United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs

United Nations Disarmament Yearbook
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The United Nations DISARMAMENT YEARBOOK

Volume 39 (Part II): 2014

Guide to the user

The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, in print and electronic format, is designed to be a concise reference tool for diplomats, researchers, students and the general public on disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control issues under consideration by the international community.

Part I of the 2014 Yearbook was published in April this year. It contains all the resolutions and decisions of the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly.

Part II is divided among the main multilateral issues under consideration throughout the year. It presents developments and trends on the issues; a convenient issue-oriented timeline; and short summaries of First Committee and General Assembly actions taken on resolutions and decisions.

As much of the background information is condensed, it is helpful to consult previous editions for expanded historical knowledge. Factual information, presented where possible in tabular form, is provided in the appendices. Websites of United Nations departments and specialized agencies, intergovernmental organizations, research institutes and non-governmental organizations appear as footnotes.

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Foreword

It is my pleasure to introduce the thirty-ninth edition of the United Nations Disarmament Yearbook.

The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs annually produces numerous important and high-quality publications. The Yearbook, however, is our centrepiece—a chronicle of the developments over the last calendar year in disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control.

This publication is a record of the international community’s efforts to create a safer and more secure world through the regulation, control and outright banning of weapons, including the most dangerous invented by humanity.

The Yearbook is also a narrative of the work done by, and the challenges to, the United Nations disarmament machinery—the First Committee of the General Assembly, the Conference on Disarmament and the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

It is with a great deal of pride that I am able to say the Yearbook has become an indispensable tool for diplomats, civil society, students, academia and all those with an interest in the multilateral diplomacy of disarmament.

2014 was demonstrative of the increasingly complex nature of the international environment. Enduring problems and conflicts mixed with new and emerging challenges. Rising East-West tensions and a return to cold war–style rhetoric seemingly dampened the prospects for nuclear disarmament and arms control. Internecine conflict and the continued growth of powerful non-State actors armed with heavy weapons led to a number of severe humanitarian crises. 2014 created more displaced persons than at any time since the end of the Second World War. New threats, including cyberthreats, tested existing international norms and structures.

Yet 2014 was also a year of genuine highlights. Chief among these was the entry into force on 24 December of the Arms Trade Treaty. That this historic treaty entered into force only 18 months after it was opened for signature is a truly remarkable achievement in arms control. As at 24 December, the Treaty had 130 signatures and 61 ratifications. In the words of the Secretary-General, this “marks the opening of a new chapter in our collective efforts to bring responsibility, accountability, and transparency to the global arms trade”.

The Arms Trade Treaty imposes the highest possible common standards to regulate the global arms trade and to prevent and eradicate illicit trade and diversion, including to warlords, human rights abusers, terrorists and criminal organizations. For the millions around the world suffering as a result of armed violence, the Treaty is a beacon of hope. Its successful entry into force is a result of the diligence of States, civil society and the United Nations.
A second significant achievement in this field in 2014 was the removal of the Syrian Arab Republic’s declared chemical-weapon stockpile. Under the auspices of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons–United Nations Joint Mission for the Elimination of the Chemical Weapons Programme of the Syrian Arab Republic, the declared chemical weapons of the Syrian Arab Republic have been removed and destroyed. The destruction of the Syrian chemical-weapon infrastructure has already begun and will be completed in 2015.

The successful completion of the Joint Mission is a signature outcome for disarmament and non-proliferation, but the international community now needs to take the steps to prevent the future use of chemical weapons—in the Syrian Arab Republic or anywhere else.

2014’s track record on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation was mixed. On the one hand the five recognized nuclear-weapon States presented reports using a common framework on their nuclear programmes and implementation of disarmament commitments to the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and all nuclear-weapon States signed the protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia that will, when ratified, provide binding negative security assurances to States parties. On the other hand, all nuclear-armed States continued to modernize their nuclear arsenals and, in the case of some nuclear-armed States, expand them.

The movement to bring to the forefront the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons gained further ground in 2014. Conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons were held in Mexico in February and in Austria in December 2014. The latter was attended by 158 States, including four nuclear-armed States. At the General Assembly’s First Committee in October, New Zealand delivered a statement on behalf of 155 States. These numbers highlight the real concerns a great many States, as well as civil society, maintain about the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons.

On non-proliferation, there were positive developments towards a comprehensive agreement to assuage international concerns over the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear programme, including through the entry into force of an interim Joint Plan of Action, which was extended until mid-2015. However, the Six-Party Talks on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula remained suspended.

At the regional level, the United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament in Africa (UNREC in Togo), Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC in Peru), and the Asia and the Pacific (UNRCPD in Nepal) continued to play a vital role in peacebuilding. They focused on education, capacity-building to implement disarmament treaties and combating
illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, including through training of
government and civil society representatives and assisting with the destruction
of firearms and ammunition.

2014 was a year of milestones for several disarmament initiatives. It
marks the tenth anniversary of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). The
resolution, designed to prevent nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and
their delivery systems from falling into the hands of non-State actors, is now
a critical pillar of the non-proliferation regime. Last year also saw the Fifth
Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the
Third Review Conference of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their
Destruction. Both of these treaties, which continue to grow in strength, outlaw
categories of some of the world’s most inhumane weapons.

Humanitarian concerns also drove discussions on emerging disarmament-
related issues, including new technologies. The Convention on Prohibitions
or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May
Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects
considered the issue of “lethal autonomous weapons systems”—weapons that
can select and engage a target without human intervention. The issue of armed
unmanned aerial vehicles (or “drones”) in conflict and counter-terrorism
operations has already garnered attention, including from the Human Rights
Council. In 2014, the Secretary-General, on the advice of his Advisory Board
on Disarmament Matters, commissioned a study on armed drones, covering
topics such as the need for improved transparency, robust oversight and
accountability measures, and the applicability of international humanitarian
law.

On the issue of emerging challenges, the international community
continues to grapple with how to confront the security dimensions of
developments in information and communications technologies (ICT). States
have become increasingly concerned about cyberthreats, as was reflected in
the report of a Group of Government Experts to the General Assembly. Given
the centrality of ICT to our daily lives, this is an issue that will only grow in
importance.

The following chapters provide greater detail on each of the issues
outlined above. It is my hope that from these pages readers will reach the view
that, in an increasingly complex international environment, the importance
of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control measures—particularly
multilateral measures—remains vital in stabilizing forces for international
peace and security.

Kim Won-soo
High Representative for Disarmament Affairs
September 2015
Acknowledgements

The production of volume 39 (Part II) of the United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, like all previous productions, was a team effort involving the considerable time and energy of many staff members of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. The publication was produced under the overall direction of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Kim Won-soo, and the Director of the Office, Virginia Gamba.


Curtis J. Raynold
Editor-in-Chief
New York, September 2015
Multilateral disarmament timeline
Highlights, 2014

- Conference on Disarmament, 1st session (20 Jan.-28 Mar.)
- United Nations Disarmament Commission session (7-25 Apr.)
- Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention entry into force, 15th Anniversary (1 Mar.)
- Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 3rd session (28 Apr.-9 May)
- Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia entry into force, 5th Anniversary (21 Mar.)
- Conference on Disarmament, 2nd session (12 May-27 June)
- Third Review Conference of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (23-27 June)
- Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies entry into force, 30th Anniversary (11 July)
- Pelindaba Treaty entry into force, 5th Anniversary (15 July)
- Conference on Disarmament, 3rd session (28 July-12 Sept.)
- Fifth Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (16-20 June)
- Sixth Review Conference of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (23-27 June)
- First International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (26 Sept.)
- Arms Trade Treaty entry into force (24 Dec.)
- Antarctic Treaty opening for signature, 55th Anniversary (1 Dec.)
- Sixty-ninth session of the First Committee of the General Assembly (7 Oct.-4 Nov.)
- Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson (centre) addresses the opening meeting of the Disarmament Commission. © UN Photo/Paulo Filgueiras
- Sigrid Kaag, Special Coordinator of the Joint Mission, inspecting preparations at the Port of Latakia, Syrian Arab Republic. © OPCW-UN Joint Mission
Chapter I
Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation


**Chapter I**

**Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation**

*History has taught us many lessons about the dangers inherent in nuclear weapons. Possession does not prevent international disputes from occurring, but it makes conflicts more dangerous. Maintaining forces on alert does not provide safety, but it increases the likelihood of accidents. Upholding doctrines of nuclear deterrence does not counter proliferation, but it makes the weapons more desirable. Growing ranks of nuclear armed-States does not ensure global stability, but instead undermines it.*

**Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary-General**

**Development and trends, 2014**

**Throughout 2014, the humanitarian approach to nuclear disarmament continued to grow and gather a renewed momentum among Governments and civil society campaigning for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. During the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly, at the First Committee, a total of 155 States endorsed the joint statement on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons delivered by New Zealand, and a total of 20 States endorsed the separate joint statement made by Australia.**

Mexico and Austria hosted major international conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, building upon the process initiated by Norway in 2013. These conferences fostered a greater understanding of the risks and long-term consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and culminated in a national pledge by Austria to work with all interested stakeholders to identify and pursue effective measures to bridge the legal gap and thus secure the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons.

While the humanitarian discourse led to new understandings about the urgent necessity of nuclear disarmament on humanitarian grounds, the deterioration of East-West relations impacted prospects for progress in nuclear arms reductions. The situation in Ukraine undermined the credibility of security assurances provided to that country in 1994 in connection with its accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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2 For the list of countries and the text of the statements, see also the section entitled “Joint statements at the sixty-ninth session of the First Committee” on page 56.

The need for urgent progress in nuclear disarmament was not reflected in the outcome of the work of key United Nations disarmament bodies. The Conference on Disarmament remained unable throughout its 2014 session to commence substantive negotiations or deliberations on the basis of an agreed programme of work. The United Nations Disarmament Commission ended a third consecutive three-year cycle without agreement on matters of substance, amid particularly irreconcilable differences on its agenda item dealing with recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Despite the continued stagnation, the United Nations General Assembly continued to utilize innovative approaches, including the observance of the first International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September and the establishment of the Group of Governmental Experts for a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

The third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference successfully completed all the necessary procedural arrangements, including the agenda for the Review Conference. As in previous cycles, however, the Committee was ultimately unable to agree on recommendations for consideration by the Review Conference. The discussions of States parties pointed to the critical issues that would be faced at the Review Conference. These included, for example, the status of the 64-point Action Plan\(^4\) of the 2010 Final Document and questions as to whether unfulfilled commitments, particularly those related to nuclear disarmament, should be strengthened, built upon or given implementation deadlines. The possible convening of the Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction continued to be a major concern for many States parties and a factor that could affect prospects for a successful Review Conference.

The nuclear-weapon States continued their engagement towards fulfilling commitments they had made at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Meeting in Beijing in April, they reviewed their progress on transparency, confidence-building and verification measures, as well as on the development of a glossary of key nuclear terms. Using a standardized template, the five

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States submitted reports\(^5\) to the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the NPT Review Conference.

While there was no measurable progress towards securing the remaining ratifications required to bring the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty\(^6\) into force, the ratifying and signatory States continued to promote this objective. The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization completed another major step in demonstrating the readiness of the Treaty’s verification regime by conducting its largest Integrated Field Exercise hosted by Jordan to simulate an on-site inspection.

There was some progress in 2014 towards the consolidation and further establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. In May, the nuclear-weapon States signed the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia,\(^7\) granting assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to the members of the zone. The facilitator and co-conveners of the postponed Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, together with the States of the region, held two additional rounds of consultations in the first half of the year. These efforts stalled during the second half of the year, due in part to growing tensions and active conflicts in the Middle East region, as well as continued differences among the parties on important aspects of the Conference. From January onward, the E3+3 and the Islamic Republic of Iran implemented their respective commitments under the Joint Plan of Action\(^8\) and pursued negotiations towards a comprehensive solution. While the parties were unable to complete negotiations within the initial period provided for under the Joint Plan of Action, they made sufficient progress to justify the extension of the arrangement for two additional periods until the middle of 2015. While the Islamic Republic of Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency made some progress in the first half of the year towards resolving outstanding issues, they struggled to address substantive questions related to a possible military dimension in connection with Iranian nuclear activities.

The participants of the long-suspended Six-Party Talks made no discernible progress in 2014 towards the resumption of negotiations. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea appeared to continue to operate its uranium enrichment and plutonium production facilities and is also believed to have continued its development of long-range ballistic missiles.

The Netherlands hosted the third Nuclear Security Summit at The Hague from 24 to 25 March, attended by 53 States and four international organizations. In the Summit Communiqué, the participants welcomed the contribution made by the United Nations to strengthening nuclear security, citing, in particular, its work in promoting the implementation of international conventions and protocols against terrorism, including nuclear terrorism, as well as Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). The United States announced that it would host the next Nuclear Security Summit in 2016.

Issues related to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference held its third session in New York from 28 April to 9 May, with Enrique Román-Morey (Peru) serving as Chair. Representatives from 130 States parties, 1 observer, 8 international organizations and 67 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) participated in the session. The Committee adopted

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9 Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen and Zambia.

10 State of Palestine.


a final procedural report, which recorded the decisions on the organization of the 2015 Review Conference, including those adopted at the third session, which crucially related to its agenda and rules of procedure.\textsuperscript{13}

In her statement\textsuperscript{14} to the Preparatory Committee, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs emphasized the significance of the third session as it must attempt to translate principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, into concrete recommendations to the Review Conference. She noted that it was “a crucial moment” in implementing the Action Plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference and appealed to all States parties to “take bold steps” to accomplish general and complete disarmament in good faith.

At its first meeting, the Committee adopted the draft provisional agenda of the 2015 Review Conference. It also agreed to recommend that the Main Committees of the Review Conference be chaired by the Chairs of the three consecutive sessions of the Preparatory Committee.


\textsuperscript{13} NPT/CONF.2015/1.

Five meetings were set aside for a general debate related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee, during which 81 statements were made by States parties and representatives of international organizations. States parties reaffirmed their commitment to the NPT and to achieving a world free of nuclear weapons in accordance with the objectives of the Treaty. They underlined the fundamental importance of effective and balanced implementation of the Treaty across its three pillars; namely, nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. They also stressed the importance of full compliance with all the Treaty’s provisions and universal adherence. The representative of the Marshall Islands, citing nuclear detonations in his country and the suffering these caused, underlined the necessity of pursuing peace and security to realize a world without nuclear weapons, and urged all NPT members to work towards achieving effective and secure disarmament. In this context, some States noted that, on 24 April, the Government of the Marshall Islands had filed cases in the International Court of Justice against the five NPT nuclear-weapon States (NWS), as well as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, India, Israel and Pakistan, claiming that these States had failed to comply with disarmament obligations pursuant to Article VI of the NPT and customary international law to pursue negotiations for the elimination of nuclear weapons.

States parties recalled the necessity of implementing decisions 1 and 2, as well as the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the Final Document adopted at the 2000 Review Conference, and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted at the 2010 Review Conference. While acknowledging some progress in the implementation of the commitments contained in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted at the 2010 Review Conference, States parties recognized that greater efforts towards implementation were required. Many States parties expressed concern over the slow pace of implementation of the 2010 Action Plan, in particular its disarmament obligations, and made a number of recommendations on how to implement disarmament obligations further.

With respect to nuclear disarmament, the first pillar of the NPT, many States parties also reiterated their concern over current modernization programmes for weapons, delivery systems and related infrastructure. While

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15 See NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/SR.1-3, 5, 6 and 17.
16 The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, on 11 May 1995, adopted without a vote a package of three decisions, including Decision 1, entitled “Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty”; and Decision 2, entitled “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament”.
acknowledging some steps by the NWS to reduce the number of weapons in their stockpiles, many States parties expressed serious concern over the continued reliance on nuclear weapons in defence and security policies, and over upgrade plans announced by some. With regard to transparency and, as mandated by the 2010 Review Conference, the five NPT nuclear weapon States submitted national reports using an agreed common template on all three pillars of the NPT.

On nuclear non-proliferation, the second pillar of the Treaty, a large number of States recognized the importance of strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency comprehensive safeguards and called for adherence to the Additional Protocol. During the general debate, many delegations also reiterated their deep regret at the failure to convene, in 2012, the Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in accordance with the agreement reached at the 2010 Review Conference.

With regard to the third pillar, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, States parties reaffirmed the right of every State to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with the Treaty.

Following the general exchange of views, the Committee devoted 11 meetings to issue-specific discussions, organized into three clusters and three blocks of specific issues. The clusters were the following: (a) non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security; (b) non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones; and (c) the inalienable right of all States parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of the NPT. The specific issues addressed were the following: (a) nuclear disarmament and security assurances; (b) regional issues, such as the Middle East and the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East; and (c) peaceful uses of nuclear energy and other provisions of the Treaty including improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process.

Cluster 1

States parties recalled the unequivocal undertaking of the NWS to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament and underlined the need for the full implementation of concrete actions leading to nuclear disarmament as contained in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted at the 2010 Review Conference. A number of States parties expressed the view that the success of the 2010 Review Conference would be judged by the extent to which demonstrated progress was made within the present review cycle.

Building on the momentum of concern arising from the 2010 NPT Review Conference regarding the catastrophic humanitarian consequences
of the use of nuclear weapons, States parties welcomed the resurgence of discourse on the humanitarian dimension of nuclear disarmament. Many States parties referred to the unacceptable harm that would result from a nuclear detonation and expressed further concern over the wider and longer-term impact on socioeconomic development. They underlined their expectation that the humanitarian consequences would continue to be addressed during the current review cycle. Many States parties welcomed the second Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons held in Nayarit, Mexico, on 13 and 14 February, as well as the follow-up conference held in Vienna in December. Following from the discussions at the Nayarit Conference, they stressed their concern that even the detonation of a single nuclear weapon in a densely populated area would cause profound social and political harm, and require several decades of reconstruction of infrastructure and the regeneration of economic activities, trade, communications, health facilities and schools. They looked forward to these ongoing discussions and encouraged the five NWS to engage in these deliberations.

The NWS informed States parties of the outcome of the most recent “P5” conference, held in Beijing from 14 to 15 April, to review progress towards fulfilling their commitments made at the 2010 NPT Review Conference and to continue discussions on issues related to all three pillars of the NPT. Pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 adopted at the 2010 Review Conference regarding transparency, the five NWS submitted national reports\(^\text{19}\) using an agreed common template on all three pillars of the NPT at this session of the Preparatory Committee. A number of States welcomed the efforts of the NWS and recalled the importance of regular reports on their efforts to implement their obligations and commitments under the NPT. The Russian Federation announced that the NWS were planning to hold another P5 conference in the United Kingdom in 2015.

Many States parties also welcomed the steps taken to implement the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms\(^\text{20}\) by the United States and the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation and the United States were encouraged to continue negotiations to reach greater reductions in all types of nuclear weapons, including non-strategic and non-deployed nuclear weapons.

Many States parties stressed the need for the negotiation of a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including a nuclear weapons convention. Some States parties called for the elaboration of a comprehensive and legally binding framework committing all States to a world without nuclear weapons comprising mutually reinforcing components, backed by a strong system of verification and clearly

\(^{19}\) NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/13-17.

defined benchmarks and timelines for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons. It was recalled that achieving progress on nuclear disarmament was a shared responsibility of all States.

States parties maintained that the total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. They recalled that non-nuclear-weapon States had a legitimate interest in receiving unequivocal and legally binding security assurances from NWS not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them. Many States parties emphasized the need to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument in this regard and called for the establishment of a subsidiary body at the 2015 Review Conference on this issue.

While acknowledging some progress on the reduction of the number of nuclear weapons, many States parties expressed concern that the total estimated number of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, still amounted to several thousands and that some States continued to build up their arsenals. They also expressed concern regarding the continued role of nuclear weapons in national and regional military doctrines, noting that quantitative reductions in nuclear weapons should be accompanied by steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in all such concepts, doctrines and policies. A number of States parties stressed that they remained deeply concerned at the maintenance of many nuclear weapons on high alert status and regretted the lack of declared or assumed reductions in operational status since the 2010 Review Conference. Many States parties continued to emphasize that concrete and meaningful measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems would represent an important interim nuclear disarmament step.

States parties expressed deep concern at the continuing stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament, including the persistent failure to agree on and implement an agreed programme of work, notwithstanding further attempts to achieve consensus. Despite reiteration of dissatisfaction with the ongoing stalemate in the disarmament machinery, some States parties noted positive developments in the re-establishment of the informal working group on a programme of work for the Conference on Disarmament and the discussions of the Open-ended Working Group to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations pursuant to General Assembly resolution 67/56 of 3 December 2012. Many States parties also welcomed the holding of the high-level meeting on nuclear disarmament in September 2013 and called for the full implementation of follow-up actions contained in General Assembly resolution 68/32 of 5 December 2013, including the convening of an international conference in 2018 on nuclear disarmament to review progress in this regard.

States parties continued to underscore the urgent importance of bringing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty into force. All States that had not yet done so were called upon to sign and ratify the Treaty without delay,
particularly the eight remaining States whose ratifications were necessary for
the Treaty to enter into force. Pending the negotiation and entry into force
of the Treaty, some States parties called for the NWS and all other relevant
States to maintain or implement declared moratoriums on the production of
fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

States parties also exchanged some views regarding the importance of
disarmament and non-proliferation education and the role of civil society in
this regard.

Cluster 2

States parties reaffirmed that the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) was the competent authority responsible for verifying and
assuring compliance by States parties with their safeguards agreements.
They welcomed the fact that nine additional States had brought into force
comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA since the 2010 Review
Conference, and urged the 12 States parties that had not yet done so to bring
their comprehensive safeguards agreements into force as soon as possible.
They encouraged all States that had not yet done so to conclude and bring into
force additional protocols, leading to their universalization.

They welcomed the fact that 122 States parties had brought additional
protocols into force, including the 21 States parties that had done so since
the 2010 Review Conference.\textsuperscript{21} Many States parties noted that comprehensive
safeguards agreements were not sufficient for the IAEA to provide credible
assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.
A number of States parties considered that comprehensive safeguards
agreements and additional protocols represented the current verification
standard. Many States parties noted that it was the sovereign decision of
any State to conclude an additional protocol and emphasized the need to
distinguish between legal obligations and voluntary confidence-building
measures. A number of States parties welcomed the work undertaken by the
IAEA in the conceptualization and the further implementation of State-level
approaches to safeguards in order to increase the efficiency and effectiveness
of the safeguards system.

Many States parties expressed concern with respect to matters of
non-compliance with non-proliferation obligations, and a number of States
parties emphasized that responses should be pursued by diplomatic means, in
accordance with the provisions of the Treaty, the Charter of the United Nations
and other relevant legal obligations. Delegations underlined the significance

safeguards/safeguards-legal-framework/additional-protocol/status-of-additional-protocol
of maintaining and fully observing the principle of confidentiality with respect to safeguards information.

States parties recalled the need to ensure that their nuclear-related exports did not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. A number of States parties expressed the view that export controls were a legitimate, necessary and desirable means of implementing the obligations of States parties under article III of the Treaty.

Many States parties expressed concern related to the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-State actors might acquire nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. Delegations acknowledged the national commitments made at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague and noted the continuing efforts to implement The Hague Communiqué.22 A number of States parties looked forward to the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit in the United States to further strengthen nuclear security.

States parties reaffirmed the importance of effective physical protection of all nuclear material and the need to strengthen international cooperation in this respect. A number of States parties also noted the need to strengthen the protection of radioactive sources. States parties emphasized that, when developing nuclear energy, including nuclear power, the use of nuclear energy must be accompanied by appropriate and effective levels of security, consistent with States’ national legislation and respective international obligations. They considered that the IAEA had had a central role in efforts to improve the global nuclear security framework, and to promote its implementation.

Wide support was expressed for internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones. States parties welcomed the signing of the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone in Central Asia by all NWS. They also welcomed the preparations to convene, in 2015, the Third Conference of the States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia.

States parties expressed continued disappointment and regret at the postponement of the Conference, that was to be held in 2012, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. They noted the report of the facilitator,23 Jaakko Laajava (Finland), and expressed appreciation for his efforts. They also expressed appreciation for the constructive engagement of the States of the region, including at the informal consultations held in Glion, Switzerland. States parties noted the intention of the facilitator and conveners to host further informal meetings in order to focus on the preparations for the

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Conference, including its agenda, modalities, rules of procedure and timing. Many States parties expressed support for convening the Conference as soon as possible before the end of 2014. They also recalled the importance of a process leading to the full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and the practical steps to that end endorsed at the 2010 Review Conference. They expressed serious concern over the nuclear programme of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, including its announcements regarding the resumption of nuclear activities at the Yongbyon site, its continuing uranium enrichment activities, and its construction of a light water reactor. They reaffirmed that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea could not have the status of an NWS in accordance with the Treaty. They called upon the country not to conduct any further nuclear tests, to fulfil without delay all of its international obligations, to return at an early date to the NPT and to abandon all nuclear weapons programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. States parties called for the resumption of diplomatic dialogue on the peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

States parties welcomed the agreement on a Joint Plan of Action between the E3+3 and the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as the Joint Statement on a Framework for Cooperation signed by the IAEA and the Islamic Republic of Iran. They noted that the IAEA had confirmed that the nuclear-related measures set out in the Joint Plan of Action were being implemented as planned. They also noted the progress in the implementation of verification activities under the Framework for Cooperation. Many States parties emphasized the urgent need for further concrete steps leading to the resolution of all outstanding issues, as well as for a political solution that restored international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran while fully respecting its right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in conformity with the Treaty. A number of States parties called for the full implementation of the resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council and IAEA Board of Governors in that regard.

Many States parties continued to call for the resolution of outstanding issues with respect to the nuclear activities of the Syrian Arab Republic in full cooperation with the IAEA. They called upon the Syrian Arab Republic to comply with its safeguards agreement. The Syrian Arab Republic reiterated that it was committed to that agreement.

**Cluster 3**

States parties recalled that nothing in the Treaty should be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop

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research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without
discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty, and
that that right constituted one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty.
Many delegations stressed that that right must be exercised in conformity with
obligations under the Treaty.

States parties emphasized the value and importance of the IAEA technical
cooperation programme, particularly in the areas of human health, food and
agriculture, water resources, environmental protection, industrial application,
nuclear and radiation safety, and nuclear energy. A number of States parties
recalled the need to strengthen the IAEA technical cooperation programme
in assisting developing States parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy
and thus helping to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. States parties
emphasized the need for continued efforts, within the IAEA, to enhance
the effectiveness, efficiency and transparency of its technical cooperation
programme and to ensure that IAEA resources for technical cooperation
activities were sufficient, assured and predictable. Many Member States also
expressed their support for the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative and encouraged
all parties to contribute to this valuable initiative.

States parties emphasized the central role of the IAEA in enhancing the
global nuclear safety regime through the sharing of lessons learned from the
accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station and implementing
the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety\textsuperscript{25} adopted by the General Conference
in 2011, including through its ongoing international expert meetings, safety
assessments and peer review service missions. They also recommended that
the 2015 Review Conference emphasize the importance of States continuing
to take active steps to fulfil the actions contained in the Action Plan on Nuclear
Safety as a matter of priority and to identify further scope for enhancing
nuclear safety.

Many States parties noted the continuing efforts of the IAEA related
to implementing the various decisions of the Board of Governors pertaining
to assurances of supply. They emphasized that multilateral approaches
to the nuclear fuel cycle should be economically viable, sustainable,
non-discriminatory, predictable and transparent under the auspices of the
IAEA and that all technical, legal, political and economic implications and
complexities should be taken into account.

States parties that had not yet done so were called upon to become
parties to conventions on nuclear safety. Delegations also recalled the need
for States to put into force a civil nuclear liability regime by becoming parties
to relevant international instruments or adopting suitable national legislations.

\textsuperscript{25} Available from https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/actionplans.pdf (accessed 17 June
2015).
Regarding the universality of the Treaty, States parties again called on India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States promptly and without conditions, and to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements as required by the Treaty. They also called on South Sudan to accede to the Treaty.

A number of States parties called for further discussion pertaining to article X, paragraph 1, on withdrawal from the Treaty, including possible responses to a notice of withdrawal, and, in the event of a withdrawal, the continued application of IAEA safeguards, and the disposition of equipment and materials acquired or developed under safeguards while party to the Treaty. States parties affirmed that they did not support efforts to reinterpret or restrict the sovereign right of withdrawal, as these could be detrimental to the implementation of the Treaty.

Pursuant to his mandate, the Chair presented delegations with draft recommendations on all three pillars of the NPT—nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy—as well as on regional issues and other provisions of the Treaty. While some States parties felt that the draft recommendations could serve as a basis for work towards a consensus outcome, some States firmly held the view that there was not sufficient time available to reach agreement on all issues during the session. The Chair therefore decided to issue his draft recommendations as a working paper under his own authority.

**Issues related to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty**

**Entry into force and universality**

In 2014, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) moved closer to universality after Niue and the Congo ratified the Treaty in March and September, respectively, bringing the total number of ratifications to 163 with 183 States signatories. These additional ratifications have reaffirmed the important role of the CTBT within the international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime.

**Seventh CTBT Ministerial Meeting**

The seventh biennial Ministerial Meeting convened by the Friends of the CTBT took place at the United Nations in New York on 26 September. During the meeting, high-level representatives from over 90 CTBT States signatories, including nearly 30 foreign ministers, reaffirmed their

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commitment to the CTBT as a core element of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. The participating ministers joined the United Nations Secretary-General in urging the eight remaining Annex 2 States\textsuperscript{29} to ratify the Treaty without delay in order to achieve its earliest entry into force.

Convened by the Friends of the CTBT, in cooperation with the Co-Presidents of the eighth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT, Hungary and Indonesia, the meeting was chaired by Fumio Kishida (Japan). In his opening remarks, the Secretary-General called on all members of the international community to “do everything possible to secure this Treaty’s entry into force for the sake of our planet and all living beings”.\textsuperscript{30}

The meeting adopted a joint ministerial statement\textsuperscript{31} calling for the entry into force of the CTBT. The Ministers acknowledged the importance of the Treaty’s entry into force as “a vital step towards the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons”. The statement further highlighted the role of the Group of Eminent Persons in assisting in the process of entry into force and stressed the importance of the on-site inspection simulation, the Integrated Field Exercise 2014 in Jordan.

**Group of Eminent Persons**

A meeting of the Group of Eminent Persons (GEM) was held in Stockholm on 11 and 12 April, bringing together a number of senior statesmen, active and former politicians and internationally recognized experts to promote the entry into force of the CTBT and to reinvigorate international endeavours towards this goal.\textsuperscript{32} During the opening session, the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), Lassina Zerbo, outlined a strategy to secure ratification by the outstanding Annex 2 States. The Group agreed to promote the Treaty’s entry into force through multilayered engagement at the national, regional and global levels. Based on the outcome of the meeting, GEM members conducted outreach and engagement within four overarching categories: direct engagement with key role players, utilizing networks and

\textsuperscript{29} China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Pakistan and United States.


\textsuperscript{32} For more information on members of the group, see http://www.ctbto.org/specials/group-of- eminent-persons-gem/ (accessed 5 June 2015).
force multipliers, engagement at high-level events, and public and media outreach.

**International Day against Nuclear Tests**

To commemorate the 2014 International Day against Nuclear Tests on 29 August, a collection of paintings—mainly depicting the physical and psychological aspects of atomic testing in the 1950s and 1960s—was displayed at the United Nations Office at Vienna. The exhibition, sponsored by the Permanent Mission of Kazakhstan, concluded with a reception featuring statements by the CTBTO Executive Secretary, the Permanent Representative of Kazakhstan to the International Organizations in Vienna, Kairat Sarybay, the Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the International Organizations in Vienna and Chairperson of the CTBTO, Selwyn Das, as well as Doug Waterfield, Professor of Art at the University of Nebraska at Kearney. On display at the exhibition was Doug Waterfield’s “Doomtown” series, which depicted the phenomenon of atomic culture and the intense psychological symbol of the mushroom cloud. Other events related to the International Day included a special meeting on 10 September hosted by the President of the United Nations General Assembly to mark the International Day, and a special event in Washington, D.C., entitled “Nuclear Weapons Testing: History, Progress, Challenges” on 15 September.

**Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization**

The forty-second and forty-third sessions of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission were held on 16 and 17 June, respectively under the leadership of Toshiro Ozawa (Japan) and from 28 to 30 October under the leadership of Selwyn Das (Malaysia). In his opening statement, the Executive Secretary welcomed the participation of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs during the forty-third session and outlined much of the progress made by the Commission, praising the strong support that led to these accomplishments.

Among the accomplishments was the steady growth of the International Monitoring System (IMS), which comprises 321 monitoring stations, 16 radionuclide laboratories and 40 noble gas detection systems located across the globe in over 90 countries. As at December 2014, 281 facilities and 22 noble gas systems were certified. With three facilities and four noble gas systems certified in 2014, the operational capacity of the IMS has reached 90 per cent.

With the completion of the IMS in sight, future attention will be shifting to maintaining sustainability, cost effectiveness and financial viability of the CTBT verification regime. With this in mind, two strategic goals, the operation and sustainment of the verification system, and the development of on-site-
inspection operational capabilities, have been identified in the Organization’s mid-term strategy through 2017.

**Integrated Field Exercise 2014**

The second on-site inspection (OSI) exercise of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission, Integrated Field Exercise 2014 (IFE14), was held from 7 November to 9 December in Jordan. As the final verification measure under the CTBT, an OSI can be requested only upon the Treaty’s entry into force. In this regard, the IFE14 served to benchmark progress made since the last IFE, held in 2008 in Kazakhstan, in bridging previously identified operational capability gaps, identifying further areas for improvement and helping shape and inform subsequent efforts of the organization towards further developing OSI operational capability and readiness for entry into force of the CTBT. Involving four years of preparation, 150 tons of specialized equipment, over 200 international experts, and a budget of US$ 10 million, the IFE14 was the most complex and comprehensive exercise conducted by the CTBTO Preparatory Commission.

Jordan was selected to host the IFE14 by the Preparatory Commission through a competitive process, in part due to the country’s rich variety of geological features, which allows for the testing of OSI procedures and techniques under realistic conditions. Providing an inspection area on the banks of the Dead Sea for the exercise, Jordan demonstrated its commitment to strengthening the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation framework, in particular in the Middle East. The Executive Secretary paid tribute to the Government of Jordan for its outstanding leadership and cooperation with the CTBTO and the international community.

Preparations for the IFE14 started in 2010 with the launch of the “surrogate” inspectors training cycle. Between 2012 and 2014, the organization conducted a series of build-up exercises to prepare for the launch, pre-inspection and inspection phases, and post-inspection activities of an OSI within strict time frames. These training activities prepared participants for the specific roles that they had to play during the exercise.

The IFE14 was launched on 3 November, after a request for an OSI submitted by the fictional country of Alluvia was approved to be conducted in the fictional country of Maridia. The request triggered the activation of the Operations Support Centre located in Guntramsdorf, Austria. Within the OSI timelines, as stipulated by the Treaty, an inspection team deployed to Jordan on 6 November, and, following point of entry procedures, proceeded to set up the Base of Operations—a temporary settlement covering an area of 400 square metres on the borders of the proposed inspection area. The team included experts in seismology, geophysics, geology, radionuclides, radiation protection, communications, logistics, health and safety, and other disciplines.
During the five-week exercise, inspectors searched an inspection area of nearly 1,000 km² for signatures of a nuclear explosion. Inspectors utilized 15 of the 17 techniques permissible under the Treaty for both the initial and continuation periods. Some of the techniques were used for the first time in an OSI context.

As a constituent part of the IFE14, observers from 30 States signatories, international organizations, research organizations and GEM members were present in Jordan to witness field activities, including through a high-level event for dignitaries on 15 November, as well as through the resident, point of entry and technical observer programmes. In parallel, two briefings on the work of the Operations Support Centre during the IFE14 were provided to the Permanent Missions in Vienna. These events brought ministers and senior officials from a number of countries together to observe progress in the most comprehensive OSI simulation carried out to date.

During the IFE14, the Executive Secretary noted that the success of IFE14 would demonstrate the CTBTO capability to detect a hidden nuclear test through an OSI, creating confidence in the CTBT verification regime and encourage the remaining States to sign and ratify.

Science and Technology 2015 Conference

Preparations for the CTBT: Science and Technology 2015 Conference progressed throughout 2014. Three Conference goals were set up to enlarge the scientific community engaged in test-ban monitoring, to promote the wider scientific applications of data that are used for test-ban verification and to enhance the exchange of knowledge and ideas between the CTBTO and the broader scientific community. It was also decided that the Conference would address four main themes: the Earth as a complex system; events and their characterization; advances in sensors, networks and processing; and performance optimization.

The Conference will take place from 22 to 26 June 2015 at the Hofburg Palace in Vienna, Austria. It will provide an opportunity for the CTBTO Preparatory Commission to build and strengthen its relationship with the broader science and technological community in support of the CTBT.

Outreach activities

In 2014, the Preparatory Commission maintained interaction with the international community, including States, international organizations and civil society, such as academic institutions and the media.

With a view to promoting signatures and ratifications of the CTBT and to enhancing cooperation between the CTBTO and States signatories, the Executive Secretary made official visits to Argentina, the Czech Republic, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Germany, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, the Republic of Korea,
Slovakia, the Russian Federation, Sweden, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The Organization was also officially represented by the Executive Secretary at various international and regional conferences, seminars and workshops, including the following: the African Union Summit; the Forum for Security Co-operation of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe; the 130th session of the Inter-Parliamentary Union Assembly; the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference; the sixty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly; the third European Union Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Conference; the Workshop on the NPT held in Annecy, France; the Hoover Institution Conference entitled “The Power to Act: Advancing Nuclear Security to Prevent the Unthinkable”; the Summit on the Global Agenda of the World Economic Forum; the 2014 Moscow Nonproliferation Conference: Nuclear Energy, Disarmament and Nonproliferation; the Prague Agenda Conference; and the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons.

The CTBTO also took advantage of various global, regional and subregional conferences and other gatherings to enhance understanding of the CTBT and advance its entry into force, as well as sustain support for the expansion of the Treaty’s verification regime. On 19 and 20 May, the CTBTO Regional Conference for the South East Asia, Pacific and Far East (SEAPFE) region was hosted in Jakarta by the Government of Indonesia with the support of the European Union and Japan. The conference gave participants the opportunity to interact and discuss the technical, scientific, legal and political aspects of the Treaty, with a view to further increasing signatures and ratifications of the CTBT by SEAPFE countries.

A group of government representatives from selected non-ratifying States, including Comoros, Cuba, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Swaziland, Yemen and Zimbabwe, was invited to participate in the 2014 CTBT Public Policy Course: Verification through Diplomacy and Science, which took place in Vienna from 1 to 9 September. The objectives of this informational visit were to familiarize participants with the significance of the Treaty and the legal and technical aspects of its verification regime, as well as with the work of the Commission, and enable them to leverage the acquired knowledge in informing authorities in their countries about the CTBT.

A visit on 15 and 16 October to IMS station PS19/IS26 near Freyung, Germany, was organized by the Permanent Mission of Germany in Vienna, in cooperation with the CTBTO. There were more than 40 participants, including approximately 30 representatives from various Vienna-based permanent missions, the organizers and CTBTO staff members.
Integrated capacity-building, education and training

During the year, the CTBTO continued to organize integrated capacity-building, education and training activities that sought to enhance understanding of the Treaty and its verification regime, including the civil and scientific applications of the verification technologies, while promoting the entry into force and universalization of the CTBT.

CTBTO offered States signatories training courses and workshops in technologies associated with the IMS, the International Data Centre (IDC) and OSI, as well as on the political and legal aspects of the Treaty, thereby strengthening national scientific and decision-making capabilities in related areas. In some cases, equipment was provided to National Data Centres to increase their capacity to actively participate in the verification regime by accessing and analysing IMS data and IDC products. Such capacity-building activities enhanced the technical capabilities of States signatories, as well as those of the Commission by empowering all stakeholders to participate in implementing the Treaty on an equal footing.

As technologies expanded and improved, the knowledge and experience of designated personnel increase as well. Training courses were held at the headquarters of the Commission, as well as in numerous external locations with the assistance of the hosting States.

In addition to the CTBT Tutorial, comprising five individual modules available in the official United Nations languages and Portuguese, the Commission enhanced its interactive online modules by adding a component on the development of OSI capabilities and IFE14. These educational resources are available in various formats and across different platforms free of charge.

The 2014 CTBT Academic Forum was held in Vienna on 8 and 9 May with over 40 participants representing a broad range of academic and research institutions from 20 countries across Africa, Asia, Europe, North America and Latin America. The Forum explored the integration of political, legal and technical aspects of the CTBT in academic curricula and served as a platform for exchanging new ideas and approaches to pursue research related to the CTBT.

CTBTO also arranged a programme for a group of 25 United Nations Disarmament Fellows in tandem with the CTBT Public Policy Course, which included four individuals from non-ratifying States. In addition to participating in the online segment of the course and the simulation exercise, they also visited the IDC and test-bed IMS infrasound and seismic stations located in Vienna. This was the fifth year that CTBTO had hosted the United Nations Disarmament Fellows, representing an integral component of the Programme’s visit to the international organizations in Vienna.
In 2014, CTBTO offered research fellowships to graduate students, recent graduates and post-doctoral scientists to conduct research into developing original ideas and solutions in all areas of the CTBT. A particular focus of such research was the link between the scientific and diplomatic elements associated with the Treaty, as well as its entry into force.

**Bilateral agreements, multilateral discussions and other issues**

**Implementation of disarmament commitments by the nuclear-weapon States**

The nuclear-weapon States (NWS) continued their engagement through the “P5 process” on the implementation of their commitments agreed to at the 2010 NPT Review Conference and following from their meetings held in Geneva in 2013, Washington, D.C., in 2012, Paris in 2011, and London in 2009. China hosted the fifth meeting in this format on 14 and 15 April in Beijing.\(^{33}\) The NWS most notably advanced their work in particular on transparency, mutual confidence and verification. They also exchanged views on their respective nuclear doctrines, strategic stability and international security to gain better understanding and to build strategic trust.

With respect to their commitment to provide information to NPT States parties using a standard reporting form, NWS welcomed the achievement, under the leadership of France, of a reporting framework that was introduced in their respective national reports pursuant to actions 5, 20, and 21 of the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions agreed to at the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

The NWS reviewed the work carried out by the working group chaired by China on the glossary of key nuclear terms, which they considered to be important for increasing mutual understanding and for facilitating further discussions beyond the 2015 NPT Review Conference. The NWS reaffirmed their aim to present the outcome of the first phase of their work to the Review Conference.

The NWS announced their intention to hold a sixth meeting in London in 2015.

**Implementation of the New START**

The Russian Federation and the United States continued to work towards the implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction

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\(^{33}\) For more information, see the statement of the Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs of China during the 4th meeting of the First Committee on 9 October 2014 (A/C.1/69/PV.4, pp. 13-14).
and Limitation of Offensive Arms (New START).\footnote{34} From 18 to 28 February in Geneva, the two sides convened the seventh session of the Bilateral Consultative Commission, where they discussed practical issues related to implementation of the Treaty and adopted a decision on the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) for which telemetric information will be exchanged in 2014.\footnote{35}

There were signs in 2014 that increasing East-West tension and unresolved disputes over strategic weapons programmes, such as missile defence and long-range conventionally armed missiles,\footnote{36} could jeopardize the implementation of the New START Treaty and any effort to achieve a follow-on arrangement. None of these factors appeared to impact the operation of the Treaty in 2014, however.

According to data published by the parties pursuant to the biannual exchange of data required by the Treaty, as at 1 September, the parties possessed aggregate total numbers of strategic offensive arms as laid out in the table below.

Table 1. Aggregate numbers of strategic offensive arms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of data</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Russian Federation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers</td>
<td>749</td>
<td>528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warheads on deployed ICBMs, on deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers</td>
<td>1,642</td>
<td>1,643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, deployed and non-deployed launchers of SLBMs, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers</td>
<td>912</td>
<td>911</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{Source:} Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, United States Department of State.

Further to the above information required to be published under the Treaty, the United States continued to publish a detailed breakdown of the numbers and types of deployed and non-deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, as well as the number and types of test launchers.


\footnote{36}Referred to in some contexts as “prompt global strike”.

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Alleged violations of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles

The Russian Federation and the United States traded accusations regarding violations of the 1988 Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate and Shorter Range Missiles, also referred to as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty). The INF Treaty, which is of unlimited duration, was initially a bilateral agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States. It required the parties to eliminate and subsequently not to possess ground-launched ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles with ranges between 500 km and 5,500 km, or any launchers for such systems. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, several newly independent States with Treaty-accountable sites on their territory, namely Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, agreed to accept on-site inspections and participate in the Special Verification Commission established under the Treaty.

In July, following months of press reports about United States concerns over compliance with the INF Treaty, the United States made its allegations public in the annual unclassified report prepared by the Department of State on adherence to and compliance with arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament agreements and commitments. In that report, the United States determined that “the Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles”. In a letter dated 29 July, President Barack Obama reportedly informed President Vladimir Putin of this determination.

On 30 July, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a response to the United States report, asserting that the finding was unsupported and claimed that problems related to the INF Treaty were not new and were well known to both parties. Furthermore, the Russian Federation alleged that the Mark-41 launch systems of the United States that are to be deployed in Poland and Romania as part of the European Phased Adaptive Approach missile defence would violate the Treaty if deployed in a ground-launched mode.

The two sides reiterated their concerns and allegations in prepared statements at the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly First Committee.

Alleged violation of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum

Events in Ukraine, particularly the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by the Russian Federation, gave rise to allegations over the violation of the 1994 Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the NPT, also known as the Budapest Memorandum. Under the Memorandum, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States agreed, inter alia, to respect the independence and sovereignty of the existing borders of Ukraine and to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine. They also provided Ukraine with assurances against the threat or use of nuclear weapons.

In various statements throughout the year, including at the Conference on Disarmament, the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference and the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly First Committee, Ukraine and a number of other States alleged that the Russian Federation had violated the Budapest Memorandum. Statements by the Russian Federation on this matter variously referred to, inter alia, the extraordinary nature of the situation in Ukraine, alleged acts committed by armed groups and its obligation to safeguard the lives of Russian nationals.

In resolution 67/262, adopted on 27 March, the General Assembly, inter alia, recalled the Budapest Memorandum, affirmed its commitment to the sovereignty, political independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders and called upon all States to desist and refrain from actions aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine, including any attempts to modify Ukraine’s borders through the threat or use of force or other unlawful means.

Review of strategic deterrence doctrines

Declaration of the NATO Summit in Wales

On 5 September, the Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) issued a declaration from their Summit in Wales. With respect to the NATO nuclear posture, the document reaffirmed

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key elements from the 2010 Strategic Concept, including that as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. The declaration reiterated that the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States, were the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies. It also reiterated that the independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France had a deterrent role of their own and contributed to the overall deterrence and security of the Alliance.

The declaration also reflected on the continued development of the NATO ballistic missile defence capability. It described missile defence as becoming an integral part of the Alliance’s overall defence posture and reaffirmed the aim to provide full coverage of European NATO populations, territory and forces. The deployment of the first land-based interceptor site in Europe, to be located in Deveselu, Romania, remained on track to be completed in 2015. Building upon its interim capability, which included the deployment of Aegis destroyers in the Mediterranean in 2011, the declaration noted the forward deployment of additional Aegis destroyers to Rota, Spain, which could be made available to NATO.

**Developments in the Russian Federation**

On 25 December, President Putin approved the revised Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, updating the version in place since 2010. The new doctrine did not change the Russian Federation’s nuclear posture. It reiterated that nuclear weapons would remain an important factor in preventing nuclear war, and non-nuclear large-scale and regional conflicts. The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction against it or its allies, as well as in response to the use of conventional weapons against it that pose a threat to the existence of the State. According to the Government, preventing armed conflict through nuclear and non-nuclear strategic deterrence remained one of the main tasks of the Russian armed forces in peacetime.

**The Hague Nuclear Security Summit**

The third Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) was held in The Hague on 24 and 25 March. Participating States and international organizations were identical to those attending the 2012 Summit held in Seoul. The 2014 Summit

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45 In 2009, President Putin delivered a speech in Prague in which he called nuclear terrorism one of the greatest threats to international security. With that in mind, President Obama hosted the first NSS in Washington D.C. in 2010, in order to draw attention, at the highest possible level, to the need to secure nuclear material and thus prevent nuclear terrorism. Forty-seven countries and three international organizations participated in the first summit. In 2012 the second NSS was held in Seoul. Fifty-three countries and four international organizations were invited. The first summit was concerned with making
charted the accomplishments of the past four years, identifying which of the objectives set out in the Washington Work Plan\textsuperscript{46} and the Seoul Communiqué\textsuperscript{47} had not been met and proposed ways to achieve them.

The Hague Summit’s Communiqué\textsuperscript{48} reaffirmed the fundamental responsibility of States, in accordance with their respective obligations to maintain at all times effective security of all nuclear and other radioactive materials, including nuclear materials used in nuclear weapons and nuclear facilities under their control.

It identified 11 areas where continued attention was necessary: (a) the need to further strengthen and coordinate international cooperation in the field of nuclear security (in this regard, the Summit concluded that much work could be accomplished through the IAEA and other intergovernmental organizations and initiatives, and through bilateral and regional cooperation); (b) the need for a strengthened and comprehensive international nuclear security architecture consisting of legal instruments, international organizations and initiatives, internationally accepted guidance and good practices; (c) the need for voluntary measures that States could consider taking to show that they had established effective security of their nuclear materials and facilities while protecting sensitive information; (d) the need for special precautions for handling nuclear materials, which are appropriately secured, consolidated and accounted for; (e) the need for better protection of radioactive sources; (f) the need for nuclear safety measures and nuclear security measures that are designed and managed in a coherent and coordinated manner in the specific areas where nuclear security and nuclear safety overlap, including the maintenance of effective emergency preparedness and response and mitigation capabilities in a manner that addressed both nuclear security and nuclear safety; (g) the need to secure nuclear material by nuclear operators; (h) the need to address the growing threat of cyberattacks, including on critical information infrastructure and control systems; (i) the need to enhance the security of nuclear and other radioactive materials while in domestic and international transport; (j) the need to locate and secure nuclear material out of regulatory control, including through effective export control arrangements and law enforcement mechanisms; and (k) the need for the development of nuclear forensics into an effective tool for determining the origin of nuclear

\footnotesize{political agreements, while the follow-up in Seoul focused on the progress made on implementing those agreements.}


and other radioactive materials and providing evidence for the prosecution of acts of illicit trafficking and other malicious acts.

The United States announced that it would host the next and final Nuclear Security Summit in 2016.

Other issues and developments

Islamic Republic of Iran

Initial steps in the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action

Throughout 2014, the E3+3 States\textsuperscript{49} and the Islamic Republic of Iran made considerable efforts towards the achievement of a comprehensive agreement that would restore international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme. Following the conclusion of the Joint Plan of Action (JPA)\textsuperscript{50} in November 2013, the parties held four rounds of expert-level talks on its implementation. The parties held the final round of expert-level talks from 9 to 11 January in Geneva, which enabled the JPA to enter into force on 20 January. In a letter dated 13 January, the parties requested that the IAEA undertake the necessary nuclear-related monitoring and verification activities in relation to the JPA.

On 20 January, the IAEA submitted to its Board of Governors an information note on the implementation of the JPA. The IAEA confirmed that as at that date, the Islamic Republic of Iran had undertaken the initial steps required under the plan, including: ceasing production of uranium enriched up to 20 per cent U-235; ceasing to operate interconnected centrifuge cascades; beginning to dilute part of its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 20 per cent U-235 to lower enrichment levels; continuing to convert part of its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 20 per cent U-235 into oxide; not installing capacity to reconvert its uranium stockpile; not advancing work at its industrial-scale enrichment plant at Natanz or at its heavy-water research reactor at Arak; and continuing to construct a plant to convert its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 5 per cent U-235 into oxide.

The IAEA also confirmed that it had received several letters from the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding the voluntary measures it had agreed to undertake, including the following: not to plan the location of any additional uranium enrichment site beyond its two declared sites; not to engage in any plutonium reprocessing activities; not to install the capacity to reconvert any uranium back into a form suitable for enrichment; and to provide information on its centrifuge manufacturing sites.

\textsuperscript{49} China, France, Germany, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.

In response to the report, on 20 January the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy issued a statement acknowledging that the Islamic Republic of Iran had implemented its agreed measures and announcing that the European Union foreign ministers had adopted the necessary legislation to suspend sanctions. The United States affirmed separately that the Islamic Republic of Iran had implemented the required initial steps and that it would issue the necessary waivers to suspend the implementation of certain United States sanctions.

**Negotiations towards a comprehensive agreement**

The JPA established a deadline of 20 July for the parties to reach agreement, with a provision for the parties to extend it for a further period of up to six months. Catherine Ashton continued to function as coordinator for the E3+3 group, initially in her capacity as High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and from October, as Chief Negotiator. Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohammad Javad Zarif led the Iranian delegation.

The E3+3 and the Islamic Republic of Iran held their first round of negotiations on a comprehensive agreement from 18 to 20 February in Vienna, where they reached agreement on an agenda and timetable for negotiations, including the identification of all issues that need to be addressed in a final agreement. They held further rounds of negotiations in Vienna from 18 to 20 March and on 8 and 9 April. During these talks, the parties reportedly were able to discuss substantively all issues that would need to be part of a comprehensive agreement, gaining important insights regarding the largest and most challenging gaps in their positions. After these initial rounds of talks, the parties moved towards drafting the text of a comprehensive agreement, in accordance with the previously agreed timetable.

The E3+3 and the Islamic Republic of Iran held their first drafting session from 13 to 16 May in Geneva. They held a second round in Vienna from 16 to 20 June and a third round in Vienna commencing on 2 July until the deadline stated in the JPA. While the parties were able to reach agreement on key principles, such as limiting the size of the Iranian uranium enrichment programme to the country’s “practical needs”, they were not able to reach a common understanding on how this principle should be applied in terms of the scale of the programme. Other reported areas of major divergences included the duration of the comprehensive agreement, especially the period of time in which restrictions on the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran would be in effect, as well as the scope, timing and sequencing for the lifting of sanctions. Despite these differences, the parties considered that they had

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made sufficient progress to justify extending the negotiations as provided for in the JPA.

On 20 July, the E3+3 and the Islamic Republic of Iran announced their agreement to extend the JPA for an additional four months, until 24 November, in order to complete negotiations on a comprehensive agreement. Pursuant to the terms of the extension, in addition to continuing all previous commitments under the JPA, the Islamic Republic of Iran agreed to dilute its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 2 per cent U-235; limit its production of advanced centrifuges to only provide replacement for existing machines; and accelerate its fabrication of fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor. In exchange, the United States agreed to continue the suspension of sanctions targeting the petrochemical and automotive sectors of the Islamic Republic of Iran and to release additional Iranian financial assets it had previously seized.

After a hiatus, the parties resumed negotiations from 18 to 21 September in New York, on the margins of the annual high-level segment of the General Assembly. They held two additional rounds of political-level talks in Vienna, from 14 to 16 October and from 18 to 24 November. During the push to meet the 24 November deadline, Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif and United States Secretary of State John Kerry, held various bilateral meetings with support from Catherine Ashton. In the final stages of the November meeting in Vienna, they were joined by the ministers for foreign affairs from China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom.

On 24 November, the E3+3 and the Islamic Republic of Iran announced their decision to extend the JPA for an additional seven months, until 30 June 2015, in order to complete negotiations on a comprehensive agreement. The parties set a deadline of up to four months for the conclusion of a political framework, with the remaining time to be used to finalize any possible remaining technical and drafting issues. The extension did not include any new voluntary measures, but it carried forward the measures already in place. Following the announcement of the extension, Catherine Ashton and the Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif issued a joint statement in which they affirmed that “based on the progress made and on the new ideas which continue to be explored, there was a credible path through which a comprehensive solution could be reached”. Reportedly, the primary point of contention continued to relate to the size of the Iranian uranium enrichment capacity, which members of the E3+3 had sought to limit below the level at which the Islamic Republic of Iran would be able to produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon within one year.

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In reaction to the agreement to further extend the JPA, the Secretary-General issued a statement\(^53\) through his spokesperson in which he expressed his encouragement at the determination and commitment of the parties to overcome their remaining differences and to achieve a comprehensive agreement. He called on the parties to make use of the months ahead to sustain the positive momentum and to build upon the progress they had made. He expressed hope that all sides would continue to implement their agreed commitments with a spirit of mutual trust and in good faith.

Following the further extension of the JPA, the parties generally described the status of negotiations in positive terms, reflecting their shared interest in achieving a durable agreement and the progress they had made in resolving the remaining gaps in their positions, especially in the closing days of the November talks. The record of the parties in adhering in good faith to their agreed commitments under the JPA also helped to maintain positive political atmosphere and build confidence.

**Democratic People’s Republic of Korea**

The members of the Six-Party Talks\(^54\) failed to make any demonstrable progress towards the resumption of denuclearization talks in 2014. Having declared the Six-Party Talks defunct following the Security Council’s condemnation of its third nuclear test, conducted in February 2013, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea made new proposals at the beginning of 2014 for mutual restraint with respect to military exercises and political rhetoric, as well as the improvement of inter-Korean relations. The re-escalation of tension over the conduct of military exercises in the region by the Republic of Korea and the United States and the launching of ballistic missiles by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea again played a role in frustrating any new diplomatic approaches to resume disarmament negotiations.

During the months of February and March, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea launched at least 80 ballistic missiles in reaction to the annual Foal Eagle and Key Resolve military exercises conducted jointly by the Republic of Korea and the United States. The missile launches were believed to have included more than 70 FROG artillery rockets, 4 short-range Scud missiles and, on 26 March, 2 medium-range Nodong missiles, which the United States alleged were launched into international waters without the issuance of any maritime notifications. On 27 March, following closed consultations, the President of the Security Council delivered a statement to

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\(^{54}\)China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Japan, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation and United States.
the press on behalf of the Council, condemning the launches of the Nodong missiles as a violation of the Council’s resolutions.

Due to lack of access to nuclear facilities in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the IAEA remained unable to verify the status of the nuclear programme in that country. The Agency continued to monitor, through satellite imagery, developments at the 5-megawatt plutonium production reactor at Yongbyon. Since August 2013, the IAEA had observed signatures consistent with the resumed operation of the reactor, which is capable of producing approximately 6 kg of plutonium—enough for one nuclear weapon—per year. In 2014, the IAEA also continued to observe ongoing construction activities at the site of the adjacent light water reactor, consistent with public statements made by the Government.

With respect to its ballistic missile programme, NGO analysis of commercial satellite imagery indicated that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea completed upgrades to its Sohae Satellite Launching Station in the second half of 2014, enabling it to launch larger ballistic missiles or rockets from the site. NGO analysts also continued to observe activities related to the development of a new intermediate-range ballistic missile, as well as multiple test launches of a short-range, road-mobile ballistic missile system.

Despite varying reports, there were no reported indications throughout 2014 that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was preparing to conduct a further nuclear explosive test. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea raised the possibility of conducting such a test at various times throughout the year, including in response to the above-mentioned statement on 27 March by the President of the Security Council, as well as in response to the adoption by the General Assembly Third Committee of draft resolution A/C.3/69/L.28/Rev.1 of 18 November 2014 (adopted as resolution 69/188 by the General Assembly on 18 December 2014), entitled “Situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”. In that resolution, the Assembly notably decided to report the matter to the Security Council and encouraged the Council to take appropriation action, including, inter alia, through consideration of referring the situation to the International Criminal Court. Although the Council decided on 22 December to add an item to its agenda entitled “The situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea refrained from making any further reference to a possible nuclear test in its public statements on the matter.

**International Atomic Energy Agency verification**

A major pillar of the IAEA programme involves activities that ultimately enable the IAEA to provide assurances to the international community regarding the peaceful use of nuclear material and facilities. The IAEA verification programme thus remains at the core of multilateral efforts to
prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons by verifying that States are complying with their safeguards obligations.\textsuperscript{55}

**Safeguards conclusions**

At the end of each year, the IAEA draws safeguards conclusions for each State with a safeguards agreement in force, based upon the evaluation of all safeguards-related information available to it for that year. For a “broader conclusion” to be drawn that “all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities”, a State must have both a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA)\textsuperscript{56} and an additional protocol (AP)\textsuperscript{57} in force, and the IAEA must have been able to conduct all necessary verification and evaluation activities for the State. For States that have CSAs but not APs in force, the IAEA draws a safeguards conclusion regarding only the non-diversion of declared nuclear material, as the IAEA does not have sufficient tools to draw credible safeguards conclusions regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

In the case of those States for which the broader conclusion had been drawn and a State-level integrated safeguards approach had been approved,\textsuperscript{58} the IAEA was able to implement integrated safeguards to maximize effectiveness and efficiency in meeting its safeguards obligations.

In 2014, safeguards were applied for 180 States\textsuperscript{59,60} with safeguards agreements in force with the Agency. Of the 118 States\textsuperscript{61,62} that had both a

\textsuperscript{55} For more information, see IAEA, “Basics of IAEA Safeguards” (available from https://www.iaea.org/safeguards/iaea-basics (accessed 18 June 2015)). See also article III, paragraph 1, of the NPT (available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt/text (accessed 18 June 2015)).

\textsuperscript{56} CSAs are based on “The Structure and Content of Agreements between the IAEA and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” (IAEA, document INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), available from http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc153.pdf (accessed 18 June 2015)).

\textsuperscript{57} APs are based on “Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards” (IAEA, document INFCIRC/540 (Corrected), available from http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1997/infcirc540c.pdf (accessed 18 June 2015)).

\textsuperscript{58} IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors from 1992 to 1997, the Board’s approval in 1997 of the Model Protocol Additional (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work begun in 1999 directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards: an optimized combination of all safeguards measures available to the IAEA under CSAs and APs to maximize effectiveness and efficiency in meeting IAEA safeguards obligations.

\textsuperscript{59} These States do not include the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, where the Agency did not implement safeguards and, therefore, could not draw any conclusion.

\textsuperscript{60} And Taiwan Province of China.

\textsuperscript{61} And Taiwan Province of China.
CSA and an AP in force, the Agency concluded that all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities in 65 States; for 53 States, as the necessary evaluation regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for each of these States remained ongoing, the Agency was unable to draw the same conclusion. For these 53 States, and for the 54 States with a CSA but with no AP in force, the Agency concluded only that declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities. In 2014 integrated safeguards were implemented for 53 States.

With respect to the three States for which the Agency implemented safeguards pursuant to item-specific safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, the Agency concluded that nuclear material, facilities or other items to which safeguards had been applied remained in peaceful activities. Safeguards were also implemented with regard to nuclear material in selected facilities in the five nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT under their respective voluntary offer agreements. For these five States, the Agency concluded that nuclear material in selected facilities to which safeguards had been applied remained in peaceful activities or had been withdrawn from safeguards as provided for in the agreements.

As at 31 December 2014, 12 non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT had yet to bring CSAs into force pursuant to article III of the Treaty. For these States, the Agency could not draw any safeguards conclusions.

**Safeguards agreements, additional protocols and small quantities protocols**

Safeguards agreements and APs are the principal legal instruments that provide the basis for IAEA verification activities. The entry into force of such instruments therefore continued to be crucial to effective and efficient IAEA safeguards.

The IAEA continued to implement the Plan of Action to Promote the Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which was updated in September. The IAEA organized national events on safeguards for Brunei Darussalam in June and for Myanmar in December, at which the IAEA encouraged these States to conclude APs and to amend their small

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63 And Taiwan Province of China.
64 Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Palau, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine, Uruguay and Uzbekistan.
65 And Taiwan Province of China.
66 Specific types of safeguards agreements are defined in *IAEA Safeguards Glossary* (2001 edition, International Nuclear Verification Series, No.3), paras. 1.18-1.21
quantities protocols. In addition, consultations on the conclusion of safeguards agreements and APs were held throughout the year with representatives from various States in Geneva, New York and Vienna, and also during training events organized in Vienna and elsewhere by the IAEA. During the year, India and Saint Kitts and Nevis brought APs into force. In addition, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic signed an AP, and an AP for Cambodia was approved by the Board of Governors.

The IAEA also continued to communicate with States in order to implement the Board’s 2005 decisions regarding small quantities protocols, with a view to amending or rescinding such protocols to reflect the revised standard text. Operative small quantities protocols were amended to reflect the revised standard text for Cambodia and New Zealand. Fifty-three States have operative small quantities protocols in force based on the revised standard text, and four States have rescinded their small quantities protocols.

Verification activities

Islamic Republic of Iran

In 2014, the Director General submitted four reports to the Board of Governors entitled “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran”.

Contrary to the relevant binding resolutions of the Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council, the Islamic Republic of Iran did not implement the provisions of its AP nor did it implement the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to its Safeguards Agreement. The Islamic Republic of Iran failed to suspend all enrichment-related activities or to suspend all heavy-water related activities. It also failed to resolve the Agency’s concerns about possible military dimensions to its nuclear programme. The resolution of the latter was necessary to establish international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of that programme.

Within the Framework for Cooperation, the Agency and the Islamic Republic of Iran agreed, between November 2013 and May 2014, on a total of 18 practical measures to be implemented by the latter in three sequential steps as part of an approach to resolve all present and past issues. As at the end

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67 Ghana, Jamaica, Morocco and Nigeria.


70 The initial six practical measures were agreed upon on 13 November 2013. Another seven practical measures were agreed upon on 9 February 2014. A further five practical measures were agreed upon on 20 May 2014.
of 2014, the Islamic Republic of Iran had implemented 16 of these practical measures. Two practical measures related to possible military dimensions to the Iranian nuclear programme, agreed upon under the third step of the Framework for Cooperation, remained to be implemented. The Agency also invited the Islamic Republic of Iran to propose new practical measures to address the concerns over possible military dimensions to the Iranian nuclear programme, to be implemented in the next step of the Framework for Cooperation. As at 31 December, the Islamic Republic of Iran had not proposed any such measures.

From 20 January, the Agency undertook monitoring and verification in relation to the nuclear-related measures set out in the Joint Plan of Action agreed upon between China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran, the aim of which is to reach a “mutually-agreed long-term comprehensive solution that would ensure Iran’s nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful”. The initial duration of the Joint Plan of Action was six months. On 24 July, the Joint Plan of Action was extended until 24 November, when it was further extended until 30 June 2015. The Agency’s work in relation to the Joint Plan of Action has required an approximate doubling of its verification activities compared with those the Agency had already been carrying out pursuant to the Safeguards Agreement of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council.

While the Agency continued throughout 2014 to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and locations outside facilities declared by the Islamic Republic of Iran under its Safeguards Agreement, the Agency was not in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran and, therefore, was unable to conclude that all nuclear material in the country was in peaceful activities.

**Syrian Arab Republic**

In September, the Director General submitted a report to the Board of Governors entitled “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic”. According to the report, the Agency’s assessment that it was very likely that a building destroyed at the Dair Alzour site was a nuclear reactor that should have been declared to the Agency by the Syrian

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72 This was because, for example, the Islamic Republic of Iran did not implement its AP, as required in the binding resolutions of the Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council.

Arab Republic remained unchanged. In 2014, the Director General renewed his call on the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate fully with the Agency in connection with unresolved issues related to the Dair Alzour site and other locations. The Syrian Arab Republic has yet to respond to these calls.

In 2014, the Syrian Arab Republic indicated its readiness to receive Agency inspectors, and to provide support, for the purpose of performing physical inventory verification at the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor in Damascus. The Agency—after considering the United Nations Department of Safety and Security’s assessment of the prevailing security level in the Syrian Arab Republic and the small amount of nuclear material declared by the Government to be at the reactor—decided to postpone the physical inventory verification at the reactor until the security level had sufficiently improved. By the end of 2014 the assessment of the security level there had not changed.

Based on the evaluation of information provided by the Syrian authorities and other safeguards-relevant information available to it, the Agency found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful activities. For 2014, the Agency concluded in respect of the Syrian Arab Republic that declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.

**Democratic People’s Republic of Korea**

In September 2014, the Director General submitted a report to the Board of Governors and General Conference entitled “Application of Safeguards in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”, which provided an update of developments since the Director General’s report of August 2013.

Since 1994, the Agency had not been able to conduct all necessary safeguards activities provided for in the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. From the end of 2002 until July 2007, the Agency was not able—and, since April 2009, has not been able—to implement any verification measures in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and, therefore, could not draw any safeguards conclusion regarding the country.

Since April 2009, the Agency had not implemented any measures under the ad hoc monitoring and verification arrangement that was agreed upon between the Agency and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

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74 The Board of Governors, in its resolution GOV/2011/41 of June 2011 (adopted by a vote), had, inter alia, called on the Syrian Arab Republic to remedy urgently its non-compliance with its NPT Safeguards Agreement and, in particular, to provide the Agency with updated reporting under its Safeguards Agreement and access to all information, sites, material and persons necessary for the Agency to verify such reporting and resolve all outstanding questions so that the Agency could provide the necessary assurances as to the exclusively peaceful nature of the Syrian nuclear programme.

and foreseen in the Initial Actions agreed upon at the Six-Party Talks. The international community remained concerned by the statements of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea about its third nuclear test, the reiteration of its “right” to conduct further nuclear tests, and its intention to readjust and restart its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. These pronouncements, as well as previous statements about uranium enrichment activities and the construction of a light water reactor, were seen as deeply regrettable by the international community.

No verification activities were implemented in the field in 2014, but the Agency continued to monitor the nuclear activities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea by using open-source information (including satellite imagery and trade information). Using satellite imagery, the Agency continued to observe signatures which were consistent with the operation of the 5-MW(e) reactor at Yongbyon throughout 2014, and the renovation or expansion of other buildings was also seen within the Yongbyon site. However, without access to the site, the Agency could not confirm the operational status of the reactor or the purpose of the other observed activities. The Agency also continued to further consolidate its knowledge of the nuclear programme of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with the objective of maintaining operational readiness to resume safeguards implementation in the country.

Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East

As requested in operative paragraph 13 of resolution GC(57)/RES/15 on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East adopted at the fifty-seventh regular session of the General Conference of the IAEA in 2013, the Director General submitted to the IAEA Board of Governors and to the General Conference at its fifty-eighth regular session a report on the implementation of this resolution. The report described, inter alia, the steps undertaken by the Director General in his efforts to further the implementation of his mandate conferred by the IAEA General Conference in resolution GC(57)/RES/15 and by decision GC(44)/DEC/12 (2000).

In light of the discussions of the report at the September 2013 meeting of the Board of Governors, the Director General provided to member States of the IAEA the “background documentation for the 2012 Conference regarding modalities for a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems”.

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Assurances of supply of nuclear fuel

In December 2010, the work to establish an IAEA Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) Bank was authorized by the IAEA Board of Governors. Following an IAEA solicitation for a host State, Kazakhstan offered to host the IAEA LEU Bank, which will be located at the Ulba Metallurgical Plant in Ust Kamenogorsk, Kazakhstan. The IAEA LEU Bank will be a physical stock of LEU under the Agency’s jurisdiction and control with enrichment levels of up to 4.95 per cent, and will serve as a supply mechanism of last resort in the event that an eligible member State’s supply of LEU is disrupted and cannot be restored by commercial means. Funds in excess of $150 million were pledged for the IAEA LEU Bank by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the United States, the European Union, Kuwait, Norway, the United Arab Emirates and Kazakhstan. These funds will permit acquisition of LEU sufficient for up to three reloads for a 1,000-MW(e) reactor.

The Agency’s secretariat was well advanced in its work on the financial, legal and technical arrangements for establishing the bank. This has included a comprehensive technical assessment of the facility that is proposed to contain the IAEA LEU Bank. In 2014, a programmatic impact of seismic safety on the overall IAEA LEU Bank project was assessed to determine whether a geological fault that exists in close proximity to the proposed IAEA LEU Bank site has the potential to affect the safety of the IAEA LEU Bank. This Programmatic Risk Assessment, as independently reviewed by an international seismic engineering consultancy, concluded that the seismic safety of the IAEA LEU Bank could be ensured through appropriate engineering measures, even in the extreme seismic event scenario posited for the assessment. Based upon the assessment’s outcome, the IAEA and Kazakhstan concluded with confidence that the IAEA LEU Bank could be established at the Ulba Metallurgical Plant site.

Nuclear safety and security (IAEA)


The IAEA began implementation of the 2014-2017 Nuclear Security Plan. The objective of the Plan is to contribute to global efforts to achieve effective security wherever nuclear and other radioactive materials are in use, in storage and/or in transport. The Plan provides for support to States, upon request, in their efforts to meet their national responsibilities and international obligations to reduce risks and to respond appropriately to threats.

78 Other assurances of nuclear fuel supply mechanisms are described in previous editions of the United Nations Disarmament Yearbook.
International nuclear security framework

Together with the nuclear security guidance—developed and published in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series\(^80\)—the global nuclear security framework encompasses binding and non-binding international legal instruments. These instruments and their implementation through, inter alia, training, information exchange, legislative assistance and capacity-building would, according to the IAEA, bring about an effective nuclear security regime within a State.

The primary binding international instruments relevant to nuclear security include the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)\(^81\) and its Amendment,\(^82\) and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.\(^83\) Other binding international instruments include United Nations Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004). The non-binding international instruments are the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the IAEA Supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources. In addition, document INFCIRC/225/Revision 5, containing recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, provides a comprehensive basis for guiding States on the requirements that should be met by systems for the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities.

The Agency organized a seminar to promote the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM in Vienna on 12 and 13 June, which was attended by more than 60 participants from 27 States. The seminar raised awareness of the Amendment among Contracting Parties to the Convention and provided details of assistance available to facilitate their adherence to the Amendment and its implementation. In addition, the IAEA organized a regional Workshop in Mexico in April, as well as a national workshop in Philippines in March, to promote the Amendment.

Table 2. Status of key international instruments relating to nuclear security
(As at 31 December 2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instrument</th>
<th>Binding</th>
<th>Adherents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code of Conduct's supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nuclear security guidance for member States

During the year under review, the IAEA published one implementing guide on radiological crime scene management, which was jointly developed by the IAEA, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute. The Nuclear Security Guidance Committee, a standing body of senior representatives open to all member States, met twice during the year to make recommendations on the development and review of IAEA Nuclear Security Series publications.

Incident and Trafficking Database

The IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) contained data on illicit trafficking and other unauthorized activities and events from 1995 onward. The membership of the IAEA ITDB programme continued to expand, with 128 member States and 1 non-member State by the end of the reporting period.

In 2014, States confirmed 186 incidents, most of which involved radioactive sources and radioactively contaminated material. A much smaller number of incidents (20) involved nuclear material.

The preparation of biennial reports on the analysis of threats, trends and patterns in ITDB incidents resumed in 2014, and a report, which covered the six year period (2007-2012) since the last biennial report was published (2005-2006), was made available to ITDB points of contact through the Nuclear Security Information Portal. The report highlighted, inter alia, several reported incidents that involved the seizure of gram amounts of high-enriched uranium.

and plutonium (from plutonium-beryllium sealed sources) in the possession of criminal groups. A further key point was the importance of police and related investigative operations in many seizures of radioactive material. Attention was drawn to the high average annual rate at which incidents were reported during the 2007-2012 period, compared with the average annual rate during the 1995-2006 period. Most of the observed increase was due to incidents that involved radioactively contaminated material and, to a much lesser extent, radioactive sources (approximately 700 per cent and 15 per cent, respectively). The rate of reported incidents involving nuclear material remained fairly constant over both time frames. Over half of reported incidents were associated with international borders (37 per cent detected at borders and 8 per cent after having crossed borders). It was emphasized that approximately half of the radioactive sources reported to the ITDB might not have been recovered and hence were still available for malicious use or might still be trafficked. Attention was drawn to the vulnerability to theft of portable highly radioactive sources.

**Nuclear security human resource development**

Education and training continues to be essential to sustainable improvement in nuclear security. In 2014, the IAEA conducted some 85 training events covering all aspects of nuclear security, involving more than 1,200 people.

In addition, the Agency published five online e-learning modules on transport security, computer security, nuclear material accounting and control for security purposes, radiological crime scene management and physical protection to better enable member States to implement the guidance in the Nuclear Security Series.

The Agency conducted the fourth annual two-week intensive school for young professionals in nuclear security at the International Centre for Theoretical Physics in Trieste, Italy, from 28 April to 9 May. A total of 46 participants from 33 member States attended from regulatory authorities, universities, research institutions, government ministries, operators using radioactive sources and law enforcement agencies. In addition, the Agency conducted the first regional school on nuclear security for member States of the Asia and the Pacific region, based on the same curriculum. This was held in Jakarta in October, for 34 participants from 11 member States and two observers from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

**Nuclear security peer reviews**

The IAEA continued to implement peer reviews and advisory services to help States to evaluate their nuclear security systems and needs. Such missions were conducted with a focus on physical protection and the legal, regulatory and practical measures for controlling nuclear and other radioactive material.
In 2014, the IAEA completed six International Nuclear Security Advisory Service missions to Cameroon, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Qatar, Romania, South Africa and Sri Lanka. In addition, the IAEA undertook four International Physical Protection Advisory Service missions to Armenia, Belgium, Indonesia and the Republic of Korea.

The importance of peer reviews was noted in a number of forums. In addition to helping a State to identify best practices and areas where improvements were required, they also served as a useful confidence-building measure to provide assurance that a State was meeting the requirements and guidance set out in the nuclear security framework and supporting IAEA Nuclear Security Series documents.

Nuclear forensics

In response to requests from member States for assistance in developing national nuclear forensics capabilities, the IAEA convened the “International Conference on Advances in Nuclear Forensics: Countering the Evolving Threat of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control” at IAEA headquarters in Vienna from 7 to 10 July. It was attended by more than 28 participants from 76 member States and eight international organizations.

Risk reduction

The IAEA continued to advise States on formal threat characterization and assessment, the development, use and maintenance of Design Basis Threats, vulnerability analysis and the development of methodologies for performance assessment of physical protection systems. Other activities such as the securing of vulnerable radioactive sources, upgrading facilities and the repatriation of high-enriched uranium continued.

Greater emphasis was placed on activities related to nuclear security culture, which was essential to ensuring and sustaining the security of nuclear and other radioactive material in use, storage, transportation and disposal. In 2014, the Agency completed the development of a comprehensive methodology for assessing nuclear security culture practices and analysing its strengths and weaknesses in a nuclear facility or organization. At the request of Bulgaria, the Agency provided support for the pilot implementation of the methodology at the Kozloduy nuclear power plant. In addition, nuclear security culture was the focus on the nuclear security event held on the margins of the General Conference.
Export controls

Nuclear Suppliers Group

The twenty-fourth Plenary Meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), currently chaired by Rafael Mariano Grossi (Argentina), was held in Buenos Aires on 26 and 27 June.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship of Argentina, Héctor Timerman, delivered a welcome speech on behalf of his Government in which he reaffirmed his country’s strong support to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and in particular the essential contribution that the NSG provides to this end.

The Foreign Minister also noted the global relevance of the work of the Group to ensure the peaceful uses of nuclear energy worldwide, and underscored the honour for Argentina to be at the helm of the NSG. He stressed that Argentina’s chairmanship would focus on updating and strengthening the work of the Group while ensuring that legitimate trade and international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy would not be hindered.

The Group took stock of the significant progress it had made in recent years, highlighted by the successful review of the NSG control lists and the establishment of the Technical Experts Group, and considered further areas requiring attention. The Group has embarked on a common exercise to make a useful contribution to the 2015 NPT Review Conference. It also requested the Chair to plan and conduct an information and outreach event at the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

The Group also reiterated its deep concern regarding continued global proliferation activities and reaffirmed its determination to continue to cooperate closely in order to deter, hinder and prevent the transfer of controlled items or technology that could contribute to manufacturing nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Furthermore, the Group expressed grave concern at the proliferation implications of the nuclear programme of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and its nuclear test on 12 February 2013. In this regard, the NSG reiterated its long-standing support for diplomatic efforts for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and a solution to the issue of

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85 Currently, the participating Governments of the NSG are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States. The European Commission and the Chair of the Zangger Committee participate as permanent observers.
the nuclear programme of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in a peaceful manner consistent with the 2005 Joint Statement\(^{86}\) of the Six-Party Talks, as well as for full compliance with relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions.

The NSG expressed the hope that the ongoing processes conducted by the E3+3 and the Islamic Republic of Iran, and by the IAEA and the Islamic Republic of Iran, would yield satisfactory results at the earliest possible date, ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme, as envisaged under the Joint Plan of Action and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors.

The Group also discussed possible options for engaging with those States that declare their adherence to the NSG Guidelines,\(^{87}\) considered various options to assist those Governments in implementing the NSG Guidelines in an effective manner and decided to continue discussions on enhanced engagement with them.

**Missile Technology Control Regime**

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) held its twenty-eighth Plenary Meeting in Oslo from 29 September to 3 October. The State Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Norway, Hans Brattskar, opened the meeting with a welcoming speech. The meeting was chaired by Roald Næss (Norway), who would remain the Chair of the MTCR until the next Plenary Meeting, scheduled for 2015.

MTCR Partners\(^{88}\) recalled that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery remained a threat to international peace and security, as recognized in United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). They reiterated their commitment to limit the risks of proliferation by controlling transfers that could contribute to delivery systems for WMD and appealed to all States to support the non-proliferation aims of the Regime by observing its Guidelines, and by establishing appropriate national legislation and law enforcement mechanisms.

The Partners underlined that the MTCR Guidelines\(^{89}\) should be no impediment to technological advancement, development and space


\(^{88}\) The MTCR has 34 members: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States.

programmes as long as these programmes could not contribute to delivery systems for WMD. Nevertheless, they emphasized that observance of the MTCR Guidelines by as many States as possible would contribute substantially to limiting the risks of proliferation of delivery systems for WMD and to fostering international security. They welcomed that a number of countries who were not members of the Regime, had taken on commitments to observe the Guidelines as a basis in their national export control concerning missile technology. Partners invited countries to declare full adherence to the MTCR Guidelines and formally notify the MTCR Point of Contact in writing, on a voluntary basis, of their political commitment to control all of the items on the MTCR Annex according to the MTCR Guidelines, including any subsequent changes to the Annex/Guidelines.

Furthermore, the MTCR Partners encouraged relevant regional bodies and institutions to give attention to the role of export controls in preventing the proliferation of missiles capable of carrying WMD, including the role of export controls.

Within the framework of the MTCR mandate, they conducted extensive discussions on various country issues including the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran and expressed concerns associated with global missile proliferation activities, in particular regarding ongoing missile programmes in the Middle East, North-East Asia and South Asia, which might fuel missile proliferation activities elsewhere.

The Partners reaffirmed the critical importance of the ongoing technical work of the MTCR. They underlined that the rapid technological development related to sensitive items and technologies continued to require great awareness and effective actions to address those developments. They recognized that the Equipment, Software, and Technology Annex was a cornerstone of the work done by the MTCR to prevent illegal transfers of missile technologies and expressed deep appreciation for the accomplishments of the MTCR Technical Experts Meeting.

MTCR Partners continued discussions on a number of issues, including proliferation trends, procurement activities and strategies in support of programmes for WMD delivery means; risks and challenges posed by intangible technology transfers; key technology trends in missile programmes; catch-all controls for non-listed items; and brokering, transit and trans-shipment issues and efforts to exploit them to evade export controls. These discussions showed that constant awareness, information-sharing (including on best practices), and updating of MTCR countries export control systems and enforcement efforts were of great importance and had a great impact on their work towards curbing the proliferation of WMD means of delivery.

MTCR Partners also exchanged views on issues relating to future membership, including their overall approaches to membership evaluation.
Individual applications for membership were also thoroughly discussed. The membership issue will continue to be on the agenda.

The Partners reviewed a number of issues relating to the internal operation of the MTCR, including the continuity and effectiveness of its chairmanship. They welcomed and approved the offer of a joint MTCR chairmanship by Luxembourg and the Netherlands in 2015 and 2016.

Missile-related issues

The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation

The thirteenth annual Regular Meeting of the Subscribing States to The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) took place in Vienna on 29 and 30 May with the participation of 67 registered delegations.

The participants reaffirmed the importance of the Code as a unique multilateral confidence-building and transparency instrument against ballistic missiles proliferation, while contributing to the process of strengthening existing national and international security arrangements, as well as disarmament and non-proliferation objectives and mechanisms.

Japan, as outgoing Chair of the HCOC, outlined the efforts made during the last year to achieve the universalization of the HCOC and to enhance its implementation by Subscribing States. Peru introduced the objectives of its presidency in 2014 and 2015: the full and comprehensive implementation of the Code in all its aspects, and the strengthening of outreach activities for advancing the process of HCOC universalization. To that end, the Subscribing States agreed to continue to support the efforts for reaching universalization of the Code. The Subscribing States also decided to promote a resolution on the HCOC to be adopted at the sixty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

The participants welcomed the new subscriptions of Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, and Saint Kitts and Nevis to the Code. As at the end of 2014, 137 States had subscribed to the Code. Subscribing States appreciated

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90 The 137 Subscribing States: Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Latvia, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique,
the outreach activities conducted by the outgoing Chair as well as by interested Subscribing States and the European Union.

The Subscribing States reaffirmed the threat to international peace and security posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, which, they said, constituted a serious concern of the international community, particularly in some regions. In this regard, the recent ballistic missile launches by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea were noted in the course of the discussion. The Subscribing States stressed the ongoing need to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and to encourage new subscriptions to the HCOC, particularly by countries with space-launch vehicles and ballistic-missile capabilities.

The Subscribing States stressed the importance of the full implementation of the Code, in particular with regard to pre-launch notifications and the timely submission of annual declarations, and underlined the importance of further steps in this direction.

**Implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004)**

**Status of implementation**

The Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) (1540 Committee) submitted to the Council in December its review of the implementation of the resolution for 2014. The Committee’s activities covered the following main areas: monitoring and national implementation; assistance; cooperation with international, regional and subregional organizations, including the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001), as well as transparency and outreach. The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) continued to provide support to the 1540 Committee.

The Committee continued its facilitation and monitoring efforts, encouraging States that had not yet done so to submit a first report on their implementation efforts. Two more States, Lesotho and Malawi, submitted their reports.

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Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Zambia.

91 S/2014/958.
their first reports, bringing the number of initial reports from States to 173 of the 193 Member States. Twenty Member States have yet to submit a first report to the Committee. During the year, 24 Member States provided additional information on their efforts to implement the resolution, including on their national practices.

**Monitoring and national implementation**

In resolution 1977 (2011), the Security Council encouraged States to prepare, on a voluntary basis, national implementation action plans (NIAP) mapping out their priorities and plans for further implementing resolution 1540 (2004). Colombia, Croatia, Mexico, Montenegro, Niger and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia submitted their respective national implementation action plans, bringing the total number of such plans received by the Committee to 14. UNODA organized and supported activities to facilitate the preparation and implementation of NIAPs.

The Security Council recognized the importance of the active engagement and dialogue of the Committee with States on their implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), including through visits to States at their invitation. Members of the Committee and its Group of Experts visited China, Bangladesh, Malawi, the Niger and the United Kingdom. During the visits, representatives and experts of the Committee met relevant national officials, including representatives at the ministerial level. The visits enabled States to provide updated information on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and to identify achievements, gaps and assistance needs.

On 7 May, representatives of 60 States addressed the Security Council at its meeting to mark the tenth anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004). States provided information on the implementation of the resolution and the many activities in the context of its tenth anniversary. Those activities served to highlight the importance of resolution 1540 (2004) and to encourage cooperative endeavours for the full and effective implementation of the resolution.

Based on the outcome of the meeting, the Republic of Korea, in cooperation with UNODA, organized the “Regional Workshop on Promoting Full Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540.

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93 Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Swaziland, Timor-Leste, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
94 Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Colombia, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Germany, Guyana, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Montenegro, Poland, Russian Federation, Serbia, Spain, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates and United States.
95 S/PV.7169.
Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation

Sharing Effective Practices, Revitalizing Assistance and Developing Future Strategy”, which was held on 27 and 28 October. Thirty Member States participated, aiming to achieve progress especially in the North-East, South-East and South Asian regions, and to exchange ideas on preparing the comprehensive review of the resolution’s implementation status, due at the end of 2016, as decided by the Security Council in its resolution 1977 (2011).

In 2014, the Committee received six submissions from States and three from international, regional and subregional organizations on relevant experiences, lessons learned and effective practices in the areas of concern of resolution 1540 (2004).

Assistance

The Committee continued its consultations with representatives from States and international organizations on existing and new assistance requests, including during visits to States and in the context of national round tables.

In 2014, four States submitted new requests for assistance to the Committee, while four States submitted offers in response to those requests and some from 2013. In addition, seven international organizations sent 10 responses to requests from 2013 and 2014.

The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC) supported States in the Caribbean through legislative assistance to strengthen the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) in the region. In this regard, national round tables were organized in Grenada, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago.

In response to a request by the secretariat of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Australia informed the Committee that it would finance, from 1 June to 31 December, the position of a focal point for CARICOM to strengthen implementation of non-proliferation and counter-terrorism obligations, including those related to resolution 1540 (2004).

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96 Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, China, Timor-Leste, France, India, Japan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam.
97 Argentina and Germany, Colombia, Croatia and Poland, Iraq, United Arab Emirates and United States.
98 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, League of Arab States and Nuclear Suppliers Group.
99 Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Niger and Togo.
100 Argentina, Australia, South Africa and Spain.
Cooperation between the 1540 Committee and international, regional and subregional organizations

The Committee continued to engage with international, regional and subregional organizations, including the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001), with the objective of cooperating more closely with them, reflecting the variation in the capacity and mandate of each organization.


OPCW collaboration with the Committee intensified, including through participation in the meeting of the open-ended working group in The Hague.

The Committee continued its cooperation with the Biological Weapons Convention\footnote{The full title of this treaty is the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. Its text and adherence status is available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/bwc (accessed 4 June 2015).} Implementation Support Unit by attending the annual Meeting of Experts from 4 to 8 August, held in advance of the Meeting of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention.

Other international partners\footnote{Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, Financial Action Task Force, International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), International Maritime Organization, World Customs Organization, World Health Organization and World Organization for Animal Health.} continued to engage with the Committee on a regular basis through discussions and invitations to the Committee and its Group of Experts to participate in their respective events related to the resolution.

Regional and subregional organizations continued to play an important role in enhancing the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Cooperation with the African Union was increased, inter alia, by the African Union Commission’s hosting in November of a meeting of national points of contact with regard to resolution 1540 (2004).

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) enhanced its cooperation with the Committee, in particular through inviting Committee experts to participate in consulting sessions on the development...
of national implementation action plans with representatives from the Governments of Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, organized in cooperation with UNODA. During the year, the OSCE also organized a number of workshops and capacity-building events in the region, including a meeting of OSCE points of contact and three events\textsuperscript{105} for international and regional organizations in Vienna, supported by UNODA.

The Organization of American States (OAS) increased its support for the work of the Committee in 2014. The OAS and the Government of Colombia, supported by UNODA, officially launched that country’s voluntary national implementation action plan in November. The OAS also assisted in the drafting and official launch of Mexico’s voluntary national implementation action plan in December.

Sixteen Member States\textsuperscript{106} and representatives of international and regional organizations participated in a seminar, held in Zagreb on 26 and 27 June, on effective practices for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) with a focus on the peer review process. The seminar was organized by the Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre–Centre for Security Cooperation, in cooperation with UNODA and the Government of Croatia.

Cooperation with the regional centres\textsuperscript{107} for peace and disarmament of UNODA intensified. UNREC collaborated with the 1540 Committee in organizing three workshops on the implementation of the resolution in Gabon, South Africa and Togo, held in March, April and June, respectively. UNLIREC organized a regional workshop for South American States, held in Lima in November, on the resolution’s implementation, focusing on physical protection and accounting of related materials.

**Cooperation with civil society and the private sector**

In its resolution 1540 (2004), the Security Council called upon all States to develop appropriate ways to work with and inform industry and the public regarding their obligations emanating from national laws implementing the resolution. The Committee continued, where appropriate, to reach out

\textsuperscript{105} International and Regional Organizations (IRO) Open Briefing on the Development of a Comprehensive Security Culture, 7 April; IRO Round Table Meeting on UNSCR 1540 Activities, Focusing on Technical Assistance Programmes, 8-9 April; and IRO Seminar on Identification of Effective Practices, 10-11 April.

\textsuperscript{106} Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, France, Jamaica, Kyrgyzstan, Montenegro, Philippines, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Serbia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey and United States.

\textsuperscript{107} United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC), located in Lima; United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific (UNRCPD), located in Kathmandu; and United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC), located in Lomé.
to industry and the public with the consent of the States to generate wider awareness about the resolution and to facilitate its effective implementation.

As part of the effort to reach out to industry, Germany continued to invite the Committee to participate in the third Wiesbaden industry conference, held in November in Frankfurt am Main, organized in cooperation with UNODA and the European Union Outreach Programme in Export Control of Dual-Use Items.108 The conference focused on governance and compliance management and provided a platform for raising awareness about resolution 1540 (2004) and the sharing of effective practices among diverse sectors of industry on matters related to nuclear, chemical and biological security.

In general, the engagement of civil society increased and various institutions organized events related to the resolution.109

Outreach

In 2014, the Committee participated in 89 outreach events, 38 of which were organized or supported by UNODA, including two regional workshops on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) in Phnom Penh in October for South-East Asian States and in Lima in November for South American States.

UNODA, in cooperation with the Committee and the Department for Public Information produced for global distribution a short film entitled Weapons of mass destruction: threats and global responses to promote resolution 1540 (2004) on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of its adoption.

Specific outreach to the media included a briefing of the United Nations press corps by the Chair of the Committee.

A number of activities conducted during the year in the context of the tenth anniversary of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) highlighted the importance of the resolution and promoted cooperation and its full and effective implementation.

Political declarations and other initiatives

Humanitarian approach to nuclear disarmament

The humanitarian approach to nuclear disarmament continued to accelerate in 2014. Building upon the Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons held in Oslo in 2013, the Government of Mexico hosted

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109 These include, inter alia, the following: King’s College, London; Center for International Trade and Security of the University of Georgia, United States; Diplomatic Academy of Mexico; and James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey, United States.
a second conference in Nayarit from 13 to 14 February. The Conference was attended by representatives from 146 States, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and a large number of civil society organizations. Beyond the discussions in Oslo on the immediate consequences resulting from the use of nuclear weapons, the Nayarit Conference addressed the global and long-term consequences of any use, particularly in terms of the impact on public health, humanitarian assistance, the economy, development, the environment, the climate and food security.

The Chair’s summary highlighted a number of key conclusions drawn from the discussions. These included, inter alia, that the effects of a nuclear weapon detonation would not be constrained by national borders, hamper socioeconomic development, damage the environment and cause widespread human suffering, with the poor and vulnerable being most severely affected. The summary also cited the long time frame that would be required to rebuild critical infrastructure, as well as the long-term and intergenerational effects of radiation exposure. It also noted that the risk of use was growing due to proliferation, the vulnerability of command and control systems to cyberattack and human error, and the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-State actors. The Chair concluded from a national perspective that the time had come to initiate a diplomatic process in order to reach new international standards and norms through a legally binding instrument, including through a process with a specific time frame.

The Government of Austria hosted the third Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons on 8 and 9 December in Vienna, with a total of 158 States in attendance. The High Representative for Disarmament Affairs delivered a message on behalf of the Secretary-General at the opening session. Pope Francis also sent a message to the Conference and the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross participated in the opening session. The Vienna Conference expanded on the previous discussions by including sessions on risk factors that could lead to accidental, unauthorized or intentional use of nuclear weapons, including cyberthreats; specific plausible scenarios involving the use of nuclear weapons against likely military objectives on the territory of nuclear-armed countries and their allies; the status of the possession and use of nuclear weapons under international law; and the humanitarian legacy of nuclear testing.

Building upon the discussions at the two previous conferences, key conclusions from the substantive sessions included, inter alia, the following: the humanitarian consequences of a nuclear-weapon detonation were catastrophic and more complex than commonly understood; long-term effects had been demonstrated by previous use and testing of nuclear weapons, the radioactive contamination of which continued to be measurable in the atmosphere; the risk of use was unacceptable and growing; there were many
circumstances in which nuclear weapons could be used and limiting the role of nuclear weapons to deterrence did not remove the possibility of their use; and new evidence in recent years had cast further doubt as to whether nuclear weapons could ever be used in conformity with international humanitarian law.

At the end of the Vienna Conference, the Chair presented the Austrian Pledge, which included a number of conclusions beyond the summary of the meeting. Key elements in the pledge included the following: a commitment to present the outcomes of the Vienna Conference to all relevant forums so they could be at the centre of all future nuclear disarmament deliberations and undertakings; a call for all NPT States parties to identify and pursue effective measures to fill the legal gap for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and a commitment by Austria to cooperate with all stakeholders in this regard; and a commitment by Austria to cooperate with all relevant stakeholders in efforts to stigmatize, prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons.

**Joint statements at the sixty-ninth session of the First Committee**

Further to the joint statement, initially presented in 2012 on behalf of 16 States, a total of 155 States endorsed the joint statement on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons delivered by New Zealand at the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly First Committee. The statement once again affirmed that nuclear weapons should never be used...

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111 Afghanistan, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, São Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia; the Holy See and the State of Palestine, in their capacity as Observer States; and the non-Member States Cook Islands and Niue.

112 A/C.1/69/PV.11, pp. 5-7.
under any circumstances. For a second consecutive year, Australia delivered a separate joint statement on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. The statement, endorsed by 20 States, shared the concerns regarding the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons but placed emphasis on the necessity of a step-by-step approach towards nuclear disarmament.

**Marshall Islands files cases at the International Court of Justice**

On 24 April, the Marshall Islands filed applications for contentious proceedings against nine States for their alleged failure to fulfil their obligations with respect to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. The nine States are China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, France, India, Israel, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States. The applications requested the Court to order the respondents to take all necessary steps to comply with their applicable international obligations with respect to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and nuclear disarmament, including the pursuit, by initiation if necessary, of negotiations in good faith aimed at the conclusion of a convention on nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

With respect to the States parties to the NPT, the Marshall Islands contended that these States were in breach of their obligations under article VI of the Treaty by not actively pursuing negotiations in good faith. With respect to the States not party to the NPT, the Marshall Islands asserted that the obligations under article VI were not merely treaty obligations but also existed separately as obligations under customary international law. In its applications, the Marshall Islands variously accused the respondents of engaging in conduct contrary to their obligations, including by, inter alia, opposing United Nations resolutions supporting negotiations on nuclear disarmament, declaring intent to retain nuclear weapons for decades to come, and qualitatively and quantitatively building up their nuclear forces.

Three of the respondents, India, Pakistan and the United Kingdom, have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. As for the other six respondents, the Marshall Islands invited them to accept the Court’s jurisdiction voluntarily regarding the applications. For the case against the United Kingdom, the Court set deadlines in 2015 for the filing of initial

113 A/C.1/69/PV.11, pp. 10-11.
114 Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain.
pleadings by the parties.\textsuperscript{116} India and Pakistan respectively informed the Court that they considered that the Court lacked jurisdiction. Pakistan further argued that the case was inadmissible. For these cases, the Court considered it necessary to first resolve the questions of jurisdiction and admissibility. The Court set deadlines in late 2014 and 2015 for the filing of initial pleadings on these questions.\textsuperscript{117}

\textbf{Other initiatives}

\textit{Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament initiative}

The 12 members\textsuperscript{118} of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative held their eighth ministerial meeting on 12 April in Hiroshima. The ministers heard testimonies by the atomic bomb survivors (hibakusha) and, in their ministerial statement,\textsuperscript{119} invited the world’s political leaders to visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki to witness first-hand the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the atomic bombings. In their statement, the ministers also recalled and reaffirmed various international obligations and commitments on nuclear disarmament and called for a number of steps, including, inter alia, for the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals through bilateral and multilateral negotiations, to increase transparency in information about nuclear forces, to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in national security strategies, and to de-alert their nuclear forces. They considered that the ongoing discussion on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons should be inclusive and universal, and that it should serve as a catalyst for a united global action towards a world free of nuclear weapons.

\textit{International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification}

In December, the United States announced the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification,\textsuperscript{120} a new cooperative framework to facilitate collaboration between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. The partnership was intended to build upon the lessons learned from earlier efforts, such as the United States–United Kingdom Technical


\textsuperscript{117} For the case against India, the Republic of the Marshall Islands must file its Memorial by 16 December 2014 and India must file its Counter-Memorial by 16 June 2015 (see http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/158/18334.pdf (accessed 2 July 2015)). For the case against Pakistan, the Republic of the Marshall Islands must file its Memorial by 12 January 2015 and Pakistan must file its Counter-Memorial by 17 July 2015 (see http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/159/18346.pdf (accessed 2 July 2015)).

\textsuperscript{118} Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, Turkey and United Arab Emirates.

\textsuperscript{119} NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.29.

\textsuperscript{120} For more information, see http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/234680.htm (accessed 19 June 2015).
Cooperation Program and the United Kingdom–Norway Initiative. Its objective is to further understanding about the complex challenges involved in the verification of nuclear disarmament, and to work to surmount those challenges. The United States intends to engage a diverse group of States with relevant technical expertise to assess and, potentially, to develop approaches to address monitoring and verification challenges across the nuclear-weapon life cycle. The United States is taking the partnership forward together with the NGO Nuclear Threat Initiative.

**Trident Commission**

In July, the Trident Commission, convened by the British American Security Information Council, released its concluding report. The members of the Commission, formed in February 2011, included a number of former high-level officials and academics from the United Kingdom. The purpose of the Commission was to provide an independent, cross-party review of the United Kingdom nuclear weapons policy, particularly in light of the decision of successive Governments since 2006 to support the renewal of the Trident sea-based nuclear ballistic missile capability.

The Commission unanimously concluded that the United Kingdom should retain and deploy a nuclear arsenal. This conclusion was based in particular on the national security environment, including the continued or possible re-emergence of nuclear threats or comparable technologies, as well as commitments to the nuclear weapons capability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Commission considered that the United Kingdom should remain at the forefront of the multilateral nuclear disarmament process. It recommended that the Government consider whether there are steps towards nuclear disarmament that could be taken now without additional security risks, assess the conditions that would enable further steps beyond these, and develop proactive strategies that would support the emergence of these conditions.

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Chapter II

Biological and chemical weapons

© UN Photo/Hend Abdel Ghany
Biological and chemical weapons

The horrific use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic in 2013 casts a shadow over this year’s commemoration. I cannot forget the deeply shocking images I saw. The use of chemical weapons in Syria was a deplorable offense against humanity.

The multinational effort to rid Syria of its chemical weapons programme shows what can be done when the international community comes together. Although there is still more to do, 90 per cent of Syria’s chemical weapons have now been either removed or destroyed.

Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary-General

Development and trends, 2014

Significant developments in chemical weapons–related issues continued to mark the year in 2014. Particularly, international efforts to rid the Syrian Arab Republic of its chemical weapons programme went into full gear during the year. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)–United Nations Joint Mission for the Elimination of the Chemical Weapons Programme of the Syrian Arab Republic, which was formally established on 16 October 2013 and mandated to oversee the timely elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme, continued its work throughout most of 2014.

As at 23 June, all chemical weapons materials were removed from the Syrian Arab Republic and, as at the end of the year, almost 98 per cent of these stocks were destroyed. The Joint Mission concluded its work on 30 September. Nonetheless, the OPCW continued to maintain a presence inside the Syrian Arab Republic with a view to finalizing remaining activities, including the destruction of 12 remaining declared chemical weapons production facilities.

Following the closure of the Joint Mission, the Special Coordinator, Sigrid Kaag, was requested by the Secretary-General to assist him in continuing to engage with the Syrian authorities and other relevant stakeholders in furthering the implementation of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013). Her activities in exercise of the good offices of the Secretary-General concluded on 31 December upon her appointment as Special Coordinator for Lebanon. The Office for Disarmament Affairs was asked to continue exercising the

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Secretary-General’s good offices in furtherance of the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013).

In another major development, the OPCW established the Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) in the Syrian Arab Republic following allegations of the use of toxic chemicals for hostile purposes inside the country. The FFM prepared three reports on its work, which concluded with a high degree of confidence that chlorine was used in a number of attacks in the Syrian Arab Republic. The work of the FFM has been ongoing.

The year was also busy with activities related to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Meetings of the BWC were convened in 2014 in the context of the 2012-2015 intersessional work programme mandated by the Seventh Review Conference in 2011.

The third Meeting of Experts of the 2012-2015 intersessional programme was held in Geneva from 4 to 8 August, and its report was adopted by consensus. The Chair expressed satisfaction with the results of the Meeting, noting that it was encouraging to hear the views of new contributors to the debate, including Nepal, Mauritania and Thailand.

The Meeting of States Parties was held in Geneva from 1 to 5 December. The Meeting welcomed the largest number of States parties ever to attend a BWC meeting. States parties identified a wide range of common understandings across the full spectrum of topics covered by the Meeting. The Meeting of States Parties, inter alia, devoted a working session on the Chair’s report on universalization activities, considering progress towards the universalization of the Convention. It also welcomed Myanmar as a new State party joining the BWC in 2014. Another working session was devoted to the report of the Implementation Support Unit, considering the activities of the Unit during 2014. States parties also welcomed the appointment of a new Chief for the BWC Implementation Support Unit.

In the area of export controls, the Australia Group held its annual plenary meeting in Paris from 2 to 6 June. The chemical weapons situation in the Syrian Arab Republic again dominated the Group’s discussions, which stressed the need to strengthen global chemical and biological weapons non-proliferation measures. Mexico was also welcomed as a new participating State in the Australia Group.

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3 A total of 110 States parties attended the Meeting. For the full list, see the section entitled “Meeting of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention” on page 68.
**Biological and chemical weapons**

**Intersessional work programme on the Biological Weapons Convention**

The 2014 meetings of the BWC were part of a four-year intersessional work programme mandated by the Seventh Review Conference in 2011. This programme aims at strengthening the implementation of the Convention and improving its effectiveness as a practical barrier against the development or use of biological weapons. Its formal mandate is to “discuss, and promote common understanding and effective action” on specific topics related to the implementation of the BWC. It is based around three standing agenda items, which are considered every year: (a) cooperation and assistance, with a particular focus on strengthening cooperation and assistance under article X; (b) review of developments in the field of science and technology related to the Convention; and (c) strengthening national implementation. Each of these three standing agenda items includes a number of sub-items (see table 1). In addition, there is a biennial agenda item, which for 2014 to 2015 is how to strengthen implementation of article VII.

**Table 1. Topics covered by the standing agenda items of the 2012-2015 work programme of the Biological Weapons Convention**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standing agenda items</th>
<th>Cooperation and assistance</th>
<th>Review of developments in the field of science and technology</th>
<th>Strengthening national implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reports on implementation of article X, and the operation of the assistance and cooperation database</td>
<td>Developments that have potential for uses contrary to the provisions of the Convention</td>
<td>Specific measures for the full and comprehensive implementation of the Convention</td>
<td>Ways and means to enhance national implementation, sharing best practices and experiences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenges and obstacles to developing international cooperation, assistance and exchange in the biological sciences and technology</td>
<td>Developments that have potential benefits for the Convention</td>
<td>Measures for strengthening national biological risk management</td>
<td>Regional and subregional cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific measures for the full and comprehensive implementation of article X</td>
<td>Voluntary codes of conduct and other measures to encourage responsible conduct by scientists, academia and industry</td>
<td>Ways and means to target and mobilize resources, including financial resources, to address gaps and needs</td>
<td>National, regional and international measures to improve laboratory biosafety and biosecurity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ways and means to target and mobilize resources, including financial resources, to address gaps and needs</td>
<td>Education and awareness-raising about risks and benefits of life sciences and biotechnology</td>
<td>Any potential further measures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Standing agenda items

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cooperation and assistance</th>
<th>Review of developments in the field of science and technology</th>
<th>Strengthening national implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education, training, exchange and twinning programmes and other means of developing human resources</td>
<td>Developments relevant to the activities of multilateral organizations such as the World Health Organization, the World Organisation for Animal Health, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the International Plant Protection Convention and OPCW</td>
<td>Any other developments of relevance to the Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity-building in biosafety and biosecurity and for detecting, reporting and responding to outbreaks of infectious disease or biological weapons attacks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination of cooperation with other relevant international and regional organizations and other stakeholders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BWC States parties discussed these items at a technical level at the Meeting of Experts in August; the information generated at this meeting was then reviewed and shaped into common understandings at the Meeting of States Parties in December. The 2014 meetings were chaired by Urs Schmid (Switzerland), with Mazlan Muhammad (Malaysia) and György Molnár (Hungary) serving as Vice-Chairs.

**Biological Weapons Convention Meeting of Experts**

The third Meeting of Experts of the 2012 to 2015 intersessional programme was held in Geneva from 4 to 8 August. A total of 90 States took part, including 84 States parties,\(^4\) 4 signatory States,\(^5\) and 2 States from outside the regime (which were granted observer status).\(^6\) The national delegations

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\(^4\) Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia, Libya, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Yemen.

\(^5\) Haiti, Myanmar, Nepal and United Republic of Tanzania.

\(^6\) Israel and Mauritania.
were joined by the United Nations\textsuperscript{7} and seven specialized agencies or other international organizations,\textsuperscript{8} including those dealing with disarmament and non-proliferation; crime and justice; law enforcement; international humanitarian law; technology; and public, animal and plant health. At the invitation of the Chair, and in recognition of the special nature of the topics under consideration, four scientific, professional, commercial and academic organizations and experts\textsuperscript{9} participated in informal exchanges in the open sessions as guests of the Meeting of Experts. Thirteen other non-governmental organizations and research institutes attended the Meeting. In total, over 400 individuals, including over 200 technical experts, gathered in Geneva to consider the standing agenda items and the biennial item. As in previous years, this large number and diverse range of participants allowed the Meeting of Experts to draw upon expertise from independent, national, regional and international perspectives. The benefits of having such a broad base of expertise present were evident throughout the formal and informal sessions, as well as during events held on the margins of the Meeting.

The substantive work of the Meeting began with a formal session offering opportunities for experts to make introductory comments. Non-governmental organizations and research institutes also had an opportunity to address delegations on the opening day.

Two working sessions were then devoted to each of the standing agenda items and the biennial item on how to strengthen implementation of article VII.

The Meeting of Experts benefited from a full schedule of side events organized by professional, academic and other non-governmental organizations, as well as States parties, and guests of the Meeting.

Delegations were also able to draw upon a variety of other resources such as background papers prepared by the Implementation Support Unit and working papers from States parties. Throughout the course of the Meeting, the Chair compiled a list of considerations, lessons, perspectives, recommendations, conclusions and proposals drawn from the discussions and resources available, and this document was annexed to the report.

\textsuperscript{7} United Nations 1540 Committee Group of Experts, United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.


\textsuperscript{9} Biotechnology Industry Organization, Developing Countries Vaccine Manufacturers Network, Global Network of Science Academies and Massachusetts Institute of Technology Center for International Studies.
The final session of the Meeting was devoted to summarizing its work in a factual report. The report\textsuperscript{10} was adopted by consensus and the Meeting closed as scheduled on 8 August.

**Meeting of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention**

The Meeting of States Parties was held in Geneva from 1 to 5 December with the participation of representatives from 110 States parties (the largest number of States parties ever to attend a BWC meeting),\textsuperscript{11} 3 signatory States,\textsuperscript{12} and 2 States not party.\textsuperscript{13} The national delegations were joined by the United Nations,\textsuperscript{14} 4 specialized agencies or other international organizations\textsuperscript{15} and 15 non-governmental organizations and research institutes. In total, nearly 500 participants took part in the Meeting.

The Meeting of States Parties started with a general debate, followed by an informal session. The States parties then devoted working sessions to each of the three standing agenda items, and to the biennial item on how to strengthen implementation of article VII. During these working sessions, States parties identified a broad range of common understandings across all topics covered at the Meeting. A working session was also devoted to the Chair’s report on universalization activities\textsuperscript{16} and the report of the Implementation Support Unit (see below).

The Meeting of States Parties benefited from several events held on its margins organized by professional, academic and other non-governmental organizations, as well as States. Delegations were also able to draw upon a

\textsuperscript{10} BWC/MSP/2014/MX/3.

\textsuperscript{11} Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Belgium, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen and Zambia.

\textsuperscript{12} Côte d’Ivoire, Nepal and United Republic of Tanzania.

\textsuperscript{13} Israel and Mauritania.

\textsuperscript{14} United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute and United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.


\textsuperscript{16} BWC/MSP/2014/3.
variety of other resources, including working papers, which were circulated during the Meeting.

With regard to building capacity through international cooperation and assistance, States parties reached a broad range of new understandings on several issues. Some of these issues included the value of assessing the functionality of the database system to facilitate requests for and offers of exchange of assistance and cooperation; the value of ensuring that offers for cooperation are sustainable and systematic, and include possibilities for the long-term provision of assistance; and the importance of coordination with relevant international and regional organizations and other relevant stakeholders, and taking into account the mandates of existing mechanisms established by those organizations.

On developments in science and technology, States parties reviewed a number of recent developments such as certain advances in the understanding of pathogenicity, virulence, toxicology, immunology and related issues. They identified these developments, discussed potential benefits for the Convention and agreed on the need to share information on these developments. They also reviewed a number of other recent developments that could be used contrary to the provisions of the BWC. As in previous years, concepts such as the responsible conduct of science were discussed, as an overarching theme to be promoted in States parties’ efforts on education and awareness-raising about risks and benefits of life sciences and biotechnology.

On national implementation, States parties highlighted their willingness to find ways to improve how they work domestically. Taking into account differences in national circumstances and legal and constitutional processes, they agreed on the value of strengthening implementation of all provisions of the Convention. They were encouraged to continue to learn from each other by sharing best practices and experiences, and to collectively think about ways and means to enhance national implementation, including through regional and subregional cooperation and through national, regional and international measures to improve laboratory biosafety and security of pathogens and toxins.

States parties, while discussing how to strengthen the implementation of article VII, recognized the need to also strengthen the international community’s capacity to effectively provide assistance related to article VII and reviewed a number of related challenges. These included the possibility that national means and resources of a State party could be overwhelmed following a biological or toxin weapon attack and that assistance may be required. States parties also recognized the importance of national preparedness in contributing to international capabilities and agreed on the value of collaborating to build relevant national capacity.
Closing the Meeting on 5 December, the Chair noted, “As stressed by many delegations during our work, the Convention is faced with many challenges. To meet them, a robust intersessional process is more than ever required.”

The Meeting also considered progress towards universalization of the Convention, and welcomed the accession of Myanmar, which joined the BWC in December. The Chair urged States that were not yet party to join the Convention, highlighting the role of the BWC as one of the main pillars of the international community’s efforts against weapons of mass destruction. The Chair also encouraged the States parties to promote the Convention and to provide assistance to States that were preparing to join the BWC.

**Work of the Implementation Support Unit**

At the Meeting of States Parties, the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) presented its annual report.\(^\text{17}\) The report included a summary of the Unit’s efforts to provide support for the administration of the BWC, national implementation, confidence-building measures (CBMs), universalization, maintaining the database for assistance requests and offers, and the sponsorship programme.

The Unit’s support for the administration of the Convention included the following: acting as the substantive secretariat of the Meeting of Experts and Meeting of States Parties; preparing background information documents for those meetings; developing and expanding its website; following and reporting on scientific and technological developments; keeping in regular contact with relevant international organizations, as well as professional, commercial and academic institutions and associations; and organizing and participating in relevant workshops, seminars and meetings.

As part of its efforts under national implementation, the ISU continued to develop the BWC website\(^\text{18}\) to increase its utility not only for States parties, but also for outreach, awareness-raising and communication to a global audience. In 2014, the ISU significantly restructured and added material to the website to make it easier to access information. The Unit also continued to update the restricted access section of its website to facilitate communication among States parties; to interact with providers of relevant assistance; and to collect and distribute details of national contact points.

On the CBMs, ISU maintained capabilities for electronic reporting; compiled and distributed submissions; provided routine administrative assistance and advice; took part in or organized workshops promoting the CBMs; and wrote to States parties, reminding them of the deadline for submission.


The ISU supported the Chair of the 2014 Meeting of States Parties in his activities to promote universalization, assisting him with correspondence with States not party to the Convention, and preparing for and participating in meetings between the Chair and representatives of States not party. The Unit also supported States parties in promoting universalization, coordinating their activities and informing them about progress with accession or ratification. The Unit promoted universalization during many of the seminars and events in which it participated. The ISU also provided information and advice on the Convention to several signatories and States not party. The Unit consolidated and published information, as it became available, in the restricted area of its website on progress towards universality.

The ISU continued to update the online database of offers to provide, and requests for assistance relevant to the Convention. Information provided by States parties was added to the database. As of mid-February 2014, the ISU made the part of the database containing offers of assistance publicly available. Furthermore, as at 15 October, the database contained 27 offers of assistance, from five States parties and one group of States parties; and two requests for assistance from two States parties.

The ISU also administered the sponsorship programme designed to support and increase the participation of developing States parties in the meetings of the intersessional programme. As at 15 October, voluntary contributions to the sponsorship programme were received from one State party and from the European Union. In addition, two States parties supported the sponsorship programme through bilateral arrangements. Applications for sponsorship to participate in the 2014 BWC meetings were received from 10 States parties, 2 signatories and 1 State not party. In accordance with the mandate for the programme decided at the Seventh Review Conference in 2011, priority was given to those States parties that had previously not participated in the meetings, or had been unable to regularly send experts. Consideration was also given to participation by States not party, in order to promote universalization of the Convention. As a result, through the BWC sponsorship programme or through bilateral arrangements in support of the sponsorship programme, two States parties, two signatories and one

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19 Canada, France, Germany, United Kingdom and United States.
20 Information is available to States parties in the restricted section of the BWC website: http://www.unog.ch/bwc/restricted.
21 Australia.
22 Germany and United States.
23 Armenia, Burkina Faso, Colombia, Gabon, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Montenegro, Yemen and Zambia.
24 Myanmar and Nepal.
25 Mauritania.
26 Gabon and Lao People’s Democratic Republic.
27 Haiti and Nepal.
State not party\textsuperscript{28} were sponsored to participate in the Meeting of Experts; and three States parties,\textsuperscript{29} two signatories\textsuperscript{30} and one State not party\textsuperscript{31} were sponsored to participate in the Meeting of States Parties.

The ISU report also provided details of the submission of information under the CBMs. Recent years have seen an increase in levels of participation in this international transparency exercise, peaking in 2010 at 71 States parties. Participation remained constant throughout 2011 and 2012 at 69 States parties, representing about 42 per cent of the membership of the BWC. However, 2013 saw a slight decrease in participation at 63 States parties, representing 37 per cent of the membership of the BWC, while 2014 saw a promising increase in participation at 70 States parties, representing 41 per cent (see figure I).

**Figure I. Participation in the BWC confidence-building measures**

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{participation_graph.png}
\caption{Participation in the BWC confidence-building measures}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{28} Mauritania.
\textsuperscript{29} Burkina Faso, Ghana and Zambia.
\textsuperscript{30} Myanmar and United Republic of Tanzania.
\textsuperscript{31} Mauritania.
Chemical weapons

The historic mission to eliminate Syria’s chemical weapon programme has been a key focus for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Some 98 per cent of Syria’s declared chemicals have been destroyed. The OPCW–UN Joint Mission has fulfilled its mandate and its operations ended on 30 September. Its work stands as an excellent example of how practical cooperation between international organizations can achieve tangible results that advance the disarmament agenda.

Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary-General

Nineteenth Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention

The Nineteenth Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was held in The Hague from 1 to 5 December. It adopted a number of decisions and recommendations that would guide the work of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in 2015. The Conference was attended by 132 States parties, together with 6 international organizations, specialized agencies and other international bodies, and 32 non-governmental organizations.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Bert Koenders, addressed the Conference. The United Nations Secretary-General was represented by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, who also delivered a statement on his behalf.

In presenting his report to the Conference, the Director-General of the OPCW stated that the achievements over the past year were made possible by the strong consensus-based approach of States parties, which has been a long-established hallmark of the OPCW collective efforts to implement the CWC.

The Conference’s Chair, Vesela Mrđen Korać (Croatia), noted in her closing remarks that 2015 will be an important year in many respects. While keeping the momentum in destruction of existing stockpiles of chemical weapons

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weapons under international verification, we will need to prepare the Organisation for a gradual transition to the post-destruction phase.

Several statements on the historic mission of the OPCW to eliminate the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic were made during the Conference.

In his address\textsuperscript{36} to the Conference, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Myanmar, U Thant Kyaw, advised that the parliament of Myanmar would consider ratification of the CWC in early 2015. The Conference also adopted the 2015 programme and budget for the OPCW Technical Secretariat.

\textbf{Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons}

With regard to chemical demilitarization and verification activities, as at 31 December, the OPCW verified the destruction of Category 1 chemical weapons amounting to 61,445 metric tons or 87.2 per cent of the declared amount had been destroyed under verification by the OPCW. The aggregate amount destroyed includes 2,914 metric tons withdrawn from Category 1 chemical weapons’ stockpiles pursuant to article VI of the Convention and subparagraph 2(d) of part VI of the Verification Annex for purposes not prohibited under the Convention. Libya destroyed all of its declared Category 1 chemical weapons by January and the declared Category 1 chemical weapons of the Syrian Arab Republic were destroyed by August. The Russian Federation and the United States continued to make progress in the destruction of their chemical weapons stockpiles.

In total, 2,032 metric tons of Category 2 chemical weapons were declared by the possessor States parties, including the Syrian Arab Republic. The total amount of Category 2 chemical weapons destroyed, so far, reached 1,152 metric tons, or 56.7 per cent, of the total amount declared. Albania, India, the Russian Federation, and the United States completed the destruction of all of their declared Category 2 chemical weapons, while Libya destroyed 40 per cent of the amounts it had declared. Eighty-nine per cent of the Category 2 chemical weapons declared by the Syrian Arab Republic was destroyed within or outside Syrian territory at commercial facilities or facilities provided as in-kind contributions by other States parties. All Category 3 chemical weapons were destroyed by the end of 2014.

The OPCW industry verification activities continued throughout 2014. During the year, 241 inspections of chemical industry facilities were conducted in accordance with article VI of the Convention. Between the entry into force of the Convention in 1997 and 31 December 2014, a total of 2,840 inspections had been conducted worldwide.

The OPCW Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) continued to carry out its activities with a view to advising the Director-General on developments in science and technology relevant to the implementation of the Convention. The Board’s Temporary Working Group (TWG) on Verification continued to meet in 2014, while the TWG on Education and Outreach in Science and Technology Relevant to the Convention held its final meeting in September, after which it released a final substantive report that was endorsed by the SAB. The final report from the TWG on convergence of chemistry and biology was endorsed by the SAB at its twenty-first session in June.

In 2014, the Technical Secretariat continued to assist CWC States parties in achieving the full and effective implementation of the Convention and in developing relevant national capacities in the areas of assistance and protection against chemical weapons, national implementation and assistance, as well as international cooperation. It delivered 102 courses, workshops, seminars, and events, and provided support to 76 research projects, for over 2,375 participants from around the world.

The OPCW continued to strengthen its interaction with a wide range of stakeholders in the Convention, including chemical industry, science and academia, and other representatives of civil society. Industry associations were invited to attend the Nineteenth Session of the Conference of the States Parties. The International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry and the International Council of Chemical Associations addressed the Conference of States Parties for the first time. The Conference decided to introduce a standing agenda item dedicated to chemical industry and the scientific community. It also agreed to advance work on a code of ethics for professionals in the chemical sciences.

The OPCW worked closely with States parties to promote universal adherence to the Convention through a range of bilateral activities, including seminars related to universalizing the CWC in the Middle East and workshops related to CWC implementation in Myanmar. Throughout the year, the OPCW Director-General and Deputy Director-General conducted bilateral visits and meetings, and addressed various international, academic and scientific forums.


In 2014, the OPCW recorded remarkable achievements in the mission to eliminate the Syrian chemical weapons programme. With generous in-kind and financial contributions from more than 30 States parties and the European Union, the Technical Secretariat was able to verify the destruction of 97.8 per cent of chemical weapons declared by the Syrian Arab Republic, including all Category 1 chemicals. The Russian Federation and the United States played a key role in co-sponsoring this process. The United Nations provided vital security and logistical support through the OPCW–United Nations Joint Mission.

Contracts with commercial entities that would undertake the destruction of the 12 declared chemical weapons production facilities were finalized in December. The destruction of the first of these remaining facilities was expected to be completed by the end of December 2014.

The Technical Secretariat and Syrian authorities continued their consultations on outstanding issues regarding Syrian Arab Republic’s declaration. As a result, the Syrian Arab Republic declared to the Secretariat an additional chemical weapons production facility and three additional research and development facilities. These consultations would continue into 2015.

The mission to remove the declared chemical weapons of the Syrian Arab Republic from its territory began on 7 January and was completed on 23 June. As at 31 December, the destruction of those chemicals came close to completion, with 100 per cent of the declared Category 1 chemicals and 88.8 per cent of the Category 2 chemicals destroyed. This represented a combined total of 97.8 per cent of the declared stockpile of the Syrian Arab Republic (including the isopropanol previously verified as destroyed on Syrian territory). Destruction took place at two facilities operated by Ekokem in Finland and Veolia Environmental Services Technical Solutions, LLC, in the United States, selected through a commercial tender process and at facilities funded through in-kind contributions from some States parties.

Part of the declared stockpile was destroyed at sea, aboard the United States vessel MV Cape Ray, which completed the neutralization of sulphur mustard (HD) and methylphosphonyl difluoride (DF) stocks using two field-deployable hydrolysis systems. These operations concluded on 18 August. All effluents produced as a result of operations aboard the MV Cape Ray were subsequently delivered for disposal to Ekokem’s facility in Riihimäki, Finland (where 24.7 per cent of the DF effluent was destroyed), and to the Society for the Disposal of Chemical Weapons and Ordnance (GEKA)40 facility in Münster, Germany (where 33.3 per cent of the HD effluent was destroyed).

40 Gesellschaft zur Entsorgung von chemischen Kampfstoffen und Rüstungsaltlasten mbH.
Other chemicals declared by the Syrian Arab Republic were destroyed at four facilities. Ekokem completed the destruction of all Category 1 and 2 chemicals it received on 21 June and 20 July, and Veolia ES Technical Solutions destroyed 64.9 per cent of the chemicals it received. The Ellesmere Port High Temperature Incinerator in the United Kingdom completed the destruction of all Category 2 chemicals, while destruction activities at Mexichem UK Limited in relation to one Category 2 chemical were planned for early 2015.

During the year, the OPCW Director-General provided detailed monthly reports to the Executive Council on progress made in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme which was then forwarded to the United Nations Secretary-General for his subsequent transmission to the Security Council, pursuant to the Security Council resolution 2118 (2013).

Activities related to the verification of the destruction of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic continued to be supported through the special Trust Fund for the Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons, which attracted generous financial contributions from States parties. In addition, valuable in-kind assistance received proved instrumental to the success of the Joint Mission.

The OPCW and the United Nations enjoyed highly effective collaboration in the framework of the Joint Mission. Since 1 October, with the conclusion of the OPCW–United Nations Joint Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic, the OPCW assumed responsibility for this work, with the support of the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS).

The OPCW signed an agreement with UNOPS on the provision of safety, security and logistical support for the OPCW continuing operations in the Syrian Arab Republic.

**OPCW Fact-Finding Mission**

At a meeting of the OPCW Executive Council held on 29 April, the Director-General announced the creation of an OPCW mission to establish facts surrounding allegations of the use of chlorine in the Syrian Arab Republic. The Syrian Government agreed to this mission and undertook to provide security in areas under its control. As at 31 December, the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) issued three reports.\(^41\)

After suffering a security incident in the Syrian Arab Republic on 27 May, which prevented the FFM from undertaking a site visit, the mission

continued its work by interviewing witnesses at a safe location outside the country. In its findings from its second report issued on 10 September, the FFM concluded with a high degree of confidence that chlorine was used as a weapon systematically and repeatedly in three villages in the northern part of the Syrian Arab Republic from April to August. A third report by the FFM, issued on 18 December, provided a more detailed account of the work and process that led to the findings of the FFM in its second report. The work of the FFM will continue in 2015.

**OPCW–The Hague Award**

As a means of preserving the legacy of the 2013 Nobel Peace Prize, some of the money awarded by the Norwegian Nobel Committee, supplemented by contributions from the City of The Hague, was used to fund an annual OPCW award. Consequently, the OPCW–The Hague Award recognized outstanding contributions in advancing the objectives of the CWC. Its inaugural joint winners—Robert Mathews (Australia) and the Finnish Institute for Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention—were announced at the opening of the Nineteenth Session of the Conference of the States Parties on 1 December.

**OPCW activities related to education and outreach**

Further to the recommendations outlined in the outcome document\(^\text{42}\) of the Third Review Conference, the OPCW continued its efforts to promote the ethical norms of the Convention, as well as to encourage and promote national and international activities to raise awareness among scientists and engineers.

In September, the OPCW hosted a conference entitled “Education for Peace: New Pathways for Securing Chemical Disarmament”. This event—the first of this kind organized by the OPCW—brought together some 120 experts from government, science, industry, academia and civil society from more than 40 countries to exchange information on enhancing education and outreach activities and tools.

During the course of the year, the Technical Secretariat continued to develop educational tools and materials. Many of those educational resources were made available through the OPCW website. The OPCW worked with other organizations to make those resources more widely known and available.

**Science and technology–related activities of the OPCW**

The CWC is a disarmament treaty underpinned by science and technology. Its effective implementation required active engagement with scientific professionals, continual review of the evolving technological

landscape, and an understanding of new scientific developments and their potential beneficial applications and challenges. In 2014, the OPCW continued to place emphasis on the importance of science and technology as observed through the OPCW–United Nations Joint Mission, where analytical methods and destruction methodologies for chemicals (both on the MV Cape Ray and at industrial waste disposal sites) played a key role.

The OPCW Technical Secretariat continued to engage States parties on science and technology as a means of enhancing the dissemination of science advice. A series of events entitled “Science for Diplomats” were held on the margins of the SAB briefing at its twenty-first session, the seventy-sixth and seventy-seventh sessions of the OPCW Executive Council and the Nineteenth Session of the Conference of the States Parties. These events, which will continue in 2015, provided a forum to inform delegations on the technical dimensions of recommendations of the SAB. Additional engagement with policymakers included a break-out session at the Sixteenth Annual Meeting of National Authorities in November and presentations at events held on the margins of the following meetings: the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Meeting of States Parties held in December 2014; and the Science and Technology Committee Meeting at the sixtieth annual session of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Parliamentary Assembly in November.

The Technical Secretariat complemented its work in science and technology engagement through publications. These included the August 2014 issue of *OPCW Today,* which focused on science and technology and provided articles for both technical and non-technical audiences, and a special topical issue of the peer-reviewed journal *Analytical and Bioanalytical Chemistry* that included an introduction by the Director-General.

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The SAB, which continued to provide independent expert advice to the OPCW Director-General and his staff, met for its twenty-first session in June. The SAB responded to the Director-General’s request for advice at its twentieth session, releasing a report on the assistance and protection request. A note was released by the Technical Secretariat based on the response to the request for advice on riot-control agents. The SAB also released a set of fact sheets on saxitoxin and ricin through the OPCW public website.

The final report on the convergence of chemistry and biology from the TWG of the OPCW SAB was endorsed at twenty-first session of the SAB. Interest in this area of scientific development continued to grow. The TWG Chair, William Kane, presented the findings of this report to the BWC Meeting of Experts in August and a workshop on the subject was held by the Spiez Laboratory in October. Issues arising from the convergence of chemistry and biology continued to present opportunities for the Technical Secretariat to engage with the BWC Implementation Support Unit on issues relevant to implementation of both the BWC and CWC.

The TWG on Education and Outreach in Science and Technology Relevant to the Convention held its fourth and final meeting in September, in coordination with the OPCW, and the Education for Peace outreach event, an event that put into practice many of the recommendations from the TWG for its programme. The final report of this TWG was released at the Sixteenth Annual Meeting of National Authorities, which also included a breakout session on education and outreach. As the OPCW Director-General considers how to take forward the recommendations from this TWG, an

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internal Outreach Coordination Task Force has been implemented to keep the momentum of the TWG.

The OPCW TWG on Verification met in April\textsuperscript{57} and September\textsuperscript{58} and its end of mandate report was scheduled for review at the twenty-second session of the SAB in June 2015.

During the year, the Technical Secretariat also deepened its engagement with the global scientific community, in order to assess developments in science and technology and to augment its outreach efforts to scientific professionals. It made presentations to scientific audiences at a number of key events, which included the 2014 Annual Conference of the European Network of Science Centres and Museums in May,\textsuperscript{59} the International Conference on Pure and Applied Chemistry in Mauritius in June, the twenty-third International Conference on Chemistry Education organized by the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) in Toronto Canada in July, and the fifth IUPAC Conference on Green Chemistry in Durban South Africa in August. The Technical Secretariat also participated in a series of workshops and symposiums that addressed the security risks relating to new developments in science and technology. These included the Spiez Convergence Workshop in October, the Annual Seminar of the European Union Non-Proliferation Consortium in November and the Workshop on Biological and Chemical Security in an Age of Responsible Innovation organized by the Biochemical Security 2030 Project in November.

The Technical Secretariat also participated in several activities related to the assessment of new developments in science and technology. These activities included breakout sessions coordinated by other international organizations; technology foresight meetings at the International Atomic Energy Agency in January; collaboration with the project for the Establishment of Quality Assurance for the Detection of Biological Toxins of Potential Bioterrorism Risk; and participation in workshops on the global movement and tracking of chemical manufacturing equipment at the United States National Academy of Sciences in May, and new technologies for information analysis to support non-proliferation and disarmament by the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation in December.

Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons

Through a mandate under General Assembly resolution 42/37 C of 30 November 1987, the Secretary-General is authorized to carry out investigations in response to reports that may be brought to his attention by any Member State concerning the possible use of chemical, bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons that may constitute a violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol or other relevant rules of customary international law. The related investigative tool is known as the Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons. The investigative mandate accorded to the Secretary-General by the General Assembly was reaffirmed the following year by the Security Council, through the adoption of resolution 620 (1988).60

The 1987 General Assembly resolution, in addition to authorizing the Secretary-General to carry out such investigations, also requested that the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified experts, develop technical guidelines and procedures61 for timely and efficient investigations. These guidelines and procedures, as well as related appendices, were subsequently adopted by the General Assembly in 1990. The appendices62 were then updated in 2007. These updates focused primarily on relevant technical aspects of an investigation of an alleged use of biological weapons.

In implementing the mandate for the Mechanism, the Secretary-General is requested to compile and maintain lists of qualified experts and laboratories, nominated by Member States on a voluntary basis, whose services could be made available at short notice. The roster of both experts and laboratories is maintained by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and currently comprises nearly 400 experts nominated by more than 50 Member States. The roster also includes over 60 analytical laboratories.

The Secretary-General is also the main decision-making authority and, as such, determines whether or not an investigation is warranted. In making such a determination, the Secretary-General may make use of expert consultants to provide advice and guidance in this regard. The additional responsibilities of the Secretary-General include, but are not limited to, the appointment of the team of qualified experts and a Head of Mission and securing their access to the territory of the Member States on which the investigation is to be conducted.

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60 For further information, see http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Secretary-General_Mechanism/ (accessed 10 July 2015).
61 See A/44/561.
The Mechanism was most recently activated in response to a request by the Syrian Arab Republic on 19 March 2013, and subsequently by other United Nations Member States, to investigate separate allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. The United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic was formally established on 21 March 2013, by the Secretary-General, based on his authority under General Assembly resolution 42/37 C and Security Council resolution 620 (1988).

Following its initial investigation in the Syrian Arab Republic in August 2013, and focusing as a priority on the 21 August 2013 alleged chemical weapons attack in Ghouta, the Mission presented a preliminary report\(^{63}\) on 16 September 2013. The report concluded that chemical weapons were used on a relatively large scale, resulting in numerous civilian casualties. The final report\(^{64}\) of the Mission, which followed its return to the Syrian Arab Republic in September 2013, was submitted to the Secretary-General on 12 December 2013, and addressed all pending credible allegations. The Mission concluded that chemical weapons had been used in the conflict between the parties in the Syrian Arab Republic in Ghouta, as well as in Jobar, Saraqueb, Ashrafiyah Sahnaya and Khan al Asal.

Prior to 2013, the Mechanism was last activated in 1992, to investigate two separate allegations.\(^{65}\) In recent years, however, efforts were made to ensure the operational readiness of the Mechanism in the event that it was triggered. Such efforts included, in particular, specialized training for experts on the roster.

As stated in the guidelines and procedures cited above, in addition to the nomination of qualified experts and laboratories, Member States may also provide training to enhance operational readiness of these experts. Training activities have, in practice, focused on scenarios involving the use of biological weapons. Under the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is authorized to conduct investigations of the alleged use of chemical weapons in States parties to the Convention (totalling 190 as at the end of 2014).\(^{66}\) In cases where the alleged use of a chemical weapon occurs in a State not party to the Convention (such as the Syrian Arab Republic in 2013) or in the case of such an alleged use in territory not controlled by a State party, the Secretary-General may cooperate with the OPCW in this regard, through the modalities set out in the 2012 Supplementary Arrangement to the 2001 Relationship

\(^{63}\) A/67/997-S/2013/553.

\(^{64}\) A/68/663-S/2013/735.

\(^{65}\) See S/24065 and S/24344. The investigations were conducted in Mozambique and in Azerbaijan.

\(^{66}\) See Chemical Weapons Convention, Verification Annex, Part XI.
Agreement between the United Nations and OPCW. In 2014, three sequential training courses were conducted involving the same group of experts. The first, a basic training course on the Mechanism, was organized in Sweden in June. This was followed by a specialized course in the United Kingdom in September on the command and control of investigations. Finally, a full field exercise based on a scenario involving an alleged use of a biological weapon took place in Germany in November. Member States continued to express interest in hosting further training activities for qualified rostered experts.

The United Nations continued to increase its ongoing cooperation with other relevant international organizations within the framework of the Mechanism. This includes not only the OPCW, but also the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). In addition to the aforementioned Supplementary Arrangement between the United Nations and the OPCW, the United Nations has also concluded separate legal arrangements in the form of memorandums of understanding with the WHO and OIE. Such arrangements serve to also specify modalities of cooperation in the event of an investigation, as well as to enhance overall collaboration in the context of the Mechanism, including through the exchange of information and development of technical capabilities. In addition, the OPCW, the WHO, the OIE and INTERPOL have participated in training courses, both as instructors and as trainees.

Lessons learned from the United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic

Following the submission of the final report of the United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic on 12 December 2013, the Mission was widely hailed as significantly demonstrating the value and relevance of the Secretary-General’s

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67 A/55/988.
68 Five trainings have been conducted in total. The first took place in Sweden in 2009 and the second in France in 2012.
Mechanism. As underscored by the Secretary-General in a statement to the General Assembly on 13 December 2013 in the context of the United Nations Mission, “There is room for strengthening and improving the Mechanism”. The Secretary-General, therefore, proposed holding a lessons-learned exercise with the purpose of enhancing the Mechanism and enabling partner organizations to work more effectively under the common mandate of the Mechanism should it be activated again in the future.

With the Secretary-General’s proposal in mind, UNODA undertook an exercise in 2014 to engage various stakeholders involved in the United Nations Mission to distil transferable lessons for future investigations under the Mechanism mandate and to identify concrete actions to strengthen the Mechanism.

The exercise was launched in May, and its results were expected to be released in January 2015. An initial workshop was convened in Glion, Switzerland, from 28 to 30 May to identify the overarching lessons learned from the United Nations Mission. This first workshop brought together participants who had played leading roles in the investigation, including the Head of Mission, the team leaders of the subcomponents from the OPCW and the WHO, as well as other representatives from the United Nations who had been directly involved in the conduct of the Mission.

Two follow-up workshops were hosted at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from 29 September to 3 October and from 3 to 7 November, respectively, on the lessons learned that had been identified in Glion. Additionally, legal representatives from the United Nations and OPCW held separate discussions on the margins of the New York workshop sessions and provided regular briefings to the larger group on pertinent legal topics.

Upon completion of the range of consultations in both Glion and New York, overarching objectives to strengthen the application of the Mechanism were formulated based on the lessons learned from the experience in the Syrian Arab Republic. These objectives were as follows:

1. Detail activation of the Secretary-General’s Mechanism with particular focus on the immediate steps required once a request to investigate is received from a State.
2. Ensure unity and consistency of mission once an investigation is launched.
3. Build and sustain strategic partnerships and modes of cooperation for efficient conduct of the mission.
4. Operationalize the centrality of multidisciplinary training and information-sharing, including when the Mechanism is not activated.

UNODA also recognized the importance of applying the lessons learned to strengthen the Mechanism over the long term. In this regard, additional steps were considered for future implementation to ensure that the conclusions of the lessons-learned exercise would enhance the operational readiness of the Mechanism and, thereby, the ability of the Secretary-General to launch and conduct timely and effective investigations of alleged use.

Export controls

Australia Group

The Australia Group held its annual plenary meeting in Paris from 2 to 6 June. The meeting was chaired by Australia and hosted by France.

At the Group’s 2014 plenary meeting, the chemical weapons situation in the Syrian Arab Republic again dominated its discussions, which emphasized the need to strengthen global chemical and biological weapons non-proliferation measures. Mexico was also welcomed as a new participating State in the Australia Group.

The Group agreed to the following measures to strengthen the non-proliferation of chemical and biological weapons: (a) to encourage more non-participants to adhere to the Group’s Guidelines in order to increase synergies with the growing number of non-participants, using the Australia Group control lists and Guidelines as the benchmark for global best practice for chemical and biological export controls, and to reduce loopholes that proliferators and terrorists could exploit (such adhering countries would be afforded a broader range of information from Group participants to assist them in observing global best practice); (b) to increase efforts against chemical and biological weapons terrorism in line with Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), including by adding to the Group’s Guidelines the requirement to consider the risk of diversion to terrorists when reviewing export licenses for Australia Group–controlled items, and by sharing more information

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72 The Australia Group is a cooperative and voluntary group of countries seeking to counter the spread of technologies and materials that may facilitate the development or acquisition of chemical and biological weapons by States and non-State actors. Australia Group participants are committed to ensuring that their export controls do not hinder legitimate trade and technical cooperation in the chemical and biological sectors. Participants include the European Commission and 41 member States: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and the United States. More information is available from www.australiagroup.net (accessed 10 July 2015).


related to chemical and biological terrorism with each other and with non-participants; (c) to enhance outreach to industry and academia to improve their understanding of the risks of chemical and biological proliferation and how they could help to prevent it.

The Group reaffirmed its view that the use of chemical weapons against the Syrian people underlined the necessity for the complete eradication of chemical weapons by all States through the universal adherence to and effective implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. It welcomed the progress made in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme since the accession of the Syrian Arab Republic to the Convention in 2013 but stressed that until the Syrian Arab Republic had facilitated the complete and verified destruction of its chemical weapons programme and had resolved all ambiguities in its declaration to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the international community would not have confidence that the Syrian Arab Republic had fully met its obligations under Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), as well as the Convention. Concerns were also expressed about continued reports of the use of toxic chemical agents in the ongoing Syrian conflict. The plenary also considered lessons that could be learned from the Syrian chemical weapons programme and agreed on measures to further strengthen non-proliferation export controls.

The Group continued its process of review of the proliferation risk associated with new and emerging technologies, and participating experts continued their review of lists of chemical and biological items that were to be subject to export control.

As in previous years, the plenary enabled licensing and enforcement experts to share experience and information to prevent attempts to proliferate sensitive dual-use chemicals, biological materials and related equipment. The participants conducted a tabletop exercise to evaluate responses to various enforcement challenges and welcomed a comprehensive handbook on the identification of Australia Group listed items prepared by the United States. The Group affirmed its commitment to ensuring that its export controls would not hinder legitimate trade and technical cooperation in the chemical and biological sectors.

The Australia Group participants agreed to amend the Group’s guidelines to increase the prominence of “catch-all” controls on exports of unlisted items that might contribute to chemical and biological weapons, and put particular priority on catch-all implementation. It was also agreed to strengthen national efforts to control transfers of Australia Group–listed technology in intangible forms or by intangible means, including via the provision of training. The Group agreed to continue sharing information on approaches to visa vetting and to the control of proliferation-sensitive brokering services. It also clarified the implementation of its “no-undercut” policy, which promoted uniformity
in the implementation of export controls. Consideration was also given to the issue of potential new members that have formally expressed interest in joining the Group.

The Group agreed to continue an active programme of international outreach and engagement in the 2014 to 2015 period to further enhance efforts to prevent the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, with particular emphasis on encouraging adherence to the Australia Group Guidelines; the threat of chemical and biological weapons terrorism; the need for catch-all controls; and the importance of outreach to industry and academia.

The Group accepted the Government of Australia’s offer to host the next plenary meeting in Perth in 2015, which would also mark the thirtieth anniversary of the establishment of the Australia Group.
Chapter III
Conventional weapons issues
A display of unexploded ordnance at a demining demonstration organized by the United Nations Mine Action Service for the International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action in Bamako, Mali, where two demolitions were triggered on 4 April 2014.

© UN Photo/Marco Dormino
Chapter III

Conventional weapons issues

This marks the opening of a new chapter in our collective efforts to bring responsibility, accountability and transparency to the global arms trade. From now on, the States parties to this important Treaty will have a legal obligation to apply the highest common standards to their international transfers of weapons and ammunition.

The speed with which the [Arms Trade Treaty] came into force—less than two years since its historic adoption by the United Nations General Assembly—is testimony to the commitment of States, international organizations and civil society to stop irresponsible arms transfers. Ultimately, it attests to our collective determination to reduce human suffering by preventing the transfer or diversion of weapons to areas afflicted by armed conflict and violence and to warlords, human rights abusers, terrorists and criminal organizations.

Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary-General

Developments and trends, 2014

A major highlight of the year was the early entry into force of the long-awaited Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) on 24 December. The relatively short time in which the ATT reached the threshold of 50 States needed for its entry into force—a mere 18 months from the date of its opening for signature in June 2013—was hailed as a major achievement for the international community. By the time the ATT entered into force, 130 States had signed the Treaty with 61 ratifications.

In a statement issued on the occasion of the Treaty’s entry into force, the Secretary-General of the United Nations described the event as a new chapter in the international community’s collective efforts to bring responsibility, accountability and transparency to the global arms trade.

The ATT aims to establish the highest possible common international standards for regulating the international trade in conventional arms, and to prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and their diversion. The entry into force of the ATT was expected to have a substantial impact on illicit trade, making it more difficult for weapons to reach warlords, pirates,
terrorists and criminals or to be used to perpetrate human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law.

The Treaty would also enable the United Nations to carry out its mandates more effectively, particularly in the areas of humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and in the promotion of social and economic development.

The swift entry into force of the ATT was the result of a vigorous campaign undertaken by States, the United Nations and civil society. It involved events at the United Nations for depositing instruments of ratification, and consistent appeals to high-level government officials and parliamentarians by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs and other United Nations high-level officials. It also involved initiatives undertaken by civil society entities, as well as the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations, often working in multiparty partnership arrangements. These initiatives also included the organization of regional and subregional meetings and workshops, the publication of relevant information brochures and papers, and the implementation of projects to pave the way for the effective implementation of the Treaty. A number of States sponsored and provided financial and technical support to the majority of those initiatives.

In 2014, States also adopted by consensus, the substantive outcome of the Fifth Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, held from 16 to 20 June in New York. The outcome document listed recommendations on the way forward to strengthen implementation of the Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument. The outcome document also addressed the new challenges posed by technological developments in the manufacture and design of small arms and light weapons (SALW).

The Security Council’s increasing recognition of the threats posed by the trafficking and diversion of SALW was demonstrated by the adoption of a resolution\(^2\) with a special focus on the work of United Nations Police Components. This resolution, the first of its kind, reiterated that, upon request, the Security Council may mandate United Nations peacekeeping operations and special political missions to assist in capacity-building for host Governments, to implement commitments under existing global and regional instruments and to address the illicit trafficking of SALW.

Transparency in armaments remained a concern for the international community as the number of States reporting remained at levels below those of the previous decade. In this regard, the ATT came with its own annual reporting mechanism, modelled on the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

Arms Trade Treaty

Throughout 2014, initiatives were made and events organized to promote the early entry into force of the ATT, including ceremonial events in which several States jointly deposited their instruments of ratification. Additionally, in anticipation that the ATT would enter into force towards the end of the year, the States that had deposited their instruments of ratification, as well as the other signatories, organized informal consultations on preparations for the Treaty’s first Conference of States Parties, to be held in 2015 in Mexico.

Entry into force

On 2 April, to mark the first anniversary of the adoption of the Treaty by the General Assembly, 18 States jointly deposited their instruments of ratification at a high-level special event held in New York, in a collaborative effort of States, the United Nations and civil society. The Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations, who chaired the event, called on States, civil society, and international and regional organizations to continue working together to ensure that the ATT would make a tangible difference and to achieve its early entry into force. A similar event was held in New York on the first anniversary of the opening for signature of the Treaty, on 3 June, when a further eight States jointly deposited their instruments of ratification.

On 25 September, the threshold of 50 ratifications needed for the ATT to enter into force was crossed, as eight States jointly deposited their instruments of ratification during the United Nations Annual Treaty Event, held in New York. In his remarks at the event, the Secretary-General stressed how important it was for the international community to work towards the universalization and efficient implementation of the Treaty, so that the regulation of armaments, as envisaged in the United Nations Charter, could become a reality once and for all.

4 Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Malta, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and United Kingdom.
5 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Burkina Faso, Jamaica, Luxembourg, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Samoa.
6 The ATT entered into force 90 days from 25 September 2014.
7 Argentina, Bahamas, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Czech Republic, Portugal, Saint Lucia, Senegal and Uruguay.
The first Conference of States Parties and its preparatory process

Article 17 (1) of the ATT stipulates that a Conference of States Parties shall be convened no later than one year following the entry into force of this Treaty.

On 29 January, in this regard, the Government of Mexico expressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations its interest in hosting the first Conference of States Parties. Mexico also requested the Secretary-General, as the depositary of the Treaty, to communicate Mexico’s intention to other States that had ratified the ATT. In response, the United Nations issued notes verbales to States that had ratified the ATT prior to the informal endorsement of Mexico’s offer at preliminary consultations of signatory States convened by Mexico on 5 May in New York.

On 17 April, Mexico invited all States that had already signed the ATT to attend the aforementioned preliminary consultations, which focused on the preparations for the Conference. Approximately 60 signatories, as well as representatives of the United Nations and civil society, attended the consultations, chaired by Jorge Lomónaco (Mexico).

The first round of informal consultations on the preparations for the Conference was convened in Mexico City on 8 and 9 September, also under the chairmanship of Jorge Lomónaco. Some 70 signatory States attended. The agenda included an exchange of views on the following topics: rules of procedure for the conferences of States parties; financial rules; the establishment of the provisional secretariat in accordance with article 18 (1) of the ATT; the permanent secretariat of the ATT; and dates and venues of subsequent consultations, formal preparatory meetings and conferences of States parties. A summary by the Chair was produced and made available to participants in the consultations.

On 27 August, Germany invited signatory States to participate in a second round of informal consultations on preparations for the first Conference of States Parties, which took place on 27 and 28 November in Berlin, under the co-leadership of Germany and Mexico. The consultations in Berlin were attended by 92 States, as well as representatives from international, regional and civil society organizations. The Berlin consultations focused on the preparatory process; the provisional secretariat; the permanent secretariat; participation in the preparatory process and the first Conference; rules of procedure of the conferences of States parties; financial rules; and reporting. The meeting had at its disposal non-papers on the rules of procedure, financial issues, secretariat and reporting templates. The non-paper on rules of procedure was prepared by Mexico, while the other non-papers were prepared by Ghana, France and Sweden, acting as facilitators on these topics. On 12 December, Germany and Mexico issued a joint note verbale circulating the Chair’s summary of the consultations.
On 2 December, the General Assembly adopted resolution 69/49 entitled “The Arms Trade Treaty”, by which it welcomed the offer by Mexico to host the first Conference of States Parties to the Treaty in 2015. In the recorded vote on the resolution, 154 countries voted in favour, 29 abstained and none voted against.

**Small arms and light weapons**

**Security Council**

In August, the Security Council adopted resolution 2170 (2014) on threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, with a specific reference to the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters. Significantly, the Council reaffirmed its decision that States should prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer, from their territories to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, Al Nusrah Front and all individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida, of arms and related material of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned, and technical advice, assistance or training related to military activities. The resolution also called on all States to prevent such activities by their nationals outside their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft.

Additionally, the Council called on States to identify ways to intensify and accelerate the exchange of operational information regarding traffic in arms, and to enhance coordination of efforts at national, subregional, regional and international levels. The call for enhanced information exchange echoed commitments undertaken in the framework of General Assembly processes related to SALW. In the agreed outcome document of the Fifth Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and its International Tracing Instrument, held in June, States undertook “to enhance information exchange at the national, regional and international levels including on information relevant to preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in SALW and to preventing their diversion to the illicit trade, illegal armed groups, terrorists and other unauthorized recipients”.

That Security Council resolution also complemented the provisions of the ATT that encouraged States parties to share relevant information on effective measures to address the diversion of conventional arms, including information on illicit activities such as corruption, international trafficking routes, illicit brokers, sources of illicit supply, methods of concealment,

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9 A/CONF.192/BMS/2014/2, para. 27 (a).
common points of dispatch, or destinations used by organized groups engaged in diversion.10

Fifth Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons

The implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects11 and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI)12 remained a priority for the international community. Following the successful conclusion of the second Review Conference, held in 2012,13 and by United Nations General Assembly resolution 68/48 of 5 December 2013, the Fifth Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action (BMS) was held from 16 to 20 June. In line with past practice, the BMS included a separate segment on the ITI. The Meeting was chaired by Zahir Tanin (Afghanistan). At the request of the Chair, Anthony Simpson (New Zealand) assumed the role of moderator for the ITI segment of the BMS.

At the Meeting, Member States considered a report14 by the Secretary-General on recent developments in the manufacture, technology and design of small arms and their implications for the implementation of the ITI. The report covered key developments such as new trends in manufacture and design of small arms, including modular weapons that could be fitted with different components, and the printing of weapons using three-dimensional printers. New technologies that could potentially enhance weapons marking, record-keeping and tracing, such as biometric and radio frequency identification technologies, were also highlighted. Additionally, the report contained suggestions for acquiring these new technologies, including in the context of international cooperation and assistance. In this regard, the report stressed the need for technology transfers to be included in wider plans for training, compatibility, maintenance and regional harmonization in order for them to be effective.

The BMS concluded successfully with the adoption, by consensus, of a substantive outcome document.15 At the Meeting, States discussed the

10 Arms Trade Treaty, article 11 (5).
13 The Second United Nations Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects was held in New York from 27 August to 7 September 2012.
14 A/CONF.192/BMS/2014/1.
following topics: stockpile management, physical security measures, the ITI, international cooperation and assistance, capacity-building, and the transfer of technology and equipment. States also discussed the follow-up to the Second Review Conference.

The focus on recent developments in small arms technology was the most significant development at the BMS. In this regard, States agreed to take advantage, where feasible, of technological advances to strengthen stockpile management. They also urged States, and international, regional and subregional organizations in a position to do so, to cooperate and provide assistance, including through the transfer of technology and equipment. Additionally, in order to ensure that parties remained fully informed of relevant technical developments, States encouraged industry engagement to support the effective implementation of the Programme of Action and the ITI.

States took steps to develop a comprehensive international assistance framework on the Programme of Action and the ITI. To that end, they requested the United Nations Secretariat to explore options for the enhanced funding of activities relating to the implementation of the Programme of Action and the ITI, including trust fund arrangements. The United Nations Secretariat was also requested to undertake a comprehensive study on the adequacy, effectiveness and sustainability of financial and technical assistance, including on the transfer of technology and equipment for the full implementation of the Programme of Action. This study would address, in particular, assistance and transfer of technology to developing countries since 2001.\textsuperscript{16}

Looking ahead, States recommended that the one-week Open-ended Meeting of Governmental Experts on the Implementation of the Programme of Action to be held in 2015 consider the following topics: (a) the implications of recent developments in SALW manufacturing; (b) practical steps to ensure the continued and enhanced effectiveness of national marking, record-keeping and tracing; (c) the transfer of technology and equipment; and (d) capacity-building, in particular training, for the full and effective implementation of the Programme of Action and the ITI. States also reaffirmed that international cooperation and assistance should continue to be an integral element of the agenda of all meetings on the Programme of Action.\textsuperscript{17}

States nominated Vlad Lupan (Republic of Moldova) to be the Chair-designate of the second Open-ended Meeting of Governmental Experts, which will be held from 1 to 5 June 2015 in New York.

\textsuperscript{16} See A/CONF.192/BMS/2014/2, paras. 38 (m) and (n)(i).

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., paras. 40 and 41.
United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms

The Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA), which brings together 23 United Nations system partners, is the Organization’s coordination mechanism on small arms, the arms trade and ammunition issues. In 2014, CASA continued to present a united voice in order to achieve a higher degree of coordination and integration, in particular on multidisciplinary global issues related to the arms trade, ammunition stockpile management and the reduction and prevention of armed violence.

CASA continued to coordinate and oversee the development of the voluntary International Small Arms Control Standards and the follow-up to the empirical inter-agency study on the adverse impact of unregulated arms transfers on the work of the United Nations. The group enabled relevant United Nations entities to prepare for and participate in the BMS in a coherent and coordinated manner. CASA also continued to support Organization-wide efforts to strengthen the rule of law and to seek complementarities between arms control and the rule of law at policy and operational levels within the United Nations system.

Group of Interested States in Practical Disarmament Measures

In 2014, the Group of Interested States in Practical Disarmament Measures (GIS) renewed its commitment to the United Nations small arms process with a specific focus on the facilitation of international assistance. The group continued to promote international assistance in the implementation of the Programme of Action and the ITI through three distinctive approaches:

• Support for the newly established United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR). To this effect, the relevant General Assembly resolution included a call for financial contributions to UNSCAR and the UNSCAR updates were reflected in the agenda of GIS meetings. (For more information on UNSCAR, see page 105.)

• Support for activities related to the issue of new technologies for small arms control in post-conflict settings. The GIS continued to discuss how recent developments in small arms technology could contribute to advancing practical disarmament measures, as well as how relevant tools and technologies could be applied effectively to capacity-building projects in conflict and post-conflict contexts.

20 General Assembly resolution 69/60, operative paragraph 9.
21 Ibid., operative paragraph 5.
• Support for regional efforts for enhancing practical disarmament measures. The UNODA regional centres in Africa and in Latin America and the Caribbean were provided opportunities to present their activities in that regard. In this context, the findings of a study on the role of regional organizations in the implementation of the Programme of Action were presented at a meeting of the GIS.

International Small Arms Control Standards

The International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS) provide voluntary and practical guidance on establishing effective national controls over the full life cycle of small arms so as to reduce the risk of their falling into the hands of criminals, terrorists and those who would misuse them.\(^{22}\) ISACS were developed by the more than 20 United Nations entities that participate in CASA, in cooperation with experts worldwide.

The above standards ensured that a Member State could approach any part of the United Nations system for advice and support to address small arms–related challenges, and that such assistance would be provided by the United Nations with consistently high quality. The framework for these standards was provided by global agreements\(^{23}\) and international law that aimed to prevent the illicit trade in, and the destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms. These standards were also built on a foundation of best practice guidelines, model regulations and legislation, codes of conduct, and standard operating procedures, developed at regional and subregional levels.

In 2014, the United Nations, international and regional organizations, and training institutes used ISACS to assist more than 50 countries in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean and South-East Europe to build more effective national controls over SALW.

Such assistance took many forms. For example, the United Nations undertook joint efforts to build the capacity of Somalia to manage arms imported under the partially lifted arms embargo. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the United Nations Development Programme carried out efforts to demonstrate how adherence to ISACS could contribute to a successful small arms collection and destruction campaign. Similarly, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean worked with countries in the region on using ISACS to develop standard operating procedures and training materials on stockpile

\(^{22}\) For further information, see www.smallarmsstandards.org (accessed 6 August 2015).

\(^{23}\) United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects; International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons; Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime; and Arms Trade Treaty.
management and destruction, tailored to the needs of the region. Meanwhile, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research trained United Nations partners and regional organizations in the use of the ISACS Assessment Tool\(^\text{24}\) to support Governments in designing, monitoring and evaluating effective small arms control programmes. The ISACS Assessment Tool, launched by the Institute during the BMS, is a software application that facilitates national self-assessments of existing SALW controls and supports the design, monitoring and evaluation of SALW control programmes. Also during the BMS, CASA released four additional ISACS modules, which brought the number of modules available for download from the ISACS website to 12. The new modules are:

- 03.10—National controls over the manufacture of small arms and light weapons
- 03.20—National controls over the international transfer of small arms and light weapons
- 03.21—National controls over the end-user and end-use of internationally transferred small arms and light weapons
- 03.40—National coordinating mechanisms on small arms and light weapons control

**Conventional arms ammunition**

Ammunition diverted from national stockpiles has often found its way into civil wars, crime and other situations of armed violence threatening the security of States. Diverted conventional ammunition was also increasingly used to assemble improvised explosive devices (IEDs), which could be used in acts of terrorism. The unsafe stockpiling of ammunition also resulted in grave unintended explosions, sometimes in civilian areas and with disastrous consequences.

The expression of gravest concern by United Nations Member States on this issue resulted in the development of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG)\(^\text{25}\) and the establishment of the umbrella United Nations SaferGuard programme on ammunition management.\(^\text{26}\) The aim of the IATG is to assist national authorities, industry and others in their efforts to enhance the safety and security of ammunition stockpiles, thus reducing the dual risks of explosions and diversion. The guidelines were structured to offer

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26 The completion of the IATG and the establishment of the United Nations SaferGuard Programme were welcomed by United Nations Member States in General Assembly resolution 66/42 of 2 December 2011.
three levels of protection with ascending comprehensiveness, to be applied according to the specific needs of a particular country or situation. The basic level presents the most expedient ways to apply the essential principles of safe and secure whole-life ammunition management. Subsequent levels detail progressive measures that can be taken so that the highest standards are attained.

In April, the implementation phase of the United Nations SaferGuard Programme and the IATG were officially launched. Training courses on the IATG were organized by UNODA and its partners under the United Nations SaferGuard Programme in Africa, Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Middle East. The United Nations SaferGuard quick-response mechanism, which deploys ammunition experts to assist States rapidly upon request in the urgent management of ammunition stockpiles, is being used to support the World Customs Organization in assisting States in the interdiction of dangerous goods.

Transparency in conventional arms transfers and military expenditures

United Nations Register of Conventional Arms

The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms was established by the General Assembly in 1991, with a view to promoting transparency in the international transfer of conventional arms. Under the Register, Member States of the United Nations annually report on their exports and imports of conventional arms that took place in the previous calendar year in the following seven categories: (a) battle tanks; (b) armoured combat vehicles; (c) large-calibre artillery systems; (d) combat aircraft; (e) attack helicopters; (f) warships; and (g) missiles and missile launchers. Member States are also encouraged to provide additional background information, such as their military holdings, procurement through national production, and international transfers of SALW.

The reports, submitted to the Register on a voluntary basis, were published in the report of the Secretary-General and in the electronic database maintained by the Office for Disarmament Affairs.

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27 The establishment of the United Nations SaferGuard quick-response mechanism was welcomed by United Nations Member States in General Assembly resolution 68/52 of 5 December 2013.
Global reported arms trade

An electronic database “The Global Reported Arms Trade”\textsuperscript{28} was launched in 2011. It contains all information submitted by Member States to the Register. This database also contains an online reporting facility, which enables Member States to submit their annual reports on the Register directly into the database, thus greatly enhancing the efficiency of the operation of the Register.

UNODA vigorously promoted the use of the online reporting facility by Member States, including through briefings and written communication. A video tutorial on the use of online reporting facility was developed in 2014 and added to the online reporting facility. The number of States submitting their information through the online reporting facility has steadily increased over the years, from 10 States (18 per cent of those who submitted) in 2012 and 25 States (39 per cent) in 2013, to 32 States (55 per cent) in 2014.

Annual report on the Register

Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 68/43 of 5 December 2013, UNODA sent a note verbale in February to all Member States requesting the submission of reports to the Register by 31 May 2014. In response, 58 States submitted reports, including “nil reports”, on transfer of conventional arms that took place in 2013. Thirty-four of the reports were included in the report of the Secretary-General on the matter\textsuperscript{29} and 11 were included in the addenda to the report.\textsuperscript{30} Thirteen reports were received after the issuance of the addenda and were thus included only in the electronic database. The number of reports received in 2014 represented a decrease vis-à-vis 2013, when 73 States submitted reports to the Register.

Of the 58 reports received in 2014, 15 were “nil reports”, indicating no transfers of weapons in the seven categories of the Register, while 29 contained information on exports, and 24 contained information on imports in the seven categories, respectively. In addition, 22 States provided background information on military holdings, 15 on procurement through national production (including six “nil reports”), and 34 on international transfers of SALW (including two “nil reports”). A table that lists all replies received by the Secretary-General, as well as the kind of information received, is included as annex I to this chapter. The percentage of reports containing information on transfers of small arms is shown in figure I. The complete list of States who have provided information on international transfers of small arms since 2004 is presented in annex II to this chapter.

\textsuperscript{29} A/69/124.
\textsuperscript{30} A/69/124/Add.1.
As in the previous years, the rate of participation by Member States differs from region to region. Participation rates remained high for Eastern Europe (19 out of 23 States) and Western European and other States (21 out of 30 States), while other regions’ participation was considerably lower (Africa: 1 out of 54 States; Asia and the Pacific: 9 out of 53 States; Latin America and the Caribbean: 8 out of 33 States).

**Table 1. Regional participation of Member States in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms: 2001-2014**

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*Note: The table shows participation in the Register based on the years in which the national report was submitted.*
Objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures

The United Nations Report on Military Expenditures was established in 1980 by the General Assembly to increase transparency in military expenditures. Member States are called upon to provide information on their military expenditures for the latest fiscal year for which data are available. Member States are encouraged to provide such information in the templates developed by the United Nations (standardized form or simplified form) or provide “nil reports” for those Member States who do not have military expenditures. Submission of reports is voluntary and the submitted information is published in the reports of the Secretary-General and in the electronic database maintained by UNODA.

Annual report on military expenditures

UNODA received reports on military expenditures from 66 States, including three “nil reports”. Thirty-five of the reports were included in the report of the Secretary-General and 14 reports in its addenda. Seventeen reports were received after the issuance of the addenda and were thus included only in the electronic database.

The number of reports submitted in 2014 was higher than that of 2013, when 57 submissions were received. A table that lists all replies received by the Secretary-General, as well as the kind of information received, is included as annex III to this chapter.

As in the case of the Register, and reflecting previous years’ trends, the rate of participation continued to vary by region. Of the 66 reports received in 2014, 4 came from Africa, 11 from Asia and the Pacific, 11 from Latin America and the Caribbean, 19 from Eastern Europe, and 21 from Western Europe and other States. Regional participation in the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures is reflected in table 2. The rates of participation by Member States from Asia and the Pacific and Eastern Europe have rebounded from the near-record low level in 2013.

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31 It was originally called the Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures and was renamed in 2011 to the present name as a result of a review of the instrument by a group of governmental experts.
32 A/69/135.
33 A/69/135/Add.1.
Table 2. Regional participation of Member States in the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures: 2001-2014

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*Note:* The table shows participation in the instrument based on reports on military expenditures submitted by Member States, which generally contain information on the latest available fiscal year. This information is requested by UNODA through an annual note verbale, as mandated by the relevant General Assembly resolution.

**United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation in Arms Regulation**

The United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR) was established in June 2013 in response to the need for focused and effective funding to support conventional arms regulation. UNSCAR is a multi-donor, flexible funding mechanism, designed to fund projects that supported the implementation of the ATT and the Programme of Action on SALW. To that end, it aimed to improve effectiveness of assistance through improved coordination and matching of needs with resources.

In 2014, recipients of UNSCAR funds continued to implement projects supported by the Facility under the 2013 call for proposals. In June, UNSCAR issued its 2014 call for proposals, resulting in the submission of 57 proposals for funding. Eighteen of these projects were selected for funding and were expected to be implemented in 2015. The total amount of grants awarded under the 2014 call for proposals was US$ 3.1 million.\(^{34}\)

UNSCAR also provided for the submission of “special circumstances projects” in response to emergencies requiring rapid intervention. In 2014, UNSCAR funded one

\(^{34}\) For more information, including projects funded in 2014, selected proposals for 2015 and donor countries, see www.un.org/disarmament/UNSCAR/ (accessed 6 August 2015).
such project in Ukraine to conduct a baseline assessment on non-State armed groups and their weapons and ammunition.

**Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons**

*The ongoing relevance of the [Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons] will be determined not only by States parties’ response to new developments in conventional weapons and armed conflicts, but also in their collective will to implement the obligations set out in the existing Protocols.*

*BAN Ki-moon, UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL* 35

**Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention**

The objectives of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW) 36 are to address conventional weapons that are “excessively injurious” to combatants or that have “indiscriminate effects” on civilians. The year 2014 was a landmark period for the CCW. States parties initiated discussions on the new issue of lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) in an informal Meeting of Experts. The highest rate of national annual reports on CCW compliance 37 was recorded in 2014. Universalization continued to be a priority for the States parties to the CCW. Grenada and Iraq joined the Convention during the year and, by the end of 2014, there were 119 High Contracting Parties to the CCW.

Remigiusz A. Henczel (Poland) presided over the 2014 CCW Meeting of States Parties, held on 13 and 14 November. The two most prominent issues were LAWS and mines other than anti-personnel mines (MOTAPM) or anti-vehicle mines. With respect to LAWS, there was strong support for continuing the discussions on this issue within the CCW and, as a result, it was decided that a second Meeting of Experts would be held in 2015. The debate on MOTAPM commenced with a presentation by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute entitled “The Humanitarian and Developmental Impact of

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Anti Vehicle Mines—Global AVM Study.” This was followed by a debate on MOTAPM in which a range of views were expressed on the need to regulate these weapons. Two other important issues discussed during the CCW Meeting were the use of explosive weapons in populated areas and allegations of use of incendiary weapons.  

**Informal Meeting of Experts on lethal autonomous weapon systems**

The issue of LAWS was a very new issue that many States had only considered for the first time at the 2014 Meeting of Experts. LAWS is most commonly understood to refer to weapons systems that can select and engage a target without human intervention. The mandate of the Meeting of Experts was to “convene in 2014 a four-day informal Meeting of Experts, from 13 to 16 May, to discuss the questions related to emerging technologies in the area of LAWS, in the context of the objectives and purposes of the Convention. The Chair would, under his/her own responsibility, submit a report to the 2014 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention, objectively reflecting the discussions held.”

The Meeting of Experts, chaired by Jean-Hugues Simon-Michel (France), attracted record attendance and strong interest from the media. In order to thoroughly examine all aspects of LAWS, sessions were held on ethical and sociological issues; international humanitarian law; and other areas of international law, such as human rights, legal responsibility and the law concerning the use of force. The experts also examined operational, military and technical aspects of LAWS and held a concluding session to address the way ahead. Each of the sessions was led by “Friends of the Chair” and commenced with presentations by experts.

The development of LAWS depends on an array of technological advancements. While LAWS would be a major breakthrough for armed forces, it was acknowledged that there were risks such as the lack of predictability, difficulties in adapting to complex environments and vulnerability to cyberattacks. For some States, the possible lack of control over LAWS in the field meant that they could not be considered autonomous weapons. Autonomous technologies were being developed in the civilian sphere and

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39 See CCW/MSP/2013/10, para. 32.
41 The Friends of the Chair were the following: on technical issues, Michael Biontino (Germany); on ethics and sociological issues, Pedro Motta Pinto Coelho (Brazil); on international humanitarian law, Aya Thiam Diallo (Mali); and on other areas of international law, Yvette Stevens (Sierra Leone).
42 For a list of the experts and their presentations, see CCW/MSP/2014/3.
there was a risk that a civilian application could be weaponized in the future, raising the prospect of dual-use autonomous technologies.

Two important questions arose during the discussion. First, participants discussed what constituted “meaningful human control” over a weapon system. In other words, what level of human supervision was required when such a weapon system was being operated? Another related question was whether autonomy in the critical functions of a weapon system was acceptable. Critical functions considered were those required to identify and attack a target.

There were in-depth discussions on international law, including on whether LAWS could comply with international humanitarian law and whether this body of law could adequately address the challenges posed by these weapon systems. The development of LAWS highlighted the need for States to implement legal weapons reviews (article 36, Additional Protocol I\(^\text{43}\) to the 1949 Geneva Conventions). Another important question that arose related to who would be held responsible for violations of international law committed through the use of LAWS.

**Amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-traps and Other Devices (Amended Protocol II)**

Amended Protocol II is an important instrument for addressing the indiscriminate damage caused by landmines, booby-traps and other devices. In 2014, the States parties continued to exchange experiences and lessons learned and to bring greater clarity and focus to the work on preventing the development of IEDs. The Protocol remains the only legal instrument to address these weapons. The States parties also continued to report on their implementation of the key provisions of Amended Protocol II. Regarding universalization of the Protocol, Iraq and Grenada were welcomed as new States parties in 2014, taking the total membership to 102.

**Sixteenth Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II**

The work of Amended Protocol II was led by Päivi Kairamo (Finland), who presided over the Sixteenth Annual Conference when it met on 12 November. The Group of Experts on Amended Protocol II, which met separately on 1 and 2 April, also participated in the Conference and reported on the work accomplished at their April meeting.

During the Conference, the Group of Experts focused on IEDs, and the operation and status of the Protocol. The work of the Group was led by the Coordinators, who facilitated the substantive deliberations and conveyed the results of those discussions to the Conference.

**Improvised explosive devices**

The Group of Experts reported to the Conference on their work on IEDs during the April meeting, which covered five topics: information exchange on the threat of IED use; developing best practices; reducing risk; cooperation and assistance; and victim assistance. Information exchange on IED incidents and their prevention continued to be an important means of highlighting the global humanitarian impact of IED use. It also remained key to exploring the evolution and impact of the threat, as well as global and regional trends. Case studies on Afghanistan and Mali revealed that victim-triggered IEDs with no arming mechanisms are the type used most prolifically.

On developing best practices, the Coordinators of the Group of Experts discussed the possibility of using a database as a tool for improving information-sharing and strengthening cooperation among the States parties. Australia’s demonstration of an existing information exchange database provided some guidance for small-group discussions on possible categories of information; hosting and access; and possible outputs of a database. The Group of Experts indicated that this issue would be the subject of further discussion as questions on database hosting, data ownership and access restrictions remained.

Four different sources for potentially developing IEDs were military munition stocks, explosive remnants of war, commercial explosive stocks and civilian chemicals. These were discussed in the context of preventing the development of IEDs. Discussions at the Sixteenth Conference were led by an expert panel and informal small-group sessions were later organized to explore how to prevent access to such materials for use in IEDs.

The work on best practices in international cooperation and assistance was considered important in identifying needs and potentially matching them with assistance. Two prominent issues were training on IED awareness and risk education. For example, Lebanon, as an affected State, shared its experience in combating the threat of IEDs, and Germany presented how it shared and promoted best practices through counter-IED multinational training exercises.

On the issue of victims of IED incidents, the United Nations Development

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44 The Amended Protocol II Group of Experts’ meeting took place on 1 and 2 April and the Sixteenth Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties on 12 November.

45 The Coordinators were the following: on operation and status of Amended Protocol II, David Pusztai (Hungary); and on improvised explosive devices, Namdi Payne (Australia), assisted by the Co-Coordinator, Erwan Roche (France).

46 CCW/AP.II/CONF.16/4.
Programme made a presentation on its work with IED victims, in particular the consequences for victims in terms of physical and psychological trauma and building community resilience.

The session on the way forward provided States with an opportunity to discuss possible options for further work on IEDs. The potential options discussed included: developing a network of national contact points on counter-IED issues; continuing information exchanges and focusing on one specific topic each year; drafting guidelines regarding counter-IED measures; and measures on limiting Internet access of sites that promote bomb-making.

The Sixteenth Annual Conference agreed to continue work on IEDs in 2015, in particular to focus the information exchange on national measures and best practices on one or several of the following topics: preventing the diversion of commercial-grade explosives for use in IEDs; preventing the diversion of commercially available detonators and other non-explosive materials or elements from being used in IEDs; raising public awareness and/or risk education campaigns; and/or enhancing voluntary information-sharing on detection and countermeasure techniques. The Conference also agreed to consider a one-time questionnaire on national counter-IED frameworks.

**Operation and status of Amended Protocol II**

On the operation and status of Amended Protocol II, the Group of Experts reported that it had continued to focus on addressing the implementation and universality of Amended Protocol II, including the issue of the original Protocol II compared to its amended version. Bilateral contacts with the remaining States parties to Protocol II continued under the responsibility of the President.

With respect to national reporting under Amended Protocol II, the Group of Experts reported on its work in 2014 on the information submitted under Form D of the national annual reporting form on implementing legislation. The Implementation Support Unit presented the results of the analysis and found that only 48 per cent of the States parties that had responded to Form D had followed the guide to reporting on Amended Protocol II. The Sixteenth Annual Conference agreed to task the Group of Experts in 2015 to analyse the implementation by the States parties, focusing on information submitted in Form E of the national annual report (measures taken on international technical information exchange, on international cooperation on mine clearance, and on technical cooperation and assistance).

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47 See CCW/AP.II/CONF.16/6, para.29.
48 CCW/AP.II/CONF.16/5.
50 See CCW/AP.II/CONF.16/6, para.27.
Protocol V on explosive remnants of war

Eighth Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V

Protocol V seeks both to prevent and remedy the humanitarian harm caused by explosive remnants of war (ERW). In 2014, the work of Protocol V and specifically the Eighth Conference was chaired by Katerina Sequensova (Czech Republic).\(^51\)

Each of the five Coordinators\(^52\) from the Protocol V Meeting of Experts reported\(^53\) to the Eighth Conference on the work they had led in their respective areas of responsibility. These areas included the following: (a) implementation in the areas of clearance and article 4; (b) cooperation and assistance; (c) generic preventive measures; (d) national reporting; and (e) victim assistance. The Coordinators had facilitated the discussions on each area of focus during the Meeting of Experts held in April, prior to the Eighth Conference.

In accordance with the mandate from the Seventh Conference,\(^54\) the Czech Republic was proactive in promoting universalization of both the CCW and Protocol V. New States parties to Protocol V in 2014 were Greece, Grenada and Iraq.

Article 3

Article 3 of Protocol V addresses the surveillance, clearance and removal of ERW. This session focused on what had been achieved in the areas of national capacity-building, surveillance and clearance. Responding were Albania, Burundi, Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Mali, Mozambique, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Zambia. Nearly all of these States had established the necessary infrastructure for their mine action programmes and made progress, but majority continued to rely on further cooperation and assistance to carry out substantive work. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining made a presentation on the clearance of underwater ERW, which was a problem confronting a number of States. At the Eighth Conference, States parties decided to focus again

\(^{51}\) The Protocol V Meeting of Experts took place from 3 to 4 April and the Eighth Conference from 10 to 11 November.

\(^{52}\) The Coordinators were the following: on clearance and article 4, Ivan Grinevich (Belarus); on cooperation and assistance, Marketa Holmolkova (Czech Republic); on generic preventive measures, Jim Burke (Ireland); on national reporting, Aviateur Lode Dewaegheniere (Belgium); and on victim assistance, Maria Victoria Picazo (Argentina) and Friend of the Coordinator, Fernando Guzman (Chile).


\(^{54}\) CCW/PV/CONF/2013/11, para. 25.
on the implementation of article 3 and to take up specific challenges such as the clearance of sand deserts and the areas where intensive battles had taken place.

**Article 4**

Article 4 requires that armed forces record the use and abandonment of ordnance and follow the cessation of hostilities and that this information be transferred to the party in control of the contaminated territory. Such information is crucial to undertaking effective clearance operations. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) spoke about the difficulties they had experienced in receiving article 4 information. In the case of Libya, for example, UNMAS received information on the airstrikes associated with explosive ordnance “that had not gone off”. The information was considered incomplete as no details were received concerning the strikes on targets such as the Libyan bunkers, which themselves created further ERW. UNMAS proposed that work be undertaken to improve the quality of information recorded and transferred under article 4 and that discussions be had on a mechanism to facilitate the transfer of article 4 information. The Eighth Conference agreed to these proposals.

**Cooperation and assistance**

The Landmine Monitor, a non-governmental organization, made a presentation on trends in funding for mine action. Despite the global financial crisis, the organization said that mine action funding had remained constant. A number of States and organizations spoke about their priorities for mine action. These ranged from obtaining baseline surveys in affected States to building national capacity and assisting particular regions on specific issues, such as stockpile management and victim assistance. The Eighth Conference decided that in 2015 the priority would be the identification of those States that required assistance in the management of munitions sites and stockpiles.

**Generic preventive measures**

Generic preventive measures were aimed at preventing explosive ordnance from becoming ERW. For example, these include the safe transportation and storage of munitions. Although substantial work had been undertaken on the safe storage of munitions, in 2014 the focus was on the management of munitions sites. The questions States addressed included: the identification of the entity within their armed forces responsible for munitions management; measures taken to maintain munitions sites; and questions regarding the records on the number and types of munitions. The Eighth Conference believed that if military forces had up-to-date munition records and operated well-managed munitions sites, they would be better prepared to fulfil the obligations of Protocol V. Argentina, Bulgaria, Cuba, the Czech
Republic, Hungary, India, Mali and the United States made presentations on the management of their munitions sites.

**National reporting**

National reporting is the key mechanism for promoting transparency and building confidence in the implementation of Protocol V. In 2014, the reporting rate declined for the first time to 56 per cent. To improve the reporting rate and to assist those States that had recently joined Protocol V, the Coordinator met with newcomers to explain reporting requirements and made a presentation on reporting under article 3, which identified those States parties with contamination from ERW, the source of the contamination and rough estimates on the total land area cleared. At the Eighth Conference, States parties agreed to streamline the reporting form by combining two forms that addressed cooperation and assistance under articles 7 and 8.

**Victim assistance**

The Meeting of Experts’ session on victim assistance heard a presentation from María Soledad Cisternas Reyes, Vice-Chair of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, on the right to education and victim assistance. The right to education is a cornerstone to victims’ ability to exercise all other rights. Representatives from Burundi, Cambodia, Croatia and Zambia spoke on their respective efforts in the areas of data collection on victims; the provision of medical care, rehabilitation services and psychological support for victims; national laws and policies to protect and promote victims’ rights; and support for the social and economic reintegration of victims. From these presentations it was clear that work on implementation needed to continue in order to ensure that victims were receiving appropriate assistance and their rights were being respected and promoted. The Eighth Conference agreed to continue its work on implementation of the obligations undertaken on victim assistance and the practical cooperation with other relevant legal instruments. It was also agreed that a new initiative in 2015 would be an invitation to States parties to speak at the 2015 CCW Meeting of States Parties about their experiences with victim assistance.

**Implementation Support Unit**

In 2014, the major areas of work for the CCW Implementation Support Unit (ISU) were the provision of both administrative and substantive support to the Chairs, Friends of the Chair and Coordinators responsible in leading the work of the Meetings of Experts on Amended Protocol II, Protocol V and lethal autonomous weapon systems. The ISU also supported the CCW Meeting of the High Contracting Parties and the conferences of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II and Protocol V. This work included promoting implementation of Amended Protocol II and Protocol V and assessing where progress had been made and where States faced challenges.
Another major area of work was the promotion of the universalization of the CCW and its protocols. During the year, new initiatives in this area included holding a seminar open to all States and led by the office holders, organizing meetings with members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the African Union, producing a booklet on the CCW and its protocols and continuing to follow-up directly with non-States parties. The ISU continued to be involved in a range of other activities such as organizing the CCW Sponsorship Programme; updating the CCW, Amended Protocol II and Protocol V reporting databases and following up with those States that had not met reporting requirements; updating the CCW website; and facilitating communications between States parties and organizations relevant to CCW work.

**Cluster munitions**

**Fifth Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions**

The 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions prohibits, under any circumstances, the use, development, production, stockpiling or transfer of cluster munitions, and establishes clear deadlines for the destruction of existing stockpiles and for the clearance and destruction of cluster munition remnants located in cluster munition–contaminated areas. Article 11 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions provides as follows:

“1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider and, where necessary, take decisions in respect of any matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Convention, including:

(a) The operation and status of this Convention;

(b) Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this Convention;

(c) International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 6 of this Convention;

(d) The development of technologies to clear cluster munition remnants;

(e) Submissions of States Parties under Articles 8 and 10 of this Convention; and

(f) Submissions of States Parties as provided for in Articles 3 and 4 of this Convention.

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2. The first Meeting of States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations within one year of entry into force of this Convention. The subsequent meetings shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations annually until the first Review Conference. […]"

In this connection, the General Assembly, by resolution 63/71 of 2 December 2008, requested the Secretary-General “to render the necessary assistance and to provide such services as may be necessary to fulfil the tasks entrusted to him by the Convention on Cluster Munitions”.

Against this background, and in accordance with the decision\(^56\) of the Fourth Meeting of States Parties, convened in Lusaka from 10 to 13 September 2013, the Fifth Meeting of States Parties was convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in San José, Costa Rica, from 2 to 5 September.

Preparations for the Fifth Meeting of States Parties were facilitated by an informal intersessional meeting in Geneva from 7 to 9 April. The Meeting focused on the core Convention implementation topics: universalization; clearance and risk reduction; cooperation and assistance (including, South-south and triangular cooperation in clearance, stockpile destruction and victim assistance); and stockpile destruction and retention.\(^57\) Under the topic “General status and operation of the Convention”, the following matters were discussed: compliance with article 7; national implementation measures; matters pertaining to the future Implementation Support Unit of the Convention; and preparations for the Fifth Meeting of States Parties.\(^58\)

The Fifth Meeting was opened by Encyla Sinjela, on behalf of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Zambia, and the President of the Fourth Meeting of States Parties to the Convention, Harry Kalaba (Zambia). Ninety-nine States participated in the Meeting, including 15 signatories and 22 non-signatory States.\(^59\) The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Cluster Munition Coalition and the Organization of American States also attended the meeting.

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\(^56\) See CCM/MSP/2013/6.


\(^58\) In accordance with the relevant decision of the Fourth Meeting of States Parties, the new Coordinators that guided the intersessional work programme from the end of the Fourth Meeting of States Parties were the following: Working Group on the General Status and Operation of the Convention—Netherlands and Costa Rica; Working Group on Universalization—Norway and Ghana; Working Group on Victim Assistance—Mexico and Afghanistan; Working Group on Clearance and Risk Reduction—Switzerland and Lao People’s Democratic Republic; Working Group on Stockpile Destruction and Retention—Albania and Spain; Working Group on Cooperation and Assistance—Chile and Sweden; Reporting—Belgium; and National Implementation Measures—New Zealand.

\(^59\) See [http://www.clusterconvention.org/meetings/msp/](http://www.clusterconvention.org/meetings/msp/) (accessed 6 August 2015) for participating States making statements in the general exchange of views as well as on specific items on the agenda.
The Fifth Meeting elected by acclamation Manuel A. González Sanz (Costa Rica) as President of the Fifth Meeting of States Parties to the Convention, assisted by Christian Guillermert Fernandez (Costa Rica). The opening of the meeting also featured messages from the Director and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Virginia Gamba, on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations; the head of the regional delegation for Mexico, Central America and Cuba of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Juan Pedro Schaerer; and the Director of the Cluster Munition Coalition, Sarah Blakemore. The Bureau also included four Vice-Presidents elected by acclamation by the Meeting.60

The Meeting welcomed the accession of Belize to the Convention and the ratification by the Congo,61 noting that the accession of Belize to the Convention made Central America the first cluster munitions–free region in the world. The Meeting also welcomed the interest expressed by States not party to the Convention to join in the near future and reiterated its call to all States that had not yet done so to consider ratifying or otherwise acceding to the Convention as a matter of priority.

The establishment of the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) continued to attract significant attention. In this regard, the Meeting expressed its appreciation to the President of the Fourth Meeting of States for its efforts and welcomed the conclusion of an agreement62 with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining on hosting the Unit. The Meeting also noted with appreciation the steps taken by the President of the Fourth Meeting in the recruitment of the ISU Director and took note of the vacancy notice issued for the recruitment, as well as of the composition of the selection panel, which comprised five States parties (Costa Rica, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Netherlands and Zambia). The Meeting decided to request the President of the Fifth Meeting of States Parties, assisted by the selection panel, to finalize the recruitment process for the ISU Director as soon as possible, preferably by March 2015. The Fifth Meeting also requested that the recruitment process be conducted in a transparent way and in consultation with the Coordinators, taking into account the views of all States parties. Consequently, the secretarial functions provided by the interim ISU, based in the Bureau for Policy and Programme Support of the United Nations Development Programme, shall be handed over to the Director of the ISU for the Convention on the first day of the First Review Conference (7 September 2015). Noting that it was not possible for the States parties to agree on a funding model for an ISU, and with a view to taking a final

60 Croatia, Lebanon, Norway and Zambia.
61 By the first day of the Fifth Meeting, the Convention had been signed by 108 States and ratified by 84. The accession of Belize and the ratification by the Congo brought the number of States parties to 86.
62 CCM/MSP/2014/INF/1.
decision on this matter at the First Review Conference, the Meeting agreed to task the Co-Chairs for general status and operations of the Convention with conducting consultations with States parties in order to come up with a draft compromise proposal on the funding model.

The Fifth Meeting welcomed the San José progress report on the implementation of the 66 concrete steps and goals contained in the 2010 Vientiane Action Plan, as well as the working papers submitted by Mauritania and Norway, entitled “Declaration of compliance with article 4.1 (a) of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.” It appointed six additional Coordinators of the informal intersessional activities in 2014 and 2015 and decided to convene in 2015 an informal intersessional meeting in Geneva on 1 and 2 June, as well as two sessions of the Preparatory Committee in preparation for the First Review Conference on 5 February and 3 June in Geneva.

**Anti-personnel mines**

Anti-personnel mines are delayed-action munitions designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person. Widely available and easily accessible, these victim-activated weapons brought by the early 1990s unprecedented suffering and casualties, killing or maiming hundreds of people every week, obstructing economic development and reconstruction, and preventing civilians from returning to a normal life.

A broad coalition of interested States, the United Nations, international organizations and civil society, mobilized to address this humanitarian crisis. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention) was concluded by the Diplomatic Conference on an International Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Land Mines at Oslo on 18 September 1997. The Convention prohibits under any circumstance the use, development, production, stockpiling or transfer of anti-personnel mines and sets clear deadlines for the destruction of the existing stockpiles, as well as for the clearance and destruction of mine-contaminated areas.

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63 CCM/MSP/2014/6, annex I.
64 CCM/MSP/2010/5, annex II.
65 CCM/MSP/2014/WP.3 and CCM/MSP/2014/WP.2, respectively.
66 Working Group on the General Status and Operation of the Convention: Lebanon working with the Netherlands; Working Group on Universalization: Ecuador working with Norway; Working Group on Victim Assistance: Australia working with Mexico; Working Group on Clearance and Risk Reduction: Bosnia and Herzegovina working with Switzerland; Working Group on Stockpile Destruction and Retention: France working with Albania; Working Group on Cooperation and Assistance: Austria working with Chile.
The Convention was opened for signature at Ottawa on 3 and 4 December 1997, and thereafter at the United Nations Headquarters in New York until its entry into force on 1 March 1999.

By the time of the Third Review Conference in June 2014, the Convention was signed by 133 States and ratified by 161.68

Third Review Conference on the Mine Ban Convention

The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention provides in article 12, paragraphs 1 and 2, that “a Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations five years after the entry into force of the Convention” and that “further Review Conferences shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations if so requested by one or more States parties, provided that the interval between Review Conferences shall in no case be less than five years”.

The 2009 Second Review Conference had decided, in particular, that the Third Review Conference would take place in the second half of the year 2014. Against this background and pursuant to the relevant decision of the Thirteenth Meeting of the States Parties,69 the Third Review Conference was held in Maputo from 23 to 27 June. Henrique Banze (Mozambique) presided over the Third Review Conference.

The Conference preparations were discussed at two meetings on 6 December 2013 and on 10 April 2014.

The First Preparatory Meeting focused on procedural, financial and other organizational issues. The meeting also decided that, in keeping with the established practice, the Co-Chairs of the Standing Committees should serve as Vice-Presidents of the Third Review Conference, namely: Austria, Belgium, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Japan, Indonesia, New Zealand, Norway and Poland.

The Second Preparatory Meeting approved the agenda and the provisional programme of work of the Conference and took note of the papers submitted in preparation for the Third Review Conference and expressed general satisfaction with their content. Four events held in Geneva from 19 to 22 May, entitled “Maputo +15”, complemented the formal preparatory process. In addition, informal meetings were held in Geneva on 5 June to seek views on matters of substance, to which all States parties, States not parties and interested organizations were invited to participate.

In particular, the above meetings considered papers in relation with the draft review of the operation and status of the Convention for the 2010-2014

68 With the accession of Oman on 20 August 2014, the Convention had 162 States parties by the end of 2014.
69 See APLC/MSP.13/2013/6.
period;\textsuperscript{70} the Maputo Action Plan;\textsuperscript{71} the Maputo +15 Declaration,\textsuperscript{72} as well as a proposed decision related to the implementation machinery.\textsuperscript{73} Comments and amendments to these drafts were also provided in the intersessional period preceding the Review Conference, as well as during the Conference itself.

Representatives of over 90 States parties and observer States, as well as representatives of the United Nations and a number of international, regional and non-governmental organizations participated in the work of the Conference. The Conference reiterated the success and importance of the Ottawa process.

The Conference culminated in a high-level segment on 26 and 27 June, during which messages were heard from the United Nations Secretary-General, delivered by Angela Kane, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs;\textsuperscript{74} Christine Beerli, Vice-President of the International Committee of the Red Cross; Princess Astrid of Belgium; Prince Mired of Jordan; ministers or senior officials from Gambia, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia, Sudan, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Uganda, Zambia and others; and representatives of civil society. Pursuant to the established practice, a large number of events and exhibitions also took place on the margins of the Conference, including on 25 June, the national holiday of Mozambique.

The Conference considered and adopted the following:

(a) The review of the operation and status of the Convention for the 2009-2014 period, which contains a detailed factual overview of the implementation of the Cartagena Action Plan\textsuperscript{75} adopted by the Second Review Conference in 2009.

(b) The Maputo +15 Declaration, which contains a renewed political commitment by the States parties to fulfil their obligations to destroy all stockpiled anti-personnel mines, to clear all mined areas and to spare no efforts until the main object and purpose of the Convention are fully materialized; to ensure compliance with the Convention’s comprehensive prohibitions; to promote universal observance of the Convention’s norms and to condemn any use of anti-personnel mines; to strengthen efforts to address the needs of mine victims; and to strengthen national ownership and capacity, enhance cooperation and establish partnerships for completion. It also refers

\textsuperscript{70} APLC/CONF/2014/WP.13-18.
\textsuperscript{71} APLC/CONF/2014/WP.5.
\textsuperscript{72} APLC/CONF/2014/WP.7.
\textsuperscript{73} APLC/CONF/2014/WP.6.
to the aspiration date of 2025 by which all goals of the Convention should be met.

(c) The Maputo Action Plan, 2014-2019, which contains 31 measurable, practical steps aimed at securing sustainable and significant progress in the implementation of the Convention. These measures cover universalization, stockpile destruction, mine clearance, victim assistance, cooperation and assistance, transparency and exchange of information, measures to ensure compliance, and implementation support.

The extension requests by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Yemen and Zimbabwe for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas pursuant to article 5 of the Convention were assessed and granted. In accordance with the established procedure, all requests had been considered by the Analysing Group chaired by the Algerian presidency of the Thirteenth Meeting of the States Parties.

The Conference agreed on new implementation machinery, making some modifications to the machinery in place since the entry into force of the Convention. The new machinery consists of four committees with limited membership that will replace the five open-ended Standing Committees: (a) Committee on Article 5 Implementation; (b) Committee on Cooperative Compliance; (c) Committee on Victim Assistance; and (d) Committee on Enhancing Cooperation and Assistance. These committees will have no decision-making authority, which rests solely with the States parties at the formal meetings of the States parties or Review Conferences.

The Conference also agreed to retain the meetings of the States parties which would be convened each year at the end of November or the beginning of December until the end of 2018, and that the Fourth Review Conference would be held at the end of 2019. Finally, the Conference discontinued the intersessional work programme and replaced it with informal two-day-long intersessional meetings to be held each year, preferably after the 30 April deadline for submitting transparency reports. The meetings could consist of a thematic segment and a preparatory segment.

Pursuant to the established procedures and practice, the Conference also approved the Implementation Support Unit 2015 Work Plan and Budget\(^76\) and the Interim Report\(^77\) on the 2014 activities, functioning and finances of the Unit.

It was decided that the Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties would be held in Geneva from 30 November to 4 December 2015. The 2014 Review Conference also agreed to hold intersessional meetings for a period of


up to two days on 4 and 5 June 2015. The Conference further noted with appreciation the offer made by Chile to host the Fifteenth Meeting of the States Parties.

**Export control**

**Wassenaar Arrangement**

The Wassenaar Arrangement held its twentieth plenary meeting in Vienna on 2 and 3 December. At the meeting, the Participating States of the Arrangement agreed to conduct further work on addressing new challenges, including emerging technologies of concern, and to keep pace with advances in technology, research and innovation. Specifically, its Participating States agreed to new export controls in a number of areas, including spacecraft equipment and technology for fly-by-wire/flight-by-light systems. In addition, texts for the control of a number of items were substantially reviewed, such as those related to machine tools, optical equipment for military utility, fibre laser components, vessels, unmanned aerial vehicles, equipment for the production of electronic devices, and telecommunications equipment with specific information security functionality for the administration, operation or maintenance of networks.
Annex I

Composite table of Member States that reported in 2014 to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Data on exports</th>
<th>Data on imports</th>
<th>Military holdings</th>
<th>Procurement through national production</th>
<th>International transfers of small arms and light weapons</th>
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## Conventional weapons issues

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### Annex II

**United Nations Register of Conventional Arms: Participation of Member States in reporting on transfers of small arms and light weapons, 2004-2014**

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<tr>
<th>Year of Secretary-General report</th>
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1. Albania                    ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
2. Andorra                     ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
3. Antigua and Barbuda          ✓ nil nil nil nil ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
4. Argentina*                  nil nil nil nil nil ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
5. Armenia                     ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
6. Australia                   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
7. Austria                     ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
8. Azerbaijan                  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
9. Bangladesh                  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
10. Belgium                    ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
11. Bolivia (Plurinational State of) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
12. Bosnia and Herzegovina     ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
13. Brunei Darussalam          ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
14. Bulgaria                   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
15. Canada                     ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

* Qatar submitted its views on the Register.
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- From 2008 to 2010, Argentina also reported on military holdings of SALW.
- Japan reported procurement of SALW through national production (PNP) from 2004 to 2009. It is not counted into the total number of States that reported on SALW transfers.
- Trinidad and Tobago provided information on military holdings in SALW.
## Annex III

Composite table of reports from Member States to the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures in 2014

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Chapter IV
Regional disarmament
Marking weapons at Kpalimé, Togo.
Chapter IV

Regional disarmament

Nuclear-weapon-free zones contribute greatly to strengthening nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regimes, and to enhancing regional and international security.

Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary-General

Developments and trends, 2014

There continued to be progress towards the consolidation of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The declaration of Latin America and the Caribbean as a Zone of Peace by the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States and the endorsement of the Zone by the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean marked a milestone in the cooperation between the two intraregional organizations. Furthermore, in 2014 the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia was signed by the five nuclear-weapon States. The Protocol provides legally binding negative security assurances to the Treaty’s States parties.

Intensive efforts were made to achieve consensus among the regional States on the modalities for holding the Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa engaged in wide-ranging activities to promote disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation. In particular, the Centre provided technical and other capacity-building assistance to States and regional organizations on various aspects of the small arms issue, including arms registration, stockpile management, awareness-raising programmes and implementing the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).

The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean assisted States in implementing disarmament and non-proliferation instruments and in complying with international standards and norms. In particular, the Centre provided capacity-building assistance for destroying surplus, obsolete

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and confiscated weapons; safeguarding stockpiles of small arms and light weapons; and implementing the ATT. It also provided technical assistance to States for implementing Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of WMD.

The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific promoted disarmament and confidence-building through dialogue and disarmament education. In particular, the Regional Centre assisted in enhancing national capacities for implementing Security Council resolution 1540 (2004); the ATT; the Biological Weapons Convention;\(^3\) the Chemical Weapons Convention;\(^4\) and for combating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. The Centre also promoted mutual understanding among States on cybersecurity issues, in part through the convening of a conference in Beijing in cooperation with the Government of China and the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association.

Both intergovernmental and non-governmental regional organizations continued to be actively engaged in advancing the disarmament agenda within the framework of their respective mandates, backed by significant support from the donor community and various organs of the United Nations.

Intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations also remained engaged in assisting post-conflict countries with demining issues and other activities related to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, particularly in Africa and the Asia Pacific.

In addition, projects and programmes were initiated or continued to be implemented in severely afflicted countries to improve citizen security through local police and community measures for the reduction of armed violence.

**Nuclear-weapon-free zones**

Nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) represent a regional approach that seeks to strengthen global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament norms, as well as promote international peace and security. The importance of NWFZs is also recognized by article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),\(^5\) which states: “Nothing in this Treaty affects the

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\(^3\) The full title of this treaty is the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. Its text and adherence status is available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/bwc (accessed 4 June 2015).


right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the
total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories”.

NFWZs exist in five regions of the world and were established under the
Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967) in Latin America and the Caribbean; the Rarotonga
Asia; the Treaty of Pelindaba (1996) in Africa; and the CANWFZ Treaty
(2006)\(^6\) in Central Asia. As a result of the first four of these treaties, almost the
entire southern hemisphere has been covered by NWFZs. In addition to the
regional zones, Mongolia’s self-declared status as a single-State NWFZ has
been recognized by the United Nations.

In May, at the Third Preparatory Meeting for the Third Conference of
States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free
Zones and Mongolia, Angela Kane, United Nations High Representative for
Disarmament Affairs, observed that NWFZs were “an extraordinary example
of the synergy between regional and global efforts towards a world without
nuclear weapons” as these zones helped to advance the rule of law applicable
to nuclear weapons within such zones. The zonal approach, she added, “could
apply to the creation of new NWFZs in other regions including the Arctic,
Northeast Asia and certainly the Middle East”.\(^7\)

**Third Preparatory Meeting for the Third Conference of States
Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-
Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia**

The Third Preparatory Meeting for the Third Conference of States
Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones
and Mongolia\(^8\) took place in New York on 7 May, on the margins of the third
session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference.
It was chaired by Triyono Wibowo (Indonesia) and attended by representatives
of 62 States from NWFZs, observer States, the United Nations, the Agency for
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and
civil society.

The participants discussed a number of procedural issues relating
to the Third Conference, to be held in 2015, and agreed to hold a series of
informal meetings in New York to discuss the draft outcome document for the
Conference. They stressed the important role NWFZs played in maintaining
international peace and security, and encouraged further cooperation among

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\(^6\) Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia.

\(^7\) Remarks to the Third Preparatory Meeting for the Third Conference of States Parties and
Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia, New

\(^8\) The treaties and their adherence status are available from http://disarmament.un.org/
treaties/ (accessed 4 June 2015).
NWFZs in the areas of common interest. They also reiterated calls for the withdrawal of interpretative declarations and reservations to the protocols to the NWFZ treaties made by the nuclear-weapon States.

Addressing the Meeting, the United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs expressed appreciation for the role played by the evolution of NWFZs in strengthening the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and in contributing to regional and international peace and security. She observed that the large number of States within such zones had now provided a substantial foundation for building greater safety and security for all.9

**Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)**

In 2014, the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL)10 continued its mutual cooperation with the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC).

In resolution CG/Res.554 on the strategic agenda of OPANAL,11 the General Conference acknowledged “the importance of the relation between OPANAL and CELAC, particularly, the cooperation efforts to articulate a common position regarding nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation matters”. To that end, the second CELAC Summit, held in Havana on 28 and 29 January, reaffirmed the importance of its cooperation with OPANAL and declared “Latin America and the Caribbean as a Zone of Peace based on respect for the principles and rules of International Law”.12

The OPANAL member States, in their joint declaration of 26 September,13 also reaffirmed the “historic declaration of Latin America and the Caribbean as a Zone of Peace”. They further expressed support for declaring 26 September the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.

In the declaration, the OPANAL member States reiterated their call, particularly on the nuclear-weapon States (NWS),14 “to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons from their doctrines, security policies and military strategies, and to fully comply with their legal obligations and unequivocal undertakings to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons without further delay”.

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10 Under the Treaty of Tlatelolco, OPANAL was created to ensure that the obligations of the Treaty were met. The treaty text and adherence status are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/tlatelolco (accessed 4 June 2015).
12 A/68/914, pp. 31-32.
14 France, China, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.
In addition, they called on the NWS to cease the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons. The OPANAL member States further urged the NWS to comply with their commitments under article VI of the NPT and to move forward towards the total elimination of such weapons. The NWS were also urged to advance with the implementation of the 13 practical steps agreed upon at the 2000 NPT Review Conference and the 64-point Action Plan\textsuperscript{15} agreed upon at the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

On 19 November, the twenty-third special session of the General Conference of OPANAL was held in Mexico City. By its resolution CG/E/Res.576, entitled “Report of the Working-Group on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education”,\textsuperscript{16} the General Conference took note of the recommendations of the Working-Group, established under resolutions CG/E/Res.547 (XXI-12) and CG/Res.556 (XXIII-13), and broadened the Group’s mandate to explore new possibilities for the implementation of the training course entitled “Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education”. It also decided to continue its cooperation with the Latin American Institute for Educational Communication, the Instituto Matias Romero de Estudios Diplomáticos and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mexico in this endeavour.

**African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty)**

The Third Conference of States Parties to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty)\textsuperscript{17} was held at the African Union (AU) Headquarters in Addis Ababa on 29 and 30 May. It was attended by 27 States parties to the Treaty, as well as France and the Russian Federation. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), the Forum for Nuclear Regulatory Bodies in Africa and the Institute for Security Studies also attended the Conference.

The Conference reviewed the operational status of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE) secretariat; the status of States parties’ contributions to the 2013-2015 budget; the implementation of the AFCONE programme of work; and other issues related to the implementation of the Pelindaba Treaty.\textsuperscript{18}


\textsuperscript{17}The treaty text and status of adherence are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/pelindaba (accessed 4 June 2015).

The Conference called on AU member States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty without further delay. It also appealed to the relevant non-African States to speedily sign and ratify the appropriate Protocols to the Treaty and to comply with all their obligations contained therein.

The Conference took note of the report submitted by the Chairperson of AFCONE on the operational status of the AFCONE secretariat, the appointment of the Executive Secretary, and the status of States parties’ assessed contributions to the budget of AFCONE for the period 2013-2015, as adopted by the Second Conference of States Parties held in Addis Ababa in 2012. The Conference further took note of the progress made by AFCONE in implementing the different pillars of its programme of work, including the monitoring of States parties’ compliance with their Treaty obligations; nuclear and radiation safety and security; nuclear sciences and applications; and partnerships and technical cooperation with relevant regional and international bodies.

The Conference welcomed the AFCONE assessment that all activities by States parties were in full compliance with the non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty, while noting the need to strengthen safety and security programmes. It further emphasized that AFCONE should provide the necessary technical expertise and support to States parties to enable them to fully benefit from the peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology in the areas of socioeconomic development, human and animal health, food and agriculture, water resources, sustainable energy development and industry. The Conference also welcomed the AFCONE cooperation with relevant regional and international organizations, including the African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology, the Forum for Nuclear Regulatory Bodies in Africa, the IAEA and the CTBTO, in order to optimize resources and address gaps.

In light of significant shortfalls in their contributions to the AFCONE budget, the Conference called on all States parties to honour their budgetary obligations, as adopted by the Second Conference of States Parties, in order to enable AFCONE to effectively implement its programme of work in a manner that ensures full ownership by States parties.

The Conference also took note of the tentative road map developed by AFCONE for the period 2014-2016, which would, inter alia, work towards the appointment of national focal points by States parties; the strengthening of cooperation with regional and international organizations; the establishment of regional verification systems; and securing appropriate resources, including human and infrastructure development resources.

Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia

During the period 2013-2014, consultations were held between the parties to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (CANWFZ Treaty) and the NWS, under article 9, paragraph 3, of the NPT, with regard to the latter’s adherence to the Protocol to the CANWFZ Treaty.

As a result of these efforts, the NWS signed the Protocol in a ceremony held in New York on 6 May. The Protocol provided for a legally binding guarantee that the NWS would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the parties to the CANWFZ Treaty. The Secretary-General welcomed the signing of the Protocol by the NWS and congratulated the five Central Asian States on the first concrete step towards the consolidation of the CANWFZ. He also expressed the hope that the NWS would ratify the Protocol without delay. In addition, Angela Kane, United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, urged the signatories to proceed with their internal ratification processes to achieve the Protocol’s prompt entry into force, since much work remained to be done to ensure that the Protocol’s legal commitments were reflected in domestic laws, regulations, and policies.

Pursuant to article 7, the Protocol to the CANWFZ Treaty enters into force for each party to the Protocol on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification with the depositary. Under article 4, the parties to the Protocol are France, China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States. France ratified the Protocol to the Treaty on 17 October and deposited its instrument of ratification with Kyrgyzstan on 17 November. In 2014, the United Kingdom began the process towards ratification of the Protocol to the Treaty expected in early 2015. The remaining NWS, as at 31 December 2014, had not yet ratified the Protocol.

On 2 December, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted resolution 69/36, entitled “Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia”, in which it welcomed the signing of the Protocol to the CANWFZ Treaty by the NWS and called upon them to take measures for its early ratification.

Kyrgyzstan assumed the chairmanship of the group of States that are parties to the CANWFZ Treaty on 25 December. Together with the other parties to the Treaty, Kyrgyzstan expressed the intention to continue

21 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
consultations with the NWS in order to accelerate their ratification of the Protocol to the Treaty.

In its capacity as depositary of the Treaty, Kyrgyzstan convened a consultative meeting of the parties to the Treaty in Almaty on 25 July.

**Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty**

(Bangkok Treaty)

The forty-seventh Foreign Ministers’ Meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), held in Myanmar on 8 August, issued a joint communiqué, in which the ASEAN foreign ministers reaffirmed their commitment to uphold the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. They further underlined the importance of full and effective implementation of the Treaty and its Plan of Action for the 2013-2017 period adopted at the previous ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, held in June 2013. The ASEAN foreign ministers also reiterated their commitment to engage the NWS on their early signing and ratification of the Protocol to the Treaty without reservations.

Following the forty-seventh ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, the Commission for the Treaty held its meeting in Myanmar on 8 August, which was chaired by the Foreign Minister of Myanmar and attended by the ASEAN foreign ministers and the ASEAN Secretary-General. The meeting discussed the progress made on the implementation of the Treaty and the signing of the Protocol to the Treaty by the NWS at the earliest opportunity without reservations. The ASEAN foreign ministers agreed to continue consultations with the NWS towards the prompt signing of the Protocol.

During the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly’s First Committee, four NWS (France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States) specifically reaffirmed their commitment to the early signing of the Protocol to the Treaty.

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27 A/C.1/69/PV.11, pp. 21-22.
28 A/C.1/69/PV.3, pp. 6-8.
29 See A/C.1/69/PV.12.
30 See A/C.1/69/PV.15.
Regional disarmament

On 13 November, the ninth East Asia Summit was held in Myanmar. The Summit was attended by the Heads of State or Government of ASEAN member States, Australia, China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, the Russian Federation and the United States. In the Chairman’s statement, they reiterated their commitment to continue to work with the NWS in accordance with the objectives and principles of the Treaty to ensure early signing and ratification by the NWS of the Protocol of the Treaty.

Establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction

During the first half of 2014, the conveners and the facilitator for the postponed Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other WMD continued to engage with the States of the region in direct and informal consultations on the agenda, modalities and outcome for the conference. Following the same format adopted for the meetings held in Glion, Switzerland, in October and November 2013, the facilitator and the conveners held a third meeting with States of the region in Glion on 4 and 5 February 2014.

On 1 May, the facilitator reported to the third session of the Preparatory Committee of the 2015 NPT Review Conference on the status of preparations for the conference. While confirming that the parties remained ready to make progress through an open and constructive approach, he noted that divergent views persisted on important aspects of the conference. The facilitator announced that there would be further informal meetings in order to arrive at an early agreement on the arrangements for the conference.

States parties, taking note of the facilitator’s report, renewed their appreciation for the efforts of the facilitator. They also expressed appreciation for the constructive engagement of the States of the region and took note of the intention of the facilitator and the conveners to host additional informal meetings aimed at finalizing the preparations for the conference. States parties recalled the importance of a process leading to the full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and the practical steps to that end endorsed at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Many States parties expressed support for convening the conference as soon as possible before the end of 2014.

32 Secretary-General of the United Nations, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.
33 Jaakko Laajava (Finland).
34 NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/18.
36 See A/69/130 (Part I).
In a joint statement\textsuperscript{37} to the Preparatory Committee meeting, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States commended the facilitator’s “tireless and creative” efforts and hoped the regional States would be able to reach agreement on the agenda, modalities and date for the conference in the next round of meetings.

The facilitator and conveners held two additional meetings with States of the region, advancing the process of engagement initiated through the meetings in Glion. These meetings, which were held in Geneva on 14 May and on 24 and 25 June, allowed States of the region to continue their engagement and consideration of the arrangements and outcome of the Conference on the basis of non-papers and proposals circulated by the facilitator and the conveners, as well as by States of the region.

At the fifty-eighth session of the IAEA General Conference, the Group of Arab States introduced for a second consecutive year a draft resolution entitled “Israeli nuclear capabilities”. The General Council rejected the resolution by a recorded vote of 45 in favour, 58 opposed and 27 abstentions.

At the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly’s First Committee, the United Kingdom made a joint statement on behalf of the three convening States, reaffirming their full commitment for convening the conference. They acknowledged the disappointment expressed by many States over the failure to hold the conference, but reaffirmed their readiness to convene it as soon as the States of the region agreed to its modalities by consensus, which they believed was possible. They emphasized that the States of the region must be willing to take difficult decisions that would enable the convening of an inclusive conference, and urged all States to accept the facilitator’s proposal for a further round of multilateral consultations so that the conference could be held soon.

From September to the end of 2014, the facilitator and the conveners made intensive efforts for a renewed multilateral engagement among the States of the region to promote meaningful dialogue to conclude arrangements for the conference. Despite the extended consultations held in the first half of the year, there remained differences among the parties on several important aspects of the conference, including its agenda. Thus, agreement on the modalities for the Conference could not be reached.

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs regional centres

United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa

In 2014, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC) continued to provide support to the disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation efforts of African States and regional organizations. Overall, more than 2,000 representatives of Governments and civil society organizations from 42 African States participated in activities organized by the Regional Centre.

UNREC provided expert advice and substantive inputs to events organized by States and partner institutions, such as the Nigerian Presidential Committee on Small Arms and Light Weapons, in particular on the legal review of the Nigerian Firearms Act of 1959. The Regional Centre also assisted in strengthening institutional capacities and provided technical expertise on arms control in Africa, gun-free zones, and women, peace and security to the regional meetings in North and East Africa organized by Morocco, as a member of the Core Group of the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development. In addition, UNREC briefed regional experts on the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) at a workshop of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate on counter-terrorism in Bujumbura.

Through its Côte d’Ivoire assistance programme, UNREC developed national standard operating procedures and guidelines for security forces on stockpile management of small arms and light weapons (SALW). Based on these procedures, West African security and defence officers received training on weapons and ammunition.

UNREC also continued to provide expertise to the Mali national commission on small arms and light weapons, reviewed the country’s national legislation on SALW, assisted in capacity-building, and supported civil society. The Regional Centre developed a course to assist security forces in combating the illicit trafficking in SALW and it also provided awareness-raising.

39 These guidelines, which are detailed standards for voluntary use by countries that wish to improve the safety and security of their ammunition storage sites, were developed in response to General Assembly resolution 63/61 of 2 December 2008. Available from http://www.un.org/disarmament/un-safeguard/ (accessed 14 May 2015).
training for civil society representatives in five of Mali’s eight regions. This training would be undertaken in the remaining three regions by early 2015.

UNREC assisted Togo in reviewing its firearms legislation and building capacity for the marking and registering of SALW. As a result of its targeted outreach and awareness-raising activities, a total of 5,711 civilian-owned firearms in the country were marked and registered. The Regional Centre and United Nations system partners also provided training on the basic principles of the use of force and firearms by law enforcement officials\(^41\) to the Togolese security forces responsible for security in advance of the 2015 presidential elections.

UNREC conducted several activities to promote the implementation and use of arms control instruments, such as the International Tracing Instrument (ITI),\(^42\) the International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS)\(^43\) and the IATG. In March, the Centre organized a West African workshop on the ITI that brought together representatives from Member States, as well as regional and international organizations. UNREC also provided assistance to Burkina Faso, Niger and Sierra Leone by providing marking machines and training security personnel on marking and registration techniques. In collaboration with the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and the United Nations Mine Action Service, the Regional Centre further trained national authorities and experts dealing with conventional ammunition from 12 East African States on the IATG. A similar IATG workshop was also conducted for the United Nations Mission in Liberia.

In collaboration with the Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and experts from the Committee established by Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), UNREC conducted a number of workshops to assist African States to draft their first national reports required by this resolution. It also organized country-specific activities in Gabon, Malawi and Togo. During the course of the year, Lesotho\(^44\) and Malawi\(^45\) submitted initial reports. Togo submitted its second report\(^46\) and also initiated the drafting process of a national action plan on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004).

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\(^42\) The full title is International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons. The text is available from [www.poa-iss.org/InternationalTracing/ITI_English.pdf](http://www.poa-iss.org/InternationalTracing/ITI_English.pdf) (accessed 8 June 2015).


\(^44\) S/AC.44/2014/3.

\(^45\) S/AC.44/2014/8.

\(^46\) S/AC.44/2014/9.
In collaboration with the Geneva Branch of UNODA, UNREC further continued to support the implementation of a global programme on the Biological Weapons Convention by helping to organize country-specific workshops to raise awareness about the Convention and train officials on biosafety measures. It also held legislative review workshops in Benin, Burkina Faso and Uganda.

UNREC continued to support the African Union–Regions Steering Committee on Small Arms and Light Weapons. It also provided substantive support to the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa at its thirty-eighth and thirty-ninth ministerial meetings.

**Ministerial meetings of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa**

The United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa held its thirty-eighth Ministerial Meeting in Malabo from 29 July to 2 August.

The Committee discussed the importance of ratifying the Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and All Parts and Components That Can Be Used for Their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly (Kinshasa Convention),\(^{47}\) the inclusion of a discussion on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) in the agenda of their meetings, and the hosting of a preparatory meeting for Central African States in view of the upcoming Biennial Meeting of States on the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons\(^ {48}\) in 2016.

The Committee also discussed the growing issue of piracy and maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. In this regard, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) briefed the Committee on the establishment in September of the Regional Centre for Maritime Safety and Security in Central Africa, which is based in Pointe-Noire, Congo.

UNREC and ECCAS briefed the Committee on recent developments relating to conventional weapons, notably the Programme of Action, the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, the ATT and Security Council resolution 2117 (2013) on SALW.

The Regional Centre and ECCAS also briefed the Committee on their activities to assist States in implementing the Kinshasa Convention, the ATT and Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of WMD.


UNREC encouraged member States of the Standing Committee that had not done so to ratify the Kinshasa Convention, which requires at least six ratifications to enter into force. In this regard, the Regional Centre informed the Committee that it was developing a set of guidelines to assist in harmonizing the national laws of the States parties to the Kinshasa Convention. The Centre also urged early ratification of the ATT and informed the Committee about the United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation, which is a new multi-donor financing facility for funding projects related to the implementation of the ATT and the Programme of Action, including South-South cooperation on assistance.

In his report to the General Assembly of 28 August,49 the Secretary-General observed that ratifications to the Kinshasa Convention would enable the Convention to serve as an indispensable tool in the fight against small arms proliferation and armed violence in Central Africa. The Secretary-General commended the progress being made towards implementing the Road Map for Counter-Terrorism and Non-Proliferation of Arms in Central Africa, adopted in 2011, and the recommendations of the Summit of Heads of State and Government on Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea, adopted in 2013.

**United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean**

The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC) contributed to security in the region by promoting State implementation of disarmament and non-proliferation instruments and adherence to international standards and norms. The Centre implemented more than 80 activities in response to requests for assistance from Member States. In particular, it provided expertise and capacity-building assistance towards the destruction of surplus, obsolete and confiscated weapons; the safeguarding of stockpiles of SALW; and the implementation of the ATT. The Centre also provided legislative and policy assistance to States to implement Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

UNLIREC concluded the final phase of its Caribbean stockpile management and weapons destruction assistance, which led to the destruction of over 50,000 firearms and 64 tons of small arms ammunition throughout the region. The Centre also continued to provide specialized training courses to security sector officials, covering issues such as weapons storage, management and accountability. These courses reduced the risk of small arms proliferation and trafficking, reaching over 400 officials from 13 States of the Caribbean region.

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49 A/69/361.
UNLIREC launched its first comprehensive Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) assistance programme for Caribbean States, which provided these States with the technical and legal resources to update and develop the required legislation to implement the resolution. Legislative support focused on the provisions pertaining to import and export control regulations, as well as measures to prevent the financing of proliferation. In this context, the Regional Centre also supported the development of voluntary national action plans in the Caribbean States participating in this programme. States also received support to undertake risk assessments in port and maritime security contexts.

In October, UNLIREC piloted a training course in Costa Rica for national authorities responsible for arms controls, import and export regulations and the effective implementation of the ATT. The course was the first of its kind in the region and included two simulations that required groups to incorporate human rights and gender violence considerations into their evaluation of conventional arms exports in complex contexts.

**United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific**

In 2014, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific (UNRCPD) continued its efforts to promote disarmament and confidence-building through dialogue; peace and disarmament education; the effective implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004); enhancing national capacity to combat illicit trade in SALW; and the ATT. The Centre also facilitated international discussion to build mutual understanding on cybersecurity matters and national capacity-building for the implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention.

UNRCPD helped to organize two workshops in Nepal on the national implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention. The workshops brought together officials from multiple Nepalese government departments and agencies and facilitated active discussions on key issues and progress on the ratification and implementation of the Convention. A similar workshop was held in Mongolia to facilitate the national implementation of the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions.

In addition, UNRCPD actively participated in multiple events relating to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). Workshops were held in Myanmar, Cambodia, the Philippines and Bangladesh on various issues, which included chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear security threats; accounting and physical protection; general implementation of resolution 1540 (2004); and contribution to regional and global disarmament and non-proliferation. Resolution 1540 (2004) experts also made a country visit to Bangladesh in April.
In May, UNRCPD organized a capacity-building workshop to assist Myanmar in implementing the provisions of the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons at the national level. Discussions focused on the firearms situation in Myanmar; relevant international instruments and practices in the area of physical security; and stockpile management of small arms, light weapons and ammunition.

In November, UNRCPD conducted a regional workshop in Cambodia to assist 13 countries in the region by enhancing the understanding of Governments on the requirements for national legislation to comply with the ATT. The workshop further provided States with the opportunity to discuss their treaty implementation status and related challenges, as well as assistance needed to sign and become party to the Treaty.

In its effort to reduce the negative impact caused by the illicit possession and use of small arms in Nepal, the Regional Centre continued to provide substantive support to the Nepal Working Group on Armed Violence Reduction.

UNRCPD organized an international workshop on cybersecurity in China in June. Under the theme “Towards a Peaceful, Secure, Open and Cooperative Cyber Space”, senior officials from 25 Member States, civil society and the United Nations discussed the nature of the challenges; the role of the United Nations in promoting dialogue; and potential national, regional and international responses.

In December, UNRCPD co-organized the thirteenth annual United Nations–Republic of Korea Joint Conference on Disarmament and Non-proliferation Issues, which focused on matters relevant to the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, nuclear non-proliferation in a regional context and lethal autonomous weapon systems.

For the third year, UNRCPD organized an art competition to raise awareness about peace and disarmament issues among Nepalese youth. Approximately 450 students from six different schools participated in the event. The Centre also cooperated with Nepal’s Ministry of Education on integrating peace and disarmament education concepts into the Nepali school curriculums that will reach approximately 400,000 girls and boys in Nepal every year.
Disarmament and arms regulation at the regional level

Africa

African Union


To support the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), the AU Commission organized a training workshop, held in Addis Ababa on 18 and 19 November, for National Points of Contact on the implementation of the resolution.

The AU Commission endeavoured to enhance the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. On 21 November, in collaboration with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Commission organized a workshop in Addis Ababa for the focal points of regional economic communities on the development and assessment of their regional plans of action for the implementation of the Convention.

With regard to capacity-building in the areas of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear safety and security, on 20 November, the Commission convened a workshop for international and regional organizations that specialize in these fields, as well as related sciences and technology issues, in order to build partnership towards enhanced support to member States.

The AU Commission assisted its member States in the control of the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of SALW. To that end, it organized the third and fourth meetings of the AU–Regions Steering Committee on SALW and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, which were held on 14 and 15 May in Nairobi and on 8 and 9 December in Lusaka, respectively. The Commission also provided technical and operational support to Gabon and Ethiopia towards the establishment and operationalization of their national commissions.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

The AU Commission undertook with partners a joint assessment mission to the Sudan on 15 and 16 April and organized a follow-up meeting on 21 and 22 October on the implementation of its recommendations. A high-level disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) sensitization briefing was held in Libya from 4 to 8 May, and a training workshop was organized in Ethiopia on 11 and 12 December on “Children and DDR” for the handover of children associated with armed forces or groups in Somalia. The Commission
also finalized five DDR guidance notes on women in DDR, children in DDR, detention, national frameworks and reintegration.

Mine action

The AU Commission organized a victim assistance workshop in Addis Ababa from 4 to 6 March, commemorated the International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action, and donated de-mining equipment to Ethiopia, Sudan, Mauritania and Zimbabwe. In addition, the Commission launched its Mine Action and Explosive Remnants of War Strategic Framework project document and organized training on explosive ordinance disposal for selected member States in partnership with the International Peace Support Training Centre in Nairobi from 20 October to 7 November.

Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons

In 2014, the Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons (RECSA) continued to support stockpile control and management. Under an AU/European Union (EU) transregional project, it provided one arms-marking machine to Somalia and an additional one to South Sudan. Law enforcement officers in both countries were trained to operate the machines to mark arms. In addition, the AU/EU project funded the purchase of arms-marking machines and the training of personnel in the use of the machines, as well as electronic record keeping in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) region. The project also supported the construction of an armoury at the Rwanda Police Training School.

With support from the AU/EU project, the RECSA convened a regional orientation workshop on issues relating to small arms in Nairobi for RECSA National Focal Points. The project also supported a regional conference in Zimbabwe for South African Development Community member States on best practices in arms marking and electronic record keeping.

Under an arms-marking project supported by the United States Government, the United Republic of Tanzania received a computer server from RECSA to support electronic record keeping and began using the RECSA Small Arms Tracing System to manage arms records. Under the same project, a sensitization meeting was held with Tanzanian military personnel on arms marking.

RECSA collaborated with the Bonn International Centre for Conversion and Sudan government experts in the development of the country’s draft National Action Plan on small arms control and management.

50 Guinea, Liberia and Mali.
RECSA also collaborated with the International Committee of the Red Cross to convene a regional sensitization conference in the United Republic of Tanzania on the ATT.

With support from the United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR), RECSA also commissioned a study on the complementarities between the ATT and other small arms instruments (the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, the Nairobi Protocol and the Kinshasa Convention). The study was validated in an experts’ meeting in Nairobi in November and will be published in early 2015.

RECSA member States continued to review their national laws on small arms and to draft relevant policies. RECSA also partnered with the Danish Demining Group (DDG) to provide technical support to “Somaliland” in the development and review of small arms legislation. These draft legislative bills and policies were at various stages of being adopted by the respective Governments.

In 2014, RECSA participated and contributed substantively in various small arms forums convened by international and regional partners: the AU, the United Nations, police chiefs and the Africa-China-EU Experts Working Group on Conventional Arms, among others.

**Economic Community of West African States**

In 2014, the ECOWAS Commission, with the support of its Small Arms Division (SAD), continued its disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation interventions through a number of activities, as follows:

*United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004)*


*ECOWAS Convention, Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, ATT*

(a) SAD participated in workshops on the implementation of the ATT by identifying areas of overlap between the ECOWAS Convention, the ATT and regional priorities;

(b) SAD supported the proposal for funding the West Africa Action Network on Small Arms (WAANSA) by the United Kingdom to aid the

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51 Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda.

campaign for the ratification of the ATT by member States, and it provided technical input into the WAANSA advocacy strategy to achieve that objective. Ratification by four additional ECOWAS member States in 2014 contributed to the entry into force of the ATT on 24 December.

(c) ECOWAS participated in the Programme of Action and supported member States under the chairmanship of Ghana. At the plenary, it highlighted the successes and challenges in the fight against the proliferation of arms.

Other relevant activities

(a) In 2014, over 60 journalists and members of the national commissions on SALW were sensitized on regional and global developments and trained in planning advocacy interventions in the Gambia and Senegal.

(b) ECOWAS participated in AU Steering Committee coordination meetings on SALW and conducted its annual meeting of Chairpersons of the national commissions where their 2013 activities were reviewed and activities for 2014 concluded.

(c) SAD mobilized resources from the EU and launched a pilot ECOWAS-EU Arms Collection and Destruction Programme in Northern Niger, Mali, Western Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea Forest Region, East Liberia and North-East Sierra Leone.

(d) ECOWAS worked with the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa to submit a proposal to the UNSCAR. It developed a strategy against the proliferation of SALW in the Sahel, and printed and circulated a practical guide on the exemption procedure applicable to the ECOWAS Convention on SALW.

In 2014, ECOWAS consolidated the implementation of its five-year priority activity plan based on its Convention on SALW, the Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument. However, the implementation of its activities was circumscribed by the outbreak of the Ebola Virus Disease in 2014.

Economic Community of Central African States

On the basis of article 29 of the Kinshasa Convention on SALW, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) defined its four strategic priorities as follows: (a) consolidation of national institutional frameworks; (b) support for the adoption and revision of national legal measures; (c) implementation of operational awareness-raising activities; and (d) cooperation and exchange of experiences.

53 Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Senegal and Sierra Leone.
Consolidation of national institutional frameworks

Since the publication of its booklet on procedures for the establishment and operationalization of national commissions to combat the proliferation of SALW in Central Africa in 2012, ECCAS has continued to provide technical assistance to its member States in establishing national commissions and making them operational. In that context, a pilot project comprising three country-level forums on combating the proliferation of SALW in Cameroon, the Congo and Gabon was organized in 2014. One aim of the national forums, which were attended by government experts, parliamentarians and civil society representatives, was to help the competent national authorities to recognize the need to establish and operationalize their national commissions as soon as possible. Relevant legal texts were in the process of being drafted and adopted in each of the target countries.

Support for the adoption and revision of national legal measures

ECCAS, with technical support from the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, began developing a guide for harmonizing national legislation on SALW in Central Africa. ECCAS will provide member States with copies of the guide for their use once it is reviewed by government experts and adopted.

Implementation of operational awareness-raising activities

By the end of 2014, only four ECCAS member States, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Congo and Gabon, had deposited instruments of ratification for the Kinshasa Convention with the United Nations. Ratification processes to enable the entry into force of the Convention were under way in Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2014.

ECCAS, the Government of Chad and the Centre for Peace, Security and Armed Violence Prevention, based in Birmingham, United Kingdom, jointly organized a forum on the role of parliamentarians in the implementation of subregional and international commitments to women, peace and security in Central Africa, which took place in N’Djamena in April. The purpose of the forum was to assist parliamentarians from the subregion in understanding the importance of their involvement in raising public awareness and in encouraging stakeholders to respect regional and international instruments such as the Kinshasa Convention and United Nations Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security.

Cooperation and exchange of experiences

ECCAS collaborated with the United Nations, the EU, the AU, ECOWAS and RECSA in its efforts to combat the proliferation of SALW through cooperation and exchange of experiences. To that end, in June, ECCAS participated in the Fifth Biennial Meeting of States to Consider
the Implementation of the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, which included consideration of the implementation of the International Tracing Instrument. Participants underscored the need for increased cooperation among regional and subregional organizations and international assistance in order to combat the proliferation of SALW more efficiently around the world.

**Americas**

**Organization of American States**

**Conventional weapons**

The Organization of American States (OAS) recognizes that transparency in conventional weapons acquisition is an important confidence- and security-building measure that contributes to strengthening peace and security, both regionally and internationally. To this end, in 1999, OAS member States adopted and opened for signature the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions (CITAAC) in Guatemala City. Twenty-one of its 34 member States are signatories to the Convention, of which 17 have deposited instruments of ratification or accession. The Convention is legally binding and requires each State party to provide annual reports to OAS regarding their imports and exports of conventional weapons.

On 1 March 2013 at a meeting with the National Points of Contact of CITAAC, the States parties reviewed the Convention and considered further transparency measures pursuant to article XI of the Convention. As such, OAS continued to look forward to promoting transparency in conventional weapons’ acquisition among its member States.

In resolution AG/RES.2866 on “Advancing Hemispheric Security”, adopted on 5 June, the OAS General Assembly urged member States that had not already done so to give prompt consideration to ratifying or acceding to the CITAAC. It also reaffirmed commitments to the principles contained in CITAAC and in the Declaration of Punta del Este, adopted at the tenth Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas, to promote universal participation in and full implementation of the said Convention.

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55 These 17 countries are Argentina, Barbados, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of).
Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials

The Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials (CIFTA) has been in force since 1998. The OAS Secretariat for Multidimensional Security functions as the Technical Secretariat of the Convention.

On 6 May, the Consultative Committee of CIFTA met in Washington, D.C., and adopted the draft Model Legislation on Security Measures to Eliminate Loss and Diversion of Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and other Related Materials. It also adopted the draft Model Legislation on Record-keeping, Confidentiality, and Exchange of Information related to the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and other Related Materials. The Technical Secretariat reported on the status of ratifications to the Convention, indicating that 31 States had deposited their respective instruments of ratification or accession.

On 5 June, the OAS General Assembly, in its resolution AG/RES.2866 on “Advancing Hemispheric Security”, urged member States that had not already done so to give prompt consideration to ratifying or acceding to CIFTA, and also requested the OAS Secretary General to present to the Permanent Council a report on the status of signatures and ratifications of and accessions to CIFTA prior to the forty-fifth regular session of the General Assembly.

Caribbean Community

The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Crime and Security Strategy, adopted in 2013, outlined the region’s crime and security agenda. Meanwhile the CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS) has been involved in a number of collaborative initiatives with regional and international partners, and among its member States towards the implementation of its stated goals, with particular emphasis on disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation.

Weapons of mass destruction

The CARICOM IMPACS co-hosted with the Department of National Defence of Canada a “Capacity Building Workshop on the Interdiction of Weapons of Mass Destruction” on 16 and 17 September. Among the participants were senior representatives from ministries of foreign affairs; national security, customs and border security agencies; national police; and

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military organizations from the Caribbean and Central American region. The objectives of the workshop were to strengthen regional participation in the proliferation security initiative; examine the specific challenges in the Caribbean region in conducting effective interdictions to stop the spread of WMD, their delivery systems and related materials across the region; and discuss concrete steps required for effective interdictions in the Caribbean region.

Arms Trade Treaty

With the adoption of the landmark ATT and all member States of CARICOM having signed it, steps were taken to promote greater compliance with its obligations.

CARICOM IMPACS conducted a baseline assessment on the status of CARICOM member States with respect to the ATT. The Treaty’s Preliminary Assessment Questionnaire was designed to:

• Provide a preliminary assessment of CARICOM member States’ progress in advancing the ratification and implementation of the ATT;

• Contribute towards a targeted and coordinated regional approach by providing information to help avoid duplication and to ensure that scarce resources are utilized most effectively and efficiently; and

• Provide indicators for future actions, activities and areas of assistance required in order for CARICOM member States to achieve the objective and purpose of the Treaty.

CARICOM IMPACS partnered with the Government of Trinidad and Tobago, Oxfam International, and the Caribbean Coalition for Development and Reduction of Armed Violence to host a CARICOM workshop in February on the implementation of the ATT. The goal of the workshop was to promote the accelerated ratification of the Treaty.

In June, CARICOM IMPACS in partnership with the International Committee of the Red Cross hosted a regional technical support workshop. This workshop was held for participants from CARICOM member States’ ministries of legal affairs, attorney general chambers and customs and excise divisions to promote ratification of the Treaty and to further assist States in the implementation of their obligations.

United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons

The Regional Integrated Ballistic Information Network (RIBIN) was established for three CARICOM member States, Barbados, Belize and Jamaica, linking them to the INTERPOL Ballistic Information Network (IBIN). States that have joined RIBIN can search for information shared in

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59 International Criminal Police Organization.
the network by these three States, as well as by all other IBIN-connected countries. RIBIN will improve CARICOM member States’ ability to identify and trace guns used in cross-border criminal activities.

A regional training workshop was held in August on the use of the International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS) and its Assessment Tool. The workshop was a joint initiative of CARICOM IMPACS and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research designed to build capacity in the region. The programme will enhance member States’ ability to conduct regular monitoring and evaluation of the application of global SALW control standards, such as the Programme of Action, International Tracing Instrument, Firearms Protocol and the ATT, to guide the development of policies, programmes and practices to improve SALW control.

**Enhanced partnership**

CARICOM IMPACS executed a memorandum of understanding with the Organization of American States and entered into a regional programme with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, which signalled an important step towards the implementation of an enhanced security partnership in the fight against crime in the region.

The memorandum of understanding includes effective implementation and monitoring mechanisms, which would build on existing structures, and will be complementary to relevant partnership frameworks. IMPACS remains committed to working with international strategic partners and non-traditional donors towards the establishment of safe and secure societies, as well as sustainable growth and development in the region.

**Union of South American Nations**

Created in 2008, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) is the first subregional advisory body established specifically to address regional defence and security issues by advising the South American Defence Council, which consists of the ministers of defence of the 12 member States of the subregion. The Council seeks to make South America a zone of peace; build a common South American defence identity; and generate the consensus needed to strengthen regional defence cooperation.

In 2011, the Council established the Centre for Strategic Defence Studies with the mission of “developing strategic thinking at the regional level, leading to coordination and harmonization of South American defence policies”.  

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61 Statute of the Centre for Strategic Defence Studies, paragraph II, Mission, article 2.
In 2014, the Centre and Council released the South American Record of Aggregated Defence Expenditures, which covered the period 2006-2010. It is an official report on the defence expenditures of the UNASUR member States, based on a common definition of defence expenditures, a standardized technical methodology for measuring their expenditures and an annual mechanism for submitting information to the Centre, which is the implementing body.

**Asia and the Pacific**

**Association of Southeast Asian Nations**

The Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty) was signed in 1995 by 10 States in South-East Asia and entered into force in 1997. In order to fully realize the goals and objectives of the Treaty, the Plan of Action to Strengthen the Implementation of the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone was adopted in 2007 for a period of five years. The Plan of Action was extended for another five years (2013-2017) with a renewed commitment and a stronger emphasis on concrete action.

New developments in 2014 include the following: (a) the Lao People’s Democratic Republic’s signature and entry into force of the Revised Supplementary Agreement Concerning the Provision of Technical Assistance by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in January; (b) Cambodia’s acceptance of the Fifth Agreement to Extend the 1987 Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology in January; and (c) Singapore’s accession to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in September and acceptance of the Convention’s Amendment in October.

In 2013, the leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) agreed to establish the ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy (ASEANTOM) to further promote and strengthen nuclear safety, security and safeguards within the ASEAN community. The second

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meeting of ASEANTOM in Chiang Mai, Thailand, in August reaffirmed the importance of developing further the institutional framework of ASEANTOM in order to ensure its credibility and sustainability in the future, including in cooperation between ASEANTOM and external partners.

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) continues to discuss non-proliferation and disarmament matters through the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. An emerging topic being discussed in the ARF sphere is on the safety and security of outer space. The second ARF Space Security Workshop in Tokyo in October reaffirmed the importance of ensuring the long-term sustainability and security of the space environment and preventing the militarization and weaponization of space.

**Pacific Islands Forum**

In 2014, the regional security agenda of the Pacific Islands Forum continued to prioritize disarmament issues, with the Forum secretariat providing support to Forum countries in order to implement relevant regional and international instruments.

**Small arms and light weapons**

Combating the illegal use and trade of SALW remained a high priority for Forum leaders, with the secretariat providing assistance to members to develop effective policy and regulatory frameworks through the regional Model Weapons Control Bill and the implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons.

In June, the Forum Regional Security Committee (FRSC) established the Regional SALW Technical Experts Group to provide specialist support to Forum countries. In December, the secretariat supported and co-funded a regional training-of-trainers workshop, which was held in New Zealand, on the International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS) and its Assessment Tool. Organized by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, the ISACS Implementation Support Unit and the United Nations Development Programme, the workshop attracted participants across the Asia-Pacific region from a range of fields including policy, law enforcement and civil society organizations. Thirteen participants received training on the use of ISACS and its Assessment Tool to strengthen capacity in areas such as stockpile management; marking, record keeping and tracing; and border controls and law enforcement cooperation.

**Unexploded ordnance**

The presence of unexploded ordnance (UXO) remained a human security problem for many Forum countries, threatening public health, safety and the environment. The Forum’s Regional UXO Strategy, endorsed in 2012, aims to improve coordination between Governments, donors and demining organizations to mitigate and remove the threats posed by UXO.
In 2014, the secretariat continued to assist countries to improve their knowledge, policies and skills to address national UXO issues. In collaboration with other organizations, the secretariat organized a workshop in Kiribati to assist its Government in developing a national UXO policy and plan of action. The secretariat also assisted a United States–funded research project, which seeks to obtain historical data to assess the extent of UXO contamination in the region.

**Arms Trade Treaty**

In June, the FRSC endorsed the Model Law, which is an initiative of the Government of New Zealand, to assist Pacific States to implement the ATT. The Model Law was developed in consultation with legal officials from Pacific countries and the secretariat. Since then, the secretariat has worked to promote awareness of the Model Law, including through the Regional Legal Assistance Workshop on the ATT, hosted in December by the Government of Cambodia and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific.

**Middle East**

**League of Arab States**

Among the many roles, the League of Arab States (LAS), consisting of 22 States, is the coordination and elaboration of a common Arab position on arms control and disarmament issues, both regionally and internationally.

**Weapons of mass destruction–related activities**

The LAS held eight meetings of the Committee of Senior Officials in charge of nuclear weapons and other WMD issues to coordinate a common Arab position on convening the postponed Conference in 2012 on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other WMD.

On the basis of the Committee’s recommendations, the LAS Ministerial Council adopted resolutions 7748 on 9 March and 7815 on 9 July, entitled “Establishing a Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and other WMD in the Middle East”. The resolutions deal with issues concerning the postponed 2012 conference, coordination of the Arab position for the 2015 (Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the upcoming fifty-ninth session of the IAEA General Conference.

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68 Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, State of Palestine, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic (suspended), Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen.

69 S/2014/685, pp. 84-85.
The LAS presented its report on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

Activities related to conventional arms

The LAS Regional Focal Point on SALW organized the seventh Annual Meeting of Arab National Points of Contact regarding the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons at the LAS headquarters in Cairo on 2 and 3 June.

Europe

European Union

The actions of the European Union (EU) in 2014 continued to be guided by the European Security Strategy (2003-2008), the EU Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (2003), and the EU Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition (2005), including in particular the principle of support for effective multilateralism. EU member States continued to implement the 2013 Council conclusions on enhanced efforts in combating the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery.

Upholding the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime remained a key priority for the EU. At the 2014 meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, the EU vigorously engaged in efforts to strengthen nuclear security and safety, including by presenting working papers. The EU continued to support the activities of the IAEA in Vienna and also strengthened cooperation and dialogue in the context of the IAEA Director General’s visit to Brussels and the EU-IAEA Annual Senior Officials Meeting held in February. Practical Arrangements that were concluded in 2013 to ensure complementarity between the EU CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) Centres of Excellence and the IAEA were continuously undertaken.

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The EU continued to actively promote the universalization and early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty\textsuperscript{74} through the implementation of Council decision 2012/699/CFSP of 13 November 2012.\textsuperscript{75} In this regard, the EU provided more than €5 million for conducting outreach efforts, including the regional conference of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization held from 19 to 21 May in Jakarta, the ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Meeting on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament held on 8 and 9 July in Tokyo, and the on-site inspection Integrated Field Exercise 2014 held from 14 to 17 November in Jordan.

The EU remained fully committed to ongoing efforts to achieve a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue through negotiations, based on the NPT and the full implementation of all relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors. The interim agreement, known as the Joint Plan of Action,\textsuperscript{76} reached between the E3+3\textsuperscript{77} and the Islamic Republic of Iran in Geneva in November 2013, entered into force on 20 January. Since then, the EU has been engaged in intensive negotiations to reach a long-term comprehensive solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, as envisaged in the Joint Plan of Action. At the November round of E3+3 talks with the Islamic Republic of Iran in Vienna, all parties agreed to extend the measures under the Joint Plan of Action to allow for further negotiations until 30 June 2015, with the intention to complete these negotiations within the shortest possible time.

The EU remained strongly committed to the non-proliferation of ballistic missiles, especially those capable of delivering WMD. It provided €990,000 for efforts against ballistic missile proliferation,\textsuperscript{78} including support for the universalization of The Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC) through awareness-raising activities. In this context, the efforts of the HCOC Chairs (Japan and Peru) were noteworthy.

The EU continued to pursue the universalization and full national implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Support to the BWC Implementation Support Unit and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Technical Secretariat was ensured by extending the validity of the

\textsuperscript{74} The treaty text and adherence status are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/ctbt (accessed 4 June 2015).


\textsuperscript{77} China, France, Germany, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.

\textsuperscript{78} The funds were provided under European Council decision 2014/913/CFSP.
respective Council decisions, while a new Council decision in support of the OPCW for the period 2015-2016 was prepared. The EU continued to support the OPCW–United Nations Joint Mission for the Elimination of the Chemical Weapons Programme of the Syrian Arab Republic, to which it contributed €16.7 million. Furthermore, the EU supported projects and activities implemented by the WHO in the areas of biosafety and biosecurity.

In 2014, the EU continued to actively promote signature and ratification of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). In support of effective implementation of the Treaty, the EU also activated its dedicated support programme worth €6.4 million to assist countries outside the EU at their request. Implementation support activities took place or were planned with Colombia, Jamaica, the Philippines and Senegal.

In the area of conventional arms control, including SALW and their ammunition, in December the EU approved a project in support of physical security and stockpile management activities to reduce the risk of the illicit trade in SALW and their ammunition in the Sahel region. It is envisaged that the technical implementation of these activities will be carried out by the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa. The EU contributed financially and participated actively at the 2014 Maputo Review Conference of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention,79 reaffirming its continued commitment to support implementation by States parties.

The EU continued to promote the initiative for an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities in a transparent and inclusive manner by holding a third and final round of open-ended consultations in May in Luxembourg. Many meeting participants underscored a strong desire to bring the process from a consultative to a negotiating phase. Ahead of the meeting of the First Committee during the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly, the EU and its member States conducted consultations to ascertain the views of United Nations Member States on moving the process to a negotiating phase. The EU also organized, with the participation of United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Angela Kane, an event on the margins of the First Committee meeting entitled “An International Code of Conduct as a Contribution to Transparency and Confidence Building Measures in Outer Space Activities”.

The EU further extended support to its Non-Proliferation Consortium of think tanks through a new Council decision covering the period 2014-2016.80 The annual international conference on non-proliferation and disarmament

and the Third Consultative Meeting of the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium were held in Brussels in September and November, respectively. In 2014, the first three ad hoc seminars were organized on issues related to the BWC, a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other WMD, and the future of nuclear energy. Furthermore, a new education project was started for the elaboration of an online curriculum course on non-proliferation and disarmament.

**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe**

**Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction**

In coordination with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), its Expert Group and UNODA, the OSCE continued to assist States in the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) through the development of national action plans. Regional coordination workshops organized by the OSCE and UNODA were held in 2014. In March, the OSCE secretariat presented the outcomes of these joint activities to the Committee’s Working Group.

**Small arms and light weapons and stockpiles of conventional ammunition**

In 2014, the Voluntary Guidelines for Compiling National Reports on SALW Exports from/Imports to other Participating States During the Previous Calendar Year were adopted. The guidelines seek to overcome reporting fatigue, increase the number of participants and improve the clarity of the data reported and its use.

On 27 and 28 October, the OSCE organized the OSCE Mediterranean Conference, held in Neum, Bosnia and Herzegovina, on illicit trafficking in SALW and the fight against terrorism in the Mediterranean region. The Conference provided opportunities for sharing views and experiences among the OSCE participating States and Mediterranean Partners with a view to identifying avenues for concrete cooperation and the exchange of best practices for combating illicit arms trafficking in the region.

The OSCE organized a round table on SALW in Yerevan on 4 October to review the implementation of relevant commitments and make recommendations for further work. At the request of Tunisia, the OSCE conducted a needs assessment mission to gain a deeper understanding of Tunisia’s national priorities regarding SALW trafficking, border security and counter-terrorism.


The OSCE continued to assist participating States in the area of SALW and stockpiles of conventional ammunition. In 2014, four joint programmes with the United Nations Development Programme continued in Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia. Key project activities were completed in Albania, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Montenegro, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. In 2014, OSCE formulated two new projects for implementation in 2015: rocket fuel component disposal in Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria and Kyrgyzstan; and ammunition demilitarization in Georgia.

Activities related to general security and disarmament

The Vienna Document 2011 was extensively applied during the crisis in Ukraine, where 26 countries sent military inspectors and observers in accordance with the terms of that document. The Mechanism for Consultation and Cooperation as regards Unusual Military Activities under chapter III of the Vienna Document was invoked on 17 occasions and 12 verification activities were conducted under chapter IX.

Throughout 2014, States made significant progress in implementing the initial set of OSCE confidence-building measures to reduce the risk of conflict stemming from the use of information and communication technologies. OSCE participating States also focused on developing a second set of CBMs designed to build processes and capabilities for dealing with common cyberthreats. The OSCE undertook a wide range of activities to complement the work of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security, which is supported by UNODA.

Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre–Centre for Security Cooperation

In 2014, more than 220 arms control and cooperative security experts participated in activities within the framework of the “Cooperative Security Environment with focus on Arms Control Pillar” (CSE Pillar), a programme of the Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre–Centre for Security Cooperation (RACVIAC). Almost all countries of the region benefited as partners in CSE Pillar activities.

CSE Pillar had nine activities in 2014, which covered the areas of WMD and arms control, with a focus on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM), namely:

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83 For more information on the Group of Experts, see http://www.un.org/disarmament/topics/informationsecurity/ (accessed 5 June 2015).
1. Chemical Weapons Convention Seminar
4. Proliferation Pathways
5. Open Skies Treaty (OST) Aerial Observation Course
7. Arms control symposium (Developments in the Conventional Arms Control Field)
8. Physical Security and Stockpile Management (PSSM) Workshop
9. Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control (Dayton Agreement Article IV)—Orientation Course.

The CSE Pillar activities were a combination of lectures and presentations, followed by discussions and an exchange of experience, and include in most cases a well-developed practical component, covering, for example, the OST, the Vienna Document 2011, the Dayton Agreement,84 PSSM and the Ottawa Convention.85

The CSE Pillar’s success depended on bringing together experts (politicians, diplomats, military and academic personnel) to discuss arms control topics closely related to current security and political developments. The CSE Pillar continued to serve as a significant research and discussion platform for providing practical/theoretical advice to organizations, working groups, and political and administrative structures in all areas of confidence-and security-building.

South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons

The South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) worked to strengthen the capacities of national and regional stakeholders to control and reduce the proliferation of SALW, thus contributing to enhanced stability, security and development of South-Eastern Europe.

The Council of the European Union supported SEESAC disarmament and arms control activities in the South-Eastern Europe subregion for the 2014-2016 period.\textsuperscript{86} In 2014, the main achievements of SEESAC included increasing stockpile security by upgrading the Kosovo Police Force’s firearms and ammunition storage in Pristina and the Montenegro Armed Forces’ ammunition depot in Brezovik; reducing stockpile by disposing of 10,047 pieces of SALW and 2,705 SALW components and spare parts; and coordinating region-wide SALW destruction on the International Gun Destruction Day (9 July) with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. SEESAC also supported the “Be on the Right Side—Choose Life without Weapons” collection campaign in 25 cities and towns in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

SEESAC continued to focus on facilitating regional cooperation, information exchange and knowledge transfer by holding regular regional meetings of the National SALW Commissions. These meetings concentrated on improving national policymaking and other regional capacities to implement SALW control measures. This work focused on the South East Europe Firearms Expert Network (SEEFEN), established in 2014, and the Regional Information Exchange Process (RIEP) on Arms Exports, which held three meetings in 2014. SEEFEN supports combating SALW trafficking in the region and consists of senior police, customs officers and the public prosecutor’s investigators. RIEP involves a group of Western Balkan government officials responsible for the development and implementation of arms transfers policies.

SEESAC, through its Arms Transfers Control Programme in the Western Balkans and with the support of Norway, assisted in the publication of annual national reports on arms exports by Albania,\textsuperscript{87} Montenegro\textsuperscript{88} and Serbia.\textsuperscript{89} It also published the sixth Regional Report on Arms Exports,\textsuperscript{90} a joint effort of six Western Balkan countries, based on export licenses issued in 2012, which offered a detailed breakdown of their arms exports.


OSCE also participated in a vigorous joint fundraising campaign along with UNODA and the United Nations–mandated University for Peace, securing the necessary funds to implement assistance to member States as of January 2015.

**North Atlantic Treaty Organization**

In the 2014 Wales Summit Declaration,\(^91\) the NATO Alliance reaffirmed that arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation continued to play an important role in its security objectives and it stressed the importance of compliance with disarmament and non-proliferation commitments under existing treaties. At the Summit, the Alliance also reaffirmed its long-standing commitment to conventional arms control as a key element of Euro-Atlantic security, and it continued to emphasize the importance of full implementation and compliance to rebuild trust and confidence.

NATO Allies also expressed concern about what they perceived as the Russian Federation’s efforts to undermine peace, security, and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region through its unilateral military action in Ukraine, in clear violation of the Budapest Memorandum;\(^92\) its selective implementation of the Vienna Document and Treaty on Open Skies;\(^93\) and its long-standing non-implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).\(^94\) All of these actions, the Allies said, had eroded the positive contributions of the various arms control instruments.

NATO continued to implement its policy to prevent WMD proliferation and ensure that it had the appropriate capabilities to address and respond to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats. The Alliance also continued to pursue its arms control obligations, assist its partners on compliance issues, and share lessons derived from more than four decades of negotiation and implementation of arms control agreements.

In 2014, the Alliance conducted seven courses on arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation at the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany, with a total of 144 participants. NATO convened its tenth Annual Conference on WMD Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation in Switzerland on 23 and 24 June, bringing together leading non-proliferation officials from more than 50 countries and international organizations. The Alliance also attended the Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention.

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\(^92\) A/49/765-S/1994/1399, annex I.


NATO reiterated its support for the implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and other related international instruments. The Alliance also convened regular meetings within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) on this subject and developed an online information-sharing platform for coordinating all SALW and mine action projects. NATO also supported regional initiatives to address SALW threats in Central Asia and North Africa.

**United Nations Development Programme**

Globally, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) continued to advocate a United Nations system-wide approach, involving relevant United Nations entities, regional organizations and civil society, to support efforts by States to prevent the proliferation and use of illicit weapons and to reduce armed violence.

UNDP increasingly focused on linking small arms control efforts to broader support for strengthening the rule of law and security, and on reducing the impact of violence. Its main emphasis was on the need to reduce armed violence and increase citizen security, as reflected in the 2014 report of the United Nations Secretary-General on security sector reform (SSR)\(^{95}\) and Security Council resolution 2151 (2014) on SSR adopted unanimously on 28 April.

In 2014, UNDP also co-hosted five regional review conferences, which were related to the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development.\(^{96}\) It reviewed the progress made in implementing armed violence reduction measures and explored opportunities for integrating armed violence reduction measures in national and international development processes, in particular in the post-2015 development agenda.

At the country level, UNDP continued to provide support to countries in conflict and those with high levels of armed violence in order to increase citizen and community security.\(^{97}\) This support was either provided directly through armed violence reduction and small arms control programmes or as part of broader rule of law, justice and security programmes.

In Kenya, UNDP support further strengthened national mechanisms to control SALW. Through the Kenyan National Focal Point on SALW, UNDP supported SALW marking in Turkana in accordance with international standards. UNDP also started to support the professionalization of the

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\(^{97}\) Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Iraq, Kenya, Kosovo, Liberia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of).
national police reserves to combat the proliferation of small arms, to counter radicalization, and to increase security at community levels.

As part the broader Rule of Law and Security Programme, UNDP supported the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) in building the capacity of Somalia’s federal government to manage and report on arms imported under the partially lifted Security Council arms embargo, using the International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS) as a guide.

In Côte d’Ivoire, UNDP assisted the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa in supporting the national commission on small arms and light weapons in the development of a manual of procedures and training tools on physical security and stockpile management in accordance with the ISACS and the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines. The manual served as a working document for the adoption of national stockpile management standards for small arms, light weapons and ammunition.

In 2014, UNDP provided advice to Bosnia and Herzegovina on the content of the small arms amnesty law adopted by the federal parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the end of 2013. UNDP supported a follow-on small arms awareness-raising, collection and destruction programme that resulted in the collection and destruction of nearly 7,000 weapons and over 300,000 rounds of ammunition and unexploded ordnance.

UNDP continued to support the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Kosovo. In November this resulted in the destruction of about half a ton of ammunition.

In the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, UNDP contributed to the adoption in 2014 of the law on arms control and disarmament, unanimously approved in 2013. As part of the operationalization of this law, the Government also created the National Commission of Disarmament, which is responsible for SALW disarmament and recovery of such weapons from civil society.
Chapter V
Emerging, cross-cutting and other issues
A bomb-disposal, or explosive ordnance disposal, robot is remotely driven to disarm an ordnance.

© UN Photo/Marco Dormino
Emerging, cross-cutting and other issues

Alas, the technology of weaponry is anything but static—new weapons are emerging all the time. Scarcely a day goes by without new references to cyberweapons, lethal autonomous weapons and countless other diabolical inventions designed to kill or injure. Many of these weapons raise profound questions of accountability, especially given that their victims would largely be civilians. We have a variety of expert groups, as well as national governments, looking into these weapons to explore possibilities for developing new norms governing their use or their prohibition.

ANGELA KANE,
UNITED NATIONS HIGH REPRESENTATIVE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS

Developments and trends, 2014

HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS CONTINUED to drive new international efforts to address the concerns raised by emerging technologies, such as armed unmanned aerial vehicles and autonomous weapon systems, as well as by the actual or potential use of existing weapons, such as nuclear weapons (see chapter I) and explosive weapons in populated areas.

To date, international efforts to address issues pertaining to armed unmanned aerial vehicles focused on preventing their proliferation, particularly to non-State actors, for use as delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction, and on ensuring transparency in their international transfer. In recent years, the Human Rights Council has been the primary forum where these issues have been discussed. The increasing diversity and diminishing costs of this technology have generated new interest in making use of multilateral disarmament bodies to address concerns regarding armed unmanned aerial vehicles, including their use in traditional armed conflict and in other situations, such as in counter-terrorism operations. In this regard, a number of States addressed the issue at the General Assembly First Committee and the Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters and recommended the commissioning of a new study to examine various aspects of the matter.

The international community carried forward informal deliberations on autonomous weapon systems in 2014, focusing on building better understanding of definitions and concepts, and the sources of international concerns. These discussions continued to focus primarily on legal and ethical concerns, centred in particular on the notion of ensuring meaningful human control over the critical functions of weapon systems, namely the selection of targets and the use of force. Concerns related to international peace and security aspects and proliferation also received increased attention.

In 2014, efforts by States and civil society to address the harm caused by the use of explosive weapons in populated areas continued to gain momentum. The urgency of this issue was once again most comprehensively underscored by data collated by the non-governmental organization Action on Armed Violence, which showed that, of the 37,809 deaths and injuries reported to be caused by explosive weapons in 2013, 82 per cent were civilians; that when those weapons were used in populated areas, that figure rose to 93 per cent; and that the number of civilian casualties caused by explosive weapons had risen 15 per cent from the previous year. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs continued to lead efforts to facilitate information-sharing on practice and expert discussions leading to a possible political commitment by States to refrain from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, as called for by the Secretary-General.

**Emerging issues**

**Unmanned aerial vehicles**

*Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters*

During its sixty-first and sixty-second sessions, the Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters continued its consideration of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) under its agenda item on the disarmament and security implications of emerging technologies. Reflecting on emerging technologies in their broadest sense, the Board noted that, while exponential technological development had created a number of challenges to the disarmament and arms control agenda, it also had the potential to deliver new innovations in verification technology. Turning specifically to UAV technology, the Board discussed as a particular concern the possibility that such vehicles could be used as WMD delivery systems.

The Board recommended that the Secretary-General commission a study on UAVs to examine the following: the distinction between armed/military drones and unarmed/peaceful/civilian drones; improving transparency in targeted UAV strikes as a confidence-building measure; developing robust oversight and accountability mechanisms for targeted strikes outside of active battlefields; how relevant international humanitarian law principles
such as distinction, proportionality and military necessity should be applied to such strikes in order to avoid excessively injurious or indiscriminate effects; and the effects of other emerging technologies that might have an impact on international security and the arms control process, including in the field of outer space. At the ninth meeting of the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly’s First Committee, the Chair of the Advisory Board, István Gyarmati (Hungary), announced that the Secretary-General agreed with the recommendation and had commissioned the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs to produce the study.

**Discussions in the Human Rights Council**

On 28 March, the Human Rights Council adopted resolution 25/22, sponsored by Pakistan, on “Ensuring use of remotely piloted aircraft or armed drones in counter-terrorism and military operations in accordance with international law, including international human rights and humanitarian law”. In the resolution, the Council, inter alia, expressed deep concern at the civilian casualties resulting from the use of armed drones; expressed concern at the broader impact of armed drones on individuals, children, families and communities; and noted with appreciation the reports of the Special Rapporteur on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, presented to the Human Rights Council in 2014, as well as of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, submitted to the General Assembly in 2013. It further urged all States to ensure that armed drones were used in compliance with international law and called for States to ensure transparency in their use of armed drones.

As decided in resolution 25/22, on 22 September the Council held a panel discussion on remotely piloted aircraft or armed drones in counter-terrorism and military operations. Panel speakers considered that the legal framework for the use of armed drones in appropriate circumstances was already in place and that drones should be used in compliance with the principles of precaution, distinction and proportionality. The speakers also noted the need to balance territorial integrity, sovereignty and human rights with efforts to combat terrorism. The discussion underscored widespread support for further examining various aspects of the issue, particularly within multilateral disarmament bodies.

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3 A/HRC/25/59.
4 A/68/382.
Report by the Special Rapporteur for extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions

In his 6 August report\(^5\) to the General Assembly, the Special Rapporteur for extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christoph Heyns, raised concerns regarding the use of armed UAVs in domestic policing. In this regard, the Special Rapporteur considered that the increasing depersonalization of the use of force may infringe upon human rights; that advances in technology implied higher levels of obligation regarding decisions on whether to use force, the amount of force to use, and accountability and monitoring on the exercise of that discretion; and that consideration should be given to whether controls in addition to the requirements of the Arms Trade Treaty should be applied to the international trade of such weapons. He noted the increased availability of unmanned systems for use by law enforcement agencies and non-State actors, such as private security companies. Questioning whether they should be viewed as legal in the context of law enforcement as readily as they were in armed conflict, he called for a coherent approach from the human rights and disarmament bodies engaged in these issues.

In his April report to the Human Rights Council,\(^6\) the Special Rapporteur also considered concerns about legal uncertainty in relation to the use of unmanned systems in the interpretation of the rules on the international use of force.

Autonomous weapons

Informal meeting of experts established under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons

As previously decided, the High Contracting Parties to the Convention of Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)\(^7\) held an informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems from 13 to 16 May in Geneva. Jean-Hugues Simon-Michel (France) chaired the meeting, which was attended by delegates representing CCW States parties, the International Committee of the Red Cross and non-governmental organizations.

The meeting provided States with an opportunity to explore the ethical, technical, military and legal issues raised by autonomous weapons. Delegates expressed a range of views on the need and means for restricting the use of such weapons. A key perspective to emerge from the discussion was the concept of “meaningful human control”, the idea that humans must

\(^{5}\) A/69/265.
\(^{6}\) A/HRC/26/36.
remain responsible for the critical functions of a weapon system, considered by a number of participants to include the selection of targets and the use of force. The meeting also considered the relevance of States’ obligations under article 36 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions\(^8\) to review new weapon systems to ensure their compatibility with international humanitarian law. Some States discussed increasing transparency in such reviews, including by exchanges of information on best practice.

Participants recognized the utility of continuing dialogue to build a common understanding of the nature and implications of autonomous weapon systems, a sentiment echoed by a number of Member States at the First Committee of the General Assembly. The mandate on lethal autonomous weapon systems was renewed at the 2014 annual meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW held in Geneva on 13 and 14 November. Delegations agreed to convene a meeting of experts in 2015, which would be increased from four to five days, with official documentation.

**Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters**

The Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters continued its consideration of autonomous weapons under its agenda item on the disarmament and security implications of emerging technologies during its sixty-first and sixty-second sessions. It heard presentations from a number of experts drawn from academia and civil society, including representatives of the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots.

Over the course of its sessions, the Board discussed the implications of autonomous weapon systems for international humanitarian and human rights law in the context of meaningful human control and supervision. It recognized the absence of clear and specific norms to prevent the development and use of potentially unsafe systems. In this regard, the Board emphasized the importance of continuing the CCW discussions and the need to consider first steps, such as definitions, before moving forward.

The Board also noted progress under a project convened by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research entitled “The Weaponization of Increasingly Autonomous Technologies: Implications for Security and Arms Control”. The project convened a cross-disciplinary group of experts and scholars to examine issues that States should consider when establishing policy on the weaponization of increasingly autonomous technologies. The project produced two publications in 2014, one seeking to frame the discussion on such technologies and the second considering how the concept of meaningful human control could advance the discussion.

Report of the Special Rapporteur for extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions

In his April report⁹ to the Human Rights Council, the Special Rapporteur for extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions welcomed the addition of the issue of autonomous weapons to the agenda of the CCW States parties. He noted the human rights implications of such weapons and the danger of their use outside the geographical scope of established armed conflicts.

Further to his report in August to the General Assembly on the use of unmanned systems in domestic law enforcement contexts, the Special Rapporteur considered the emergence of increasingly autonomous weapon systems in military contexts. The Rapporteur reflected that the right to life and the right to human dignity were relevant in this regard.

Use of explosive weapons in populated areas

Norway hosted a meeting of experts on explosive weapons in populated areas in Oslo on 17 and 18 June. The meeting followed on from a 2013 expert meeting, held in London, on reducing the humanitarian impact of the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. The Oslo meeting was attended by twice as many States as the London meeting, as well as representatives of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the International Committee of the Red Cross and civil society. Individual military and weapons experts also attended. Participants noted the dire impact on civilians of explosive weapons with wide-area effects, and that civil society data indicated that the magnitude of the problem was increasing. They discussed the degree of protection afforded to civilians by international humanitarian law and examples of military policies seeking to minimize the impact of their operations on civilians beyond the minimum requirements of international humanitarian law. The meeting gave States an opportunity to explore for the first time approaches to a political commitment on the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. It also provided for an initial exploration of definitions. The delegate from Austria announced that it would host a third meeting of experts in Vienna in 2015.

The Secretary-General drew attention to the destructive impact of explosive weapons in populated areas in his report¹⁰ to the General Assembly on strengthening the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the United Nations. He noted increasing concern over the negative impact of the use of explosive weapons in populated areas through civilian death and injury, damage or destruction of essential civilian infrastructure, disruption to education and livelihoods, and dramatic impacts on post-conflict

⁹ A/HRC/26/36.
¹⁰ A/69/80.
reconstruction. He called on Member States to, inter alia, strengthen the political commitment to address the problem.

A number of delegations, including Austria, Costa Rica, Mexico, the Netherlands and the Russian Federation, raised the issue of explosive weapons in populated areas in their statements at the First Committee of the General Assembly. The International Committee of the Red Cross also devoted a significant portion of its statement to the issue of the use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects in populated areas, stating that such use should be avoided.

**Cross-cutting issues**

**Outer space**

Discussions at the First Committee on outer space issues highlighted long-standing divisions among States. Some topics discussed provoked sharp exchanges between several parties, including China, the Russian Federation and the United States, indicating that the growing East-West tensions posed an impediment to progress in this area. In its continued pursuit of a legally binding instrument to prohibit the placement of weapons in outer space, the Russian Federation introduced a new resolution entitled “No first placement of weapons in outer space”. The resolution, which encapsulated space-faring nations’ political commitment not to be the first to place weapons in outer space, was adopted by a vote of 126 States in favour, 4 against and 46 abstentions. However, the United States faulted the Russian proposal on three grounds: (a) not adequately defining a “weapon in outer space”; (b) not being verifiable; and (c) not addressing terrestrially based anti-satellite weapons, thus failing, in the United States’ view, to meet the criteria of valid transparency and confidence-building measures. Nevertheless, the Russian Federation and China also continued to cooperate with the United States and other Western countries in promoting transparency and confidence-building measures on outer space activities, particularly in light of the recommendations made by the group of governmental experts on this subject. The European Union noted that resolution 69/50 had called on Member States to review and implement the proposal for a voluntary international code of conduct on outer space activities.

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11 See A/C.1/69/PV.14 and A/C.1/69/PV.15.
13 General Assembly resolution 69/32 of 2 December 2014.
14 General Assembly resolution 69/38 of 2 December 2014.
15 A/68/189.
Group of Governmental Experts on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security

By resolution 68/243, which was adopted without a vote on 27 December 2013, the General Assembly invited all Member States, taking into account the assessments and recommendations contained in the report of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security, to continue to inform the Secretary-General of their views and assessments on the following questions:

(a) General appreciation of the issues of information security;
(b) Efforts taken at the national level to strengthen information security and promote international cooperation in this field;
(c) The content of the concepts mentioned in paragraph 2 of the resolution;
(d) Possible measures that could be taken by the international community to strengthen information security at the global level.

Replies received from 16 Governments (Australia, Austria, Canada, Colombia, Cuba, El Salvador, France, Georgia, Germany, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Serbia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom) are contained in the Secretary-General’s reports on the subject published in 2014. Ten of those States submitted full reports that were too long to be included in the published report of the Secretary-General.

By the same resolution, the General Assembly also called for the establishment of a new GGE and decided that the Group would report to the Assembly at its seventieth session in September 2015. This is the fourth GGE to be established to examine existing and potential threats in the cybersphere and possible cooperative measures to address them.

In 2014, the new GGE, with 20 experts and chaired by Carlos Luis Dantas Coutinho Perez (Brazil), held its first session in New York in July. Three more sessions were planned for 2015.

At its sixty-ninth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 69/28 on 2 December, which noted the outcome of the work of the GGE and again invited Member States to continue to inform the Secretary-General of their views and assessments on the same questions set out in General Assembly resolution 68/243. The 2014 resolution, which was adopted without a vote, also welcomed the commencement of the new GGE and authorized the

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16 A/68/98.
17 A/69/112 and Add.1.
Group, taking into account the assessments and recommendations contained in the 2013 report (A/68/98), to continue to study the issue and report to the General Assembly in 2015.

For more information, refer to appendix II.

Other issues

Terrorism and disarmament

Ten years ago today, the Security Council took bold action to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by unanimously adopting resolution 1540 (2004). This global instrument requires Governments to prevent non-State actors or terrorists from acquiring, proliferating and using nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery.

In the decade since its adoption, resolution 1540 (2004) has become an important component of the global security architecture. Enacted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, it recognizes that its full national, regional and global implementation requires international cooperation and assistance. I urge all States and stakeholders to reaffirm their common commitment to achieve the great goals of this resolution and to devote their utmost efforts to saving present and future generations from the double threat posed by terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary-General

Weapons of mass destruction and terrorism

In its resolution 69/39 of 2 December, the General Assembly expressed deep concern over the growing risk of linkages between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The General Assembly also called upon all Member States to support international efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring WMD and their means of delivery. It also urged all Member States to take and strengthen national measures, as appropriate, to prevent terrorists from acquiring WMD, their means of delivery and materials and technologies related to their manufacture. The General Assembly also encouraged cooperation among and between Member States and relevant regional and international organizations for strengthening national capacities in this regard.

In response to resolution 68/41 of 5 December 2013, in which the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to compile a report on measures to prevent terrorist from acquiring WMD, 18 Member States, the...
European Union and 14 international organizations and bodies and agencies of the United Nations system, provided contributions.\textsuperscript{20}

**UNODA activities related to the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy**

In its endeavours to support the implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy,\textsuperscript{21} the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), under the Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, continued to maintain the roster of experts and laboratories provided by Member States. The Secretary-General can call upon the experts on the rosters to carry out fact-finding activities to investigate reports of alleged use of chemical and biological weapons. (For more information on the Secretary-General’s Mechanism, see chapter II.)

Cooperative arrangements between the United Nations and relevant international organizations continued to be in effect.\textsuperscript{22} Most notably, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons–United Nations Joint Mission for the Elimination of the Chemical Weapons Programme of the Syrian Arab Republic, established in October 2013, completed its work on the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme on 30 September 2014. (For more information on the Joint Mission, see chapter II).

The Secretary-General’s Mechanism has been continuously enhanced through training courses to increase the capability of the experts on the roster, particularly in the biological area. Previous training courses have been hosted by the Governments of Sweden in 2009, France in 2012 and Denmark in 2013. In 2014, training courses were organized in Sweden, United Kingdom and Germany.

**Contribution of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to global anti-terrorism efforts**

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) continued to support global anti-terrorism efforts within the parameters of its mandate and through full and effective implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention.\textsuperscript{23} The OPCW Technical Secretariat also maintained

\textsuperscript{20} See A/69/138 and Add.1.
\textsuperscript{21} See General Assembly resolution 60/288 of 8 September 2006.
\textsuperscript{22} In order to increase the cooperation with relevant international organizations, the United Nations signed a memorandum of understanding with the World Organization for Animal Health in July 2012, as well a supplementary arrangement with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in September 2012.
Emerging, cross-cutting and other issues

collaborative relationships with relevant United Nations, international, regional and sub-regional organizations in the field of counter-terrorism and non-proliferation.

The Technical Secretariat supported the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on Terrorism of the OPCW Executive Council with its three meetings held in 2014. In addition to briefings by key international organizations on the current terrorism concerns, and their organizations’ respective anti-terrorism roles and mandates, the OEWG provided a forum for experts in the field of chemical safety and security, as well as in the broader field of security, to share their expertise and experience. The OEWG also examined specific articles of the Convention with a view to exploring further potential contributions to global anti-terrorism efforts.

As an integral part of the OPCW activities supporting implementation of the Convention, the Technical Secretariat continued to conduct various capacity-building activities related to protection and assistance against the use or threat of use of chemical weapons, including national and regional courses in emergency response. The OPCW also continued its chemical safety and security management programme, which began in 2009. The seminars and workshops organized under this programme provided a forum for professionals in the field to exchange best practices and lessons learned, initiatives and practices relevant to regulatory and implementation frameworks, and possible ways forward to improve and enhance safety and security culture within the chemical industry.

Cooperation with the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force

The OPCW supported the implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy by initiating a project jointly with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to enhance inter-agency interoperability and coordinated communications in the event of an attack using a chemical or biological weapon. The project is undertaken within the overall United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) framework, and the CTITF Working Group on Preventing and Responding to WMD Terrorist Attacks, which is chaired by the IAEA and co-chaired by the OPCW. The project brings together the 15 United Nations and international organizational entities of the Working Group, as well as other key organizations, in a collaborative and cooperative effort to achieve the project objectives.

The Technical Secretariat continued to support States parties in their efforts to adopt comprehensive national legislative and administrative measures to ensure all aspects of the Convention are fully and effectively implemented. In this regard, training was arranged to support States parties in drafting national legislation, and a number of courses were conducted
for national customs authorities, given their important role in monitoring chemical trade to prevent illicit transfers.

Cooperation in promoting implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004)

The OPCW contributed to events sponsored by the United Nations Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), and by the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, to promote the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) at the international, regional and national levels. The Technical Secretariat also supported the Committee’s clearing house role with regard to requests for assistance from States.

Terrorism and disarmament (IAEA)


In this regard, resolution 11 recalled United Nations General Assembly resolution 67/44 of 3 December 2012 on measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring WMD, which stated that progress was urgently needed in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation in order to maintain international peace and security and to contribute to global efforts against terrorism. All IAEA member States were encouraged to become parties to the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism if they had not yet done so.

The Conference also encouraged all member States that had not yet done so to become parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.\(^{26}\) These member States and those already party to the Convention were called upon to also ratify, accept or approve the 2005 Amendment\(^{27}\) to the Convention as soon as possible and encouraged them to act in accordance with the objectives and purpose of the Amendment until such time as it enters into force.


Resolution 11 recognized and supported the Agency’s continuing work to assist, upon request, States’ efforts to establish effective and sustainable national nuclear security regimes, as well as to fulfil their obligations under United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), provided that the requests are within the scope of the Agency’s statutory responsibilities.

In noting the Agency’s efforts to raise awareness of the threat of cyberattacks and their potential impact on nuclear security, the General Council encouraged States to take effective security measures against such attacks. It also encouraged the Agency to make further efforts to improve international cooperation, to develop appropriate guidance and to assist member States, upon request, in this area by providing training courses and hosting further expert meetings specific to cybersecurity at nuclear facilities.

**Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control**

Emphasizing the importance of the observance of environmental norms in the preparation and implementation of disarmament and arms limitation agreements, and mindful of the detrimental environmental effects of the use of nuclear weapons, the General Assembly adopted without a vote on 5 December 2013 resolution 68/36, entitled “Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control”.

In that resolution, the Assembly called upon States to pursue unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures to ensure the application of scientific and technological progress in international security, disarmament and other related spheres, without detriment to the environment or to attaining sustainable development.

The resolution also invited all Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General the measures they had adopted to promote the objectives envisaged in the resolution, and requested the Secretary-General to submit a report containing that information to the General Assembly at its sixty-ninth session. The replies received from five Governments (Cuba, Georgia, Iraq, Portugal and Ukraine) are contained in the Secretary-General’s report on the subject.28

At its sixty-ninth session, the General Assembly adopted without a vote resolution 69/55 on 2 December 2014, in which it made a similar request to Member States for information and to the Secretary-General for a report containing that information to be submitted at its seventieth session. For more information, refer to appendix II.

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28 A/69/115.
Disarmament and development

The resolution on disarmament and development, submitted by Indonesia on behalf of the members of the Non-Aligned Movement, was adopted by consensus by the General Assembly on 2 December. As in the previous resolutions, the General Assembly urged the international community to devote part of the resources made available by the implementation of disarmament and arms limitation agreements to economic and social development, and encouraged the international community to make greater efforts to integrate disarmament, humanitarian and development activities. The Assembly also invited Member States to provide the Secretary-General with information concerning measures and efforts undertaken in this regard.

Pursuant to the resolution, UNODA sent a note verbale in February to all Member States requesting the submission of information by 30 April. Thirteen Member States provided information in response, which were included in the report of the Secretary-General on the matter.

Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation

In its resolution 68/38 of 5 December 2013, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States on the promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation and to submit a report to the General Assembly at its sixty-ninth session. Replies received from 10 Governments (Argentina, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Georgia, Iraq, Mexico, Pakistan, Portugal and Ukraine) are contained in the Secretary-General’s reports on the subject.

At its sixty-ninth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 69/54 on 2 December 2014 by a vote of 131 States in favour, 5 against and 49 abstentions, by which it decided to include the subject in the provisional agenda of its seventieth session. For more information, refer to appendix II.

Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament

By its decision 69/515 of 2 December, the General Assembly decided without a vote to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-ninth session the item entitled “Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament”. For more information on the subject, refer to appendix II.

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29 General Assembly resolution 69/56.
30 A/69/152.
31 A/69/118 and Add.1.
Gender and disarmament

The international community continued to address the link between gender and disarmament in 2014. There were two distinct but complementary focus areas of this work: empowering women’s participation in disarmament forums and the nexus between conventional arms control and preventing gender-based violence.

Women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control

The General Assembly addressed gender-sensitive disarmament policy and practice in resolution 69/61 of 2 December, entitled “Women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control”, sponsored by Trinidad and Tobago. As in the resolution’s predecessors, the Assembly, inter alia, recognized the contributions of women to disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control and urged States to support the effective participation of women in the field of disarmament.

In contrast to previous years, the resolution was adopted by a vote (183 in favour, 0 against and 0 abstentions), which was precipitated by additional text acknowledging the inclusion of a gender-based violence criterion in the Arms Trade Treaty. Also new to the resolution was the call for States to collect sex- and age-disaggregated data on the impact of illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons. Furthermore, in resolution 69/61, the Assembly welcomed the call for the full and meaningful participation of women in efforts to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit transfer of small arms pursuant to relevant Security Council resolutions under the agenda item “Women, peace and security”—2106 (2013), 2117 (2013) and 2122 (2013).

UNODA strives to operationalize the goal of increasing women’s involvement in disarmament processes in all aspects of its work. Gender parity is a priority when forming expert groups, organizing meetings and making staffing decisions. An interesting development in this connection was the initiative of Article 36, a non-governmental organization (NGO) based in the United Kingdom, entitled “No to All-Male Panels”, whereby men pledge not to speak on all-male panels on global disarmament, arms control and peace and security. Over 50 men signed on to the list in 2014 and the initiative highlighted the importance of women’s participation in disarmament forums.

Arms Trade Treaty

The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) entered into force on 24 December. The ATT represents a significant gain in addressing the disarmament-gender nexus and is the first international agreement to recognize the link between gender-based violence and the international arms trade. It includes a legally binding

provision (article 7 (4)) requiring States parties to take into account the risk of arms being used to commit gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children in their export assessments.

Efforts by Member States and civil society to operationalize this provision have already begun. Some NGOs, including the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, have engaged in capacity-building activities in order to ensure that all States parties to the ATT can implement the provision. Preliminary NGO research has yielded a number of concrete items for States to consider when conducting an arms transfer risk assessment, including whether a recipient State has commitments or legislation related to gender-based violence, or whether there is evidence of acts or patterns on such violence in a recipient State.\(^3\)

**Further recognition of the gender dimension of small arms control**

In the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons,\(^3\) States express grave concern over the negative impact on women of the illicit trade in small arms. States particularly emphasized the participation and representation of women in small arms control processes in the outcome document of June 2014 adopted by the Fifth Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action.\(^3\) The outcome document also calls for the promotion of the role of women in combating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, including through training.

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\(^3\) For more information, see Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, “We Made it Binding!—The first ATT includes preventing gender-based violence”. Available from http://www.wilpfinternational.org/att-2013/ (accessed 28 May 2015).


\(^3\) A/CONF.192/BMS/2014/2, para. 10: “States highlighted the need to facilitate participation and representation of women in policymaking, planning and implementation processes related to small arms and light weapons, including in processes related to stockpile management and physical security measures, taking into account General Assembly resolutions on women, disarmament and non-proliferation and arms control (A/RES/65/69 and subsequent resolutions), as well as United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 and its follow-up resolutions.”

Para. 20: “To promote the role of women in preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, including through access to training, as well as through their meaningful participation and representation in policymaking, planning and implementation processes related to the implementation of the Programme of Action, including stockpile management and physical security measures, and awareness-raising and education.”
In 2014, the UNODA regional centres continued their work to promote the participation of women in disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control activities. In November, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC) issued a publication entitled *Forces of Change II: Recognizing the Contribution of Latin American and Caribbean Women to Disarmament*, highlighting the important and practical role women have played in the security area in the region. UNLIREC also conducted a research project on stray bullet shootings, with a special focus on women and children, and recommended measures to mitigate their impact. It was found that, in the 550 cases of stray bullet violence in 27 Latin American and Caribbean countries documented between 2009 and 2013, women represented 43 per cent of stray bullet victims, a much higher percentage than in cases of armed violence in general.

UNLIREC also received voluntary funding in 2014 to specifically support States to implement General Assembly resolution 65/69 of 8 December 2010 and its successors. UNLIREC assisted female legal practitioners and judicial officials in Peru to reduce impunity rates in cases of illicit small arms trafficking. In a similar collaboration with Mexico, UNLIREC organized a seminar for national officials on how to incorporate gender and youth approaches into the implementation of the Programme of Action and the ATT. At this seminar, the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women contributed to the identification of concrete measures and ways forward to ensure the participation of women and youth in national strategies to combat trafficking of small arms, in the development and tracking of specific indicators to document the impact of small arms trafficking on women and youth, as well as in the development of technical tools to facilitate the inclusion of gender sensitive indicators in national export control systems of conventional arms as required by the ATT. UNLIREC also developed an assessment tool to evaluate the risk of weapons being used to perpetrate acts of violence, particularly against women and youth.

The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific promoted a gender perspective in all its activities by ensuring the highest possible female participation at its events and by selecting female experts whenever possible. Through its Peace and Disarmament Education Project, the Centre included gender concepts related to disarmament and peace education into Nepal’s school curriculums, which will reach approximately 400,000 girls and boys in Nepal every year.

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Similarly, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC) continued to support gender-related activities and the participation of women at all levels of decision-making. In 2014, UNREC presented at the Regional Review Conference on the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development\(^37\) held in Nairobi. In addition to underlining the effects of armed violence on women, this pertinent presentation promoted instruments to prevent such violence from occurring in the first place. UNREC also developed and secured funding for a project that aims to build practical measures to implement the provisions of the ATT pertaining to gender-based violence and serious acts of violence against women and children.

**Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in peacekeeping**

Women play essential roles in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) processes. As recognized in Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), the integration of gender into DDR programmes and projects is fundamental to effective peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations.

In 2014, the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau carried out a study on women’s perspectives on DDR to update the National Strategy Document on security sector reform, which led to an increased focus on women’s participation and an emphasis on outreach to women through community radios. Also in 2014, the African Union (AU), with the support of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the World Bank, developed an operational guidance note on women and DDR. This guidance note will be disseminated through the African Centres of Excellence and will be integrated into the AU DDR Training Manual for the African Standby Force. In Sudan, the AU–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur developed vocational training projects targeting women to support livelihoods and reduce community violence.

**Effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium**

By paragraphs 2, 3 and 7 of its resolution 67/36 of 3 December 2012, entitled “Effects of the use of armaments and ammunition containing depleted uranium”, the General Assembly invited Member States and relevant international organizations, particularly those that had not yet done so, to communicate to the Secretary-General their views on the effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium, and requested the Secretary-General to submit a report on that subject to the General Assembly at its sixty-ninth session.

Twelve Member States provided their views in response to the request: Argentina, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Cuba, Ecuador, Iraq, Libya, Mexico, Netherlands, Oman, Panama, Spain and Ukraine. Two international organizations, namely, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations Environment Programme, also provided their studies and research. These are contained in the Secretary-General’s report on the subject. At its sixty-ninth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 69/57 on 2 December, entitled “Effects of the use of armaments and ammunition containing depleted uranium”. For more information, refer to appendix II.

38 A/69/151.
Chapter VI
Disarmament machinery
A wide view of the Council Chamber at the United Nations Office at Geneva during a meeting of the Conference on Disarmament on 20 May 2014.
© UN Photo/Jean-Marc Ferré
CHAPTER VI

Disarmament machinery

In my part of the world, 2014 has been designated the “year of the blue horse”. A horse represents of course vigour and speed—and a blue horse of course is an animal of imagination. I hope this august forum—as the sole standing body on disarmament negotiations—will take inspiration and make 2014 a year of creativity and action.

Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary-General

Developments and trends, 2014

From the situation in Ukraine to the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant in the Middle East, developments in the international political landscape in 2014 heightened concerns about the global security environment surrounding multilateral disarmament. As the international community addressed the changing security dynamics, the revitalization of multilateral disarmament machinery emerged as an even more pressing priority for Member States throughout the year. Although the Conference on Disarmament remained deadlocked over its programme of work and the United Nations Disarmament Commission ended another three-year cycle without producing any substantive outcomes in 2014, there were particularly high levels of participation and engagement in these multilateral disarmament forums, as well as the First Committee of the General Assembly.

The Conference on Disarmament did not reach agreement on a programme of work and was not able to commence substantive work in 2014. Under effective cooperation and coordination among the six presidents of the 2014 session, however, members of the Conference engaged in some productive work and continued their search for an early resumption of substantive work. In March, the Conference established a parallel process of renewing the mandate of the Informal Working Group to produce a programme of work, while holding a series of informal meetings on its seven agenda items under a schedule of activities. The Informal Working Group conducted consultations and considered various proposals for a programme of work that would allow the Conference to begin substantive work, including negotiations on any of the four core issues. In the absence of consensus on these proposals, the group also explored the possibility of entering into negotiations on another

agenda item (weaponization of radioactive sources/a ban on radiological weapons) and the possibility of formulating a programme of work on the basis of proposals submitted by the Acting Secretary-General of the Conference, such as a framework convention approach and voluntary, politically binding regimes. However, there was no consensus on these innovative approaches.

In 2014, the United Nations Disarmament Commission held the third and last session of the current three-year cycle. Despite the tireless efforts of the Chair of the Commission and the Chairs of the two Working Groups, the Commission was unable to reach agreement on recommendations to the General Assembly at the end of its annual session. Neither Working Group I (entrusted with the agenda item entitled “Recommendations for achieving the objectives of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons”) nor Working Group II (entrusted with the agenda item entitled “Practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons”) achieved consensus on their respective working documents. Member States were unable to compromise on their strongly held positions on nuclear disarmament, including the issue of the delayed Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. The question of linkage between the agenda items on nuclear and conventional weapons also emerged as a contentious issue for certain States.

In the meantime, the First Committee witnessed a higher level of participation and engagement by Member States in its work in 2014. Record-breaking numbers of statements were made, with 107 during the general debate and 70 during the thematic debate on the nuclear weapon cluster. The Committee approved 57 resolutions, the highest number in the past decade, and six decisions under various agenda items. As the Committee began its work in October, there were serious concerns over the global security environment, particularly the situation in Ukraine and its negative repercussions for international relations, especially between the Russian Federation and Western countries. Member States were increasingly divided over how to advance the disarmament agenda and there was growing frustration over slow progress in nuclear disarmament, including the delay in convening the Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. However, there were also positive developments noted by the First Committee, such as the forthcoming entry into force of the Arms Trade Treaty\(^2\) on 24 December and the successful removal and destruction of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, both of which were noted positively by the Committee. Unfortunately, the higher level of activity also revealed the divisions among Member States, particularly between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, as out of the 62 drafts adopted by the Committee, only 53 per

Disarmament machinery

Disarmament machinery were adopted by consensus. Furthermore, new focus on the follow-up process to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament and heightened activities on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons highlighted the differences in approaches to nuclear disarmament.

Although the formal outcomes of the multilateral disarmament machinery remained lackluster in 2014, a number of informal activities therein helped build momentum for the efforts to revitalize the three disarmament forums. In Geneva, the Conference on Disarmament re-established the Informal Working Group with a mandate to produce a programme of work and held structured and substantive discussions on its agenda items. In New York, after the conclusion of the 2014 session of the Disarmament Commission, Member States remained engaged with its Chair to consider measures to improve its working methods and began discussion on the agenda for the 2015-2017 cycle. Following the initiative by the Chair of the First Committee at its 2013 session, Member States also explored ways and means to revitalize the work of the First Committee, an exercise that continued under the leadership of the Chair of the Committee at its 2014 session. Such informal activities neither substituted formal processes nor produced mandated outcomes, but facilitated greater engagement by Member States with the disarmament agenda and helped them focus their efforts on how to take this agenda forward.

First Committee of the General Assembly

Overall work of the Committee

The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security Committee) of the General Assembly held its sixty-ninth session from 7 October to 4 November under the chairmanship of Courtenay Rattray (Jamaica). The Committee undertook its work against the backdrop of serious concerns about the situation in Ukraine and its negative repercussions for international relations, particularly between the Russian Federation and Western countries, as well as growing frustration over slow progress in nuclear disarmament, including the delay in convening a Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. The First Committee, however, benefited from positive developments, particularly the forthcoming entry into force of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) on 24 December.

The Committee held 24 meetings, including 7 devoted to the general debate and 11 to the thematic debates. Action on draft resolutions and decisions took place during the final segment of the Committee’s work. Member States engaged in thematic debates on the following seven clusters: (a) nuclear weapons; (b) other weapons of mass destruction; (c) outer space (disarmament aspects); (d) conventional weapons; (e) other disarmament measures and international security; (f) regional disarmament and security;
and (g) disarmament machinery. The Committee heard record-breaking numbers of statements—107 during the general debate and 70 during the thematic debate on the nuclear weapon cluster—underscoring an increased level of engagement by Member States in the annual deliberations of the General Assembly on issues related to disarmament and international security.

Over the course of the thematic debates, the Committee held exchanges with the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Angela Kane, and other high-level officials in the field of arms control and disarmament, including those of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. The Committee also held exchanges with the current President of the Conference on Disarmament, the Chair of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, and the Chair of the Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. During the thematic cluster on regional disarmament and security, briefings were held by the directors of the three regional centres of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, namely the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, as well as the Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. In addition, during the thematic debate on nuclear weapons, the Chair of the Group of Governmental Experts on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices briefed the Committee on the progress of its work.

Following the thematic debate, the Committee heard statements by members of civil society. Representatives of various non-governmental organizations spoke about issues including nuclear weapons, autonomous weapons, armed drones, outer space, cybersecurity, gender and disarmament, the ATT, small arms and light weapons, landmines, cluster munitions, depleted uranium weapons, and explosive weapons in populated areas.

During its third and final segment, the First Committee approved 57 resolutions, the highest number in the past decade, and six decisions under various agenda items. Of the 63 drafts adopted, however, only 33 drafts (52 per cent) were adopted without a vote, reflecting increasing divisions among Member States. On 2 December 2014, the General Assembly adopted the 63 drafts approved by the First Committee, as well as a procedural decision on the provisional agenda of work and the timetable of the Committee for 2015.

For more information on the resolutions and decisions, including voting patterns and explanations of votes, refer to appendix II.

3 At the sixty-eighth session, the Committee adopted 53 drafts, with 32 (60 per cent) adopted without a vote.
Overview of key substantive discussions in the Committee

Nuclear weapons

Discussions on nuclear weapons in the First Committee indicated that, amid the growing frustration at the slow pace of nuclear disarmament, there was increasing divergence between nuclear-weapon States and many non-nuclear-weapon States on how to pursue the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. The Non-Aligned Movement continued to forge ahead on the path set in the previous year’s resolution entitled “Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament” (68/32) by welcoming the first observance of the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, stressing the need to commence negotiations on a comprehensive convention to ban nuclear weapons in the Conference on Disarmament, and underscoring the importance of convening a high-level United Nations conference on nuclear disarmament no later than 2018. Nuclear-weapon States and their allies again criticized this resolution for ignoring their position on nuclear disarmament and diverging from the Action Plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Reflecting persistent differences, the General Assembly adopted on 2 December the resolution entitled “Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament” (69/58) by a vote of 139 to 24, with 19 abstentions.

During the general and thematic debates of the Committee, nuclear-weapon States stressed their achievements in nuclear disarmament and highlighted their record of implementing the 2010 Action Plan, including by reporting at the 2014 session of the Preparatory Committee of the 2015 NPT Review Conference. They continued to emphasize that nuclear disarmament could be achieved only through a gradual, step-by-step approach. The deteriorating relationship between the Russian Federation and the United States, however, appeared to foreclose the possibility of further reductions of their strategic warheads, with both sides either acknowledging or insisting that conditions were not right for deeper cuts.

Increasingly impatient with the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament, more States indicated their readiness to consider a comprehensive treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons. Reflecting its strong commitment to move forward on nuclear disarmament, the New Agenda Coalition included various

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6 The New Agenda Coalition comprises Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and South Africa. Its resolutions were on topics such as giving due prominence to the humanitarian imperatives, ending the modernization of nuclear weapons and related infrastructure, enhancing transparency including through supplementing the reports
concrete recommendations for the 2015 NPT Review Conference in its resolution entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments” (69/37). Although the Committee adopted the resolution with an overwhelming majority of 166 States voting in favour, all nine nuclear-armed States either voted against or abstained.\(^7\)

There was widespread disappointment and deepening concern over the delay in convening the Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. Hardening their position in advance of the 2015 NPT Review Conference, the Arab States blamed Israel for the failure to convene the Conference, and placed more emphasis on its linkage to the 1995 NPT resolution on the Middle East,\(^8\) which they stressed was an integral part of the bargain on the indefinite extension of the NPT. However, Israel emphasized its participation in previous rounds of consultations with Arab States, while pointing the finger at the latter’s refusal to engage in direct dialogue to address regional security issues. (See chapters I and IV for more detail on the Middle East zone.)

The humanitarian initiative on nuclear disarmament gained further momentum, with the overwhelming majority of States supporting the humanitarian discourse, highlighting the important outcomes of the first and second Conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, and expressing their hope for further progress at the third Conference to be held in Vienna on 8 and 9 December. References to the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons were made in several First Committee draft resolutions,\(^9\) as well as in two separate joint statements during the thematic debate on nuclear weapons. The humanitarian initiative elicited sharper responses from nuclear-weapon States than in previous years. During the thematic debate, the Russian Federation and the United States expressed criticism and concern about the discussion of humanitarian impacts.\(^{10}\)

\(^7\) The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, France, India, Israel, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States voted against the resolution. China and Pakistan abstained.


\(^9\) The First Committee draft resolutions in 2014 that referenced the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons were adopted by the General Assembly as resolutions 69/58, 69/48, 69/37, 69/43 and 69/52. Such references had been made in the resolutions of the same titles since 2010 when the 2010 NPT Review Conference adopted its Final Document, which included a reference to the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons.

\(^{10}\) The Russian Federation criticized the discussion on humanitarian impacts as distracting attention from addressing practical disarmament measures. The United States noted that it understood the sincere motivations behind efforts to address the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons, but warned against moving nuclear disarmament into international humanitarian law circles.
The humanitarian initiative continued to divide non-nuclear-weapon States as well. The Committee again faced two contending initiatives on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. Building on the initiative taken at the 2012 session of the NPT Preparatory Committee, New Zealand delivered a joint statement\(^{11}\) on behalf of 155 States, an increase of 32 from 2013, which emphasized that nuclear weapons should never be used under any circumstances. Australia delivered a separate joint statement\(^{12}\) supported by 20 States—primarily NATO members and other States under the nuclear umbrella—two more States than in 2013. The Australian statement continued to be grounded firmly in a gradual step-by-step approach to disarmament. (See chapter I for more detail on the humanitarian dimension of nuclear disarmament.)

Member States continued to stress the need to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and expressed concern over the nuclear programmes of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Syrian Arab Republic. In this regard, many States expressed continued support for the diplomatic effort to negotiate a permanent agreement on the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Commenting on the situation in Ukraine, many States accused the Russian Federation of violating its commitment under the Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Budapest Memorandum),\(^{13}\) adopted in 1994. Dismissing these accusations, the Russian Federation stressed that it had abided by the commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine. However, the renewed East-West tension appeared to be increasingly jeopardizing prospects for further bilateral reductions and forestalling the initiation of any multilateral disarmament process. In particular, mutual accusations by the Russian Federation and the United States of violations of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty)\(^{14}\) threatened to unravel their bilateral arms control achievements since the end of the cold war.\(^{15}\)

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\(^{11}\) A/C.1/69/PV.11, pp. 5-7.
\(^{12}\) A/C.1/69/PV.11, pp. 10-11.
\(^{13}\) A/49/765-S/1994/1399, annex I.
\(^{14}\) While the Russian Federation described “the use of target missiles during the test of missile defence system and the commissioning of strike UAVs” and “the scheduled deployment of Mk-41 launchers in Europe” as alleged violations of the United States, the United States statement was limited to reiterating its claim that “the Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty” without further detail.
**Chemical weapons**

Member States universally welcomed the success of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons–United Nations Joint Mission for the Elimination of the Chemical Weapons Programme of the Syrian Arab Republic in removing and eliminating the declared chemical weapons of the Syrian Arab Republic. However, many States expressed concern regarding allegations of the continued use of toxic chemicals (presumed to be chlorine) as a weapon during the conflict, as well as the gaps and discrepancies in the chemical weapons declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic. Discussions in this regard revealed a sharp divergence of opinion, with many States identifying the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic as the responsible party, while the Syrian Arab Republic and its allies pointed to the ability of non-State actors such as fighters of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant to launch such attacks. The disagreement over the issue of the Syrian chemical weapons resulted in the adoption by a vote of the annual resolution on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and Their Destruction” (69/67), which had been previously adopted by consensus. Explaining the vote, the United States, speaking on behalf of 34 countries, expressed serious concern over the use of chlorine as a chemical weapon in the Syrian Arab Republic, and the gaps and discrepancies in the Syrian CWC declaration, and emphasized that the Syrian chemical weapons file remained open and would not be closed until all of these issues were fully addressed and the Syrian Arab Republic had complied with its obligations under the CWC and Security Council resolution 2118 (2013). (See chapter II for more detail on issues related to chemical weapons.)

**Conventional weapons**

The majority of Member States welcomed the fiftieth ratification of the ATT and its forthcoming entry into force on 24 December. Many States looked forward to the informal preparatory process for the first Conference of States Parties to the ATT, to be held in 2015, with a view to laying the

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16 The second Fact-Finding Mission of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons found “compelling confirmation” of the systematic and repeated use of a toxic chemical (most likely chlorine) as a weapon in the Syrian Arab Republic.


18 Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Jordan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States.

19 Its article 22 stipulates that the ATT shall enter into force 90 days following the date of the deposit of the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval with the depositary.
groundwork for the effective future implementation of the Treaty and deciding on key implementation issues such as a secretariat, the rules of procedure and financial arrangements.\textsuperscript{20} States welcomed the offer by Mexico to host the Conference.

Despite their initial reservations on the ATT, several major exporters and importers of arms, such as China and India, stated that they were studying the issue of signing the Treaty. The growing momentum for the ATT notwithstanding, a number of States continued to express dissatisfaction with the Treaty. Several member States of Non-Aligned Movement, in particular those that had not signed the Treaty, stressed that the ATT needed to be implemented in a balanced and objective manner without jeopardizing the right of States to acquire weapons. Reflecting their concerns, 29 States abstained from the vote when the General Assembly adopted on 2 December the draft resolution entitled “The Arms Trade Treaty” (69/49), and the Islamic Republic of Iran voted against the paragraph calling for adherence to the Treaty. (See chapter III for more detail on the ATT adoption and signing.)

States welcomed the positive outcomes of the Fifth Biennial Meeting of States, held in New York from 16 to 20 June, to review the implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects\textsuperscript{21} and the International Tracing Instrument.\textsuperscript{22} A number of States proposed concrete measures to improve the implementation of the Programme of Action, which included the development of a supplementary document to the International Tracing Instrument at the 2015 Open-ended Meeting of Governmental Experts on the Implementation of the Programme of Action; the inclusion of ammunition in the Programme of Action; and the development a legally binding instrument on brokering in small arms and light weapons.

Member States welcomed the successful outcomes of the Third Review Conference of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention,\textsuperscript{23} held in Maputo from 23 to 27 June, and the Fifth Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions,\textsuperscript{24} held in Costa Rica in September. The United States

\textsuperscript{20} The first informal preparatory meeting for the first Conference of States Parties was held in Mexico in September 2014, to be followed by the second meeting in Berlin in late November. Switzerland announced that it would hold the final preparatory meeting in Geneva before the Conference. The location of the ATT secretariat remained to be agreed upon as Austria, Switzerland and Trinidad and Tobago reiterated their candidatures.


\textsuperscript{24} The treaty text and adherence status are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/cluster_munitions (accessed 21 July 2015).
reaffirmed its recent announcement to neither produce nor acquire any anti-personnel landmines that are not compliant with the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, and expressed the intention to align its policy on landmines outside the Korean Peninsula with the key requirements of that Treaty. Several States expressed serious concerns over the alleged uses of cluster munitions in Ukraine, the Syrian Arab Republic, South Sudan and by fighters of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant.

The Committee heard views on several emerging issues in the field of conventional arms. A number of States welcomed the informal meeting of experts of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)\(^\text{25}\) to discuss lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), held from 13 to 16 May in Geneva, as an example of the continued dynamism and relevance of the CCW for addressing emerging technologies. States emphasized the need to address not only legal, security and technical questions raised by LAWS, but also related ethical and moral concerns, underlining the importance of examining the international humanitarian law and human rights law implications of the development and deployment of such weapons. States supported the renewal of the CCW mandate on LAWS and the continuation of discussion at the 2015 Open-ended Meeting of Governmental Experts. (See chapter III for more detail on conventional arms issues and chapter V for more information on autonomous weapons.)

**Other issues, including disarmament machinery**

The First Committee approved a new resolution on space security entitled “No first placement of weapons in outer space” (69/32). Introduced by the Russian Federation, the resolution encapsulated space-faring nations’ political commitment not to be the first to place weapons in outer space. It was adopted by a vote of 126 to 4, with 46 abstentions. The vote reflected persistent divisions among States on a legally binding instrument to prohibit the placement of weapons in outer space, particularly between China and the Russian Federation on the one hand and the United States on the other. In explaining its negative vote, the United States faulted the Russian proposal for not adequately defining a “weapon in outer space”, not being verifiable and not addressing terrestrially based anti-satellite weapons, thus failing to meet the criteria of valid transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs).

The Committee approved the annual resolution entitled “Prevention of an arms race in outer space” (69/31) by a vote of 180 to none, with 2 abstentions. Explaining its abstention, the United States stated its opposition to the Chinese/Russian revised draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and of the threat or use of force against outer space objects, which was introduced in the Conference on Disarmament in June.

and referenced in the preamble of the resolution. The United States reiterated its view that the draft treaty did not meet the criteria for space arms control proposals and concepts that were equitable, effectively verifiable and that enhanced the security of all nations.

Although there were indications that the growing East-West tensions were becoming an impediment to progress in the area of outer space issues, Member States continued to cooperate in implementing the TCBMs recommended in the 2013 report\(^{26}\) of the Group of Governmental Experts on TCBMs in outer space activities, with China, the Russian Federation and the United States again co-sponsoring the resolution entitled “Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities” (69/38). Although this resolution was adopted by consensus, there emerged slightly different approaches between the Russian Federation and the United States. The former introduced in the updated draft a decision to convene a joint ad hoc meeting of the First and Fourth Committees during the next session of the General Assembly to address possible challenges to space security and sustainability. The United States had previously proposed that the forthcoming three-year cycle of the United Nations Disarmament Commission include a third agenda item on the implementation of TCBMs as contained in the report of the Group of Governmental Experts. In the meantime, the European Union announced its decision not to table a draft resolution to pursue negotiations on the proposal for an international code of conduct for outer space activities, taking into account the view that the consultations need to move into a negotiating phase under the auspices of the United Nations.\(^{27}\) (See Chapter V for more detailed information on outer space.)

The First Committee adopted, without a vote, the annual resolution entitled “Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security” (69/28). Reflecting a mounting concern that advances in information and communications technologies (ICT) could facilitate the growth of existing and potential threats from the cybersphere, an increasing number of States demanded more strongly that the international community focus on the malicious use of ICT and stressed the importance of ensuring that such technologies are used in accordance with international law and the United Nations Charter. A number of Member States recognized that existing international law provided adequate guidance on State behaviour on the use of cyberspace in line with the report\(^{28}\) of the 2013 group of governmental experts. China recalled that, on behalf of the members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, it had submitted a draft international code of conduct on information security.

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26 A/68/189.
27 The Russian Federation stated that the draft code of conduct did not belong to the work of the First Committee.
28 A/68/98.
As in previous sessions of the First Committee, Member States expressed deep concern over the prolonged paralysis in the Conference on Disarmament and the United Nations Disarmament Commission, and stressed the need to revitalize the work of the disarmament machinery. However, four years after the Secretary-General convened the high-level meeting for revitalizing the work of the Conference on Disarmament and taking forward multilateral disarmament in September 2010, there was no indication that the Conference would agree to start negotiations as Member States continued to pursue different negotiating priorities. Some States remained opposed to efforts aiming at launching multilateral disarmament negotiations outside the Conference on Disarmament, reiterating that the Conference could not be substituted by any other forum and stressing the importance of its consensus rule and membership. As in the two previous sessions of the Committee, the Russian Federation delivered a joint statement with 20 countries in support of the Conference on Disarmament, reaffirming its commitment to the resumption of negotiations therein.

Member States expressed disappointment at the lack of progress in the Disarmament Commission as its 2012-2014 three-year cycle had ended with no outcomes. But they supported the Chair’s efforts for its reinvigoration, including his proposal to add a third item to the agenda and involve disarmament experts, especially those of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, in the work of the Commission. Although there was no agreement on these proposals, the Committee adopted by consensus the resolution on the report of the Disarmament Commission (69/77), which contained a number of elements aimed at revitalizing the work of the Commission.

Momentum for revitalizing the disarmament machinery appeared to be waning. The Committee postponed a decision concerning the follow-up to the new initiatives taken after the high-level meeting convened by the Secretary-General in September 2010 with a view to revitalizing the work of the Conference on Disarmament and taking forward multilateral disarmament. Reflecting divergences in approaches to nuclear disarmament, Member States remained divided over how to build on the work of the Open-ended Working

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29 As in previous sessions, the Non-Aligned Movement called for negotiations on a comprehensive treaty to ban nuclear weapons. The EU, echoed by many States, stressed that the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations for a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices remained a clear priority. A number of States, particularly the Russian Federation and members of the Union of South American Nations, called for negotiations on all four core issues, including the prevention of an arms race in outer space and negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

30 There was stiff opposition to any attempt to reform the rules of procedure of the Conference on Disarmament, particularly the consensus rule, as China, the Russian Federation, France, India and Pakistan emphasized the importance of the consensus rule.

31 CD/1971.
Group to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations. The Committee approved the draft resolution entitled “Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations” (69/41) by a vote of 152 to 4, with 22 abstentions, but the resolution did not establish a follow-up process to the report\(^\text{32}\) of the Open-ended Working Group.\(^\text{33}\) With regard to the agenda item entitled “Revitalizing the work of the Conference on Disarmament and taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations”, the Committee deferred action to its seventieth session by adopting a procedural decision. There was no agreement on convening a fourth special session of the General Assembly on Disarmament to reform the multilateral disarmament machinery as France, Israel, the United States and the United Kingdom abstained from voting on the draft decision of the Non-Aligned Movement entitled “Open-ended Working Group on the Fourth Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament” (69/518).

**United Nations Disarmament Commission, 2014**

The United Nations Disarmament Commission held the third and final session of its three-year cycle of deliberations at United Nations Headquarters from 7 to 25 April, under the chairmanship of Vladimir Drobnjak (Croatia). Prior to its substantive session, the Commission held its organizational session for 2014 at United Nations Headquarters on 20 December 2013,\(^\text{34}\) during which it took up the question of the election of its officers\(^\text{35}\) and considered the provisional agenda for the 2014 substantive session.

At the beginning of the substantive session on 7 April, the Commission adopted the provisional agenda for the 2014 session.\(^\text{36}\) In accordance with the decision taken at its 2012 substantive session, the Commission entrusted Working Group I with a mandate to address agenda item 4, entitled “Recommendations for achieving the objectives of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons”. Likewise, it entrusted Working Group II with a mandate to address agenda item 5, entitled “Practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons”. Naif bin Bandar Al-Sudairy (Saudi Arabia) and Knut Langeland (Norway) continued to serve as Chairs of Working Group I and Working Group II, respectively.

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\(^{32}\) A/68/514.

\(^{33}\) France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States voted against the resolution. Explaining their votes, the United States, on behalf of France, the United Kingdom and itself, expressed concern about inconsistency between the Open-ended Working Group process and the 2010 NPT Action Plan.

\(^{34}\) See A/CN.10/PV.336

\(^{35}\) During the 2014 session, the Bureau of the Commission was constituted as follows: Chair: Vladimir Drobnjak (Croatia); Vice-Chairs: Representatives of Austria, Brazil, Ecuador, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Morocco, Romania, Republic of Korea and Senegal; and Rapporteur: Peter Winkler (Germany).

\(^{36}\) See A/CN.10/L.72.
During its substantive session, the Commission held six plenary meetings,\(^{37}\) and, on 7 and 8 April, engaged in a general exchange of views on all agenda items.\(^{38}\) Working Group I held eight meetings from 9 to 24 April, while Working Group II held 10 meetings between 10 and 24 April.

On 7 April, the Deputy Secretary-General, Jan Eliasson, delivered a statement\(^{39}\) to the Commission on behalf of the Secretary-General. He recalled that key recommendations, guidelines and principles related to disarmament had historically emanated from the Disarmament Commission and that even the cold war had not prevented progress on vital and common interests. Quoting words from General Assembly resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January 1952, which established the original Commission, he noted that the General Assembly still remained “moved by anxiety at the general lack of confidence plaguing the world and leading to the burden of increasing armaments and the fear of war”. He emphasized that the concerns over trust and confidence remained and continued to prevent collective action in the common interest on the extremely important component of the United Nations agenda. The Deputy Secretary-General pointed out that he saw the symptoms of that lack of trust and confidence in the lack of nuclear disarmament or plans to achieve such disarmament; in the relentless drive to develop ever more advanced weaponry; soaring military budgets; and the lack of transparency in the armaments trade. He stressed that the Disarmament Commission was eminently placed and mandated to start a difficult but vitally needed process of rebuilding trust and confidence among Member States. Although acknowledging that each of the substantive items on the Commission’s agenda presented its own difficulties, he emphasized that they were clearly mutually reinforcing approaches to international peace and security, and, together, formed the very heart of the notion of general and complete disarmament—a goal found in a dozen multilateral treaties and long recognized as the ultimate objective of the United Nations. He noted that if Member States succeeded and broke the stalemate that had prevented the Commission from adopting guidelines or recommendations since 1999, further progress elsewhere in the disarmament machinery might well follow.

In his opening statement,\(^{40}\) the Chair of the United Nations Disarmament Commission noted that the Commission had been meeting year after year, and agenda items in both the nuclear and conventional weapons fields had been extensively debated, but no concrete result had been achieved since 1999. Recalling that, from 1979 to 1999, the Commission was able to adopt by consensus 16 recommendations, guidelines and declarations, he stressed that the very credibility of the Commission was at stake, and it ran the risk

\(^{37}\) See A/CN.10/PV.337-342.
\(^{38}\) See A/CN.10/PV.337-340.
\(^{40}\) Ibid., pp. 2-4.
of its relevance being eroded. The Chair noted that although disarmament was high on the United Nations agenda and the Commission needed to make essential proclamations repeatedly, for 15 years it had not stated even the most obvious things for the record. He stressed that the Commission should at least confirm its place within the United Nations disarmament machinery, noting that as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, it was composed of all Member States, and that its recommendations on nuclear disarmament and confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons carried global authority. Explaining the schedule of meetings for the 2014 session, the Chair announced that following two days of plenary meetings, Working Group I would commence its work in two consecutive sessions in the morning and the afternoon on 9 April, and Working Group II would start on 10 April, whereby the Working Groups would not meet on the same day, but each Group would have an entire day for its deliberation. He also encouraged Member States to come up with new creative ideas and proposals that could revitalize the work of the United Nations Disarmament Commission and provide it with more result-oriented dynamics. He suggested exploring ways of using the vast expertise of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

Forty-six delegations made statements during the general exchange of views on 7 and 8 April. Member States reaffirmed the important role of the Disarmament Commission as the sole specialized deliberative body in the United Nations disarmament machinery, and expressed concern that the Commission had not been able to agree on any recommendations to the General Assembly since 1999. They all underscored the need for the Commission to achieve a consensus outcome at the end of the current session, as it would conclude the three-year cycle of discussions. Several States suggested that even a modest consensus outcome on nuclear and conventional topics would be better than no outcome at all. The general exchange of views during the 2014 session of the Commission shared many characteristics with its previous sessions, such as strong support for more progress on nuclear disarmament and widespread recognition of the importance of confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms. However, it again

[41] See A/CN.10/PV. 330-333. See also http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/dc3486.doc.htm and http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/dc3489.doc.htm (accessed 1 August 2015). Representatives of the following countries made statements during the general exchange of views: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Columbia, Costa Rica (on behalf of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States), Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Greece (on behalf of the European Union and associated countries), India, Indonesia (on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries), Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Nepal, Nigeria (in its national capacity and on behalf of the Group of African States), Norway, Oman (on behalf of the Group of Arab States), Pakistan, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Viet Nam.
revealed persistent divisions on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, particularly different approaches to nuclear disarmament.

On nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, Member States reaffirmed the vital importance of strengthening the regime established by the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), calling for its universality and full implementation, equal and balanced treatment of its three mutually reinforcing pillars—nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy—as well as the early convening of the Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. Greece, speaking on behalf of the European Union (EU) and its member States, stated that the EU continued to regard the NPT as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with article VI of the Treaty and an important element in the further development of nuclear energy applications for peaceful purposes. The EU emphasized the importance of universalizing the NPT and called on all States that had not yet done so to join the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. A number of States also stressed the importance of the forthcoming third session of the Preparatory Committee of the 2015 NPT Review Conference, and expressed the hope that the work of the Commission would create a favourable environment necessary for productive discussions at that session.

Non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the Group of African States and the Group of Arab States, expressed deep concern over the slow pace of progress in nuclear disarmament. They highlighted their concern about the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament, in fulfilling article VI of the NPT, particularly following the unequivocal undertakings made by nuclear-weapon States at the 2000 Review Conference, and in implementing the Action Plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference. South Africa noted that non-compliance with article VI obligations and the lack of implementation of the concrete steps agreed upon during Review Conferences undermined the NPT as the foundation of the nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Reflecting such concerns, many non-nuclear-weapon States, especially those belonging to the NAM, highlighted the momentum created by the high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear Disarmament held on 26 September 2013, and emphasized that resolution 68/32 of 5 December 2013, entitled “Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament”, was an appropriate framework to pursue

the objective of nuclear disarmament. In particular, NAM States underscored the three-point proposal contained in the resolution: (a) calling for the urgent commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction; (b) convening a United Nations high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament to review the progress made in this regard; and (c) declaring 26 September as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. The Group also emphasized that nuclear disarmament, as the highest priority established at the first session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and as a multilateral legal obligation, should not be made conditional on confidence-building measures or any other disarmament efforts.

Costa Rica, speaking on behalf of CELAC States members, expressed its strong support for the conclusion of a universal legally binding instrument that would lead to effective, irreversible and verifiable nuclear disarmament in order to achieve the goal of complete elimination of all nuclear weapons under a multilaterally agreed timetable. Recalling the first high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament on 26 September 2013 CELAC also expressed its firm commitment to working towards holding a high-level international conference on identifying measures and actions for eliminating nuclear weapons as soon as possible, with a view to an agreed phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in a specific time frame, banning their development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use, and requiring their destruction.

A number of non-nuclear-weapon States also expressed support for another initiative launched by the General Assembly under resolution 68/46 of 5 December 2013, the Open-ended Working Group to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations. Mexico expressed the hope that the Commission would review the conclusions of its report\(^{43}\) as input for its deliberation. Many non-nuclear-weapon States also reaffirmed the importance of the application by nuclear-weapon States of the principles of transparency, irreversibility and international verifiability in all measures related to the fulfilment of their nuclear disarmament obligations and undertaking. Brazil stressed that the goal of eliminating and prohibiting nuclear weapons in a transparent, irreversible and verifiable manner, according to clearly defined benchmarks and timelines, must be achieved through multilateral concerted efforts, and suggested that the Commission could contribute to the beginning of the discussions of the principles and elements of a nuclear weapons convention, taking into account, inter alia, the 1988 guidelines on verification.\(^{44}\) A number of non-nuclear-weapon

\(^{43}\) A/68/514.

\(^{44}\) See A/45/372, annex.
States, particularly members of the NAM, CELAC and the African Group, also expressed serious objection to nuclear-weapon States’ efforts to improve existing nuclear weapons and developing new types of nuclear weapons, which were inconsistent with the obligation of nuclear disarmament, and reiterated the need to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in strategic doctrines and security policy.

Non-nuclear-weapon States welcomed the consideration of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, including at the second Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, convened by Mexico on 13 and 14 February. Reporting on the outcome of the Conference, Mexico noted that the working sessions of the Conference demonstrated, using scientific data, the lethal or harmful effects that the detonation of any nuclear weapons, whether intentional or accidental, would have on public health, climate change, food security, development, economic growth and population displacement. It also noted that the Conference had addressed the risks of detonation and the international community’s lack of capacity to respond to such a humanitarian disaster. It reported that a great majority of participants had called for substantive progress on nuclear disarmament by establishing new international standards and parameters in order to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world. It added that the final document of the Nayarit Conference set out the debates and a draft road map for participants to make the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons the keystone of disarmament efforts.

Austria noted that having facilitated the Action Plan on nuclear disarmament at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, it considered the full and swift compliance with article VI of the NPT to be of the utmost importance. Announcing that it would host the third Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons in Vienna towards the end of the year, Austria emphasized that international nuclear disarmament efforts required an urgent paradigm shift and expressed its view that the doctrine of nuclear deterrence was among the key drivers of proliferation and collective security, whereas the focus of the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons promoted the paramount concept of human security. Noting that the growing international awareness of the devastating humanitarian impact and consequences of nuclear weapons had a positive effect on international discussions and was resulting in greater understanding of the need to eliminate that risk, it stressed that there was indeed overwhelming support to firmly anchor the humanitarian imperative in the discussion about nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament.

Members of CELAC expressed grave concern about the enormous humanitarian impact and global consequences of any accidental or intended use of nuclear weapons, and expressed their belief that the issue should be

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45 NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.35.
Disarmament machinery

raised whenever nuclear weapons were discussed. Nigeria, speaking on behalf of the African Group, called on nuclear-weapon States to consider the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and to take measures aimed at the voluntary renunciation and dismantling of those weapons. In this context, several States urged nuclear-weapon States to actively participate in the third Conference in Vienna.

Many States also stressed the importance of the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)\textsuperscript{46} and called for the immediate commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) in the Conference on Disarmament. A number of States congratulated Guinea-Bissau, Iraq and Niue on their ratification of the CTBT during the past year and expressed hopes that the work of the Group of Governmental Experts on an FMCT, established under General Assembly resolution 67/53 of 3 December 2012, would take positive steps towards the start of negotiations by making recommendations on possible aspects that could contribute to a treaty.

Australia and Japan noted that, in advance of the third session of the Preparatory Committee of the 2015 NPT Review Conference, the 12-member Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) had been working to propose practical steps that could contribute to greater nuclear transparency, further reductions in arsenals, de-alerting, humanitarian aspects, the holding of the Conference on a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, addressing article X withdrawal, and greater security of nuclear weapons and materials. They announced that on 11 and 12 April, NPDI foreign ministers would meet in Hiroshima, directly see and feel the realities caused by the bombings, exchange views on those issues and finalize the NPDI positions on many of them. Quoting from the speech of its Minister for Foreign Affairs in Nagasaki in January, Japan noted that nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts should be built upon the following: (a) a clear understanding of the humanitarian aspect of nuclear weapons as a point of departure; and (b) an objective assessment of the reality facing the international community in terms of increasingly diverse nuclear risks.

Nuclear-weapon States, as defined by the NPT, reaffirmed their commitment to the long-term goal of achieving a world without nuclear weapons and their commitment to their obligations under the NPT, referring to the fifth P\textsuperscript{5}\textsuperscript{47} Conference in Beijing to be held on 14 and 15 April. Recalling President Barack Obama’s Prague address\textsuperscript{48} on nuclear disarmament, the United States reaffirmed its policy of achieving the peace and security


\textsuperscript{47} China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.

of a world without nuclear weapons and stressed that it was working to create the conditions for the eventual achievement of that goal. However, the United States also noted that disarmament would not be achieved by a single negotiation or by setting artificial deadlines. It also stressed that it was precisely because it well understood the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons that the United States had devoted time, hard work and considerable resources to a decades-long endeavour to reduce and ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons. For subsequent steps towards nuclear disarmament, the United States stated its commitment to pursuing the entry into force of the CTBT and an international agreement to start negotiations on an FMCT. In advance of the third session of the Preparatory Committee of the 2015 NPT Review Conference, the United States stated that it would continue to fulfil its NPT obligations and remained committed to full implementation of the 2010 Review Conference Action Plan.

China stated that it stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and that it had always maintained its own nuclear forces at the minimum level necessary for its national security needs. It reiterated that China had always exercised utmost restraint in the development of nuclear weapons, that it adhered firmly to a nuclear strategy of self-defence and a policy of non-first-use of nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances, and that it was unconditionally committed to a policy of no-use or threat-of-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or in nuclear-weapon-free zones. China again stated its view that international nuclear disarmament should follow the principles of maintaining global strategic stability and undiminished security for all, and that countries with the largest nuclear arsenals should continue to make drastic and substantive reductions in their nuclear arsenals. In this regard, it noted that the development of missile defence systems, which undermined global security, strategic balance and stability, should be suspended. It noted that the international community should develop, at an appropriate time, a viable and long-term plan composed of phased actions, including the conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. It also added that, in addition to the fifth round of the P5 Conference on the implementation of the NPT to be held in Beijing on 14 and 15 April, the P5 Working Group on the Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms held two expert meetings in Beijing and would endeavour to submit its outcome to the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

The Russian Federation stated that a world free of the threat of use of weapons of mass destruction was one of the key elements for strengthening international security and strategic stability. It added that it was making an important contribution to achieve that goal by strictly adhering to its obligations under bilateral and multilateral disarmament agreements, including the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation
of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START).\textsuperscript{49} It stressed that further steps by the Russian Federation in the field of nuclear disarmament were only possible with the implementation of the Treaty. It further noted that a reduction and limitation of nuclear weapons could not be achieved without due regard for all the factors affecting strategic stability.\textsuperscript{50} It called on all countries of the world to unite and strengthen their efforts to establish the conditions that would make possible further steps towards nuclear disarmament while strengthening stability and equal and indivisible security for all. It said that it considered counterproductive any attempt to distract the international community by introducing certain artificially created issues such as the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons.

The United Kingdom stated that it had already taken further unilateral disarmament steps than any other nuclear-weapon State, to a level of minimal credible deterrence, stressing that it had a strong record of fulfilling its nuclear disarmament commitments and of meeting the international legal obligations as a member of the NPT. It also noted that the United Kingdom had a strong record of transparency on the capability it possessed and on the limited role that this capability played in its defence doctrine, as reported in its 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review.\textsuperscript{51} It further noted that unilateral action was only one part of the process towards a world without nuclear weapons, and stressed the need to focus on a shared commitment to building an international environment where no States felt the need to possess nuclear weapons and where States with nuclear weapons could disarm in a balanced and verifiable manner. It added that building the right international environment involved many steps, not least including the entry into force of the CTBT and negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on an FMCT.

France noted that nuclear-weapon States must live up to their commitments, and it was aware of its responsibilities as such a State. It said that its record in terms of nuclear disarmament was exemplary, referring to the irreversible dismantling of its nuclear test site and of its facilities producing fissile material for weapons purposes, the dismantling of the land-based component of its deterrent capacity, and the reduction by a third of its oceanic and airborne components. It also underscored the need to strengthen the other aspects of the multilateral framework, including by ensuring all States


\textsuperscript{50} The Russian Federation noted that, in its opinion, those factors were the unilateral and unjustified building of the United States global missile defence system, the lack of any substantive progress in the ratification of the CTBT, the unwillingness of the United States to renounce the possibility of placing weapons in outer space, and the build-up of quantitative and qualitative imbalances in the field of conventional weapons and others.

that had not yet done so to sign the CTBT, and negotiating a treaty banning
the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons in the Conference on
Disarmament. France, however, stressed that all States must contribute
to disarmament by creating the necessary security environment, which
would require resolving the two major proliferation crises that threatened
international peace and security. In this regard, it referred to the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, which had continued its enrichment activities
and relaunched the plutonium reactor at the Yongbyon site, and to the Iranian
nuclear programme, which the 2013 Joint Plan of Action\textsuperscript{52} sought to address.

India, expressing the conviction that the goal of nuclear disarmament
could be achieved through a step-by-step process underwritten by a universal
commitment and an agreed global and non-discriminatory multilateral
framework, underscored the need for a meaningful dialogue among all States
that possessed nuclear weapons to build trust and confidence and to reduce
the salience of nuclear weapons in international affairs and security doctrines.
Referring to its working paper\textsuperscript{53}, which was developed in the spirit of the
Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan of 1988\textsuperscript{54} and submitted to the United Nations
Disarmament Commission in 2007, it mentioned specific measures such as
those to reduce nuclear danger arising from accidental and unauthorized use
of nuclear weapons, a global no-first-use agreement and a convention on the
prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

Reiterating the need to rebuild global agreement on the disarmament
agenda, Pakistan stated that the best way to achieve that goal was to
convene the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to
disarmament, with the aim of developing an integrated approach to achieve
the goal of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in a balanced and
non-discriminatory manner, taking into account the security interests of all
States. Stating that it was imperative for the United Nations Disarmament
Commission to give a fresh impetus to the exercise of rebuilding global
agreement on the disarmament agenda, Pakistan outlined the factors
influencing such an agreement: (a) the universally recognized premise that
security is indivisible and based on the right of all States to equal security;
(b) the need to understand three drivers for the acquisition of weapons—
perceived threats from superior conventional and non-conventional forces,
disputes and conflicts with more powerful States, and discrimination in the
application of international norms and laws; (c) the need to develop an agreed
criteria-based and non-discriminatory approach for the promotion of peaceful
uses of nuclear energy under appropriate international safeguards; (d) the
need to address concerns arising from the development, deployment and

\textsuperscript{52} IAEA, document INFCIRC/855. Available from http://www.iaea.org/Publications/

\textsuperscript{53} A/CN.10/2007/WG.1/WP.1.

\textsuperscript{54} See A/S-15/PV.14, pp. 2-22.
proliferation of anti-ballistic missile systems by means of legal instruments; and (e) the need to conform strictly to international law in the development and use of armed drones and lethal autonomous robots. It also noted that an FMCT should be conceived and negotiated as an integral part of the overall disarmament agenda, stressing that a lopsided, unifocal pursuit of an FMCT, driven by a non-proliferation prism, had not succeeded in the past and would not work in the future.

Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, many non-nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed the need for the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States as a matter of high priority. In this context, Ukraine, referring to the twentieth anniversary of its accession to the NPT and subsequent signing of the Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Budapest Memorandum), on security assurances to Ukraine, recalled that 23 years ago, immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it owned one of the largest nuclear arsenals in the world, but it had renounced its nuclear weapons. In light of the explosive situation on the Korean Peninsula, as well as the Russian military aggression in Crimea and the further escalation of the situation in its northern borders, Ukraine drew the attention of Member States to the unique example it provided in the framework of the United Nations by remaining committed to the provisions of the NPT, despite the fact that the Russian Federation had failed to fulfil its obligations under the Budapest Memorandum. It also commended the efforts by States that had reaffirmed their guarantees for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, adding that it continued to rely on those States because it did not recognize the deliberate annexation of a part of its territory by the Russian Federation.

The Russian Federation countered that the provisions of the Budapest Memorandum did not apply to conditions that occurred as a result of internal political and economic factors—very complex internal processes with which the Russian Federation, pursuant to the Budapest Memorandum, had no connection. Responding to statements that the Russian Federation was demonstrating that negative security assurances by nuclear-weapon States were unreliable and that it was undermining nuclear disarmament, it stated that it had in no way violated the obligations not to use or threaten to use

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56 The Russian Federation also maintained that Ukraine had not fulfilled the obligations in the framework of the Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe to combat an increase in chauvinist and nationalist trends, whose importance was emphasized in the joint statement issued by the leaders of the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States and Ukraine. It noted that for many years, Ukraine had done nothing to stop the rising nationalism and chauvinism that contributed to Crimea’s decision to join the Russian Federation.
nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, an important element of the Budapest Memorandum, or the concept of negative security assurances.

Member States expressed strong support for nuclear-weapon-free zones as they strengthened the nuclear non-proliferation regimes, and called for the early establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they did not yet exist, particularly in the Middle East. Many States, especially those belonging to the Arab Group, expressed deep disappointment and grave concern regarding the delay in convening the Conference, which was to be held in 2012, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. Oman, speaking on behalf of the Arab Group, underscored the importance of holding the Conference as soon as possible and of all parties’ compliance with implementation deadlines set out in the Action Plan of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The Group emphasized that the postponement of the Conference could be ascribed to Israel’s refusal to abide by and comply with the international consensus, and its insistence on possessing nuclear weapons. Oman noted that the Group welcomed the initiative proposed by Egypt on 28 September 2013 before the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly, which included tangible steps to support regional and international efforts on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. Egypt stated that the continued failure to convene the Conference called into question the credibility and relevance of the NPT review process, if not the Treaty itself, referring to the above-mentioned initiative launched by its Minister of Foreign Affairs before the General Assembly on 28 September 2013. Egypt further noted that that initiative had garnered letters of support from the States of the region that were members of the Non-Aligned Movement, and called on the permanent members of the Security Council and the remaining State in the region that was not party to the NPT to follow suit in endorsing the initiative by sending letters to the Secretary-General confirming their commitment to the establishment of the zone.

States parties to the NPT that were members of the Non-Aligned Movement noted that the continuing delay in convening the Conference ran contrary to the letter and spirit of the 1995 resolution and also violated the collective agreement reached at the 2010 Review Conference. They rejected the alleged impediments presented by the conveners (the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States and the United Nations Secretary-General) for not convening the Conference on schedule and urged them to seek out credible assurances with regard to the unconditional participation of Israel and to convene the Conference without any further delay. The African Group noted that the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle

57 A/68/PV.18, p. 42.
58 See A/68/781.
East was an integral and essential part of the package of decisions that allowed the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995.

The United States stated that it stood by its commitment to work with the other conveners, the facilitator (Jaakko Laajava (Finland)) and States in the region to hold the Conference. The United Kingdom also reaffirmed its commitment to the objective of achieving a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, noting that it was encouraged by the informal consultations that had taken place over the previous six months. France also expressed support for efforts to implement the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, and reaffirmed its support for the efforts of the facilitator to ensure that the Conference would be held as soon as possible with all the stakeholders concerned.

Costa Rica, speaking on behalf of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, noted that, on the occasion of its second summit in Havana on 28 and 29 January, the Heads of State and Government of its States members had declared Latin America and the Caribbean to be a zone of peace and reaffirmed its permanent commitment to resolving disputes through peaceful means. The Community again confirmed the pride of its region in being the first densely populated area in the world to be declared a nuclear-weapon-free zone through the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), and urged the nuclear-weapon States to withdraw all reservations to the Treaty’s Protocols and respect the region’s denuclearized character.

Regarding nuclear non-proliferation, a number of States expressed concern that serious cases of non-compliance threatened the integrity of the NPT and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, referring to the need for the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People’s Republic Korea and the Syrian Arab Republic to return to compliance with their international obligations. The United States, echoed by a number of States, underscored the need to gain universal support for the Additional Protocol so that the IAEA had the essential tools for identifying possible non-compliance.

The Republic of Korea stressed that the nuclear programme of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea continued to pose a grave threat to the Korean Peninsula, the region and beyond, as well as a serious and immediate challenge to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, noting that in recent weeks the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had launched a series of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, in violation of the relevant Security Council resolutions, and had publicly threatened another nuclear test. It urged the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to immediately stop such provocation and abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes, including

59 The treaty text and adherence status are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/tlatelolco (accessed 1 August 2015).
its uranium enrichment, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, in compliance with its international obligations.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea insisted that the United States should stop its joint military drills with the Republic of Korea, as they were tantamount to “nuclear blackmailing”. It also stressed that the United States should stop misleading the world with false rumours about the so-called provocation and threats by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with regard to its very righteous and just self-defence countermeasures against the joint military drills and “nuclear blackmail”. It stated that in 2014, the National Defence Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had advanced crucial proposals calling for the halting of hostile military actions between the two Koreas as key elements, which, in the follow-up, led to an opening of dialogue and an easing of tensions. It asserted, however, that the United States had brazenly ignored its crucial proposals to stop the mobilization of nuclear weapons and had openly declared that it would not change its policy. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea further noted that it had recently conducted routine rocket launch exercises. Those exercises, it said, were conducted in the context of the right to self-defence as a United Nations Member State in response to the joint United States–Republic of Korea military drills. It pointed out that the United States, however, had raised the issue at the Security Council, had manipulated the adoption of so-called elements and had condemned the rocket launches by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as a violation of the resolutions. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea reiterated that the escalation of tension in the Korean Peninsula had been created by the United States and that, as long as the United States continued to bring all the various means for a nuclear strike into the Korean Peninsula under the pretext of its joint nuclear war exercise, it was natural for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to take self-defence countermeasures to strengthen its nuclear deterrent force and its power.

China reaffirmed its commitment to achieving the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and to safeguarding the peace and stability of the Peninsula and North-East Asia. It stated that it would continue to make efforts to urge all parties to resolve their concerns through dialogue in a balanced manner and ease the current situation, and would commit to promoting the resumption of the Six-Party Talks.

A number of States welcomed the efforts of the E3+3\textsuperscript{60} on the Islamic Republic of Iran, which the United States noted offered an important opportunity to peacefully resolve one of the greatest challenges to the NPT regime. France noted that discussions on the Iranian nuclear programme had seen encouraging developments and that the adoption of the Joint Plan of Action on 24 November 2013 was indeed a step forward for peace and

\textsuperscript{60} China, France, Germany, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.
security. It added that, for the first time, the E3+3 had obtained from the Islamic Republic of Iran a six-month suspension of its most sensitive nuclear programme activities and thereby gained time for negotiations. China noted that it had actively participated in the diplomatic efforts to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue through dialogue and negotiations, provided its voluntary contribution (RMB 1.5 million) to the IAEA for its safeguards work in the Islamic Republic of Iran and proposed five principles for a comprehensive settlement. Saudi Arabia expressed the hope that the Islamic Republic of Iran would continue on the path of cooperation with the E3+3 group and on a positive track towards security and stability in the region. Norway noted that, in parallel, the IAEA and the Islamic Republic of Iran had reached a framework agreement\(^6\) with a view to resolving all outstanding issues, and highlighted the role and proven relevance of the Agency in verifying that parties to the agreement between the E3+3 and the Islamic Republic of Iran abided by its terms.

The Non-Aligned Movement reiterated its position that proliferation concerns must be addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements, and stressed that such non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States. The Group also stressed the importance of the inalienable right of developing countries to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy, including the sovereign right to develop a full national nuclear fuel cycle for peaceful purposes without discrimination, and to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Pakistan called upon the international community to reverse discrimination and enable full access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

A number of States stressed the importance of nuclear security, particularly the need to prevent non-State actors from gaining access to nuclear weapons and related material and technology. In this context, they welcomed the success of the third Nuclear Security Summit held in The Hague on 24 and 25 March, and reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening the security of civilian facilities and the storage and transport of fissile materials to prevent terrorist attacks. However, several States expressed the view that the IAEA was the main international forum for discussing matters related to nuclear security and for establishing standards and regulations in that field. Egypt noted that concerns about nuclear security should not be invoked to preclude the legitimate right of States to the development, research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with article IV of the NPT.

With regard to other weapons of mass destruction, several States welcomed the accession of the Syrian Arab Republic to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the decision of the Executive Council of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to destroy expeditiously chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. France noted, however, that while the Third Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention had been conducted successfully, it had also learned of the Syrian Government’s repeated use of chemical weapons against its own people, culminating in the Al-Ghouta chemical attack of 27 August 2013. It maintained that the strong response by the international community, in particular by France, had led to the adoption of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), forcing the Syrian Arab Republic to dismantle its chemical weapons under the OPCW–United Nations Joint Mission. France acknowledged that the Joint Mission was making progress, but stressed the need to remain vigilant and ensure that the decommissioning was complete and verified over time.

Exercising the right of reply, the Syrian Arab Republic noted that France’s hostile policy was intended to falsify reports by the investigators, headed by Professor Åke Sellström, which did not attempt to identify the perpetrators of the crime of using chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. It noted that the Syrian Government had asked the United Nations to officially oversee the mission to investigate the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, starting with Khan Al Assal near Aleppo, as well as to identify the perpetrators of that crime. The Syrian Arab Republic maintained that, in attempting to forge the findings of the mission’s reports, the French representative was deliberately disregarding the many reports confirming that terrorist groups committed those horrible crimes and was also intentionally ignoring the progress in eliminating chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic through constructive cooperation between the Syrian Government and the OPCW–United Nations Joint Mission.

In the field of conventional weapons, many States welcomed the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) by the General Assembly and stressed the need for its early entry into force and effective implementation. They expressed the hope that the ATT would establish the highest international standards for regulating the international arms trade and provide a new multilateral framework for transparency and accountability therein. Member States also reaffirmed the importance of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects62 and the International Tracing Instrument.63

They welcomed the successful adoption in 2012 of the outcome document\textsuperscript{64} of the second United Nations Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the Programme of Action and underscored the importance of the forthcoming Fifth Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action in June. Several States welcomed the convening of the high-level meeting on small arms by the Security Council on 26 September 2013 under the Australian presidency and the adoption of Security Council resolution 2117 (2013), the first resolution adopted by the Council on the issue of small arms and light weapons. In addition, the Commission heard expressions of support for other international instruments, particularly the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.

CELAC expressed the belief, echoed by many other States, that practical confidence-building measures (CBMs) in the area of conventional weapons played an important role in promoting understanding, transparency and cooperation among States and enhancing stability and security, and that they should be adopted in strict compliance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with respect for their voluntary nature and for States’ specific security concerns and situations. Member States reaffirmed the validity and importance of the existing transparency and CBMs adopted under the auspices of the United Nations, particularly the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures.

The European Union reminded members of the Commission of the working paper\textsuperscript{65} on practical CBMs in the field of conventional weapons that it had presented in Working Group II during the 2013 session. It stated that practical CBMs in the field of conventional weapons should include, inter alia, the following: exchanges of information on national legislation, regulations and procedures on the transfers of arms, military equipment, dual-use goods and technology; inclusion of small and light weapons as a separate category of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms; transparency in the field of military expenditures; and CBMs at the regional and subregional levels.

The United States noted that in addition to arms control, CBMs were effective elements in a limited toolkit for reducing tensions and preventing future escalation in a time of crisis. It underlined that the crisis in Ukraine had demonstrated the continuing value of implementing transparency and confidence-building regimes such as the Vienna Document 2011 on

\textsuperscript{64} A/CONF.192/2012/RC/4.
\textsuperscript{65} A/CN.10/2013/WG.II/WP.1.
Confidence- and Security-Building Measures\textsuperscript{66} and the Open Skies Treaty.\textsuperscript{67} It reminded Member States that, although the action of the Russian Federation in Ukraine had significantly undermined mutual trust, even in the darkest days of the cold war, the United States and the Russian Federation had found it in their mutual interest to work together on reducing the nuclear threat. Referring to conventional arms control regimes in Europe starting with the Helsinki process in the 1970s, Norway said that, as international relations developed and technology evolved, it was paramount to renew and adapt these regimes to the changing security environment. Noting that the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe\textsuperscript{68} had served States well for many years, Norway underlined the importance of striking a new balance that provided a formula for an effective regime for the decades to come.

India stressed that the initiation of a confidence-building process must be freely decided upon by States and in the exercise of their sovereignty, and that States must utilize a step-by-step process and should evolve at a pace comfortable to all participants. Underscoring the need for CBMs in specific regions to take into account the political, military and other prevailing conditions in the region, it noted that CBMs in a regional context should be adopted upon the initiative and with the agreement of the States of the region concerned. It also noted the need to take advantage of the guidelines on CBMs\textsuperscript{69} endorsed by the General Assembly at its forty-first session in resolution\textsuperscript{70} on the recommendations of the United Nations Disarmament Commission and expressed the belief that discussions on CBMs in the field of conventional weapons should not become a tool for promoting instruments that did not enjoy universal support.

Welcoming the adoption of the ATT as a first step towards a more responsible transfer of arms and as a means of addressing human suffering without having an impact on the self-defence needs of States, Pakistan called for the next steps of promoting conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels, legal restraints on excessive production of such arms and balanced reduction in conventional arms forces and armaments. Iraq noted that excessive stockpiling of conventional weapons damaged national, regional and international security, as well as socioeconomic and human development efforts, and emphasized the guiding principles outlined by the Disarmament Commission in its report contained in document A/54/42, which

\textsuperscript{68} The treaty text and adherence status are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/cfe (accessed 1 August 2015).
\textsuperscript{69} Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/41/42), annex II.
\textsuperscript{70} General Assembly resolution 41/60 C of 3 December 1986.
discussed limits on conventional weapons in the light of the importance of reducing excessive stocks of such weapons, while taking into consideration the legitimate right of Member States to use them for self-defence.

Egypt called for the following elements as integral components of any possible CBMs: subjecting to international scrutiny the overproduction and increasing stockpiles of conventional weapons in the hands of major arms exporters and producers; ensuring mutual international accountability as the only guarantee against the potential abuse of the existing imbalance between major arms producers and the rest of the world; and addressing protracted threats to international peace and security, particularly aggression and foreign occupation.

Noting its belief that practical CBMs for conventional weapons were best and most fully expressed at the regional, subregional and bilateral levels, Ecuador stated that the countries of the Union of South American Nations had been promoting and supporting CBMs, particularly in the categories of information exchange and transparency, in terms of defence systems and defence spending; notification of military activities; measures in the field of security; guarantees; and compliance and verification measures.

Ukraine emphasized that the relevance of CBMs in the field of conventional weapons had been confirmed by the aggressive actions of the Russian Federation against it. It noted that Ukraine had long participated in pan-European subregional and complementary bilateral confidence-building mechanisms relevant to arms control, such as the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Treaty on Open Skies, the Vienna Document 2011 on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, as well as separate bilateral agreements on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM) with Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Belarus and, since 10 March, Romania. It regretted that its numerous proposals to enter into similar agreements with the Russian Federation had been rejected by the Russian side under the pretext of a strategic partnership between the two countries. It further noted that during its chairmanship in 2013 of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Ukraine had initiated a discussion on the role that conventional arms control and CSBMs could play in future regional security architecture with the goal of creating a future-oriented strategic discussion on conventional arms control and CSBMs.

With regard to transparency, the Russian Federation noted that the main task of the relevant mechanisms, including the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, was to monitor the destabilizing accumulation of conventional weapons in order to foster effective dialogue among States to address the concerns they might have. China expressed support for the necessary adjustments to the Register in line with the development of international and regional security situations, while taking into account the
concerns of all parties. It noted that the priority was to improve the coverage of the Register, namely, to increase the number of participating countries.

South Africa, which chaired in 2013 the Group of Governmental Experts on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development, noted that while the Group thoroughly considered the decline in participation in the instrument, it was disappointed that no progress could be made on the possible expansion of the Register. Rebutting the argument that the Register was not so much a CBM as it was a voluntary transparency measure, South Africa stressed that the terms “transparency” and “confidence-building measures” were synonymous when it came to conventional arms control and international security. It said that Member States needed to take note of recent international developments and of the need for the instrument to remain relevant to conventional arms CBMs. It added that, in South Africa’s view, the Register remained at the heart of discussions on practical CBMs in the field of conventional weapons.

Welcoming the first anniversary of the adoption of the ATT, Mexico noted that the international community now faced the challenge of implementing the system established by the Treaty. Mexico therefore expressed the hope that it would host the first Conference of States Parties to the Treaty in order to build a comprehensive regime to counteract the consequence of the illicit trade in conventional weapons. Australia, one of the authors of the ATT, reaffirmed its strong commitment to the Treaty, stressed the need to turn attention to its effective implementation, and referred to Australia’s continuing support to those countries most affected by the uncontrolled spread of conventional arms through the United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation, which provided assistance for implementation of both the ATT and the Programme of Action.

Stressing the need to develop a legally binding international treaty to prevent deployment of weapons in outer space, the Russian Federation noted that the Russian-Chinese draft text of such a treaty was supported by the overwhelming majority of the members of the international community and called on all States to commit themselves to a policy of no-first-placement of weapons in outer space. In this regard, it expressed the intention to introduce, during the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly, a draft resolution on no-first-placement of weapons in outer space. The United States expressed its commitment to the stable, sustainable and peaceful use and protection of outer space to support the vital interests of all nations, noting that it had sponsored, along with the Russian Federation and China, resolution 68/50 of 5 December 2013, which referred to the recommendations contained in the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities (A/68/189). It further noted that the Group’s recommendations were an ideal topic for in-depth consideration at a future substantive session of the Commission, stating its belief that the Commission
should establish a working group on space transparency and confidence-building measures as part of its agenda for 2015-2017.

All Member States expressed deep concern over the continued paralysis of the disarmament machinery and called for a stronger political will and greater flexibility to achieve substantive outcomes in the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament. While sharing the same concern about the credibility and relevance of the multilateral disarmament machinery, Member States held divergent views on the causes of its impasse and stagnation, namely the lack of political will or the working methods. Brazil stated its belief that the problem was political rather than procedural, noting that blaming the United Nations disarmament architecture for the absence of concrete results would be inappropriate. To name a few important outcomes of past sessions of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, Brazil mentioned the principles agreed to in 1988 on verification, the 1996 guidelines for international arms transfers and the 1999 guidelines on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Pakistan also noted that the deadlock afflicting the disarmament machinery did not arise from the way it conducted its business and that there was nothing wrong with the disarmament machinery, the rules of procedure or the working methods. It maintained that the real challenge lay with the international strategic and political environment.

Regarding the Conference on Disarmament, Iraq, which chaired the forum from 24 June to 18 August 2013, noted that, during its presidency, the Conference had endorsed the draft decision on establishing an informal working group with a mandate to produce a programme of work robust in substance and progressive over time in implementation. Switzerland noted that an increasing number of delegations were participating in discussions about revitalizing the Conference on Disarmament and that delegations of the Conference had re-established an informal working group mandated to produce a programme of work.

Several States suggested concrete ideas to improve the working methods of the Disarmament Commission. Expressing its belief that the Commission should consider ways to improve its working methods and enhance its functioning, Switzerland noted that it was essential to deepen the discussion on the composition of the agenda, namely on the relationship between the work of Working Group I and that of Working Group II. It explained that it was highly problematic to link the possible improvement of practical CBMs in conventional arms to developments in the general guidelines on nuclear

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71 See A/45/372, annex.
disarmament and non-proliferation, noting that such linkages reinforced dividing lines and were a recipe for inaction. It suggested focusing on areas where progress was possible by launching multiple parallel efforts, while noting that the Commission stood to gain by focusing on specific issues rather than one generic theme such as nuclear disarmament or conventional disarmament. It suggested that the Commission could further examine the possibility of opening up its proceedings with representatives from civil society and academia, and also review the structure of its report to the General Assembly so that it better reflected the substance of those exchanges. Agreeing that the methods of work could be improved, Brazil noted that the Commission could benefit from a more specific agenda, although it expressed preference for a more comprehensive approach to revitalizing the disarmament machinery, which should be pursued through the convening of a fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Report of the Commission (A/69/42)

At its first meeting on 9 April, the Chair of Working Group I circulated a non-paper dated 1 April, which served as a basis for discussion. At the second and third meetings on 11 April, delegations exchanged views and made various proposals on the Chair’s paper. Subsequently, at the fourth and fifth meetings on 15 and 17 April, delegations exchanged views and made various proposals on the Chair’s revised papers dated 10 and 14 April. At the sixth and seventh meetings on 22 April, delegations again exchanged views and made various proposals on the working paper dated 17 April submitted by the Chair. Thereafter, at the eighth meeting on 24 April, the Chair circulated a revised working paper dated 24 April. Following the discussion of the Working Group, the Chair concluded that there was no consensus on the revised working paper, and decided to circulate it under his own responsibility and without prejudice to the position of any delegation. On the same day, Working Group I considered and adopted, by consensus, its report on agenda item 4.

At its first and second meetings on 10 April, Working Group II took up the Chair’s previous working paper dated 18 April 2013, which had been circulated at the 2013 session of the Commission, and completed a reading of the text. At the third meeting on 13 April, the Chair circulated a non-paper dated 11 April based on his previous working paper and also taking

74 A/CN.10/2014/WG.I/WP.2.
75 A/CN.10/2014/WG.I/CRP.1 and Rev.1.
76 A/CN.10/2014/WG.I/WP.3.
79 A/CN.10/2013/WG.II/WP.2.
80 A/CN.10/2014/WG.II/CRP.1.
into account written and oral proposals made by delegations. At the third meeting, the Working Group also began a reading of the Chair’s non-paper. At the fourth meeting on 14 April, the Chair circulated his non-paper, taking into account additional comments and proposals made by delegations at the third meeting, and the Working Group completed the reading of the Chair’s non-paper. At the fifth meeting on 16 April, the Chair circulated a revised version of his non-paper dated 16 April, on the basis of which the Working Group engaged in discussions and consultations. At the sixth meeting on 21 April, the Chair circulated a second revised version of his non-paper dated 17 April, based on his previous text and taking into account written and oral proposals made by delegations. At the seventh and eighth meetings on 21 and 23 April, delegations made various proposals and exchanged views on the basis of the Chair’s second revised non-paper. At the ninth meeting on 23 April, the Chair circulated a third revised version of his non-paper dated 23 April under his own responsibility, on the basis of which the Working Group engaged in discussions and consultations. At the tenth meeting on 24 April, the Working Group was unable to achieve consensus on the Chair’s third revised non-paper. The Working Group was informed that the Chair’s third revised non-paper would be issued as a working paper under his own responsibility and without prejudice to the position of any delegation. On the same day, Working Group II considered and adopted, by consensus, its report on agenda item 5.

At the 342nd plenary meeting on 25 April, the Disarmament Commission adopted by consensus the reports of its subsidiary bodies and the conclusions contained therein. At the same meeting, the Commission adopted, by consensus, the report of the Disarmament Commission for 2014 to the General Assembly at its sixty-ninth session, and thus concluded its work during the 2014 session. The Commission put forward no recommendations for adoption by the General Assembly.

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82 A/CN.10/2014/WG.II/CRP.1/Rev.2.
83 A/CN.10/2014/WG.II/CRP.1/Rev.3.
Conference on Disarmament, 2014

[T]he pervasive cycle of pessimism in this body must still be overcome or else the [Conference on Disarmament] will be overtaken by events.

Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary-General

The 2014 session of the Conference on Disarmament commenced with an address\(^{86}\) by the United Nations Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, in which he called on the Conference to overcome its long deadlock and resume substantive negotiations.

Although the Conference again failed to start negotiations on the items on its agenda in 2014, the session was characterized by heightened activity. The six presidents of the session (Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Malaysia) ensured continuity of efforts from one President to the next, in the search for an early resumption of substantive negotiations. In addition, many member States made statements, including during the high-level segment meetings held in March, on the best ways and means for the Conference to adopt a programme of work with a negotiation mandate. The new level of energy of the Conference was also demonstrated through a record number in recent years of over 60 official documents issued during the session in relation to the substantive agenda items.

In March, the Conference adopted two parallel processes: the renewal of the mandate of the Informal Working Group to produce a programme of work robust in substance and progressive over time in its implementation;\(^ {88}\) and a series of informal meetings under a schedule of activities with a mandate to discuss all substantive agenda items.\(^ {89,90}\)

The Informal Working Group (chaired by the President and assisted, as in 2013, by Luis Gallegos Chiriboga (Ecuador) as Co-Chair and Peter Woolcott (Australia) as Vice Co-Chair) held four meetings and conducted a series of consultations on disarmament subjects that could gain support for a programme of work. As these consultations proceeded, it was clear that no

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\(^{87}\) Ibid.


\(^{90}\) The following are the substantive agenda items for the 2014 session of the Conference on Disarmament: (1) cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; (2) prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters; (3) prevention of an arms race in outer space; (4) effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (5) new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons; (6) comprehensive programme of disarmament; and (7) transparency in armaments.
consensus existed to formulate a programme of work on any of the four core issues. There was also no prospect for agreement on a simplified programme of work, nor on combining specific items among the core agenda items for the purposes of negotiation.

Given the likelihood that consensus for launching negotiations would not be garnered on any of the four issues, the Co-Chairs also explored whether there was any interest and willingness to enter into a possible negotiation in the Conference concerning the weaponization of radioactive sources and a ban on radiological weapons. In this regard, the Co-Chairs noted that radioactive sources were hazardous and could be lethal either through accident, misuse or malicious activity. The working paper submitted to the Group on this topic was discussed but there was no consensus that the subject of radioactive sources was robust enough to justify the launch of negotiations.

Additionally, the Informal Working Group also explored the possibility of formulating a programme of work on the basis of the proposals of the Acting Secretary-General of the Conference, Michael Møller, submitted on 20 May. He recommended, in summary, the following: developing, where possible, a framework convention approach, to which substantive protocols might subsequently be added; and exploring ways on which voluntary, politically binding regimes might be negotiated. Following a discussion on these proposals, it was apparent that there was no consensus on progressing with the proposed options in the immediate future. Nevertheless, several delegations noted that the proposals could offer ways forward in the future for enabling the Conference to secure agreement on a negotiating mandate. (For more detail on the proposals, see the section entitled “Revitalization of the Conference on Disarmament” on page 242.)

Regarding the schedule of activities, the Conference adopted decision CD/1978 on 26 March establishing a calendar of discussions on all substantive items on its agenda. The decision stated that “While continuing to seek the path towards renewed negotiations, it is important that the Conference on Disarmament holds structured and substantive discussions on all the items listed in its agenda contained in document CD/1965.”

The informal meetings on the substantive agenda items were chaired by coordinators whose designation reflected broad geographical balance of the membership of the Conference. Meetings on agenda items 1 and 2 with a general focus on nuclear disarmament were coordinated by Walid Mahmoud Abdelnasser (Egypt); agenda items 1 and 2 with a general focus on the ban of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices by Michael Biontino (Germany); agenda item 3 by Matthew Rowland (United Kingdom); agenda item 4 by Jose Luis Balmaceda Serigus (Chile); and agenda items 5, 6 and 7 by Mikhail Khvostov (Belarus). The coordinators, in accordance with decision CD/1978, produced and submitted
to the President in their personal capacities reports reflecting the discussions on their respective agenda items.

Many delegations expressed the view that the discussions in the informal meetings organized under the schedule of activities on all agenda items were rich in substance and were a foretaste of the long-delayed negotiations in the Conference. The deliberations revealed that the disagreements that continued to exist across the agenda items were likely to complicate the resumption of negotiations in the Conference.

**Nuclear disarmament**

_Do not hide behind the utopian logic which says that until we have the perfect security environment, nuclear disarmament cannot proceed._

_Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary-General_91

As in previous years, nuclear disarmament, in accordance with the agenda92 of the Conference on Disarmament was addressed mainly under agenda item 1, “Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament”, and agenda item 2, “Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters”. Throughout the session and, in particular, during the informal meetings held within the framework of the schedule of activities chaired by Walid Mahmoud Abdelnasser (Egypt), many States called for an early negotiation of a legally binding instrument on nuclear disarmament as an important objective for international security.

Nevertheless, despite broad agreement on this objective, States continued to express differing views on the approach to its attainment.

Under its 2014 schedule of activities contained in decision CD/1978, the Conference on Disarmament convened five informal meetings focusing on nuclear disarmament from 21 to 23 May. These meetings provided another opportunity for a number of delegations to recall the priority assigned to nuclear disarmament in the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (SSOD-I) and underscored that priority should be given to negotiating a legally binding nuclear disarmament instrument in a time-bound framework with specified deadlines to eliminate nuclear weapons. Proponents of nuclear disarmament made reference to United Nations General Assembly resolution 68/32, which called for the urgent commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and


Disarmament machinery
to provide for their destruction. Those delegations called for the establishment
of an ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a
legally binding nuclear disarmament instrument in a time-bound framework to
eliminate nuclear weapons.

They argued that the mere existence of nuclear weapons poses a threat
to humanity and that nuclear disarmament was a legal obligation under article
VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Some
delegations also insisted that, as it had been the case with other disarmament
conventions, nuclear weapons should first be banned and then destroyed.
Progressive delegitimization of nuclear weapons, decreasing their military
utility and negotiation of a global non-discriminatory convention along the
lines of the Chemical Weapons Convention, were also highlighted by some
States.

A number of delegations emphasized the need for urgent progress
on nuclear disarmament, given the catastrophic consequences of nuclear
weapons detonation. They drew attention to the immense and uncontrollable
capability and the indiscriminate nature of a nuclear weapons detonation,
whose devastating impact could go far beyond national borders. They argued
that the only way to guard against a nuclear weapons detonation—whether
by accident, miscalculation or design—was to ensure the total elimination of
nuclear weapons and the assurance that they would never be produced again.
As such, they emphasized that humanitarian considerations were recognized
as a fundamental global concern.

Some other States, while acknowledging the importance of the
humanitarian dimension, highlighted the importance of the security
considerations and underlined the need to foster international conditions
in which the possession of nuclear weapons would no longer be seen as
necessary or legitimate for the preservation of national and global security.
In response, some States maintained that such assertions only serve to fuel
proliferation.

A number of delegations arguing for a step-by-step approach to nuclear
disarmament reiterated that the entry into force of the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the negotiations on a treaty banning the
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
deVICES, the enhancement of the level of security and confidence, no first use,
negative security assurances, the universalization of NPT, the renunciation
of extended nuclear deterrence and the removal of nuclear weapons from the
territory of non-nuclear-weapon States were practical steps towards nuclear
disarmament.

Some delegations expressed their continuing concern that one of the
important decisions of the 2010 NPT Review Conference—for a Conference
on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all
other weapons of mass destruction to be convened in 2012 by the United Nations Secretary-General and the sponsors of the 1995 NPT Review Conference resolution—had not been realized. They stressed that the agreed mandate of the Conference, as contained in the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and the 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan, should be maintained and constitutes the basis for convening the conference without further delay.

The five sessions devoted to the informal discussions on nuclear disarmament in 2014 provided member States with a renewed opportunity to discuss in depth their views on different matters related to one of the “core issues” on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. However, as reflected in the report submitted by the Coordinator of the informal meetings under this topic, “the views are still divided on many fundamental related issues including the legal framework, the approaches to achieve nuclear disarmament, and the timing and content of the mandate of the Conference on Disarmament. Differences and disagreements are mainly related to the fact that some States believe that it is time to initiate negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention while others do not.”

**Fissile materials**

As in previous years, the issue of a prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices was included under agenda items 1 (entitled “Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament”), and 2 (entitled “Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters”).

Many delegations continued to refer to a ban on fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices as the first logical step to nuclear disarmament. These delegations called for an early start in the Conference on Disarmament of negotiations on such a ban on the basis of the Shannon Mandate as contained in decision CD/1299. No consensus, however, emerged for the commencement of negotiations on this issue. Some delegations continued to question the ambiguity of the Shannon Mandate regarding the inclusion of pre-existing weapons-grade stockpiles of fissile material in the negotiations of a treaty.

On 26 March the Conference adopted decision CD/1978 establishing a schedule of activities with a series of informal open-ended meetings under agenda item 1 and 2 with a general focus on the ban of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. The meetings were held from 4 to 6 June and were chaired by Michael Biontino.

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94 CD/1995, p. 5.
(Germany), who had been designated as Coordinator for this item. The deliberations covered, in particular, the elements of how to take forward the discussions and negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on the ban of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, its scope, the required definitions, the appropriate verification system and legal and institutional aspects of a future treaty.

The informal meetings drew largely from the existing mandates for a ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. These included United Nations General Assembly resolution 48/75 L entitled “Prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” of 16 December 1993, which concluded that the Conference on Disarmament would be the appropriate body to negotiate a “non-discriminatory multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty” to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and decision CD/1299 containing the Shannon Mandate. References were also made to CD/1864 of 2009, which contains the only programme of work adopted in recent years by the Conference and contains an agreement to launch negotiations, which had never been implemented, on the prohibition of the production of fissile material.

The informal meetings under the schedule of activities revealed the continued interest the member States of the Conference attached to a ban on the production of weapons-grade fissile materials. While they provided an opportunity for deepening discussions on the issue, member States did not, however, change their positions on some of the divisive issues, such as the scope of the future treaty, which have prevented the start of negotiations for decades. Indeed, there continued to be a divergence of views on whether or not to include pre-existing stocks in the future treaty. Many expressed the view that agreement on the scope of the treaty would determine the appropriate verification regime that would be required for the treaty to be effective.

In the face of the diverging views on these key aspects of the future treaty, many delegations expressed the hope that the Group of Governmental Experts established by General Assembly resolution 67/53 of 3 December 2012 to make recommendations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices would succeed in its work.

Security assurances

Pursuant to decision CD/1978 to convene a series of informal open-ended meetings for holding structured and substantive discussions on all its agenda items, three informal meetings were held on agenda item 4, entitled “Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons”, from 18 to 20 June under the overall coordination of Marta Maurás Pérez (Chile). The debate was based on a list of
possible discussion points circulated in advance by the Coordinator. The list
drew on the outcome of the relevant discussions on the same subject in 2007,95
200896 and 2010.97

The importance of effective international arrangements to assure
non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,
as contained in item 4 of the agenda, was also addressed by delegations during
other plenary meetings throughout the 2014 session of the Conference on
Disarmament. The discussion focused on the current situation; challenges
that need to be overcome in order to reach an agreement on negative security
assurances; and the way forward. The majority of the States reiterated the
legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in receiving unequivocal
and legally binding security assurances from nuclear-weapon States. When
taking stock of the current situation, all delegations referred to United Nations
and the nuclear-weapon-free zones. Several delegations, particularly the
non-nuclear-weapon States, reiterated their disappointment that none of
the above had so far addressed in an efficient and satisfactory manner their
legitimate concerns. On the one hand, many stressed that Security Council
resolutions 255 and 984 and the unilateral declarations by the nuclear-weapon
States98 did not amount to international legally binding instruments. Moreover,
the unilateral declarations were also considered by many to be inadequate, as
they could easily be withdrawn and, more importantly, most of them did not
exclude the use of nuclear weapons under certain conditions. Furthermore,
some States argued that nuclear-weapon-free zones did provide legally
binding negative security assurances but did not cover the whole globe and
even excluded some of the most sensitive parts of the world. It was noted that
not all nuclear-weapon States had ratified the respective relevant protocols
annexed to these treaties. In some instances, the protocols were ratified with
unilateral reservations and interpretative declarations.

Many delegations showed particular interest in the discussion on the
legal and political challenges that needed to be overcome in order to reach an
agreement on negative security assurances. This discussion covered a wide
range of issues including, inter alia, the relationship between negative security
assurances and the NPT; the compatibility of negative security assurances
and military alliances between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-
weapon States; negative security assurances in light of current developments,
upcoming events and recent nuclear disarmament action, such as the initiative
on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons (the conferences held in

95 In 2007, the Coordinator designated for this agenda item was Carlos Antonio Da Rocha
Paranhos (Brazil).
96 In 2008, the Coordinator designated for this agenda item was Babacar Carlos Mbaye
(Senegal).
97 In 2010, the Coordinator designated for this agenda item was Abdul Hannan (Bangladesh).
Oslo, Nayarit and Vienna), the nuclear case by the Marshall Islands in the International Court of Justice, the postponement of the Conference on the Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, and the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

Many States stressed that negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States were not a one-way favour accorded by nuclear-weapon States but a legitimate right for those States that had voluntarily committed themselves not to aspire to possessing nuclear weapons. This, they said, had prevented nuclear proliferation and contributed to nuclear disarmament.

There were persisting divergences between those stressing that unilateral declarations by nuclear-weapon States and/or ratification or accession to the protocols to the nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties were a sufficient measure and those in favour of a universal legally binding agreement to provide negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. Several States underlined that the Conference on Disarmament remained the most appropriate forum for negotiating a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and called for the creation of a Conference on Disarmament subsidiary body for that purpose.

Issues directly linked to the main subject of such negotiations were also raised, in particular possible means of verification and potential sanctions for non-compliance with a future treaty, the role of the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court; the relationship between a treaty on negative security assurances and nuclear-weapon-free zones; the change in the security doctrines of NWS and the role of nuclear weapons in case such a treaty is concluded.

Many delegations stated that the total elimination of nuclear weapons remained the only international arrangement that could provide absolute and effective assurances for the non-nuclear-weapons States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States.

**Outer space**

In accordance with decision CD/1978 to convene a series of informal open-ended meetings to hold structured and substantive discussions on all the agenda items of the Conference on Disarmament, five informal meetings were held on agenda item 3, entitled “Prevention of an arms race in outer space”, from 11 to 13 June under the overall coordination of Matthew Rowland (United Kingdom). Delegations also addressed this topic in statements during other plenary meetings throughout the 2014 session.

The deliberations on this item reflected considerable interest and delegations engaged in a substantive discussion on many aspects of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, including on elements of a potential
legally or politically binding instrument. The debate focused on three areas, as follows:

(a) Examination and identification of issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space;

(b) Examination of the existing agreements relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space; and

(c) Consideration of existing proposals and future initiatives on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

In general, States reiterated that outer space and celestial bodies were the common heritage of humankind and should be used in a spirit of cooperation for peaceful purposes only on a mutually agreed basis. Many emphasized that space should not become an area of conflict and that its weaponization exacerbated global stability and should be prohibited.

A number of States also commented on the increasing congestion of outer space and the ensuing risk of collisions between space assets and resulting debris, on issues related to the weaponization or the militarization of outer space, its physical nature and delimitation, critical orbital regions and others.

Delegates also reviewed existing agreements preventing the arms race in outer space and existing proposals for a way forward on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Considering eventual prohibition of specific activities in outer space and space weapons, some definitional elements of the latter were addressed. In this regard, delegations outlined the difficulties of defining what actually constitutes a space weapon for a range of reasons, including the dual-use nature of most space objects.

Building further on their joint initiative launched in 2002, China and the Russian Federation presented on 10 June an amended and updated version of their 2008 draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and of the threat or use of force against outer space objects. In his introductory remarks, the Russian representative specified that the updated draft treaty took into account comments and proposals received from all interested States since the presentation of the previous draft in 2008, the results of the Group of Governmental Experts on transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBM) in outer space activities, and the evolving situation in outer space. While the draft was welcomed by several States as a useful basis for further discussions and negotiations on this issue, some, in particular the United States, pointed out its lack of a verification regime and its limited scope, as well as its failure to address the territorially based anti-satellite weapon systems as fundamental flaws of the draft. Other

100 CD/1839.
States favoured the development of TCBMs in outer space activities, as formulated in the International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities of the European Union (EU) and proposed by the Group of Governmental Experts on TCBMs, which concluded its work in 2013.

During the debate, the representative of the EU again drew the attention of the Conference on Disarmament to the International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities prepared by the EU as a confidence-building measure applicable to all outer space activities, both civil and military, conducted either by States or by non-governmental entities. The EU representative also said that the draft Code did not address the weaponization of outer space but centred on the measures that would prevent space from becoming an area of conflict and peaceful solution of any outer space conflict. Against this background, some States, particularly the Russian Federation, questioned some elements of the draft and the appropriateness of discussing a political instrument, most of which is not related to disarmament in the context of the Conference on Disarmament.¹⁰¹

While recognizing the shortcomings of the current legal regime on outer space, States expressed persisting divergent views on how to address the issue, in particular the main approach to be undertaken—whether the Conference on Disarmament should commence negotiations on a legally binding treaty banning the placement of weapons in outer space or whether voluntary measures would suffice to encourage responsible actions in and the peaceful use of outer space.

Several delegations, in pointing out the special responsibility of States with major space capabilities for the peaceful use and the prevention of an arms race in outer space, emphasized the inadequacy of the existing legal standards to prevent the militarization of outer space or its weaponization. They stressed the need to reinforce the existing regime and negotiate on matters related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

During the discussion, the issue of not being the first to deploy weapons in outer space was also addressed. Two joint statements¹⁰² issued by the Russian Federation and Argentina and by the Russian Federation and Cuba, respectively declaring that they would not be the first to place weapons of any kind in outer space, were circulated as official documents of the session.

**Agenda items 5 to 7**

As in previous years, agenda items 5, 6, and 7 (respectively on “New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons”, “Comprehensive programme of disarmament” and

¹⁰¹ See CD/1996.
“Transparency in armaments”) were discussed throughout the 2014 session, and delegations referred to these items invariably.

On 26 March, the Conference adopted decision CD/1978 establishing a schedule of activities envisaging discussions on all substantive items on its agenda. Meetings on agenda items 5 to 7 were coordinated by Mikhail Khvostov (Belarus), and took place on 25 and 26 June.

The Coordinator, in accordance with decision CD/1978 produced and submitted to the President, in his personal capacity, a report\(^ {103}\) reflecting the discussions on these three agenda items. To facilitate the preparation of the delegations for these informal meetings, the Coordinator circulated a letter reminding delegations of the compilations prepared by the Conference on Disarmament secretariat, containing basic documents\(^ {104}\) submitted for consideration of the Conference on Disarmament from 1979 to 2006 and related to agenda items 5 to 7. The letter also reminded delegations of the publication of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research entitled *The Conference on Disarmament: Issues and Insights*,\(^ {105}\) published in 2012.

At the invitation of the Coordinator, Sergey Batsanov, Director of the Geneva Office of Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs and member of the Pugwash Council, made a presentation to the informal meeting devoted to agenda item 5.

During the discussions, some delegations referred to the issue of the adequacy of existing international law and international humanitarian law in prohibiting any possible development of any new types of weapons of mass destruction. Some delegations stressed that the developments of all new systems of weapons should comply with existing international law and international humanitarian law. Others reflected on the importance of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques,\(^ {106}\) as well as specific provisions of the Additional Protocol I of 1977\(^ {107}\) to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and reiterated the need to support the idea of negotiating an international treaty on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons.

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\(^{103}\) CD/1995, annex V.

\(^{104}\) CD/INF.52, CD/INF.54 and CD/INF.55.


of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons as a preventive measure in the field of non-proliferation.

A working paper on “the weaponisation of radioactive sources”, prepared by Luis Gallegos Chiriboga (Ecuador) and Peter Richard Woolcott (Australia), respectively Co-Chair and Vice Co-Chair of the Informal Working Group on a programme of work of the Conference, was submitted for discussion to the informal meeting. The working paper explored, inter alia, the arguments in favour and against negotiating a legally binding convention within the Conference on Disarmament on the weaponization of radioactive sources.

Following deliberations on the working paper, many delegations expressed the view that the next steps to explore a possible negotiation of a convention dealing with radioactive sources should take into account existing processes such as the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

A number of delegations indicated that radiological weapons were neither manufactured nor used as a method of warfare by States but recognized the potential threat of use of radiological weapons by non-governmental armed groups or terrorists.

On agenda item 6, Daniel Plesch (Director of the Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London) presented his initiative, the Strategic Concept for Removal of Arms and Proliferation, which consisted of the proposal to adopt an international legally binding agreement for complete and general disarmament covering WMD and conventional weaponry in one text.

On agenda item 7, the Conference considered, inter alia, the confidence-building potential of transparency in armaments; the supporting role of transparency in armaments in disarmament and arms control negotiations; the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and possible ways to modify its scope; and unilateral transparency measures concerning nuclear arsenals.

All delegations recognized the merit of appropriate measures on transparency in armaments for global strategic stability, predictability and trust among the States. The importance of the implementation of these measures at the national level was also stressed. At the same time, a number of delegations favoured transparency measures agreed on the basis of a broad consensus. Some delegations also indicated that transparency measures should not infringe upon the rights of States to self-defence in accordance with the United Nations Charter. States referred to the important role of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms; the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects; the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons; and unilateral transparency measures concerning nuclear arsenals.

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Some delegations underlined the importance of a strong reporting mechanism within the framework of the Arms Trade Treaty, and others called for the enlargement of the scope of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

A number of delegations also called on the Conference on Disarmament to comprehensively address the issue of lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), with a view to pre-emptively banning their further development and use and place an immediate moratorium on their production and use. They also stated that the use of armed drones against civilian populations constitutes a violation of international law, the United Nations Charter, international humanitarian law and international human rights and called on the Conference to look into their use. Others argued in favour of continuing discussions on the issue of LAWS within the framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.

Revitalization of the Conference on Disarmament

In 2014, the long stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament was again a source of serious concern, leading to calls for revitalizing its work. Throughout the session, a large number of member States raised the issue in their plenary statements. The six presidents of the session consulted on this recurring topic intensively and, under the Kenyan presidency in July, a draft proposal was presented for the establishment of a subsidiary body to examine the issue. The draft proposal, fully supported by the six presidents of the session, failed to attract a consensus and was not further discussed.

On 20 May, the Acting Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Michael Møller, suggested options that could be explored by the Conference: to consider negotiations on areas of common ground with a view eventually to produce framework conventions to which substantive protocols may be subsequently negotiated and added; to explore issues for which voluntary, politically binding regimes may be negotiated; to consider the establishment of a subsidiary body to examine and make proposals on the improvement of the working methods of the Conference; and to hold an informal conference on disarmament-civil society forum, hosted by the Acting Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament (CD/PV.1316).\textsuperscript{109} At the 1319th plenary meeting on 10 June, the Acting Secretary-General further elaborated on his suggestions, which elicited a number of divergent views. Although no agreement was reached in carrying them forward, he pursued plans for the organization of the civil society forum in his personal capacity as Acting Secretary-General of the Conference.

\textsuperscript{109} See CD/PV.1316.
The question of the expansion of the membership of the Conference was addressed by delegations in plenary meetings. No agreement was reached on this issue.

**Group of Governmental Experts to make recommendations on possible aspects that could contribute to, but not negotiate, a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices**

The General Assembly of the United Nations, pursuant to its resolution 67/53, requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of United Nations Member States on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, including possible aspects thereof, and to submit a report on the subject to the General Assembly at its sixty-eighth session. Replies were received from the European Union and 37 Governments, which were included in the Secretary-General’s report on the subject, submitted on 16 July 2013 to the General Assembly.

By the same resolution, the General Assembly established the Group of Governmental Experts to make recommendations on possible aspects that could contribute to, but not negotiate, a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices on the basis of document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein. The Group held its first of four sessions in Geneva from 31 March to 11 April and its second from 11 to 22 August. Elisssa Goldberg (Canada) was unanimously elected as the Chair, and a draft agenda was adopted for the entire duration of the Group’s work. An indicative programme of work was adopted at each of the sessions.

During the first session, experts exchanged general views on the future treaty and examined past proposals from States and the developments in the political, legal and technological environments made over the past years. They discussed the definition of fissile material, production and production facilities, and the implications thereof, as well as verification objectives and approaches. Furthermore, the Group took into consideration the views on this issue conveyed by States to the United Nation’s Secretary-General. During the second session, the Group focused its attention on the scope of such a treaty, verification tools and techniques, legal and institutional issues, as well as the interrelationships among the topics under review.

The work of the Group was conducted without prejudice to national positions in the future negotiations. In addition, as the General Assembly

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110 Algeria, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Congo, Cuba, Ecuador, France, Finland, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Italy, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Serbia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States and Uruguay.

111 A/68/154 and Add.1.
stated in resolution 67/53, “should the Conference on Disarmament agree upon and implement a balanced and comprehensive programme of work that included negotiations of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, the group of governmental experts shall conclude and its work shall be submitted to the Secretary-General for onward transmission to the Conference on Disarmament”.

The third session of the Group will take place from 12 to 23 January 2015, and the fourth and last session from 23 March to 2 April 2015.

Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters

The Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters held its sixty-first session in New York from 5 to 7 March and its sixty-second session in Geneva from 2 to 4 July. During those sessions, it focused its deliberations on the following substantive items on its agenda: (a) disarmament and security implications of emerging technologies; and (b) verification, with a special focus on new verification technologies. (For a list of members of the Board, see annex I to this chapter.)

In July, the Secretary-General submitted a report\textsuperscript{112} to the General Assembly summarizing the Advisory Board’s deliberations and recommendations.

The Board had an exchange of views on the first agenda item at its two sessions in 2014. With respect to unmanned aerial vehicles, commonly known as drones, the Board recommended that the Secretary-General commission a study to examine the distinction between armed/military drones and unarmed/peaceful/civilian drones. In addition, it suggested exploring such ideas as improving transparency in targeted unmanned aerial vehicle strikes as a confidence-building measure and developing robust oversight and accountability mechanisms for targeted strikes outside active battlefields. The proposed study should also consider international humanitarian law and how relevant principles such as distinction, proportionality and military necessity should be applied with a view to avoiding excessively injurious or indiscriminate effects.

The Board recommended that the Secretary-General consider including in the above-mentioned study a broader range of emerging technologies that might have an impact on international security and the arms control process, including in the field of outer space. It was also recommended that the Secretary-General encourage international and regional organizations to engage in and discuss more actively the issue of emerging technologies. Furthermore, it was recommended that the Secretary-General encourage Member States to take into account their responsibility and obligation to the wider international community when using emerging technologies, given the

\textsuperscript{112} A/69/208.
absence of international regulation in that field. In this connection, it was recommended that the Secretary-General encourage States to develop and implement inter-State transparency and confidence-building measures with regard to emerging technologies.

The Board engaged in a very active discussion on the second agenda item at both of its sessions in 2014, as well as during the intersessional period. It recommended that the Secretary-General use his authority to promote the importance of developing new verification technologies for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In this connection, the Board also recommended that he encourage States to share verification technologies with respect to the disarmament of weapons of mass destruction, as long as appropriate mechanisms were put in place. In addition, it was recommended that the Secretary-General encourage all Member States, in appropriate circumstances and with the necessary safeguards in place, to voluntarily share with multilateral organizations information derived from national technical means to enhance verification. These multilateral organizations should, however, ensure the protection of the confidentiality of such information when requested and ensure that the information was corroborated, where possible, using other sources of information. In this regard, information derived from national technical means would remain only supplementary to information from multilateral sources.

The Advisory Board recommended that the Secretary-General make further efforts to foster more active and constructive interaction and cooperation among existing organizations based on extensive verification regimes (especially those of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization) through information and experience-sharing to maximize synergy in the conduct of verification activities. The Board also recommended that the Secretary-General consider convening a meeting of the relevant organizations to discuss cooperation. Recognizing the urgent need for capacity-building to ensure that verification procedures were fully implemented, it recommended that the Secretary-General encourage Member States with the requisite means to assist other States, in particular developing countries, with capacity-building in the areas of monitoring and verification. It noted that the Panel of Government Experts on Verification in All Its Aspects, including the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Verification, had last been convened in 2006. Given a decade of rapid technological developments in the field of verification, notably in remote sensing, communications and information technology, the Board believed that it was an opportune time to establish a new panel. It therefore recommended that the Secretary-General convene a new panel of experts on verification, with a focus on the role of new verification technologies.
Annex I

Members of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters

István Gyarmati (Chair), Ambassador, Professor, President, Centre for Democracy Public Foundation, and Head of the International Centre for Democratic Transition, Budapest

Wael al-Assad, Ambassador, Representative of the Secretary-General for Disarmament and Regional Security and Director of Multilateral Relations, League of Arab States, Cairo

Mely Caballero Anthony, Associate Professor and Head of the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

Choi Sung-joo, Ambassador for International Security Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Seoul

Rut Diamint, Professor of International Relations, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos Aires

Trevor Findlay, Professor, William and Jeanie Barton Chair in International Affairs, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Ottawa

Anita Friedt, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear and Strategic Policy, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, Department of State, Washington, D.C.

Vicente Garrido Rebolledo, Professor, King Juan Carlos University, and Director, International Affairs and Foreign Policy Institute (INCIPE), Madrid

Camille Grand, Director, Foundation for Strategic Research, and Chair, European Union Non-Proliferation Consortium, Paris

Pervez Hoodbhoy, Professor, School of Science and Engineering, Lahore University of Management Sciences, and Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad

Eboe Hutchful, Professor, Africana Studies, Wayne State University, Detroit


Fred Tanner, Ambassador, Senior Adviser to the Secretary-General of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and Liaison, Swiss chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 2014, Vienna

Wu Haitao, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary for Disarmament Affairs and Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations
Nations Office at Geneva and other International Organizations in Switzerland, Geneva

Vladimir I. Yermakov, Deputy Director, Department for Security Affairs and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Moscow

Theresa Hitchens (ex officio member), Director, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva
Chapter VII
Information and outreach
United Nations Messenger of Peace Michael Douglas poses for a group photo with young participants at a special event held at United Nations Headquarters to launch a book entitled *Action for Disarmament: 10 Things You Can Do!* The event was co-organized by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs and the Department of Public Information on 15 April 2014.

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Chapter VII

Information and outreach

This International Day is not merely one on which we call for limiting nuclear weapons, reducing their range, constraining their deployments or reducing their role in security policies. It is also a day when the world community reflects on the many benefits that nuclear disarmament would offer, from enhanced security to the conservation of financial and scientific resources. It is a day on which to imagine the consequences should the dangerous and fragile doctrine of nuclear deterrence fail.

Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary-General

Development and trends, 2014

The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) continued to build upon its information and outreach activities, in particular by communicating and interacting with a global audience through the expansion of the Office’s website. The Office also partnered with permanent missions to the United Nations, the Department of Public Information and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in events, activities and publications to enhance outreach efforts. Multiple media outlets were used to promote the disarmament agenda of the United Nations.

UNODA published print and electronic versions of the two-part United Nations Disarmament Yearbook for 2013, which is available from its website (www.un.org/disarmament). The disarmament website featured new content and was increasingly used by Member States, conference participants, NGOs and the general public to access daily updates of documents and statements, including video messages.

The web analytics of UNODA online media (website and Twitter account) continued to show increased traffic and time spent by visitors. Additionally, dedicated websites were designed for major disarmament-related conferences, including the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation

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of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)\(^2\) and the seventh Ministerial Meeting in support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).\(^3\)

The Office facilitated the participation of civil society organizations in disarmament-related meetings and conferences, collaborating closely with NGO partnerships at the forefront of such participation.

The main vehicle for information and outreach was the Disarmament Information Programme,\(^4\) which was administered by UNODA in close collaboration with the Department of Public Information. The Programme had objectives that reflected the overall orientation of UNODA, was guided by the priorities of Member States articulated in General Assembly resolutions and had a particular focus on information campaigns for major disarmament-related forums, events and conferences. It was funded from the regular budget and from extrabudgetary resources through the Voluntary Trust Fund for the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme.

UNODA continued its advocacy of disarmament and non-proliferation issues with Member States and civil society and expanded its interaction with the media, think tanks, academia and civil society organizations, all of which played a critical role in building and encouraging public opinion on disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.

In the area of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference was held in New York from 28 April to 9 May, and the seventh CTBT Ministerial Meeting was convened in New York on 26 September. Building on the momentum from the constructive engagement at the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament, a meeting of the General Assembly to commemorate the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons was held on 26 September. These events generated an increased interest for information from the diplomatic community, other international and civil society organizations, the media and the public.

Additionally, over the course of 2014, considerable work was undertaken to provide information to delegations, the media and the public in connection with the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT),\(^5\) particularly during the period leading up to the Treaty’s entry into force on 24 December.

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\(^4\) See A/69/134.

In the field of conventional weapons, the entry into force of the ATT on 24 December necessitated the mobilization of resources to meet the increased demand for information from various sectors.

In relevant resolutions adopted at its sixty-ninth session, the General Assembly reaffirmed the importance of the Office’s three regional centres for peace and disarmament in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and Latin America and the Caribbean in carrying out dissemination and educational programmes. Three separate reports\(^6\) to the General Assembly on the regional centres provided detailed information on the activities of each centre.

The United Nations Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament continued to be the Office’s largest annual training programme. The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research also organized a number of information and education activities.\(^7\)

**Disarmament and non-proliferation education**

In paragraph 2 of resolution 67/47 of 3 December 2012, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to review the results of the implementation of the recommendations contained in the United Nations study\(^8\) on disarmament and non-proliferation education and possible new opportunities for promoting disarmament and non-proliferation education, and to submit a report to the General Assembly at its sixty-ninth session.

Pursuant to that request, the Secretary-General submitted his report\(^9\) containing information, on the implementation of the recommendations of the United Nations study, provided by 10 Member States,\(^10\) the United Nations, international organizations, 22 civil society and NGOs.

In the report, the Secretary-General concluded that Governments, international organizations and civil society groups had continued to increase their use of digital content and new technologies, such as social media tools, to disseminate information and reach a wider audience. He also observed that these new technologies provided a platform for the Member States, the United Nations, international and regional organizations, and civil society organizations to reach out to youth to promote their understanding of disarmament and non-proliferation issues. He stressed that young people around the world had a critical role to play in raising awareness and developing new strategies to reduce the threats from weapons of mass destruction and from small arms and light weapons. He concluded that it was important,

\(^6\) A/69/136, A/69/127 and A/69/133.
\(^7\) See A/69/176.
\(^8\) A/57/124.
\(^9\) A/69/113 and Add.1.
\(^10\) Argentina, Austria, Cuba, El Salvador, Germany, Iraq, Japan, Mexico, Panama and Portugal.
therefore, to reach out, inform and empower young people to become agents of peace by helping them mobilize, act and promote disarmament ideals throughout their schools, their communities and beyond.

**Disarmament education website—a resource for learning**

A number of new content elements were added to the disarmament education website\(^1\) in 2014. In order to draw the attention of young people around the world to the promotion of international peace and security through disarmament, UNODA launched a publication entitled *Action for Disarmament: 10 Things You Can Do!*\(^2\) It offers 10 practical steps to help young people mobilize, act and promote the disarmament ideals of the United Nations throughout their schools and communities. This publication’s web page has been linked to the disarmament education website.

In order to promote information-sharing, several new organizations working on disarmament issues were added to the education website. The documentary film entitled *Weapons of Mass Destruction: Threats and Global Responses*, produced by UNODA in cooperation with United Nations Television and Video on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the adoption of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) (preventing access to weapons of mass destruction and related materials by non-State actors), was also added to the website.

**Training activities**

UNODA offered opportunities for young professionals to acquire experience under the United Nations Associate Expert Programme. In New York and Geneva, UNODA mentored more than 30 graduate students through the United Nations 2014 internship programme.

UNODA, in collaboration with Hibakusha Stories, a New York–based NGO that brings atomic bomb survivors to New York City high schools to tell their stories, organized biannual briefings by hibakusha (atomic bomb survivors) for United Nations tour guides, staff and permanent mission interns.

The Office, through the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, focused on disarmament and non-proliferation education for women. It hosted an event on career opportunities for women in the fields of peace and disarmament, as well as a training sessions for young women in celebration of the International Day of Peace, briefing participants on Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) with a view to promoting women’s participation in the global disarmament and peace process. The


Regional Centre further organized training workshops for professionals, including several workshops for journalists as key partners in the disarmament education process, where they were briefed on a number of topics related to disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation issues in Africa.

**Disarmament Information Programme**

**Print and e-publications**

The *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook* remains the flagship publication of UNODA. Its 2013 edition was distributed to all permanent missions and was also produced in electronic format, which is accessible from the Office’s website.

One UNODA Occasional Paper was published in 2014: *The New Zealand Lectures on Disarmament* (No. 26, June). In December, UNODA released a publication under the Civil Society and Disarmament series entitled *The Importance of Civil Society in United Nations and Intergovernmental Processes: Views from Four Delegates to the United Nations*. The publication contains the views of diplomats who have been actively involved in the disarmament discourse in New York, particularly in the process leading up to the adoption of the ATT.

In June, the 2013-2014 edition of the publication entitled *Programmes Financed from Voluntary Contributions*, first released in June 2013, was published and widely disseminated in July. The report demonstrated how UNODA was able to achieve concrete results through partnerships with donors and how essential such support is in attaining important disarmament goals.

UNODA also released three other print publications in 2014. The first, entitled *Guidelines—How to Establish and Maintain Gun-free Zones*, provided clear and comprehensive guidance to assist national governments, local authorities, and international development and peacebuilding organizations in their efforts to prevent and reduce armed violence anywhere in the world. The publication *Action for Disarmament: 10 Things You Can Do!* drew the attention of young people around the world to the promotion of international peace and security through disarmament and emphasizes the critical role youth can play in that process. The third publication, *Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons*, was a reproduction of the text of the Convention.

In cooperation with the Government of the Netherlands, UNODA published an online version of *Disarmament and Related Treaties*, a

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compilation of the texts of multilateral treaties that focus on nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons, and nuclear-weapon-free zones.

The Office continued to produce what was previously a quarterly e-publication (UNODA Update) that highlights recent events and activities of UNODA and other disarmament forums, providing links to more comprehensive material and documents available online, including the UNODA website. The individual articles in the Update were published on the website when they became available, closer to real-time, and also collated in a quarterly mode.

A feature on the website of UNODA is a series of short two-page fact sheets on various topics for which the Office is responsible. In 2014, 36 of these concise fact sheets were updated on a quarterly basis.

See also annex I to this chapter for a list of 2014 UNODA publications.

Websites

UNODA continued to maintain and improve the substantive content and technical delivery of its website in order to reach a broader audience that includes both the general public and specialists in the fields of disarmament and non-proliferation.

The number of visitors to the UNODA website continued to grow as evidenced by data analytics on traffic and time spent by visitors. The time spent by visitors to the site increased significantly in 2014. There was also an increase of more than 58 per cent in the number of first time visitors to the UNODA website.

The number of visits to the site remained constant, averaging 55,000 per month, while the number of page views increased from 90,000 per month in 2013 to 100,000 in 2014. The greatest website traffic occurred at the conclusion of the debate of the First Committee of the General Assembly when traffic reached 12,000 page views in a single day.

Exhibitions

Exhibitions played an important role in advocacy and in providing disarmament-related information at various conferences and other related events. However, work involving the renovation of United Nations Headquarters (the Capital Master Plan) meant that the permanent disarmament exhibit at Headquarters had to be temporarily dismantled. A limited number of artefacts and posters were retained and moved to a new location in the Conference Building for 2014, and a large display on military expenditure was housed in the temporary visitor centre and still attracted substantial attention. Discussions between the Department of Public Information and UNODA
on the installation of a new disarmament exhibit in the renovated General Assembly building continued throughout 2014.

In a joint effort with its NGO partner the Harmony for Peace Foundation, UNODA launched an ad hoc exhibit of the 12 original winning artworks from the “Art for Peace” contest at United Nations Headquarters to mark the first observance of the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which was observed on 26 September. The exhibit was part of a series of events to commemorate the International Day, an initiative of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement. The Day provided an opportunity for the international community to reaffirm its commitment to global nuclear disarmament. The objective of the exhibit was to educate the public about the benefits of eliminating nuclear weapons, and to highlight the social and economic costs of retaining them. The same exhibit was subsequently moved to Vienna and displayed in conjunction with the third Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, held there on 8 and 9 December. The exhibit was then moved to the United Nations Office at Vienna.

To mark the fiftieth ratification of the ATT, UNODA facilitated a photo exhibition by Control Arms entitled “50 Celebrating 50” in an installation at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. The exhibit highlighted 50 people, including senior Government officials, campaigners, public figures and armed violence survivors, who had played an important role in the achievement of the ATT. The exhibit displayed photos accompanied with personalized quotes depicting unique recollections from the ATT negotiations, celebratory messages and calls to action for strong implementation. The list of featured personalities included Liberian President, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf; Grammy Award–winning recording artist Angélique Kidjo; and the United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Angela Kane.

Events

In 2014, there was significant media and civil society interest in a number of events requiring information and outreach support in New York.14 These included, inter alia, the International Day against Nuclear Tests (29 August, observed at the United Nations headquarters on 5 September) and the first observance of the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (26 September).

As part of its outreach efforts, UNODA continued to organize and host a range of meetings, seminars and events. Some examples follow:

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On 7 February, the High Representative met with Yasuyoshi Komizo, Secretary-General of the Mayors for Peace. The Mayors for Peace network is rapidly approaching 6,000 cities in 158 countries. Its goal includes the promotion of the abolition of nuclear weapons by 2020, including a nuclear weapons convention. To this effect, Mayors for Peace was looking forward to a number of events to draw attention to its cause. This included enhanced interaction with the United Nations through participation at the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

On 20 February, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs met with NGOs working in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. This was her third meeting with NGOs since taking office as High Representative. The aim of this meeting was to improve coordination and collaboration between NGOs and UNODA. It was also an occasion to assess the advances that had been made and that remained to be made in the field of disarmament. Thirteen NGOs were represented that day, and participants sketched out their main campaigns for the coming year.

On 18 March, UNODA staff met with youth representatives of Soka Gakkai Japan and of Soka Gakkai International (SGI)–United States, NGOs working in the field of nuclear disarmament. Ten youth representatives from Japan and seven from the United States visited UNODA for the first time to engage in a dialogue on nuclear disarmament. SGI, a lay Buddhist organization with 12 million members in 192 countries and territories, has been in consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council since 1983. As an NGO working with the United Nations, SGI has been active in public education with a focus mainly on peace and disarmament, human rights and sustainable development.

On 14 April, which is the Global Day of Action on Military Spending, an event entitled “World Military Spending: Trends and Implications” took place at United Nations Headquarters in New York. This event was co-organized by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and UNODA, with the sponsorship of the Permanent Mission of Japan. Virginia Gamba, the Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, welcomed the participants and opened the event, noting that “this initiative was started in the year 2011 and has since been marked every year around the world to raise awareness of the issue of military spending”.

For a list of events held at the margins of the 2014 meetings of the First Committee and the United Nations Disarmament Commission, see annex III to this chapter.

**Briefings**

During 2014, staff members of UNODA undertook briefing engagements, which focused on education and training activities involving a range of target audiences. The participants included: (a) student visitors within the framework
of university programmes on the United Nations; (b) United Nations Association members from various countries; (c) foreign ministry trainees; (d) students preparing for the model United Nations exercises; (e) high school teachers for continuing education; and (f) visiting NGO members. Staff members also participated in numerous panels and events on arms control, disarmament and security issues organized by research- or university-related institutes or think tanks.

**Media**

Throughout 2014, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs and the staff of UNODA participated in interviews with television, radio and print outlets. Media interest in disarmament was particularly focused on the aftermath of the Secretary-General’s investigation into the alleged use of chemical weapon in the Syrian Arab Republic; the entry into force of the ATT (December 2014); and the preparations for the 2015 NPT Review Conference. In addition, the series of conferences on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons became an increasing are of interest for the media. Many of the interviews of the High Representative are available in the “Spotlight” section of the UNODA website.

On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the adoption of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), aimed at preventing the flow of weapons of mass destruction and related materials to non-State actors, UNODA, in cooperation with United Nations Television and Video (UNTV), produced a documentary film *Weapons of Mass Destruction: Threats and Global Responses* to be disseminated globally on the UNTV series *21st Century* to over 90 broadcast partners worldwide.15

**Education**

On 4 November, Hibakusha Stories, in collaboration with UNODA and Peace Boat, organized a workshop at the United Nations Headquarters on nuclear disarmament for teachers from New York City public high schools. Sixty educators specializing in social studies, global studies, government and history at 19 schools participated as part of their continuing education activities on Staff Development Day. The workshop included a substantive session that explored the subjects of nuclear disarmament and the role of the United Nations, the dawn of the nuclear age and the Manhattan Project, and the human dimensions of the Second World War and the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

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Secretary-General’s Messenger of Peace on disarmament

The Secretary-General’s Messenger of Peace on disarmament, Michael Douglas, has continued to support the work of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation.

In April, he participated and spoke at the book launch of Action for Disarmament: 10 Things You Can Do!, a book encouraging youth to become involved in disarmament. He joined the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs to encourage students to find their voice with help from the book. While at Headquarters for the book-launch event, he taped two short sequences to help promote the sale of the book and two messages in support of the ATT entry into force and of the third Review Conference of the States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention in June 2014.16

On 14 January, he was given the Danny Kaye Humanitarian Award from the United States Fund for the United Nations Children’s Fund. The Award is given annually to an entertainment industry individual in recognition of his or her visionary and transformative advocacy on behalf of children and women worldwide.

Disarmament fellowships, training and advisory services

Through the United Nations Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament,17 UNODA has trained over 900 officials from 164 Member States. A large number of them hold important positions of responsibility in the disarmament field within their Governments. The Programme has enabled former Fellows to participate more effectively in regional and global disarmament efforts and, by creating an informal network spanning the various regions of the world, to work cooperatively and constructively in pursuit of disarmament and non-proliferation goals.

In 2014, young diplomats and other officials from the following 25 Member States participated in the Programme: Algeria, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, China, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Guyana, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Madagascar, Montenegro, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Togo, Turkmenistan, United States, Viet Nam and Zambia.

The Programme’s initial segment started in Geneva on 25 August and was aimed particularly at exposing the Fellows to issues on the agenda of

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17 The Programme was established by the General Assembly at its tenth special session, as contained in paragraph 108 of its Final Document (resolution S-10/2 of 30 June 1978).
Information and outreach

the Conference on Disarmament and the work of various treaty regimes, in particular the Biological Weapons Convention, the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It also included a one-day study visit to Bern, organized by the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland.

During the second segment of the programme, the Fellows participated in study visits to several international organizations, structures or arrangements related to disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation. These included, inter alia, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the secretariat of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Wassenaar Arrangement and the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs in Vienna, as well as the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in The Hague. At the invitation of the Governments of China, Germany and Japan, the Fellows also participated in country-specific study visits to those countries.

The third segment of the Programme took place at the United Nations Headquarters in New York in October, where the Fellows followed the work of the First Committee of the General Assembly and also developments related to key disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control–related issues.

After completing the nine-week Programme at Headquarters on 25 October, the 2014 Fellows were awarded certificates of participation by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs.

The 2014 Fellowship Programme comprised a variety of theory-based activities and practical exercises, including lectures by senior diplomats, academia, NGOs and the representatives of international organizations. Participants took part in round-table debates and panel discussions with senior-level officials, including at the ambassadorial level, on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues. The activities also included simulation negotiation exercises on the work of the CTBTO Executive Committee, on the NPT Review Conference and on United Nations General Assembly resolutions. Field visits to a weapons destruction facility, a nuclear reactor, disarmament research laboratories and a chemical weapons on-site inspection simulation were organized.

20 The treaty text and adherence status are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/cluster_munitions (accessed 3 August 2015).
In developing greater expertise in disarmament and non-proliferation issues and a better understanding of the concerns of the international community in the field of disarmament and international security, the United Nations Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament continues to make a concrete contribution to the process of promoting deliberations and negotiations on disarmament and to preparing a younger generation of diplomats and officials to tackle the complex challenges in an evolving international security environment.

Vienna Office of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs

The Vienna Office continued to promote the disarmament agenda and to foster its collaborative working relationship with the relevant Vienna-based organizations. The Office focused its activities on three major areas: (a) to energize dialogue; (b) to build capacity; and (c) to transfer knowledge, lessons learned and best practices on disarmament and non-proliferation issues to regional organizations. Moreover, specific areas of assistance to Member States were also identified, allowing for the development of assistance proposals which, with the support of a wide range of cross-cutting partnerships, have set the stage for the implementation of the 2015 road map of the UNODA Vienna Office in collaboration with individual Member States, regional groups of Member States, civil society organizations and academia.

The Office undertook a vigorous joint fundraising campaign in coordination with the OSCE and the United Nations–mandated University for Peace, securing the necessary funds to implement assistance to Member States beginning in January 2015. Its first disarmament and non-proliferation training course was designed, with scholarships to be granted for the training of 140 women from four continents in the global South during the 2015-2017 period. Funds were also secured to launch “The Vienna Round Table”, a new series of dialogues to be organized in cooperation with several partners to bring together the Vienna disarmament and non-proliferation community to collectively address issues that fundamentally hinder the capacity, effectiveness and readiness of organizations to fulfil their mandates.

As part of its outreach and advocacy efforts, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs addressed the joint meeting of the OSCE Forum for Security and Cooperation and its Permanent Council on 21 May; made opening remarks during the forty-second session of the CTBTO Preparatory

Commission on 16 June; and delivered remarks\(^{23}\) on behalf of the United Nations Secretary-General during the opening of the fifty-eighth annual IAEA General Conference on 22 September. Furthermore, the Office participated as an observer at the regular meetings of the IAEA Board of Governors, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the OSCE, increasing its opportunities to promote disarmament and non-proliferation activities in Vienna.

The UNODA Office in Vienna also continued its substantive support to Permanent Missions to the United Nations in Austria. Consultations were carried out with the Group of Latin American and the Caribbean States (GRULAC) and the League of Arab States at their meetings in July and November, respectively, initiating a new series of cooperation, facilitating exchange of information and identifying possible areas of assistance. The High Representative for Disarmament Affairs made presentations to the Group of European Ambassadors and the Women’s Ambassadors’ Group, further widening outreach efforts while engaging the participation of the diplomatic community in the work of the Office in Vienna.

Additionally, presentations were made on 26 September on the International Day for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, contributing to the commemoration of this important occasion. The event was hosted by the GRULAC countries that had established the first Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in a densely populated area.

The Vienna Office also participated in the CTBTO Academic Forum on 8 and 9 May, further highlighting the central role it played in support of disarmament and non-proliferation activities in Vienna. As a consequence, a series of consultations were undertaken with Member States and a new assistance proposal was developed by UNODA and its partners to train national representatives on a wide range of disarmament and non-proliferation issues.

On 15 January, the Vienna Office participated at the Academic Council of the United Nations System annual meeting, which focused on the evolution of United Nations policies facing changing realities. Cooperation with the Academic Council and the Universal Peace Federation was carried out from 6 to 8 August through the organization of the Genbaku No Hi event, remembering the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 8 and 9 August 1945. On 23 and 24 October, the Vienna Office participated in the Shadow Programme (sponsored by the United Nations Information Service), whereby two young professionals were given the opportunity to see first-hand the day-to-day work of an international organization and gain some knowledge of the disarmament and non-proliferation agenda.

International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

First proposed in October 2013, resolution 68/32 of 5 December 2013 was meant as a follow-up to the high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament, held on 26 September 2013. In the resolution, the Assembly, inter alia, called for the “urgent commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer and use or threat of use, and to provide for their destruction”. The resolution also “declared 26 September as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons”. The resolution was approved by a vote of 137 to 28, with 20 abstentions. An initiative of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Day provides an occasion for the world community to reaffirm its commitment to global nuclear disarmament as a high priority.

On 26 September, the President of the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly, Sam Kutesa (Uganda), convened an informal meeting of the Assembly to mark the first observance of the International Day.24 In his statement25 delivered at the meeting, the President emphasized that the sobering prospect of the catastrophic consequences of the use of nuclear weapons anywhere on our planet was a reminder of the need to work urgently and with determination to prohibit and eliminate such weapons once and for all. He added that “Today is significant because it reassures us that the United Nations and world leaders, in particular, should remain engaged on this important issue.”

In his address to the meeting,26 delivered by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, the United Nations Secretary-General noted that the world had long recognized that nuclear disarmament offers the only absolute guarantee against the use of nuclear weapons, and that any such use would have catastrophic humanitarian consequences. “Nuclear disarmament is therefore not an idealistic dream, but an urgent necessity to meet the genuine security interests of all humanity”, he added.

In a joint effort with its NGO partner, the Harmony for Peace Foundation, UNODA launched an exhibit of the 12 original winning artworks from the

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24 For more information, see http://www.un.org/en/events/nuclearweaponelimination/ (accessed 3 August 2015).
2012 “Art for Peace” contest at the United Nations Headquarters to mark the first observance of the International Day.\(^\text{27}\)

The international NGO Unfold Zero and the Geneva Branch of UNODA organized an event on 25 September to mark the Day. Co-sponsored by the Permanent Missions of Indonesia, Kazakhstan, New Zealand and a number of NGOs, the event featured the screening of *The Man Who Saved the World*, a documentary (later released at the Woodstock Film Festival in October) about an incident on 26 September 1983 in which a nuclear weapons exchange was narrowly avoided.

**International Day against Nuclear Tests**

On 10 September, the President of the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly, John Ashe (Antigua and Barbuda), convened an informal meeting of the Assembly to mark the International Day against Nuclear Tests (29 August) for the fifth consecutive year at United Nations Headquarters.\(^\text{28}\)

In his statement\(^\text{29}\) delivered at the meeting by the Vice-President, Charles Thembani Ntwagae, the President emphasized the importance of the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and progress on all parallel fronts. “The promotion of peace and security is among the main purposes and principles of the United Nations. As agreed in General Assembly resolution 64/35 of 2 December 2009, every effort should be made to end nuclear tests. In the future we want, the future we deserve, there is no space for nuclear weapons and the well-being and health of people and the environment come first,” he said.

In his address to the meeting,\(^\text{30}\) the United Nations Secretary-General noted that “Nuclear disarmament has always been a priority for me, and ending testing is a central component.” He said that he had personally seen the terrible effects of nuclear tests in Kazakhstan. “I spoke on the fields of Semipalatinsk, to the world, that there should be no more nuclear tests,” he added.

\(^{27}\) For more information, see http://www.un.org/disarmament/update/20140923/ (accessed 3 August 2015).

\(^{28}\) The International Day was established by the General Assembly in its resolution 64/35 of 2 December 2009, at the initiative of the Government of Kazakhstan. The preamble emphasizes that “every effort should be made to end nuclear tests in order to avert devastating and harmful effects on the lives and health of people […] and that the end of nuclear tests is one of the key means of achieving the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world”. For more information on the informal meeting, see http://www.un.org/disarmament/update/20140910/ (accessed 3 August 2015).


Yermek Kosherbayev, the First Deputy Governor of Eastern Kazakhstan (Semipalatinsk region), in addressing the event, noted that over a period of 40 years, 490 nuclear explosions devastated 1.5 million people and an immense territory, comparable in size to entire European countries. The radiation impacted and damaged all forms of life—human, plant and animal—and can be measured in decades to come. He added that an intensive programme of rehabilitation and reconstruction of the destroyed region was being implemented jointly by the Government of Kazakhstan at the national, regional and local levels, together with the United Nations system, particularly the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Children’s Fund and the United Nations Population Fund.

The General Assembly event was followed by a high-level panel on the theme “The Path to Zero: The Role of the United Nations in Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation”. The panellists, moderated by U. Joy Ogwu (Nigeria), covered a number of key issues, including the steps necessary for further progress on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, the establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones, confidence-building and other relevant issues.

Annex I

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs publications and other materials in 2014


Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa


Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean


ATT Implementation Tool Kit: Youth and Gender Risk Assessments. UNLIREC, 2014.


UNLIREC Newsletter: No. 15 (March 2014); No. 16 (July 2014); and No. 17 (December 2014). Available from http://www.unlirec.org/newsletter.

Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific

UNRCPD Newsletter: No. 4 (February 2014); and No. 5 (June 2014). Available from http://unrcpd.org/publications/newsletter/.


Annex II

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research publications in 2014


Information and outreach


Annex III

Events held on the margins of the First Committee 2014 session

16 October  Weapons, Technology and Human Control (organized by UNIDIR)


21 October  UNODA Regional/Subregional Initiatives (presentation of New Regional Project Portfolio) (organized by UNODA)
Appendix I
Status of multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements
APPENDIX I

Status of multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements

The most up-to-date information on disarmament treaties and their status of adherence is available from the UNODA website at:

http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/

The data contained in this appendix has been provided by the depositaries of the treaties or agreements, as follows (inclusion of information concerning the treaties and agreements of which the United Nations Secretary-General is not the depositary is as reported by the respective depositaries and implies no position on the part of the United Nations with respect to the data reported):

Secretary-General of the United Nations

Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
Arms Trade Treaty
Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and All Parts and Components That Can Be Used for Their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly (Kinshasa Convention)
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
Convention on Cluster Munitions
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC)
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention)

African Union

African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty)

Canada and Hungary

Treaty on Open Skies
France
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (1925 Geneva Protocol)

Kyrgyzstan
Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (CANWFZ Treaty)

Mexico
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

Netherlands
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty)

Organization of American States
Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials
Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions

Pacific Islands Forum
South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Rarotonga Treaty)

Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological ( Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BWC)
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Partial Test Ban Treaty)
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty)
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (Sea-bed Treaty)

Thailand
Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Bangkok Treaty)

United States
Antarctic Treaty
Actions reported in the period 1 January to 31 December 2014

The following list shows actions reported, if any, during the period 1 January to 31 December 2014 with regard to multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements. The agreements are listed according to the date of signature or opening for signature. The total number of parties for each treaty or agreement has been calculated based on information received from the depositaries.

A new State party in the following list includes the date of deposit, to the respective depositary, of the State’s instruments of ratification, and are further noted as follows, if applicable: (a) = accession, (A) = acceptance, (AA) = approval, (P) = consent to be bound, and (s) = succession.

In the case of multi-depositary clauses, depositary action may be completed with one or more of the several depositaries. The following notation indicates where the reported action was completed: (M) = Moscow, (L) = London and (W) = Washington.

Certain treaties that establish nuclear-weapon-free zones (Bangkok Treaty, CANWFZ Treaty, Pelindaba Treaty, Rarotonga Treaty and Treaty of Tlatelolco) have associated protocols concerning security guarantees from the nuclear-weapon States and some also have protocols for States outside the zone of application, but which have some territory within the zone. They are at different stages with regard to signature, ratification and entry into force. Full details can be found at http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/.

Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (1925 Geneva Protocol)

Signed at Geneva: 17 June 1925
Entered into force: 8 February 1928
Depositary: France
New parties: None
Total number of parties: 138

Antarctic Treaty

Signed at Washington: 1 December 1959
Entered into force: 23 June 1961
Depositary: United States
New parties: None
Total number of parties: 50


2 Accession is a one-step process for becoming bound by a treaty after it has entered into force. A glossary of other terms relating to treaty actions is available from http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Overview.aspx?path=overview/glossary/page1_en.xml (accessed 5 May 2015).
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Partial Test Ban Treaty)

Signed by the original parties in Moscow: 5 August 1963
Opened for signature at London, Moscow and Washington: 8 August 1963
Entered into force: 10 October 1963
Depositary: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom (L) and United States (W)
New parties: None
Total number of parties: 126

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty)

Entered into force: 10 October 1967
Depositary: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom (L) and United States (W)
New parties: None
Total number of parties: 103

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

Opened for signature at Mexico City: 14 February 1967
Entered into force: for each Government individually
Depositary: Mexico
New parties: None
Total number of parties: 33

Amendment to article 7
New parties: Saint Lucia —10 April

Amendment to article 25
New parties: Saint Lucia —10 April

Amendment to articles 14, 15, 16, 19 and 20
New parties: Saint Lucia —10 April

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1 The original parties are the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States.
4 Amendment adopted by the General Conference of OPANAL, pursuant to resolution 267 (E-V) of 3 July 1990.
5 Amendment adopted by the General Conference of OPANAL, pursuant to resolution 268 (XII) of 10 May 1991.
6 Amendment adopted by the General Conference of OPANAL, pursuant to resolution 290 (VII) of 26 August 1992.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
Opened for signature at London, Moscow and Washington: 1 July 1968
Entered into force: 5 March 1970
Depositary: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom (L) and United States (W)
New parties: None
Total number of parties: 190

Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (Sea-bed Treaty)
Opened for signature at London, Moscow and Washington: 11 February 1971
Entered into force: 18 May 1972
Depositary: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom (L) and United States (W)
New parties: None
Total number of parties: 94

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BWC)
Opened for signature at London, Moscow and Washington: 10 April 1972
Entered into force: 26 March 1975
Depositary: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom (L) and United States (W)
New parties: Myanmar —1 December (L, M, W)
Total number of parties: 169

Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques
Opened for signature at Geneva: 18 May 1977
Entered into force: 5 October 1978
Depositary: Secretary-General of the United Nations
New parties: None
Total number of parties: 76

Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
Opened for signature at New York: 18 December 1979
Entered into force: 11 July 1984
Depositary: Secretary-General of the United Nations
New parties: Kuwait —28 April (a)
Total number of parties: 16

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7 Article 19, paragraph 4, states:
“For each State depositing its instrument of ratification or accession after the entry into force of this Agreement, it shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of deposit of any such instrument.”
**Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)**

*Opened for signature at New York: 10 April 1981*

*Entered into force: 2 December 1983*

*Depository: Secretary-General of the United Nations*

**New parties:**
- Grenada — 10 December (a)
- Iraq — 24 September (a)

**Total number of parties:** 119

**Amendment to Article 1 of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (entered into force on 18 May 2004)**

**New parties:**
- Grenada — 10 December (P)
- Iraq — 24 September (P)

**Total number of parties:** 81

**Amended Protocol II (entered into force on 3 December 1998)**

**New parties:**
- Grenada — 10 December (P)
- Iraq — 24 September (P)

**Total number of parties:** 102

**Protocol IV (entered into force on 30 July 1998)**

**New parties:**
- Grenada — 10 December (P)
- Iraq — 24 September (P)

**Total number of parties:** 104

**Protocol V (entered into force on 12 November 2006)**

**New parties:**
- Greece — 21 October (P)
- Grenada — 10 December (P)
- Iraq — 24 September (P)

**Total number of parties:** 87

**South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Rarotonga Treaty)**

*Opened for signature at Rarotonga: 6 August 1985*

*Entered into force: 11 December 1986*

*Depository: Secretary-General of the Pacific Islands Forum*

**New parties:** None

**Total number of parties:** 13

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8 Article 5, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the Convention state:

“2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force six months after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

“3. Each of the Protocols annexed to this Convention shall enter into force six months after the date by which twenty States have notified their consent to be bound by it in accordance with paragraph 3 or 4 of Article 4 of this Convention.”
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty)

Signed at Paris: 19 November 1990
Entered into force: 9 November 1992
Depositary: Netherlands
   New parties: None
   Total number of parties: 30

Agreement on Adaptation
Adopted and signed at Istanbul: 19 November 1999
Not yet in force
New signatories: None
Total number of signatories: 30
New parties: None
Total number of parties: 3

Treaty on Open Skies
Signed at Helsinki: 24 March 1992
Entered into force: 1 January 2002
Depositary: Canada and Hungary
   New parties: None
   Total number of parties: 34

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC)

Signed at Paris: 13 January 1993
Entered into force: 29 April 1997
Depositary: Secretary-General of the United Nations
   New parties: None
   Total number of parties: 190

Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Bangkok Treaty)

Signed at Bangkok: 15 December 1995
Entered into force: 27 March 1997
Depositary: Thailand
   New parties: None
   Total number of parties: 10

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9 Article 31, paragraph 3, states:
“This Agreement on Adaptation shall enter into force 10 days after instruments of ratification have been deposited by all States Parties listed in the Preamble, after which time the Treaty shall exist only in its amended form.”
African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty)

Signed at Cairo: 11 April 1996
Entered into force: 15 July 2009
Depository: Secretary-General of the African Union

New parties: Angola — 20 June
Seychelles — 23 May

Total number of parties: 39

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

Opened for signature at New York: 24 September 1996
Not yet in force
Depository: Secretary-General of the United Nations

New signatories: None
Total number of signatories: 183

New parties: Congo — 2 September
Niue — 4 March

Total number of parties: 163

Constitution on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention)

Opened for signature at Ottawa: 3 December 1997
Entered into force: 1 March 1999
Depository: Secretary-General of the United Nations

New parties: Oman — 20 August (a)

Total number of parties: 162

Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials

Entered into force: 1 July 1998
Depository: Organization of American States

New parties: None
Total number of parties: 31

10 Article XIV, paragraph 1, states: “This Treaty shall enter into force 180 days after the date of deposit of the instruments of ratification by all States listed in Annex II to this Treaty, but in no case earlier than two years after its opening for signature.”

11 Article 17, paragraph 2, states: “For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.”

12 Article XXV, states: “This Convention shall enter into force on the 30th day following the date of deposit...
Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions

Opened for signature at Guatemala City: 7 June 1999
Entered into force: 21 November 2002
Depository: Organization of American States

New parties: None
Total number of parties: 16

Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (CANWFZ Treaty)

Opened for signature at Semipalatinsk: 8 September 2006
Entered into force: 21 March 2009
Depository: Kyrgyzstan

New parties: None
Total number of parties: 5

Convention on Cluster Munitions

Opened for signature at Oslo: 3 December 2008
Entered into force: 1 August 2010
Depository: Secretary-General of the United Nations

New parties:
- Belize — 2 September (a)
- Congo — 3 September
- Guyana — 31 October (a)
- Guinea — 21 October

Total number of parties: 88

Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and All Parts and Components That Can Be Used for Their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly (Kinshasa Convention)

Opened for signature at Brazzaville: 19 November 2010
Not yet in force

Depository: Secretary-General of the United Nations

New signatories: None
Total number of signatories: 11
New parties: None
Total number of parties: 4

of the second instrument of ratification. For each State ratifying the Convention after the deposit of the second instrument of ratification, the Convention shall enter into force on the 30th day following deposit by such State of its instrument of ratification.”

13 Article 36, paragraph 1, states:
“This Convention shall enter into force 30 days after the date of deposit of the sixth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.”
Arms Trade Treaty

Opened for signature at New York: 3 June 2013
Entered into force: 24 December 2014
Depository: Secretary-General of the United Nations

New signatories:

- Andorra — 18 December
- Cameroon — 3 December
- Georgia — 25 September
- Haiti — 21 March
- Israel — 18 December
- Lebanon — 27 October
- Malawi — 9 January
- Namibia — 25 September
- Niger — 24 March
- San Marino — 19 December
- Sao Tome and Principe — 19 December
- Singapore — 5 December
- Thailand — 25 November
- Ukraine — 23 September
- Zimbabwe — 18 December

Total number of signatories: 130

New parties:

- Albania — 19 March
- Argentina — 25 September
- Australia — 3 June
- Austria — 3 June
- Bahamas — 25 September
- Belgium — 3 June
- Bosnia and Herzegovina — 25 September
- Bulgaria — 2 April
- Burkina Faso — 3 June
- Croatia — 2 April
- Czech Republic — 25 September
- Denmark — 2 April (AA)
- Dominican Republic — 7 August
- El Salvador — 2 April
- Estonia — 2 April (AA)
- Finland — 2 April
- France — 2 April
- Germany — 2 April
- Guinea — 21 October
- Hungary — 2 April
- Ireland — 2 April
- Italy — 2 April
- Jamaica — 3 June
- Japan — 9 May (A)
- Latvia — 2 April
- Liechtenstein — 16 December
- Lithuania — 18 December
- Luxembourg — 3 June
Malta — 2 April
Montenegro — 18 August
Netherlands — 18 December (A)
New Zealand — 2 September
Norway — 12 February
Panama — 11 February
Poland — 17 December
Portugal — 25 September
Romania — 2 April
Saint Kitts and Nevis — 15 December
Saint Lucia — 25 September
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines — 3 June
Samoa — 3 June
Senegal — 25 September
Serbia — 5 December
Sierra Leone — 12 August
Slovakia — 2 April
Slovenia — 2 April
South Africa — 22 December
Spain — 2 April
Sweden — 16 June
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia — 6 March
United Kingdom — 2 April
Uruguay — 25 September

Total number of parties: 61
Appendix II

Disarmament resolutions and decisions listed by chapter
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Disarmament resolutions and decisions listed by chapter

At its sixty-ninth session, the General Assembly adopted 57 resolutions and 6 decisions related to disarmament, which are arranged in the present appendix by chapter topic. The highlights of each resolution and decision are presented below, followed by corresponding general statements and explanations of vote of Member States during the First Committee session. Additional voting information is found in the boxes, including cross-references to Part I of the Yearbook.

Chapter I. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation

69/30. Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

The General Assembly recommended that further intensive efforts be devoted to the search for a common approach or common formula, that the various alternative approaches, particularly those considered in the Conference on Disarmament, be further explored, and that the Conference actively continue intensive negotiations to reach agreement and conclude effective international agreements on security assurances, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective.

First Committee. After voting in favour of the draft resolution, Japan emphasized the importance of deepening substantive discussions regarding a common approach to negative security assurances and on ways to improve their efficacy. It added that the draft resolution should not prejudice discussions in the Conference on Disarmament. Finally, it expressed hope that member States of the Conference would break its long-standing stalemate in order to advance its substantive work.

Abbreviations used in the boxes: o.p. = operative paragraph; p.p. = preambular paragraph. The order of the numbers for the voting statistics indicates the votes in favour, the votes against and the abstentions, respectively.
Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments

The General Assembly called upon the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in its decisions and follow-on actions, to give due prominence to the humanitarian imperatives underpinning the need for nuclear disarmament and to the urgency of achieving and maintaining a world free of nuclear weapons. The Assembly urged the nuclear-weapon States to supplement the reports presented to the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference at its third session with concrete and detailed information concerning their implementation of the undertakings set out in action 5 of the action plan on nuclear disarmament contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference. It also urged Member States to pursue multilateral negotiations without delay and in good faith on effective measures for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world and to this end urges States parties to the Treaty to explore, during the 2015 Review Conference, options for the elaboration of the effective measures envisaged in and required by article VI of the Treaty.

First Committee. After voting in favour of the draft resolution, the Netherlands spoke on behalf of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Slovakia and itself. While the Netherlands expressed the delegations’ support for the overall goal to encourage nuclear disarmament, it also conveyed their disappointment that the draft resolution had made reference in its seventh preambular paragraph, not only to resolution 68/32 but also to the decisions contained therein. It pointed out in this regard that delegations had previously expressed concern about decisions taken in resolution 68/32, notably that the aim of the proposed 2018 meeting remained unclear and could potentially open up an alternative pathway. Such a pathway could potentially damage the NPT. The Netherlands also expressed support for the prominence accorded to the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons in paragraph 3, but stressed that, in order for it to be successful, constructive and concrete proposals were needed well ahead of the April 2015 meeting. It concluded by welcoming the call for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to abandon its nuclear-weapons programmes.

After voting against the draft resolution, the following three States explained their votes:

- India stated that while it remained committed to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and recognized the mutually reinforcing nature of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, it could not accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State. India said that the call for it to accede to the NPT was inconsistent with the principle that a State’s acceptance, ratification or accession to a treaty was based on the principle of free consent as enshrined in customary international law. India further explained that nuclear weapons

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The initial draft resolution was introduced by Mexico. The revised draft resolution was submitted by the sponsors.
were integral to its national security, thus precluding the possibility of its accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State (NNWS). While India expressed support for the commencement of fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, it underscored its inability to vote on paragraph 11 as it referred to the 2010 NPT action plan. India noted moreover that while the draft resolution urged States to consider the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons within the NPT framework, the Treaty only restrained the possession of nuclear weapons but not their use. It also explained that it had participated in the Oslo and Nayarit Conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons in the hope of promoting mechanisms to restrain the use of nuclear weapons. In conclusion, India argued that discussions on the issue should involve nuclear powers and should not impede the functioning of the established disarmament machinery.

- The United States also spoke on behalf of France and the United Kingdom. Despite agreeing with many elements of the draft resolution, particularly those reflecting language in the action plan in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, the United States said that the draft resolution detracted from common understanding and introduced new concepts that were not included in the NPT action plan. It stated, moreover, that the text had failed to reflect an equitable balance between the NPT’s three pillars of disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses, but instead had focused exclusively on disarmament. It also called for a greater emphasis on the need for all States possessing nuclear weapons to undertake activities to make the world safer, regardless of whether or not they had signed the NPT. It said that the delegations were concerned that the draft resolution had not included a step-by-step approach to disarmament, and that the focus must be on proven measures that promoted, rather than detracted from, security and strategic stability. The United States concluded by saying that the delegations lamented the fact that the text had failed to recognize the important work undertaken by Ambassador Laajava in fulfilling his mandate.

- The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea said that paragraph 10 was neither fair nor balanced. In light of the 2005 joint statement of the Six-Party Talks, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea believed that all States shared equal obligations and must take coordinated steps to achieve denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In particular, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea argued that the United States had treated it as an enemy, refused to recognize its sovereignty and had continued to be hostile, despite the calls in the 2005 joint statement for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the United States to respect each other’s sovereignty and to normalize relations. The representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea said that his country was not the only one bearing responsibility for denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. He said that his country had developed nuclear weapons as a defensive mechanism against the United States. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea asserted, however, that its negative vote had not cast a shadow on attempts to work together to achieve global nuclear disarmament and denuclearization.

After abstaining from the vote on the draft resolution as a whole, the following States explained their positions:
• **Pakistan** said that it considered unrealistic the calls for it to unconditionally accede to the NPT as an NNWS. It reiterated its position that as a non-party to the NPT, it did not subscribe to nor was it bound by that treaty’s conclusions and decisions.

• **China**, in explaining its abstention, said that parts of the draft resolution had exceeded the language agreed in the action plan of the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

### 69/40. Reducing nuclear danger

The General Assembly called for a review of nuclear doctrines and, in that context, for immediate and urgent steps to reduce the risks of unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons. The Assembly requested the Secretary-General to intensify efforts and support initiatives that would contribute towards the full implementation of the recommendations of the Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters that would significantly reduce the risk of nuclear war, and to continue encouraging Member States to consider the convening of an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers.

**First Committee.** After voting in favour of the draft resolution, **Brazil** expressed support for the goal to reduce the risk of the unintentional or accidental use of nuclear weapons. In this regard, Brazil explained that the very existence of nuclear weapons posed a serious threat to humankind and to the survival of civilization. However, Brazil stressed that despite the importance of measures such as reviewing nuclear doctrines, de-alerting and detargeting nuclear weapons, these measures could not substitute for multilateral agreements on the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

After voting against the draft resolution, **Switzerland** explained that its position on this draft resolution was similar to its position on the draft resolution entitled “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons”. In this regard, Switzerland reaffirmed its support for strengthening existing international norms.

### 69/41. Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations

The General Assembly welcomed the report of the Secretary-General containing the views of Member States on how to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, including the steps that Member States had already taken to that end. Italy requested the Secretary-General to transmit that report to the Conference on Disarmament and the United Nations Disarmament Commission for their consideration. The Assembly called upon all Member States, international organizations and civil society to continue to enrich the discussions on how to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations in the United Nations bodies in which disarmament and peace and security were addressed, taking into account the report of the Working Group and the proposals contained therein, as well as the
report submitted by the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 68/46. The Assembly encouraged Member States, international organizations and civil society to take into account the report of the Working Group and the proposals contained therein, as well as the report submitted by the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 68/46, in the discussions in other forums in which humanitarian, health, human rights, environmental and development affairs were addressed.

First Committee. Before voting against the draft resolution, the United States spoke on behalf of France, the United Kingdom and itself. It reiterated these delegations’ previous position that adequate forums for advancing multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations already existed. It also raised concerns about the consistency between the proposed draft resolution and the 2010 action plan of the NPT. Specifically, it criticized the final report of the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) for failing to mention the 2010 NPT action plan and for diluting the urgency of negotiating an FMCT. The United States argued that these omissions detracted attention from the consensus-based approach embodied in the 2010 action plan. It concluded by expressing concern about processes that focused solely on nuclear disarmament and which failed to cover all three pillars of the NPT in a balanced manner.

After voting in favour of this draft resolution, four States delivered statements:

- India indicated that its position had shifted since 2012 when it had abstained from voting on the draft resolution due to concerns about its impact on the established disarmament machinery. India explained that while it had voted in favour of the draft resolution given the importance of sustaining efforts on multilateral nuclear disarmament, it remained concerned about parallel initiatives that could affect the existing disarmament machinery. Accordingly, India clarified that its vote in favour of that draft resolution was made without prejudice to its support for the role of the Conference on Disarmament.

- Pakistan stated that it had always supported the goal of universal nuclear disarmament and expressed frustration with the lack of progress on nuclear disarmament negotiations. Pakistan agreed with the decision not to propose re-establishing the OEWG because it would weaken the capacity of the Conference on Disarmament to function as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. It argued that convening a fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament would be the best step to reaching global consensus and reconciling differences that had eroded the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

- Kazakhstan stated that its support for the draft resolution was based on the understanding that the OEWG would not serve as an independent platform parallel to the Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission. Instead, Kazakhstan called for the outcome recommendations made by the OEWG to be presented for further consideration and possible approval by these bodies.

- Brazil applauded the discussions of the OEWG established by resolution 67/56, and in particular, civil society participation in these deliberations. It confirmed that the initiatives of the OEWG should constitute useful steps towards negotiations on legally binding instruments within the United Nations framework and, preferably, in the Conference on Disarmament. Accordingly,
it expressed support for the draft resolution’s reaffirmation of the validity of multilateral diplomacy and the roles and functions of the Conference and the General Assembly.

After abstaining from action on the draft resolution, two States explained their positions:

- **China** stated that the international nuclear disarmament process should be promoted in the framework of existing multilateral disarmament mechanisms, such as the Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission. China also expressed concern that the establishment of a new mechanism to deal with nuclear disarmament would undermine the authority of existing mechanisms and would not ensure universal participation.

- **Portugal**, also speaking on behalf of Cyprus, expressed support for the overall contents of the draft resolution, and specifically its reference to the work undertaken by the OEWG. It reiterated their strong view that all individuals had an interest in the success of disarmament negotiations and that multilateralism was essential to that success. While it acknowledged some weaknesses in the Conference on Disarmament, it also described the inclusive and non-discriminatory nature of multilateral negotiation mechanisms as a prerequisite for effective and universal progress towards peace and security. Accordingly, it advocated for the inclusion of a reference to the urgent need to enlarge the Conference via a specific request to the draft sponsors. As this request was not agreed to, the delegations abstained from voting on the draft resolution.

**69/42. Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems**

The General Assembly called for further practical steps to be taken to decrease the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems, with a view to ensuring that all nuclear weapons are removed from high alert status, and looked forward to the issue of the lowering of the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems being addressed further at the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

**First Committee.** After voting in favour of this draft resolution, the following two States explained their votes:

- **India** said that its vote was due to the importance that it attached to de-alerting and explained its historical support for the resolution since its introduction in 2007 due to its likeness to a resolution sponsored by India entitled, “Reducing nuclear danger”. India explained that it had voted in favour of the draft resolution because it considered de-alerting to be an important and practical step in the process of reducing nuclear danger. However, India abstained from the vote on the eighth preambular paragraph, explaining that it was not party to the NPT and so was not bound by its outcome document. Moreover, India believed that the issue that the draft resolution sought to address was not limited to the context of a specific treaty.
• **Pakistan** explained that it agreed with most elements of the draft resolution and reiterated the importance of reciprocity in decreasing the operational status of nuclear weapons. However, Pakistan considered the reference to the conclusions and recommendations of the 2010 NPT Review Conference to be unwarranted and stated that, as a non-party to the NPT, it could not subscribe to the decisions of the Conference. Accordingly, Pakistan abstained from voting on the eighth preambular paragraph.

After voting against the draft resolution, the **United States** spoke on behalf of France, the United Kingdom and itself. It said that these delegations disputed the draft resolution’s basic premise that the current level of readiness of nuclear weapons increased the risk of unintentional use and that lowered alert levels would automatically lead to heightened international security. Instead, it argued that the complex relationship between alert levels and security could not be reduced to a simple formula. It also asserted that operational readiness of their nuclear weapons systems was maintained in accordance with domestic and allied security requirements and stated that their nuclear weapons systems were no longer targeted against any State. It reiterated that their nuclear weapons systems were subject to rigorous command, control and communication systems to prevent accidental use. It stated that those weapons could only be used at the sole direction of the national command authority and to maximize that authority’s decision time.

69/43. **Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons**

The General Assembly underlined the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that there existed an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. The Assembly called upon all States to immediately fulfil that obligation by commencing multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination.

**First Committee. Cuba** voted in favour of the draft resolution, explaining that it had supported the draft resolution because of the relevance of the issues raised by the ICJ in 1996, which unanimously found the existence of an obligation to pursue in good faith and conclude negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

After voting in favour, the following two States explained their positions:

• **Sweden** expressed its support for the unanimous conclusion of the ICJ on the good faith obligation to pursue and conclude negotiations leading to disarmament. However, it emphasized that it did not consider the immediate commencement of multilateral negotiations for the early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention as the only way of achieving that goal. It reaffirmed its commitment to its NPT obligation to engage in negotiations on
measures to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons in good faith and looked forward to participating actively in the December 2014 conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons and the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

- **Pakistan** expressed support for the cause of nuclear disarmament and the goal of achieving a world without nuclear weapons. As a non-party to the NPT, Pakistan expressed reservations about the references to the principles and objectives of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the 2000 Review Conference and the action points agreed to at the 2010 NPT Review Conference in the fifth preambular paragraph.

After abstaining from voting on the draft resolution, **Japan** explained that it believed that the use of nuclear weapons did not comply with the spirit of humanitarianism. Despite supporting the unanimous conclusion of the judges of the ICJ on the obligation to pursue in good faith and conclude a negotiation leading to nuclear disarmament, Japan said that it remained convinced of the importance of realistic measures to achieving progress in this regard. Accordingly, Japan argued that it was not yet incumbent on all States to fulfil that obligation by commencing multilateral negotiations leading to the early conclusion of the nuclear weapons convention.

### 69/44. The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation

The General Assembly welcomed the fact that 137 States had, so far, subscribed to the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. It also welcomed the advancement of the universalization process of the Code of Conduct, and underscored the importance of making further efforts, at both the regional and the international levels, towards achieving universalization. The Assembly called upon all States that had not yet subscribed to the Code of Conduct, in particular those possessing space launch vehicle and ballistic missile capabilities and those developing corresponding national programmes, to do so.

**First Committee. Cuba** explained that it would abstain from voting on the draft resolution, asserting that the issue of missiles could and should be considered inclusively and transparently within the existing United Nations framework. Cuba said that the Code addressed neither the issue of the peaceful use of missile technology, nor the need for cooperation in this area to address the specific interests of developing countries. It believed that the Code was concerned only with horizontal proliferation and not vertical proliferation, that the Code ignored the serious problem of the ongoing existence and development of nuclear weapons, and that the Code referred only to ballistic missiles without addressing other, relevant types of missiles.

In voting against the draft resolution, the **Islamic Republic of Iran** contended that the text was unbalanced, incomprehensive and did not involve any disarmament objective. It pointed out in this regard, that the text had not been drafted in consultation with non-subscribing States. It believed that the draft resolution was seeking to preserve the status quo and did not address vertical proliferation because...
it acknowledged the possession and development of ballistic missiles by a few States while discouraging others from acquiring them without providing an incentive. The representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran argued that the Code did not distinguish between space launch vehicle programmes and ballistic missiles programmes. It only focused, he said, on ballistic missiles and had failed to define ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction (WMD). He said that rather than providing incentives for membership, the Code restricted international cooperation and assistance in the area of space launch vehicles arguing that the draft resolution had overlooked the right of all States to the peaceful use of outer space.

The following five States explained their abstentions from the vote:

- **India** explained that the proliferation of ballistic missiles had adversely affected India’s security. It emphasized the complexity of the issue partially due to the absence of a global legal regime governing the possession and use of missiles and the development and modernization of advanced weapons systems. It argued that any initiative on this matter must be inclusive, sustainable and comprehensive. It expressed its willingness to study the Code provided that its members would still be able to test and deploy ballistic missiles for national security reasons or use space launch vehicles.

- **Egypt** described the Code as a product of export control regimes developed outside the United Nations in a discriminatory matter. It criticized the Code’s voluntary non-verifiable nature arguing that it was neither balanced in its approach nor comprehensive in its scope. Specifically, Egypt asserted that the Code focused only on the issue of ballistic missiles while ignoring more advanced means for delivering WMD. It expressed concern regarding additional language included in the draft resolution which Egypt believed could restrict the rights of States to peaceful uses of outer space. It argued that any legitimate and effective consideration of the issue of missiles could only take place within the United Nations framework.

- **Pakistan** emphasized the importance of addressing the complex issue of missiles in a duly constituted multilateral forum where the views of all States could be considered. In this regard, it criticized the ad hoc nature of the forum where the Code had been negotiated and the fact that it lacked proper deliberations. Accordingly, while it acknowledged that some effort had been made to accommodate the concerns of participating States, the Code could not gain the support and acceptance of other missile-possessor States. Pakistan said that since it was obliged to respond to the missile threat from within its region, the Code did not address its security concerns.

- **Brazil** welcomed the inclusion of language which indicated that States should not be prevented from enjoying the benefits of outer space for peaceful purposes. However, it reiterated concerns about the notion that space launch vehicle programmes could conceal ballistic missile programmes, that disregarded the unequivocal non-proliferation commitments of countries developing exclusively peaceful space programmes—a view reaffirmed in paragraph 3, which placed space launch vehicles and ballistic missile capabilities on the same footing. Brazil also stated that the Code should adequately address the question of international cooperation.
The Syrian Arab Republic expressed its full commitment to the Charter of the United Nations and its work towards the effective implementation of disarmament mechanisms, as well as the right to self-defence. However, it expressed concern about the States pursuing non-proliferation and disarmament mechanisms outside the United Nations framework arguing that these worked contrary to the goal of non-proliferation. Describing the Code as discriminatory, Syria asserted that it did not address the deep-rooted causes of proliferation.

69/48. Nuclear disarmament

The General Assembly welcomed the signing by China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, in New York on 6 May 2014. The Assembly urged the Conference on Disarmament to commence, as early as possible, its substantive work during its 2015 session. It welcomed the re-establishment of the informal working group with a mandate to produce a programme of work robust in substance and progressive over time in implementation, on the basis of a comprehensive and balanced programme of work. This programme of work would take into consideration all the real and existing priorities in the field of disarmament and arms control, including the immediate commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices with a view to their conclusion within five years.

First Committee. Before voting in favour of the draft resolution, the following two States delivered general statements:

Myanmar reiterated the importance of nuclear disarmament and its firm belief that the total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only absolute guarantee against their use. Moreover, Myanmar expressed support for the unanimous decision of the ICJ which confirmed the existence of an obligation for all States to pursue in good faith and to conclude negotiations leading to complete nuclear disarmament under strict and effective international control. Myanmar explained that the draft resolution had been updated to reflect developments in nuclear disarmament that occurred in 2014, such as the re-establishment of the informal working group by the Conference on Disarmament, the signing of the Protocol of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia by the nuclear-weapon States (NWS) and the denotation of Latin America and the Caribbean as a zone of peace. Additionally, Myanmar highlighted that the draft resolution recalled the declaration on nuclear disarmament made at the 17th Ministerial Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), where the Movement reiterated its firm commitment to the goal of a safer world for all and to achieving peace and security in a world without nuclear weapons and to the convening of a high-level international conference of the United

Submitted by: Sponsors (4 Nov.)
GA vote: 121-44-17; 175-1-3, o.p. 16 (2 Dec.)
1st Ctte vote: 102-41-17; 146-1-4, o.p. 16 (4 Nov.)
For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 88-97.

* The initial draft resolution was introduced by Myanmar. The revised draft resolution was submitted by the sponsors.
Nations on nuclear disarmament by 2014. Finally, Myanmar indicated that the draft resolution called upon various players to take action towards achieving a world free of nuclear weapons.

- **Cuba** reiterated the importance of nuclear disarmament in the field of disarmament and the important obligations and commitments contained in the draft resolution. It also explained that the draft resolution had been updated to welcome the commemoration of the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. It concluded by applauding the 2014 proclamation of Latin America and the Caribbean as a zone of peace.

After voting in favour of the draft resolution, the **Democratic People’s Republic of Korea** expressed support for the principled position of the NAM on nuclear disarmament and argued that nuclear disarmament should take precedence over non-proliferation as the total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only absolute solution to the threat that they posed. In this regard, it called upon the NWS with the largest nuclear arsenals to lead the disarmament process. It concluded by conveying reservations regarding the continued requests for adherence to the NPT and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), but nonetheless voted in favour of the draft resolution’s adoption.

After abstaining in the vote on the draft resolution, three States explained their positions:

- **India** explained that its abstention was due to the text’s references to the NPT. It indicated, however, that it did not oppose other provisions that were consistent with the position of the NAM and India’s domestic positions on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Specifically, it reiterated its support for references to the outcome document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, NAM summit statements, the 1996 ICJ advisory opinion, the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, the role and work of the Conference on Disarmament, the reference to CD/1999, the negotiation of an FMCT in the Conference on the basis of the Shannon mandate and the call for convening an international conference on nuclear disarmament in all its aspects at an early date.

- **Japan** explained that while it shared the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, it believed that in order to implement concrete measures for nuclear disarmament, united action by the international community, including the NWS, was required.

- **Pakistan** expressed its support for the draft resolution’s call for the establishment of an ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament on nuclear disarmament, the conclusion of a legally binding instrument on negative security assurances and the need for taking into account the security interests of all States while negotiating disarmament treaties. Despite this support, it indicated that, due to its position on the NPT, it did not support the calls for the full implementation of the action plan of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. While it supported the clear calls for the immediate commencement of negotiations on an FMCT in paragraph 16, it expressed reservations regarding the fact that the only aspect of the draft resolution that focused on non-proliferation related to FMCT negotiations.
69/52. United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons

The General Assembly called upon all States parties to the NPT to work together so that the 2015 NPT Review Conference could successfully strengthen the Treaty regime and advance the action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference covering all of the three pillars of the Treaty. It also called upon the NWS and all other NPT States parties to continue and further enhance their reports on implementation of the action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference. The Assembly welcomed the signature of the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia by the five NWS on 6 May 2014. On the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other WMD, the Assembly called for the earliest possible convening of a successful conference in Helsinki, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on its establishment on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region. It called upon all States to fully implement relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1540 (2004) of 28 April 2004.

First Committee. Before voting in favour of the draft resolution, Ecuador said that it welcomed the reference in the draft resolution to the Conference on Disarmament as the natural forum for discussion of negotiations on an FMCT. However, Ecuador explained that the text still lacked features of an all-encompassing nuclear disarmament resolution, such as references to a legally binding instrument providing negative security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States and to a convention prohibiting the development, possession and use of nuclear weapons. Ecuador acknowledged observations offered by Middle Eastern States regarding operative paragraph 17 on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other WMD.

Before voting against the draft resolution, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea said that it rejected the draft resolution as it had not correctly reflected the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. In this regard, it pointed out that the draft had expressed concerns over peaceful nuclear activities but had focused on the activities of only one country. The representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea also noted that the draft resolution had said that his country could not have the status of a nuclear-weapon State under the NPT. He pointed out in this regard, however, that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was now a non-party, having withdrawn from the NPT and, therefore, was no longer bound by that treaty. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, he said, had since manufactured nuclear weapons in order to deter nuclear threats and attacks from the United States and to defend its sovereignty. The representative asserted that as long as the United States nuclear threat persisted, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea would increase and update nuclear weapons as a deterrent.

Before abstaining from the vote on the draft resolution, two States explained their positions:
• **Egypt** stated that, while it supported the goal of taking united action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, it did not believe that the draft resolution could achieve that objective. Egypt also regretted that the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other WMD had not been convened in 2012. With respect to paragraph 17 on the Middle East, Egypt expressed concern regarding that paragraph’s complete omission of any reference to the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and the 2010 NPT Review Conference final outcome. Nonetheless, Egypt expressed strong support for paragraph 3 of the resolution on the importance of the universality of the NPT.

• **The Islamic Republic of Iran** stated that it shared and supported the main objective of the draft resolution which called for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. It also supported paragraph 3 of the draft which reaffirmed the universality of the NPT. However, it did not accept the assertion in the sixth preambular paragraph that the fulfilment of nuclear disarmament obligations was conditional upon the enhancement of international peace and security. It argued further that while the draft had focused extensively on certain regional issues, the draft resolution had ignored the “proliferation risk posed by Israel’s unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.” The Islamic Republic of Iran pointed out, in this regard, that Israel was not a party to the NPT. The draft, the Islamic Republic of Iran said, had also failed to refer to the agreed mandate for convening a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMD. It described the draft as significantly imbalanced since it had focused solely on an FMCT while failing to call for the urgent commencement of negotiations on nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament.

After voting in favour of the draft resolution, three States delivered statements:

• **Japan** stated that paragraph 17 reaffirmed the General Assembly’s support for the establishment of a Middle East Zone free of nuclear weapons and all other WMD and called on States to convene a successful conference in Helsinki as soon as possible.

• **France** explained that the draft generally reflected France’s commitments on nuclear disarmament, but stressed that the 2006 consensus plan of action on the NPT should move forward in a balanced way. France expressed concerns regarding the serious consequences of the possible future use of nuclear weapons and explained that, in its view, nuclear weapons were a means of deterrence rather than weapons of war. France regretted the fact that this draft resolution did not refer to the considerable work that had been done by the Group of Governmental Experts on a treaty on the prohibition of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. France concluded by affirming its commitment to move towards a more secure world and to create the proper conditions for a nuclear-weapon-free world in accordance with the goals of the NPT.

• **Morocco** expressed its support for the draft resolution’s provisions and objectives. It also extended appreciation to Japan for having referred to the need to establish in the Middle East a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other WMD, and the call to hold the Helsinki conference as soon as possible.
Morocco also reiterated that the conference should be convened according to the plan of action agreed at the 2010 Review Conference of the NPT.

After abstaining from voting on this draft resolution, the following four States explained their positions:

- **India** argued that the draft resolution fell short of the goal of achieving global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament in a time-bound framework. It also explained that it could not join the NPT as an NNWS until non-discriminatory and global nuclear disarmament was achieved. India asserted that the concept of a comprehensive safeguards agreement only applied to NNWS party to the NPT and had thus abstained from voting. India highlighted, moreover, that it had already signed and ratified an India-specific safeguard agreement and an additional protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It also said that, due to its support for negotiations on an FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament, the question of imposing a moratorium on the production of fissile material did not arise and it had, therefore, abstained from voting on paragraph 11.

- **China** argued that a moratorium on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices would not only be difficult to define and verify but also would be counterproductive to promoting negotiations of an FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament.

- **Pakistan** described the draft resolution as unrealistic since it called upon Pakistan to accede to the NPT as an NNWS without conditions. While expressing support for the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, Pakistan did not agree to the immediate commencement of negotiations on an FMCT. Specifically, Pakistan expressed reservations regarding a resolution that sought united action towards the elimination of nuclear weapons that only addressed the non-proliferation aspect of fissile materials. Pakistan reiterated its position that the universalization of a comprehensive safeguards agreement applied only to States that had freely assumed legal obligations under the NPT.

- **Brazil** criticized the text’s failure to recognize the compliance deficit among NWS with respect to their obligations under article VI of the NPT. It disputed the suggestion that nuclear disarmament required improved international peace and security and argued that the draft resolution should have focused on the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. It stated that paragraph 10 should have referred explicitly to the States whose ratification of the CTBT was required for its entry into force and believed that explicit reference should have been made to the need for an FMCT to extend to existing stocks of fissile material. It argued that paragraph 14 should have supported the immediate commencement of discussions within the Conference on Disarmament of effective international arrangements to assure NNWS against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Brazil recalled the voluntary nature of the additional protocol and argued that the language could have been improved from the relevant provisions set out in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference.
69/58. Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament

The General Assembly recalled its decision (68/32) to convene, no later than 2018, a United Nations high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament to review the progress made in this regard. It also took note of the views provided by Member States with regard to achieving the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, in particular on the elements of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, as reflected in the report submitted by the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 68/32, and requested that the Secretary-General forward this report to the Conference on Disarmament and the United Nations Disarmament Commission for their early consideration. It called upon Member States, the United Nations system and civil society, including non-governmental organizations, academia, parliamentarians, the mass media and individuals, to commemorate and promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons through all means of educational and public awareness-raising activities about the threat posed to humanity by nuclear weapons and the necessity for their total elimination in order to mobilize international efforts towards achieving the common goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

First Committee. Prior to voting, and also speaking on behalf of France and the United Kingdom, the United States indicated that the delegations would vote against the draft resolution. First, it explained that halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons was a necessary part of a step-by-step process towards the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament. It stated that, as a result, they regretted the fact that the High-level Meeting had not addressed both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in a balanced manner. It expressed concern that the “insufficient, incidental and unbalanced” reference to the NPT in the draft resolution and its omission of the 2010 action plan suggested that some States were moving away from the consensus reached in 2010. The United States confirmed its own commitment and that of France and the United Kingdom to a practical step-by-step process as the only way to make real progress in disarmament while maintaining global security and stability. The next step in that process, as outlined by the 2010 action plan, the United States said, involved the negotiation of an FMCT and the entry into force of the CTBT. Accordingly, it said that they rejected the calls for the negotiation of another instrument that was not mentioned in the 2010 action plan. In conclusion, the United States argued that another conference to discuss nuclear disarmament in 2018 was inconsistent with the NPT agenda and could weaken the commitment to secure a successful outcome to the Review Conference in 2015.

The following three States voted in favour of the draft resolution and made statements explaining their votes:

- China confirmed its support for the complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons and underlined the importance of maintaining stability and undiminished security to the cause of nuclear disarmament. It also explained that all issues related to nuclear weapons should be addressed within the
existing framework of multilateral disarmament mechanisms and called on parties to the NPT to fulfil their Treaty obligations in a comprehensive and balanced manner. In this regard, it argued that States with the largest nuclear arsenals should drastically reduce their nuclear weapons. China also discussed the need for a viable long-term plan, including the conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons.

- **Switzerland** applauded the explicit references in the draft resolution to the NPT outcome documents, including the 2010 action plan, which it saw as consistent with the support expressed at the High-level Meeting for the three pillars of the NPT and for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. It also welcomed the reference to article VI of the NPT, which called for urgent compliance with the legal obligations and commitments on nuclear disarmament. It cautioned that due to the mutually reinforcing nature of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, any further proliferation of nuclear weapons could imperil further progress on nuclear disarmament. It also indicated that a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons was not the only option for achieving and maintaining a world free of nuclear weapons. Switzerland, in conclusion, welcomed the fact that the draft resolution called for negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament and considered the conference to be convened in 2018 as an opportunity to advance towards the goal of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons.

- **Ireland**, also speaking on behalf of Austria, Liechtenstein, Malta, San Marino and Sweden, expressed strong support for the disarmament objectives of the draft resolution. The draft resolution, it said, was entirely consistent with article VI of the NPT, as well as the 2010 NPT Review Conference action plan. Ireland recalled the commitments freely accepted by States parties to the NPT and the 13 practical steps agreed by consensus at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, which included an unequivocal undertaking by NWS to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament. Ireland also expressed its own approval and that of the other States on whose behalf it was speaking of the explicit reference to the NPT and its sixth article. Moreover, it said that they supported the important ongoing discussion regarding the humanitarian consequences of any nuclear-weapon detonation and applauded its inclusion in the draft resolution. Finally, Ireland confirmed their support for any effective measures to achieve complete nuclear disarmament, regardless of how those measures might be codified. A comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, Ireland said, was not the only available option to achieve this goal.

After abstaining from the vote on the draft resolution, two States explained their positions:

- The **Netherlands** spoke on its own behalf and that of the delegations of Albania, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Germany, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Poland and Slovakia. It underlined that these delegations shared the long-term goal of the draft resolution, namely, a world free of nuclear weapons and in this regard cited their support for and participation in the High-level Meeting on Nuclear Disarmament, held
on 26 September 2013. They regretted, however, that the various proposals they had made during the High-level Meeting had not been included in last year’s resolution 68/32 and that only one particular view had been brought forward. The delegations noted again that in the current draft resolution under consideration, there was again no clear reference to the NPT. The Netherlands pointed out, in this connection, that although they had approached the main sponsors about their concerns, these had not been taken into account. It highlighted the continuing concerns with draft resolution which it said included only limited references to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, a seminal instrument for the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world. The Netherlands welcomed the decision of the drafters to include a reference to article VI of the NPT, but signalled that the above delegations would have preferred a broader reference to the Treaty as a whole. It expressed the delegations’ concern about the lack of clarity regarding the aim of the proposed 2018 meeting. The Netherlands said that the meeting could, for example, be interpreted as either another high-level meeting on disarmament to ensure the continued high profile of the issue, but could also be a potential vehicle for negotiating a nuclear-weapons convention. That, the Netherlands said, would be regrettable, as it could undermine the collective efforts of the above delegations to seek a positive outcome for the 2015 NPT Review Conference. The lack of clarity regarding the 2018 meeting could potentially open an alternative pathway that would damage the NPT, the Netherlands concluded.

• **Spain**, speaking also on behalf of Bulgaria, Cyprus, Finland, Greece, the Republic of Moldova, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, explained that they had abstained last year in the voting on resolution 68/32 and could not, therefore, support the draft resolution as the concerns expressed with regard to resolution 68/32 remained valid in 2014. Spain underlined that they believed in a world free of nuclear weapons, and that disarmament and non-proliferation were mutually reinforcing goals to be pursued gradually with the involvement of all the NWS. It stressed the fundamental role of the NPT as the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. In this context, it urged States to continue implementing the action plan elaborated at the 2010 NPT Review Conference in order to achieve a successful 2015 Review Conference. Spain indicated that another “review conference” by 2018, as noted in the draft resolution, would shift the focus away from the NPT. While the delegations appreciated the reference to the NPT in the draft resolution, Spain noted that the emphasis there had only been on one of the disarmament pillars. In this regard, Spain underlined the view of the above delegations that nuclear disarmament was directly linked to the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime, and that NPT obligations should not be approached selectively. Progress on these commonly shared goals, Spain said, required the early entry into force of the CTBT and the commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. While agreeing that the Conference on Disarmament should start substantive work as soon as possible, Spain and the other delegations cited above did not see a nuclear weapons convention as the
first priority of the Conference. They instead called for a comprehensive and balanced programme of work that included the Conference’s four core issues.

69/59. Compliance with non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements and commitments

The General Assembly welcomed efforts by all States to pursue additional areas of cooperation to increase confidence in compliance with existing non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements and reduce the possibility of misinterpretation and misunderstanding. The Assembly also called upon Member States to support efforts aimed at the resolution of compliance questions by means consistent with such agreements and with international law. It also welcomed the role that the United Nations had played and continued to play in maintaining the integrity of certain arms limitation, disarmament and non-proliferation agreements and in addressing threats to international peace and security.

First Committee. Before voting in favour of the draft resolution, the following two States delivered statements:

- **Mexico** expressed its support for the provisions relating to current disarmament and arms control initiatives, including article VI of the NPT, the NPT Review Conference and the issue of principles and objectives for disarmament. It also confirmed the importance of the agreements made at the 2000 and 2010 NPT Review Conferences. Mexico believed that the nations that should have played a role in implementing international agreements on disarmament had not done so. It explained that it would vote in favour of the draft resolution in view of the importance of calling international attention to the need to implement these provisions.

- **Ukraine** reiterated its support for addressing the issue of compliance with international agreements on non-proliferation and expressed concern regarding the Russian Federation’s remarks (see below), which Ukraine interpreted as indicating that the Russian Federation had deliberately broken its obligations under international treaties, such as the NPT.

Before abstaining from the vote on the draft resolution, the following three States explained their positions:

- The **Democratic People’s Republic of Korea** emphasized the importance of nuclear disarmament to building a peaceful and prosperous world and highlighted what it saw as major obstacles to achieving that goal. These included the pursuit of the doctrine of hegemony, the power politics of the cold war era, and the double standards of nuclear power politics which, according to the representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, had reduced legal instruments such as the NPT to mere nominal status and had driven the world into a nuclear arms race. It further argued that the draft resolution was a one-sided initiative that promoted the implementation of non-proliferation and disarmament agreements that reflected the strategic interests of the United States. It concluded that the draft resolution, in essence,
had nothing to do with genuine nuclear disarmament obligations based on the Charter of the United Nations and was mainly aimed at disarming other countries, while putting aside the main sponsor’s own bilateral and multilateral implementation commitment.

- **Cuba** stressed that it had always championed the need to preserve and strengthen multilateralism and guarantee strict observance of all disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. It argued, however, that the draft resolution had not addressed that issue adequately. Cuba stated that the text had not focused sufficiently on cooperation, and that the language had been deliberately formulated to highlight non-proliferation to the detriment of disarmament. It believed that the draft provided an opportunity for unacceptable interpretations of treaty law where States parties could refuse to comply with some of their treaty obligations. Cuba stated that the text disregarded the specific characteristics, modalities and mechanisms of each agreement which could not be addressed from a sole perspective.

- The **Russian Federation** expressed concern that the sponsors of the draft resolution, having initiated the draft resolution on the CTBT two decades earlier, had refused to ratify the Treaty and, despite being depositaries of the Biological Weapons Convention, they had not developed a legally binding protocol to strengthen its provisions. It also criticized the sponsors for retaining reservations on the Geneva Convention and for blocking international efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space. It argued that disarmament work should be performed within the existing framework and suggested that an operative paragraph referring to the five agreements reached in this mechanism could be included in the draft resolution.

After voting in favour of the draft resolution, India and Brazil explained their votes:

- **India** expressed its belief in the responsibility of States to fully comply with the obligations undertaken in the various disarmament, non-proliferation and arms limitation agreements to which they were a party in a manner consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and international law. It also emphasized the importance of multilateralism in addressing issues that might arise in relation to such agreements and commitments. It asserted that other agreed obligations implied only those obligations that had been undertaken by States voluntarily and in exercise of their sovereignty.

- **Brazil** expressed its belief that, in order to eradicate WMD, all Member States should fully implement and comply with relevant agreements on disarmament and non-proliferation and that compliance must not be selective. It also reiterated the importance of full compliance with article VI of the NPT. On the reciprocity of verification mechanisms and compliance, it said that the draft could have benefited from broader language on the importance of effective verification mechanisms to non-proliferation and disarmament agreements. Brazil also expressed regret that some States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention were still not in a position to resume negotiations on a universal, legally binding and non-discriminatory verification protocol. It indicated that it would have preferred the retention of language stating that the United
Nations should play an active role in fostering negotiations on disarmament and non-proliferation.

After abstaining from voting on the draft resolution, the five States below delivered statements:

- **Egypt** explained that, despite negotiations with the main sponsor, the final draft resolution still contained language that it considered problematic. It argued that the scope of the draft resolution extended beyond disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control agreements because the text referred to other commitments that were not clearly defined. It also criticized the calls in the preamble for States to implement effective national capacities for verification and enforcement, arguing that verification and enforcement responsibilities lay with international treaty organizations, rather than individual States. It stated that the draft resolution failed to underscore the urgency of achieving the universality of multilateral and non-proliferation agreements, in particular the NPT.

- **Ecuador** expressed concern that the call on States to adopt bilateral or multilateral measures to encourage compliance and to hold States that fail to comply accountable, could be misinterpreted as an endorsement of unilateral means and sanctions with extraterritorial application. It regretted the fact that the resolution did not include a call for the universalization of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control instruments. Accordingly, it explained that it recalled pending commitments on nuclear disarmament and hoped that future assessments of compliance and non-compliance would be conducted in a balanced manner. It also argued that instances of real or presumed non-compliance under the non-proliferation framework should be given the same attention as that given to redress instances of non-compliance with obligations under article VI of the NPT.

- **Pakistan** argued that the consensus that once surrounded this text had deteriorated because the sponsor had deleted significant language from the previous version. It believed that the draft resolution should have universal application and not be a tool for targeting specific countries. In this regard, Pakistan argued that some sponsors of the draft had pursued policies of exceptionalism, discrimination and selectivity to further their political and commercial interests at the expense of their international disarmament and non-proliferation obligations.

- The **Syrian Arab Republic** expressed concern that some sponsors of the draft resolution had, themselves, not been compliant with international non-proliferation agreements. It called into question the credibility of the resolution and its call to hold non-compliant States accountable, given the fact that it had been sponsored by Israel, a country possessing nuclear weapons that had refused to join the NPT.

- The **Islamic Republic of Iran** acknowledged the merits of the draft resolution, such as the fact that States not currently in compliance were being urged to make the strategic decision to resume compliance. It also expressed reservations, pointing out that the text failed to accord priority to compliance with nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments. It regretted that the draft had overlooked the principles of consultation and cooperation, necessary
elements to resolving concerns with respect to compliance and implementation under multilateral treaties and to effecting their implementation. It asserted that it was paradoxical that a regime that was not party to any international instruments banning WMD and had continued to develop such weapons in the Middle East region was a sponsor of the resolution.

69/69. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

The General Assembly reiterated its request to the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations in order to reach agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, and requested the Conference to report to the General Assembly on the results of those negotiations.

First Committee. After voting in favour of the draft resolution, Brazil stated that nuclear weapons should never be used again due to the threat they posed to the survival of mankind. It also stressed the need to go beyond the mere prohibition of their use to their complete elimination. It called for negotiations on a comprehensive, legally binding instrument banning the development, production, acquisition, possession, stockpiling, retention, testing, use and transfer of these weapons. In this regard, it recalled the undertaking of NWS to achieve nuclear disarmament in keeping with their NPT obligations.

After voting against the draft resolution, Austria and Switzerland delivered statements:

- **Austria**, also speaking on behalf of Ireland, said that the delegations strongly supported the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. It argued that the resolution was insufficient to achieve that goal because the resolution had made no reference to the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. It also expressed their deep concern over the humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and reaffirmed the need for all States to comply with applicable international law and international humanitarian law in accordance with the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Accordingly, it described efforts to prevent the use of nuclear weapons as an urgent challenge. While calling on all nuclear-weapon States to reduce the risk of their use, it affirmed that the ultimate guarantee against their use was their total elimination. It concluded by applauding the focus on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons.

- **Switzerland** argued that a resolution that aimed to prohibit the use or threat or use of nuclear weapons should include an appropriate reference to the international non-proliferation system. In light of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any nuclear detonation as highlighted by the Oslo and Nayarit Conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, Switzerland urged the international community to strengthen the norm of the non-use of nuclear weapons. It then argued that in the absence of a legally binding instrument addressing that issue, all NWS should take

**Introduced by:** India (20 Oct.)

**GA vote:** 125-50-7 (2 Dec.)

**1st Cttee vote:** 123-48-7 (29 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 186–188.
practical measures to ensure that the use of nuclear weapons did not occur, including refraining from expanding their nuclear arsenal, reducing the alert level of nuclear weapons and diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in national doctrines.

69/78. The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East

The General Assembly stressed that the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty was an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and basis on which the Treaty had been indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995. It reiterated that the resolution would remain valid until its goals and objectives had been achieved. The Assembly called for immediate steps towards the full implementation of the resolution.

First Committee. Before voting in favour of the draft resolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran said that the draft resolution had addressed the most important aspect of security in the Middle East, namely, the threat of Israel’s nuclear-weapons arsenal. It described Israel’s policies as aggressive and expansionist and stated that its large arsenal of nuclear and other sophisticated weapons, and its non-adherence to international norms, posed the only obstacle to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free Middle East. Accordingly, it argued that the international community had no choice but to exert maximum pressure on the Israeli regime to eliminate its nuclear weapons, to accede to the NPT as an NNWS and to immediately place all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA comprehensive safeguards. It recalled the consensually adopted Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference through which 189 NPT States parties, including the main supporters of the Israeli regime, unanimously had called upon Israel to accede to the NPT and to put all clandestine nuclear activities under international safeguards.

In an explanation of vote, before the vote, Israel and the United States explained their intention to vote against the draft resolution:

- **Israel** described the draft resolution as “politically biased” and motivated to detract attention from the actual nuclear proliferation threats in the Middle East, pointing to NPT violations and other aggressive behaviour that had recently occurred in other regional countries. Accordingly, it described the resolution as perpetuating the illusion that Israel posed a proliferation risk and that other real threats to regional security were non-existent. Israel argued that while the draft resolution had lamented the failure to convene the Helsinki conference in 2012, it had failed to mention the five rounds of consultation convened by Finnish Under-Secretary Laajava, in which Israel participated, to promote the regional consensus necessary to convene the Helsinki conference. Israel emphasized the importance of these consultations and explained that it was the first time in many decades that direct regional

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4 The initial draft resolution was introduced by Egypt (on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the League of Arab States).
discussion had taken place on this complex issue. Israel concluded by questioning whether the authors of the draft resolution were as committed to this process as they purported to be.

- The **United States** argued that the resolution had failed to meet the fundamental tests of fairness and balance because its focus was confined to the activities of a single country and did not refer to the Syrian Arab Republic’s nuclear proliferation concerns in the region. Of particular concern was the fact that the resolution did not mention regional cases of non-compliance with IAEA safeguards, NPT obligations and relevant Security Council resolutions. Despite its negative vote, the United States reiterated its commitment to building the necessary confidence for a successful regional conference regarding a Middle East zone free of all WMD and their means of delivery. It acknowledged efforts to convene the Helsinki conference and to reach consensus among regional States regarding the agenda, and specifically applauded Israel’s participation in the consultations which it described as constructive. It called on regional parties to continue to exhibit the skill and determination needed to produce an agreement soon and suggested that the annual pursuit of resolutions such as this did not build confidence in the region.

After the voting, three States that had voted in favour of the draft resolution as a whole spoke:

- **Switzerland** expressed its full support for the resolution’s objective of the universalization of the NPT and welcomed specific measures adopted by the 2010 NPT Review Conference as well as the multilateral consultations that had been convened towards the goal of achieving a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons. It clarified that while the resolution had singled out the proliferation risks posed by one State in the Middle East region, by voting in favour of the draft resolution, Switzerland intended to indicate its support for adherence to Treaty obligations by every State, whether signatories or not.

- **The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea** expressed its strong support for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. However, it explained that it had abstained from voting on the fifth preambular paragraph, which extended a general call for universal adherence to the NPT and the implementation of the final documents of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, as that did not conform to its position.

- **Pakistan** reiterated its support for the primary purpose of the draft resolution but expressed concern about the continued calls on Pakistan to join the NPT as an NNWS. It confirmed its position as an NWS and confirmed that it would not join the NPT as an NNWS.

After voting against the draft resolution, **Canada** argued that the resolution was biased in that it had unfairly singled out Israel by calling for its accession to the NPT. It pointed out, in this regard, that the draft had failed to address the serious non-compliance issues of multiple States in the region that were already parties to the NPT. Specifically, Canada also claimed that the draft resolution was deficient because it did not acknowledge the non-cooperation of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Syrian Arab Republic with the IAEA and their violation of international legal obligations. Canada went on to outline the history of that non-compliance.
The following three States abstained from the voting on the draft resolution as a whole and made statements:

- **India** explained that it believed that the resolution should be limited to the region that it intended to address. It also argued that calling on non-States parties to the NPT to accede to it and to accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear activities was not in keeping with the principle of free consent by which States were bound according to customary international law. India concluded by confirming it was not bound by the NPT outcome documents as it was a non-State party to the NPT.

- **The United Kingdom** emphasized its strong support for effectively verifiable nuclear-weapon-free zones and for the establishment of a Middle East free from nuclear weapons and other WMD. Specifically, it reiterated its support for the 1995 resolution the Middle East and the outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference and called upon regional States to accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention and the CTBT, and to conclude comprehensive safeguard agreements and an additional protocol with the IAEA. It lamented the fact that the conference on the establishment of a zone free of WMD in the Middle East, which had been scheduled to take place in 2012, had not been convened. It argued that the draft resolution should explicitly reflect both the need to convene the conference and the steps that had already been taken towards convening it.

- **Australia** reiterated its commitment to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and the universalization of the NPT and its goals. Furthermore, it stressed the importance of implementing the consensus outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference and the practical steps endorsed by the Review Conferences towards the convening of a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other WMD. In that regard, Australia acknowledged the steps taken in the past year through the series of meetings held in Switzerland between the Arab States and Israel. It described the draft resolution as imbalanced because it referred only to one country without referring to other current nuclear proliferation threats in the region.

**69/81. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty**

The General Assembly shared the grave concern of the Security Council about the nuclear test conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on 12 February 2013, recalled Council resolutions 1718 (2006) of 14 October 2006 and 1874 (2009) of 12 June 2009, called for full compliance with the obligations under the relevant resolutions, and reaffirmed its support for the Six-Party Talks. It also welcomed the ratification of the Treaty by the Congo and Niue, since it considered that every ratification was a significant step towards the early entry into force of the Treaty.

**First Committee.** After voting against the draft resolution, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea explained that Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), referred to in the draft resolution, were the products of arbitrariness,
coerciveness and double standards. It criticized the Security Council’s silence regarding the annual nuclear war exercises of the United States in South Korea. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea contrasted this with the response to its own nuclear tests, which, it said, were conducted to measure self-defence capabilities. In this connection it asserted that the United States had conducted more nuclear tests than any other State. It then suggested that more attention should be paid to taking practical steps towards nuclear disarmament.

After voting in favour of the draft resolution, the following three States delivered explanations of their votes:

- **Pakistan** reaffirmed its consistent support for the objectives of the CTBT and agreed that its entry into force would be expedited if its major proponents were to ratify it, as envisaged by the draft resolution. It also observed that acceptance of the CTBT obligations by countries in the South Asian region would also speed up its entry into force. However, Pakistan reiterated that it did not consider itself to be bound by any of the provisions that emanated from the NPT Review Conferences. Accordingly, it abstained from voting on its sixth preambular paragraph, which welcomed the conclusions and recommendations of the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

- Having abstained from the vote on the sixth preambular paragraph, **Israel** pointed out that the CTBT and the NPT carried distinct obligations and membership, and that decisions taken in the context of one treaty could not automatically be imposed on States that had not subscribed to the other. It said that major steps were still required for the continued build-up and testing of the International Monitoring System stations, the completion of the operational manual for on-site inspection, and equipment purchase and training. It added that the CTBT verification regime should be robust in detecting non-compliance, be immune to abuse and should allow each State party to protect its national security interests. In this respect, Israel stressed the importance of adequate coverage of the Middle East by the International Monitoring System, drawing attention to the fact that three Middle Eastern countries had not yet set up national seismic stations or transferred data to the International Data Centre.

- The **Islamic Republic of Iran** disassociated itself from references in the draft resolution to resolutions of the Security Council “because of the language of the text and the way it had been drafted”.

After abstaining from voting on the draft resolution, the **Syrian Arab Republic** criticized the CTBT, which, it said, should have taken into account the concerns of NNWS. In this regard, it asserted that the CTBT offered no protection from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and did not permit the acquisition of peaceful technology. It further argued that the draft resolution had failed to put an end to the threat of use of nuclear weapons or to address the issues of nuclear tests, the qualitative development of nuclear weapons and the production of new weapons. Citing Israel as the only country in the Middle East with weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons, the Syrian Arab Republic asserted that Israel, a non-party to the NPT, was working towards developing them qualitatively and quantitatively. This, it said, was as an obstacle to all efforts to attain a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in the Middle East.
69/516. Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (decision)

The General Assembly decided to include in the provisional agenda of its seventieth session, under the item entitled “General and complete disarmament”, the sub-item entitled “Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”.

First Committee. Before voting against the draft decision, Pakistan reminded States that it had previously opposed the decision to establish a group of governmental experts on an FMCT as such a group would undermine the Conference on Disarmament without bringing any added value, and thereby deplete meagre United Nations resources. It argued that disagreements between NWS and NNWS regarding fissile material stocks, the definition of fissile material, equitable verification procedures and entry into force could not be resolved by the proposed group of governmental experts, and that, even if they could be resolved by such a group, the outcome reached would not be binding on the international community. Pakistan also contended that the absence of two NWS from such a group meant that it was “stillborn”.

Before abstaining from vote on the draft decision, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea expressed concern regarding provisions in the draft decision that permitted negotiations outside the Conference on Disarmament. It indicated that, as the sole multilateral negotiating forum, the Conference was the only appropriate venue to discuss disarmament issues. It also stated that Canada was irresponsible for having boycotted the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s presidency of the Conference in 2013. It argued that the main obstacle to reaching consensus in the Conference was the lack of political will to address core issues in a balanced manner.

After voting in favour of the draft decision, India and China made statements explaining their votes:

- India reiterated its support for negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament of a non-discriminatory and internationally verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It confirmed that it had submitted its views on an FMCT for the report of the Secretary-General in accordance with resolution 67/53. It explained that the Group of Governmental Experts on an FMCT, in which it was participating, constituted neither pre-negotiation nor non-negotiation of an FMCT, emphasizing that the appropriate forum for such discussion was the Conference on Disarmament, which remained the world’s single multilateral forum for disarmament negotiation. It expressed hope that the Group would strengthen international resolve to commence FMCT negotiations in the Conference.

- China confirmed its support for the negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally verifiable FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament, in accordance with the Shannon report and its mandate. It also mentioned its participation in the Group of Government Experts on an FMCT and related informal discussions that occurred in the Conference.
on Disarmament in 2014. However, it emphasized that the Conference was the only appropriate venue for such negotiations and that the work of the Group of Government Experts in this matter did not constitute negotiation or pre-negotiation.

Having abstained from the voting on the draft decision, Egypt and Israel explained their positions:

- **Egypt** reiterated the importance of a treaty on fissile material in achieving nuclear disarmament. In this regard, Egypt recalled the inclusion of step 3 in the New Agenda Coalition-sponsored language on the 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts towards nuclear disarmament at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, which called on the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral, and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. However, Egypt opposed the reference to General Assembly resolution 67/53 as it lacked operative language towards achieving complete nuclear disarmament and for omitting a clear reference to stockpiles from past production of fissile material for military use. Egypt, nonetheless, welcomed the creation of the Group of Governmental Experts under resolution 67/53 and confirmed its ongoing commitment to seeking the early adoption of a comprehensive and balanced programme of work for the Conference on Disarmament, addressing a fissile material treaty and all core issues on the agenda of the Conference.

- **Israel** argued that the capacity for a FMCT to address the growing proliferation challenges had not yet been proven and suggested that its success was even more doubtful in the Middle East due to the poor track record of compliance of several States with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations. Instead, it explained, the notion of an FMCT should be subsumed in the concept of a Middle East zone free of all WMD. Israel asserted, however, that the prerequisites for achieving such a zone were far from being fulfilled.

### 69/517. Missiles (decision)


**First Committee.** Before the draft decision was adopted, the **Islamic Republic of Iran** spoke on behalf of Egypt, Indonesia and itself, explaining that the draft had been prepared and submitted in line with the position of the NAM. It said that, in its final document, the Seventeenth Ministerial Conference of the NAM had reaffirmed the need for a multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive, transparent and
non-discriminatory approach towards the issue of missiles in all its aspects, as a
contribution to international peace and security, and expressed support for efforts to be
continued within the United Nations to explore further the issue of missiles in all its
aspects.

After this draft decision was adopted without a vote, Israel expressed
reservations regarding the fact that one of the sponsors of the draft decision had
been heavily involved in what it said was “the wholesale proliferation of rockets and
missiles to States and terrorist organizations in the Middle East region.”

**Chapter II. Biological and chemical weapons**

**69/27. Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament**

The General Assembly requested the Conference on Disarmament to keep the
matter under review with a view to making recommendations on undertaking specific
negotiations on identified types of such weapons, when necessary. It also called upon
all States to give favourable consideration to those recommendations and requested the Conference to report the results of any
consideration of the matter in its annual reports to the General Assembly.

*First Committee.* After voting against the draft resolution, the United States said
that the international community should focus on the real problem of the proliferation
of known weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and that the notion of new types of
WMD beyond chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons remained
entirely hypothetical. It explained that it voted against the draft resolution because no
useful purpose was served by diverting attention away from existing threats.

**69/53. Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol**

The General Assembly called upon those States that continued to maintain reservations
to the Geneva Protocol to withdraw them, and requested the Secretary-General to submit to the
General Assembly at its seventy-first session an implementation report on the resolution.

*Introduced by:* Belarus (30 Oct.)
*GA vote:* 174-2-1 (2 Dec.)
*1st Cttee vote:* 177-2-1 (30 Oct.)
For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see
Yearbook, Part I, pp. 3-5.

*Submitted by:* Indonesia, on behalf of
the States Members of the United Nations
that are members of the Movement of
Non-Aligned Countries (30 Oct.)
*GA vote:* 181-0-2 (2 Dec.)
*1st Cttee vote:* 178-0-2 (30 Oct.)
For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see

The General Assembly called upon all States that had not yet done so to become parties to the Convention without delay. It recalled that the Third Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) had expressed concern that Libya, the Russian Federation and the United States had been unable to fully meet the final extended deadline of 29 April 2012 for the destruction of their chemical weapons stockpiles, and also expressed determination that the destruction of all categories of chemical weapons should be completed in the shortest time possible. The Assembly emphasized the importance of the provisions of article XI of the Convention relating to the economic and technological development of States parties, recalled that the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of those provisions contributed to universality, and also reaffirmed the undertaking of the States parties to foster international cooperation for peaceful purposes in the field of chemical activities of the States parties and the importance of that cooperation and its contribution to the promotion of the Convention as a whole.

First Committee. Before voting in favour of the draft resolution, the Syrian Arab Republic reiterated its cooperation with and commitment to its responsibilities to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the United Nations mission. It stated that it had shown complete transparency regarding its chemical weapons programme and transfers, and had ended its chemical weapons programme despite doubts from the international community. It suggested that the international communities apply pressure on Israel to eliminate its WMD stockpiles and programmes, and to sign all relevant instruments and treaties as it was the only country with biological, chemical and nuclear weapons in the region. It called on countries fostering terrorism in the Syrian Arab Republic to meet their international obligations and to support the work of the OPCW by fighting those who supported and financed terrorist groups.

After voting in favour of the draft resolution, the following 11 States delivered their explanations of vote:

- The United States also spoke on behalf of Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Jordan, the Republic of Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Slovenia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine and the United Kingdom. It reaffirmed support for the objectives of the CWC and OPCW and expressed concern that the draft resolution had not gone far enough in addressing the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic and the discrepancies in the CWC declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic. It referred to the findings of the 10 September OPCW fact-finding mission that strongly implicated the Syrian Government in deadly chemical weapons attacks. The United States concluded by calling on the Syrian Arab
Republic to provide credible evidence to support its claims that it had fully abandoned its chemical weapons programme.

- **Cuba** expressed its support for the CWC and the work of the OPCW and stated that the General Assembly was not the appropriate forum for repeating discussions that had already taken place in the OPCW. It then explained that it abstained from voting on the fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs because the sponsors of the draft had failed to consider amendments proposed by Cuba.

- **Ecuador** explained that its vote was a sign of its ongoing support for and adherence to the CWC. However, Ecuador indicated that it had abstained from voting on the fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs, arguing that, by referring to specific situations that should be addressed in the OPCW, they detracted from the overall goal of the draft resolution, which was to promote the full implementation of the CWC. Ecuador concluded by expressing concern the growing trend to include new elements in draft resolutions that had previously been adopted by consensus, arguing that this could endanger the adoption of those draft resolutions by consensus.

- **Israel** expressed its ongoing support for the CWC and the OPCW. It went on to discuss ongoing concerns regarding evidence of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic provided by the OPCW fact-finding mission, which emerged after the Syrian accession to the CWC. Israel argued that the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic was not only a human tragedy with significant regional security ramifications but also was capable of undermining the basic premise of the CWC and eroding the norm against the use of chemical weapons. Accordingly, Israel called for vigilance in the international community until the complete fulfilment of Syrian obligations pertaining to chemical weapons.

- The **Russian Federation** expressed its unswerving support for the CWC. However, it explained that it had abstained from voting on the fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs because only experts were capable of assessing instances of chemical weapons use. Thus, the Russian Federation argued, the chemical demilitarization of the Syrian Arab Republic and the destruction of removed components and chemical weapons precursors required close cooperation between Damascus and the OPCW. Nonetheless, it applauded the unprecedented transparency and cooperation of the Syrian regime with the OPCW, and believed that the Syrian regime’s decision to destroy their chemical arsenal was courageous and merited the unbiased support of the international community. It added that the use by terrorists of toxic chemicals in the Middle East required the unwavering attention of the international community.

- **Turkey**, further to the statement that the United States had made on behalf of Turkey and other States, added that the sixth preambular paragraph did not reflect the actual situation with respect to the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, which it described as a flagrant violation of international law and a threat to international peace and security. Accordingly, it emphasized the ongoing importance of dismantling the Syrian regime’s chemical weapons programme and applauded the efforts of the United
Nations and OPCW personnel in that regard. It also called upon the regime to rectify discrepancies and inconsistencies between declared and actual figures of chemical weapons and production facilities.

• The Islamic Republic of Iran expressed concern that the draft resolution had failed to achieve consensus and attributed that failure to ill-informed or ill-intentioned attempts to highlight the issues of the implementation of obligations of a specific party to the Convention. It suggested that such an outcome could have been avoided if the draft resolution had been adopted without a vote as it had been previously. It argued that the main aim of the draft resolution was to promote global and complete implementation of the CWC rather than to raise country-specific issues relating to its implementation and the OPCW.

• Saudi Arabia expressed its support for the statement delivered by the United States. Specifically, it conveyed concerns regarding the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, which it believed had lied to the world by denying chemical weapons use. Saudi Arabia also alleged that the Syrian regime had provided terrorist organizations with chemical weapons.

• The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela conveyed its full support for the implementation and universalization of the Convention. However, it expressed discomfort with the fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs, which it said brought an imbalance to the objectives and the purposes of the draft resolution by focusing specifically on one country. Venezuela argued that the text of a draft resolution was not the appropriate forum for expressing concerns regarding one country’s compliance with the CWC, and so it abstained from voting on the said paragraphs.

• Nicaragua expressed its support for the universalization and implementation of the CWC and its condemnation of the use of chemical weapons. However, it explained that it abstained from voting on the fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs because they focused on one State party to the Convention in an unbalanced manner. It also argued that the paragraphs included technical elements that were already being addressed in the appropriate forum of the OPCW. Nicaragua urged the Syrian Arab Republic to continue cooperating with the OPCW.

• Egypt explained its affirmative vote stating that it had always supported the establishment and aims of the CWC. However, Egypt argued that accession to the CWC should be linked to the universalization of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons due to the lack of progress towards establishing a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other WMD in the Middle East. Egypt also explained that in September 2013, it had invited regional countries to ratify multilateral instruments on WMD and that all States in the region, except for one, answered that call. Egypt concluded by calling for a Middle East free from all WMD.
69/82. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

The General Assembly noted, with satisfaction, that the meeting of States parties and the meeting of experts, held in Geneva from 9 to 13 December 2013 and from 4 to 8 August 2014, respectively, had successfully addressed the three standing agenda items and the biennial item on the agenda. It called upon States parties to continue to participate in and contribute to the work of the intersessional process and, in particular, to make the most of the time allotted to consideration of the new biennial agenda item to be discussed in 2014 and 2015 on article VII in the remaining meetings of experts and meetings of States parties during the current intersessional process. The Assembly appreciated the information and data on confidence-building measures provided by States parties, recalled the discussions on the biennial item on confidence-building measures in 2012 and 2013 and relevant paragraphs of the reports of the meetings of States parties, and called upon all States parties to participate in the exchange of information and data on confidence-building measures called for in the relevant decisions of the review conferences.

Chapter III. Conventional weapons issues

69/33. Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons and collecting them

The General Assembly encouraged the international community to support the implementation of the Economic Community of West African States Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials, and encouraged States in the Sahelo-Saharan region to facilitate the effective functioning of national commissions to combat the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons. In this regard, the Assembly also encouraged the collaboration of civil society organizations in the efforts of the national commissions.

First Committee. After this draft resolution was adopted without a vote, Armenia expressed its full support for the overall core content of the text. Armenia explained, however, that its decision to join the consensus did not indicate a shift in its position on the Arms Trade Treaty. It reminded the delegations of its concern about the Treaty, specifically with respect to the need to include references to the principle of the equal rights and self-determination.
Disarmament resolutions and decisions listed by chapter

69/34. Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction

The General Assembly invited all States that had not signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Mine Ban Convention) to accede without delay. It urged the remaining State that had signed but had not ratified the Convention to ratify it without delay. It stressed the importance of the full and effective implementation of and compliance with the Convention. The Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to undertake the preparations necessary to convene the Fourteenth Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention.

First Committee. Before voting in favour of the draft resolution, Morocco reiterated its support for the Ottawa Convention’s humanitarian objectives, as demonstrated by its ratification of Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). It also highlighted specific measures it had adopted to apply the provisions of the Ottawa Convention, such as destroying thousands of anti-personnel mines, anti-tank mines and unexploded devices and providing care for victims in the areas of medical, social and economic rehabilitation.

Before abstaining from vote on the draft resolution, the United States explained the recent changes to its anti-personnel landmine policy. It confirmed that it would not produce or acquire any anti-personnel munitions that were not compliant with the Ottawa Convention. It indicated that it would not use anti-personnel mines outside the Korean peninsula, nor assist, encourage or induce anyone outside that area to engage in activity prohibited by the Ottawa Convention. Finally, it stated that it would undertake to destroy anti-personnel landmine stockpiles not required for the defence of the Republic of Korea. However, the United States explained that, due to the unique circumstances in the Korean Peninsula, it was not in a position to comply fully with the Ottawa Convention and therefore had abstained on the draft resolution.

After voting in favour of the draft resolution, the following two States delivered statements:

- Singapore expressed its continued support for all initiatives against the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines. In this regard, it explained details of an indefinite moratorium on the export of all anti-personnel mines it had initiated in 1996. It stressed that the legitimate security concerns and the right to self-defence of all States could not be disregarded. It concluded by confirming its commitment to working with all members of the international community towards finding a durable, global solution.

- Libya explained that it was not a State party to the Mine Ban Convention and that its Transitional Government could not, therefore, address that issue. Nonetheless, it explained that it shared humanitarian concerns regarding the

\* The initial draft resolution was introduced by Mozambique. The revised draft resolution was submitted by the sponsors.
use of anti-personnel mines. It thanked the non-governmental organizations that had supported Libya in addressing the problems caused by unexploded mines in its territory and expressed hope that such assistance would continue. Libya concluded that this was the first time that it had voted in favour of the draft resolution.

After abstaining from the vote on the draft resolution, the following six States explained their positions:

- **India** expressed its support for the vision of a world free of anti-personnel landmines. It stated that the goal would be supported by the development of militarily effective and affordable alternative technologies that fulfilled the legitimate defensive role of anti-personnel mines. India emphasized that it was a High Contracting Party to Amended Protocol II of the CCW and that it had fulfilled its obligations accordingly. Moreover, India explained that it had sought to address the humanitarian concerns arising from the use of anti-personnel landmines in keeping with international humanitarian law. Finally, it stressed that it had participated as an observer in the Third Review Conference of the Mine Ban Convention.

- **Pakistan** confirmed its commitment to pursuing the objectives of a universal and non-discriminatory ban on anti-personnel mines that took into account the legitimate defence requirements of States. It explained that it was not able to agree to the demands for the complete prohibition of anti-personnel landmines until non-lethal, militarily and cost-effective alternative technologies were available due to its long borders that were not protected by natural barriers. It stated that it was a party to Amended Protocol II of the CCW and that it had continued to vigorously implement that Protocol. Pakistan concluded by reiterating its unique record of clearing all minefields after the three wars in South Asia and its ongoing commitment to ensuring that mines in our military inventory never become a cause for civilian casualties.

- The **Democratic People’s Republic of Korea** explained that it shared the humanitarian concerns associated with the use of anti-personnel mines but that due to the particular security environment on the Korean peninsula, it was not willing to give up the use of mines in keeping with its right to self-defence. It expressed concerns regarding the United States’ failure to join the Mine Ban Convention and its continued use of mines on the Korean peninsula. Accordingly, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea explained that it was not in a position to join the Ottawa Convention or to support this draft resolution.

- **Cuba** expressed its concerns over the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines. It explained that it had been subject to a policy of hostility and aggression by a military super-power for five decades and that, in order to preserve its sovereignty and territorial integrity, it would not be possible to forgo the use of mines. It confirmed its ongoing support for all methods that maintained the necessary balance between humanitarian and national security questions and that were aimed at eliminating the terrible effects that landmines caused. It concluded by calling on all States in a position to do so to provide financial, technical and humanitarian assistance for mine removal, social rehabilitation and economic support for victims.
• **Egypt** described the instrument as unbalanced as it was developed outside the United Nations framework. The representative of Egypt highlighted that a moratorium on landmines was initiated by Egypt in the 1980s, before the conclusion of the Convention. The Convention, he said, lacked a balance between the humanitarian concerns related to the production and use of anti-personnel landmines and their legitimate military uses in border protection. Moreover, Egypt stressed that the Convention did not impose any legal responsibility on States to remove anti-personnel mines that they had placed in the territory of other States, which made it impossible for many States to meet demining requirements on their own.

• The **Republic of Korea** explained that, while it sympathized with the objectives of the Ottawa Convention and the draft resolution, it was compelled to give priority to its own security concerns due to the security situation on the Korean peninsula and was therefore unable to accede to the Convention. However, it expressed concerns about the problems associated with the use of anti-personnel mines. In this regard, it emphasized its commitment to mitigating the suffering that mines caused through an indefinite moratorium on their export. The representative of the Republic of Korea noted in her statement that her country had joined the CCW and had contributed more than $8.5 million since 1993 to demining and victim assistance.

### 69/49. The Arms Trade Treaty

The General Assembly welcomed the 54 ratifications of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) to date, its forthcoming entry into force on 24 December 2014 and the offer by Mexico to host the first Conference of States Parties to the ATT in 2015. It called upon those States in a position to do so, to provide technical and/or financial assistance to requesting States in order to promote the universalization and effective implementation of the Treaty.

**First Committee.** Before voting in favour of the draft resolution, **Canada** reiterated its belief in the goal of impeding the illicit and irresponsible arms trade that fuelled terrorism, organized crime and armed conflict. It confirmed its high standards for export controls. Canada acknowledged that some language in the ATT reaffirmed the sovereign right of any State to regulate and control conventional arms exclusively within its own territory. However, it stressed the importance of not discouraging or impeding exports and imports of firearms for legitimate purposes, such as sports shooting and hunting. In conclusion, it confirmed that it was taking the time to review the text of the ATT and to consult with domestic stakeholders.

After voting in favour of the draft resolution, the following two States explained their positions:

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1 The initial draft resolution was introduced by the United Kingdom. The revised draft resolution was submitted by the sponsors.
• **Libya** confirmed that it shared the concerns of all delegations regarding excessively harmful weapons, and expressed eagerness to review its position on some disarmament treaties to which it had not yet acceded, and to take proper decisions on those treaties. It said that it would consider its own defensive needs as well as the humanitarian consequences of those weapons.

• **China** confirmed its support for the purpose and objectives of the ATT and the great importance that it attached to the issue of illicit trafficking in, and misuse of, conventional arms. It explained that, while it was seriously considering signing the ATT, multilateral arms control treaties should be concluded by consensus rather than by the General Assembly because such treaties affected international and national security. It expressed its commitment to strengthening cooperation with all parties and for regulating the arms trade.

After abstaining from voting on the draft resolution, the five States below spoke:

• **India** reiterated its active participation in negotiations for the ATT and expressed its belief that the pursuit of national security objectives did not conflict with the aspiration that the ATT be strong, balanced and objective. It explained that recent events had highlighted the deficiencies of the ATT with respect to the imbalance in obligations between exporting and importing States and whether the Treaty was capable of making any meaningful impact on illicit trafficking in conventional arms and their use by unlawful non-State actors. Finally, it explained that it would be unable to adopt a final position on the ATT until it had conducted a thorough review of the Treaty with respect to India’s defence, security and foreign policy interests.

• **Ecuador** highlighted flaws of the ATT, in particular the imbalance of rights and obligations between exporting and importing States; the relationship between important fundamental principles of international law and the Treaty; the absence of an explicit prohibition of transfers to non-State and unauthorized actors; the absence of any explicit reference to the crime of aggression; and the possibility that some articles could be used to exert undue political pressure. Ecuador also regretted the attempt at the final moments of the Conference to redefine the practice and definition of consensus. It explained that it was considering the text of the Treaty, its implications and the specific way in which it would be implemented in order to take a final position on the Treaty, and said that those States that promoted the ATT would have to demonstrate that the Treaty’s real purpose was not to exert undue political control on the internal affairs of other States.

• **Egypt** expressed concern that the Treaty had failed to define important terms and concepts or to mention the crimes of aggression and foreign occupation as part of the assessment of the implementation process. It also argued that the continued lack of adherence to the ATT by major producing and exporting States, and the lack of international scrutiny regarding production and stockpiles in those States, detracted from its usefulness. It concluded by confirming that it would continue to closely follow developments regarding the ATT in order to adopt a final position with respect to the Treaty.

• Referring to the negotiations on the ATT, **Cuba** stated that a premature vote was forced on a text that did not align with the demands and needs of the
international community. It described the ATT as ambiguous, inconsistent and unbalanced. It argued that the ATT favoured States that exported arms and that the parameters established to evaluate transfers were subjective and easy to manipulate. In particular, Cuba believed that the ATT effectively legitimized one of the main sources of illicit arms trafficking because it failed to include a provision on the transfer of weapons to non-State actors. It confirmed that it would strictly apply all measures necessary to prevent and combat the illicit arms trade.

• The **Islamic Republic of Iran** stated that it had extensively explained its position regarding the ATT during the thematic discussion under the “Conventional weapons” cluster. It said that it had voted against paragraph 3 of the draft resolution and abstained from voting on the draft resolution as a whole for the reasons outlined in a statement on 23 October 2014 (see A/C.1/69/PV.15).

### 69/51. The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects

The General Assembly endorsed the report adopted at the Fifth Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, and encouraged all States to implement the measures highlighted in the annex to the report under the sections entitled “Way forward”. The Assembly decided to hold the next open-ended meeting of governmental experts in New York from 1 to 5 June 2015, the agenda of which would include the topics contained in paragraph 40 of the outcome document of the Fifth Biennial Meeting of States. It recognized the urgent need to maintain and enhance national controls to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, including their diversion to illicit trade, illegal armed groups, terrorists and other unauthorized recipients.

**First Committee.** Following the adoption of the resolution without a vote, Armenia expressed its full support for the overall core content of the text. However, it explained that its decision to join the consensus did not indicate a shift in Armenia’s stated position on the ATT. It reminded delegations of its concern with the ATT, specifically with respect to the need to include references to the principle of the equal rights and self-determination.

**Canada,** which also spoke after action on the draft, explained the importance of preventing irresponsible trade in those weapons that fuelled armed conflict and terrorism and mentioned strict domestic instruments it had adopted in that spirit. It also highlighted that the ATT reaffirmed the right of every State to regulate and control conventional weapons exclusively within its own territory. Accordingly, it argued that it was important that the Treaty did not discourage the import and export of firearms for legitimate purposes.
69/57. Effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium

The General Assembly encouraged Member States in a position to do so to provide assistance to States affected by the use of arms and ammunitions containing depleted uranium, in particular in identifying and managing contaminated sites and material.

First Committee. Before voting in favour of the draft resolution, the following three States explained their votes:

- **Belgium** stated that in May 2007 it had enacted domestic legislation that classified inactive munitions and armour, depleted uranium or any other type of industrial uranium as prohibited weapons. It stressed the importance that it attached to developments in the scientific analysis of dangers associated with the use of depleted uranium weapons systems. In this regard, it stated that it was available to the United Nations for any clarification regarding the 2007 legislation and that it was willing to offer its expertise to interested States by discussing the Belgian legislative experience in this matter.

- **Cuba** stated that the draft resolution took a very balanced and comprehensive approach to legitimate international concerns regarding the effects of the use of depleted uranium weapons systems.

- **Japan** confirmed that it had neither used nor possessed weapons or ammunitions containing depleted uranium. It recognized that despite reputable studies documenting the effects of the use of such weapons on human health and the environment, no internationally definitive conclusion had yet been drawn. Accordingly, Japan called on all relevant international organizations to conduct on-site studies and further information-gathering and also to pay due attention to the opinions and activities of interested non-governmental organizations in this field.

Before voting against the draft resolution, the **United States** spoke on behalf of the United Kingdom, France and itself. It stated that, despite thorough investigations into the environmental and long-term health effects of the use of depleted uranium munitions by the World Health Organization, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the International Atomic Energy Agency, among others, none of those inquiries had documented long-term environmental or health effects attributable to the use of these munitions. Accordingly, it said that the delegations regretted the fact that the conclusions of these studies had been ignored. Moreover, it argued that the sponsors of the draft resolution had included only a partial quotation from the 2010 UNEP response in order to strengthen their claim. It stated that, given the lack of contrary evidence, the delegations did not recognize the presupposed potential risk to health and the environment of these weapons, and so did not support the draft resolution.

Before abstaining from the vote on the draft resolution, **Germany** expressed regret that the results of the 2010 UNEP report (A/65/129) continued to be quoted in a selective and misleading way. Specifically, it stated that the report had concluded...
that the measured overall levels of radioactivity had been low and within acceptable international standards and had posed no immediate danger but that these findings were not adequately reflected in the draft resolution. It expressed similar concerns that the text did not include findings of the 2012 report of the IAEA (A/67/177). It concluded that further studies regarding the effects of depleted uranium weapons should be studied more closely.

After voting in favour of the draft resolution, the following two States delivered statements:

- **Sweden** stated that it was not opposed to further research in that area and that it appreciated that the issue was being discussed in the United Nations. It went on to note that the potential harmful effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium on human health and the environment had not been substantiated by conclusive scientific evidence. Accordingly, it explained that it would have preferred the draft resolution to point to the outcome of research conducted so far. It concluded by noting that it would monitor ongoing research in this field and would take any developments into consideration in the 2016 session of the First Committee.

- The **Netherlands** explained that despite its affirmative vote, it regretted the fact that the UNEP report from 2010 (A/65/129/Add.1) was cited in a selective way in the text of the draft resolution. Moreover, it argued that the more neutral term “possible consequences” would have been preferable to terms such as “potential long-term effects”, “potential harmful effects” and “potential hazards”. Nonetheless, it stated that due to ongoing scientific uncertainties regarding the consequences of using armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium, the Netherlands supported the call for a cautionary approach to their use.

**69/60. Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures**

The General Assembly emphasized the importance of including in United Nations-mandated peacekeeping missions practical disarmament measures aimed at addressing the illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons, including through weapons collection, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes and through enhancing physical security and stockpile management practices. It encouraged the Group of Interested States to continue to discuss how recent developments in small arms technology can contribute to the advancement of practical disarmament measures, as well as how relevant tools and technologies can be applied effectively to capacity-building projects in conflict and post-conflict contexts. It also encouraged Member States in a position to do so to financially contribute to the United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation.
69/64. Information on confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms

The General Assembly encouraged Member States to continue to adopt and apply confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms and to provide information in that regard. It took note, with appreciation, of the report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to resolution 65/63, and took note of its conclusions, including the importance of tailoring confidence-building measures agreed in regional and subregional or bilateral contexts to the particular security concerns of States within a region and subregion.


The General Assembly noted with satisfaction the decision of the 2013 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention to convene in 2014 a four-day informal meeting of experts to discuss the questions related to emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems, and welcomed the informal discussions held from 13 to 16 May 2014 in that regard.

Chapter IV. Regional disarmament


The General Assembly welcomed the convening of the third Conference of States Parties, on 29 and 30 May 2014, held in Addis Ababa and encouraged States parties to the Treaty to conclude additional protocols to their safeguards agreements on the basis of the model protocol approved by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency on 15 May 1997.

First Committee. After the draft resolution was adopted without a vote, the three following States explained their positions:

- **India** affirmed its respect for the sovereign choice of non-nuclear-weapon States to agree to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones. In this regard, it expressed support for the sovereign choice of States parties to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty and conveyed its unambiguous assurance that it would respect the status of the African nuclear-weapon-free zone.
Spain acknowledged the significant contribution of the Treaty of Pelindaba to strengthening international peace and security and affirmed its preparedness to ensure that the States parties to that Treaty were capable of implementing its provisions. However, it indicated that it had not signed the Protocol and, in this regard, highlighted its concerns. First, it explained that the Treaty did not contain any provision with respect to disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation that Spain had not already adopted. Second, it stated that it had already taken all necessary measures to ensure that the Treaty applied throughout its territory. It concluded by stating that it did not consider itself bound by the consensus on paragraph 5.

Israel explained that it had joined the consensus on the Treaty because it supported the principle that nuclear-weapon-free zones should emanate exclusively from free, regional consensus. It also noted that, of those States that had not yet ratified the Treaty of Pelindaba, some had called on States to join and establish a zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the Middle East. Israel argued that it would seem logical that those States should begin by adopting the Treaty of Pelindaba, rather than focusing their efforts on unhelpful resolutions.

69/29. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East

The General Assembly called upon all countries of the region that had not yet done so, pending the establishment of the zone, to agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, and requested the Secretary-General to continue to pursue consultations with the States of the region and other concerned States and to seek their views on the measures outlined in the study annexed to his report of 10 October 1990 or other relevant measures.

First Committee. After the draft resolution was adopted without vote, the following two States explained their positions:

Israel stated that it was committed to establishing a more peaceful Middle East region. It concurred with the draft’s recognition of the importance of a credible regional security process that considered the security concerns of all regional States, which was fundamental to achieving a Middle East zone free of WMD. It argued that a credible process was closely related to the principle that the establishment of any WMD-free zone must be based on consensus. It concluded by noting the lack of mechanisms to foster dialogue about core security issues and to de-escalate tensions in the Middle East, adding that direct discussions between regional partners were needed to build consensus in the Middle East.

The Islamic Republic of Iran lamented the lack of progress in establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, criticizing Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, it called upon Israel to eliminate all its nuclear weapons, to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and to place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.
It also called upon the sponsors of the draft resolution to exert pressure on the Israeli regime to participate in the 2015 NPT Review Conference without any preconditions. It concluded by confirming its commitment to take practical steps within the agreed mandate of the 2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document to make progress towards establishing an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of WMD.

69/35. Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas

The General Assembly welcomed the signing by the nuclear-weapon States of the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, and encouraged progress with a view to concluding consultations between the nuclear-weapon States and the parties to the Bangkok Treaty on the Protocol to that Treaty.

First Committee. After voting against the draft resolution, the United States spoke on behalf of France, the United Kingdom and itself. While emphasizing the importance of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones, it explained that such zones must be established in accordance with the 1999 United Nations Disarmament Commission guidelines, that is, they are supported by all States of the region concerned, and by nuclear-weapon States; secondly, the subject of appropriate treaties including comprehensive safeguards provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency; and thirdly, satisfactorily concluded in consultation with the nuclear-weapon States. The United States pointed out, however, that the delegations believed that it was contradictory to propose simultaneously the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone composed largely of the high seas, yet to say that it would be fully consistent with applicable principles and rules of international law relating to the freedom of the high seas and the right of passage through maritime space, including those of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The United States and the delegations associated with its statement continued to question whether the real goal of the draft resolution was, in fact, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone covering the high seas.

69/36. Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia

The General Assembly welcomed the signing of the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia on 6 May 2014 by the nuclear-weapon States, and called on them to take measures for its early ratification. It also welcomed the convening of the consultative meeting of States parties on 25 July 2014 in Almaty.
69/45. Regional disarmament

The General Assembly called upon States to conclude agreements, wherever possible, for nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and confidence-building measures at the regional and subregional levels. It welcomed the initiatives towards disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and security undertaken at these levels, and supported and encouraged efforts aimed at promoting confidence-building measures, easing regional tensions and furthering disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation at the regional and subregional levels.

69/46. Confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context

The General Assembly called upon Member States to refrain from the use or threat of use of force in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It also called upon Member States to pursue confidence- and security-building measures through sustained consultations and dialogue, and urged States to strictly comply with all bilateral, regional and international agreements, including arms control and disarmament agreements, to which they were party. The Assembly encouraged the promotion of bilateral and regional confidence-building measures.

69/47. Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels

The General Assembly requested the Conference on Disarmament to consider the formulation of principles to serve as a framework for regional agreements on conventional arms control, and looked forward to the subsequent report on the subject. It requested the Secretary-General, in the meantime, to seek the views of Member States on the subject and to submit a report to the General Assembly at its seventieth session.

First Committee. India explained that it had voted against the draft resolution, as well as its paragraph 2, which requested the Conference on Disarmament to consider the formulation of principles that could serve as a framework for regional agreements on conventional arms control. India emphasized the role of the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, stating that it had a vocation to negotiate disarmament instruments of global application. It noted, however, that in 1993, the United Nations Disarmament Commission had adopted, by consensus, guidelines and recommendations for regional disarmament. India argued that given the Commission’s action, there was no need for the Conference on
Disarmament to engage itself in formulating principles on the same subject at a time when it has several other priority issues on its agenda.

69/63. Mongolia’s international security and nuclear-weapon-free status

The General Assembly welcomed the declarations of 17 September 2012 by Mongolia and the five nuclear-weapon States on Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, as a concrete contribution to nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the enhancement of confidence and predictability in the region.

First Committee. After the draft resolution was adopted without vote, India welcomed its adoption. It noted the many steps taken by Mongolia to reinforce its nuclear-weapon-free status and the support and security assurances that it had received from Member States. India concluded by confirming its full respect for Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status.

69/66. Third Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia, 2015

The General Assembly decided to convene the third Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia as a one-day Conference, in New York in 2015. It requested the Secretary-General to provide a conference room at United Nations Headquarters for the Conference, along with the necessary assistance and conference services as may be required.

First Committee. After abstaining from voting on the draft resolution, the United States spoke on behalf of the United Kingdom, France and itself, reiterating their concerns about the draft resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Southern hemisphere. The above delegations, the United States said, did not endorse the language of the third preambular paragraph. In this regard, it explained that they could not give an unqualified endorsement to paragraph 172 of the Final Documents of the Sixteenth Non-Aligned Movement Summit, or to the proclamation of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. The United States requested that the Secretariat confirm that the cost of the third Conference would be borne by States parties to the Treaties and that the Conference would not impact on the regular budget of the United Nations.
69/68. United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific

The General Assembly expressed its satisfaction with the activities carried out in the past year by the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, and invited all States of the region to continue to support the activities of the Regional Centre, including by continuing to take part in them, where possible, and by proposing items for inclusion in the programme of activities of the Centre, in order to contribute to the implementation of measures for peace and disarmament.

69/70. United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament

The General Assembly appealed to Member States in each region that were able to do so, as well as to international governmental and non-governmental organizations and foundations, to make voluntary contributions to the United Nations regional centres in their respective regions to strengthen their activities and initiatives. It also requested the Secretary-General to provide all support necessary, within existing resources, to the regional centres in carrying out their programmes of activities.

First Committee. Before the draft resolution was adopted without a vote, Cuba expressed its support for the revitalization of the regional centres for peace and disarmament. It drew attention to the work of the centres to educate the public, to foster support for United Nations disarmament objectives and to promote a culture of peace. It concluded by recognizing the assistance provided by regional centres to consensus building and cooperation among States in each region.

69/72. United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean

The General Assembly encouraged the Regional Centre to further develop activities in countries of the region in the important areas of peace, disarmament and development and to provide support to Member States of the region in the national implementation of relevant instruments, inter alia, the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the Arms Trade Treaty, as well as in the implementation of the Caribbean 1540 programme on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Submitted by: Indonesia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (31 Oct.)
GA vote: w/o vote (2 Dec.)
1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (31 Oct.)
For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 189-190.
69/73. Regional confidence-building measures: activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa

The General Assembly called upon Member States to take immediate concerted action to counter poaching and illegal wildlife trafficking. It strongly encouraged the States members of the Standing Advisory Committee and international partners to support the work of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa, including by ensuring that it had adequate resources to undertake its mandate.

Introduced by: Equatorial Guinea, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Economic Community of Central African States (22 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (31 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 198-203.

69/74. United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa

The General Assembly noted with appreciation the substantive support provided by the Regional Centre to the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, and to African Member States in the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) of 28 April 2004 and of the Biological Weapons Convention. It commended the Regional Centre for the support and assistance that it had provided to African States, upon request, on the Arms Trade Treaty, including through the organization of subregional and regional seminars and workshops.

Introduced by: Nigeria, on behalf of States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of African States (22 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (31 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 204-207.

69/80. Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region

The General Assembly reaffirmed that security in the Mediterranean was closely linked to that of Europe, as well as to international peace and security. It called upon all States of the Mediterranean region that had not yet done so to adhere to all the multilaterally negotiated legal instruments related to the field of disarmament and non-proliferation; and encouraged them to strengthen confidence-building measures by promoting openness and transparency on all military matters, by participating, inter alia, in the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures and by providing accurate data and information to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

Introduced by: Algeria (27 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (3 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 227-230.
69/514. Maintenance of international security—good-neighbourliness, stability and development in South-Eastern Europe (decision)

The General Assembly decided to include in the provisional agenda of its seventy-first session the item entitled “Maintenance of international security—good-neighbourliness, stability and development in South-Eastern Europe”.

Chapter V. Emerging, cross-cutting and other issues

69/28. Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security

The General Assembly welcomed the commencement of the work of the Group of Governmental Experts, and authorized the Group to continue to study existing and potential threats in the sphere of information security and possible cooperative measures to address them, including norms, rules or principles of responsible behaviour of States and confidence-building measures, the issues of the use of information and communications technologies in conflicts and how international law applies to the use of information and communications technologies by States.

First Committee. Before the draft resolution was adopted without a vote, Cuba, Sweden and Belarus explained their votes:

- In a general statement, Cuba said that the hostile use of telecommunications to subvert the internal legal order of another State was a violation of recognized international norms, was detrimental to promoting international peace and security and undermined the principles of the United Nations Charter. It stated that the draft resolution adequately emphasized the need to avoid the use of information technology and resources for criminal terrorist purposes. It denounced any covert and illegal use of information systems belonging to other nations by individuals, organizations and States.

- Sweden made a general statement on behalf of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, Montenegro, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and Uruguay. While the delegations intended to join consensus on the draft resolution, Sweden stressed that international deliberations on cyberspace issues and the use of information...
and communications technologies must evolve in line with greater common understanding on these issues. In that regard, they welcomed the efforts of the 2012-2013 Group of Governmental Experts on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security. They believed that the Internet should be kept open and that individuals should enjoy the same rights online as they did offline. Sweden argued that discussions with wider implications for the future of the Internet should be based on a multi-stakeholder approach that included private sector and civil society actors. It also stressed the importance of continuing to engage in an international discussion on norms and principles of responsible State behaviour. This statement was in keeping with the Group’s finding that international law was applicable in guiding State activities in cyberspace.

- **Belarus** emphasized the importance of information technology to contemporary society and the need to combat cybercrime through joint efforts. It expressed concern that the Internet was increasingly used for crimes committed under the guise of personal freedom of expression and said that it was implementing policies to counteract cybercrime.

### 69/31. Prevention of an arms race in outer space

The General Assembly invited the Conference on Disarmament to establish a working group under its agenda item entitled “Prevention of an arms race in outer space” as early as possible during its 2015 session.

**First Committee.** Before voting in favour of the draft resolution, **China** delivered a general statement expressing support for resolutions on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, in which the General Assembly had affirmed that the Conference on Disarmament should play the primary role in the negotiation of multilateral agreements on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

### 69/32. No first placement of weapons in outer space

The General Assembly reaffirmed the importance and urgency of the objective to prevent an arms race in outer space and the willingness of States to contribute to reaching this common goal. It reiterated that the Conference on Disarmament had the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. It urged an early start of substantive work based on the updated draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and of the threat or use of force against outer space objects submitted by China and the Russian Federation at the Conference on Disarmament. The Assembly stressed that, while such an agreement had not yet been concluded, other measures could contribute to ensuring that weapons were not placed in outer space.
Disarmament resolutions and decisions listed by chapter

First Committee. Before voting in favour of the draft resolution, the following seven States delivered general statements:

- **Cuba** affirmed States’ legitimate right to use and explore outer space for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of scientific and economic development, while emphasizing the danger that an arms race in outer space would pose to international peace and security. It described the draft resolution as a contribution to the effort to prevent an arms race in outer space and to promote transparency in space activities.

- **Kazakhstan** explained that it had sponsored the draft resolution because of the growing use of space for military, commercial and other purposes. It drew attention to the danger that acquiring advanced space warfare technology could trigger an arms race in outer space. It confirmed its commitment to the peaceful use of outer space and sought assurances that no weapons would be placed in outer space.

- **Belarus** emphasized its consistent commitment to preventing an arms race in outer space. It stated its belief that the draft resolution would contribute to commencing negotiations on the development of a legally binding treaty on preventing the deployment of weapons in outer space.

- **Indonesia** confirmed its belief in the sovereign rights of all States to explore and use outer space for peaceful purposes and that the prevention of an arms race in outer space would avert a grave danger to international peace and security. In that regard, it expressed concern over the threat of the weaponization of outer space, as underscored by the draft resolution. It reiterated the central role of the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral negotiating forum with the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement on an arms race in outer space.

- **Pakistan** said that it reaffirmed its commitment to ensuring that outer space remained clear of weapons and arms. It argued that States’ commitment to keep outer space free of weapons did not undermine the security of any other State and were therefore positive contributions to ensuring peace and security.

- **China** described space as the common heritage of humankind and affirmed the importance of preventing the weaponization of, and an arms race in, outer space. It expressed its support for General Assembly resolutions on preventing an arms race in outer space, in which the Assembly reiterated the important role of the Conference on Disarmament in the negotiation of multilateral agreements on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It also welcomed comments from all Member States regarding an updated draft treaty submitted by China and the Russian Federation to the Conference on Disarmament on the prevention of weapons in outer space and the threat or use of force against outer space objects.

- **Nicaragua** said it was in favour of preventing the deployment of weapons in outer space and that it hoped that space would always be used to promote peace. It expressed support for negotiating a multilateral agreement to prevent the weaponization of outer space.

Before voting in favour, the following two States explained their positions:
• **Mexico** reiterated its support for preventing an arms race in outer space and its commitment to preserve outer space for solely peaceful uses. It also asserted that all nuclear weapons must be prohibited and eliminated, irrespective of their classification and where they were found. It concluded by noting that a statement by a country or several countries that they would not be the first to place weapons in outer space should not be construed in any way as a tacit endorsement or acceptance of any right to do so, as that could lead to a de facto arms race in outer space.

• **Costa Rica** expressed its commitment to preserve outer space for exclusively peaceful purposes and to achieve full disarmament. However, it said that the mere fact that one State or a group of States had declared that they would not be the first to place weapons in outer space did not lead to an absolute prohibition on avoiding having weapons in outer space. It suggested that, in that regard, the draft resolution did not go far enough towards the goal of a full, universal and complete prohibition and elimination of all nuclear weapons.

Before voting against the draft resolution, the following two States spoke:

• The **United States** indicated that, in light of the criteria for evaluating space-related transparency and confidence-building measures found in the July 2013 consensus study (A/68/189) by a Group of Governmental Experts, it found that “the no first placement pledge” proposed by the Russian Federation contained several problems. It argued that the pledge did not adequately define a weapon in outer space; that it would be impossible to confirm a State’s political commitment not to be the first to place weapons in outer space; and that the pledge focused exclusively on space-based weapons without considering terrestrially based anti-satellite weapons, which could pose a significant threat to spacecraft. It believed that pragmatic and effective measures were needed to maintain the space environment for future generations.

• **Ukraine** reiterated its commitment to all aspects of disarmament, including to such efforts in outer space. However, it doubted the sincerity of the Russian Federation in proposing the draft resolution. In that regard, it discussed the annexation of Crimea and said that the Russian Federation had violated the Charter of the United Nations by sending regular troops to the eastern regions of Ukraine and by providing armaments. It also stated that the Russian Federation had violated the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Budapest Memorandum and key Baltic treaties with Ukraine, and described the draft resolution as a weak attempt to draw the attention of the international community away from those matters.

Before abstaining from voting on the draft resolution, **Italy** spoke on behalf of the member States of the European Union, as well as Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Iceland and Norway. Italy explained their concern about the ambiguity of the “no first placement of weapons in outer space” pledge, which may entice States to prepare to be the second or third. It also argued that the initiative had failed to define what constituted a “weapon” in outer space. Moreover, it expressed their concern regarding the continued development of all anti-satellite weapons and capabilities and argued that the pledge in that environment could lead to
misunderstanding. Accordingly, it argued that it would be more useful to address the use of outer space so as to prevent it from becoming an arena for conflict.

After voting in favour of the draft resolution, **India** referred to its vital developmental and security interests in outer space and expressed support for the goal of consolidating and reinforcing the legal regimes applicable to outer space needs, to protecting and preserving access to outer space for all, and to preventing the weaponization of outer space. It also expressed support for the substantive consideration of the prevention of an arms race in outer space in the Conference on Disarmament and argued that transparency and confidence-building measures could complement legally binding instruments. Finally, India described the draft resolution as an “interim step” rather than a substitute for substantive legal measures.

After abstaining from voting on the draft resolution, **Switzerland** expressed support for the development of legally binding instruments to prevent an arms race in outer space and suggested that, before the finalization of such instruments, confidence-building measures were needed. It argued that the preservation of outer space required ensuring that no weapons were placed in outer space and also that outer space did not become a theatre for conflict. It said that a “no first placement” pledge was only one element of a much broader set of necessary measures to preserve outer space. It stated that the development of ground-based systems that made it possible to attack or undermine space activities was a source of concern that was even more immediate than the possible placement of weapons in outer space.

**69/38. Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities**

The General Assembly requested the relevant entities and organizations of the United Nations system, to which, in accordance with resolution 68/50, the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-building Measures in Outer Space Activities had been circulated, to assist in effectively implementing the conclusions and recommendations contained therein, as appropriate. The Assembly decided to convene, within existing resources, a joint ad hoc meeting of the Disarmament and International Security Committee (First Committee) and the Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee) to address possible challenges to space security and sustainability, and to include in the provisional agenda of its seventieth session, under the item entitled “General and complete disarmament”, a sub-item entitled “Joint ad hoc meeting of the First and Fourth Committees on possible challenges to space security and sustainability”.

**First Committee.** In a general statement before the draft resolution was adopted without a vote, **Cuba** emphasized the legitimate right of all States to use and explore outer space for peaceful purposes for the benefit of scientific and economic development. It believed that continuing the implementation of transparent international measures was necessary to promote confidence in outer space. It explained that it had previously concluded a joint declaration with the Russian Federation according to which each State committed itself not to be the first to
place any kind of weapon in outer space. Cuba also stated that the Conference on Disarmament would be the appropriate forum to conduct negotiations for a multilateral agreement on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

After the draft resolution was adopted without a vote, India explained that it had joined consensus on the draft resolution due to the usefulness of confidence-building and transparency measures. It regretted that it had not been included in the Group of Governmental Experts convened by the Secretary-General and suggested that a Group with more inclusive participation, including all the relevant space-faring nations, would have ensured that the Group produced a more balanced and coherent report.

69/39. Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction

The General Assembly called upon all Member States to support international efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and urged them to strengthen national measures in that regard. It appealed to them to consider early accession to and ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and requested the Secretary-General to compile a report on measures already taken by international organizations on issues relating to the linkage between the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It also requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States on additional relevant measures for tackling the global threat posed by terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction and to report to the General Assembly at its seventieth session.

First Committee. Before the draft resolution was adopted without a vote, the following two States delivered statements:

• The Islamic Republic of Iran argued that the IAEA was the most appropriate forum to garner international cooperation to prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons by strengthening the security and physical protection of nuclear material and facilities. In that regard, it expressed reservations regarding the reference to the nuclear security summits in the ninth preambular paragraph of the draft resolution, and dissociated itself from the consensus under that paragraph.

• The Russian Federation stressed that the prohibition of the development, production and manufacture of new types of WMD should occupy a special place on the agenda of the First Committee and called for proactivity in that regard. It described the goal of the draft resolution as an attempt to establish coordinated international procedures to monitor the development of new types of WMD.

After the draft resolution was adopted without a vote, Pakistan stressed that concerns regarding terrorism should not be used to pursue a policy of discrimination against selected countries. It argued that international assistance and capacity-building were important in domestic measures to prevent WMD from falling into the hands of terrorists, and urged that measures like the adoption of Security Council resolutions
1540 (2004) and 1977 (2011) be done in a more inclusive and representative United Nations forum. It criticized the slow progress of chemical weapon disarmament and the ongoing existence of huge quantities of chemical weapons, and stated that the Chemical Weapons Convention could effectively address many threats envisaged by the draft resolution. Similarly, Pakistan also called for greater control of biological weapons and the strengthening of the Biological Weapons Convention through a verification protocol. Finally, it welcomed the reference to the Final Document of the sixteenth Non-Aligned Movement Summit, which referred to suppression, injustice and deprivation as causes of terrorism.

69/50. Preventing the acquisition by terrorists of radioactive sources

The General Assembly encouraged all Member States that had not yet done so to become party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as soon as possible, in accordance with their legal and constitutional processes. It encouraged Member States to work with the International Atomic Energy Agency to enhance the non-legally binding international framework for radioactive sources, especially on the safe and secure management of disused radioactive sources, in accordance with relevant resolutions of the Agency, in particular with resolutions GC(58)/RES/10 and GC(58)/RES/11. The general Assembly also encouraged Member States to participate, on a voluntary basis, in the International Atomic Energy Agency Incident and Trafficking Database programme.

First Committee. Before the draft resolution was adopted without a vote, Egypt explained that it supported the draft resolution. It added, however, that any new issues raised by international governmental agencies should be incorporated into the final version of the draft resolution transmitted to the General Assembly.

After the draft resolution was adopted without a vote, the Islamic Republic of Iran explained that, to preserve global consensus on the issue, unrelated matters should not be included in the text, and welcomed the removal of new language and concepts included in the initial draft text. In that regard, it called on the sponsors to refrain from raising technical issues, which it believed should be exclusively considered within the IAEA. It concluded by stating that, due to the limited time available to consider the new provisions of the draft resolution, it reserved the right to make further comments on the draft resolution at a later stage.

69/54. Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation

The General Assembly reaffirmed multilateralism as the core principle in disarmament and non-proliferation negotiations and called, once again, upon all Member States to renew and fulfil their individual and collective commitments to multilateral cooperation as an important means of pursuing and achieving their
common disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. It requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States on the issue and to submit a report thereon to the General Assembly at its seventieth session.

69/55. Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control

The General Assembly called upon States to adopt unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures to contribute to ensuring the application of scientific and technological progress within the framework of international security, disarmament and other related spheres, without detriment to the environment or to its effective contribution to attaining sustainable development. It invited all Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General the measures they had adopted, and requested the Secretary-General to submit a report containing that information to the Assembly’s seventieth session.

First Committee. After this draft resolution was adopted without a vote, the following two States explained their positions:

• The United Kingdom, also speaking on behalf of France, said that the delegations had joined the consensus on the draft resolution and stressed that they had stringent domestic environmental impact regulations for many activities, including the implementation of arms control and disarmament agreements. However, it indicated that they did not see a direct connection between general environmental standards and multilateral arms control, as suggested by the draft resolution.

• The United States highlighted its stringent domestic environmental impact regulations for many activities, including the implementation of arms control and disarmament agreements. However, it explained that it did not see a direct connection between general environmental standards and multilateral arms control, as stated in the draft resolution, nor did it consider the matter to be germane to the First Committee.

69/56. Relationship between disarmament and development

The General Assembly reiterated its invitation to Member States to provide the Secretary-General with information regarding measures and efforts to devote part of the resources made available by the implementation of disarmament and arms limitation agreements to economic and social development, with a view to reducing the ever-widening gap between developed and developing countries.
**First Committee.** After the draft resolution was adopted without a vote, the two States below explained their positions:

- The **United Kingdom**, speaking also on behalf of France, explained that the delegations had joined the consensus but questioned the link between disarmament and development, arguing that the conditions conducive to disarmament were not necessarily dependent on development only. Instead, it described the relationship between disarmament and development as a complex one. Moreover, it suggested that the notion that military expenditure directly diverted funding from development requirements was more nuanced because defence investments were also necessary to develop peacekeeping, to improve response to natural disasters and, in certain conditions, to favour stability.

- The **United States** said that it did not participate in the Committee’s action on the draft resolution. It expressed its belief that disarmament and development were two distinct issues. Accordingly, it did not consider itself bound by the Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development that was adopted in 1987.

**69/61. Women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control**

The General Assembly encouraged Member States to better understand the impact of armed violence, in particular the impact of the illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons on women and girls, through, inter alia, strengthening the collection of data disaggregated by sex and age. It also called upon all States to develop appropriate and effective national risk assessment criteria to facilitate the prevention of the use of arms to commit violence against women and children.

**First Committee.** After voting in favour of the draft resolution, the following eight States delivered statements:

- **India** expressed its full support for the objectives of the draft resolution. However, it explained that it had abstained from voting on the eighth preambular paragraph due to its reference to the ATT. India explained that it was still conducting an internal review of its position on the ATT.

- The **Islamic Republic of Iran** explained that it abstained from voting on the eighth preambular paragraph due to the reference to the ATT, which it believed was not a consensus-based Treaty and was “full of legal flaws and loopholes”. It stressed that it had engaged in consultations with the main sponsor but regretted the fact that its suggestions were not accommodated in the draft resolution. It confirmed that the draft was in line with the Islamic Republic of Iran’s constitution, laws and regulations and administrative procedures.

- **Indonesia** expressed its strong conviction that women and men had an equal right and role to play in the attainment of international security and
stressed the need to develop the role of women in ensuring the effective implementation of practical disarmament measures. It emphasized that it had adopted the nine core human rights instruments as well as their optional protocols. It explained, however, that it had abstained from voting on the eighth preambular paragraph due to references to the ATT, of which it was not a State party. Despite its abstention, Indonesia reaffirmed its commitment to advancing the goals of the draft resolution.

- **Morocco** expressed its full support for the draft resolution and welcomed the sponsor’s openness to its proposals. It expressed hope that the sponsors of the text would keep the draft resolution focused in the future and avoid raising any issues that could prevent its adoption without a vote.

- **Pakistan** commended the sponsors of the draft resolution for highlighting the role of women in promoting disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control, and agreed that equal, full and effective participation of both genders was one of the essential factors for promoting sustainable peace and security. However, it criticized paragraphs 4 and 7 for creating a hierarchy of violence and for prioritizing one type of risk assessment over others. Moreover, it argued that the draft resolution should have considered the availability of required resources and existence of national laws with respect to the varying priorities of States.

- The **Syrian Arab Republic** explained that it abstained from the vote on the eighth preambular paragraph because of a reference to the ATT, which it believed was imbalanced and failed to address many important issues. In its view, such issues included prohibiting the transfer of weapons to non-State actors and armed groups and preventing aggression. It argued that illicit trafficking in weapons endangered international peace and security and so the Syrian Arab Republic sought to regulate the arms trade by legalizing it.

- **Egypt** explained that it abstained from voting on the eighth preambular paragraph because it referred to the ATT. Egypt stressed that it considered that any reference to the entry into force of the ATT applied solely to its States parties.

- **Armenia** said that it had abstained from voting on the eighth preambular paragraph, which contained a reference to the ATT. It described the Treaty as unbalanced, non-inclusive and deficient.

### 69/62. Preventing and combating illicit brokering activities

The General Assembly encouraged Member States to fully implement relevant international treaties, instruments and resolutions to prevent and combat illicit brokering activities, and implement, where appropriate, the recommendations contained in the report of the Group of Governmental Experts. It emphasized the importance of international cooperation and assistance, capacity-building and information-sharing in preventing and combating illicit brokering activities, and encouraged Member States to take such measures as appropriate and in a manner consistent with international law.
First Committee. After voting in favour of the draft resolution, the three States below delivered statements to explain their votes:

- **Cuba** explained the importance that it attached to the objectives of the draft resolution, but highlighted several ways in which the text could be improved. It argued that paragraph 2 should not be interpreted as a source of legitimacy for instruments that were not fully consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and with international law; that resolution 2117 (2013) failed to refer to the improper nature of arms transfers to non-State actors; that the Nuclear Security Summit was open only to a limited group of States; and that the review of nuclear physical security and safety should be conducted in an inclusive and transparent manner. In that regard, it stressed the important role of the IAEA in coordinating international efforts. It added that the reference to the ATT in the eighth preambular paragraph introduced an imbalanced element to the draft resolution.

- **India** expressed its full support for the objectives of the draft resolution. However it explained that it abstained from voting on the eighth preambular paragraph due to its reference to the ATT. India stated that it was still conducting a review on its position on the ATT and stressed that, until that review was completed, it would continue to abstain from voting on any draft resolutions that referred to the ATT.

- **Egypt** explained that it had abstained from voting on the eighth preambular paragraph due to a reference to the ATT. In that regard, it stressed that any reference to the ATT was applicable only to the implementation of the Treaty among States parties.

After abstaining from voting on the draft resolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran argued that the notion of illicit brokering in WMD implied that there was a licit trade in such weapons. It stressed that under major international conventions on WMD, the production, development, research, transfer and use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons was prohibited. Accordingly, it argued that the only interpretation of some paragraphs contained in the draft resolution was that the transfer of those weapons from a possessor State to a non-possessor State was legal, despite the fact that it was prohibited by treaties like the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It also explained that it abstained from voting on the eighth preambular paragraph due to its reference to the ATT.

69/515. Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament (decision)

The General Assembly decided to include in the provisional agenda of its seventieth session the item entitled “Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament”.

Introduced by: India (28 Oct.)
GA vote: w/o vote (2 Dec.)
1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (31 Oct.)
For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, p. 241.
Chapter VI. Disarmament machinery

69/76. Report of the Conference on Disarmament

The General Assembly welcomed the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish the informal working group with a mandate to produce a programme of work, robust in substance and progressive over time in implementation, and appreciated the efforts of the Co-Chair and Vice Co-Chair of the informal working group. It also welcomed the fact that the Conference on Disarmament held a series of structured and substantive informal discussions on all items on the agenda of the Conference.

First Committee. Before the draft resolution was adopted without a vote, the Czech Republic spoke on behalf of the informal group of observer States to the Conference on Disarmament, which included Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei Darussalam, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, the Holy See, Jamaica, Jordan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Montenegro, Nepal, Oman, the Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, the Republic of Moldova, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Slovenia, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the United Arab Emirates and Uruguay. The Czech Republic also spoke on behalf of Angola, Austria, Bulgaria, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, El Salvador, Finland, Germany, Guinea Bissau, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Mexico, New Zealand, Romania, Spain, Sweden and Ukraine. The Czech Republic, in explaining the position of the informal group of observer States to the Conference on Disarmament, stated that while the group would join the consensus on the draft resolution, it was unfortunate that no reference had been made in the draft to the appointment of the Ambassador of Albania as Friend of the President of the Conference on Disarmament on the enlargement of the Conference. In that regard, the Czech Republic reiterated the fundamental aspiration of the informal group to expand the membership of the Conference and highlighted a decade of consultations on that question, stressing that more than 14 years had passed since action had last been taken on the issue of enlargement. The informal group believed that the expansion of the Conferences would restore its credibility. Speaking on behalf of the informal group, the Czech Republic asserted that, as a universal question, international stability and security must be addressed by a universally represented body.
69/77. Report of the Disarmament Commission

The General Assembly noted that the United Nations Disarmament Commission had not submitted any substantive recommendations to the General Assembly in the course of the past 15 years. It thus encouraged Member States to revitalize the work of the Commission in its upcoming triennial cycle. It emphasized the need for a focused and results-oriented discussion on the items on the agenda of the Commission. The Assembly recommended that the Commission intensify consultations with a view to reaching agreement on the items on its agenda, in accordance with General Assembly decision 52/492, before the start of its substantive session of 2015, providing for focused deliberations, keeping in mind the proposal to include a third agenda item. The Assembly requested the Commission to meet for a period not exceeding three weeks during 2015 and to submit a substantive report to the General Assembly at its seventieth session. It stressed that the report should contain a summary by the Chair of the proceedings to reflect different views or positions if no agreement could be reached on a specific agenda item.

First Committee. Morocco referred to the draft resolution in a general statement before it was adopted without a vote. It expressed concern over the incapacity of the Disarmament Commission to reach agreement on any recommendations since 1999 and suggested that focused deliberations would be one way forward, as proposed by the draft resolution.

Before action on the draft resolution, the European Union made a statement, indicating that Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland, Montenegro, Serbia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine and the United States had also aligned themselves with that statement. It said that the delegations acknowledged the important role of the Disarmament Commission as the main subsidiary body of the General Assembly on disarmament matters. However, they regretted that since 1999, the Commission had failed to properly fulfil its mandate or to agree on any recommendations. The European Union believed that the way forward on that issue should be consistent with decision 52/492 of the General Assembly. In particular, they considered that it would be worthwhile to explore the possibility of making the substantive agenda of the Commission more flexible and including a third agenda item. It was suggested that this could create favourable conditions to resolve the deadlock and allow the Commission to discuss new developments in the field of international security and multilateral disarmament. The European Union hoped that the Commission would take the opportunity to agree on a more focused agenda and fulfil its intended role.
69/518. Open-ended Working Group on the Fourth Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament (decision)

The General Assembly decided to: (a) hold, at a later date, an organizational session of the Open-ended Working Group on the Fourth Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament for the purpose of setting a date for its substantive sessions in 2015 and 2016, and submit a report on its work, including possible substantive recommendations, before the end of the seventy-first session of the General Assembly; and (b) include in the provisional agenda of its seventieth session, under the item entitled “General and complete disarmament”, a sub-item entitled “Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament”.

First Committee. Before voting in favour of the draft decision, Cuba expressed support for the proposed organizational session of the Open-ended Working Group in 2015, as well as for setting a date for its substantive sessions in 2015 and 2016. Cuba emphasized the importance of the draft decision both for members of the Non-Aligned Movement and for the international community as a whole.

After voting in favour of the draft decision, Germany and Spain explained their positions:

- **Germany**, speaking also on behalf of Bulgaria, Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Sweden, stressed that the United Nations disarmament machinery urgently required “political impulses towards revitalization and the resumption of the main tasks and to that end, they had voted in favour of the draft decision”. However, it also emphasized that the pursuit of a fourth special session should neither postpone nor substitute for efforts to overcome the stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament and to implement relevant disarmament and non-proliferation commitments.

- **Spain** spoke on behalf of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania and Spain stating that the vote in favour of the draft decision was based on the conviction that the United Nations disarmament machinery needed “serious attention and political impulse” to allow for its revitalization and the resumption of its main task, negotiating multilateral instruments in the field of disarmament. Spain said that this year, it, as well as the States on whose behalf it was speaking, had voted in favour of the draft decision since they considered it to be complementary to other initiatives pursuing the same goal of revitalizing the disarmament machinery.

The **United States** spoke on behalf of France, the United Kingdom and itself to explain their abstentions. It said that the draft decision was based on the provisions of General Assembly resolution 65/66 on which they had previously abstained for budgetary and substantive reasons. Since these reasons remained valid, in respect of the draft decision, they had, accordingly, also abstained in the vote on the draft decision.
69/519. Revitalizing the work of the Conference on Disarmament and taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations (decision)

The General Assembly decided to include in the provisional agenda of its seventieth session the item entitled “Revitalizing the work of the Conference on Disarmament and taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations”.

Chapter VII. Information and outreach

69/65. United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education

The General Assembly reiterated its request to the Secretary-General to fully utilize electronic means to disseminate related information on the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education and any other information that the Office for Disarmament Affairs gathered on an ongoing basis in connection with that study. It also requested the Secretary-General to maintain the website “Disarmament education: resources for learning” as well as the “Disarmament today” series of podcasts updated, as an efficient and effective tool to promote disarmament and non-proliferation education.

69/71. United Nations Disarmament Information Programme

The General Assembly recommended that the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme continue to inform, educate and generate public understanding of the importance of multilateral action and support for it, including action by the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament, in the field of arms control and disarmament, in a factual, balanced and objective manner, and that it focus, inter alia, on its efforts to continue the publication of the United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, the flagship publication of the Office for Disarmament Affairs, in all official languages, as well as its Occasional Papers, Study Series and other ad hoc information materials in accordance with the current practice.
69/75. United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services

The General Assembly expressed its appreciation to the Governments of China, Germany, Japan, Kazakhstan and Switzerland for continuing extensive and highly educative study visits for the participants in the Disarmament Fellowship Programme during 2013 and 2014. It also expressed its appreciation to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual Use Goods and Technologies, the Asser Institute and the Monterey Institute of International Studies for organizing specific study programmes in the field of disarmament in their respective areas of competence, thereby contributing to the objectives of the programme.
Appendix III
Abbreviations and acronyms
Appendix III

Abbreviations and acronyms

AFCONE African Commission on Nuclear Energy
AP additional protocol
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEANTOM ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy
ATT Arms Trade Treaty
AU African Union
BMS Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects
BWC Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction; Biological Weapons Convention
CANWFZ Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia
CARICOM Caribbean Community
CASA Coordinating Action on Small Arms
CBM confidence-building measure
CCW Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects; Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
CELAC Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
CIFTA Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials
CITAAC Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions
CPPNM Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
CSA comprehensive safeguards agreement
CSBM confidence- and security-building measure
CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
CTBTO Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>CWC</td>
<td>Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction; Chemical Weapons Convention</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>disarmament, demobilization and reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERW</td>
<td>explosive remnants of war</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FFM</td>
<td>Fact-Finding Mission</td>
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<td>FMCT</td>
<td>fissile material cut-off treaty</td>
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<td>FRSC</td>
<td>Forum Regional Security Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEM</td>
<td>Group of Eminent Persons</td>
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<td>GGE</td>
<td>Group of Governmental Experts</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIS</td>
<td>Group of Interested States in Practical Disarmament Measures</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCOC</td>
<td>The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<td>IATG</td>
<td>International Ammunition Technical Guidelines</td>
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<td>IBIN</td>
<td>INTERPOL Ballistic Information Network</td>
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<td>ICBM</td>
<td>intercontinental ballistic missile</td>
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<td>ICT</td>
<td>information and communications technology</td>
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<td>IDC</td>
<td>International Data Centre</td>
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<td>IED</td>
<td>improvised explosive device</td>
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<td>IFE14</td>
<td>Integrated Field Exercise 2014</td>
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<td>IMPACCS</td>
<td>Implementation Agency for Crime and Security</td>
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<td>IMS</td>
<td>International Monitoring System</td>
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<td>INTERPOL</td>
<td>International Criminal Police Organization</td>
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<td>ISACS</td>
<td>International Small Arms Control Standards</td>
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<td>ISU</td>
<td>Implementation Support Unit</td>
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<td>ITI</td>
<td>International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons; International Tracing Instrument</td>
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<td>JPA</td>
<td>Joint Plan of Action</td>
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<td>LAS</td>
<td>League of Arab States</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAWS</td>
<td>lethal autonomous weapon system</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOTAPM</td>
<td>mines other than anti-personnel mines</td>
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**Abbreviations and acronyms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MTCR</td>
<td>Missile Technology Control Regime</td>
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<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>New START</td>
<td>Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIAP</td>
<td>national implementation action plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>NNWS</td>
<td>non-nuclear-weapon State</td>
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<td>NPDI</td>
<td>Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPT</td>
<td>Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>Nuclear Security Summit</td>
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<tr>
<td>NWFZ</td>
<td>nuclear-weapon-free zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>NWS</td>
<td>nuclear-weapon State</td>
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<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIE</td>
<td>World Organisation for Animal Health</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPANAL</td>
<td>Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
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<td>OPCW</td>
<td>Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSI</td>
<td>on-site inspection</td>
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<tr>
<td>RECSA</td>
<td>Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>RIBIN</td>
<td>Regional Integrated Ballistic Information Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAB</td>
<td>Scientific Advisory Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>SALW</td>
<td>small arms and light weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLBM</td>
<td>submarine-launched ballistic missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSOD</td>
<td>special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCBM</td>
<td>transparency and confidence-building measure</td>
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<tr>
<td>TWG</td>
<td>Temporary Working Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>unmanned aerial vehicle</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNLIREC</td>
<td>United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>United Nations Mine Action Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNODA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNRCPPD</td>
<td>United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNREC</td>
<td>United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCAR</td>
<td>United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UXO</td>
<td>unexploded ordnance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>weapons of mass destruction</td>
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The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook

A rich source of historical knowledge of developments, trends and achievements of multilateral disarmament for more than 30 years. Part I contains an annual compilation of text and statistics of disarmament-related resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly. Part II presents the main topics of multilateral consideration during the year and a convenient issues-oriented timeline.

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• Text and status of treaties and agreements—database
• Dedicated working websites for conferences and meetings (NPT and Small Arms)
• Education resources
• and more ...