. Frank Luntz for his service to USMA and the Corps of Cadets. Dr. Luntz thanked the Board and Academy leadership and reflected on his work with cadets, emphasizing their service, character, leadership, and powerful inspiration for all Americans.

3. SECRETARY OF THE ARMY REPRESENTATIVE'S REMARKS

Mr. Jimmy Byrn, senior official performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, thanked the Board for its support to USMA and emphasized the Academy's role in preparing leaders of character for complex future battlefields shaped by autonomy, robotics, and advanced technology. He stated that he would convey the Board's comments and deliberations to Army senior leadership. He also thanked former Superintendent LTG Steven Gilland, welcomed LTG Jay Bartholomees, and recognized Senator Joni Ernst for her service to the Board.

4. SUPERINTENDENT'S OPENING REMARKS

LTG Jay Bartholomees, the 62nd Superintendent, welcomed the Board to West Point and underscored the Board's historic role and the Academy's focus on the 47-month cadet experience. He stated that the meeting's presentations would be predominantly cadet-focused and centered on preparing leaders of character for the Nation.

5. ADMINISTRATIVE ANNOUNCEMENTS AND ROLL CALL

COL Diep stated that the previous Board meeting occurred on February 23, 2026, in Washington, D.C., with a quorum present. Board members received the agenda, briefing slides, minutes from the February 2026 meeting, and public statements received since that meeting. A quorum was present for the October 2026 meeting.

Members in Attendance: Senators Joni Ernst and Tim Kaine; Representatives Steve Womack, Patrick Ryan, Sanford Bishop Jr., Pat Harrigan, and Wesley Hunt; and Ms. Maureen Bannon.

Members Absent: Senators Jerry Moran, Elissa Slotkin, and Gary Peters; Representative Stephanie Bice; LTG(R) Michael Flynn; MG(R) Daniel Walrath; Mr. David Bellavia; and Dr. Meaghan Mobbs.

Secretary of the Army's Representative: Mr. Jimmy Byrn, Senior Official Performing the Duties of Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower & Reserve Affairs.

6. BOARD BUSINESS

Chairman Womack presented the February 2026 meeting minutes for approval. Senator Ernst moved to approve the minutes; the motion was seconded by Congressman Harrigan. The Board approved the minutes by voice vote without objection. No additional business was raised before the Academy update.

7. ACADEMY UPDATE

a. Superintendent Overview. LTG Bartholomees described his command approach and ongoing external review of the Academy. He stated that USMA's mission and vision remain sound and described three leadership fundamentals: soldier discipline; leader initiative and agility; and strengthening Soldiers, families, and community. His overview placed the 47-month cadet experience at the center of the Academy's work, emphasizing the complementary roles of its developmental programs. He organized his initial priorities into four lines of effort:

- Develop leaders of character with a winning warrior ethos through an integrated academic, military, physical, and character-development experience.
- Recruit, develop, and empower the faculty, tactical officers and NCOs, and coaches who most directly influence cadets.
- Modernize the academic, military, physical, information-technology, data, sustainment, governance, and infrastructure enterprises.

- Strengthen strategic partnerships with Army commands, government research organizations, industry, academia, and the West Point Association of Graduates.

b. Military Program. BG Joe Katz, Commandant of Cadets, described efforts to retain demanding foundational training while integrating emerging technology and current operational lessons. Cadet presenters explained the progression from Cadet Basic Training through Cadet Field Training and Cadet Leader Development Training, including simulation-enabled marksmanship, survival training, UAS integration, night operations, air assault missions, multinational training at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Germany, and military advanced schools. Cadets emphasized leadership under stress, teamwork, resilience, candid feedback, and interoperability with allied forces. Discussion also addressed deliberate preparation and mentorship for advanced schools, balancing training with other cadet obligations, and using challenging experiences to develop humility and the ability to lead and follow. USMA reported that advanced-school graduation rates generally exceed Army averages, identified Pathfinder School as an exception, and described adjustments to candidate selection and preparation. Multinational training with Royal Military Academy Sandhurst cadets provided opportunities for shared tactical experiences, comparative leadership discussions, and cross-cultural learning in preparation for coalition operations.

c. Physical Program. BG Katz reported strong cadet performance on the Army Fitness Test, competitive club participation, voluntary endurance events, and company athletics. He emphasized that the physical program builds readiness, grit, confidence, and the ability to lead by example. These activities complement the Academy's academic, military, and character-development experience. Discussion of specialized military-school preparation also highlighted the need to coordinate physical readiness activities with academic requirements and other demands on cadet time.

d. Academic Program and Modernization. BG Nick Gist, Dean of the Academic Board, described three academic priorities: intellectual readiness, academic excellence, and stewardship. He framed modernization as balancing the timeless foundations of a West Point education with timely preparation for emerging warfare. He highlighted revised courses, new majors and minors, super intelligence and data-engineering instruction, human-machine teaming, project-based learning, faculty development, and partnerships across government and industry. Discussion further addressed responsible SI use, independent judgment, and the complementary contributions of civilian, permanent military, and rotating military faculty to interdisciplinary learning and research. USMA described technical, legal, and ethical SI instruction, critical-thinking requirements, and ongoing coordination among service academies. On civilian faculty appointments and tenure policy, USMA stated that implementation guidance was being coordinated with the Army and accepted follow-up questions concerning supporting research and potential recruitment and retention effects.

e. Cadet Research and Innovation. Cadet Jake Rizzo presented interdisciplinary research using machine learning, terrain segmentation, and probabilistic modeling to improve autonomous drone search efficiency. Cadet Jack Wilson presented missile-propellant research conducted with Army and Navy partners and emphasized lessons in resilience, disciplined initiative, interdisciplinary teamwork, and learning from failed experiments. USMA leaders also highlighted the West Point Werx Innovation Hub, Five Eyes technology experimentation, the Field Assistance in Science & Technology (FAST) cadet team, human-performance research,

space research, counter-UAS projects, and partnerships with organizations including Army Research Laboratory, Army Combat Capabilities Development Command (DEVCOM), and defense industry companies. Follow-on discussion explored pathways from cadet research to operational and commercial application, access to national laboratories and high-performance computing, and more than 20 interdisciplinary counter-UAS projects. USMA noted a small on-site high-performance computing capability and described counter-UAS work involving directed energy, autonomous tracking, and sensors. Leaders committed to a more focused counter-UAS presentation at the next Board meeting and future feedback on concrete industry-partnership outcomes.

f. Facilities Modernization. USMA leaders reported that Goethals Hall, the Cyber and Engineering Academic Center, is expected to begin hosting classes in January 2027, with a potential dedication aligned with Projects Day in April. Planned capabilities include military vehicle testing, ballistics, aerospace and wind-tunnel laboratories, rocket-motor testing, and high-bay drone testing. USMA also discussed the transition of classes from Thayer Hall and continuing delays in cadet barracks projects. The Thayer Hall transition remains contingent on Goethals Hall availability; discussion also addressed crowded cadet barracks conditions and continued Army-USMA coordination on infrastructure delivery. USMA reported that Soldier barracks affected by the 2023 flood were back in service. Leaders also stated that alternative-energy opportunities were under examination and took the question of microreactor readiness and planning for action.

8. BOARD MEMBER ISSUES, QUESTIONS, AND DISCUSSION

a. Military Training, Advanced Schools, and Leader Development.

- **Representative Steve Womack, Chair:** Asked how cadets balance specialized military-school preparation with academic, physical, and other obligations. USMA leaders explained that readiness activities are coordinated across programs and require deliberate choices about cadet time and faculty support.
- **Representative Wesley Hunt:** Asked whether cadets attending advanced military schools are prepared to compete alongside experienced Soldiers and special operators. Cadet Hoeffler described the depth of USMA pre-course preparation and mentorship from experienced participants.
- **Ms. Maureen Bannon:** Asked whether cadets receive adequate preparation for advanced schools, whether graduation rates justify the use of Army training slots, and whether cadet performance reflects positively on USMA. USMA stated that graduation rates generally exceed Army averages, identified Pathfinder School as an exception, and described adjustments to candidate selection and preparation.
- **Senator Tim Kaine:** Asked how humility contributes to successful warfighter development. BG Katz stated that USMA deliberately creates challenging experiences, including opportunities to fail and learn, so cadets understand how to lead and follow with humility.
- **Representative Pat Harrigan:** Asked whether USMA uses candid peer-evaluation methods similar to those described by a cadet who attended the Combat Diver

Qualification Course. He recommended more direct, face-to-face feedback to prepare future officers for difficult counseling and evaluation responsibilities.

b. International Programs and Coalition Relationships.

- **Senator Joni Ernst:** Asked about the relationship-building value of international cadet programs. Cadet Ingle described multinational training with Royal Military Academy Sandhurst cadets, shared tactical experiences, comparative leadership discussions, and the importance of cross-cultural competence for coalition operations.
- **Representative Wesley Hunt:** Offered, if confirmed as Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, to explore a summer opportunity for cadets at the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh and asked which USMA organizations identify nontraditional developmental opportunities.

c. Academic Program, Faculty, and Super Intelligence.

- **Senator Tim Kaine:** Raised three questions regarding the Secretary of War memorandum directing an end to new tenured civilian appointments: how USMA will treat current permanent faculty and tenure-track faculty; whether evidence or research supported the policy change; and whether USMA could track future effects on faculty recruitment and retention. USMA stated that implementation guidance was being coordinated with the Army, that no completed research was known at the meeting, and that the research questions would be taken for follow-up.
- **Representative Patrick Ryan, Vice Chair:** Asked how interdisciplinary teams and the mix of civilian, permanent military, and rotating military faculty support cadet research. USMA emphasized the complementary value of each faculty category and the role of research as part of the curriculum and leader-development process.
- **Representative Sanford Bishop Jr.:** Asked how cadets are taught the responsible use and limits of artificial intelligence, how independent judgment is preserved, whether rules are consistent across courses, and how SI-related honor cases are handled fairly. USMA described technical, legal, and ethical instruction; critical-thinking requirements; and ongoing coordination among service academies, while noting that the academic presentation would provide additional examples.
- **Ms. Maureen Bannon:** Asked whether courses and content identified in public submissions remained in the curriculum. USMA stated that two of the named courses were no longer taught and a third had been modified to comply with executive orders.

d. Cadet Research, Innovation, and Operational Application.

- **Representative Steve Womack, Chair:** Asked whether cadet researchers have access to national laboratories and high-performance computing. USMA stated that cadets have access through Army Research Laboratory and other partnerships, including a small on-site high-performance computing capability.
- **Representative Patrick Ryan, Vice Chair:** Asked how cadet research transitions from academic work to commercial and operational application. Cadet Rizzo described work with Army Special Operations, Palantir, DEVCOM, and Anduril.

- **Representative Wesley Hunt:** Asked about the intended application of research related to 3D-printable propellants and encouraged stronger relationships with private-sector defense technology firms. He offered to help facilitate relationships where useful.
- **Representative Pat Harrigan:** Asked what USMA is doing in counter-UAS research. USMA reported more than 20 interdisciplinary projects involving directed energy, autonomous tracking, sensors, and other counter-UAS capabilities.
- The Board expressed interest in receiving additional information on USMA's counter-UAS research and related initiatives at a future meeting.
- The Board encouraged continued engagement with industry and further consideration of opportunities to advance innovation partnerships.

e. Energy and Infrastructure Modernization.

- **Representative Pat Harrigan:** Asked whether USMA has a plan to accept a microreactor and advocated for West Point to pursue one for education and future-force applications. USMA stated that it was examining alternative-energy opportunities and took the microreactor question for action.
- **Representative Steve Womack, Chair:** Asked when Goethals Hall would begin supporting classes and when a formal dedication might occur. USMA stated that classes are expected in January 2027 and that an April dedication aligned with Projects Day was under consideration.
- **Ms. Maureen Bannon:** Asked for status and schedule details on Goethals Hall, Soldier barracks affected by the 2023 flood, delayed cadet barracks, and Thayer Hall. USMA reported that the flooded Soldier barracks were back in service; Goethals Hall classes were expected in January 2027; delayed cadet barracks remained under construction; and classes were expected to leave Thayer Hall after the January transition, contingent on Goethals Hall availability. She expressed continuing concern that infrastructure delays and crowded barracks conditions could create cadet safety issues and asked that improved Army-USMA coordination continue.
- **Representative Patrick Ryan, Vice Chair:** Commended improved coordination among USMA, the Army, and construction stakeholders on military construction and infrastructure projects, while acknowledging that significant work remains.

f. Closing Observation.

- **Senator Joni Ernst:** Emphasized that relationships matter and presence is power, and thanked the Board, Academy leaders, and cadets for the opportunity to serve.

9. CLOSING COMMENTS AND ADJOURNMENT

Chairman Womack thanked the Superintendent, Academy leadership, cadet presenters, and Board members. He stated that the timing of the next meeting would be considered following publication of the Congressional calendar, with the February-March 2027 timeframe under consideration. A motion to adjourn was made by Congressman Ryan and seconded by Senator Ernst. The October 2026 meeting was adjourned by voice vote without objection. The meeting adjourned at 11:50 am.

CERTIFIED BY

STEVE WOMACK
United States Representative
Chair, USMA Board of Visitors

DAVID NAGLE
Designated Federal Officer
USMA Board of Visitors

UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY

WEST POINT®

Board of Visitors Meeting

9 October 2026

APPENDIX A

Meeting Agenda

Opening Statements

Board Business

- *Approve Minutes from February 2026 Meeting*

Academy Update

- *Superintendent's Update*
- *Commandant's Update*
  - *Cadet Summer Training Update*
  - *Physical Program Update*
- *Dean's Update*
  - *Academic Modernization*
    - *Super Intelligence in the Curriculum*
    - *Innovation*
  - *Infrastructure Modernization*

Open Discussion

Closing Remarks



Academy Update

LTG James Bartholomees III
62nd Superintendent



Commandant's Update

BG Joseph Katz
82nd Commandant of Cadets

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
MILITARY PROGRAM UPDATE: CADET BASIC TRAINING













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MILITARY PROGRAM UPDATE: CADET FIELD TRAINING













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MILITARY PROGRAM UPDATE:
CADET LEADER DEVELOPMENT TRAINING













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MILITARY PROGRAM UPDATE: DYNAMIC VICTORY













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MILITARY PROGRAM UPDATE:
MILITARY INDIVIDUAL ADVANCED DEVELOPMENT













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PHYSICAL PROGRAM UPDATE















Dean’s Update

BG Nicholas Gist
16th Dean of the Academic Board


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Academic Modernization




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Terrain Simulation




Particle Field



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Drone Simulation



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Beyond the Classroom



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Modern Foundation



STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FROM MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC

HOW DOES THE CURRICULUM VIEW THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE JOINT AND ARMY APPROVED DOCTRINE FOR MULTI DOMAIN OPERATIONS, AND DOES THE PROPONENCY FOR THE TEACHING OF THIS NEW FORM OF WARFARE AS WELL AS THESE NEW SETS OF DETTERENCE CAPABILITIES RESIDE IN ONE OF MORE ACADEMIC DEPARTMENTS, OR DOES IT RESIDE WITHIN THE PRINCIPAL PROPONENT OF THE COMMANDANT OF CADETS?

FURTHER, DOES THE VISION OF FUTURE CONFLICT RELATE TO THE CURRENT PRACTICALLY DAY-TO -DAY EVENTS NOW IN PLAY THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, TO INCLUDE THE DOMAINS OF SPACE AND CYBER, AND IF SO, DOES USMA NOW TAKE A LEADERHISP ROLE IN HOW TO FIRST ANALYSE THIS RELATIONSHIP AND OFFER WAYS TO DISCUSS AND PROMOTE DEBATES OF THE 5 DOMAINS?

MARK GERNER

Member, Board, MacArthur Society

Pursuant to 41 CFR 102-3.105(j) and 102-3.140 and section 10(a)(3) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, I submit the following written question for review by the West Point Board of Visitors Committee Chairperson, and that this question be provided to all members of the Committee for their review and consideration prior to the 09 Oct. 2026 West Point Board of Visitors meeting. I further request that this question be formally added to the minutes of the meeting.

In 2024, cadets under Prof. Morten Ender's supervision submitted the following during the Projects Day Research Symposium:

"Deconstructing Patriotism: Exploring Postmodernism and US Army Recruitment Amidst the Lack of a National Narrative."

"Uniformed Perspectives: The Evolution of Cross Dressing in the Military and Gender Norms."

During a 26 June 2020 recorded interview, "Dreams Deferred: The Battle for Transgender Military Rights Marches On", Prof. Ender using his title as "Professor of Sociology at West Point" said "within the military there is still institutional racism, there is institutional sexism, there is institutional homophobia." He equated the transgender movement with the integration of blacks in the military.

In Mar. 2017, Prof. Ender along with four other instructors from the Dept. of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership published an academic paper titled: "Dinner and a Conversation – Transgender Integration at West Point and Beyond."

Is Prof. Ender still a member of the USMA faculty? If so, does he continue to provide instruction to cadets on deconstructing patriotism, cross dressing and transgender integration in the military?

Name: Col. (Ret.) William F. Prince
Affiliation: USMA class of 1970
Address: 1773 Independence Ave., Melbourne, FL 32940
Daytime phone #: 321-514-7177

Pursuant to 41 CFR 102-3.105(j) and 102-3.140 and section 10(a)(3) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, I submit the following written question for review by the West Point Board of Visitors Committee Chairperson, and that this question be provided to all members of the Committee for their review and consideration prior to the 09 Oct. 2026 West Point Board of Visitors meeting. I further request that this question be formally added to the minutes of the meeting.

Does the United States Military Academy continue to offer the following courses, previously offered in support of the now terminated Minor in Diversity & Inclusion Studies:

SS392: The Politics of Race, Gender, and Sexuality.

HI461: Sex and Civilizations (aka Topics in Gender History: Sex and Civilizations).

HI463: Race, Ethnicity, Nation (aka Race, Ethnicity, Nation & Gender).

Name: Col. (Ret.) William F. Prince
Affiliation: USMA class of 1970
Address: 1773 Independence Ave., Melbourne, FL 32940
Daytime phone #: 321-514-7177

RESTORATION OF AMERICA FOUNDATION

September 30, 2026

Secretary of the General Staff
United States Military Academy
ATTN: David Nagle
646 Swift Road
West Point, NY 10996

Subject: USMA BOV Public Comment

Dear Board of Visitors,

I am Doug Truax, a USMA 1992 graduate and CEO of Restoration of America Foundation / Restoration of America. My organization advocates for America's service academies to develop the best leaders of warfighters in the world.

We want to extend warm congratulations to Lieutenant General James B. Bartholomees III on his appointment as the 62nd Superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy, as well as to Brigadier General Nicholas H. Gist on his appointment as the 16th Dean of the Academic Board. We look forward to collaborating with them to support West Point's vital mission of developing our nation's future officers and leaders. To help accomplish this, we hope they will eliminate all racism in the form of DEI and renew the Academy's focus on meritocracy and unity.

We continue to urge the Board to end participation in the Rhodes Scholarship due to the harmful propaganda it pushes. Any leader or employee who institutionalizes racism, compromises meritocracy, and/or degrades the brand of our service academies must be removed.

We are also calling for the BOV to request that the Academy submit a report describing compliance with the Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA) lawsuit settlement and the safeguards the Academy has in place to prevent race from influencing admissions decisions.

As a reminder, here are items previously submitted in our letters to the BOV. We are asking that the Board prioritize these issues to strengthen the Academy by removing anti-American ideologies and other agendas not in alignment with the directives of the War Secretary and President. We have identified and elaborated on these at RestoreTheMilitary.com.

High-Quality Education:

1. Conduct an immediate, thorough, and independent review of curriculum and instruction to make sure cadets are receiving the highest-quality education focused on creating the best leaders and warfighters for America.
2. Conduct a thorough assessment of all professors to make sure they align fully with the mission and not on "social justice" agendas.

3. Eliminate the Rhodes Scholar program that seeks to indoctrinate students in Marxist ideals. Read our report on the topic here.
4. Increase the percentage of professors who have a previous or current military background.
5. Remove any staff members with a political agenda.

Admissions:

1. Conduct a thorough review of the recruitment and admissions process to make sure employees are seeking candidates that align with USMA's traditional mission without regard to non-merit factors such as race or gender.
2. Immediately remove all data tracking related to race and gender for admissions and appointments.
3. Remove the requirement for photos to be submitted with applications.

If any of these measures I've mentioned have already been implemented, please notify us. We would be happy to amplify your work to restore the warrior ethos and merit-based standards.


Last but not least, I'd like to share two resources. The first is Restoration of America Foundation's *Restore The Military* podcast, hosted by myself and former U.S. Army Ranger Will Thibeau. Each episode tackles a different topic on what it will take to restore the U.S. military to excellence. Episode 4 will be of particular interest to your work, as Will and I discuss how the service academies lost their way. Furthermore, we lay out reforms to restore merit and the warrior ethos back at the center of how we form officers. Season 2 just launched on September 22nd, and we will be rolling out new episodes for the next several weeks.

The second resource is our July 2026 white paper titled *Restoring America's Service Academies and War Colleges*, which I have attached to this letter. This white paper proposes a comprehensive reform agenda organized around four pillars: admissions, curriculum, faculty, and governance. Each pillar is designed to restore a single animating principle to the center of military education: the relentless preparation of officers to close with and destroy the enemies of the United States. The proposals herein build on the reform momentum initiated by President Trump's Executive Order 14173, "Ending Illegal Discrimination and Restoring Merit-Based Opportunity," and Secretary of War Hegseth's subsequent directives banning race- and sex-based considerations from academy admissions and ordering a task force to evaluate the senior service colleges.

RESTORATION OF AMERICA
FOUNDATION

Thank you for your time and your service to West Point. At Restoration of America Foundation / Restoration of America, we are working to be a resource and to advocate for the United States Military Academy. Please reach out if we can assist in any way.

Very Respectfully,



Doug Truax
Founder and CEO
Restoration of America Foundation / Restoration of America

Restoring America's Service Academies & War Colleges

A Plan for Institutional Reform

RESTORATION OF AMERICA FOUNDATION

July 2026







Executive Summary

The primary purpose of the U.S. service academies and war colleges is to produce officers capable of winning the nation's wars. That purpose has been diluted by decades of institutional drift toward the norms, incentives, and ideological commitments of civilian academia. The result is a professional military education system that churns out credentialed strategists rather than warfighters, rewarding the habits of the seminar room over the demands of the battlefield.

This white paper proposes a comprehensive reform agenda organized around four pillars: admissions, curriculum, faculty, and governance. Each pillar is designed to restore a single animating principle to the center of military education: the relentless preparation of officers to close with and destroy the enemies of the United States. The proposals herein build on the reform momentum initiated by President Donald Trump's Executive Order 14173, titled "Ending Illegal Discrimination and Restoring Merit-Based Opportunity," and Secretary of War Pete Hegseth's subsequent directives banning race- and sex-based considerations from academy admissions and ordering a task force to evaluate the senior service colleges.[1]

Some commentators have cautioned against what they term the "cult of lethality," arguing that senior officers need strategic breadth, not more tactical training. The strategic failures of the past 25 years were not caused by officers who understood warfighting too well; they were caused by an officer corps trained to think like diplomats and contractors rather than warriors willing to deliver blunt counsel to their civilian leaders. The corrective is not more of the same education that produced those failures. It is a fundamental reorientation of every institution that shapes the American officer.[2]

The Problem: Strategic Drift and Institutional Capture

The U.S. military has not lost a tactical engagement of strategic significance since the fall of Saigon. It has, however, failed to translate tactical dominance into strategic victory across two decades of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan. The architects of those strategies were, without exception, products of the same professional military education system that this paper seeks to reform.

The roots of this failure lie in an officer corps that was educated to prize credentialism over candor, consensus over confrontation, and the approval of civilian academic elites over fidelity to the warfighting mission. As one retired Army colonel and war college graduate observed, the curricula of the war colleges seem designed to produce military officers who think like politicians, State Department employees, and military contractors. The United States has enough of those. What it lacks are senior officers so thoroughly grounded in the art of war that they will tell their political masters hard truths, including that certain missions are ill-conceived and certain strategies will fail.[3]

Samuel Huntington's framework for civil-military relations, articulated in *The Soldier and the State*, remains the essential starting point for this analysis. Huntington argued that the health of civil-military relations depends on maintaining a clear distinction between the civilian and military spheres: civilians set policy objectives, and a professional military executes them with operational autonomy. The military profession is defined by its specialized expertise in the management of organized violence, its corporate identity, and its ethic of service to the state.[4]

Huntington could not have anticipated that the institutions responsible for cultivating military professionalism would themselves become vectors of the very civilianization he warned against. The war colleges and service academies have adopted the tenure structures, accreditation dependencies, and ideological fashions of civilian universities. The result is not Huntington's ideal of a professional military insulated from political interference, but a military education establishment thoroughly colonized by the priorities of an activist civilian academy.

Critics of reform, writing in forums such as *War on the Rocks*, have cautioned that removing civilian faculty and interagency students from war colleges would deprive officers of the strategic breadth they need. This argument rests on a false choice. No serious reformer proposes that senior officers should be ignorant of diplomacy, economics, or intelligence. The question is who controls the curriculum, what ideological assumptions undergird it, and whether the institution's primary loyalty is to warfighting or to the approval of regional accrediting bodies. On each of these questions, the status quo fails.[5]



Pillar One: Admissions — Restoration of Meritocracy

The Current System

Admission to the service academies currently operates under a "whole candidate" model that evaluates academic ability, physical fitness, leadership potential, and character. Candidates must secure a congressional or other authorized nomination, pass the Department of Defense Medical Examination Review Board (DoDMERB) physical, and complete the Candidate Fitness Assessment (CFA). Standardized test scores from the SAT, ACT, and (beginning in February 2026) the Classic Learning Test (CLT) are required.[6] The average SAT composite at West Point is approximately 1,313, with the 75th percentile at 1,420.[7]

In 2023, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down race-conscious admissions in *Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard*, but Chief Justice Roberts carved out a specific exception for military academies, citing their "potentially distinct interests." This exception created a legal anomaly in which the institutions most dependent on unit cohesion and colorblind meritocracy were the only ones in America still permitted to sort applicants by skin color.[8]

Secretary Hegseth's May 2025 memorandum ordering merit-based admissions at all service academies closed that anomaly as a matter of policy. The directive orders the academies to apply no consideration of race, ethnicity, or sex and to offer admission based exclusively on merit. This paper builds on that directive by offering structural recommendations to make the meritocratic principle permanent and resistant to future reversals.[9]

Recommendations

Codify colorblind, merit-based admissions in statute. Executive directives are reversible by future administrations. Congress should amend Title 10 to prohibit any service academy or war college from considering race, ethnicity, or sex as a factor in any admissions decision, eliminating the Supreme Court's carve-out through legislative action. The statutory language should define "merit" to include academic aptitude, physical fitness, leadership record, and demonstrated character—nothing else.

Abolish all quotas, targets, and benchmarks linked to demographic composition. No office within the Department of War should track, report on, or optimize for the racial, ethnic, or sex composition of any entering class or applicant pool. Existing datasets used for such purposes should be archived and discontinued.

Reweight the Candidate Fitness Assessment and standardized test scores as the primary determinants of admission. The current "whole candidate" score distributes weight across many factors, diluting the importance of the two metrics most predictive of performance as a combat officer: physical fitness and cognitive aptitude. The CFA and SAT/ACT/CLT composite should constitute no less than 60 percent of the total candidate score. The remaining 40 percent should be allocated to leadership record, including JROTC service, scouting, varsity athletics, and similar demonstrated leadership under pressure.[10]

Expand and weight prior enlisted service. Candidates with prior enlisted military service, particularly those with combat deployments, should receive a substantial admissions preference scored in the merit framework. These candidates bring maturity, discipline, and firsthand understanding of the institution they will one day lead. The preparatory school pipeline at each academy should be expanded to accommodate more prior-service candidates.

Restore the congressional nomination system to its original meritocratic function. Members of Congress should be directed, through the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), to nominate candidates in rank order of merit within their nomination slates. The practice of providing unranked slates, which enables the academies to exercise discretion in selection among nominees, should be curtailed.



Pillar Two: Curriculum — Restoration of Lethality

Service Academies: Undergraduate Reform

The service academies grant bachelor's degrees and prepare cadets and midshipmen for commissioning as junior officers. At West Point, for example, the core curriculum comprises 27 required courses (including a three-course engineering sequence), 12 of which are in science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) fields. All graduates receive a Bachelor of Science degree, regardless of major. Of the 36 academic majors available, 23 are in STEM fields.[11]

This ratio needs to be flipped on its head. To ensure these institutions are laser-focused on their primary mission of training future warfighters, the core curriculum must enforce a strict 75/25 credit-hour ratio: at least 75 percent of all coursework must be directly geared toward tactical, operational, and strategic military competencies, including military science and military history, while the remaining 25 percent is reserved for rigorous STEM and other foundational disciplines.

Non-essential electives must be aggressively pruned in favor of warfighting readiness. The current weakness lies in the elective structure and in the encroachment of ideological content into courses that nominally serve the warfighting mission. The recommendations below expand the emphasis on warfighting and preserve STEM as a foundational discipline, while also eliminating ideological distractions.

Recommendations

Enforce a strict 75/25 curriculum split. The superintendent and academic dean of each service academy must restructure all degree programs to adhere to the 75/25 mandate. Three-quarters of all academic credits must have a direct, one-to-one correlation with winning wars. This includes military science, history of warfare, military strategy, tactical training, and leadership under stress. The remaining quarter of the curriculum will be dedicated to difficult, high-level technical fields (such as engineering and computer science) that contribute directly to technical competence in the field, entirely eliminating "basket-weaving" or soft-science filler courses.

Conduct a comprehensive course audit. In alignment with the 75/25 restructuring, the superintendent of each service academy, in consultation with the commandant and the military chain of command, should direct a line-by-line review of every course offered. The standard for retention should be a direct and demonstrable contribution to warfighting readiness, technical competence, or the intellectual foundations of military leadership. Courses that cannot meet this standard should be eliminated.

Eliminate non-relevant electives in the social sciences. Electives in gender studies, critical race theory, identity-based sociology, and similar disciplines rooted in ideological frameworks hostile to military cohesion should be permanently removed from every course

catalog. This is not a prohibition on intellectual inquiry; it is a recognition that a military installation has a specific mission, and courses that actively undermine unit cohesion by encouraging cadets to view their peers through lenses of racial or sexual grievance are incompatible with that mission.

Double down on warfighting domains within the 75/25 framework. The credit-hour allocation for engineering, computer science, cyber operations, military history, and strategy must be explicitly balanced to hit the new curriculum target. Every graduate of a service academy should possess working fluency in at least one emerging warfighting domain: autonomous systems, electronic warfare, cyber operations, or space operations. The foreign language requirement should prioritize languages of strategic competitors: Mandarin, Russian, Farsi, and Arabic.

Increase the credit-hour weight of tactical training and leadership under stress. To fulfill the 75 percent military competency requirement, the Departments of Military Instruction at each academy should have greater authority to integrate field training, live-fire exercises, and small-unit leadership scenarios into the academic calendar. Cadet summer training periods should expand, and the current Cadet Leader Development Training (CLDT) and Cadet Troop Leader Training (CTLT) programs should carry academic credit commensurate with their importance to officer development.

Eliminate participation in the Rhodes Scholarship Program. West Point and other service academies should cease nominating cadets for the Rhodes Scholarship. The program's own selection criteria disqualify it as an appropriate post-graduate track for American officers. The American Secretary of the Rhodes Trust states that a scholar must demonstrate "great ambition for social impact" and be "acutely conscious of inequities." The Trust describes the 2026 American cohort, which includes five service academy cadets, as focused on housing policy, health outcomes, sustainability, and prison re-entry. These are not the formative priorities of a combat officer. They are the priorities of an overseas academic establishment whose institutional incentives are increasingly hostile to the warfighting ethos and the constitutional order that ethos defends.

The consequence is a self-selecting pipeline in which the military's most academically capable junior officers spend two formative post-commissioning years absorbing the political commitments of Oxford's senior common rooms rather than leading platoons. Secretary Hegseth has already barred military officers from government-sponsored fellowships at Harvard and signaled that additional institutions will follow. The Rhodes Scholarship, Marshall Scholarship, and comparable foreign academic fellowships warrant the same treatment. Service academies should redirect the institutional effort currently devoted to Rhodes candidacy toward branch qualification, tactical proficiency, and early operational command. The U.S. military does not need more scholars. It needs officers prepared to lead warriors in combat.[12]

War Colleges: Senior-Level Reform

The six senior service colleges—the National War College, the Eisenhower School, the Army War College, the Naval War College, the Air War College, and the Marine Corps War College—educate the senior officers who often go on to command at the strategic level. The curriculum at these institutions is where the tension between warfighting and credentialism is most acute.

Prussian reformer Gerhard von Scharnhorst established the *Kriegsakademie* as the world's first war college after Prussia's catastrophic defeat at Jena-Auerstedt in 1806. The institution that Scharnhorst built focused on strategic and critical thinking through a curriculum of military art, history, politics, and economics. It produced the Prussian General Staff, which enabled the victories that unified Germany. Every subsequent war college, including those in the United States, was modeled on the *Kriegsakademie*. The lesson is clear: the best war colleges in history taught their officers to think strategically about war, not to think like civilians who happen to wear uniforms.[13]

A retired colonel and war college graduate put it bluntly: These institutions seem more interested in mimicking the prestige of the Ivy League than in mastering the profession of arms.[14] One war college sent a dozen students to China for two weeks to study climate change, accompanied by minders from the Chinese Communist Party. The trip had nothing to do with warfighting.[15]

Critics of this assessment argue that the war colleges rightly focus on the strategic level, where officers must understand diplomacy, economics, and the interagency process. One such critic, writing in *War on the Rocks*, contends that the "cult of lethality" approach, characterized by its focus on tactical warfighting at the expense of strategic study, will not produce senior leaders with the necessary skills for today's complex environment.[16]

This objection conflates two distinct problems. The first is whether senior officers need to understand the instruments of national power beyond the military instrument—of course, they do. No serious reformer argues otherwise. The second, and far more consequential, question is whether the institutional structures of the war colleges have been captured by civilian academic norms that systematically orient officers away from warfighting and toward the preferences of the very policy establishment that produced two decades of strategic failure. On this question, the evidence is overwhelming.

U.S. national security doctrine recognizes the instruments of national power under the DIME-FIL framework: Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence, and Law Enforcement. The war colleges today devote disproportionate attention to the non-military instruments, assuming that senior officers have already mastered the military dimension. That assumption is false. The correct balance, as one reform advocate has proposed, is a roughly 75 percent focus on the military instrument, with the remaining 25 percent allocated to the other instruments insofar as they directly support warfighting.[17]

Recommendations

Purge all curricula that disguise ideological content as military necessity. Courses on climate change as a national security threat, bias in Army talent management, and similar topics that launder progressive policy preferences through the language of military readiness should be eliminated. The standard is simple: If the course content would be equally at home in a civilian university's political science department, it does not belong in a war college.

Restructure around warfighting at the operational and strategic levels. The core curriculum should center on the study of military campaigns, strategic competition with peer adversaries, force design and modernization, joint and combined operations, and the integration of emerging technologies into warfighting doctrine. Case studies should draw from historical campaigns in which strategic and operational decisions determined outcomes, such as the Prussian campaigns of 1866 and 1870, the Pacific theater in World War II, the Korean War, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, and the Gulf War.



Pillar Three: Faculty — Restoration of Warfighters

The Civilian Faculty Problem

The civilian faculty at America's war colleges and service academies represent the single most important vector of institutional capture. Career civilian professors bring the incentive structures, ideological commitments, and professional loyalties of the civilian academy into military institutions. Many view their positions as stepping stones to prestigious civilian university appointments, and they orient their research and curriculum accordingly.

The research they supervise with military students is geared toward appealing to future civilian employers rather than solving warfighting problems.

Defenders of the status quo argue that civilian faculty possess deep expertise in areas where military officers lack knowledge: artificial intelligence, nuclear proliferation, Russian foreign policy, Chinese domestic politics, and the intelligence community. This is true as far as it goes. But the solution is not a permanent civilian professoriate embedded in military institutions. It is a targeted use of civilian expertise through guest lectures, classified briefings, and short-term technical appointments that serve the military mission without importing the institutional culture of the civilian academy.[18]

Recommendations

Mandate that the overwhelming majority of faculty at both service academies and war colleges be active-duty or retired military officers. The military-to-civilian faculty ratio should be inverted from its current state. Civilian faculty should teach only technical disciplines in which military expertise is genuinely insufficient: engineering, medicine, law, advanced computer science, and select foreign language instruction. In all other areas, military officers who have demonstrated excellence in command should constitute the teaching faculty.

Give preferential treatment in faculty selection to combat veterans. Officers selected for faculty duty should, wherever possible, have combat command experience. An officer who has led soldiers in battle possesses credibility in the classroom that no academic credential can replicate. The war colleges, in particular, should be staffed by officers who have commanded at the battalion or brigade level and are on track for general officer selection.

Abolish tenure at all military educational institutions. Tenure is a mechanism designed to protect academic freedom within civilian universities. It has no place in a military institution. Military installations are not universities; they are instruments of national defense. Faculty who cannot accept that their continued employment depends on their contribution to the warfighting mission should seek employment elsewhere.

Establish mandatory faculty rotation. Active-duty faculty should serve teaching tours of no more than three years, with a mandatory return to operational assignments between teaching tours. This prevents the "wannabe Ivy" acculturation that occurs when military faculty spend extended periods in academic environments. Retired military faculty should be limited to defined terms, only extendable for operationally experienced veterans, with no possibility of permanent appointment.

Decouple from civilian institutional norms. Faculty handbooks at all military educational institutions should explicitly state that the institution is a military installation first and an educational institution second. Faculty speech or curricula that promote seditious ideologies, undermine unit cohesion, or advocate frameworks hostile to the constitutional order and the warfighting mission should be grounds for immediate contract termination. This is not a restriction on academic freedom. It is a recognition that military institutions exist to serve a specific national defense function, and the First Amendment does not entitle anyone to a government-funded platform from which to subvert that function.

Implement ideological neutrality vetting for new faculty. All prospective faculty, military and civilian alike, should undergo a review of past publications, public statements, and teaching philosophies as part of the hiring process. The purpose is not to impose a political litmus test but to ensure that incoming faculty do not advocate frameworks, such as critical race theory, gender ideology, or anti-American narratives, that are incompatible with the military's mission and cohesion. The vetting process should be administered by the commandant's office, not by the academic provost.



Pillar Four: Governance — Restoration of Accountability

Leadership

Reform begins at the top. Superintendents and commandants who presided over the ideological capture of their institutions should be relieved and replaced with officers who have demonstrated both combat excellence and a commitment to institutional reform. Secretary Hegseth's March 2026 directive establishing a task force under the Under Secretary of War for Personnel and Readiness to evaluate the senior service colleges is a welcome step. That task force should be empowered to recommend the immediate relief of any war college leader who has permitted or encouraged the infiltration of divisive ideologies into the curriculum.[19]

Accreditation

The dependency of military educational institutions on civilian accreditation bodies represents a structural vulnerability that must be addressed. Under current law, the degree-granting authority of the Army War College and similar institutions is contingent on accreditation by a civilian agency recognized by the U.S. Department of Education. Civilian accrediting bodies, such as the Northwest Commission on Colleges and Universities, require institutions to demonstrate "similar characteristics to other higher education institutions." This requirement is the mechanism by which civilian academic norms are imported into military institutions.[20]

The solution is twofold. First, Congress should investigate whether the accreditation requirements imposed on military educational institutions serve the national defense or merely the interests of the civilian academic establishment. Second, Congress should consider establishing a separate military accreditation body, operating under the authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that evaluates military educational institutions against warfighting readiness standards rather than civilian academic norms. The loss of civilian degree recognition is an acceptable cost. An advanced military degree should be valued within the military for what it represents: mastery of the art and science of war. It should not be a credential designed to make a colonel competitive for a post-retirement teaching position at Georgetown.[21]

DEI Elimination

All Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) offices, staff positions, and "chief diversity officer" roles at every service academy and war college should be immediately and permanently dissolved. This includes eliminating all DEI training modules, mandatory climate surveys focused on identity categories, and any administrative function whose purpose is to monitor or promote demographic outcomes rather than warfighting readiness. Secretary Hegseth's January 2025 directive banning DEI throughout the Department of War has initiated this process. The task now is to ensure that DEI does not reconstitute itself under alternative labels, as it has in civilian institutions where "belonging," "inclusive excellence," and "community engagement" serve as euphemisms for the same programs.[22]

Boards of Visitors

The boards of visitors that oversee each service academy require fundamental restructuring. Congress should limit or eliminate congressional membership. Sitting members of Congress often treat these seats as ceremonial appointments, attend sporadically, and lack both the time

and the institutional incentive to impose genuine accountability on academy leadership. In their place should sit veterans and civilian appointees whose commitments to the warfighting mission are demonstrable and ideologically aligned with the restoration agenda. Statute should require members to certify annually, under a "Warfighting First" mandate, that the academy's curriculum, faculty, and admissions practices conform to that standard, and should impose personal legal exposure for false certification. Each board should seat no more than two retired senior flag officers, preventing the board from degenerating into a protection racket for the institutional status quo its members helped create. Terms should run three years with no renewal, forcing continuous turnover and foreclosing the slow capture that produced the current drift. The purpose of a board of visitors is accountability, not prestige. The reform must reflect that purpose.

Commandant Over Provost

At every service academy and war college, the military chain of command must hold final authority over curriculum and faculty decisions. The current practice at many institutions, in which a civilian provost or academic dean exercises de facto control over the academic program, must be reversed. The commandant of cadets or the military commander of the war college should have unambiguous authority to approve, modify, or reject any course offering, faculty appointment, or curricular change. The provost may advise; the commander decides.

Cohesion and Readiness Audits

The identity-focused "climate surveys" currently administered at service academies and war colleges should be replaced with "Cohesion and Readiness Audits" designed to measure unit morale, small-unit effectiveness, and combat readiness. These audits should be designed and administered by operational commanders, not human resources professionals trained in civilian diversity frameworks. The metrics that matter are whether cadets and students trust their leaders, whether they are prepared to fight, and whether their education is making them more lethal. Demographics are irrelevant to each of these questions.

Answering the Critics

The most sophisticated criticism of the reform agenda outlined in this paper comes from those who accept the need for institutional change but reject what they characterize as the "cult of lethality" approach. Their argument, articulated most fully in a March 2026 War on the Rocks essay[23] by Bradford T. Duplessis, a retired infantry officer and National War College graduate, can be summarized in three propositions:

- First, Duplessis argues that the United States' strategic failures in Iraq and Afghanistan were caused not by too much strategic education but by too little. The military won every tactical engagement but failed to link tactical success to strategic objectives. Removing civilian expertise from the war colleges would only deepen this deficiency.
- Second, Duplessis contends that civilian faculty bring irreplaceable expertise in areas like artificial intelligence, nuclear policy, and regional geopolitics. Military officers rotating through teaching tours cannot replicate this depth of knowledge.
- Third, Duplessis observes that interagency students from the State Department, the intelligence community, and other agencies provide war college students with perspectives that sharpen strategic thinking and build the interagency relationships that senior leaders will need.

Each of these propositions contains a grain of truth embedded in a larger error.

On the first point, the strategic failures of the past two decades were not failures of education. They were failures of an officer corps that had been socialized, through precisely the kind of education the critic defends, to defer to civilian policy preferences rather than deliver candid military counsel. When political leadership asked whether Afghanistan could be transformed into a liberal democracy, the correct military answer was no. That answer was not given, or was given too quietly, because the officers who should have delivered it had likely spent their formative professional education learning to think like the diplomats and policy analysts sitting across the seminar table. The problem is not that officers lack understanding of the interagency process. It is that they understand it too well and have internalized its risk-averse, consensus-driven culture at the expense of their own professional military judgment.

On the second point, civilian technical expertise is valuable but does not require a permanent civilian professoriate. The military regularly brings in outside experts for classified briefings, wargames, and advisory panels. A reformed war college can access the best minds in artificial intelligence or nuclear policy through visiting lecture series, red team exercises, and short-term consulting arrangements without ceding institutional control to career academics whose primary loyalty is to the civilian academy.

On the third point, interagency attendance at war colleges is a mechanism that, in practice, civilianizes military officers more than it militarizes civilian officials. The war colleges should maintain relationships with the interagency community through joint exercises, exchange programs, and liaison arrangements. But the core student body of a war college should be military officers, and the core purpose of their education should be warfighting at the strategic level.

Conclusion: The Standard Is Victory

The institutions that educate U.S. military officers exist to serve one purpose: the production of leaders capable of winning the nation's wars. Every other function—the conferral of credentials, the pursuit of academic prestige, and the cultivation of interagency relationships—is subordinate to that purpose. When those secondary functions begin to compete with or displace the primary mission, the institution has lost its way.

That is the case concerning the U.S. service academies and war colleges. The reforms proposed in this paper—merit-based admissions, a curriculum rebuilt around lethality and strategic warfighting, a faculty dominated by combat-experienced military officers, and governance structures that place the warfighter in command—represent a comprehensive plan to restore these institutions to their founding purpose.

The 2026 National Defense Strategy identifies four priorities: defend the homeland, deter China, increase allied burden-sharing, and rebuild the defense industrial base. None of these objectives will be achieved by officers educated in the image of the civilian university. They will be achieved by officers who have been trained, educated, and forged in institutions that prize lethality above all else.[24]

As Huntington understood, the health of civil-military relations depends on a military profession that is distinct from civilian society, not absorbed into it. The service academies and war colleges are the institutions where that professional identity is formed. If they are permitted to remain outposts of the civilian university system, the American military profession will continue its slow dissolution into the broader culture of credentialism, ideology, and institutional self-preservation that has already corrupted so much of American public life.[25]

The standard is not accreditation. The standard is not academic prestige. The standard is not the approval of the faculty lounge. The standard is victory.

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I would like to add 7 questions to the USMA BoV meeting -

It is solely focused on the "Spirit of the Honor Code" from the Simon Center of the Professional Military Ethic, within the Office of the Commandant, that states, "Cadets should attempt to be fair and equitable in their interactions with others". This seems to contravene EO14151 and SecWar Hegseth's orders to eliminate "Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion" and reform to "Colorblind, Gender Neutral, Merit Based" military culture.

Cadet Honor Code | U.S. Military Academy West Point

Questions:

1. According to West Point's leadership center, the term "equitable" remains on the Cadet Honor code. Please explain.

2. The Spirit of the Honor Code is a deep definition of what the Honor Code is. Why is the concept of equity part of the 3 rules test?

3. What is the difference between "fairness", as in "Acting with Fairness", and the term "equitable"?

4. Given the post-modern, academic institutional definitions of equity and equitable are in contravention to the outcomes of a "colorblind, gender-neutral, merit-based" military specified by SecWar Hegseth as late as October 1, 2026, why insist on educating and training cadets this way?

5. Which American language dictionary, to include edition and date, is West Point referencing for the definition of "equitable"? ex: *Webster's Dictionary of the American Language, 1st Edition, 1828*.

6. What were the other, higher education references the Simon Center for the Professional Military Ethic (Office of the Commandant) originally use to define "equitable"? ex: *The Middle States Commission on Higher Education (MSCHE) Accreditation* standards (14th Version, Guiding Principle #3, which included "Reflection on Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion"), or as defined in the radicalized *Student Services: A Handbook for the Profession, 6th Ed*. by Schuh, et al.

7. Given the MSCHE's Accreditation Standard has eliminated Guiding Principle #3 (per 15th Edition, dated 01 July '26) in Standard #2, Ethics & Integrity, should the Office of the Commandant still use it?

v/r,

Chuck Duray, Ed.D

Lt. Colonel (USA - Ret.)

(719) 426-1159

APPENDIX C: ATTENDANCE

BOARD MEMBERS

Present:
Senator Joni Ernst
Senator Tim Kaine
Representative Steve Womack – Chair
Representative Patrick Ryan – Vice Chair
Representative Sanford Bishop, Jr. ** - *departed the meeting at 10:40 am*
Representative Wesley Hunt
Representative Patrick Harrigan
Ms. Maureen Bannon

Absent:
Senator Jerry Moran
Senator Elissa Slotkin
Senator Gary Peters
Representative Stephanie Bice
LTG(R) Michael Flynn
MG(R) Dan Walrath
Mr. David Bellavia
Dr. Meaghan Mobbs

Based on the BOV attendance, a quorum was present.

OTHER ATTENDEES

Headquarters, Department of the Army:
Mr. Jimmy Byrn – (SOPDO) Assistant Secretary the Army (Manpower & Reserve Affairs)
SGM Ruben Murillo – Senior Enlisted Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower & Reserve Affairs)
MAJ Sean Perez – Army Legislative Liaison
MAJ William Cagney – Army Legislative Liaison
SGM Juan Vega – Army Legislative Liaison
Ms. Alexis Bergeron – Army Legislative Liaison

USMA Command and Staff Members:

LTG James Bartholomees III – Superintendent
BG Joseph Katz – Commandant of Cadets
BG Nicholas Gist – Dean of the Academic Board
CSM Phil Barretto – USMA Command Sergeant Major
CSM Kyle Keenan – USCC Command Sergeant Major
Mr. Tom Theodorakis – Director of Athletics
COL Khanh Diep – USMA Chief of Staff
COL Daniel Artino – Brigade Tactical Officer
COL Scott Blanchard – Deputy Commandant - Operations
COL Nathaniel Conkey – Commandant, US Military Academy Preparatory School
COL William Koch – Vice Dean for Operations
COL Michael Kovacevic – Director, Strategic Plans and Assessment (G5)
COL Klint Kuhlman – Director, Department of Military Instruction
COL Brad McCoy – Vice Dean for Engagement and Research
COL Riley Post – Deputy Director of Admissions
COL Michael Rizzotti – USMA Staff Judge Advocate
COL Daniel Stuewe – Commander, US Army Garrison West Point
COL Julia Wilson – Deputy, Department of Physical Education
LTC Jacqueline Asis – USCC G5
LTC Adam Brady – USCC G3
LTC Andrew Brigman – USMA Faculty
LTC Bryan Jones – Superintendent's Executive Officer
LTC Charles Patterson – Director of Communications
LTC Dennis Sugrue – Director of Strategic Resources
MAJ Daniel Amato – Aide de Camp to the Superintendent
MAJ McCoy Bean – Special Assistant to the Commandant for Honor
MAJ Frank Chen – Dean's Executive Officer
MAJ Brian Petty – USMA Faculty
CSM Scott Brinson – Command Sergeant Major, US Military Academy Preparatory School
SSG Tommy Nonesoung – Communications NCO
Mr. Carmine Cocchia – Chief, Visual Information Division
Mr. Frank DeMaro – USMA Public Affairs
Mr. John Frost – Academy Counsel
Dr. Lee Harrell – Chief, Dean's Action Group
Mr. Michael Lynn – USMA Visual Information
Mr. David Nagle – Designated Federal Officer (DFO)/Commander's Action Group
Mr. Tom Oakley – Director of Academy Advancement
Mr. Steve Price – USMA Visual Information
Dr. Michael Novitsky – USMA Faculty
Mr. Salvatore Paolicelli – USMA Protocol
Mr. Jeffrey Reynolds – Alternate DFO/Chief of Protocol
Dr. Susan Richardson – Vice Dean for Academic Affairs
Ms. Renee Sanjuan – Senior Fellow, Academic Communications
Mr. Nicholas Tantillo – USMA Multimedia Specialist
Mr. David Van Slambrook – Deputy Commandant - Support

CDT Elizabeth Fetter
CDT Michael Hoeffler
CDT Brandon Ingle
CDT Nelson Knapke
CDT Anthony Maresca
CDT Alexandra Prange
CDT Jake Rizzo
CDT Jackson Sarrazolla
CDT John Wilson

Board Member Staff:
Mr. Chris Bader – REP Womack Staff
MAJ Martain Brown – REP Bishop Staff
Mr. Kenneth Cutts – REP Bishop Staff
Mr. Carl Fisher – Ms. Bannon Staff
Mr. Michael Henry – SEN Kaine Staff
Ms. Kaitlin Kleiber – SEN Kaine Staff
Mr. Niels Larson – REP Harrigan Staff
MAJ Dillon Mathies – REP Womack Staff
Mr. Beau Stuckey – REP Womack Staff
Mr. Dan Torres – REP Ryan Staff

Members of the Public:
CDR Kyle Coleman
MSG (Ret) Jack Collins
Mr. Jasper Craven
Ms. Kirsten Dickson
Mr. John Dodson
LTC (Ret) Chuck Duray
CAPT Lawrence Gaillard
Mr. Doug Jeffrey
Mr. Jim Knapke
Mrs. Roselyn Knapke
Mr. Ken Kraetzer
Mrs. Barbara Murphy-Dodson
Mr. Matthew Newgent
Mrs. Angela Oakley
Mr. Patrick Ortland
COL (Ret) William Prince
LTC (Ret) Scott Shires
Ms. Samantha Soper
Mr. Joseph Wilson