Tracing of ammunition
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Foreword

Ageing, unstable and excess ammunition stockpiles pose the dual hazards of illicit proliferation and accidental explosion, which have caused destabilization and humanitarian disaster in all regions of the world.

Crucial for adequate stockpile management is the identification of surpluses – that is, the portion of weapons and ammunition that does not constitute an operational need. When surpluses are not recognized, the entirety of the stockpile may continue to be seen as of operational value. Although not used, weapons and ammunition surpluses thus continue to fill warehouses and can thus pose a significant risk to safety and security.

Defective stockpile management has been assessed as the norm rather than the exception in many countries. Often it is not only surplus stocks that should be the focus of attention, but the lack of appropriate policy for stockpile management. Governments remain unaware of surpluses; their national stockpiles remain a risk to public safety; and diversion from warehouses feed into crime and armed violence.

In 2011, the United Nations developed the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) to ensure that the United Nations as a whole consistently delivers high-quality advice and support in ammunition management. Many stakeholders, including international organizations, non-governmental entities and national authorities, use these guidelines.

The IATG, along with other conventional ammunition issues, are managed through the United Nations SaferGuard programme.

Taking into account the diversity in capacity of States, three levels of ascending comprehensiveness are offered in the IATG, referred to as “risk-reduction process levels” (RRPLs). These are indicated within each IATG as either LEVEL 1 (basic), LEVEL 2 (intermediate) or LEVEL 3 (advanced).

The aim of implementing partners should be to maintain stockpile management processes at RRPL 1 as a minimum. This will often reduce risk significantly. Ongoing and gradual improvements could then be made to the stockpile management infrastructure and processes as staff development improves and further resources become available. These additional actions would equate to RRPL 2 and 3.

The RRPLs are determined by calculating a weighted score of questions about a particular ammunition stockpile. A checklist is available at https://www.un.org/disarmament/un-saferguard/risk-reduction-process-levels/.

The IATG are reviewed on a regular basis to reflect developing ammunition stockpile management norms and practices, and to incorporate changes due to changing international regulations and requirements. The IATG are also available in multiple languages.

The latest version of each guideline, together with practical IATG implementation support tools, can be found at https://www.un.org/disarmament/un-saferguard/.
Introduction

The vast majority of illicit ammunition is legally manufactured or imported and then subsequently diverted to the illicit realm. Illicit ammunition fuels armed crime and conflict and its components commonly form the basis from improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

Tracing is the systematic tracking of illicit ammunition from the point of manufacture or import, through the lines of supply, to the last legal title-holder, in order to determine the point, in space and time, at which the ammunition was diverted.

Reliably identifying the point of diversion is crucial to preventing future diversion. Tracing the origin of ammunition that is recovered in crime, for example, enables law enforcement officials to develop investigative leads that may link a suspect to a weapon in a criminal investigation, identify suspected arms traffickers, and detect patterns of intra-state and international arms trafficking.

Similar benefits accrue from tracing illicit ammunition recovered in the context of armed conflict. The challenges are often greater in such cases, however, since circuitous arms trafficking routes and falsified documents are often involved. For these reasons, States and other entities rarely trace ammunition recovered in the context of armed conflict. This leaves under-used an important means to identify the actors responsible for ammunition supply and diversion, to hold them to account, and thereby to contribute to preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in ammunition.

Ammunition may be recovered from the illicit sphere during law enforcement or military operations, sanctions monitoring activities and in the context of weapons collection programs (see ISACS 05.40, Collection).

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1 This IATG is mainly based on the content of ISCAS 05.31 Tracing illicit small arms and light weapons as the principles and procedures are much alike.
Tracing

1 Scope

This IATG establishes the guiding principles and operational methodology for the tracing, in a timely and reliable manner, of illicit ammunition. It covers the establishment of an effective national infrastructure for tracing illicit ammunition in domestic records and for initiating and responding to international tracing requests.

2 Normative references

The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

A list of normative references is given in Annex A. Normative references are important documents to which reference is made in this guide and which form part of the provisions of this guide.

A further provides a list of informative references is given at Annex B in the form of a bibliography that lists additional documents that contain other useful information on the lotting and batching of conventional ammunition.

3 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this guide the following terms and definitions, as well as the more comprehensive list given in IATG 01.40:2015 Terms, definitions and abbreviations, shall apply.

The term ‘tracing’ refers to the systematic tracking of illicit ammunition from the point of its manufacture or import, through the lines of supply, to the point at which it became illicit.

In all modules of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines, the words 'shall', 'should', 'may' and 'can' are used to express provisions in accordance with their usage in ISO standards.

a) 'shall' indicates a requirement: It is used to indicate requirements strictly to be followed in order to conform to the document and from which no deviation is permitted.

b) 'should' indicates a recommendation: It is used to indicate that among several possibilities one is recommended as particularly suitable, without mentioning or excluding others, or that a certain course of action is preferred but not necessarily required, or that (in the negative form, 'should not') a certain possibility or course of action is deprecated but not prohibited.

c) 'may' indicates permission: It is used to indicate a course of action permissible within the limits of the document.

d) 'can' indicates possibility and capability: It is used for statements of possibility and capability, whether material, physical or casual.

4 Tracing methodology

Tracing illicit ammunition involves the following steps:

a) the correct identification of the ammunition based on its physical characteristics, markings and packaging;

b) A determination of whether the ammunition was diverted while under national jurisdiction (i.e. following its legal manufacture in, or legal import into, the State where it was recovered);
c) ammunition determined to have been diverted while under national jurisdiction becomes the subject of a national tracing operation;

d) ammunition determined to have been illicitly trafficked into the country becomes the subject of an international tracing operation;

e) the tracing operation contacts manufacturers and legal title-holder(s) to reconstruct the lines of supply (e.g. the transfer history of the ammunition);

f) records kept by manufacturers or legal title-holder identify the point (in time and space) at which the ammunition became illicit (e.g. when the ammunition was diverted);

g) following a successful tracing operation, action is taken to prevent similar diversions from happening again.

Under certain circumstances, it should be possible to trace illicit ammunition; e.g. when a particular lot is marked with a unique lot number, transferred to a single recipient and when the transfer documentation adequately records the lot number and associated identifying information2 (e.g. ammunition produced under contract for military forces). Under other circumstances, however, it can be difficult to trace illicit ammunition; e.g. when ammunition lots with identical markings on the ammunition bodies and/or packaging are transferred to multiple actors (e.g. a single lot of ammunition that is “split”3 and sold to different national armed forces); or when ammunition transfers are recorded without also recording the ammunition markings (e.g. the ammunition cannot be identified, post-transfer, as having been part of that transfer).

5 National point(s) of contact on tracing

5.1 Single or multiple points of contact

States shall designate one or more national points of contact as the competent national authority (or authorities) on all matters relating to tracing illicit ammunition; this should be the same point of contact for SALW tracing. Given the nature of tracing operations, the point(s) of contact should be established within the police force and/or the military.

Where a single national point of contact is designated, it shall have the authority to trace illicit ammunition in all relevant domestic records, e.g. defence and security force inventories, ammunition manufacturer/dealer production and sale records, civilian registries and law enforcement agency records. The national point of contact shall also have the authority to initiate and follow through on international tracing requests with (where applicable) domestic INTERPOL National Central Bureau (NCB) offices and relevant regional organizations.

Where two or more national points of contact are designated, it shall be specified which domestic records each is authorized to use in conducting tracing operations, e.g. those pertaining to law enforcement agencies, manufacturers, dealers, civilians and the military.

5.2 Responsibilities

The national point(s) of contact should be mandated and capacitated to, in a timely and reliable manner to:

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2 Associated identifying information includes any documentation that identifies the ammunition as having been part of a specific transfer. This includes shipping notes and sales contract numbers, which, if affixed to ammunition packaging, permit identification of the supplier or recipient.

3 Even if lot has been split and transferred to multiple actors, associated identifying information, such as shipping notes and sales contract numbers, can be used to identify ammunition as having been part of a specific transfer.
a) trace, using domestic records, illicit ammunition recovered domestically in order to determine whether (and, if so, when, where and by whom) they were diverted from the State’s jurisdiction;

b) initiate and follow through on international tracing requests in relation to illicit ammunition recovered domestically that has been illicitly trafficked into the State’s jurisdiction;

c) respond to incoming international tracing requests in relation to illicit small ammunition recovered abroad; and

d) report on national implementation of international commitments on tracing illicit small arms and light weapons (see Clause 12).

5.3 Resource requirements

The national point(s) of contact should have available adequate resources to enable it/them to carry out its functions in a timely and reliable manner. In particular, the point(s) of contact should have:

a) a clear mandate from the appropriate National Authority;

b) a sufficient number of staff trained to retrieve information from national ammunition records;

c) access to the necessary communications equipment and IT systems; and

d) adequate financial resources to cover staff, equipment and operational costs.

5.4 Standard operating procedures

Standard operating procedures should be established to provide detailed instructions and comprehensive guidance to the national point(s) of contact on tracing.

Such standard operating procedures should define the roles of the point(s) of contact as well as the methodologies and procedures to be followed in tracing operations and in handling information exchanges as part of such operations.

The national point(s) of contact on tracing should be trained in the application of the standard operating procedures.

6 Identification of ammunition

6.1 Essential information

The correct initial identification of illicit ammunition is vital to maximizing the chances that a tracing operation will be successful. The identification of an ammunition item for the purpose of a tracing operation shall include its:

a) type (i.e. Shell / Mortar Bomb / Ball Round / APFSDS etc);

b) calibre;

c) model (i.e. L15);

d) lot and/or batch number;

e) headstamp marks (if applicable);

4 Alphanumeric characters and/or symbols applied to the base of cartridge cases.
f) country of manufacture; and

g) country of last import (if applicable).

Where possible, photographs should be used to illustrate the essential information required to identify an item of ammunition, including its packaging and any marks applied to packaging.

The Ammunition Tracing Kit\(^5\) should be used to ensure consistent methodology and information presentation during the identification of ammunition and the preparation of a subsequent tracing request. (Normative reference at Annex A).

7 National tracing system

7.1 Weapons subject to domestic tracing

A national tracing system shall make possible the timely and reliable domestic tracing of illicit ammunition that:

a) was legally manufactured and/or assembled under national jurisdiction;
b) was legally imported into national jurisdiction;
c) transited national jurisdiction;
d) otherwise entered national jurisdiction (e.g. through recovery from the illicit sphere);
e) left national jurisdiction (e.g. through export or alleged destruction); and
f) was identified as domestically diverted (e.g. through theft or loss).

7.2 Extent of domestic tracing

A national tracing system shall make possible the timely and reliable domestic tracing of illicit ammunition from its manufacture, import or other point of entry into national jurisdiction up to:

a) the last legal possessor of the ammunition; or
b) the point at which the ammunition left national jurisdiction (e.g. though destruction or export).

7.3 Previously exported ammunition

In cases where recovered illicit ammunition is determined to have previously left the national jurisdiction through export, the national tracing system should make it possible to identify:

a) the recipient of the ammunition and date of transfer;
b) the lot numbers and relevant characteristics of the ammunition (see Clause 6.1);
c) the quantity of ammunition exported and its mode of transfer, including documentation;
d) the actor(s) involved in the transfer (e.g. transport agents and brokers);
e) associated financial transactions, if applicable.

7.4 Domestic information exchange

Separate systems may be used, at the national level, for tracing ammunition that is held and/or controlled by different agencies of the State (e.g. law enforcement, armed forces, etc.). In such cases, it should be possible to exchange information quickly between the different tracing systems in use. To achieve this, it may be necessary to have in place a legislative or regulatory framework to enable efficient exchange of information, at the national level, regarding domestic tracing operations.

7.5 Databases

The centralized collection and analysis of data on recovered ammunition and on its tracing can assist in the identification and design of counter-measures to prevent future diversions of ammunition.

One or more national electronic databases containing the details of all illicit ammunition recovered within the jurisdiction of the State should be created. These databases should also record the progress and outcome of domestic and international tracing operations.

Where more than one database exists, they may be networked so as to allow for the efficient searching of all databases from a single location.

8 Domestic tracing operations

8.1 General procedure

On the recovery of illicit ammunition, the following general procedure should be followed:

a) the national point(s) of contact on tracing of the State in whose jurisdiction the ammunition was recovered should be informed and provided with details of the ammunition's characteristics, in accordance with Clause 6.1;

b) the point(s) of contact, using relevant domestic records, should determine whether the ammunition in question was diverted while under national jurisdiction (e.g. after having been legally held by the State or by a private entity or individual within the jurisdiction of the State), or diverted after having left (and re-entered) national jurisdiction (e.g. following export or alleged destruction);

c) where the point of diversion, as outlined in (b) above, cannot be established using domestic records, the point(s) of contact should investigate the likelihood of the ammunition in question having been either 1) illicitly trafficked into the State, or 2) illicitly manufactured in the State;

d) where it is determined that the ammunition in question was 1) diverted while under national jurisdiction or 2) illicitly manufactured within national jurisdiction, the national Point(s) of Contact shall carried out investigations with the goal of:

- determining the point (in space and time) of diversion or illicit manufacture;
- identifying the individuals responsible for the diversion or illicit manufacture; and
- taking effective action (e.g. prosecuting those involved, strengthening national legislative and regulatory frameworks, etc.) to ensure that similar diversions or illicit manufacture do not re-occur.

e) where, on the other hand, it is determined that the ammunition in question was 1) diverted after having left national jurisdiction and/or 2) illicitly trafficked into the State, the national Point(s) of Contact shall, where applicable:
• direct an international tracing request to the State to which the ammunition was exported (identified by domestic records); or

• direct an international tracing request to the manufacturing State, or legal importing States (identified by markings on the ammunition, its packaging and associated identifying information).

8.2 Specific procedures

The specific procedures for tracing illicit ammunition in domestic records will depend on the nature of the national tracing infrastructure. A point of contact in a State that maintains an effective, regularly updated centralized record-keeping system will usually need only to consult that system.

A point of contact in a State that maintains a non-centralized record-keeping system should first determine which records need to be consulted (e.g. those held by official State agencies or by private manufacturers and dealers) and then request the tracing-related information from the relevant national or civil agency.

8.3 Domestic tracing operations in response to international tracing requests

The procedures outlined in this Clause should also be applied when conducting domestic tracing operations in response to international tracing requests.

9 International tracing operations

9.1 Routing international tracing requests

International tracing requests shall be addressed, in writing, by the national point of contact in one State to the national point(s) of contact in other State(s) that, according to the result of a domestic tracing operation, have exercised jurisdiction over the ammunition in question (e.g. preferably the State to have held most recent jurisdiction, or States that have held past jurisdiction at various points (in time and space) in the lines of supply.

The State(s) to which the tracing request is addressed may be:

a) the State(s) to which the requesting State exported the ammunition (identified by domestic records);

b) the State in which the ammunition was manufactured (identified by markings on the ammunition, its packaging and associated identifying information);

c) States(s) that have, at one time, imported/exported the ammunition (identified by markings on the ammunition, its packaging and associated identifying information); or

The national Point(s) of Contact may be required to address tracing requests to several States, including those that other contacted States have identified as having held prior or subsequent jurisdiction over the ammunition, e.g. one State may reply that it transferred ammunition to, or received it from, a second State (e.g. the tracing operation has to work ‘forwards’ or ‘backwards’ (in space and time) through the lines of supply).

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6 This may be necessary, for example, when an ammunition lot has been split between multiple entities. One State may be identified as holding jurisdiction over part of the lot, but diversion occurs from the portion of the lot held by a second State. The first State, in this case, would identify from where it acquired the ammunition (where the lot was split), so that the tracing operation could identify the second State (and, thereby, the point of diversion).
Assistance with international tracing operations may also be requested of partners other than States (see Clause 11).

9.2 Content of international tracing requests

9.2.1. Essential information

An international tracing request should contain:

a) contextual information regarding the illicit nature of the ammunition, including the legal justification for the tracing request and, to the extent possible, the circumstances under which the illicit ammunition was recovered;

b) the grounds for believing that the State in receipt of the international tracing request held jurisdiction over the ammunition;

c) correct identification of the ammunition in accordance with Clause 6.1, including supporting photographs and documentation;

d) a request for information regarding the history of the ammunition while under the legal jurisdiction of the State in receipt of the international tracing request;

e) information on any onward transfer (or previous import, if required) of the ammunition, including details or suppliers/recipients; and

f) the purpose and intended use of the information sought.

9.2.2. Additional information

An international tracing request should also contain any additional information that might assist in tracing the ammunition in question, e.g. the quantity, date, and place of recovery of the ammunition, the individuals who were detained with the recovered ammunition, etc.

10 Responding to international tracing requests

10.1 Acknowledgement of receipt

An acknowledgement of receipt of an international tracing request should be issued within seven days of receipt of the request.

10.2 Verification of completeness

An incoming international tracing request should first be checked for completeness in accordance with Clause 9.2.

A request that does not contain the information required by Clause 9.2 should be returned with a request to re-submit it with all of the necessary information.

Where the requesting point of contact indicates that it is not possible to provide all of the information required by Clause 9.2, but where the information provided is sufficient for a tracing operation to have a reasonable chance of success, the request should be processed in accordance with the remainder of this clause.

10.3 Restrictions on the use of information

The recipient of an international tracing request may impose restrictions on the use of all or part of the information provided in response to the request (e.g. proprietary information relating to
commercial transactions). Such restrictions should, however, be kept to the minimum required by law.

The initiator of the request shall comply with any such restrictions, subject to national and/or international legal obligations.

Where it is not possible, for legal reasons, for such restrictions to be complied with, the initiator of the tracing request shall inform the recipient of the tracing request of this in advance.

10.4 Information to be provided

Point(s) of contact responding to a tracing request (hereinafter the ‘requested State’) should included in their responses all relevant and available information sought by the requesting point(s) of contact.

This information should provide a full history of the ammunition for as long as it was under the jurisdiction of the State, in addition to information pertaining to imports or exports of the ammunition and (if applicable) the circumstances of its diversion.

10.4.1. In case of legal manufacture or import

If the ammunition concerned was legally manufactured in, or imported into, the jurisdiction of the requested State, information supplied in response to a tracing request may include:

a) confirmation of manufacture or import;
b) relevant information on the manufacturer or importer;
c) date of manufacture or import; and
d) any additional information that could assist in tracing the ammunition.

Examples of such additional information include an explanation of ammunition markings (including hidden or other identifying markings), any special characteristics of the ammunition, dates of technical testing, identification of the testing body, etc.

10.4.2. In case of internal transfer

If the ammunition concerned was transferred legally within the jurisdiction of the requested state, information in response to a tracing request may include:

a) the date(s) of transfer(s);
b) information on the final consignee(s);
c) details of the transfer license(s) or records, if applicable; and
d) any additional information that could assist in tracing the ammunition.

10.4.3. In case of export

If the ammunition concerned was exported from the requested state, information in response to a tracing request may include:

a) the date of export;
b) the importing state;
c) transit states where relevant;

d) the final consignee;

e) details of export, in-transit and import licenses (including end-user certification);

f) information on the mode of transport, transport agent(s) and shipping documentation; and

g) any additional information that could assist in tracing the ammunition

10.4.4. In case of internal diversion

If the ammunition concerned was diverted while under the jurisdiction of the requested state, information in response to a tracing request may include:

a) confirmation and details of the diversion;

b) information on the last legal possessor of the ammunition;

c) information on identified or suspected illicit recipients of the ammunition; and

d) any additional information that could assist in tracing the ammunition.

The requested Point of Contact should also specify whether an investigation into the circumstances of the diversion has been launched or is envisaged.

10.5 Timeframes

10.5.1. General

Responses to international tracing requests shall be timely. As a general guide, responses should be provided within three weeks of receipt of the request.

10.5.2. Delays and restrictions

The requested point of contact may delay, or restrict the content of, the response to a tracing request, or may refuse to provide the information sought:

a) if releasing the information would compromise on-going criminal investigations or violate legislation providing for the protection of confidential information;

b) if the requesting point of contact cannot guarantee the confidentiality of the information; or

c) for reasons of national security consistent with the Charter of the United Nations.

If a requested point of contact delays or provides a restricted response to a tracing request, or refuses to provide the information sought, it will inform the requesting point of contact of the reasons for this. The requesting point of contact may subsequently seek clarification of this explanation.

11 International cooperation and assistance

11.1 General

States shall co-operate with other States in tracing illicit ammunition, including by responding in a timely and reliable manner to international tracing requests.
Where required, cooperation and assistance to build capacity to trace illicit ammunition should be sought. Such cooperation and assistance can be sought from other States, as well as from relevant regional and international organizations, or from other relevant actors.

To request cooperation and assistance, use may be made of the “matching needs with resources” tool on the UN PoA-ISS website (www.poa-iss.org).

Where possible, cooperation and assistance that is requested should be provided. Such cooperation or assistance can be technical or financial in nature and can be provided bilaterally or multilaterally.

Technical assistance may include:

a) training (e.g. in the correct identification of ammunition, as well as in methods of conducting tracing operations and investigations); and
b) transfer of technology that facilitates the tracing of illicit ammunition.

11.2 INTERPOL

The International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) provides valuable assistance to its Member States in tracing ammunition recovered in crime, including through its Firearms Trace Request, and Ballistics Information Network.

In order to take full advantage of this assistance in tracing, a State that is a member of INTERPOL should ensure that its INTERPOL National Central Bureau, which links domestic law enforcement to INTERPOL, is fully operational.

Further information on INTERPOL’s role in tracing small arms recovered in crime is contained in Annex C of this guideline.

11.3 Regional organizations

A State that is not a member of INTERPOL but that is a member of a regional organization that facilitates the tracing of illicit ammunition should make use of the assistance provided by the regional organization, for example:

11.3.1. Economic Community of West African States

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is mandated to assist member States in tracing illicit ammunition. An ECOWAS member State may request the ECOWAS Commission to initiate and conduct an international tracing operation on its behalf.

11.4 Investigations of violations of UN arms embargoes

In the context of tracing illicit ammunition, States shall provide all possible cooperation to UN panels investigating possible violations of arms embargos mandated by the UN Security Council.

11.5 Nongovernmental actors

Nongovernmental actors can also provide valuable cooperation and assistance in building national tracing capacities, for example by providing training in the correct identification and safe disposal of recovered ammunition.

Research by nongovernmental actors may also uncover previously unknown cases of diversion that can be followed up on and investigated.
11.6 Information exchange

International information exchanges in the context of tracing operations can be complemented with broader information exchanges that facilitate the identification of points of diversion and overall trafficking patterns. The following types of information can be useful in this regard:

a) nationally authorized manufacturers, brokers and dealers;

b) marking systems and techniques in use for marking at the time of manufacture and at import;

c) the means of concealment and routes used by criminals in trafficking illicit ammunition as well as the ways of detecting such means and routes;

d) transfers of ammunition (information concerning national legislation, existing practices and controls, etc.); and

e) practices in relation to existing government stockpiles (management, security, surplus, losses, theft and destruction).

12 Reporting on implementation of tracing measures

12.1 Frequency of reporting

National reports detailing efforts to implement the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (International Tracing Instrument) should be submitted every two years to the UN Secretary-General, via the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs. Such reports may form part of national reports on the implementation of the UN Programme of Action.

The ‘Guidelines for reporting on the implementation of the International Tracing Instrument’, available on the UN PoA-1SS website (www.poa-iss.org), may be used for this purpose.

12.2 Content of reports

National reports on tracing illicit ammunition should include:

a) contact details of the national point(s) of contact on tracing;

b) details of national efforts to implement the International Tracing Instrument;

c) national experiences in tracing illicit ammunition, including main challenges, responses and opportunities;

d) measures taken to ensure that the national tracing system is capable of undertaking timely and reliable domestic traces and of initiating and responding to international tracing requests; and

e) measures taken in the field of international cooperation and assistance on tracing including, as relevant, 1) international cooperation and/or assistance rendered and/or received; 2) priority assistance needs; and 3) types of assistance and cooperation that can be offered to build national tracing capacities.
Annex A
(normative)

References

The following normative documents contain provisions, which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this part of the guide. Any subsequent amendments to, or revisions of, the date references listed below do not apply. However, parties to agreements based on this part of the guide are encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent editions of the normative documents indicated below. For undated references listed below, the latest edition of the normative document referred to applies. Members of ISO maintain registers of currently valid ISO or EN:

a) Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UN Firearms Protocol);

b) IATG 01.40:2015[E] Terms, glossary and definitions. UNODA. 2015;

c) International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (International Tracing Instrument); and


The latest version/edition of these references should be used. The UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UN ODA) holds copies of all references used in this guide. A register of the latest version/edition of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines is maintained by UN ODA, and can be read on the IATG website: www.un.org/disarmament/un-safeguard/. National authorities, employers and other interested bodies and organisations should obtain copies before commencing conventional ammunition stockpile management programmes.

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7 Where copyright permits.
Annex B
(informative)

References

The following informative documents contain provisions, which should also be consulted to provide further background information to the contents of this guide:


b) ISACS 05.40 Weapons: Collection. UN CASA. 2011;

c) Implementation of the International Tracing Instrument – Guidelines for National Reporting http://www.poa-iss.org/poa/poa.aspx. UN; and


The latest version/edition of these references should be used. The UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UN ODA) holds copies of all references used in this guide. A register of the latest version/edition of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines is maintained by UN ODA, and can be read on the IATG website: www.un.org/disarmament/un-saferguard/. National authorities, employers and other interested bodies and organisations should obtain copies before commencing conventional ammunition stockpile management programmes.
Annex C
(informative)
INTERPOL

C.1 General

The International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) is represented by a National Central Bureau in each of its 187 member States. Its primary task is to support law enforcement agencies in Member States in crime prevention and the conduct of criminal investigations. It offers member States secure global police communications services, operational data services and databases for police, and operational police support services.

INTERPOL is mandated to assist States in the implementation of the International Tracing Instrument, which the UN General Assembly adopted in 2005 (International Tracing Instrument, paragraphs 33 - 35). INTERPOL’s role is specified to facilitate tracing operations and assist in investigations to identify and trace illicit small arms ammunition when requested by a member State.

INTERPOL developed the INTERPOL Firearms Trace Request, which complements the existing communication system and provides an easy-to-use tool for law enforcement officers to trace ammunition that has been recovered during an investigation. INTERPOL also provides the INTERPOL Firearms Reference Table (IFRT) to assist member States in the correct identification of firearms recovered in crime, which may assist in identifying the ammunition also recovered at the crime scene.

C.2 INTERPOL Firearms Tracing Request (IFTR)

INTERPOL’s Firearms Programme comprises a three-pronged approach to assist member States with obtaining the best weapons and ammunition intelligence possible using the information on the outside of the firearm and the data that can be gleaned from the inside of the firearm to prevent and solve crime. The INTERPOL Firearms Trace Request gives the investigator the international means to request, from the country of manufacture or legal import, the firearm’s ownership history. It is available on the INTERPOL I-24/7 Network in all four official INTERPOL languages.

Illicit firearms traced through INTERPOL are checked against firearms reported to INTERPOL by member States as lost or stolen. INTERPOL also checks available information in relation to the individual from whom the firearm was recovered, as well as checking his/her passport and vehicle against relevant INTERPOL databases. Global participation in firearms tracing through INTERPOL would establish the system as a crucial central point for tracing illicit firearms in the context of law enforcement investigations. Ammunition may also be included in such requests.

C.3 INTERPOL Firearms Reference Table (IFRT)

INTERPOL assists member States in the identification of illicit firearms by hosting a comprehensive and continually upgraded library of most firearms types and models in existence. The INTERPOL Firearms Reference Table (IFRT) facilitates the correct identification of the recovered firearm prior to submitting a tracing request. It forms part of INTERPOL’s aim to provide a web-based solution to identifying and tracing illicit firearms. Knowledge of the firearm used assists in the identification of complimentary ammunition.

The IFRT is an easy-to-use system containing over 250,000 firearms references and 57,000 high quality images. The web-based application, currently available in French and English, was developed by INTERPOL using data supplied and annually updated by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.
C.4 INTERPOL Ballistic Information Network (IBIN)

The third prong of INTERPOL’s Firearms Programme is the INTERPOL Ballistic Information Network (IBIN), currently under development. IBIN will be the first large-scale international platform for the sharing and comparing of ballistics data. IBIN will connect member States/territories that have the IBIS© technology and wish to participate. It will also connect States or regional alliances that may acquire the system in the future.

It is anticipated that IBIN will link separate crimes across international borders that would otherwise not have been known to law enforcement. Over time, analysis of the shared ballistic data is expected to reveal illicit firearm trafficking routes and provide police with critical information about firearm traffickers and other violent criminals.
Amendment record

Management of IATG amendments

The IATG guidelines are subject to formal review on a five-yearly basis, however this does not preclude amendments being made within these five-year periods for reasons of operational safety and efficiency or for editorial purposes.

As amendments are made to this IATG they will be given a number, and the date and general details of the amendment shown in the table below. The amendment will also be shown on the cover page of the IATG by the inclusion under the edition date of the phrase ‘incorporating amendment number(s) 1 etc.’

As the formal reviews of each IATG are completed new editions may be issued. Amendments up to the date of the new edition will be incorporated into the new edition and the amendment record table cleared. Recording of amendments will then start again until a further review is carried out.

The most recently amended, and thus extant, IATG will be the versions that are posted on the UN SaferGuard IATG website at www.un.org/disarmament/un-saferguard/.

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