Effective Weapons and Ammunition Management
in a Changing Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Context

HANDBOOK
for United Nations
DDR practitioners
Effective Weapons and Ammunition Management
in a Changing Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Context

A Handbook for United Nations DDR Practitioners
NOTE

The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations.

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. These documents are available in the official languages of the United Nations at http://ods.un.org. Specific disarmament-related documents can also be accessed through the disarmament reference collection at www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/library.shtml. For queries or comments, contact conventionalarms-unoda@un.org.

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COVER PHOTO

An ex-combatant participating in DDR holds up ammunition in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire. (UN photo/Patricia Esteve, 2012)

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Made possible by the Federal Republic of Germany.
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Demobilization process begins in Anyama, outside Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, 2012. (UN Photo/Basile Zoma)
Foreword

United Nations peacekeeping operations are increasingly required to function in complex environments characterized by political instability, diverse armed actors and a prevalence of weapons, ammunition and explosives. Such environments complicate the application of standing United Nations peacekeeping principles and other international standards. Practical tools and innovative solutions are required to support the establishment of a sustainable peace.

Weapons and ammunition management has become crucial in the work of the United Nations in post-conflict environments, including through disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programmes. Communities awash in weapons cannot achieve the levels of peace, security and development they desire and deserve. Armed violence and insecurity have a destructive impact on a country’s development, affecting economic growth and often resulting in long-standing grievances among communities.

The nature of DDR programmes has evolved. There is a growing need to integrate technical principles of weapons and ammunition management and more comprehensive arms control measures into the framework of “classic” DDR programmes. It is also increasingly important to link weapons and ammunition management principles with innovative community violence reduction approaches, which have been developed to “reorient” DDR programmes to better address particular needs on the ground.

This Handbook builds on good practices and innovative approaches developed in the field, while taking into consideration the most recent international arms regulation standards. It responds to the greater need for arms control activities in DDR programmes, including weapons and ammunition management at the community level as part of community violence reduction projects. The material presented here equips DDR practitioners with practical resources to design effective weapons and ammunition management operations that can be implemented across the peace continuum.
This publication represents part of the ongoing efforts by the United Nations system to increase the coherence and effectiveness of peace operations, as well as to enhance the support provided to host States in addressing illicit flows of arms. Through this initiative, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) also support the African Union in its work related to improving weapons and ammunition management in peace operations, in view of its goal of “silencing the guns” in Africa by 2020. Moreover, we are confident that this Handbook will benefit the international community’s efforts in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, in particular Goal 16 on peace, justice and strong institutions. The material contained herein directly addresses target 16.1, on reduction of all forms of violence; 16.4, related to a significant reduction of illicit arms flows; and 16.a, on strengthening national institutions for building capacity for preventing violence and combating terrorism and crime.

Peacekeeping and small arms control benefit from being closely aligned and integrated. Through this Handbook, DPKO and UNODA provide synergistic ways to better respond to the needs of communities affected by conflict. This way, we ensure that our DDR and community violence reduction programmes are fit-for-purpose to facilitate sustainable peace.

Jean-Pierre Lacroix
Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations

Izumi Nakamitsu
Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs
Why this Handbook?

United Nations disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) sections\(^1\) across the world are increasingly required to operate in complex environments, characterized by political instability, acute violence, myriad armed actors—including violent extremists—and a prevalence of weapons, ammunition and explosives.

The Handbook aims to equip United Nations DDR practitioners to effectively and safely design, plan, implement and monitor weapons and ammunition management (WAM) activities tailored to these challenging environments.

The Handbook builds on best-practice and innovative approaches developed in the field, in compliance with the most recent international arms control standards and guidelines. The Handbook is also part of the ongoing effort by the United Nations system to increase coherence and effectiveness of arms control in peace operations.\(^2\) It also aims to enhance the role such operations play in supporting the transition of host States to a post-conflict setting, particularly in tackling illicit flows of arms.\(^3\)

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1. United Nations mission DDR components may have different names depending on their size and the nature of the mission as such. For ease of reference, the term “DDR section” will be used, for the purpose of this Handbook, to refer to all DDR and community violence reduction components in United Nations peace operations and regional offices.

2. See, for instance, the 2016 Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/70/19), which recognizes the need for the proper control, disposal and management of weapons collected from ex-combatants while implementing DDR programmes, as well as transparency on these issues. The Special Committee urges the Secretariat to build upon the best practices that have been used in the field.

3. This aligns with one of the key outcomes of the sixth Biennial Meeting of States under the United Nations Programme of Action on small arms, held in June 2016 (A/CONF.192/BMS/2016/2), as well as with the 14 December 2016 General Assembly resolution on the “Consolidation of Peace through Practical Disarmament Measures” (para. 3 of A/RES/71/64). Finally, effective DDR WAM contributes to the realisation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, particularly by supporting States in conflict and post-conflict situations to address illicit arms flows (target 16.4).
Who is it for?

The Handbook provides United Nations DDR officers with practical guidance regarding arms control operations at both programmatic and technical levels, adaptable to the context in which they are operating. The aim is not to turn DDR practitioners into WAM experts responsible for handling materiel but to enable them to understand the technical requirements to effectively plan and implement WAM activities, encourage them to engage individuals and partners with the appropriate WAM expertise as soon as possible in the process, and support their work appropriately.

Although this tool was designed for DDR officers operating in United Nations peace operations, it is also relevant to practitioners working for national DDR programmes or those implemented by regional organizations, as well as WAM advisors operating in United Nations or regional peace operations.

More than 30 current and former United Nations DDR officers across the world were interviewed during the research phase of the project in order to ensure that the objectives, form and content of the Handbook match their needs and address the shortcomings identified. Four common needs areas emerged:

- **Planning and programming**: Information about the scope of DDR WAM programming, including in settings not yet ready for DDR
- **Coordination**: Clear understanding of the roles and responsibilities of United Nations mission components involved in DDR WAM activities
- **Technical**: Sufficient understanding of WAM to enable DDR practitioners to plan and monitor operations more effectively and efficiently
- **Safety and security**: Guidelines for operating in volatile environments with limited resources
What are its contents?

The Handbook covers three main areas:

First, it offers guidance and tools to build an effective and robust, evidence-based DDR WAM strategy.

Second, it provides a survey of practice regarding traditional disarmament, as well as insight into the most innovative programming in transitional settings where traditional disarmament efforts are either not feasible or require complementary activities.

Third, it presents technical guidelines to complete the two previous sections effectively, safely and in line with international guidelines, standards and best practice.

Methodology

The information provided in the Handbook is based on reviews of relevant legal instruments and agreements, desk research of programmatic and technical documentation, interviews with DDR and WAM practitioners, and field missions to the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in April and August 2017, respectively, to observe live DDR WAM operations.

The author conducted interviews with more than 45 specialists, including current and former United Nations DDR officers, United Nations Mine Action Service staff, United Nations Force staff supporting DDR activities, and other relevant United Nations staff, as well as representatives of national DDR institutions in Côte d’Ivoire, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The Handbook was reviewed by experts, at the United Nations Headquarters and in the field, from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), as well as the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Mine Action Service and other members of the Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR. External partners, including the African Union and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), also provided comments. A consultative webinar was organized in September 2017 to invite feedback on the structure, form and content of the document; representatives from DPKO and UNODA
from Headquarters and field or regional offices, as well as the Small Arms Survey, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime were in attendance.

The Handbook will serve as the basis for the development of WAM training for DDR officers organized jointly by DPKO and UNODA through the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa.

Queries and comments on the Handbook can be sent to conventionalarms-unoda@un.org.
Acknowledgements

We would like to thank all interviewees who participated in the research phase and shared their expertise and ideas, including current and former members of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) sections from the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), the United Nations Support Mission in Libya and the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, as well as representatives of the United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament in Africa and in Latin America and the Caribbean.

The DDR sections in MINUSCA and MONUSCO also provided critical support to the author during field missions to the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We are also grateful for the contribution of other components of the United Nations missions and national DDR institutions in both countries.

Thanks is also due to the United Nations Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR, particularly the United Nations Mine Action Service, for their significant contribution both at the Headquarters and field levels.

Several United Nations agencies and external partners participated in the review process and/or the consultative webinar organized in September 2017, including the African Union, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and the Small Arms Survey, as well as MINUSCA, MINUSMA, MINUSTAH, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, UNAMID, the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa.

We would like to thank Cecile Salcedo and Estela Evangelista for their assistance in the publication production stage, as well as Harley Henigson for his support to the project.

We are grateful for the generous financial support from Germany for the creation and publication of the Handbook.

- Project Team and Author
Normative References

Weapons and ammunition management standards and guidelines

The United Nations developed two sets of guidelines for effective full life-cycle weapons and ammunition management (WAM): the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) and the Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC). Their development was coordinated closely and the use of both sets of guidelines is mutually reinforcing.

The challenge is to operationalize those guidelines in DDR settings where the context is unstable and resources are very limited. Technical aspects of the Handbook therefore draw on the IATG and MOSAIC to the extent possible, but are also complemented by good practice from the field.

International Ammunition Technical Guidelines

In 2011, the General Assembly mandated the United Nations to develop the IATG to ensure that the Organization as a whole consistently delivers high-quality advice and support in ammunition management to relevant stakeholders. UNODA oversaw the development of the IATG. Many stakeholders, including international organizations, non-governmental entities and national authorities, have utilized the Guidelines. The IATG were also developed for the use, on a voluntary basis, of national authorities wishing to improve the safety and security of ammunition stockpiles.

The Guidelines offer an incremental approach, which allows for adaptation according to the setting and circumstances. Three levels of ascending comprehensiveness are offered in the IATG, referred to as risk-reduction process levels (RRPLs). These are indicated within each IATG as Level 1 (basic), Level 2 (intermediate) or Level 3 (advanced).

The latest version of the IATG was released in 2015. Unofficial translations of various modules are available in Arabic, French, German, Portuguese and Russian.
Given that DDR WAM activities are generally implemented in the field with very limited resources, the Handbook applies RRPL Level 1 to stockpile management processes. Application of RRPL Level 2 or 3 can be made if additional resources become available.

For more information on the IATG, go to www.un.org/disarmament/ammunition.

**Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium**

Launched in 2012, the MOSAIC framework includes 24 modules that provide practical guidance on all aspects of small arms and light weapons control, including legislation, programme design and operational support. The United Nations and other partners use MOSAIC in more than 100 countries to help strengthen national capacities on arms management.

MOSAIC is framed by existing global agreements related to small arms and light weapons control, including the United Nations Programme of Action on illicit trade in small arms and light weapons and the International Tracing Instrument, the Firearms Protocol and the Arms Trade Treaty (see Chapter 1).

MOSAIC was developed and continue to be improved by a broad coalition of small arms control specialists drawn from the United Nations, Governments, international and regional organizations, civil society and the private sector. The initiative is overseen by the United Nations internal mechanism known as the Coordinating Action on Small Arms, which ensures dovetailing with the IATG.

MOSAIC includes an electronic assessment tool that allows users to compare existing operational small arms and light weapons controls with international standards in order to identify and prioritize areas that are in need of strengthening.

In line with other international standards, MOSAIC offers an incremental approach, designated by the language used in introducing provisions (shall, should, may and can). “Shall” provisions, being the basic requirements of MOSAIC, are prioritized in the Handbook.

For more information, go to www.un.org/disarmament/mosaic.
**Integrated DDR Standards**

Developed from 2004 to 2006, the Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) provide a set of policies, guidelines and procedures to support all aspects of DDR operations in peacekeeping contexts, including disarmament (see [www.unddr.org/iddrs.aspx](http://www.unddr.org/iddrs.aspx)). The Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR co-chaired by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the United Nations Development Programme is currently revising the IDDRS to reflect the evolution of DDR practice over the past decade, and an updated set of guidelines is due to be published in 2019. The Handbook will inform the specific revision of IDDRS Module 4.10 Disarmament and Sub-Module 4.11 Small Arms and Light Weapons Control, Security and Development, as well as their linkage to MOSAIC through MOSAIC 02.30 on small arms and light weapons control in the context of DDR.

**Arms control regulations**

All DDR WAM activities conducted in countries that have ratified legally binding instruments aimed at preventing and combating the illicit trade of arms, ammunition and/or related components, shall comply with any such instruments. These instruments cover a wide spectrum of small arms and light weapons control measures, including transfers, management, disposal and security of materiel obtained from seizures, as well as from collections and voluntary handovers conducted as part of most DDR programmes.

Such instruments are directly relevant as they include obligations regarding the following:

- Seizures and collection of illicit weapons in general, or during peacekeeping operations and/or the implementation of peace accords
- Marking, record-keeping, management and disposal of illicit materiel

**Global instruments**

*Legally binding*

- The Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and

- The Arms Trade Treaty, adopted in 2013, regulates the international trade in conventional arms and seeks to prevent and eradicate the illicit trade and diversion of conventional arms by establishing international standards governing arms transfers.

- United Nations human rights conventions, such as the International Covenant on Civilian and Political Rights, as interpreted by their universal oversight mechanisms, require States to curb the proliferation of small arms and regulate access to them as part of the duty to protect the right to life.

Politically binding for United Nations Member States

- The United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (Programme of Action), was adopted in 2001.

- The International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (International Tracing Instrument) was adopted in 2005 to operationalize the marking, record-keeping and tracing obligations contained in the United Nations Programme of Action.

Other binding global instruments may be relevant, including the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and the Basic Principles for the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials.

All documents are available from www.un.org/disarmament/salw.

Regional instruments

Legally binding

In addition to the global instruments listed above, several regional, legally binding agreements have been adopted in Europe, Latin America
and Africa to support the implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action. See the map on the next page.

**Politically binding**

As an example of politically binding regional instruments, in 2013 African Union Member States pledged to take practical steps to “Silence the Guns” in Africa by 2020, the objectives of which include ensuring the non-proliferation of small arms and light weapons, particularly through effective DDR programming.

**National arms control legislation**

Most countries have domestic legislation regulating the life cycle of weapons and ammunition, including manufacture, marking, import, export, record-keeping and civilian possession.

Countries will usually have reflected in their national legislation the provisions of global and regional instruments they have ratified. However, the degree to which national legislation has either been adopted or updated can vary greatly from country to country.
Regional Instruments Ratified as of December 2017
**Abbreviations**: CIFTA=Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials; ECCAS=Economic Community of Central African States; ECOWAS=Economic Community of West African States; EU=European Union; OAS=Organization of American States; RECSA=Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States; and SADC=Southern African Development Community.

*Source*: UNODA, 2017; the various instruments can be found via [www.un.org/disarmament](http://www.un.org/disarmament).
Launch of DDR programme in Ed Damazin, Sudan, 2009. (UN photo/Johann Hattingh)
Planning for Weapons and Ammunition Management in a DDR Context
Unit 1

Developing a DDR Weapons and Ammunition Management Plan

This first section of this Handbook will provide disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) practitioners with practical guidelines for designing and planning DDR weapons and ammunition management (WAM) activities efficiently and safely.

DDR programmes are increasingly taking place in contexts where there is ongoing conflict combined with pervasive crime, non-comprehensive peace agreements, distrust between parties, violent extremism, wide circulation of arms and ammunition, and limited institutional security provisions. All these factors make the traditional sequencing of DDR—with the disarmament phase of combatants as the foundation of the programme—inadequate. The removal of weapons from combatants is only one aspect of DDR arms control activities. A range of activities implemented by DDR sections involve WAM components, which are detailed later in this Handbook.

Designing, implementing and adjusting a DDR WAM plan should adhere to the following principles.

Guiding principles

- **National ownership** of the design and implementation of DDR WAM activities and **integration in the national DDR strategy** with the support of the DDR section.
- **Community engagement** to ensure their involvement in the design and implementation of people-centred meaningful programming.
- **Do no harm**: Arms control activities implemented by the DDR section, and disarmament or collection of weapons in particular, shall not increase the vulnerability of communities, groups or individuals to internal or external threats. All precautions shall also be taken to avoid reinforcing or generating gender inequalities.

- **Non-discrimination**: Activities must not introduce unlawful distinctions based on race, ethnicity, religion or other arbitrary criteria that may create or exacerbate vulnerabilities and power imbalances.


- **Compliance with the relevant legal framework**, including the United Nations mandate, peace agreements, national legislation and regional or international obligations (see Normative References).

- **Evidence-based design** in order to tailor programming to actual context, needs, opportunities and constraints.

- **WAM expertise** (see Box 1): The DDR section should employ a number of DDR officers with proven WAM experience, and work closely with the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) as their primary technical partner to implement WAM activities. If necessary, specialized subcontractors may be employed to carry out some of these activities.

- **Transparency and accountability** of the full cycle of DDR WAM until the disposal phase, including the destruction and/or transfer of materiel to national authorities.
Steps in the development of a DDR WAM plan:

- Identifying the legal framework of the plan (see Normative References and Unit 2)
- Conducting an assessment to inform the plan (see Unit 3)
- Determining beneficiaries (see Unit 4)
- Developing operational procedures (see Unit 5)
- Monitoring plan activities (see Unit 6).

Box 1

What is a United Nations WAM advisor?

The DDR section’s decision to involve United Nations WAM advisors in the planning and implementation of WAM activities is critical to the success of the programme. Depending on the type of activities involved, WAM advisors shall have extensive formal training and operational field experience in ammunition and weapons storage, inspection, transportation and destruction,\(^1\) including in fragile settings, and/or experience in the development and administration of new storage facilities. If the DDR section does not include such profiles among its staff, the section may rely on support from UNMAS, primarily, the Force or the United Nations Police if they have WAM specialists with the above qualifications. Force commanders shall designate a Force Explosives Safety Officer responsible for advising on all arms, ammunition and explosives safety matters, including with regard to DDR activities (see Annex L of IATG 01.90). The DDR section, UNMAS and the Force should then identify liaison officers to facilitate the implementation of DDR WAM activities.

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\(^1\) This includes advanced EOD operators with the ability to demonstrate specific competencies (this could include International Mine Action Standards Explosive Ordnance Disposal (IMAS EOD) Level 3–qualified personnel).
Unit 2
United Nations Mandate and National Legal Framework for DDR

What does the mandate of the United Nations mission in which the DDR section operates say?

DDR is often a priority area for the Security Council when setting the mandate of a United Nations peacekeeping mission. Levels of detail vary from mandate to mandate but relevant provisions usually start by requiring the mission to assist national authorities in developing and implementing a DDR strategy and, increasingly, a community violence reduction programme.

Some mandates may include detailed provisions regarding DDR WAM for instance, by requesting the mission to support the authorities in collecting, registering, securing and disposing of weapons held by armed groups.

United Nations missions’ mandates may also include other WAM activities, such as those related to illicit civilian possession of weapons, monitoring arms embargoes or the seizure of weapons from warring parties following United Nations military operations. While this may not form part of the official remit of the DDR section, all WAM activities conducted by the United Nations mission, including the management of United Nations troops’ own materiel, should be coherent and in compliance with global standards, including Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC) and the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG).
What is the national legal framework in place for the DDR WAM strategy?

1. **The framework is under construction**: The peace accord, or any other relevant national agreement, is still in the negotiating phase and there is no national DDR plan.

   Negotiators or advisers with DDR and WAM expertise should be involved to ensure that peace agreements include appropriate WAM provisions.

   Transitional programming, such as community violence reduction (see Unit 9), could support this sensitive political phase for the country by creating security and political space.
2. **A national agreement has been signed**: It should contain the framework for the design of the DDR national strategy, including its WAM components, as well as of the relevant national institutional framework.

   A **national DDR institution** should be developed with the support of the United Nations DDR section; the inclusion of national WAM experts is critical.

   A **national DDR strategy** should be developed by the national DDR institution with the support of the DDR section and United Nations WAM advisors.

   **Transitional programming** could help secure buy-in from armed groups in the agreement, as well as create political space for encouraging groups that may not have signed up to it yet (see Units 8, 9 and 10).

3. **A national agreement and national DDR plan are in place**: The legal and institutional basis for DDR should be complete.

   Depending on the sequencing of the DDR programme selected by the national authorities, disarmament and demobilization may be the first activities to be implemented and will be key in building the foundations for the success of the whole DDR programme.

   If the implementation of the DDR programme is delayed for political, security or funding reasons, transitional programming that includes WAM activities can help generate the right conditions in which to launch the DDR programme.
Unit 3
Continuous Data Collection on Armed Actors and Weapons

DDR sections are increasingly required to operate in environments with multiple armed violence dynamics and a myriad of armed actors, whose membership and alliances are fluid, often within an unstable political context. Robust analysis informed by continuous information gathering is key to understanding these complex and rapidly changing environments and to enable the implementation of evidence-based and tailored programming, including WAM activities.

Guiding principles of DDR information collection

- Accurate data on and analysis of armed groups, armed violence dynamics and illicitly held weapons and ammunition ensure that the planning of all DDR activities, including WAM components, is evidence-based and context-specific and provides a basis for monitoring the impact of operations.

- Securing contextual data and robust analysis should start as early as possible in the peace negotiation stage, in which the framework for DDR is often designed, and in the pre-planning phase of the United Nations mission.

- The collection of information is an ongoing process that requires resources. Assessments should be updated regularly throughout the life cycle of the DDR mandate.

REFERENCES FOR THIS UNIT

IDDRS 4.10 Disarmament
MOSAIC 5.10 Conducting Small Arms and Light Weapons Surveys
Information management systems and protection of data should be organized from the start by the DDR section.

- Collection of data relating to weapons and those who carry them is a sensitive process and can present significant risks to DDR practitioners and their sources. United Nations security guidelines should be followed at all times, with a view to protecting sources by maintaining their anonymity.

Information collection at the planning stage of DDR programmes

In the early phases of planning a mission, peace negotiations and a national DDR programme, the collection of information is critical to enabling and informing the technical and strategic decision-making process on the ground, which will set the foundation for the future success of the entire DDR programme (see below). Negotiators and advisers with WAM expertise should be involved in order to ensure that peace agreements
include appropriate WAM provisions and that the Mission Planning Process takes WAM activities and related challenges into account.

**What information to include in an early assessment**

The assessment should cover the following:

- Analysis of the political and security context and the major conflict drivers
- Analysis of armed actors (age, gender, etc.) and their arsenals (estimates of the number and the typology of weapons, ammunition and explosives)
- Analysis of patterns of weapons possession by men, women and children
- Understanding of power imbalances and disparities in weapons possession between communities
- Analysis of the use of weapons in the commission of serious human rights violations or abuses and grave breaches of international humanitarian law
- Understanding cultural attitudes towards weapons and the value of arms and ammunition locally (prices in the black market)
- Identification of sources of illicit weapons and ammunition
- Lessons learned from any past DDR programmes
- Analysis of the willingness of and incentives for armed actors to participate in DDR.

The assessment should include recommendations regarding the drivers to prioritize to effect change, and recommendations to inform the planning of a potential national DDR strategy. This also includes determining whether disarmament or any other transitional WAM operations are desirable and feasible in the current context, and the potential positive and negative impacts of any such activities.
The early assessment can also serve as a baseline to identify performance indicators and potential objectives against which to monitor and evaluate the DDR programme and related WAM activities (see Unit 6).

The early assessment should be updated through the continuous collection and analysis of information regarding the evolution of, among others, the security situation, armed actors, their weapons ownership, and sources of illicit weapons and ammunition.

**Methodology for continuous data collection**

A weapons survey is the most comprehensive tool to collect information about arms, armed actors and communities affected by violence and to inform a national DDR strategy. It should be conducted as early as possible. However, a survey demands significant time and resources to implement effectively (see Unit 13). The negotiation of peace accords and the planning phases of DDR operations are often time sensitive and may therefore require data to be produced more rapidly.

Data collection is likely to include the use of non-independent, non-objective information, such as arms inventories produced by armed groups. The use of multiple data-collection points and direct observations from impartial sources, such as United Nations staff, is therefore key to preventing bias.

Methods of continuous information gathering (desk research, telephone interviews, face-to-face meetings, etc.) should be adapted to resources available, as well as to the security and political context. The information should be centralized and managed by a dedicated staff designated by the DDR Chief.

*How to collect information*

- Use information already available (e.g., previous United Nations reports, publications by specialized research centres, etc.) (see also References). Most conflict-affected or fragile States have already triggered work on weapons and armed actors, particularly if the country has already undergone a DDR programme.
Engage with national authorities: talk to their experts and obtain available data (e.g., previous small arms and light weapons survey data, DDR data, national registers of weapons and records of thefts/looting from storage facilities).

Obtain data from seizures of weapons or discoveries of caches that provide good insight into which actors possess which materiel.

Organize regular meetings to compare observations and information with colleagues from other United Nations agencies collecting data on security issues and armed groups (e.g., United Nations Department of Safety and Security, Joint Mission Analysis Centre, Civil Affairs Section, Human Rights Section, etc.), as well as with relevant other international organizations and diplomatic representations.

Meet with representatives and members of armed groups and ex-combatants, and develop a network of key informants.\(^2\)

Meet with community leaders, women’s and youth groups, human rights organizations and other civil society groups.

Search for information and images on social media (e.g., monitor Facebook pages of armed groups and national defence forces).

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\(^2\) See United Nations Department of Political Affairs (DPA)/ Policy and Mediation Division (PMD) and United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)/Division for Policy, Evaluation and Training (DPET), 2017, “Aide Memoire: Engaging with Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs) for Political Purposes: Considerations for United Nations Mediators and Missions”. This document seeks to assist United Nations actors in thinking through whether and how to engage NSAGs. It provides guidance on modalities of engagement and related risks.
Unit 4

Weapons-Related Eligibility Criteria for Access to DDR and Pre-DDR Programming for Combatants

Identifying and setting clear eligibility criteria allows for determining who should enter a DDR programme or transitional activities for combatants entering or completing any DDR programme, including in the pre-DDR stage (see Unit 8). The selection and adherence to criteria will have a key impact on the success of WAM efforts and on the entire DDR process.

Though not mandatory, and depending on the context, national authorities and the DDR section can decide to include a specific weapons/ammunition-related criterion in their eligibility policy. The criterion should be determined based on a thorough understanding of the context if effective disarmament is to be achieved.

Eligibility criteria must be designed to prevent non-combatants from gaining access to programmes designed for combatants. The prospect of a DDR programme, and the benefits involved, can present an attractive opportunity to non-combatants. Furthermore, armed groups that inflated their membership numbers to increase their political weight around the negotiation table could rapidly try to recruit non-combatants to meet the shortfall.

How and when to determine eligibility criteria

- Eligibility criteria are generally agreed upon during peace accord negotiations, in the very early stages of DDR planning.

REFERENCES FOR THIS UNIT

IDDRS 3.20 DDR Programme Design
IDDRS 5.10 Women, Gender and DDR
National DDR programmes
- They should fit the context and be informed by robust, evidence-based research.
- They should ensure that they do not exclude certain types of combatants, particularly women.
- Once agreed upon, eligibility criteria should not change as this can create confusion and frustration among the beneficiary population.

Although dependent on the context, eligibility criteria generally include the following:

- **Age**: Over 18 (minors are dealt with separately)
- **Status**: Proof that the combatant is a member of an armed group or force that has signed a peace agreement or is eligible for DDR activities (e.g., she/he knows how to handle a weapon and/or is recognized by a group commander)
- **Materiel to be handed over**: Combatants active in contexts where manufactured military weapons are mostly used should be required to hand over serviceable military arms and/or ammunition; hunting rifles and shotguns should be excluded to ensure that illicit military
items are taken out of circulation. In those settings where non-military weapons are more prevalent, serviceable hunting rifles and shotguns can be permitted.

How to determine arms- and ammunition-related eligibility criteria

Too often, eligibility criteria related to weapons are not consistent or stringent enough, leading to the inclusion of non-combatants and the collection of poor-quality materiel while serviceable materiel remains in circulation.

Accurate early assessments of information regarding groups’ arsenals (see Unit 3) is key in determining relevant and effective eligibility criteria.

- **Quality, type and quantities of materiel**: This is key to determining the type and status (serviceable vs. non-serviceable) of materiel that a combatant should bring along in order to be enrolled in the programme (see table 1 below). According to the context, the ratio of arms and ammunition to individual combatants may include small arms and light weapons and heavy weaponry, as well as air and naval assets.

  Depending on the setting, armed groups’ arsenals vary in size, quality and types of weapons. For instance, conflicts where foreign States actively support armed groups result in their arsenals being quite large and varied, often including serviceable small arms and light weapons, as well as heavy weapons systems.

- **Ownership of weapons**: Depending on the context, groups could consider weapons as belonging to the unit or to individual fighters. This categorization could differ between types or size of weapons.

- **Profiles of combatants**: Understanding age and gender composition of armed groups allows for better planning and the support of vulnerable groups in accessing DDR programmes, including patterns of weapons possession among female combatants. Irrespective of whether they
present themselves with a weapon, child combatants should be enrolled on the programme designed for minors.

Respecting eligibility criteria

The development of complementary programmes to support pre-DDR and DDR allows for stricter adherence to eligibility criteria. Individuals who do not meet all DDR eligibility criteria could be enrolled in community violence reduction programming, for example (see Unit 9).

Ensuring that eligibility criteria are communicated clearly and unambiguously to members of armed groups and the wider population is key to avoid confusion and frustration (see Unit 7). Legal implications should also be clearly explained, for example, the fact that the voluntary submission of weapons during the disarmament phase will not result in prosecution for illegal possession.

Table 1
Example of the ratio of arms/ammunition per combatant in Mali

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapons system</th>
<th>No. of combatants given access to the programme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Handgun or assault rifle</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocket-propelled grenade (RPG)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light machine gun</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-mm mortar launcher</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80/81/82-mm mortar</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120-mm mortar</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106-mm recoilless gun</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155-mm Howitzer</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ammunition and explosives</th>
<th>No. of combatants given access to the programme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 grenades</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 PG rocket</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250 rounds of small arms and light weapons ammunition (any calibre)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What is a DDR WAM SOP?

A WAM standard operating procedure (SOP) is a set of mandatory step-by-step instructions designed to guide DDR practitioners within a particular United Nations mission in the management of arms, ammunition and explosives during and after voluntary disarmament, and of other materiel collected during DDR activities. The development of WAM SOPs is becoming a common practice across DDR programmes as it allows for coherence in the delivery of activities, ensuring greater safety and security and adherence to regulations.

An SOP should identify the precise responsibilities of the various United Nations components involved in DDR WAM activities, including DDR officers, the Force, UNMAS and military observers for each procedure. All components should agree on the content of the SOP and the document should be reviewed by the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs.

The development of the WAM SOP is led by the DDR section and is signed off by the Head of the United Nations mission. All staff from the DDR section, as well as Force members supporting DDR activities, UNMAS staff and other implementing partners,

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3 In order to secure the buy-in of the Force, in certain settings, the SOP should also be signed by the Force Commander.
shall be familiar with the SOP. Contact details of WAM advisors should be included in the SOP in the event support is required or in case of emergency.

How to develop a DDR WAM SOP

Guided by the relevant units of the present Handbook, as well as by MOSAIC and the IATG, WAM SOPs shall also respect national laws and international obligations (see Normative References).

The WAM SOP should be developed by the DDR section with the support of a small group of technical experts drawn from UNMAS, the Force and military observers, depending on availability and expertise within the mission.

The SOP should be informed by the early assessment and tailored to the National DDR plan (if already adopted). It should cover all procedures for each DDR WAM activity and include two lines of management procedures: (1) ammunition and explosives and (2) weapons systems.

Depending on the nature of activities planned under the DDR programme, a WAM SOP could include the following sections:
Procedures for receiving weapons and/or ammunition in static disarmament camps or mobile units (including diagram) (see Unit 12)

Compliance with eligibility criteria (e.g., what is considered a serviceable weapon?) (see Unit 4)

Weapons storage management (see Unit 16)

Ammunition and explosives storage management (see Unit 16)

Identifying and registering materiel and record-keeping (see Unit 14)

Transportation of materiel (see Unit 11)

Armoury and ammunition storage checks (see Unit 16)

Reporting and investigations of loss or theft (see Unit 16)

Disposal of weapons systems (see Unit 17)

Disposal of ammunition and explosives (see Unit 18).

Several DDR sections across the world have developed WAM SOPs that could be consulted as examples. SOPs are available from the DDR section at Headquarters.

**Materiel covered by the DDR WAM SOP**

United Nations peace operations are increasingly deployed in conflict areas with mandates allowing for offensive military operations, during which illicit weapons and ammunition are retrieved or confiscated. The DDR WAM SOP should therefore clearly state which arms and ammunition collection efforts are considered part of the DDR programme and covered by the SOP. Materiel collected by other mission components, such as weapons seized from armed groups during military operations or recovered from caches by United Nations troops or national forces, should be explicitly excluded from the DDR WAM SOP and managed in line with international standards and guidelines. The DDR WAM SOP should refer to and be coherent with any other WAM SOPs adopted by the mission.
Updating the WAM SOP

The content of all SOPs must be kept up-to-date. The DDR Chief should appoint a DDR officer with an appropriate background to manage the process of reviewing and updating the WAM SOP. The officer should keep the content of the SOP current by conducting periodic reviews and making amendments, as required.

Unqualified staff shall not handle any weapons or ammunition at any time
Unit 6

Monitoring and Evaluation of Weapons and Ammunition Management Activities

What are monitoring and evaluation?

Monitoring and evaluation involve tracking progress according to specific indicators and assessing the impact of interventions based on identified goals, objectives and accomplishments. They are a critical mechanism for determining whether a project or process is working as expected and, if not, identifying where changes in approach are required based on evidence. Although intrinsically linked, the primary differences between monitoring and evaluation are their scope and timing. Monitoring is a continuous process of gathering and analysing data to support programme management, track implementation progress and allow for regular reporting, with a particular focus on timelines, outputs, budgets, compliance with guidelines, etc. Evaluation is conducted at specific points in time—generally the mid- and end-points of a programme—and focuses more on building an assessment of the efficiency, performance and impact of a programme and determining its added value to the general objectives of the mission. Evaluations can be performed internally or by external actors, including consultants, to ensure greater objectivity.

REFERENCES FOR THIS UNIT

Monitoring and Evaluation for DDR SOP – Ref 2010.23 (reviewed in 2012)
MOSAIC 04.40 Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting (draft 2.1)
DDR Programme Management Toolkit – UNDPKO (2011)
Why are monitoring and evaluation important?

Although too often overlooked by DDR sections, monitoring and evaluation are crucial to enabling effective implementation and management of DDR activities and ensuring accountability. Specifically, they allow for the following:

- Assessing progress of activities throughout time based on evidence
- Improving the management process and timekeeping
- Confirming that activities are conducted in line with guidelines and best practice
- Adjusting programming based on findings and in line with evolution of the context on the ground
- Producing accurate and timely reporting to the host State, donors and other stakeholders
- Objectively verifying the outcomes and impact of the overall programme in line with the core objectives of the mission’s mandate
- Ensuring accountability for effective and efficient use of resources
- Sharing lessons learned and building institutional memory.

Planning monitoring and evaluation of DDR WAM activities

Planning should fit in the overall framework of the internal monitoring and evaluation strategy developed by the DDR section in the planning stage of the programme. The DDR Chief shall ensure that adequate resources are dedicated to monitoring and evaluation, including appointing a specialist responsible for implementation. For instance, although monitoring and evaluation can exploit existing data collection efforts—such as data used to design the national DDR plan (see Unit 3)—conducting focused baseline surveys in areas of community violence reduction intervention (see Unit 9) is key to informing
the selection of indicators, identifying targets and measuring impact.

When technical WAM activities are implemented by partners, including UNMAS or specialized subcontractors, the DDR section should request the partner(s) to monitor activities and provide relevant data and feedback on a regular basis. Evaluations of WAM activities should preferably be conducted by DDR monitoring and evaluation staff or a third party rather than the implementing partner.

**Defining performance indicators for WAM activities**

Standardized indicators should be identified early in the programme to allow for comparison over time and across the country. Selection of indicators should be driven by the objectives of the programme and tailored to the local context.

Regarding WAM activities, the DDR monitoring and evaluation specialist should select a combination of quantitative and qualitative indicators. Quantitative indicators could, for
example, be developed in line with specific technical outputs, providing very clear measures and allowing for comparisons:

- Number of weapons and rounds of ammunition collected
- Number of items recorded and marked
- Number of items destroyed
- Number of items stolen or lost in the process.

Qualitative indicators to assess WAM activities might include the extent to which MOSAIC and IATG global guidelines are respected.

Depending on the expected outcomes of WAM activities, other indicators could also be selected, requiring more complex data collection. For instance, in a community violence reduction intervention with an arms control component, indicators might include evolutions in the following:

- Armed criminality rates in the target area
- Number of civilian casualties and human rights abuses using weapons
- Perceptions of security by the population disaggregated by sex and age
- Visible prevalence of weapons among community members
- Prices of weapons and ammunition on the black market.
Planning for WAM in a DDR context

Unit 7
Public Information and Communications for Weapons and Ammunition Management Activities

Dealing with arms and ammunition in conflict or post-conflict settings is a very sensitive matter. In addition to the risks associated with handling this materiel, the symbolic (and monetary) value of the items involved makes arms control operations, including disarmament efforts, a significant challenge, with the potential for misinterpretation and negative coverage. Effective communications prior to and during DDR WAM operations is therefore key. Clear messaging about the outcomes is also imperative to ensure transparency, increase public buy-in and secure support for the work of the mission.

Communications efforts related to WAM should align with the DDR section’s public information strategy designed in parallel with the national DDR strategy. The DDR communications strategy on WAM interventions should align with the mission’s broader communications policy; other United Nations agencies with a small arms and light weapons mandate should also be consulted.
Guiding principles

- Design simple and unambiguous messages
- Use a mixture of media and communications platforms relevant to local practice to maximize dissemination and impact
- Use media and technology available to other components of the mission
- Base messaging on targeted analysis and cultural sensitivities (see Unit 3)
- Take into consideration vulnerable and difficult-to-reach groups, including women and children.

Reaching out to armed combatants

In addition to direct contact with armed actors, a range of media—e.g., radio, print media, television and social media—can be used to reach out to combatants with the following goals:

- Encourage them to disarm
- Explain disarmament procedures, including security measures (see Unit 12)
- Explain what will happen to collected arms and ammunition and the absence of legal repercussions, as relevant
- Explain eligibility criteria for entering DDR projects (see Unit 4)
- Explain consequences of failing to participate in disarmament
- Manage expectations.

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Radio

Radio is one of the most widely used media platforms in many conflict and post-conflict countries, capable of reaching remote areas where armed groups are often based.

In addition to procedural information, testimonies of ex-combatants who have been through the disarmament process can be broadcast to encourage other combatants to follow suit.
**Print media**

While the written press is generally quite limited in host countries, the printing and distribution—including by airdrop—of informative leaflets can be of use to reach areas that are remote, or where there is no radio or telephone network.\(^5\)

All media support should indicate a 24-hour point of contact for combatants to call for information or to declare that they intend to disarm.

**Reaching out to communities**

In addition to radio and print media, communications channels can include reaching out to community leaders, women’s groups and community liaison officers, employing interactive means such as theatre, and broadcasting television messages. With regard to WAM, such means could be used to attain the following:

- Exploit the influence communities may have on armed combatants to disarm
- Build awareness of the eligibility criteria related to the possession of weapons and ammunition and provide information on alternative options if individuals do not meet the criteria to enter a programme (see Unit 4)
- Warn communities of disarmament operations or destruction operations in their area to avoid surprise and tension
- Raise awareness in communities regarding the dangers related to the possession of weapons and ammunition, and focus on particularly hazardous items (e.g., mines and grenades)
- Publicize positive outcomes regarding WAM to increase the perception of security, encourage further buy-in for DDR projects and inform the population of efforts supported by the United Nations. This can

\(^5\) Although relatively expensive, combatants in remote areas could also be reached via mobile SMS broadcasters.
include sharing data on the numbers of weapons and ammunition collected and destroyed, or other relevant indicators as required (see Unit 6). Such efforts can also involve the organization of a public weapons or ammunition destruction (see Unit 17).
Weapons and Ammunition Management Activities in Transitional and Traditional DDR Settings
2.1 Transitional Weapons and Ammunition Management in a DDR context
Pre-DDR was first designed and implemented in the Central African Republic in 2015 as an innovative transitional stabilization measure in the absence of a political agreement between the Government and armed groups. Pre-DDR paved the way for the national DDR programme to be implemented once an agreement was in place.

**Objectives of pre-DDR**

- To create the necessary political and security space for the negotiation and/or implementation of peace agreements, holding of elections and DDR
- To maintain dialogue between the Government and armed groups
- To build confidence in a future DDR programme
- To increase security and social cohesion in high-risk communities
- To occupy and develop skills of ex-combatants
- To secure and/or collect weapons and ammunition.

**Timeline**

Pre-DDR is an interim initiative and should be limited in time. DDR should take over as rapidly as possible to take advantage of the momentum and to avoid a relapse into violence.
Example of pre-DDR activities

- Engage combatants in labour-intensive projects focusing on improving community assets with immediate, tangible incentives (e.g., cash for work)
- Vocational training in line with local economic dynamics and income-generating activities
- Awareness-raising activities around themes such as reconciliation, peaceful coexistence and risks related to the possession of arms at home
- Awareness-raising regarding the coming programme of DDR.

Eligibility criteria

Eligibility criteria should be the same as those set for the DDR programme since pre-DDR beneficiaries should eventually be integrated into the DDR programme. This can include, inter alia, the proven status of a combatant and the possession of a serviceable manufactured weapon or a certain quantity of ammunition (see Unit 4).
Eligibility criteria should be strictly applied during the pre-DDR stage since this sets the foundations for DDR. Individuals who do not meet all the criteria—e.g., those who own a serviceable craft weapon when the eligibility criteria require the submission of a manufactured weapon—could be enrolled in community violence reduction projects (see Unit 9).

**Weapons and ammunition management**

While most materiel should be handed in during the DDR disarmament phase, pre-DDR is also an opportunity to collect weapons and ammunition from armed groups. It may be prudent to avoid using the word “disarmament” to describe this phase since this is likely to cause confusion at a stage when the context is not yet fully established for DDR disarmament operations to take place.

The handover of weapons and ammunition could be on a temporary or permanent basis, depending on the context and the agreements in place with armed actors:

- **Temporary**: Materiel is registered (see Unit 14) and stored in a safe location (see Unit 16) but remains under the joint control of the armed group and the United Nations through a dual-key system.

- **Permanent**: Materiel is handed in to the United Nations for eventual disposal (see Units 17 and 18).

In both cases, unsafe ammunition should be destroyed (see Unit 18).

The collection of weapons and ammunition during pre-DDR allows for the following:

- Building confidence of armed groups in the disarmament process
- Reducing arms and ammunition in circulation
- Contributing to greater perceptions of peace
- Building knowledge of armed groups’ arsenals
- Testing operational planning of disarmament and weapons and ammunition management (WAM) procedures and adjusting where required
- Tracking and mitigating risks to future DDR disarmament programmes
- Encouraging individual members of armed groups to voluntarily disengage and immediately return to civilian life.
Community violence reduction (CVR) is an innovative concept developed by DDR practitioners in Haiti in 2006 as an alternative to DDR. As part of second-generation DDR approaches, the CVR concept has been incorporated into the mandate of several United Nations missions around the globe—including the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti—and offers a highly flexible approach, comprising a vast array of community-level non-military security interventions designed to be implemented before, during, after or instead of DDR. CVR has emerged as a second programmatic pillar of DDR. Depending on the context, CVR can prepare the ground for, complement or replace DDR operations.

**Objectives of CVR**

- Prevent and reduce violence and criminality in conflict, post-conflict or urban areas affected by armed violence and criminality
- Contribute to the peaceful return and reinsertion of ex-combatants or members of militias or gangs
- Contribute to peaceful intra- and inter-community relations

**REFERENCES FOR THIS UNIT**

MOSAIC 04.20 Designing and implementing Community Safety Programming
Gun-free zones (www.un.org/disarmament/salw)
Prevent sexual and gender-based violence
Help violent actors develop new skills and find employment as an alternative to criminality and idleness
Improve community cohesion and socioeconomic well-being
Build/rehabilitate community infrastructure.

Principles of CVR

- Focused on high-risk areas and individuals
- Community-led, bottom-up approach
- Provides tangible incentives for the reduction of violence
- A highly flexible tool that can contribute to addressing a range of security challenges and armed actors (armed groups, gangs or militias, etc.)
- Relatively short-term, high-impact initiatives
- Gender sensitive: ensures gender stereotypes are not being reinforced and that women also have access to interventions.

When to implement CVR projects

CVR projects can be implemented prior to, alongside or instead of DDR, or to address failed aspects of a DDR programme.

How to select communities and types of activities

Communities should be selected according to clear criteria and a transparent, evidence-based selection process. This can include findings from the early assessment (see Unit 3), including do-no-harm considerations (see Unit 1), the weapons survey (see Unit 13) and/or a scoping exercise on socioeconomic opportunities commissioned by the DDR section—all tools that take into account community perceptions. Additional consultations with national and local authorities, as well as civil society, are necessary during the design phase. Through a community action planning process,
communities should be encouraged to identify and collectively agree on selected projects.

Attention must be given to linkages between CVR programmes and other community security and policing efforts, such as community safety programming (see MOSAIC 04.20). When designing CVR, the DDR team should liaise with other United Nations actors responsible for implementing these programmes—e.g., United Nations Development Programme, civil affairs officers or United Nations Police.

**Beneficiaries**

Priority should be given to communities where:

- Levels of violence appear particularly concerning, but obstacles to the implementation of CVR are judged to be manageable.
- A high number of combatants are living in or likely to reintegrate into the community.
- Youth are at risk of joining armed groups or committing crimes.
- Pre-DDR or DDR programmes are already being implemented (in order to reinforce the latter and avoid the perception that violence is rewarded).
- People are willing to participate in CVR projects.

CVR project groups should comprise a range of community members to promote cohesion, including ex-combatants, youth, women, minorities, persons with disabilities, returnees, and internally displaced persons, for example.

**Examples of CVR activities**

Specific types of interventions should be motivated and informed by the security concerns and common needs identified by the community. These might include the following:

- Labour-intensive activities to rehabilitate community assets (roads, schools or water supply, etc.)
- Vocational training (depending on existing economic opportunities)
- Income-generating activities and job placement
- Education and awareness-raising activities
- Psychosocial support
- Civic education
- Trust-building activities between communities and law enforcement authorities.

**CVR and arms control**

While arms control is not the primary focus of CVR, by contributing to tackling drivers of violence and improving security perceptions, CVR projects can have a direct impact on the demand for and misuse of weapons, as well as on the creation of favourable conditions for future combatants and/or civilian disarmament operations.

A CVR project in the Central African Republic, 2017. (Photo credit: MINUSCA)
During the design process of a CVR project in a specific community, if the possession of arms and ammunition is perceived to be a primary security concern, the DDR section could consider including community arms control components in the project, such as the following:

- Awareness-raising activities regarding the risks associated with the possession of arms and ammunition
- Creation of gun-free zones to normalize the absence of gun carriage (starting with hospitals, schools and other public places)
- Collection of unwanted weapons and ammunition
- Development of a basic weapons-management capacity in the community
- Awareness-raising activities regarding participation in weapons-collection programmes, including DDR collections
- Awareness-raising activities regarding national laws relating to weapons and ammunition ownership
- Registration of weapons by local authorities in accordance with national legislation.
Unit 10
Supporting the Development of Armed Actor Capacity for Weapons and Ammunition Management

In contexts where levels of armed violence remain high, where there are significant numbers of weapons in circulation, and where disarmament may not be an option, the DDR section could be mandated to support national security actors and non-governmental armed actors in developing their WAM capacities.

Supporting national WAM capacities

In addition to the national DDR institution, or instead of it if it does not yet exist, the United Nations DDR section may work with the national coordination mechanism on small arms and light weapons, including by supporting security and stockpile-management capacities of national authorities.

This type of activity usually sits more comfortably under the remit of the security sector reform section of the United Nations.

REFERENCES FOR THIS UNIT

IATG 01.90 Ammunition Staff Competences
IATG 03 Ammunition Accounting
IATG 04, 05, 06 Explosive facilities
IATG 12.20 Small unit ammunition storage
IDDRS 6.10 DDR and Security Sector Reform
MOSAIC 05.20 Stockpile Management: Weapons
MOSAIC 05.30 Marking and Recordkeeping
MOSAIC 05.50 Destruction: Weapons
Nations mission; coordination with other relevant United Nations components is therefore key.

Sample activities include the following:

- **Marking and record-keeping of weapons**: The provision of tools and training for the marking and record-keeping of DDR weapons can be an entry point for larger training and policy development regarding marking and recording weapons across all national arsenals.

- **Rehabilitation or construction of new storage facilities**: Determining the future storage requirements for DDR weapons could also be an entry point for the rehabilitation or construction of purpose-built national storage facilities.

- **Review of national legislation regarding weapons possession**: If disarmament is not yet a feasible option, depending on the context, it may be beneficial to explore ways to render illicitly held weapons licit, for example through registration. It is key to have a good overview of national legislation and provisions.
that are not in line with international instruments for future improvement (see Normative References).

**Support to interim WAM measures: Local and mixed security units**

Missions are increasingly operating in zones where fighting is ongoing, there is little support for the peace agreement and large areas are under the control of non-State armed actors who remain reluctant to disarm. Security under these conditions is not sufficient for implementing a DDR programme.

In this case, the mission, in agreement with the national authorities, may decide to support the creation of local security units to be integrated into the national security apparatus, usually temporarily. According to the setting, these could also comprise a combination of national security forces working alongside members of armed groups—i.e., in the form of joint patrols and operations.

This approach can be particularly effective in areas where communities have established their own armed entities to provide security in the absence of any official security provider, and where those groups have requested to be integrated in the national security forces.

In other cases, such measures could also facilitate the large-scale integration of ex-combatants into the national security sector as part of a peace agreement. Integration is a process that has become increasingly relevant in contexts where peacekeeping or special political missions have been deployed (e.g., Burundi, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Mali, Nepal and Sierra Leone). Although not inherently a DDR task, DDR practitioners are often mandated to assist with integration. Sound WAM support to armed groups, whose members are to be integrated into the national security sector, can facilitate the design and implementation of such processes.

This needs to be carefully controlled by a clear framework and should include a vetting process. A disarmament and demobilization phase may be required by the national
authorities prior to the integration of members of armed groups.

**WAM activities**

Members of armed groups would retain the use of their own small arms and ammunition, which would be registered (see Unit 14) and stored in a safe container outside service hours (see Unit 16).

This contributes to the following goals:

- Improving levels of constructive engagement with armed groups
- Building trust between armed groups and the Government
- Building trust between the United Nations mission and armed groups
- Developing a security context that is increasingly conducive to potential future DDR programming
- Providing employment and incentives to combatants
- Safely storing and managing some of the weapons belonging to armed groups
- Contributing to an assessment of the size and nature of armed groups’ arsenals.

**Supporting the WAM capacity of non-State armed groups**

This is a particularly sensitive issue and should be considered very carefully before proceeding.

**Guiding principles**

- National authorities must agree with and approve this strategy as part of a broader peace process or conflict resolution approach.
- The strategy must correspond with the broader overall DDR strategy. By helping such groups formalize the management of their arsenals, there is a risk of
contributing to their fighting capacity and to their legitimacy, thereby further embedding them, which could be counter-productive as far as future potential DDR efforts are concerned.

- Activities should be in line with the overall objectives of the mission.
- Engagement with armed groups shall align with the mission policy on this matter; several United Nations missions have issued standard operation procedures on engagement with armed groups.¹

**Sample activities**

- **Storing or locking away of heavy weapons:** Banning the circulation of “technicals” (pick-up trucks mounted with light weapons), for example, to increase perceptions of security within communities, and a return to normalization.

- **Clearing remains of heavy-weapon platforms:** Moving and disposing damaged or destroyed platforms, such as tanks, from inhabited areas to increase the perception of security.

- **Storing ammunition and explosives:** Moving ammunition out of areas that are not fit for the purpose and pose a threat to civilian security into secure storage away from inhabited areas, and destroying hazardous ammunition. The storage of ammunition poses threats unique from weapons (see Unit 16).

- Providing **basic stockpile management advice** to armed groups to support the development of accountability over arsenals and to increase security.

¹ See also United Nations Department of Political Affairs/Policy and Mediation Division and United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Division for Policy, Evaluation and Training, 2017, “Aide Memoire: Engaging with Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs) for Political purpose: Considerations for United Nations Mediators and Missions”. This document seeks to assist United Nations actors in thinking through whether and how to engage NSAGs. It provides guidance on modalities of engagement and related risks.
This might include basic safety training or the setting of simple rules regarding record-keeping.

This contributes to the following goals:

- Preventing further proliferation and misuse of weapons
- Rendering weapons less visible and increasing perceptions of security if weapons are stored away from civilians
- Increasing levels of accountability and oversight for the groups’ arsenals if multiple stakeholders have defined roles of responsibility
- Building trust with armed groups
- Building an assessment of the types and quantities of weapons and ammunition for future DDR planning requirements.
2.2
Disarmament of Combatants
Unit 11
Planning Disarmament Operations

The operational planning of disarmament is framed in the national DDR programme issued by the national authorities, with the support of the DDR section. The programme provides the legal framework for DDR and sets out all phases of DDR operations from disarmament to reinsertion/reintegration. The WAM SOP provides a detailed step-by-step overview of WAM activities (see Unit 5).

When to implement disarmament operations

The primary preconditions for launching disarmament operations include the following:

- A national normative framework (an inclusive peace agreement)
- Confidence in the peace process
- A sufficient level of security
- National political will to disarm armed actors and willingness to engage in the programme.

REFERENCES FOR THIS UNIT

IATG 8.10 Transportation of Ammunition
IATG 10.10 Destruction of Ammunition
IATG 12.10 Ammunition in Multinational Operations
IDDRS 4.10 Disarmament
IDDRS 5.10 Women, gender and DDR
IDDRS 5.20 Youth and DDR
IDDRS 5.30 Children and DDR
MOSAIC 06.10 Women, men and the gendered nature of SALW
MOSAIC 5.40 Collection of illicit and unwanted SALW
United Nations missions DDR WAM SOPs
**Flexible sequencing of DDR**

Depending on the context and the findings of the early assessment and/or weapons survey, launching the DDR programme with the disarmament phase may not be the most effective approach. With a low level of security and willingness to disarm, it may be more effective to start with reintegration, which is likely to create conditions more conducive to any future disarmament. This approach, however, needs to be carefully thought through and monitored as there is a risk that combatants are rewarded without being disarmed if the process falls through.

**How to select the best disarmament approach**

Mobile and static (cantonment) approaches have been developed to fit different contexts and different constraints; they can also be combined to form a multi-strand approach (see the table on the opposite page for the advantages and disadvantages of these methods).

Depending on the national strategy and the sequencing of DDR phases, the disarmament phase may be intrinsically linked to the demobilization process; sites for both could therefore be combined.

The selection of the approach, or combination of approaches, to take should be based on the following:

- Findings from the early assessment (see Unit 3) and/or weapons survey (see Unit 13)
- Discussions and strategy planned by the national authorities
- Exchanges with leaders of armed groups and lists of combatants provided by them
- A thorough security assessment
- Financial resources.

Locations and dates of disarmament operations should be agreed upon in coordination with the national authorities and armed groups.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Methods</th>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mobile disarmament</td>
<td>Flexible approach</td>
<td>Several disarmament teams and significant logistics are required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Limited movement of armed combatants who remain in their communities</td>
<td>Security is more difficult to ensure for DDR teams and beneficiaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Often more accessible to special groups (women, children, elderly and disabled)</td>
<td>The method is more dependent on the willingness of combatants to participate in DDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Limited movements of unsafe ammunition</td>
<td>Transportation of collected weapons and ammunition require safety management and security by the Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cantonment disarmament</td>
<td>Ex-combatants are in one location, and therefore more easily controlled</td>
<td>Construction and maintenance is costly, especially when taking into account the needs of special groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disarmament logistics are easier to plan</td>
<td>Female combatants may experience security issues in cantonment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Security is easier to ensure for the DDR team and the beneficiaries</td>
<td>Temporary camps risk becoming longer term or even permanent if operations are delayed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>An arms and ammunition storage can be created and kept on site, which increases transparency in WAM</td>
<td>Communities living close to camps are exposed to potential security risks and local resources are subjected to added pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Infrastructure can be transformed afterwards to be used by communities (e.g., schools and social centres, etc.)</td>
<td>Movements of armed combatants and significant transportation logistics need to be organized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sites could become a target for violent extremist groups</td>
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</table>
Mitigating security risks

Disarmament operations are very sensitive, not only because of the inherent risks involved in handling weapons and ammunition, but also because they can generate significant levels of stress for ex-combatants and other actors involved.

The DDR section should develop a security assessment informing the planning of disarmament operations and identifying threats to DDR programme personnel, as well as to beneficiaries and communities. The assessment should also consider specific risks related to women and children and particularly vulnerable groups. Security risks to be assessed when considering which approach to take might relate to ex-combatants themselves, as well as external threats. For instance, in a setting where United Nations personnel have become a target for violent extremist groups, mobile disarmament is not recommended.

While it is impossible to remove and mitigate all risks, the security assessment should make specific recommendations regarding the design of safe disarmament procedures in order to reduce residual risk to a tolerable level.

Allocation of responsibility for the security of disarmament operations should be clearly stated in the WAM SOP; typically, this might come under the remit of the Force, in coordination with national security forces.

What constitutes a disarmament team

The disarmament team is responsible for implementing all operational procedures for disarmament: physical verification of arms and ammunition, registering of materiel, issuance of disarmament cards/certificates, storage of materiel, and the destruction of unsafe ammunition and explosives.

A disarmament team should include a gender-balanced composition of the following:

- DDR officers
- A representative of the national DDR commission (and potentially other national institutions)
An adequately sized technical support team from the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) or a specialized contractor, including an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)–qualified team leader (see Box 1), two weapons inspectors to identify weapons and assess the safety of items, registration officers, storemen and a medic

- Military observers and soldiers from the Force
- National Security Forces armament experts (police, army and/or gendarmerie)
- Representative from the mission’s department for child protection
- Representatives of leadership of armed groups.

Depending on the provisions of the peace agreement and the national DDR plan, commanders of armed groups may also attend.

**Training**

Disarmament teams should receive training on the WAM SOP, the chain of procedures involved in conducting disarmament
operations, data entry into the registration database, and the types and safe handling of arms and ammunition they are likely to deal with (see Annex 5).

Training should be designed by the DDR section with the support of UNMAS or WAM/EOD-qualified Force representatives or specialized subcontractors. Unqualified DDR officers and other personnel should also attend the training to ensure they fully understand the chain of operations and security procedures involved; however, unqualified staff should not handle weapons or ammunition at any stage.

Before the launch of operations, a simulation exercise should be organized to test the planning phase and to support each actor in understanding their respective roles and responsibilities.

**Transportation of collected materiel**

The transportation of dangerous goods should be planned in order to mitigate risks of explosions and diversions. A WAM advisor should supervise the organization of materiel: arms and ammunition should be transported separately and ammunition should be transported in locked containers.

In the absence of qualified personnel, all ammunition and explosives other than small arms and machine gun ammunition should not be transported. In such cases, WAM SOPs should provide clear instructions on steps to take and WAM advisors should be contacted to confirm instructions on how and where the remaining ammunition should be stored until UNMAS, the Force or specialist contractors are able to come and destroy it.

In mission settings, most materiel is transported by road. Security of transportation should be ensured by the Force.

Upon receipt, the shipment should be checked against the DDR weapon/ammunition-registration database, which should be updated accordingly (see Unit 14), and a handover declaration should be signed (see Unit 16).
Communication about disarmament operations

Prior to disarmament, combatants should be made aware of the location, security requirements and steps to complete the process. This can be done directly through group commanders or intermediaries such as community liaison officers. Particular care and attention must be given to inform children, youth and women about what they can expect to happen, including regarding alternatives to DDR for non-eligible individuals (see Unit 7).

It is also key that local communities are aware of the event in order not to create confusion. If destruction of ammunition is likely, it is also important to let them know to avoid unnecessary tensions (see Unit 7).

Disarming combatants

The WAM SOP (see Unit 5) should state the step-by-step procedures for receiving weapons and ammunition, including identifying who has responsibility for each step, and include a diagram of the disarmament site (whether mobile or static) (see Annex 7).

REFERENCES FOR THIS UNIT

IDDRS 4.10 Disarmament
IDDRS 5.10 Women, Gender and DDR
IDDRS 5.20 Youth and DDR
IDDRS 5.30 Children and DDR
MOSAIC 05.40 Collection of illicit and unwanted SALW
MOSAIC 06.10 Women, men and the gendered nature of SALW
United Nations missions DDR WAM SOPs
Combatants are processed one by one at the disarmament site and procedures, to be adapted to the context, are generally as follows:

### Before entering the disarmament site perimeter

- The combatant is identified by his commander and physically checked by the Force.
- If the combatant is carrying ammunition or explosives that might present a threat, she/he will be asked to leave them outside the handover area in a location identified by a WAM/EOD advisor, for separate handling.
- The combatant is asked to move with the weapon pointing towards the ground with the safety catch in "safety" position and her/his finger off the trigger.

### After entering the perimeter

- The combatant is directed to the unloading bay where he/she will proceed with the clearing of his/her weapon under the instruction and supervision of a military observer or a representative of the Force.
- Once the weapon has been cleared, it is handed over to a military observer or a representative of the Force, who will proceed with verification.
- If the combatant is also in possession of ammunition for small arms or machine guns, she/he will be asked to place it/them in a separate pre-identified location, away from the weapons.
- The materiel handed in is registered (see Unit 14) by a DDR officer with guidance on weapons and ammunition identification from UNMAS personnel or other arms experts.
- The combatant is provided with a receipt, which proves that he/she has handed in a weapon and/or ammunition. The receipt indicates the type, the status (serviceable or not) and the serial number of the weapon.
- Weapons are tagged with a code to facilitate storage, management and record-keeping throughout the disarmament process until disposal (see Unit 16).
- Weapons and ammunition are stored separately or organized for transportation under the instructions and guidance of a WAM expert (see Unit 11). Ammunition presenting an immediate risk, or deemed unfit for transport, should be destroyed in situ by qualified EOD specialists (see Units 17 and 18).
An example of the layout of a cantonment disarmament model can be found in Annex 7.

**Spontaneous disarmament of individual combatants outside of official disarmament operations**

To encourage defections from armed groups, the DDR section should establish a modus operandi for defecting combatants who wish to disarm and reintegrate into civilian life. This includes identifying a network of reception points where combatants can go, such as DDR offices or peacekeeping camps, or deploying mobile disarmament units. Procedures should be communicated to members of armed groups on a regular basis to build awareness (see Unit 7).

In the case of peacekeeping camps, the DDR section, in coordination with the Force and the battalion commander, should identify specific focal points within the camp to deal with combatants immediately upon arrival, train focal points on how to handle and disarm combatants, and store any materiel until the DDR officers take over. Unsafe items should be stored in a pre-identified or purpose-built area as advised by WAM advisors until UNMAS or the Force EOD personnel can assess the safety of the items and recommend appropriate action.

**Militias**

While militias and organized crime groups may not be eligible for DDR, the national authorities could decide to create a similar programme for such groups, taking into consideration the different context.

Called Disarmament and Dismantlement of Militias, such programmes need to address the socioeconomic drivers that lead people to join such groups. Eligibility criteria should be clear, consistent and informed by robust analysis (see Unit 3).

Weapons and ammunition collected from such groups should follow the same operational procedures as those for DDR (see Units 13-18).
Members of violent extremist groups

The United Nations is increasingly operating in terrorist-affected areas where armed groups parties to peace agreements are also operating and where affiliations are often fluid and switching.

Since economic incentives to join violent extremist groups account for some of the recruitment, certain individuals may be willing to enter the DDR programme given the benefits involved.

While the international community is still analysing this and while the United Nations is examining linkages between DDR and countering violent extremism, some DDR programmes already have to deal with individuals defecting from violent extremist groups (e.g., in Somalia). The disarmament of members of violent extremist groups requires the highest security safeguards and robust WAM on-site expertise to ensure the safety of all involved.
Weapons laid down by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia are taken from storage for deactivation as part of the peace agreement with the Government, 2017. (UN Photo/Renata Ruiz)
3

Cross-Cutting Technical Guidelines
A weapons survey is the collection and analysis of quantitative and qualitative data about weapons, which is conducted within a specific geographical area and used to provide evidence upon which to design safe, effective and efficient operations related to weapons and ammunition management (WAM) in the context of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). The survey constitutes a baseline that should be updated over time and against which interventions can be monitored and evaluated.

**When should a weapons survey be conducted?**

A survey should be implemented as early as possible in the planning of DDR operations; however, it requires significant resources, access to sensitive and often unstable parts of the country, buy-in from local authorities and ownership by national authorities, all of which can take considerable amounts of time to pull together and secure.

A weapons survey can take more than a year from the time resources are allocated and mobilized to completion and the publication of results and recommendations.

**Who should implement the weapons survey?**

While DDR teams and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) can secure funding and coordinate the process, it is critical to ensure that ownership of the project sits at the

**REFERENCES FOR THIS UNIT**

IDDRS 4.10 Disarmament
MOSAIC 5.10 Conducting SALW Surveys
SEESAC Survey Protocols (www.seesac.org/Survey-Protocols/)
national level due to the sensitivities involved, and so that the results have greater legitimacy in informing any future national policymaking on the subject. This could be through the National Coordinating Mechanism on Small Arms and Light Weapons, for example, or the National DDR Commission. Buy-in must also be secured from local authorities on the ground where research is to be conducted. Such authorities must also be kept informed of developments for political and security reasons.

Weapons surveys are often subcontracted out by United Nations agencies and national authorities to independent and impartial research organizations and/or an expert consultant to design and coordinate the survey components. The survey team should include independent experts and surveyors who are nationals of the country in which the DDR section is operating and who speak the local language(s). The implementation of weapons surveys should always serve as an opportunity to develop national research capacity.

What information should be gathered during a weapons survey?

Weapons surveys can support the design of multiple types of activities related to small arms and light weapons control in various contexts, including those related to DDR. The information collected during this process can inform a wide range of initiatives and it is therefore important to identify other United Nations stakeholders with whom to engage when designing the survey to ensure efforts are not being duplicated.

Components

- **Contextual analysis** (conflict analysis; mapping of armed actors; political, economic, social, environmental and cultural factors)

- **Weapons distribution assessment** (types; quantities; possession by women, men and children; movements of small arms and light weapons; illicit sources of weapons and ammunition)
- **Impact survey** (impact of weapons on children, men, women, vulnerable groups, DDR beneficiaries, etc.; social and economic developments; number of acts of armed violence and victims)

- **Perception survey** (attitudes of various groups towards weapons; reasons for armed groups holding weapons; trust in security forces; alternatives to weapons possession, etc.)

- **Capacity assessment** (community, local and national coping mechanism; legal tools; security and non-security responses).

**Methodology**

The survey should draw on a variety of research methods and sources in order to collate, compare and confirm information—e.g., desk research, collection of official quantitative data (including crime and health data related to firearms), and interviews with key informants such as national security and defence forces, community leaders, representatives of civilian groups (including women and youth) affected by armed violence, non-State armed groups, foreign analysts and diplomats.

The main component of the survey should be the perception survey (see above)—i.e., the administration of a questionnaire. A representative sample is to be determined by an expert according to the target population. The questionnaire should be developed and administered by a research team including male and female nationals ensuring respect for ethical considerations, and gender and cultural sensitivities. The questionnaire should not take more than 30 minutes to administer and careful thought should be given as to how to frame the questions to ensure maximum impact (see Annex C of Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC) 4.10 for a list of sample questions).

A survey can help the DDR section to identify interventions related to disarmament of combatants or ex-combatants, but also to community violence reduction (CVR) and other transitional programming.
Among others, the weapons survey will help identify the following:

- Communities particularly affected by weapons availability and armed violence
- Communities particularly affected by violence related to ex-combatants
- Communities ready to participate in CVR and the types of programming they would like to see developed
- Types of weapons and ammunition in circulation and in demand
- Groups holding weapons and the profiles of combatants
- Cultural and monetary values of weapons
- Security concerns and other negative impacts linked to potential interventions.

Poorly stored ammunition, including anti-vehicle landmines and large-calibre ammunition, was found and assessed by UNMAS partners in a barracks in Bangui, 2014. (UN Photo/Catianne Tijerina)
Unit 14
Registering Weapons and Ammunition

Registration and record-keeping of weapons, ammunition and explosives are critical to effective management of materiel, ensuring transparency of the programme, robust monitoring of activities and prevention of diversion.

The DDR section shall maintain a register of all items collected during operations to allow for precise identification and tracking of the movement of materiel from the point of collection to the point of disposal (whether by means of destruction or by means of transfer of custody to national authorities (see Units 17 and 18).

Information management systems and data on weapons and ammunition

All United Nations DDR programmes have developed and are using an information management system (IMS) to capture relevant information regarding the beneficiaries of DDR activities. While data on weapons and ammunition is generally logged in the IMS during the disarmament and registration of combatants, the type of information collected is often insufficient to allow for effective WAM. Specifically, data logged about arms and ammunition in the IMS generally relates more to the process of identifying whether an individual combatant fits the eligibility criteria based on the materiel they are handing over (see Unit 4); i.e., the type of weapon (manufactured/craft), serial number and status (serviceable/non-serviceable). The DDR section should
therefore develop a specific tool to manage DDR materiel, as described below.

**DDR materiel registration database**

The DDR section shall develop a simple database to manage weapons, ammunition and explosives collected during the DDR cycle. This could be via a standardized Excel spreadsheet template that can be used by all regional bureaux and allow for the effective centralization of data.

**Information to gather**

For each individual weapon, the following information should be gathered,\(^1\) with those categories that are critical for international traces highlighted in bold:

- **Make**
- **Model**
- **Calibre**
- **Serial number**
- **Country of manufacture (or most recent import if the weapon bears an import mark)**
  - Year of manufacture
  - Other markings (including their location on the weapon (barrel, slide, etc.)
- **Name or IMS registration number of combatant**
- **Armed group of origin (if relevant)**
- **Location of collection**
- **Storage code or location**
- **DDR tag number (see Unit 16)**

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\(^1\) Markings on the frame/receiver of the weapon shall be given priority if they do not match markings on other parts of the weapon. Markings on other parts of the weapon (e.g., the barrel) could be recorded under “Other markings”.
- Transfers (dates, new custodian)
- Destruction (date, location, method, entity who conducted the destruction, entity who verified destruction).

For each item of ammunition or explosive materiel, the following categories of information should be filled:

- Category
- Type
- Quantity
- Calibre (if relevant)
- Headstamp markings for small arms and machine gun ammunition
- Lot and batch number
- Manufacturer
- Country of origin
- Condition

DDR pilot project, Bangui, 2017.
(Photo credit: MINUSCA)
- Name or IMS registration number of combatant
- Armed group of origin (if relevant)
- Location of collection
- Storage code or location
- Transfers (dates, new custodian)
- Destruction (date, location, method, entities who conducted and verified destruction).

**Maintaining the database**

In order to ensure that the accuracy and quality of the database is maintained, the DDR section should dedicate appropriate resources to its development and ongoing maintenance. DDR officers in charge at capital and regional levels should be clearly designated and thorough handovers completed to ensure continuity. A DDR officer with WAM experience, including weapons and ammunition identification skills, should be responsible for developing the tool, maintaining the central database and verifying data provided by the regional bureaux. However, most DDR officers do not have the required skills to identify weapons and ammunition accurately. In this case, they should be trained (see Annex 5) and rely on support from UNMAS advisors or other adequate experts.

UNMAS or specialized subcontractors may develop their own separate registration tools to manage their operations; however, this should not be to the detriment of the DDR section’s own registration efforts since these supplementary databases may capture a different set of data and technical partners are often not operational throughout the full DDR mandate of the mission, nor do they cover the full spectrum of locations.

**Sharing the data**

Depending on each host country’s DDR legal framework, data collected may belong to the national authorities. The DDR section should also share all relevant data with the Joint Mission.

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2 In certain contexts, the peace agreement may include limitations regarding data gathering and sharing.
Analysis Centre and the United Nations panel of experts in countries under embargoes to allow for the tracing of materiel (see Unit 15), as well as with the United Nations Police, as required.

**Effective photography**

Data input is subject to human error and mistakes can be made. In order to support effective registration, close-up and full-frame photographs should be taken of each piece of materiel wherever possible (see Annex 6). At a minimum, these should include the serial number and any significant markings of a weapon (see Unit 15), and a clear image of the headstamp or lot/batch number of any ammunition.

It is difficult to include large quantities of images in an Excel spreadsheet; however, photographs of the items taken during disarmament operations should be kept on file and clearly referenced, including, for example, the serial number of the weapon and its DDR tag number (see Unit 16).
Unit 15
Marking DDR Weapons

In accordance with international obligations, weapons are usually marked at the point of manufacture with information that allows them to be uniquely identified (e.g., serial number, make/model identifier, calibre, etc.). Weapons should also be marked at the time of import, transfer from government stocks to permanent civilian use, deactivation and permanent confiscation by the State, although this does not always happen.

Why markings are important

Markings are critical for the following reasons:

- Identifying the weapon as a unique object
- Identifying the origin and life cycle of the weapon (e.g., country of manufacture or most recent import, international transfers, changes in ownership, etc.)
- Identifying an illicit weapon’s point of diversion from the licit to the illicit market
- Accurate record-keeping.

Markings also contribute to deterring diversions by rendering the weapons identifiable and increasing the likelihood of illicit transfers being uncovered, although this is sometimes counteracted by removing markings from weapons.

REFERENCES FOR THIS UNIT

IATG 03.50 Tracing Ammunition
MOSAIC 05.30 Marking and recordkeeping
MOSAIC 05.31 Tracing illicit SALW
International Tracing Instrument
United Nations missions DDR WAM SOPs
Markings found on DDR weapons may include some or all of the following:

- A symbol or International Organization for Standardization (ISO) code identifying the country of manufacture (see list of ISO codes)\(^3\)
- An alphanumeric serial number (which is unique to the manufacturer for that model of weapon)
- Make/name of manufacturer
- Model of weapon
- Calibre of weapon
- Country of import
- Year of import.

Why mark weapons collected during DDR operations

**Marking DDR weapons to be destroyed**

Marking materiel destined for destruction is generally considered unnecessary and expensive. It can also delay the destruction of weapons, thereby increasing the risk of diversion. However, in previous DDR programmes, diversions have occurred between the disarmament and the destruction phases. To prevent this, it is necessary to ensure that the destruction of weapons is verified by an entity that is independent of the organization or unit that carries out the destruction.

If the DDR section believes that destruction verification procedures are not sufficient to detect theft and diversion, a simple marking could be applied to the weapons (e.g., a “D” for destruction, the ISO code of the country in which the destruction is to be carried out, and the year of destruction). If a weapon destined for destruction shows up later undestroyed, either in the same country or a different one, it will be possible to identify its point of diversion.

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Marking DDR weapons to be incorporated into national stocks

While best practice encourages, and some regional instruments require, the destruction of illicit weapons recovered through disarmament or transitional programmes (see Units 8-12), national authorities occasionally decide to incorporate serviceable DDR weapons into their national stockpiles. The DDR section should seek the advice of the United Nations mission’s legal officers prior to any transfers (see Unit 17).

If transfers proceed, it is essential to ensure that such weapons are properly marked. In addition to markings made at the time of manufacture, the following markings should be applied to weapons to be incorporated into national stocks:

- A marking selected by the authorities to identify that the weapon was collected during a DDR process (e.g., “DDR”)
- ISO country code of the confiscating State
- Year of confiscation.

On weapons that do not bear a serial number or that have had it altered or removed, a serial number unique in relation to the points above should also be applied or the item should be destroyed.

Additional markings that national authorities usually apply to government weapons shall also be applied to DDR weapons incorporated into national stocks. Depending on which regional instruments have been ratified (e.g., Economic Community of...
West African States (ECOWAS) Convention), and each State’s own legislation, this might include the following:

- ECOWAS logo
- Name of security agency using the weapon.

Markings should have the following characteristics:

- Positioned on a flat, exposed surface on the frame or receiver
- Conspicuous
- Easily readable
- Durable
- Recoverable (as far as technically possible).

**Box 2**

**Tracing weapons**

Tracing is the systematic tracking of illicit small arms and light weapons found or seized on the territory of a State from the point of manufacture or most recent legal import, through the lines of supply, to the point at which they became illicit.

Weapons recovered in a breach, or suspected breach, of national and/or international law should be traced to identify the point in the transfer chain at which they entered the illicit market. Action should be then taken against those responsible to prevent similar diversions from reoccurring.

Tracing efforts have developed over the past 10 years and are now supported by the International Tracing Instrument (see Normative References), which promotes the tracing, in a timely and reliable manner, of illicit weapons and provides a framework and modus operandi for international tracing cooperation. The Instrument excludes ammunition tracing, which is more challenging since the standardization of ammunition marking at the point of manufacture is still a work in progress.

While DDR sections are not responsible for conducting tracing themselves, the accurate registration and marking of DDR weapons are critical factors that will facilitate effective tracing of these weapons should they be recovered under illicit circumstances.
DDR weapons and ammunition data recorded in the registration database (see Unit 14) should be shared with the national authorities and the United Nations Joint Mission Analysis Centre unit, as well as with the United Nations Panel of Experts in charge of monitoring United Nations sanctions if there is an embargo in place in the country. These stakeholders should also be given access to weapons, ammunition and explosives collected. In the context of DDR materiel, investigations will not look into the individual(s) handing over the weapons and ammunition but rather to the chains of custody prior to their transfer to this/these individuals.

Marking, record-keeping and cooperation are key to successful international tracing efforts. The tracing of a weapon starts with accurate identification on the basis of its physical characteristics and markings. The process is similar for ammunition. The data is then included in the trace request sent to the country of manufacture or most recent known import to request information about the chain of transfer. Tracing requests can also be done through the Illicit Arms Records and Tracing Management System (iARMS) network of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), to which each country’s police has access through its INTERPOL National Central Bureau.

4 However, ammunition cartridges generally do not bear sufficient information for successful tracing. Information contained on ammunition packaging is therefore crucial but this represents a challenge with regard to DDR materiel as most ammunition collected has changed hands numerous times and has generally been removed from its original packaging.

5 The iARMS is a tool facilitating investigative cooperation between law enforcement agencies across the globe, which can be sued to record and search for illicit firearms.

6 See www.interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/Structure-and-governance/National-Central-Bureaus. The INTERPOL Firearms Programme provides dedicated tools to ensure the accuracy of firearm identification and allow successful international tracing by law enforcement officers. The INTERPOL Firearms Reference Table is an interactive online tool available to authorized users worldwide, which provides resources on firearm markings, references and images—all of which help support law-enforcement officers around the world to accurately identify a firearm.
Unit 16
Storing DDR Weapons and Ammunition

Global guidelines stipulate that materiel should be stored in purpose-built armouries and ammunition depots. However, DDR programmes very rarely have appropriate storage infrastructure at their disposal; most programmes across the world are therefore required to build their own temporary structures using shipping containers.

Conventional weapons and ammunition can be stored effectively and safely in these temporary storage facilities if certain procedures are adhered to. The DDR section should be supported by UNMAS on this matter.

In addition to facilitating the management of materiel, storage should protect against the risk of the following:

- Diversion (i.e., theft) and onward illicit proliferation
- Unplanned explosions
- Damage of materiel.

Planning of temporary DDR materiel storage areas

The planning phase is crucial as the facility may be used for several months and may need to be expanded. This task should
be performed by qualified WAM advisors who will determine the size, location, organizational structure and equipment required based on projections of the types and quantity of materiel to be stored (see Units 3 and 13).

Using the resources available, it is the responsibility of the WAM advisors to minimize the risks listed above to the extent possible.

**What does a temporary DDR storage facility look like?**

Arms and ammunition shall be stored separately since they require different risk-assessment and management procedures and also to make it more difficult to steal arms and ammunition together.

In the field, best practice often requires the use of two to four separate containers in one storage area, depending on the resources available: one container for weapons and another for ammunition, as a minimum. Other containers should be used to store the working parts of particularly high-risk weapons (e.g., man-portable air-defense systems) separately from each other, or for storing hazardous ammunition away from the rest of the materiel.

**How to determine the location of a temporary DDR storage facility**

- **Location**: Actors responsible for securing the storage, as identified in the DDR agreement and/or the WAM standard operation procedure (SOP), will determine the perimeter of the location where the storage will be built, usually on the site of a secure United Nations camp.

- **Separation distances and accessibility**: Specific formulas defining the distance of ammunition storage from access routes, inhabited buildings and other infrastructure should be applied (see International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) 2.20).

- **Topography**: Storage facilities should be constructed on stable, level soil, away from flood plains and wooded areas.

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7 See also Quantity-Distance Map available on United Nations SaferGuard: [www.un.org/disarmament/un-saferguard/map](http://www.un.org/disarmament/un-saferguard/map).
A risk assessment shall be conducted by the WAM advisors in order to confirm the optimum location for the storage facility and identify priorities in terms of security measures to be adopted. This includes identifying the following:

- Potential threats posed by the storage facility to the local population and United Nations staff (e.g., the level of fatalities and structural damage expected in the event of an unplanned explosion)
- Risks linked to potential loss and theft
- Risks linked to market or strategic value of materiel and attacks by armed groups or violent extremist entities
- Risks linked to environment, such as flood, earthquakes, lightning, etc.

What are the basic security measures to take?

**Physical security**

- **Protection of the storage facility against weather conditions**: Containers protect materiel against rain, heat and wind. DDR programmes are mostly implemented in the southern hemisphere where temperatures and rainfall can be extreme. A roof to protect the container from direct sunlight should be added and containers should not be touching the ground to protect them from humidity.

- **Protection of the facility against theft, security breaches and attacks**: The storage area should be located in a secure area surrounded by fencing, such as a United Nations camp, with armed guards and patrols. Containers should be locked with container bar locks and keys held by those responsible for securing and managing the storage. Access should be restricted to those with authorization. Based on the security assessment, the procurement of armoured containers may be recommended.

- **Prevention of fire or the spread of fire**: Appropriate measures should be taken to reduce the risk of fire
and to prevent the spread of fire (see box below). The WAM specialist shall establish a fire safety plan (see IATG 02.50) based on the risk assessment and ensure that each storage facility is equipped with basic fire-fighting equipment.

- **Mitigation of impact of explosions**: Berm or Hescos Bastion barricades should be erected around storage containers.

All items below are strictly prohibited in ammunition storage facilities.

![Prohibitions](image)

**Non-physical security (inventory management and procedures)**

- **Stock checks**: The contents of the storages shall be checked and verified on a regular basis against the DDR registration database of materiel (see Unit 14). This task could be conducted by DDR officers with support from the Force and/or UNMAS.

  For armouries, a physical stock check by number and type of arms should be conducted on a weekly basis, as well as no less than 10 per cent of arms by serial number. For ammunition, a physical stock check by quantity and type of ammunition should be conducted on a weekly basis.

  Every six months, a 100-per-cent physical stock check by quantity, type and serial/lot number is to be conducted. Records of every stock check should be kept for review and audit purposes.
Any suspected loss or theft shall be reported immediately and investigated according to the WAM SOP (see MOSAIC 5.20 for the investigative report template).

- **Exit of materiel**: Upon collection of any materiel from DDR storages before transfer to another storage or demolition/cutting site, each party involved shall verify the list and sign a handover declaration, which includes the following information: date, storage facility, number and type of items collected, serial numbers, purpose of transfer and onward destination.

**Storage of arms**

The storage of weapons is less technical than that of ammunition, with the primary risks being loss and theft due to poor management.

Intruder detection systems (i.e., alarms) are unlikely to be used in the field; therefore, in order to prevent or delay theft, containers should be equipped with fixed racks on which weapons can be secured with chains or steel cables affixed with padlocks. Racks also help with inventory management since weapons can be organized per type and it is easier to count them and to notice if one is missing.

Some light weapons that contain explosive components, such as man-portable air-defence systems, will present explosive hazards and should be dealt with by WAM advisors and stored with other explosive materiel.

Finally, to allow for more effective management and stock-taking, weapons that have been collected should be tagged. Most DDR programmes use handwritten tags, including the serial number and a tag number, which are registered in the DDR database (see Unit 14); for instance, various tag colours may also be used to distinguish serviceable from unserviceable weapons. However, in more recent contexts, DDR sections have been using purpose-made bar code tags allowing for electronic reading, including with a smartphone, which is significantly more efficient. Radio frequency identification could also be used.
Storage of ammunition

The storage of ammunition and explosives requires **highly qualified personnel** as the risks related to this materiel are substantial, particularly in temporary storage facilities where security conditions are not optimal (e.g., absence of ventilation in containers).

**A thorough risk assessment** of ammunition storage facilities must be carried out by the expert. A range of quantitative and qualitative methods for this assessment are available (see IATG 2.10).
In accordance with the IATG, all ammunition storage facilities should be at a **minimum of Risk-Reduction Process Level 1 compliance, specifically the following**:

- Basic causes of explosions are addressed (e.g., external fires, smoking, mobile phones, etc.), although others remain (e.g., chemical stability of ammunition cannot be determined). Fatalities and injuries may still occur.

- Basic security precautions are in place to reduce diversions, including stocktaking of ammunition and basic system ofidentifying loss and theft.

Storage of mixed types of ammunition should respect rules according to their compatibility (see IATG 01.50). Most ammunition collected in DDR programmes is for small arms and machine guns (see Annex 4) and does not represent a high explosive risk and is therefore easy to store.

Boxes of ammunition shall be stocked on pallets and should not touch the wall or the roof of the container.

With the development of DDR operations in areas where groups may dispose of more light and heavy weapons systems and/or in areas affected by violent extremism, DDR programmes may be more exposed to explosives and heavy ammunition, such as those used in improvised explosive devices.

An accessible demolition area that can be used for the destruction of ammunition deemed unsafe and at risk of detonation or deflagration should be identified.

**Ammunition requiring separate storage**

Some types of ammunition should always be stored separately, and be destroyed as soon as possible, including:

- White phosphorus
- Damaged ammunition
- Ammunition of unknown condition
- Propulsive charges.
Particular attention should be paid to all warning signs (see IATG 01.50 for hazard classification).

Pictograms indicating a warning (see also Annex 4)
What to do in case of fire (IATG 02.50)

All personnel should be made aware of the Fire Safety Plan, as referenced above, which should detail actions to take in case of fire.

Depending on the Fire Safety Plan, precise approaches may diverge but generally the following immediate actions should be taken by unit staff if a fire is detected before any ammunition and explosives are involved, and it is small enough to be dealt with by unit level firefighting equipment (like portable fire extinguishers):

a) Unless ammunition or explosives are already on fire, immediately attempt to extinguish or control the fire with the immediate firefighting equipment available.

b) Sound the fire alarm.

c) Evacuate all non-essential personnel in the immediate vicinity of the fire to an appropriate safe distance (or predetermined safe place).

d) Immediately call the appropriate fire and rescue service and request their assistance (as time may be a factor later on if first-aid firefighting fails).

e) Prepare personnel for a wider evacuation should immediate firefighting fail to extinguish or control the fire.

Should the immediate firefighting actions fail to control the fire and it begins to spread towards the ammunition and explosives, the following immediate action should be taken:

a) All personnel are to be evacuated to an appropriate safe distance based on the separation distance for the potential explosion site involved in the fire.

b) A roll call should be taken to ensure that all unit personnel and visitors are accounted for.

c) The fire and rescue service should be alerted (on route if necessary) that immediate firefighting has failed and that the fire is spreading towards the ammunition and explosives.

d) The Fire Safety Plan should be fully instigated.
Unit 17
Disposal of DDR Weapons

Destruction shall be the preferred method of disposal of weapons and ammunition collected through DDR. Obtaining the agreement from the appropriate authorities to proceed may take some time, particularly if a DDR National Commission is not yet in place. Disposal methods should therefore be decided upon with the national authorities at an early stage in the process and clearly stated in the DDR plan in order to prevent delays and related risks of diversions or unplanned explosions. Transparency in the disposal of weapons and ammunition collected from former warring parties is key to building trust in DDR.

Destruction of ammunition will be detailed in Unit 18.

Why destroy DDR weapons and ammunition

- Legally binding and politically binding international and regional agreements promote the destruction of illicit weapons and ammunition (see Normative References).
- Destruction reduces the flow of illicit arms and ammunition in circulation across the globe, which is in support of the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (target 16.4 on reduction of illicit arms flows).
- Destruction removes the risk of materiel being diverted.
- Arms, and ammunition in particular, surrendered during DDR operations by armed groups in an unknown state

REFERENCES FOR THIS UNIT

MOSAIC 05.30 Tracing illicit SALW
MOSAIC 05.40 Collection of illicit and unwanted SALW
MOSAIC 05.50 Destruction: Weapons
IDDRS 4.10 Disarmament
United Nations missions DDR WAM SOPs
can be hazardous. In addition, markings, which are key to enabling effective WAM (see Unit 15), may have been altered or removed.

- The destruction of DDR arms and ammunition is a highly symbolic gesture and serves as a strong confidence-building measure if performed and verified transparently. Destruction is usually cheaper than storing and guarding weapons according to global standards.

All arms and ammunition must be recorded and information about the date and method of disposal accurately logged (see Unit 14).

**Destruction of weapons**

*How to plan the destruction of weapons*

A clear plan for destruction should be established by the DDR section, with the support of UNMAS WAM advisors. Collectively, they should do the following:

a) Establish the type and quantity of weapons to be destroyed

b) Examine and select the most suitable destruction method (see below)

c) Obtain formal authorization for destruction from the appropriate government authority, including authorization for a public destruction ceremony, if one is foreseen (see below)

d) Select an appropriate destruction location

e) Consider recovery, recycling and reuse options for the resultant scrap metal

f) Establish the financial costs of all destruction-related activities

g) Develop a security plan for the movement of weapons and destruction operations

h) Update WAM SOPs as necessary
i) Develop a public-information and awareness-raising campaign, and organize a public ceremony (invite media, observers and civil society who could also serve as monitors of destruction)

j) Update the DDR weapons-registration database with the following information for each item:

- Date
- Method of destruction
- Location of destruction
- Entity that carried out the destruction
- Entity that verified the destruction (which should be different than the one above) (see Unit 14).

**How to select the most suitable method of destruction**

There are a multitude of techniques for destroying small arms and light weapons, which vary in complexity, cost and results. The DDR section will be responsible for identifying the most suitable method with the support of UNMAS.

Selection criteria include the following:

- Type of weapons
- Quantity of weapons
- Availability of funds (for equipment, training and staff)
- Available level of WAM expertise
- Availability of local resources and technology
- Available infrastructure
- Security constraints
- Local customs and references.

In most existing DDR programmes, although not necessarily the most efficient, cutting is the preferred method of destruction. See below for the pros and cons of this and other possible techniques.
### Table 2
**Recommended methods of destruction**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technique</th>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cutting by rotating disc</td>
<td>The cutting of small arms and light weapons into unusable pieces using a bandsaw or rotating disc</td>
<td>Simple and effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equipment to procure; labour intensive (minimum of 3 cuts per weapon); large quantities of scrap involved</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cutting by oxyacetylene or plasma torch</td>
<td>The use of high-temperature cutting technology to render the weapon inoperable</td>
<td>Cheap and simple; very effective; limited training requirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Labor intensive; transfer of equipment; knowledge of use to country of operation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cutting by hydraulic shears</td>
<td>The use of hydro-abrasive cutting technology</td>
<td>Limited training requirement; effective; rapid; environmentally benign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transfer of equipment and knowledge to country of operation; medium costs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smelting</td>
<td>The use of an industrial steel smelting facility to melt down weapons</td>
<td>Simple; cheap; very efficient; minimum labour required; highly visible and symbolic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other methods of weapons destruction, including burning (with kerosene) and crushing (with tracked vehicles), are sometimes used for their highly visible and symbolic impact. Although simple and relatively low cost, these methods are not effective as weapons and component parts may still be serviceable and must therefore undergo a further process to ensure destruction.
Transfer of DDR weapons to stockpiles of national authorities

International best practice encourages the destruction of all illicit weapons and ammunition. In addition, a number of legally binding regional instruments, e.g., the Nairobi Protocol (see Normative References), require the destruction of materiel collected in caches left over from conflicts.

Despite this, national authorities may insist on serviceable materiel collected during DDR operations being incorporated into their national stockpiles. Reasons for this mainly include the following:

- Lack of resources to acquire new weapons
- Desire to regain control over materiel previously looted from national stockpiles by armed groups during the conflict
- Imposition of an arms embargo.

Before transferring any military materiel to the national authorities, the DDR section shall take account of all obligations under relevant regional and international instruments (see Normative References) and should seek the advice of the mission’s legal advisor. If the host State is prohibited from using or possessing certain weapons or ammunition, e.g., mines or cluster ammunition (see Unit 18), such materiel shall be
destroyed. Furthermore, in line with the United Nations human rights due diligence policy, weapons cannot be transferred where there are substantial indications that the receiving entity is committing grave violations of international humanitarian, human rights or refugee law.

If the country where the DDR section is operating is under a United Nations arms embargo, any transfer of military materiel to the national authorities could be in violation of the embargo or at least subject to the approval of the Security Council, or its prior notification. Depending on the provisions of the sanctions regime, procedures for requesting exemptions to the embargo vary. In general, the host State is required to send a request to the relevant United Nations Security Council sanctions committee via its diplomatic representation to the United Nations in New York, providing specific information about the materiel, its use and end users, along with supporting documentation.\(^8\)

The DDR section should have a thorough understanding of the relevant Security Council resolutions and arms embargo provisions. The relevant United Nations monitoring team or panel of experts in charge of monitoring sanctions can also be consulted.

WAM advisors should explain to the national authorities the potential negative consequences of incorporating DDR weapons into their stockpiles. This not only includes the symbolic connotations of using conflict weapons, but also any legal and technical implications of such a practice. Specifically, they should be made aware of the costs and resources involved in managing materiel that may differ from their standard equipment, as well as any specialist maintenance requirements and sourcing of spare parts and ammunition, which can have a significant impact on operational efficiency. National security forces should engage their logistics departments on the subject.

Finally, weapons handed over to national authorities should bear markings made at the time of manufacture, and best practice recommends the destruction or proper re-marking of weapons whose original markings have been altered or erased (see Unit 15).

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Disposal of DDR Ammunition

Destruction

The destruction of ammunition is the most desirable method of disposal, but the process is far more complex than for weapons. Risks inherent in destruction are significant if the procedure does not comply with strict technical guidelines. The destruction of ammunition requires highly qualified personnel from UNMAS, the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) capacity of the Force or external subcontractors with relevant expertise to complete the process.

In a DDR programme, ammunition may need to be destroyed either at the collection point, because it is unsafe, or after being transferred to a secure DDR storage.

Planning destruction of stored ammunition

The logistics of ammunition destruction can be particularly challenging and require a strict planning phase by the WAM/EOD advisor or engineer. The expert should seek to do the following:

- Identify priorities (see below)
- Obtain authorization from the national authorities
- Select the most appropriate location and method for destruction
- Develop a risk-assessment and security plan for destruction.

REFERENCES FOR THIS UNIT

- IATG 10.10 Demilitarization and Destruction of Conventional Ammunition
- IMAS 11.20 Principles and Procedures for Open Burning and Open Detonation Operations
What ammunition should be destroyed as a priority?

The following ammunition should be destroyed as a priority:

a) Ammunition that poses the greatest risk in terms of explosive safety
b) Ammunition that is attractive to criminal and violent extremist groups
c) Ammunition that must be destroyed in order to satisfy international legal obligations (anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions for States that are party to the relevant treaties)
d) Small arms and machine gun ammunition less than 20 mm.

How to select the appropriate method

The EOD expert will select the method according to the following:

- Type and quantity of ammunition to be destroyed
- Availability of qualified manpower
- Location and type of destruction sites available
- Distance from storage and destruction sites and accessibility
- Resources available (explosives, budget, etc.)
- Environmental impact.

The most commonly used methods in DDR settings are open burning and open detonation. These are regarded as the easiest ways to destroy ammunition and often present the most cost-effective solution. They are also highly symbolic and can serve as effective mechanisms for building confidence in the DDR programme.

- Open burning is generally used for the destruction of propellants and pyrotechnic compositions and has the potential to cause significant environmental impact.
- **Open detonation** uses serviceable explosives as charges to destroy ammunition and requires a large cordon to ensure protection from the blast. This method is labour intensive and may not destroy all ammunition, requiring post-blast EOD clearance.

**Transfer of DDR ammunition to national stockpiles**

While best practice stipulates the destruction of all DDR ammunition, some national authorities may insist that serviceable ammunition be handed over to them.

This should be done in compliance with binding regional and international instruments, e.g., the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and the Convention on Cluster Munitions (see Normative References), as well as with the provisions of the arms embargo if the host State is under sanctions (see Unit 17).

Transfers of ammunition also represent a significant challenge as it is difficult to know the conditions in which the ammunition was stored previously and to assess its current state. In this case, only ammunition for small arms and machine guns (less than 20 mm) in their original packaging should be handed over to national authorities. In terms of other types of ammunition, a
chemical analysis should be conducted by international experts, which is time-consuming and resource-intensive. Finally, the DDR section shall look into any legal implications prior to any transfers of military materiel to the national authorities (see Unit 17).
## Annex 1
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CVR</td>
<td>community violence reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>disarmament, demobilization and reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>Department of Political Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPET</td>
<td>Division for Policy, Evaluation and Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>Explosive Ordnance Disposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IATG</td>
<td>International Ammunition Technical Guidelines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDDRS</td>
<td>Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMAS</td>
<td>International Mine Action Standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISO</td>
<td>International Organization for Standardization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSCA</td>
<td>United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOSAIC</td>
<td>Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMD</td>
<td>Policy and Mediation Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALW</td>
<td>small arms and light weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEESAC</td>
<td>South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of the Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>standard operation procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>United Nations Mine Action Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNODA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAM</td>
<td>weapons and ammunition management</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 2

Terms and Definitions

a) “Shall” indicates a requirement. It is used to indicate requirements strictly to be followed.

b) “Should” indicates a recommendation. It is used to indicate that, among several possibilities, one is recommended as particularly suitable, without mentioning or excluding others, or that a certain course of action is preferred but not necessarily required, or that (in the negative form, “should not”) a certain possibility or course of action is deprecated but not prohibited.

c) “May” indicates permission. It is used to indicate a course of action permissible within the limits of the document.

d) “Can” indicates possibility and capability. It is used for statements of possibility and capability, whether material, physical or causal.
Annex 3

Definition of Small Arms and Light Weapons (MOSAIC 01.20)

Small arms

Any man-portable lethal weapon designed for individual use that expels or launches, is designed to expel or launch, or may be readily converted to expel or launch a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive.

Includes, inter alia, revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, submachine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns, as well as their parts, components and ammunition.

Light weapons

Any man-portable lethal weapon designed for use by two or three persons serving as a crew (although some may be carried and used by a single person) that expels or launches, is designed to expel or launch, or may be readily converted to expel or launch a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive.

Includes, inter alia, heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems, portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems, and mortars of a calibre of less than 100 mm, as well as their parts, components and ammunition.
## Annex 4

Ammunition Categories/Hazard Divisions (IATG 01.50)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hazard division</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Pictogram</th>
<th>Signal word</th>
<th>Hazard statement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Ammunition that has a mass explosion hazard</td>
<td>[Image]</td>
<td>Danger</td>
<td>Mass explosion hazard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>Ammunition that has a projection hazard but not a mass explosion hazard</td>
<td>[Image]</td>
<td>Danger</td>
<td>Severe projection hazard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hazard division</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Pictogram*</td>
<td>Signal word</td>
<td>Hazard statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.1</td>
<td>Ammunition that has a projection hazard but not a mass explosion hazard (More hazardous items of HD 1.2, which give large fragments over an extended range)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Danger</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.2</td>
<td>Ammunition that has a projection hazard but not a mass explosion hazard (The less hazardous items of HD 1.2, which give smaller fragments of limited range)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Danger</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.3</td>
<td>Ammunition that exhibit at most an explosion reaction during sympathetic reaction testing and a burning reaction in bullet impact and heating tests</td>
<td></td>
<td>Danger</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>Ammunition that has a fire hazard and either a minor blast hazard or a minor projection hazard or both, but not a mass explosion hazard</td>
<td>![ Explosives Pictogram ]</td>
<td>Danger</td>
<td>Fire, blast or projection hazard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hazard division</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Pictogram</td>
<td>Signal word</td>
<td>Hazard statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.1</td>
<td>Ammunition that has a fire hazard and either a minor blast hazard or a minor projection hazard or both, but not a mass explosion hazard (The more hazardous items with mass fire hazard and considerable thermal radiation)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Danger</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.2</td>
<td>Ammunition that has a fire hazard and either a minor blast hazard or a minor projection hazard or both, but not a mass explosion hazard (The less hazardous items that burn sporadically)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Danger</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>Ammunition that presents no significant hazard</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Explosives Icon" /></td>
<td>Warning</td>
<td>Fire or projection hazard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hazard division</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Pictogram</td>
<td>Signal word</td>
<td>Hazard statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>Very insensitive substances, which have a mass explosion hazard</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Pictogram" /></td>
<td>Danger</td>
<td>May mass explode in fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>Extremely insensitive articles, which do not have a mass explosion hazard</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Pictogram" /></td>
<td>No Signal Word</td>
<td>No hazard statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unstable Explosive</td>
<td>Any explosive in an unstable condition</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Pictogram" /></td>
<td>Danger</td>
<td>Unstable explosive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( ^a \) The examples shown also include the Compatibility Group.

\( ^b \) This is a "new" HD and is derived from NATO AASTP-3, Edition 1, Change 3. Manual of NATO Safety Principles for the Hazard Classification of Military Ammunition and Explosives, August 2009.
Annex 5

Weapons Handling and Security Training

**Trainers:** SALW and WAM/EOD advisors (UNMAS, Force or specialized subcontractor)

**Participants:** Disarmament team members, which might include the following, depending on mission settings and context:

- Military observers
- Force
- United Nations Police
- National forces
- DDR officers
- Other United Nations mission members who may attend the disarmament (e.g., child protection officers, etc.).

**Duration:** 1 to 2 days

Training should be developed in accordance with the disarmament operations as stated in the WAM SOP. Each actor should leave with a clear understanding of the chain of operations, their role in the process and security requirements.

The training aims at harmonizing practice between those qualified to handle small arms and light weapons (military and police backgrounds), but does not provide instruction to personnel not qualified to do so (DDR officers). These individuals will not be handling materiel during the disarmament process but need to know what it entails and to be aware of security procedures to ensure they are implemented.

Training should provide an opportunity for the various components to learn to work together, learn about each other’s responsibilities, and develop a collective, team spirit.
Training should involve a mixture of theory and practical modules, safe handling of weapons, group exercises and simulation of the disarmament process.

**Potential training components**

- Understanding the operational organization of disarmament
- Understanding the structure of a disarmament site
- Behaviour in the handling of small arms and light weapons
- Security rules
- How to react in case of an incident
- Identification of hazardous items
- Small arms and light weapons manipulation
- Maintenance and functional control of small arms and light weapons
- Small arms and light weapons markings and identification of main weapons in circulation in the host country
- DDR weapons and ammunition registration database (see Unit 14)
- Ammunition basic principles and identification of main items in circulation in the host country
- Behaviour in handling ammunition
- Visual quality control of ammunition.

(Source: SALW induction training organized by UNMAS, Gao, Mali, 2017)
Annex 6

Documenting Arms and Ammunition

The physical characteristics of arms or weapons, and in particular their markings, set them apart from others as unique objects whose history can be traced. Ammunition can be more difficult to trace but already basic information about its calibre and markings can provide critical insights into likely transfer chains.

For a successful trace, photos must comply with proper standards. Use a digital camera, good light, and a steady hand. Re-take the picture if the initial result is blurry.

Include photos and accompanying information specifying the date, location and circumstances of the documentation in patrol reports.

1. Be absolutely safe

- **Never** point a weapon at anyone, even if you are sure it is unloaded.
- **Ensure** the safety mechanism is in the “safe” position.
- **Remove** the magazine from the weapon.
- **Remove** the round of ammunition in the breech (if present).
- Larger ammunition can be particularly dangerous. **Do not** approach or handle cartridge-based ammunition in the following cases:
  - If its overall length is more than 160 mm
  - If it is larger than 14.5 mm in calibre

Source for Annex 6: UNMAS
If the bullet/projectile is completely painted

When in doubt, always ask a qualified ammunition technical officer.

2. Photographing arms and weapons

To correctly identify an individual arm or weapon, photos that allow trained personnel to establish, as far as possible, the arm’s or weapon’s make/type, model, calibre, serial number, and country of manufacture or most recent import are required.

Where on the arms is the information?

Some of the required information may be marked on the arms or weapons. The location of marks varies with the type and model of the arms or weapons. For assault rifles, essential marks are usually on the receiver, which houses the operating parts (e.g., trigger mechanism, magazine port) and to which other components of the weapon are attached (e.g., barrel, stock). For handguns, critical marks are usually found on the frame.

![Rifle receiver](image1)

![Handgun frame](image2)

Additional characteristics and markings that can help to identify an arm or weapon may be located on the fire-selector switch and the rear-sight. If a serial number marked on the frame/receiver differs from a serial number marked on another part, the arm or weapon is assembled from parts of two or more different arms or weapons, or the arm or weapon contains replacement parts. In such cases, the serial number marked on the frame/receiver will be the primary source for identifying the arm or weapon.
How to take the right photos

Photo 1:
Complete weapon, side 1

Photo 2:
Close-up of receiver/frame with markings, side 1

Photo 3: Complete weapon, side 2

Photo 4:
Close-up of receiver/frame with fire-selector switch marks, side 2

Photo 5:
Rear sight marks (if present)

Additional photos:
Close-ups of other identifying marks, if present (e.g., on the barrel, bolt, another part of the frame, etc.)
3. Photographing ammunition

The minimum usually required to establish possible transfer chains of ammunition is the ammunition’s **calibre** and markings that allow trained personnel to identify the **country and year of production**. Additional information that can greatly assist in tracing the ammunition’s pathway is its lot and/or batch number. Not all the information may be available, especially if ammunition rounds were removed from their original packaging. Notwithstanding, even only calibre and **headstamp marks** (see below) can provide critical information about origins and allow for targeted investigations into possible transfer paths.

**Where on the ammunition is the information?**

Ammunition rounds typically have headstamp marks, that is, alphanumeric characters and/or symbols that are applied to the **base of cartridge cases**. Other information can be derived from markings on the **packaging** and from the overall length and calibre of the ammunition.
How to take the right photos

**Photo 1:**
Headstamp marks

**Photo 2:**
The cartridge placed next to a ruler or measure (or pen)
The cartridge can be pushed into soft ground or held between fingers when taking a photo of headstamp marks. If several rounds or shells bear identical marks, a photo of one such round or shell suffices. If marks differ, photos that show marks of each round or shell with "unique" marks are required.
1. All stores are made in ISO sea metallic containers 20’.
2. Ammo containers will be mandatory painted in white color.
3. Ammo containers will contain 3 lines/levels of dismantleable shelves (60 cm large made of wood) on 3 walls in order to store vrac/unpacked ammunition.
4. Weapons containers will contain gun racks for individual weapons (like AK47), shelves and metallic boxes to store bigger size weapons (machine guns 7.62 mm, 12.7 mm, 14.5 mm, mortars 60-82 mm, RPG launchers).
5. The gun racks and shelves for weapons containers will be made of metal.
6. The containers for high explosives ammunition will have metallic roof/protection against sun heat.
7. The fence will be chain link fence, minimum 2.5 m high constructed with chain link fabric and a barbed wired topping. Supporting posts may be either reinforced concrete or tubular steel.
Annex 8

References

IATG: www.un.org/disarmament/ammunition
MOSAIC: www.un.org/disarmament/mosaic

General/DDR


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United Nations DDR Section. DDR High Level Roundtable: Tenth anniversary of the IDDRS and the experience in Côte d’Ivoire. 9 June 2017.


Assessments and weapons survey

Conflict Armament Research: www.conflictarm.com/

Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security: www.grip.org/
South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of the Small Arms and Light Weapons: www.seesac.org/

Small Arms Survey: www.smallarmssurvey.org/

**United Nations missions DDR WAM SOPs**


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**Community violence reduction**


**Disposal of arms and ammunition**

Storage of arms and ammunition
UNMAS. (No date.) Livret technique pour les armureries temporaires.

Marking and tracing