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Chairman: Mr. Roberto URDANETA ARBELÁEZ (Colombia).

Declaration on the removal of the threat of a new war and the strengthening of peace and security among the nations (*concluded*)

[Item 69]*

CONSIDERATION OF THE EIGHT-POWER DRAFT RESOLUTION (A/C.1/597/REV.2) AND THE CHILEAN DRAFT RESOLUTION (A/C.1/603).

1. Mr. CASSIMATIS (Greece) said that, in the first place, his delegation, in its previous intervention (374th meeting), had considered only the political and moral aspects of the problem; and with a view to ascertaining whether the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/595) really heralded the abandonment of that country's expansionist policy, it had invited the Soviet Union to collaborate sincerely with the free world, without making any counter-proposal.

2. Some delegations, however, had preferred to submit their own draft resolutions, with the result that the Committee now had before it, on the one hand, a Soviet Union draft resolution, complete but tendentious, without sincerity and of a purely legal nature, and, on the other hand, four texts (A/C.1/596, A/C.1/597, A/C.1/598 and A/C.1/603), each of which was incomplete in itself and which, even when taken together, did not cover the whole problem.

3. The Indian draft resolution (A/C.1/598) did not succeed in reconciling the ideal with reality. On the one hand, it linked the question of the limitation of armaments with the great problem of the threat which the poverty of the masses constituted to the maintenance of peace; and on the other hand, it linked expenditure on armaments with assistance to under-developed countries. Moreover, none of the drafts took account of the dangers which beset the world as the result of Soviet propaganda based on a distortion of the ideas of democracy, freedom and social justice. Instead of the distinction between a defensive war and an aggressive war,

which was at the very foundations of the United Nations, the USSR, as it appeared from Mr. Vyshinsky's speech of 28 October (380th meeting), had adopted another conception of world organization based on the idea of a just war, waged not only against foreign attack but also against capitalist slavery, and an unjust war. That was drawing the same distinction as between a war of aggression and a war of liberation; but it was important to be quite clear on the meaning of the word "liberation". Since the Committee's members had entered the path of counter-proposals, they should tell the peoples the truth and affirm that though poverty was an evil it need not always be associated with democratic freedom for, on the contrary, social justice, like political freedom, was an integral part of true democracy. Lastly, it should be stated that it was the policy of permanent world revolution, carried out in the latest style, which was responsible for civil wars and the war of nerves that were hindering social progress.

4. The Greek delegation had therefore prepared a draft resolution (A/C.1/602) which covered the provisions contained in the other drafts and added to them the necessary statements of principle. Since, however, the time was evidently not yet ripe for a conscientious examination of the moral and political bases of the problem of peace, it would be better to reserve the subject for special consideration later. The Greek representative therefore withdrew his draft resolution.

5. Mr. Cassimatis said that his delegation would vote, though without any enthusiasm, for the new eight-Power revised draft resolution (A/C.1/597/Rev.2) as well as for the draft resolution submitted by Chile (A/C.1/603). It would abstain from voting on the Indian draft resolution (A/C.1/598), which did not take sufficient account of the real international situation, as a tribute to that delegation's good faith and idealism. Lastly, the Greek delegation would vote against the amendments submitted jointly by the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Ukrainian SSR and the USSR (A/C.1/607), as the proposals

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

they contained had already been rejected by the vast majority of the Committee's members (382nd meeting).

6. Mr. VAN HEUVEN GOEDHART (Netherlands) stated that, after conversations had taken place between the delegations of the seven Powers and the Indian delegation, a decision had been reached to introduce certain modifications to the seven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/597/Rev.1), as a result of which the Indian delegation had agreed to submit together with the other seven delegations the joint draft resolution, as modified (A/C.1/597/Rev.2).

7. In the first paragraph of the preamble the words "and in freedom from fear and want" had been added, which involved a slight drafting change in the second paragraph where the words "such lasting peace and security" would be replaced by the words "lasting peace and security". In addition, sub-paragraph (d) had been added to paragraph 2 of the operative part, as follows: "to reduce to a minimum the diversion for armaments of its human and economic resources and to strive towards the development of such resources for the general welfare, with due regard to the needs of the under-developed areas of the world". While reserving the right to submit separately such of its ideas as had not been incorporated in the new text of the revised draft resolution, the Indian delegation felt that the substance of its own draft resolution (A/C.1/598) was now included in the new text.

8. The Netherlands representative then went on to explain briefly the position of the sponsors of the new revised draft resolution with regard to the various amendments and texts which had been taken into consideration.

9. In the first place, it might be asked whether the USSR's action in reintroducing as amendments proposals which had previously been rejected by the Committee, even though it might be in accordance with the General Assembly's rules of procedure, was calculated to serve the cause of peace.

10. Underlying the first amendment submitted jointly by the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Ukrainian SSR and the USSR (A/C.1/607) to add in the fourth paragraph of the preamble, after the words "whether committed openly or by fomenting civil strife", the words "including any form of intervention in a civil war" was a whole theory built up by the Soviet Union in connexion with the war in Korea. But the man in the street, who was more intelligent than the representative of Czechoslovakia had made him out to be, would never let himself be caught in such an obvious trap.

11. The second joint amendment proposed the addition, after the fourth paragraph of the preamble, of a new paragraph reading as follows: "*Recognizing* that the use of the atomic weapon, a weapon of aggression and mass destruction, is contrary to conscience and incompatible with membership of the United Nations". The sponsors of the draft resolution had no inclination to accept that amendment either. A certain type of propaganda would no doubt try to argue *a contrario* that those delegations were in favour of using atomic weapons. Nothing could be further from the truth, as was apparent from the efforts made for four years to

induce the Soviet Union to accept plans which would have made it possible to reserve the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. To be sure, it would be gratifying to find that certain explanations furnished by Mr. Vyshinsky indicated a *rapprochement*, but until the Soviet Union delegation had translated words into deeds, it would be useless to formulate a solemn declaration which could do nothing to spare the nations of the horror of the atomic or hydrogen bomb, air raids or heavy tanks.

12. With regard to the third joint amendment to add, in paragraph 1 of the operative part, after the words "against aggression", the words "in conformity with the principles of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations", the General Assembly had just adopted (302nd plenary meeting) a resolution on united action for peace (A/1481) which gave an interpretation of the Charter that was courageous as well as correct, to the effect that while the primary responsibility lay with the Security Council that did not exempt the General Assembly from its own responsibility, and the latter should take united action in support of peace in cases where the Security Council failed to fulfil its main function. The USSR, which was well aware that the use of the veto was the only possible cause of failure by the Security Council to act, was not unaware, either, that the adoption of the joint amendment which it sponsored would take the United Nations back to the starting point. The authors of the joint draft resolution could not therefore accept the third amendment, particularly as Mr. Vyshinsky (380th meeting) had made a very significant distinction between just and unjust wars, the difference between these being naturally left to the Soviet Union to decide, without interference by any international body. If, subsequently, a war broke out which the Soviet Union declared to be a war for the liberation of oppressed peoples, any attempt at united action against such a war would be met with a Soviet Union veto. From the point of view of the authors of the draft resolution, however, there were only two kinds of war, aggressive and defensive wars, and defence against aggression, whatever form it might take, was the right and duty of the individual State and of the international community.

13. The fourth joint amendment proposed that sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 2 of the operative part should be replaced by the following text: "On the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of strict international control, under United Nations supervision, over the scrupulous and unconditional implementation of this ban, in order to make effective the prohibition of atomic weapons". The authors of the joint draft resolution felt that the present text of that sub-paragraph was more precise and more exact than the text by which it was proposed to replace it.

14. The fifth joint amendment proposed that sub-paragraph (c) (formerly sub-paragraph (b)) of paragraph 2 should be replaced by the following: "To regulate all armaments and armed forces in such a way as to initiate, beginning in the year 1950-51, the reduction of armaments and armed forces". That amendment, however, made no reference to the problems of control and inspection and was nothing more than empty words.

15. Finally, the sixth amendment proposed the addition, after the last sub-paragraph of paragraph 2, of three new paragraphs as follows:

“Declares that the government which first uses against any country the atomic weapon or any other means of mass destruction of human beings will thereby commit a crime against humanity and will be regarded as a war criminal;

“Condemns any form of propaganda for a new war;

“Notes that the reduction of armaments and armed forces and the condemnation of propaganda for a new war are of great importance for the strengthening of peace and security among the nations.”

16. That amendment, which dealt partly with matters irrelevant to the joint draft resolution, consisted of mere resounding words and could not be accepted either by the authors of the joint draft resolution.

17. The insertion of a third paragraph in the preamble had already made it possible to incorporate the substance of the Bolivian draft resolution (A/C.1/596). However, the text appearing in document A/C.1/597/Rev.1 had now been slightly modified so as to take account not only of the use, but also of the threat of force, a wording which was absolutely in accordance with paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the Charter, by virtue of which Members were to refrain “from the threat or use of force” in a manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

18. The Egyptian delegation had proposed (A/C.1/605, amendment 1) to replace, in the fourth paragraph of the preamble of the joint draft resolution, the words “by fomenting civil strife in the interest of a foreign Power . . .” by the word “otherwise”. While it was desirable in principle to include in the idea of aggression all the forms it might assume, the representative of Egypt would no doubt admit that fifth column activities were a form of aggression so menacing as to deserve explicit mention. Hence, in order to reconcile the two points of view, the sponsors of the joint draft had retained the words “by fomenting civil strife in the interest of a foreign Power” and had added the words “or otherwise”.

19. The delegations of the eight Powers wished to explain that they referred to the fomenting of civil strife only to the extent to which it constituted an act of aggression, and that only an affirmative decision of the United Nations on the latter point would justify rapid United Nations action. Perhaps those explanations would dispel certain doubts expressed in particular by the representative of Syria (382nd meeting).

20. Mr. van Heuven Goedhart pointed out that the wording of paragraph 1 of the operative part had been modified as follows: “That prompt united action be taken to meet aggression wherever it arises”.

21. Lastly, although sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 2 of the operative part of the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/597/Rev.1) dealt with all weapons, it had been pointed out that there was no reference in that draft to weapons of mass destruction other than the atomic bomb. To meet that criticism, a new paragraph

(b) had been inserted in the eight-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/597/Rev.2) under which all nations would agree “to strive for the control and elimination, under the United Nations, of all other weapons of mass destruction”. Thus, the original sub-paragraph (b) became the new sub-paragraph (c).

22. In conclusion, he would like to emphasize that, in the opinion of the eight Powers, the supreme crime was aggression, and that only deeds could do away with the horror of the atomic bomb and other weapons of mass destruction. The truth was that there could be no stable peace without international control and inspection of atomic energy, and in the United Nations the co-operation of all was necessary in that great work.

23. The sponsors of the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/597/Rev.2) hoped therefore that the new text would be adopted unanimously.

24. GHALEB Bey (Egypt) stated that the first part of his delegation’s amendment (A/C.1/605) applied also to the new revised text of the eight-Power draft resolution. The object of deleting the words “by fomenting civil strife in the interest of a foreign Power” and replacing them by the word “otherwise” was to cover all forms of aggression other than open aggression. The amended version served the purpose aimed at by the eight-Power draft resolution, but was more expressive and less likely to lead to confusion; it should therefore allay the doubts of certain delegations.

25. Moreover, the amendment should be the more acceptable inasmuch as the case of intervention by a State in the domestic affairs of another State was already covered in the third paragraph of the preamble, which now incorporated one of the points of the Bolivian draft resolution.

26. With regard to sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 2 of the operative part, the Committee would recall that, in spite of General Assembly resolutions 191 (III) and 299 (IV), no agreement had as yet been reached between the six Powers represented on the Atomic Energy Commission, in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 1 (I) of 24 January 1946. It should therefore be understood that sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 2 was drafted in such a way as to leave open all possible avenues for agreement. With regard to sub-paragraph (c) of the same paragraph, the true conception of the regulation of armaments, in the Egyptian delegation’s view, should give priority to the defensive requirements of each State.

27. The Egyptian delegation had proposed an amendment (A/C.1/605, amendment 2) to sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 2, recommending that, at the end of that sub-paragraph, the words “all other weapons adaptable to mass destruction” should be added. That amendment was based on sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 5 of resolution 1 (I) which referred to “the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction” as well as to paragraph 3 of resolution 41 (I) which mentioned “atomic and all other major weapons adaptable now and in the future to mass destruction”. In a draft resolution entitled “Peace through deeds”, the absence of any reference to weapons of mass destruction other than atomic weapons would have been ill

received by peoples living under the threat of that dangerous product of present-day civilization.

28. Though preferring the text of its own amendment, the Egyptian delegation had no serious objection to the wording of sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 2 of the operative part of the eight-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/597/Rev.2). It should be clearly understood, however, that its content did not in any way prejudice the provisions of resolutions 1 (I) and 41 (I) of the General Assembly.

29. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the comments which had been made on the amendments submitted jointly by the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Ukrainian SSR and the USSR (A/C.1/607) called for some elucidation.

30. The joint amendment to the fourth paragraph of the preamble, proposing the addition of the words "including any form of intervention in a civil war" was, like the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union (A/C.1/595), designed to assist in reaching an agreement which would effectively remove the threat of a new war.

31. In the face of these renewed efforts, it was inadmissible for a delegation such as that of Greece to accuse the Soviet Union of expansionism and of making propaganda, unless of course that meant propaganda for peace, for it was a fact that the Soviet Union preached peace by every possible means.

32. The representative of Greece, who seemed unable to grasp the most elementary ideas, had also stated that it was of little importance to distinguish between a just and an unjust war. As a matter of fact, the USSR did believe that a war against capitalist slavery, indeed a war against any form of slavery, was a just war. But how could it be said that that opened the door to Soviet Union intervention in a struggle against the capitalist régime in any country? The first joint amendment condemned any form of intervention in a civil war, namely, in a struggle against capitalism or socialism inside any given country. If therefore it was feared that the Soviet Union conception of aggression and the distinction between just and unjust wars made intervention in support of a rising against any capitalist régime possible, the remedy was immediately to hand: it lay in adopting an amendment sponsored by the Soviet Union, which made its conception of aggression and unjust war quite clear; any unjust war was an aggression and *vice versa*, and similarly every just war was a defensive war against the various forms of aggression. On 6 November 1941, at the time of Hitler's attack, Generalissimo Stalin, in a report to the Moscow Soviet, stated that the war of the Anglo-Soviet allies against Hitler was a typical example of a just war against an aggressor, against a foreign invasion.

33. All that was perfectly clear in spite of the refusal of certain delegations to defend the cause of peace and their efforts to create confusion. How could delegations reject an amendment concerning intervention in a civil war, the very thing they professed to fear above all? If the amendment were adopted, intervention in a civil war could never be considered a just war, and the trap spoken of by the representative of Greece could no longer catch anyone.

34. Similarly, the Netherlands representative appeared to fear that, if a war against capitalist slavery were recognized as a just war, the result would be to make intervention in a civil war lawful; he too should be reassured by the amendment submitted by the Soviet Union and four other countries. Unfortunately, some delegations voted against a text, not for reasons of substance, but because it was sponsored by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, had made the necessary concessions when it had voted in favour of the draft resolution of Iraq and Syria (A/C.1/585/Rev.2) in spite of the rejection of its own amendments relating to consultations between the great Powers and to the representation of China. True, it was the Chinese people who, in the last resort, were the only judges in the matter.

35. Would delegations go so far as to reject an amendment to paragraph 1 of the operative part of the draft resolution—the purpose of which was to insert a reference to Chapter VII of the Charter—solely because it was sponsored by the Soviet Union? The USSR was ready to admit the necessity for swift united action to meet aggression, but it was important that such action should be taken in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter, which dealt with international coercive measures and conferred upon the Security Council the responsibility for meeting aggression. The contention would be that the Security Council was paralysed: yet that would be one more reason for urging it to resume action. The Soviet Union delegation, which in any case did not believe in the supposed paralysis of the Security Council, was ready, in order to reach agreement on concerted action, to accept the wording of paragraph 1 of the operative part of the eight-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/597/Rev.2). But there was nothing against the addition of a reference to Chapter VII and to the Security Council which, after all, was not an illegal body.

36. One of the arguments put forward when the General Assembly adopted the resolution on joint action for peace, was that the text in question did not constitute an amendment of the Charter. How could it be said, then, that a reference to Chapter VII of the Charter would amount to nullifying the other resolution?

37. Only the adoption of the joint amendments would provide concerted action and to reject them would mean that the Security Council could no longer fulfil its functions. But had not the fact that it was not performing its functions been publicly deplored?

38. The Soviet Union delegation, which had been accused of reintroducing proposals which had already been rejected, wished also to point out that only two of the six amendments were to some extent repetitions of previous ideas, and that, contrary to what had been stated, that was not true of the third amendment concerning Chapter VII of the Charter.

39. The fourth joint amendment dealt with the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons. How was it possible to speak of effective international control of a prohibition that had not been formulated? The text of that amendment was the only possible basis for agreement: it did not provide for measures of prohibition to be formulated at once but confined itself to stating that the General Assembly had determined to

take such a step. The time for considering the practical application of the principle would only come when the convention was being drafted.

40. With regard to sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 2 of the operative part, the fifth joint amendment did not reintroduce the recommendation for a one-third reduction of armaments but only repeated part of the rejected text in order to be more specific. There were no grounds for stating that rejection of a proposal as a whole meant that none of its parts could ever be reintroduced in the future: parts of it could be submitted anew and could figure in a new context. The Soviet Union delegation therefore accepted the control of all armaments and the principle of immediate action, and confined itself to providing for the first steps to be taken in 1950-1951, without even specifying what those steps should be.

41. Similarly, the Soviet Union proposal concerning the condemnation of propaganda for a new war had of course been rejected. But the second sub-paragraph of the sixth joint amendment did not reintroduce that text; it suggested the incorporation of one of the points of the Bolivian draft resolution (A/C.1/596) in the eight-Power text, which did not contain any provision in that sense.

42. As the Committee seemed unwilling to take sanctions against war-mongers, the Soviet Union had confined itself to submitting anew the Bolivian text which had received favourable comment. Every Member of the United Nations would be guided by its own constitutional laws; if its national laws permitted war propaganda, the guilty would not be called to account. Nevertheless, a moral condemnation would inevitably apply even to countries whose legislation did not provide for the punishment of the guilty. Here again it was argued that the Soviet Union was reintroducing a proposal that had already been rejected. It was not, however, a USSR proposal but one contained in the Bolivian draft resolution which had aroused no criticism.

43. Lastly, the final sub-paragraph of the sixth joint amendment was entirely new and that amendment, at least, should be taken seriously, if the Committee wished to reach a unanimous decision on the text sponsored by the eight Powers.

44. The Soviet Union's attitude therefore consisted in accepting a draft resolution quite different from the one it had itself submitted, subject to the incorporation of amendments which only reproduced part of its previous proposals, in order to make that draft resolution legal. Those amendments had not yet been voted upon, and they opened up new possibilities if a real desire to reach agreement existed. Only the adoption of the draft resolution by as large a vote as possible would represent a stand against a new war. It was in that spirit that the Soviet Union delegation would be glad to be able to vote in favour of the eight-Power draft resolution, after the incorporation of a few amendments, in order to strengthen the cause of international peace and co-operation and spare the world unspeakable calamities.

45. Sir Benegal RAU (India) pointed out that the two amendments which had been incorporated in the eight-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/597/Rev.2), em-

bodied in general terms the ideas underlying his delegation's draft resolution (A/C.1/598). The amendments provided, on the one hand, for the recognition of mankind's desire to live in freedom from fear and want and, on the other hand, for the use of the savings realized by disarmament to raise the standard of living in the under-developed areas of the world. Those ideas, which were as old as or even older than the Atlantic Charter, had been restated by President Truman in his address to the General Assembly on 24 October last (295th plenary meeting). The Indian delegation, which attached very great importance to them, therefore supported the eight-Power draft resolution and withdrew the draft resolution it had itself submitted.

46. With regard to sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 2 of the operative part, the Indian delegation had always stood for the prohibition of atomic weapons, not only on account of their destructive power but also on account of the waste which their production entailed. India earnestly hoped that it would be possible to use atomic energy for peaceful purposes, especially in order to supplement other sources of power, which were woefully inadequate in countries such as India.

47. One of the main reasons why the Indian delegation had withdrawn its draft resolution (A/C.1/598) was that it hoped to be able to submit a proposal for the creation of a United Nations peace fund under the terms of a resolution recently adopted by the Second Committee (128th meeting). That draft resolution recognized that an improvement in the standard of living of the under-developed areas of the world was essential to the maintenance of peace and security, and called upon States to submit to the Economic and Social Council proposals designed to give practical effect to that principle. A number of delegations, which were sympathetic to the Indian proposal, had asked for time to study it in detail.

48. Mr. LACOSTE (France) said that the eight-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/597/Rev.2) included three additions. The first, in the third paragraph of the preamble, had been submitted by the Bolivian delegation and related to the condemnation of a State's intervention in the internal affairs of another State. The second, in sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 2 of the operative part, had been proposed by the Egyptian delegation and provided for the control and elimination not only of atomic weapons but of all weapons of mass destruction. And lastly, the third, in the first paragraph of the preamble, which had been submitted by the Indian delegation, gave expression to mankind's desire to live in freedom from fear and want. Those three additions provided useful additional information on the purpose of the draft resolution.

49. The French delegation would vote against the amendments submitted jointly by the USSR and four other countries (A/C.1/607), inasmuch as the constructive elements which they contained were already included either in proposals previously adopted by the United Nations or in the Chilean draft resolution (A/C.1/603), which France supported.

50. Mr. DIEZ DE MEDINA (Bolivia) pointed out that the principle of the condemnation of propaganda in favour of a new war, which had been stated in the original Bolivian proposal (A/C.1/596), had not been em-

bodied in the eight-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/597/Rev.2) because it was the subject of the Chilean draft resolution (A/C.1/603).¹ Obviously, propaganda in favour of a new war should be condemned and it would have been preferable therefore for the USSR delegation to introduce its joint amendment on that point at the time when the Chilean draft resolution was under consideration.

51. Mr. PISEK (Czechoslovakia) had hoped that the amendments submitted jointly by his delegation with four other countries (A/C.1/607) would have been the object of careful consideration. The debate had unfortunately revealed the existence of a deliberate opposition to the USSR and the amendments in question had not even been discussed, despite the fact that their object was to find a constructive solution to the problem under discussion by strengthening the eight-Power draft resolution on the basis of the provisions of the Charter.

52. Mr. PEARSON (Canada) said that the various amendments submitted by the USSR and four other delegations (A/C.1/607) were unacceptable.

53. The first amendment aimed at substituting the idea of fomenting civil strife by the intervention in a civil war. The experience of the past six months had shown that there were wide differences of opinion on what constituted a civil war. United Nations action in Korea would certainly have been delayed if, in June 1950, the Organization had had before it a text on the lines proposed by the joint amendment now under discussion and if it had been argued, as it was later argued, that the Korean war was a civil war.

54. The third joint amendment was also unacceptable because it would prevent the United Nations from taking action except under Chapter VII of the Charter, whereas the resolution on united action for peace (A/1481), adopted by the General Assembly, permitted the United Nations to take action under other chapters of the Charter. There would, however, be no objection to a general reference to the principles of the Charter.

55. The fifth joint amendment disregarded the fact that there could be no certainty that a reduction of armaments could actually be initiated in 1950-51.

56. Lastly, the second sub-paragraph of the sixth joint amendment was misplaced, for the reasons indicated by the representative of Bolivia.

57. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) drew attention to an error in translation in the English text of the first joint amendment (A/C.1/607). That amendment did not consist in substituting one phrase for another but in adding a phrase. He wondered therefore whether, after that clarification, it would be possible for the Canadian representative to accept the amendment.

58. Mr. PEARSON (Canada) thanked Mr. Vyshinsky for his explanation but pointed out that, as he had already indicated, he was unable to accept that amendment for a different reason, namely, the difficulty in defining the term "civil war". The first joint amendment (A/C.1/607) would only be acceptable if it were

redrafted to indicate that it would be for the United Nations to determine what constituted intervention in a civil war.

59. Mr. COULSON (United Kingdom) thought that it was undesirable to adopt resolutions the terms of which might lend themselves to various interpretations. It was obvious that the concept of intervention and civil war did not have the same meaning for the USSR as it had for other Powers, inasmuch as the USSR regarded the war in Korea as a civil war. That was why the United Kingdom delegation would vote against the first joint amendment.

60. Contrary to what Mr. Vyshinsky had said, the authors of the joint draft resolution did not automatically reject amendments proposed by the USSR delegation and accept the same amendments if they were put forward by another delegation. Undoubtedly, propaganda in favour of a new war was to be condemned, but since the question had been dealt with in the Chilean draft resolution (A/C.1/603), there was no object in referring to it again in the eight-Power draft resolution.

61. Faris EL-KHOURI Bey (Syria), referring to the first joint amendment (A/C.1/607), pointed out that foreign intervention in a civil war, at the request of the legitimate government of a State confronted with rebellion, was not aggression. Consequently, the amendment in question was not acceptable.

62. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that it would be Utopian to seek a formula to cover every conceivable case at the present stage. Clearly, the organ responsible for taking action should determine the actual situation in each individual case. The difficulty mentioned with regard to the joint amendment also existed in respect of the eight-Power draft resolution, which also referred to the idea of civil war, or, to be more precise, to civil strife. Civil strife was, however, the source of civil war, and it was impossible to speak of one without envisaging the other. But the use of a concept should not be abandoned merely because it might give rise to a variety of interpretations. Moreover, the concept of civil war was quite clear; it was an armed struggle between two factions of the same people within the frontiers of a State which was temporarily divided into two opposed political camps. The classic example of a civil war was the American Civil War. Other examples could be given but were unnecessary as the question did not in fact give rise to any particularly difficult problem of interpretation.

63. Mr. Pearson's suggestion would be acceptable if the United Nations organ responsible for determining whether or not a civil war existed was specified. Under the terms of the Charter that organ should be the Security Council, acting in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII.

64. Mr. PEON DEL VALLE (Mexico) pointed out that the words "or otherwise" had been omitted from the Spanish text in the fourth paragraph of the preamble of the eight-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/597/Rev.2). The term "to foment" had been translated into French by "inciter" and into Spanish by "incitar",

¹ See 381st meeting, paragraph 3.

whereas the term "fomentar" would have been preferable.

Voting on the eight-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/597/Rev.2) and amendments

65. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the first three paragraphs of the preamble (A/C.1/597/Rev.2).

The first three paragraphs of the preamble were adopted by 53 votes to none.

66. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the joint amendment (A/C.1/607, amendment 1)² to the fourth paragraph of the preamble.

The amendment was rejected by 37 votes to 5, with 10 abstentions.

67. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the Egyptian amendment (A/C.1/605, amendment 1)³ to the fourth paragraph of the preamble.

The amendment was rejected by 24 votes to 8, with 21 abstentions.

68. GHALEB Bey (Egypt) proposed the deletion of the words "or otherwise" in the fourth paragraph. He pointed out that the Netherlands representative did not appear to attach particular importance to their inclusion in the text of the draft resolution. The present drafting might give the impression that incitement to civil war, whether or not in the interest of a foreign Power, might be regarded as aggression.

69. Mr. VAN HEUVEN GOEDHART (Netherlands), supported by Mr. LACOSTE (France) and Mr. PEON DEL VALLE (Mexico), maintained that the wording the fourth paragraph could not lead to confusion, since there was a comma before the words "or otherwise". They opposed the deletion of those words.

70. GHALEB Bey (Egypt) then proposed that the fourth paragraph should be amended by placing the words "or otherwise" before the words "or by fomenting civil strife".

71. Mr. DIEZ DE MEDINA (Bolivia), together with Mr. COULSON (United Kingdom) and Mr. LACOSTE (France), considered that that amendment would destroy the logical sequence of ideas.

72. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the amendment submitted orally by the representative of Egypt.

The amendment was rejected by 20 votes to 7, with 23 abstentions.

73. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the fourth paragraph of the preamble (A/C.1/597/Rev.2).

74. Faris EL-KHOURI Bey (Syria) explained that he would vote for the fourth paragraph of the preamble on the understanding, as had already been indicated by the Netherlands representative, that the fomenting of civil strife would not be regarded as aggression unless it bore the character described in the joint draft resolution.

The fourth paragraph was adopted by 48 votes to none, with 5 abstentions.

75. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the joint amendment (A/C.1/607, amendment 2)⁴ to add a fifth paragraph to the preamble.

The amendment was rejected by 25 votes to 7, with 21 abstentions.

76. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the joint amendment (A/C.1/607, amendment 3)⁵ to paragraph 1 of the operative part.

77. GHALEB Bey (Egypt) said that he would vote for that amendment, if the provisions of the Charter in general were referred to and not those of Chapter VII. He would, however, abstain from voting on the amendment in its present form.

The amendment was rejected by 35 votes to 6, with 11 abstentions.

78. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the introductory phrase and paragraph 1 of the preamble (A/C.1/597/Rev.2).

The text was adopted by 47 votes to 5.

79. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the joint amendment (A/C.1/607, amendment 4)⁶ to sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 2 of the operative part.

The amendment was rejected by 34 votes to 6, with 12 abstentions.

80. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 2 of the operative part (A/C.1/597/Rev.2).

81. Mr. RAFAEL (Israel) requested that the paragraph should be voted upon in two parts, the first ending with the words "United Nations".

82. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America) said that the paragraph could not be divided up. The representative of Israel could, if he so desired, propose as an amendment that part of the sentence should be deleted.

83. Mr. RAFAEL (Israel) withdrew his proposal and stated that he would abstain from voting on sub-paragraph (a) because he was unable to accept the idea that the control of atomic energy could be made effective only on the basis of the principles already approved by the General Assembly.

84. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) pointed out that the paragraph contained two ideas: the control of atomic energy and the basis on which that control would be exercised. The division was therefore logical. In his turn, he asked that the paragraph should be voted upon in two parts.

85. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America) opposed the division of the voting on that paragraph.

86. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the question whether the paragraph should be voted upon in two parts.

² Text incorporated in the present meeting, paragraph 10.

³ *Ibid.*, paragraph 18.

⁴ *Ibid.*, paragraph 11.

⁵ *Ibid.*, paragraph 12.

⁶ *Ibid.*, paragraph 13.

It was decided, by 28 votes to 8, with 15 abstentions, that the vote should not be divided.

Sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 2 was adopted by 43 votes to 5, with 4 abstentions.

87. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 2 of the operative part (A/C.1/597/Rev.2).

The sub-paragraph was adopted by 45 votes to 5.

88. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the joint amendment (A/C.1/607, amendment 5)⁷ to sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 2 of the operative part.

The amendment was rejected by 38 votes to 6, with 9 abstentions.

89. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 2 of the operative part (A/C.1/597/Rev.2).

The sub-paragraph was adopted by 47 votes to 5, with 1 abstention.

90. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote sub-paragraph (d) of paragraph 2 of the operative part (A/C.1/597/Rev.2).

The sub-paragraph was adopted by 53 votes to none.

91. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the joint amendment (A/C.1/607, amendment 6)⁸ to add three new sub-paragraphs to paragraph 2.

92. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) requested that the three parts of the amendment should be voted upon separately.

The first sub-paragraph was rejected by 35 votes to 5, with 12 abstentions.

The second sub-paragraph was rejected by 22 votes to 16, with 14 abstentions.

The third sub-paragraph was rejected by 23 votes to 12, with 18 abstentions.

93. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the last paragraph of the operative part (A/C.1/597/Rev.2).

The text was adopted by 48 votes to none, with 5 abstentions.

94. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the joint draft resolution as a whole (A/C.1/597/Rev.2).

At the request of the Netherlands representative, the vote was taken by roll-call.

⁷ *Ibid.*, paragraph 14.

⁸ *Ibid.*, paragraph 15.

Venezuela, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Venezuela, Yemen, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay.

Against: Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian SSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Abstaining: Yugoslavia.

The draft resolution was approved by 47 votes to 5, with one abstention.

95. Mr. VILFAN (Yugoslavia) explained that he had voted in favour of all the paragraphs of the draft resolution with the exception of sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) of paragraph 2 of the operative part, on which he had abstained from voting. He had also abstained from voting on the draft resolution as a whole, in view of the importance of those two sub-paragraphs in relation to the remainder of the resolution.

Voting on the Chilean draft resolution (A/C.1/603)

The draft resolution was approved by 43 votes to none, with 8 abstentions.

96. Mr. SHANN (Australia) explained that he had abstained, not because he objected to the ideas expressed in the draft resolution, but because its drafting left something to be desired on account of its lack of clarity.

97. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that he had abstained not only because the drafting of the Chilean text was unsatisfactory but also because it referred to General Assembly resolution 290 (IV), the adoption of which his delegation had opposed (261st plenary meeting). He was not against the main idea contained in the Chilean draft, as could be observed from the fact that his delegation had submitted a draft resolution proposing that not only should propaganda for a new war be condemned but that sanctions should be established against those engaging in it.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.