Seventeenth session
Agenda item 77

THE URGENT NEED FOR SUSPENSION OF NUCLEAR AND THERMO-NUCLEAR TESTS

REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED
NATIONS WITH REGARD TO THE CESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPON
TESTS

ANNEX I

1. Provisional verbatim records of the 83rd to 89th plenary meetings inclusive of the Conference.

2. Extract from the verbatim record of the 90th plenary meeting.

3. Provisional verbatim records of the 45th to 47th meetings inclusive of the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests.
CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE EIGHTY-THIRD MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Monday, 26 November 1962, at 3 p.m.

Chairman

Mr. S.K. Tsygankin (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)

This provisional record contains the originals of speeches in English together with the Conference room interpretation of speeches in other languages.

It is requested that any corrections to the originals of speeches be submitted in four parts (preferably incorporated in four of the single-sided micrographed copies with which delegations are supplied) by the authorized Liaison Officer of the delegation concerned to the Documents Office, Room 1-206. If no corrections are received within four working days from the date of distribution the final version, in which the interpretations will be replaced by translation, will be prepared and issued on the basis of the provisional record.

THE TIME LIMIT FOR CORRECTIONS TO THIS RECORD WILL BE 0900 HOURS ON 3 DECEMBER 1962.
(PROVISIONAL)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

**Brazil:**
- Mr. Issa de Almeida
- Mr. Flax de Costa
- Mr. J. Lengel

**Bulgaria:**
- Mr. K. Tsalanov
- Mr. G. Guelev
- Mr. K. Silev
- Mr. I. Tsalanov

**Burma:**
- U Tun Swein
- U Maung Phyo Tin

**Canada:**
- Mr. E.S. Burns
- Mr. J.E.S. Hardy
- Mr. J.P. S. Bell
- Mr. R.L. Tit

**Czechoslovakia:**
- Mr. K. Hulik
- Mr. H. Zima
- Mr. K. Jíla
- Mr. V. Vlahla

**Ethiopia:**
- Ato Keddis A.B. Teku

**India:**
- Mr. L.S. Mll
- Mr. L.S. Fern.

**Italy:**
- Mr. P. C. Valenti
- Mr. L. C. Valenti
- Mr. G. Costa-Regiani
- Mr. P. Lucioni Ottieri
PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

**Mexico:**
- Dr. E. Calderón Puig
- Dr. D. Gómez Gómez
- Dr. A. de Icaza

**Nigeria:**
- Dr. L.C.N. Obi

**Poland:**
- Dr. K. Lach
- Dr. E. Suchyński
- Dr. W. Wójtowicz
- Dr. A. Słomczynski

**Romania:**
- Dr. M. Duțu
- Dr. N. Floreaescu
- Dr. E. Goia
- Dr. M. Constantinescu

**Sweden:**
- Dr. R. Eriksson
  - Baron C.H. von Prittwitz
- Dr. P. Irlin
- Dr. J. Pehrson

**Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:**
- Dr. S.A. Tiskin
- Dr. V.G. Lebed
- Dr. I.G. Grachev
- Dr. P.Z. Sulikov

**United Arab Republic:**
- Dr. M.F. Ghosh
- Dr. M.A. El-Said
- Dr. S. Jired
PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:
Mr. J.B. GODBER
Sir Michael WRIGHT
Mr. J.K. WRIGHT
Mr. J.K. AIRES

United States of America:
Mr. L.A. DEAN
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. D.J. LEE
Mr. V. BAKER

Deputy Special Representative of the Acting Secretary-General:
Mr. W. EPSTEIN

Deputy Director
European Office of the United Nations: Mr. G. PALTHEY
The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): I declare open the eighty-third plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

I call on the Deputy Special Representative of the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Mr. Epstein (Deputy Special Representative of the Acting Secretary-General): On behalf of the Acting Secretary-General, U Thant, it is once again our privilege to welcome the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to the European Headquarters of the United Nations.

The Conference resumes its deliberations after a recess during which detailed and constructive discussions on disarmament and on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests have taken place in the General Assembly. The Assembly debates enabled all the Members of the world Organization to make important contributions to the solution of these problems.

Recent grave events have provided additional proof of the dangers inherent in the arms race, which gives no lasting assurance of security but results in acute political disputes and situations which may endanger the peace of the entire world.

We know from past experience and current differences that the road to disarmament is formidable and arduous. The Eighteen-Nation Committee, which has been rightly praised by the Assembly, is pursuing its goal with perseverance and zeal. In particular, it made a noteworthy contribution in narrowing the gap between the opposing positions on the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. The gap appears to have been further narrowed by the current session of the General Assembly, which not only condemned all nuclear tests and requested their cessation by 1 January 1963, but also pointed the way to compromise solutions which could lead to agreement by the nuclear Powers.

There are before you resolutions 1762 A and B (XVII) adopted by the General Assembly on the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests. These resolutions reflect the ardent desire of the overwhelming majority of the nations of the world that such tests, and their menace to health and security, be ended for ever. Members of the General Assembly, and in particular the non-aligned countries, have emphasized that a nuclear test ban is the indispensable first step to general and complete disarmament. The present moment seems especially propitious for agreement between the nuclear Powers, perhaps more propitious than ever before, in view of the recent exchanges between the heads of government and the almost simultaneous
announcements concerning the conclusion of extensive series of tests by both sides. It is our fervent hope that when the Conference reports to the General Assembly by 10 December next, it will be able to record substantial progress in the negotiations.

You also have before you Resolution 1767 (XVII) of the General Assembly, which calls for agreement on general and complete disarmament at the earliest possible date. It also recommends that urgent attention be given to collateral measures of disarmament. Various measures, besides the cessation of nuclear tests, have been urged during the Assembly, such as the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons, the reduction of the risk of war by accident or miscalculation, the establishment of nuclear-free zones in certain geographical regions, the use of outer space for peaceful purposes only, and other such measures which would decrease tension and facilitate general and complete disarmament. Agreement on such measures would greatly improve the international climate and help to solve the fundamental issues which are at the heart of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

Let me express the hope of the Acting Secretary-General that the Committee will achieve results in all the tasks entrusted to it by the General Assembly — a nuclear test ban, collateral measures of disarmament and general and complete disarmament. Let me also express my conviction that the non-aligned members of this Committee will continue their active and positive role in helping to reach agreement. I extend to you the warmest good wishes of the Acting Secretary-General for success in your work.

The Chairman (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian). In my capacity as Chairman of this meeting, I should now like to say a few words of welcome to members of this Committee.

After a recess of ten weeks, the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament resumes its work. There is no need to speak of the importance of our task. Many, if not all, international crises of the past year were an effect of the arms race feeding the cold war. If it is our wish to prevent a recurrence of these dark clouds, which are manifestations of the cold war, we should in the first place halt the arms race and solve the disarmament problem. Recent events in the Caribbean have made clear to everyone the threat of a rocket nuclear war.

During this period the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly has considered the disarmament problem and the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, which are matters immediately related to the task of our Committee.
In that important international forum the hopes and aspirations of the peoples of all countries on these important problems were expressed and resolutions were adopted calling for new and constructive efforts with a view to the speediest possible solutions. In resuming its work the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee must take into account the wishes of the people, as expressed in the resolutions of the General Assembly, in the questions of disarmament and the cessation of nuclear weapon tests and, without being deflected towards secondary questions, it should concentrate its efforts on the main problems.

I call now upon the representative of the United States, as Chairman of the Conference, for a welcoming message.

Mr. DOAN (United States of America): I should like to express my pleasure at being back in Geneva to begin this resumed session of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament. I note with great satisfaction that many old friends and colleagues from our former sessions are here again to represent their Governments. I shall look forward to establishing the same good relations with the members of delegations who are here for the first time. We anticipate working with them all at the resumed session in the quiet and effective fashion that has become the standard of this Conference. The time is right for us to reach our first agreements, and my delegation will seek every possible opportunity to bring this about. The spirit in which my delegation is returning to this Conference has been eloquently set forth in the statement of President Kennedy, issued today, concerning the opening of this resumed session, which I should now like to read:

"The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference resumes its deliberations in Geneva today. This is as it should be. The crucial developments within recent weeks have served to confirm both the need and the urgency of the task before it. It is clear that a renewed and immediate effort must be made to halt the constantly increasing tempo of the arms race if there is to be assurance of a lessening of the danger of war. It is therefore my continued hope that serious negotiations will proceed at once on those initial measures of disarmament which could, if put into effect without delay, materially improve international security and enhance the prospects for further disarmament progress."
"Among these measures we believe high priority should be given to the conclusion of an effective agreement which would end once and for all tests of nuclear weapons. The United States has completed its recent series of atmospheric tests. There is hope that the Soviet Union evidently will soon conclude its series of atmospheric tests. This suggests that the moment may be at hand to initiate the beginning of the end of the upward spiral of weapons competition. If so, the opportunity must not be lost. It is important that these negotiations now move forward, and that concrete progress be achieved. To this end I pledge anew my personal and continuing interest in the work of the Conference."

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): On that note we will end the public part of our meeting this afternoon. I now call for a five minute break in our proceedings so that the hall may be cleared of those who are not participating directly in the Conference.
The meeting was suspended at 3.25 p.m. and resumed at 3.30 p.m.

The 

C.U.R. (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (interpretation from Russian)): We shall now resume our work. Permit me to say a few words as Chairman of this meeting. Today the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament resumes its work after a recess of more than two and one half months. We have some new representatives with us here today and, on behalf of the Committee, I should like to welcome our new colleagues, the representative of Burma, Ambassador U Tun Shein, and the representative of Czechoslovakia, the Deputy Foreign Minister. These new participants will work with us for the solution of the important tasks facing us. I should also like to welcome the representative of the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations and the interpreters and other staff who help us in our work.

I have to inform the meeting that the co-Chairmen met on 25 November when they agreed that the work of the Committee should continue under the procedure previously approved on 24 July 1962 (ENDC/1/Add.3). The co-Chairmen also agreed to follow the time-table adopted earlier, namely that the Committee should meet three times a week on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays. They propose that the meetings shall begin punctually at 10.30 a.m.

The co-Chairmen also deem it appropriate that this meeting, as well as our next meeting on Wednesday, 28 November, should be devoted to a general debate in the light of the resolution adopted by the Seventeenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly on the problem of disarmament and on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

Today, on the list of speakers there are four delegations: the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and Italy. I now call upon the representative of the United States.

Mr. D'IAN (United States of America): Today we resume the meetings of our Conference after a recess of two and a half months. During the recess the General Assembly of the United Nations has had an opportunity to review and to discuss the various aspects of our work, and the members of this Conference now have the benefit of the views expressed during the General Assembly discussions. Much has happened since we last met in this council chamber, and it is appropriate to ask: Where do we stand? I believe it is fair to say that at the present
moment there is cause for concern and also cause for encouragement as we resume here.

Let us be realistic with each other. Let us not veil the causes of concern that do exist. We are all familiar with recent events that brought civilization so close to the abyss of nuclear war, a war which many have talked about but which must be viewed even more soberly and responsibly as a result of recent events. We are also familiar with the recent events in India; those have left sombre lessons for our work here. That clandestine efforts to gain military advantage may be attempted by some is now clear for all to see. That efforts at falsification of facts may be made at very high levels of government is also clear for all to see. The fact has been clearly underscored that the world cannot rest agreements involving national security on good faith alone. We all now know that agreements, if they are to bring an increased sense of security and not insecurity and suspicion, must include adequate means for giving reassurance to all parties that treaty obligations are in truth and in fact being met.

The meetings of the test ban Sub-Committee, which were continued here in Geneva during the recess at the suggestion of my Government in the hope that an agreement might be concluded by the end of this year, have unfortunately made no progress. The representative of the Soviet Union continued to reject the very minimum amount of international arrangements for the detection, identification, location and inspection of seismic tests that would give reasonable and adequate assurance of compliance with a comprehensive nuclear test ban agreement.

The Soviet delegation also refused, in effect, to consider a partial ban in those environments which do not require international verification, while negotiations went forward on a comprehensive test ban treaty to ban tests in all environments.

I wish to discuss this question further in a moment, but I do want to say at this point that we must devote ourselves with a renewed sense of urgency and purpose to this unfinished business, as President Kennedy has said in his statement which I read earlier today. 'We just cannot ignore the causes of concern that have arisen during the recess. Our tasks here are far too serious for us to allow our discussions to become a game of empty charades played in an ivory tower. At the same time, however, we must not despair. Nor, indeed, have we any reason to
despair of the prospects for a better and more secure world as the result of our efforts in this Conference.

What are the elements in the present state of affairs that lend encouragement to a more hopeful view? Of course, in terms of national self interest, the strong incentive to halt the arms race remains. The competition in arms has not diminished in its threat to the security of nations; it continues as a drain upon resources that could be better used for the more productive objectives of human society. Surely those facts will spur us on to achieve early progress in our negotiations.

Another hopeful element is the firm establishment of this Conference as a continuing negotiating body. It may have escaped general notice, but it is worth noting, I believe, that, with the exception of negotiations concerning nuclear testing, for the first time in five years disarmament negotiations are being resumed after the General Assembly's consideration of the subject in the same forum in which they were taking place before the Assembly met. Indeed, probably for the first time since the end of the Second World War, we are able to resume work on disarmament in a continuing body, with agreed procedures and an agreed plan of work.

That this forum continues to exist in the midst of the swirling international currents of our troubled world is, I believe, in large measure a recognition that nations must seek a better order of things. The existence of our continuing Conference, today again in full session, reflects the belief, now more commonly shared, that it is through our labours here that we can forge the key that will unlock the gates to a better world.
A further cause for hope is that, in the curious way history sometimes unfolds its pages, our vision may be clearer as the result of the sobering events we have recently experienced.

Further, whatever may have induced Chairman Khrushchev to initiate the events of recent weeks, thereafter wise statesmanship has been displayed on both sides in subsequent efforts to resolve the crisis; and the world has been given dramatic demonstration that the earth's two greatest military Powers can reach agreement based on reason when a sufficient incentive to reach agreement exists on both sides. It is for us here to demonstrate that the will to resolve differences can forge agreements even in the absence of the catalyst of acute crisis.

There have perhaps been few watersheds in human history so clearly discernible at the time as the one at which we now find ourselves. Thus the question which all of us in our hearts ask is: What path for humanity? It is a sobering thought that the answer may well be written, at least in the first instance, by the results of the work of this very body.

The spirit of the answer of my Government was contained in a passage of President Kennedy's message of 28 October 1962 to Chairman Khrushchev. The President said:

"Mr. Chairman, both of our countries have great unfinished tasks and I know that your people as well as those of the United States can ask for nothing better than to pursue them free from the fear of war. Modern science and technology have given us the possibility of making labour fruitful beyond anything that could have been dreamed of a few decades ago.

"I agree with you that we must devote urgent attention to the problem of disarmament, as it relates to the whole world and also to critical areas. Perhaps now, as we step back from danger, we can together make real progress in this vital field."

The obligations which rest on governments for creative initiative and demonstrations of a will to reach agreement are particularly pressing at this moment in history: for though the limitations of the spoken and written word make it difficult to state it clearly, we all sense, I believe, that there is something different about the world of 26 November 1962 as compared with the world of 7 September 1962, when our Conference recessed.
Further, we all sense, I believe, that what is hopeful about that difference may be fleeting in nature if nations fail at this moment in history to capture and utilize it. This consideration is important for the present session of our Conference.

What then should be our tasks in the coming weeks? As I have noted, we are fortunate in that we have an agreed plan of work, with an agreed schedule of meetings, set forth in documents ENDC/1/Add.2 and ENDC/1/Add.3, which you, Mr. Chairman, have already mentioned. As a useful aid to the progress of work we have the institution of the co-Chairmen, of which even greater use should be made during this session. Within this organizational framework, we can proceed with our tasks, not in a manner of routine activity but rather with that sense of urgency and of history-making which is obligatory for nations and their representatives who know that they stand at a watershed of history.

Our goal is the elaboration and execution of a programme of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. Prior to the recess we had, under our agreed plan of work, almost completed the initial consideration of the topics falling under sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 5 of document ENDC/1/Add.3. We were just about to begin consideration of sub-paragraph (d), "Measures in the field of nuclear disarmament together with appropriate measures of control". We should, during this session of the Conference, press forward with our consideration of paragraph 5. At the same time, of course, and in keeping with paragraph 4 of that document, any delegation remains free to discuss in our plenary meetings any topic relating to our work, whether or not that topic may have been considered previously.

We cannot, of course, expect to reach full agreement on a general programme of disarmament, even for the first stage, in the weeks that remain before the end of the year. This fact, however, does not diminish the very real importance of the contributions we can make to our task in this area.

During the recess, governments have had an opportunity to review the earlier work of the Conference relating to general and complete disarmament. It is true, of course, that there were other events that preoccupied the minds of national leaders during the recess. Nevertheless, we have all had some opportunity to take stock of the state of the work of our Conference. Also, during the United Nations General Assembly discussions various interesting comments were made which should be the subject of further elaboration.
In this connexion, we have, of course, not been unmindful of the brief remarks of Mr. Gromyko, Foreign Secretary of the Government of the Soviet Union, on 21 September in the United Nations General Assembly, on behalf of the Soviet Union, about the possibility of a change in his Government's attitude to the arrangements for disposing of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, as well as the amendments (ENDC/48) submitted by the Soviet Union to its treaty proposal (ENDC/28). Since this problem has been among the most acute of all those confronting our negotiations, any new approach deserves careful explanation, clarification and exploration in depth. We expect to participate actively in this aspect of our work, both in plenary meetings and in discussion with our Soviet co-Chairman.

In general, it is my Government's intention to seek, in every reasonable way, to overcome the admittedly serious differences that do exist with respect to all of the issues that go into the subject of general and complete disarmament. We hope that others will recognize the spirit with which we approach this, our more basic task; for it is one of flexibility based on a desire for mutual understanding of the concerns of each party. Let us, then, in the weeks ahead talk with and not to, or at, each other.

While we seek that broader accommodation that is required for agreement on general disarmament, we must not lose sight of the significance of the moment of history in which our Conference resumes its work. To capture and utilize that which is hopeful about the differences in world affairs resulting from recent events, we must urgently seek agreements in those areas that are ripe for early agreement. Not only would such achievements be beneficial in themselves; not only would they facilitate, in ways we may not ourselves comprehend, the reaching of agreements on general disarmament; but they would give to events that favourable momentum which history now offers.

Foremost among subjects ripe for agreement is the question of an effective ban on nuclear testing. Let me briefly review, without rancour and as objectively as I can, the situation in that area as it now exists.
Our meetings are resuming with the debates in New York on the vital issue of a nuclear test ban still ringing in our ears. In addition, we have the texts of two resolutions on this subject to provide us with the views of a large number of members of the General Assembly. Those of us who attended the meetings of the First Committee understand thoroughly the sense of urgency which pervade the attitudes of all governments on this question.

The attention given to a nuclear test ban treaty has helped significantly to make clear to all of us what are the crucial points which separate East and West from an agreement. All representatives, especially in this forum, have had many months to devote to the general problem, and there is now no need to review the many arguments on subsidiary matters or to enter into historical debates.

The United States and the United Kingdom have tabled here for consideration a draft comprehensive test ban treaty which is before the Conference as document ENDC/58. It is based on a careful study of all relevant data, including the helpful suggestions put forward by the eight nations on 16 April last as we read and understand their memorandum (ENDC/28). The United States and the United Kingdom, as suggested by the eight nations also submitted a partial test ban treaty (ENDC/59) as a possible second best agreement if the Soviet Union will not accept the necessary controls for the cessation of underground tests.

The United States and the United Kingdom delegations feel confident that the two draft treaties which they have tabled to stop all nuclear tests (ENDC/58 and ENDC/59) either on a comprehensive basis or a partial basis while negotiations continue, offer a fair and adequate framework for discussion and agreement. We have always said that these documents were put forward as a basis for constructive negotiation, and we still think now that any reasonable political and scientific modifications, which do not deviate from sound and effective disarmament or verification and inspection principles, can be suitably comprehended in our texts.

Our immediate duty, therefore, is to face up to the fundamental items which have emerged as the principal obstacles to an accord.

The most basic of these items, of course, concerns the decision that must be taken in regard to the cessation of underground tests. Will this environment be included in the initial overall agreement, or will it not? If it is to be included from the outset, as we all think is the preferable approach, then, we submit, the terms we have outlined in our draft comprehensive treaty are fair and reasonable.
As far as the United States and the United Kingdom are concerned, they remain convinced that some measure of effective and adequate international control is still essential in this area. We are equally certain that this measure of control need not be large or burdensome on any party. We believe that the terms for it can be worked out in such a way as to safeguard the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union, as we have conscientiously tried to provide in our draft treaty (ENDC/58). Although this must, in our view, involve the use of the on-site inspection technique by the international commission in appropriate cases, we see no objective reason why mutually acceptable arrangements in regard to this inspection cannot be concluded with the Soviet Union.

The exchanges which have taken place both at the General Assembly and in the test ban Sub-Committee in Geneva over the past two months have confirmed our impression of last summer that, if the control and inspection issue is once settled, it should not prove too difficult to devise solutions to remaining questions. We do not foresee prolonged debates over the creation and function of the international commission and its staff. We also have grounds for hoping that the modalities for establishing a co-ordinated worldwide data, recording and collection system, under the general overall supervision of the commission, will not be beyond our capacity to handle.

We look forward with keen anticipation to the efforts of all delegations in the next few weeks in the hope of rapid progress on a test ban.

I should now like to turn to another issue which is also ripe for early agreement, namely, measures to reduce the risk of war by accident, miscalculation or failure of communications. I intend in future meetings to discuss in more detail United States views on various aspects of this question. I wish to say at this time, however, that my Government attaches considerably importance to the effort which we should make in the coming weeks to make progress in this field.

At the present time there appears to be a substantial area of accord, in principle, between the positions of the Soviet Union and the United States on certain aspects of this matter. Specifically, these areas of general agreement relate to (1) advanced notification of military movements, (2) exchange of military missions, and (3) improved communications between governments.
Proposals on these three measures were set forth in section F. ("Reduction of the Risk of War" of the United States "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World" (ENDC/30). Specifically, they are included in paragraphs 1, 4, and 5 of section F on pages 11 and 12 of that document.

Similarly, proposals on the same measures are contained in the modifications and additions to its position submitted by the Soviet Union in the document ENDC/2/idd.1 of 16 July 1962. Specifically, these proposals are included in paragraph 3, sub-paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 on the first and second pages of that document.

I would hope that agreement can soon be reached on an even broader range of measures in this field, but for the moment we should concentrate on the measures of current common accord.

My Government believes that action is needed to reduce the risk of accidental war and that at this time measures to this end can be rapidly agreed upon. Such measures could result in a useful and indeed significant advance in the capability of States to provide mutual reassurance.

In view of the degree to which both sides appear to have similar proposals, extensive debate in general terms regarding their desirability would appear unnecessary. Rather should we focus attention as soon as possible on a discussion of the means and the manner of how these measures should be implemented. Let us, therefore, move forward rapidly in this field with the knowledge that significant agreements are within our reach.
At the last meeting of our Conference before the recess I spoke of our awesome responsibility to safeguard the future of civilization and to ensure that the precious gift of life will be passed on to our children and to our children's children. That remains our task. We can perhaps see even more clearly than before that it is not mere rhetoric to say these things.

We are also aware that we have a moment in history favourable to a real beginning in the fulfillment of our responsibility. Let not our children look back at us and our Governments and say: "They failed their moment." Let them rather be able to say: "They chose greatness rather than narrow prejudice and suspicion, and unlocked the gates to the future which we now face without fear."

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): I should now like to make a statement as representative of the Soviet Union.

Two and a half months have passed since the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament went into recess. During this period a dangerous international crisis occurred, threatening to plunge the world into a thermonuclear war. These very dangerous events of recent times compel us to draw certain conclusions for the purpose of strengthening peace.

What is needed first is the speeding up of agreements on general and complete disarmament. If in the very near future we cannot succeed in solving the problem of disarmament, there will be no guarantee against new and dangerous international crises. If this time, thanks to the moderation of the Soviet Government and its wisdom, it was possible to halt the dangerous trend of events, there is no guarantee that another time the world will not be plunged into a thermonuclear war. All this imposes on the members of the Eighteen Nation Committee the obligation to redouble their efforts and to direct their energies towards the elimination of the obstacles on the path to agreement. The participants in these negotiations must show deep understanding of the interests of peace and of humanity and must make their contribution towards the fulfillment of this historic task -- general and complete disarmament.
The second conclusion that every objective student of international affairs must draw is that disarmament should begin with the elimination of the danger of nuclear war — and of course it is not a mere accident that this conclusion appeared in literally every statement made in the course of the debate on general and complete disarmament at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly.

What is, then, the road leading to the elimination of the threat of nuclear war in the early stages of disarmament? A reply to this is to be found in the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control submitted by the Soviet Government. This draft is the result of lengthy work, of thorough analysis of the international situation, taking into account the present stage of military techniques, and, finally, of thorough and complete study of all the proposals submitted on the matter of disarmament. In this draft treaty the Soviet Government has formulated the most realistic and practical method of fulfilling the task of saving humanity from the threat of a nuclear war. This is in turn lies mainly in the liquidation of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, as a measure to be taken among the early disarmament measures. The General Assembly debate has confirmed that this is a correct conclusion. It is now recognized by all, or nearly all, that the threat of nuclear war can be eliminated either by the liquidation of the nuclear weapons themselves or by their neutralization.

The attitude of the Soviet Union in this matter is a flexible one. We have displayed this flexibility in the previous work of our Committee. Endeavouring to eliminate as early as possible and as completely as possible the threat of nuclear war, the Soviet Government has expressed its readiness, if the Western Powers agree, to transfer the series of measures on the liquidation of nuclear weapons, including the destruction of stockpiles and the cessation of production, from the second stage of the disarmament process to the first stage. Our readiness to begin disarmament with the liquidation of nuclear weapons was confirmed at the current session of the General Assembly.

The elimination of nuclear weapons is the shortest road towards the solution of this problem. It offers a guarantee of a final elimination of the threat of a new thermonuclear war. However, the negative attitude of the Western Powers makes it impossible to begin with the elimination of nuclear weapons. In the circumstances the Soviet Union, in its search for the best and speediest solution, has proposed dividing the measures for the elimination of nuclear war into two stages: in the
first stage to eliminate the delivery means and in the second stage to destroy and to prohibit nuclear weapons themselves. This is the approach that has been embodied in the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Government to this Committee.

In proposing that disarmament should begin with the elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, we fully realize what we are giving up. As is known, the Soviet Union has built its defence on nuclear delivery means, the core of which now consists of powerful rockets and missiles -- global and intercontinental rockets and rockets of other ranges. It is generally recognized that disarmament must be carried out in conditions of equality: namely, that no party at any stage of disarmament should acquire a military advantage. This requires that, simultaneously with the liquidation of the nuclear delivery means, military bases on foreign territory should be liquidated and armed forces should be withdrawn from foreign territories. Recent events have confirmed with renewed force the pressing need to do away with foreign military bases. Even the installation of a small number of launching pads in Cuba for the purpose of defence against foreign invasion was used by the United States Government as a pretext for placing the world on the brink of nuclear war. How could the Soviet Union accept the liquidation of its most powerful means of defence, global and intercontinental rockets, and radical disarmament measures in a situation where the United States would maintain intact its bases on foreign territories -- bases directed against the Soviet Union and other Socialist States?
In his message of 27 October addressed to President Kennedy, Chairman Khrushchev wrote:

"You wish to ensure the security of your country. This is understandable, but Cuba has a similar purpose. All the countries want to have security. But how can the Soviet Government evaluate your action when you have encircled the Soviet Union with military bases; when you have placed your bases around our allies, around the boundaries of our country, and when you place your rockets and missiles on those bases? This is no secret. Responsible American personalities have stated this openly and repeatedly. Your rockets are placed in England, in Italy. They are aimed at the Soviet Union. You also have rockets in Turkey."

The Soviet Government is of the view that the United States and other Western Powers, in this question of the liquidation of foreign military bases, must take into account the security interests of other States.

It is significant that in the course of the debate in the General Assembly, in statements made by representatives of States against whom the military bases of the United States and NATO are not directed, those States recognized the danger which such foreign military bases constitute for the cause of peace.

The representative of Nigeria, its representative in this Committee, emphasized the belief:

"... that the existence of foreign military bases has aggravated international tension and led to the intensification of the armaments race. Foreign bases do embitter the relations between neighbours. We should therefore like to see them done away with in toto and as quickly as possible." (A/C.1/1271, p.6)

The representative of another new Member State of the United Nations, Tenganyika, stated:

"My delegation also believes that in order to sustain confidence and trust in the contesting Powers, foreign bases and nuclear delivery vehicles must disappear, wherever they are, at a very early stage." (A/C.1/1279, p.78)
I might refer to other statements made by representatives of neutral States in the current session of the General Assembly pointing out the danger of maintaining military bases on foreign territories and pointing to the need to liquidate such bases simultaneously with the liquidation of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons.

In view of the position of the United States and other Western States, members of the Eighteen Nation Committee, in the course of our previous work it was to our regret impossible up to then to come to an agreement on the speedy elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons. As will be remembered, the Western Powers, in the course of our negotiations last summer, advanced against the Soviet proposals the argument that, allegedly, the elimination in stage I of all vehicles of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, together with the liquidation of military bases in foreign territories and the withdrawal of troops from foreign territories, would lead to the destruction of the strategic balance in the world to the advantage of the Soviet Union and would place, as they said, the European States members of NATO in an inferior position and would deprive the United States of the possibility of speedily ensuring its defence. The United States, United Kingdom and other Western representatives told us that the liquidation of delivery means would not, in their view, lead to the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war inasmuch as the methods of transport which would remain at the disposal of member States after such destruction, such as civil aircraft, ships etc., could still be used for delivering nuclear bombs.

These arguments are quite artificial. The Soviet delegation has previously pointed out that these arguments were not convincing. They cannot explain the refusal of the Western States to accept the liquidation of nuclear delivery means in stage I of the disarmament process. It is quite obvious that, as a result of the implementation of such a decision, the Soviet Union would acquire no advantage, and no one would be placed in danger. Only humanity and peace would benefit. However, having met with the opposition of the Western Powers, and in its search for agreement, the Soviet Government submitted an amendment to article 5 of its draft treaty, the substance of which was that the United States and the Soviet Union would maintain until the end of stage II, exclusively on their
own territories, agreed, strictly limited quantities of inter-continental rockets, anti-rocket weapons, and land-air rockets. Consequently, for a certain period of time the United States and the Soviet Union would retain only such means of delivering nuclear weapons as would be clearly in harmony with the Western concept of a defence umbrella. Obviously, after, in the course of stage II, measures have been carried out in order to destroy the stockpiles and to prohibit nuclear weapons, there will be no further point in retaining this agreed and limited number of weapons.

We note with satisfaction that the efforts made by the Soviet Union with the object of overcoming differences which had previously prevented our Committee from reaching agreement have met with understanding and appreciation on the part of many Member States of the United Nations. We also note that these proposals of ours have met with certain interest on the part of the Western Powers. We are profoundly convinced that if agreement can be reached on the basis of these Soviet proposals the Eighteen Nation Committee will have favourable opportunities before it.

At the same time, we cannot but look with some apprehension at certain trends which the Western Powers have displayed during the current session of the General Assembly. Instead of trying to agree with us on the principles of an agreement, they have made attempts to start discussion on all sorts of details up to and including the characteristics of the remaining rockets and their locations.

However, everyone, including those who have tried to lead the Committee along the path of fruitless detailed discussion, should understand that before we can take up concrete points of detail connected with the Soviet proposal, what is necessary is that the Western Powers should agree on the principle that we should beg with the liquidation of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and the liquidation of military bases on foreign territories. Why discuss details, why try to pin-point places on the map where such rockets would be placed, and what would be the types of these rockets, as long as we could not agree on a single position of principle?
We wish the negotiations in this Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to be really business-like, and that is why it is highly desirable that the Western Powers should state constructively their views on our proposals as well as displaying their good will and their desire to reach agreement.

We believe it necessary to emphasize that this new Soviet proposal is in no way a departure from the principles advocated by the Soviet Union regarding the sequence in which general disarmament measures should be carried out. In other words, we still adhere to the position that the liquidation of nuclear weapon delivery means should be carried out in stage I of disarmament. If the Soviet Union were to depart from this stand of principle, it would amount to accepting the existence of the possibility of a nuclear war while there would be formally in existence an agreement on general and complete disarmament. A temporary delay in the liquidation of an agreed number of rockets would be an exception to the rule and should bear only on a strictly limited -- I emphasise, a strictly limited -- number of rockets, so as to prevent the possibility of using such rockets for unleashing a world-wide nuclear war.

We agree that a strictly limited number of rockets should be maintained, because if many rockets are retained we will then have a situation which will not differ substantially from the present situation. There would still then be the possibility for a State to start a devastating nuclear war with all its harmful consequences.

In the preceding stages of our negotiations we were unable to reach agreement on the reduction of armed forces in Stage I. The Western Powers connect this question with that of the liquidation of nuclear weapon delivery means. In order to clear the ground for agreement on this matter, the Soviet Union made a move to meet the views of the Western Powers on that score as well. Although the original Soviet draft treaty provided for the reduction of armed forces of the Soviet Union and the United States to a level of 1.7 million, while the United States put forward a figure of 2.1 million, the Soviet Union now advocates a compromise solution, namely to reduce the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the United States to the level of 1.9 million for each side in Stage I. Here again, we are prepared to accept such a solution although we consider that a more substantial reduction of the armed forces would be in greater harmony with the needs of general and complete disarmament.
Other moves towards resolving sustaining differences have been made by the Soviet Union. For instance, we act the United States in accepting its proposal regarding the order of reduction of conventional armaments. As a result, there is now virtual agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, namely, that in stage I of general and complete disarmament there should be a 30 per cent liquidation of armed vehicles, armed transport, artillery systems and other conventional armaments. Obviously, in an era of rocket-nuclear armaments, conventional armaments do not play such an important role as they did in the past. Nevertheless, agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States regarding the proportion in which conventional armaments should be reduced has a positive significance and should facilitate agreement.

In the past the United States and the United Kingdom delegations opposed the Soviet Union's proposals with regard to the dates and periods contemplated for general and complete disarmament. It was argued that our proposals were not practical and that the Soviet Union was attempting to carry out disarmament within too short a time. However, those delegations offered no convincing arguments against our proposals that general and complete disarmament should be carried out within the rather short periods specified by us. One might, in fact, point out the exact opposite because a number of delegations, including those of neutralist States, stressed the need and the desirability to carry out general and complete disarmament as quickly as possible, since that would facilitate solving such problems as equal security for all States and those related to control. In spite of the fact that the Soviet Government is an advocate of the speedy implementation of general and complete disarmament, it agreed to extend the period for disarmament from four to five years and recommended that stage I should last up to two years.

We heard many assertions earlier from the Western Powers that they cannot agree with the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament because, allegedly, it fails to envisage adequate measures to reduce the danger of war. On these questions, too, the Soviet Union has displayed flexibility and an understanding of the positions adopted by the Western Powers. The Soviet Government found it necessary to adopt some of the proposals submitted by the United States on the question of the reduction of the danger of war. In particular, the Soviet Union
agreed with the measures in stage I proposed by the United States, for exchange of military missions between States for the purpose of improving communications and understanding as well as the establishment of speedy and reliable communication between the heads of States and the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Turning now to the United States proposal regarding advance notice of significant military moves and manoeuvres within the confines of national territories, the Soviet Union not only adopted that proposal but even found it necessary to go further by proposing that in stage I the carrying out of substantial joint military missions and manoeuvres with the participation of the military forces of two or more States should be prohibited.
The Soviet Union is in favour of strict international control over the implementation of disarmament measures, and we are just as interested as the Western Powers in the establishment of such control, to say the least; but the Western Powers are decisively against having control transformed into an end in itself and hope to use it in order to collect information and intelligence data on the territories of peace-loving States. It is for that reason that the scope of control measures should strictly correspond to the scope of disarmament measures. This principle is consistently adhered to in the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament. We fully realize that there are still differences of opinion on the question of control over disarmament, and we understand that solutions should be found to those questions. If we are to consider that in their natural logical connexion, and consistently, we must see that it is not possible to consider elaborating details of control without having a prior understanding of what actually should be the measures of disarmament regarding which control machinery should be established. After all, to elaborate control questions without having before us agreed measures of disarmament would be tantamount to building patterns and schemes which were abstract and divorced from life, irrespective of the way in which the disarmament process would be developing. Here we have to follow the right path we should be forced to cast aside these abstract blueprints, and not waste time but elaborate systems of control that would be tied in with concrete measures of disarmament.

However, the Western Powers continue to elaborate control blueprints which are divorced from life and, in so doing, they are not taking as points of departure the achievement of understanding and agreement but rather the plans that are being hatched by their chiefs of staff. However these blueprints might differ, in essence they are the same. They aim at establishing the widest possible measure of control in carrying out insignificant measures on the restriction of armaments: that is, calling a spade a spade, it legalised espionage.

Nothing is changed by the so called "selective sampling" plan of inspection in the United States plan. The authors of the plan call for 30 per cent of the territory of a State to be thrown open for control in the first stage of disarmament. If applied to the Soviet Union that would mean that at the very
(The Chairman, USSR)

outset of the disarmament process there would be placed under control territory of the Soviet Union equal in area to the whole of the territory of the United States of America.

The Soviet Union has reviewed, or else included again in its draft treaty, a whole series of articles relating to the most important questions of general and complete disarmament. Today the Soviet draft treaty, better than any one document, reflects a programme of action which States would have to carry out in attaining the final aim of general and complete disarmament. Summarizing the additions and modifications introduced by the Soviet Union into its draft treaty one comes to the following conclusions:

First, that the Soviet Government has reported its readiness to agree that in destroying the means of delivery of nuclear weapons in the first stage an exception should be made for a strictly limited agreed number of intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and defence missiles of the ground to air type which today are only in the hands of the Soviet Union and the United States.

Second, that the Soviet Union has agreed to compromise on the question of the level of the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the United States in the first stage.

Third, that the Soviet Union has adopted the United States proposal regarding the order in which conventional armaments should be reduced.

Fourth, that the Soviet Union has agreed to a lengthening of the duration of the carrying out of general and complete disarmament, which seems to be so close to the hearts of the Western Powers.

Fifth, that the Soviet Union has adopted a number of measures proposed by the United States with respect to a reduction of the danger of war by accident.

Sixth, that the Soviet Union has agreed to transfer from the second stage to the first stage measures on the prohibition and liquidation of nuclear weapons, if this is the wish of the other party.

The changes which the Soviet Government has made in its draft treaty give us favourable premises for pushing forward in coming to an agreement on a treaty on general and complete disarmament. This widens the horizon for overcoming the differences in the positions of the two sides as they have become evident in the course of the negotiations in this Committee. To date the Western
side, although it has touched in a general way on the proposals mentioned above, has failed to express itself clearly and succinctly with regard to them, and on a number of questions we are still at a loss as to the actual position taken by the Western Powers. The Western Powers agreed to a certain change in their position but unfortunately that change in itself fails to constitute any serious move from the earlier Western position. At the same time, however, the United States position, as expressed in the document it put forward, fails to solve the basic problem of our time: it does not lead to a reduction of the danger of a nuclear war.

Everyone knows that the United States approach lies in there being in the first stage of disarmament a limitation, an agreed reduction, of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons by only 30 per cent. We cannot but say that the United States proposals, in effect, far from eliminating do not even lessen the danger of a nuclear war, in that a destructive blow with the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons could be dealt by the 70 per cent of the missiles retained by the State, including bombers and other means of delivery. This is aside from the fact that the United States proposal on the reduction of means of delivery of nuclear weapons in the first stage by only 30 per cent is aimed at obtaining a military advantage by the United States, to the detriment of the security interests of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries -- which is in contradiction with the Agreed Principles for the negotiations on disarmament.

Where does this flow from? Well, in proposing a reduction by approximately one third of all types of means of delivery of nuclear weapons -- that is to say the destruction of one third of Soviet intercontinental missiles, which are the hub of Soviet defence -- the United States in general does not call in its plan for any measures in the first stage for the liquidation of its bases abroad, on which are located United States striking forces, medium-range missiles, operational tactical rockets, bombers and bomber destroyers which can also carry out tactical operations and nuclear warhead weapons. According to the United States proposals the liquidation of military bases abroad would be deferred to the very end of the disarmament process --- the third stage.
If we were to follow the United States plan there would be an indefinite period of time -- or an endless period of time -- before the liquidation of those bases, since the duration of the third stage has never been defined by the United States. It should be added that in the United States plan there is no clear concrete commitment for the prohibition of nuclear weapons and the liquidation of stocks. The United States proposals retain the natural possibility of carrying out or launching a nuclear war throughout the whole process of disarmament, as well as after its conclusion. Without the complete and unconditional prohibition of nuclear weapons and the elimination of all stocks of those weapons general and complete disarmament is even unthinkable, since the liquidation of atomic and hydrogen weapons constitutes the very essence of the disarmament process.
The call for a prohibition of nuclear weapons, which was the leitmotiv of the majority of the statements made in the General Assembly was not a fortuitous occurrence; it spoke of the concern felt about the horrible consequences to mankind to which the use of those tremendous weapons might lead.

The General Assembly, in its resolution adopted at the seventeenth session called upon the members of the Eighteen Nation Committee to enter into negotiations in a spirit of mutual understanding. It is impossible to hope that success in our talks can be brought about by the efforts of one side alone; there would be no compromise in that. The Western Powers, which we might suppose are just as interested as other countries in the avoidance of a thermonuclear catastrophe, are obliged, in their turn, to show readiness to seek out ways and means of settling questions in dispute and to find solutions for disarmament problems on a mutually acceptable basis.

In the course of an exchange of messages between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev, the President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy, and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Macmillan, there was an expression of readiness to resume negotiations on disarmament with greater decisiveness and energy. We should like to hope that those words by the leaders of the United States and the United Kingdom will be transformed into concrete acts and that a willingness will be evinced on the part of the West to find a basis for an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

In elaborating a treaty on general and complete disarmament, it would be important to carry out specific measures which would reduce international tension and which, in turn, would promote the creation of conditions for the settlement of the problem of general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Union considers that the implementation of such measures would have definite and positive meaning. In our view, such measures could, for instance, embrace the bringing into effect of the proposal made by the People's Republic of Poland for the creation of a nuclear-free zone for Central Europe, as well as for the creation of nuclear-free zones in other regions of the world, an agreement between States regarding the renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons, and the conclusion of non-aggression pacts between the NATO countries and the countries of the Warsaw Pact. The carrying out of such measures would eliminate a number of obstacles in the path of general and complete disarmament.
In the course of its work, the Eighteen Nation Committee should pay attention to the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. There is no need for me to speak of the great importance from many points of view which an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests would have. There is one thing that should be stressed, however: a prohibition of all tests would be a form of prologue to a more decisive step, which would be the liquidation of the nuclear weapon itself and its prohibition.

Halfway measures in this matter of the discontinuance and banning of tests, measures, that is to say, which would still leave it possible to carry out testing of nuclear weapons although in only one environment, would not give us a final solution to the problem. All tests of nuclear weapons, whether in the atmosphere, underground, under water or in outer space, should be brought to an end once and for all, and this question should be settled here and now and not deferred. That would be in line with the will of the peoples of the world. That would be consonant with the will of the overwhelming majority of Member States of the United Nations, as the debate in the seventeenth session of the General Assembly has shown and as is reflected in the resolutions adopted during that session.

It is with satisfaction that we note that in the General Assembly the debate on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests was conducted on a constructive plane, the overwhelming majority of States expressing themselves in favour of an immediate cessation of all testing of nuclear weapons. What does give rise to alarm and must cause us apprehension is the fact that the representatives of the Western Powers in Geneva, in the meetings of the Sub-Committee, have maintained their former position and continued on a line which they had formerly developed, a line to which they had adhered in the consideration of this question by the Seventeenth Session of the General Assembly.

As a result of this position, to our great regret, we were unable to move forward towards a solution of the problem of discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests and, in essence, the negotiations in the Sub-Committee remain at a deadlock. The nineteen meetings of the Sub-Committee which took place during the recess of the Eighteen-Nation Committee failed to give us anything new.
The main reason for the absence of progress in those negotiations lies in the unwillingness of the Western Powers to adopt a compromise proposal which the neutral or non-aligned countries put forward. That proposal stemmed from the consideration that national means of detection would suffice for practical purposes of control over the fulfilment of obligations to discontinue all nuclear tests. The Western Powers stubbornly put forward demands for establishing an international system of control with obligatory inspection, knowing full well and in advance that it is not possible to reach an understanding on such a basis. This bears out the fact that, although the Western Powers verbally state their desire to put an end to all testing of nuclear weapons, in actual fact this does not appear to be their aim; in fact they propose that we limit the cessation of nuclear tests to the atmosphere, outer space and under water, leaving freedom of action with regard to nuclear testing underground.

The Soviet Union is concerned with achieving a cessation of all nuclear testing, a real prohibition and not an illusory one. We cannot leave open the possibility of underground tests being carried out. We cannot agree with the putting into force of an agreement which would still make it possible to conduct nuclear tests in any one environment. After all, such an agreement would constitute an extension or expansion of the armaments race and could bring about the introduction of other States into that race. In order to prevent such a dangerous turn of events it is necessary that an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests of all types should become a reality.

We must recognize that the positions taken by the two sides have come together significantly and an effort must be made to overcome the last hurdle by coming to an agreement on a mutually acceptable basis for the prohibition of underground testing of nuclear weapons as well. The Soviet delegation expresses the hope that the Western Powers will demonstrate their good will, sagacity, farsightedness and statesmanship and will meet the aspirations of all the other countries of the world, which are calling for a cessation for all time of all types of nuclear weapons without any exceptions being made whatever. In such an event we should be able to carry out the resolution of the General Assembly which asked that there should be no further tests of any sort after 1 January 1963.
In conclusion, I should like to speak briefly about the organization of the future work of our Committee. The Soviet delegation considers that we ought to adhere to the procedure agreed upon earlier for the consideration by this Committee of the first stage of the treaty on general and complete disarmament. However, bearing in mind the fact that, in the course of the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Soviet Union put forward certain changes to its draft treaty regarding the retention by the USSR and the United States of America of a strictly limited number of missiles or rockets, we evidently will have to come back to consideration of point 5(b) (2NDC/52) regarding measures of disarmament covering nuclear weapons delivery vehicles, and strive, as provided for in the recommendations on Procedure, to overcome any difficulties or differences of view. We hope that an understanding of this question also will prove to be within our reach.
Mr. GODEF (United Kingdom): I do not wish to take up too much of the time of the Conference but I should like to make a few preliminary comments on the occasion of our reconvening here.

I should like to say how glad I am to find myself back here working on this most important task, to which we are all devoted, and how good it is to see so many of my former colleagues. I should also like to welcome one or two new colleagues who have come to join us in our efforts. I hope that their added wisdom will compensate for what is lacking in the rest of us and will thus stimulate us to greater efforts.

I listened carefully to what you, in your capacity as Chairman, said at the opening of our discussions, and to what the representative of the United States had to say to us in regard to our procedures. I understand it has been agreed that we should continue with three meetings a week in the same form as we have held them previously. But I note that it is intended that these meetings should start at 10.30 a.m. in future instead of the previous nominal 10 a.m. I hope very much, in fixing this new time, that we all really endeavour to start punctually on each of those occasions. The Chairman emphasized the word "punctually"; and I think that those of us who attended the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly will realize the advantage of the insistence of the President on the punctuality of our attendance at meetings there. If we can start punctually, without necessarily waiting for every representative to be present in his seat before we start, it might facilitate our work in that sense. I say this as one who has sinned in the past and who is thus most fitted to make this comment.

In coming back to this Conference, and having the pleasure of sitting under the chairmanship of the representative of the Soviet Union, I did think very hard of what I could say of a complimentary nature in relation to his own main contribution here this afternoon. I think that perhaps the safest thing for me to say is that I do congratulate Mr. Tserapkin on the courteous way in which he castigated the Western Powers. I shall not take it further than that at this moment but I shall wish to return in the course of my remarks to one or two points which he made.

Those of us who were present at the debates in the United Nations General Assembly will need no reminding of the urgency and importance which all the delegations there attach to our efforts here at this Conference; and I hope that we have all returned with a feeling of determination to try to find some means of making effective progress.
As we reconvene it is perhaps appropriate to consider just for a moment, in relation to our procedures, whether there is any way of a procedural nature whereby we can facilitate, and add to the success of, our labours. I noticed that the representative of the United States referred to the co-Chairmanship, which I think he said should be made use of even more in the future than in the past. It is right that he, as one of the co-Chairmen, should say that; and, as the first representative who is not one of the co-Chairmen to speak after him, I should like to say that I endorse that statement, and that the more, and harder, the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union work together, when the rest of us are not working, the more pleased I shall be. Seriously however, I do think that the more informal contacts that can take place between the co-Chairmen the better it will be for our deliberations. We think that the system of co-Chairmanship is a good one; and we only urge our two co-Chairmen on to greater efforts in this sphere. I think, so far as the rest of us are concerned, that the more informal contacts and discussions we can have outside this Conference Chamber the better. The more we can discuss in this way, possibly the better it is for us to understand one another's points of view. When one has to speak formally here it is not as easy to explore one another's minds as it is when we meet informally. I welcome an increase of these informal contacts in every way possible, both from the co-Chairmen and from others.

As I say, those of us who have been at the United Nations General Assembly do realize, perhaps more keenly than ever, the importance of making progress; and of course this has been accentuated by the events which have troubled all our minds in the last two months, notably the problem of Cuba. I do not wish to go into that history now. It is well known to all of us. I was a little surprised when our Chairman — speaking in his capacity as the representative of the Soviet Union — said that, thanks to the wisdom of the Soviet Union, this situation had been overcome. That seems to me rather like the wisdom of the small boy who sets a house on fire and then calls the fire brigade to help put it out. I really do not see how the representative of the Soviet Union can seriously seek credit in relation to this matter. I only mention it in that sense and I certainly do not wish to labour the point. I would not have mentioned it but for what he said.
However, the problem of Cuba brought us face to face with the dangers that do exist; and I think that we must all realize the added incentive there is for us to succeed in our labours and in our major efforts in relation to general and complete disarmament. But, perhaps more than anything else, the impression I had in New York was of the urgency in the minds of most representatives that we should complete our deliberations in the field of nuclear tests. I think that those of us who are concerned in the work of the nuclear Sub-Committee have obviously to exert every effort we can to find a basis for agreement. I think that the position of the Western Powers is well and clearly known: it was expanded by both the representative of the United States and myself prior to the recess when we tabled the two draft treaties which stand in our joint name (ENDC/58 and ENDC/59) and which do spell out what we believe is possible in the way of concluding an immediate and comprehensive treaty: or, if the representative of the Soviet Union finds difficulty in that, we offer the partial treaty (ENDC/59) as a step on the road towards the comprehensive treaty, but not as an alternative. I shall be sorry if the representative of the Soviet Union says that he is unable to accept the partial treaty because I think it could have been concluded immediately. However, if that is said, it makes it more than ever incumbent upon the Soviet Union to help us to find a way to resolve the problem in relation to underground tests. In that context it is well known that the United Kingdom delegation is ready and anxious to consider any facts or any scientific information that the delegation of the Soviet Union cares to lay before us in regard to the latest information it has concerning the means not only of detecting but of identifying all nuclear tests. If the Soviet delegation can help us forward in our own work in this sense then it could help us, perhaps, towards a treaty.
But until we can have this clear information, until we can be certain in our own minds that we are able not only to detect but to identify all these events, then it is necessary for us to adhere to our clear position that we must have some means of obligatory on-site inspection in regard to at least a percentage of those remaining tests. This is a clear position and I very much hope that the Soviet delegation will help us to come to an agreement bearing this fact in mind.

A few moments ago you said, Mr. Chairman, that the positions of the two sides have come together a great deal -- those were the words you used as I understood the interpretation. It is true that they have come together a great deal, but that is because the West has moved towards the position of the Soviet Union. I do beg and appeal to you, Sir, to make a complementary move towards the Western position and thus enable us to overcome the last remaining hurdle that stands in our way. Indeed, it is not very much to ask, because I do not need to remind you that it was just a year ago -- but for two days -- namely on 28 November of last year, that you gave up your previous undertaking that the Soviet Union would be willing to accept obligatory on-site inspection. So, in this past twelve months, while the Soviet Union has moved away from us we have moved towards the Soviet Union.

I am not seeking to make a big debating point out of this. I am merely reminding you, Sir, of it because of the need, as I see it, for you to revert to that position and to help us, and through helping us to help this Conference and the world as a whole, to breathe a sigh of relief that we have bridged this gap and are finally in a position to negotiate a lasting treaty. I do not think this is too much to ask of the Soviet delegation.

If I may turn from nuclear tests to the wider field of general and complete disarmament, it is obvious that we have to redouble our efforts in this regard for the same reasons that I gave a few moments ago. I believe that what we have to do is to concentrate all our efforts particularly on resolving the differences between the two sides on the question of what should go into the first stage of a disarmament treaty. And I think the statements by Chairman Khrushchev, by President Kennedy and by our own Prime Minister really have given a fresh impetus to this, and people do look to us to overcome those difficulties.
You have reminded us, Mr. Chairman, of the proposal put forward by Mr. Gromyko in the plenary debate in the General Assembly in relation to nuclear delivery vehicles. You pointed out that this was a new move on the part of the Soviet Union, a move in which the West has shown interest and one about which we have said that we would like to know a great deal more. At the end of your speech, Sir, you announced that you would wish to revert to item 5(b) of our agenda, presumably to discuss this particular item. Speaking for my own delegation, I would have no objection whatever to such a course. I would only hope that, for tidiness of debate, we may know in advance on which day we are going to discuss these matters. I understand that Wednesday's debate will be on general issues, as was the debate today, but that presumably thereafter we can have days set aside, if necessary, for discussion of item 5(b) before we continue with the agenda. That is to say, normally we should try to keep to our agenda, and if we want days for particular subjects, such as a discussion on item 5(b) or a discussion in plenary of nuclear tests, then that should be specified in advance to enable us to have clear-cut debates on those issues. Otherwise, we shall welcome a discussion of the proposal put forward by Mr. Gromyko because we wish to clarify a number of points.

In this connexion, Mr. Chairman, you referred to the desire of the West to have details. Indeed, we must have a more detailed exposition than we have had thus far if we are to evaluate this proposal properly. You told us that it was fruitless to have a detailed discussion, but I should make it clear to you that we must have considerably more knowledge of this proposal if we are to give it the consideration which it deserves. We shall want to know the number that you have in mind: we shall want to know the type of missiles you have in mind: we shall want to know how you propose to overcome the acute problem of verification in regard to this particular matter. Because, obviously, if specified limited numbers are to be left in the hands of the two major Powers -- and I say nothing about the fact that my own country has not been included in this -- then obviously that does cause a verification problem in regard to the verification of remainders, because they will be remainders in an acute way and we shall want to know a good deal more about them.
With regard to verification over the whole field of tests, I listened most carefully to what you had to say, Mr. Chairman, in relation to this particular matter. I must admit — and I hope you will not think me ungracious — that I was disappointed that you reverted to the old claim that what the West is interested in is legalized espionage. Surely we have had that out sufficiently in the past. Surely we do not need to go through all that again. The West is not interested in legalized espionage. The West is interested in knowing that undertakings given have been properly carried out, and we feel that this has become even more necessary in the light of recent events than ever before. We must have these effective measures if we are to have the necessary confidence that any disarmament measures — and particularly this proposal — are to be carried out. Please, therefore, do not let us have these polemical statements about legalized espionage. Let us get down to the basic facts of how we can verify measures of this sort so that we may know whether it is feasible and possible to do so and whether we shall be able to have confidence in these measures being carried out.

This, of course, applies to many other issues in relation to verification generally. I noticed, Sir, that you referred again to the zonal inspection proposal which has been put forward by the United States, and you referred to it in critical terms. But I must remind you, Sir, that I myself on a number of previous occasions have said to you that if you do not like this proposal then you should tell us how you propose to overcome these difficulties. This is not, I believe, an unreasonable attitude to adopt. We are not wedded to this particular proposal. What we want is some proposal which would bridge the difference between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers on how effective verification can be carried out. This proposal, as I understand it, was put forward originally mainly to overcome the fears of the Soviet Union on this matter. If it does not overcome those fears then it is really up to the Soviet Union to let us have its views on how these matters should be dealt with. I do beg our Soviet colleague to deal with this in the days and weeks ahead.

In our discussions in the General Assembly on this matter I was struck by the number of people who referred to the problem of verification and to the need for overcoming the differences between the two sides to which I have referred. I believe the Indian representative made one or two references to this in the debate in the First Committee. Speaking on 7 November he said that he hoped that when the
Geneva negotiations resumed it would be possible again to examine what could be
done to ensure that there would be no clandestine activities operating against
the agreed disarmament plan. I agree with him. I think it is very important
that we should go into this matter.
I noticed also other comments. The representative of Brazil on 8 November repeated the former proposals of his delegation for the establishment of a group of specialists to study technical problems of control, without interfering in the political negotiations at the Conference. That is something in which I would show sympathetic interest. If it were possible to get agreement here, I think it would be valuable, because we really have to try to get to grips with this and to understand one another, to find a means of bridging the gap between us. I would support any proposal of that sort. I noticed also that the representative of Sweden on 9 November suggested that the Conference tackle control as a matter of urgent priority. He said:

"It might well be that the most promising avenue would be to select for closer study such disarmament measures for which the accompanying control arrangements are at one and the same time technically feasible and politically acceptable." (A/C.1/PV.1270, p.17-20)

If we can find such measures as come within that desirable description, then let us do so by all means, and this might help us to get going on definite agreement on certain aspects of the disarmament programme where perhaps the question of control measures might not be so difficult to overcome. This is the sort of way in which I have said on previous occasions we ought to seek the places where we can get the greatest agreement.

I rather like the phrase used by our United States colleague when he said: "Let us ... talk with, and not to, or at, each other." (supra, p.23-25) I think that is exactly what we should be doing. We should be seeking to find areas where agreement exists rather than repeating our disagreements, which, after some months of discussion here, are quite well known to most of us around this table. If we could find these areas of agreement, that could be a positive advantage. Possibly some of the collateral measures mentioned by both the preceding speakers today might fit well into this context. I will not specify them today. The ones we have had in mind are well known to all of us. If we can find some basis on which we can make progress on some of these collateral measures, that again must help us.

I should have thought that our target was first and foremost to solve the test ban problem; secondly, perhaps, to deal with some of these measures to which the Swedish representative referred, where we might find some areas of agreement; and, thirdly, to deal with the collateral measures. All these seem to be ways in which
we can move forward. We might possibly consider again, where appropriate, the setting up of groups of specialists for any particular purposes. I have always had the feeling that this could help us forward with our work. I have instanced the Brazilian proposal, and there have been others in the past. I have always been puzzled at the fact that our Soviet colleagues have not been happy about the setting up of such groups. I believe that these could further our work, and that really is the criterion of whether or not we should set them up. If we think they can help our work forward, then of course this must be right to do.

There are various ways in which we can facilitate our discussions together. As I have said, I do not propose on this occasion to go into detail on any of these matters. All I really want to do today is to restate the urgency, as I see it, and the need to make progress and to find ways in which we can more easily discuss these matters together, to try to rid ourselves of polemical statements and the reiteration of fixed positions and to seek genuinely and seriously to reach agreement, even if only on limited issues. That seems to me to be what the General Assembly wanted us to do, and I think we should bear in mind its wishes in this regard and do all we can to reach agreement. In that context I would say that the contributions of the eight non-aligned countries represented here have been of major importance in the past. I noticed that they were of very real value in New York and I certainly shall welcome their continued advice to us on all matters connected with our work in the days that lie ahead.

I will conclude by merely repeating my appeal that we should seek deliberately to find the best means of conducting our discussions, that we should really seek to find areas in which we can agree and that we should have the maximum amount of unofficial consultation at all levels, with a real effort to get away from propaganda and get down to the work that really matters.

Mr. CAVALLUTTI (Italy) (interpretation from French): The Italian delegation has listened with the greatest interest to the statements that have been made this afternoon. We have listened, in particular, with the greatest attention to the statements by the two co-Chairmen, Mr. Dean and yourself, Mr. Chairman.
The words spoken by Mr. Dean are, in our view, new proof of the sincerity, good will and constructive spirit with which the United States delegation participates in our work in the desire to lead this work to a satisfactory conclusion. My delegation shares fully the hopes expressed by the United States delegation for the speedy conclusion of at least a few first important agreements. We feel certain that the concrete programme of work outlined this afternoon by Mr. Dean will be received with satisfaction by all delegations willing to carry forward our negotiations.

The statement made by you, Mr. Chairman, in spite of the repetition of theses and arguments which we have already heard and to which we have already replied on several occasions, nevertheless deserves thorough consideration. I note with special satisfaction the repeated assertions that the views of the Soviet delegation are not rigid. I also appreciate the tone of your speech, which allows hope for a relaxed and friendly atmosphere in our discussions.

With regard to Mr. Godber's statement, I should simply like to say that a speech such as his, by its clarity and its realism, based upon a constructive spirit, represents a valuable contribution to our work which the Italian delegation fully appreciates.

The resumption of this Conference takes place in the presence of renewed hopes in the world. It is no mere accident -- it is already a positive fact -- that the Committee has been able to carry out the agreement concluded in September to the effect that the Committee should resume its work immediately after the debate on general disarmament in the United Nations General Assembly. This is proof that we consider our task here superior to other requirements and we wish to confirm our unanimous will, in harmony with the resolutions of the General Assembly, to continue our negotiations without relaxation of our efforts until we achieve tangible results. During the recess the people of the United States, through their representatives, have expressed once again their anxiety with regard to the present situation in which peace is kept by a fragile equilibrium of forces and in which huge resources are used for the armament race while they should be used for the welfare of humanity.
The Italian delegation, like other delegations, has followed carefully the disarmament debate in the United Nations. It is comforting to note that this debate was crowned with resolutions adopted nearly unanimously. Most of the Members of the United Nations took encouraging attitudes. States possessing huge stocks of armaments affirmed their will to get rid of them as soon as we in Geneva could define solutions in keeping with the principles of peace and security.
Countries not possessing armaments were not content with expressing their preoccupations and anxieties. They promised their co-operation in the search for agreement. This is a precious opportunity for us all.

All these are useful and positive points. However, during our recess there have been not only the meetings of the General Assembly of the United Nations; events of a quite different kind have unfolded themselves. However, these events, although linked to grave perils, afford useful lessons. I refer to the crisis in the Caribbean not with a desire to engage in polemics but simply in order to stress the lesson which it teaches all of us. As our Prime Minister, Mr. Fanfani, said on 3 October:

"Peace in the world rests on a fragile equilibrium until we find more satisfactory solutions."

The events connected with Cuba have shown how dangerous it is to try to disturb this equilibrium. However, we cannot try to alter this equilibrium forcefully while disarmament negotiations are continuing. This might lead to a new crisis and possibly to catastrophe. These events have also made it quite clear that there can be no confidence without control, objective strict control, fool-proof against espionage but at the same time efficient, effective and reliable.

The Italian delegation notes with satisfaction that the Soviet delegation, after having accepted the principle of controlled disarmament, has accepted concrete control in a specific case. This is why today one may hope that we will meet with fewer difficulties in trying to devise a general system of control and inspection which ought to be acceptable to the Soviet Union and under which it should be possible to harmonise the necessary guarantees of disarmament to the exclusion of all attempts at espionage.

It has also been proved that even in an extremely delicate situation there is always an alternative to nuclear war -- the path of negotiation and agreement in good faith, honour and security, a path always open to everyone.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs in my country stated in the Italian Chamber on 30 October:

"It is possible that these recent events will give a new impetus to the disarmament negotiations."
We hope this trust will be fulfilled. The peoples of the world are looking towards our negotiations with renewed hope. It is for us here to find practical and legal terms for realistic and concrete obligations in order to strengthen peace and security and to eliminate nuclear war as a means of settling differences. Our work is all the more necessary and urgent because while the United Nations was discussing disarmament a great and peaceful country, devoted to non-violence, became the victim of aggression. Italy looks with sympathy and friendly feelings towards India which is suffering and struggling for the preservation of its boundaries and the integrity of its territory. A solution based on the principles of justice and in accordance with human rights ought to be found.

In resuming our negotiations today we have an advantage as compared with our earlier sessions. We have a path clearly mapped out before us. We have already travelled across some most difficult terrain. We have learned the nature of the problems before us, we know what are the respective positions, and a certain measure of rapport has been achieved. During this recess we have had time for reflection and it is our hope that in resuming our work with renewed zeal today we shall reach the desired results.

The Italian delegation has already noted the proposal put forward in the debate in the General Assembly by Mr. Gromyk and referred to by Mr. Tsarapkin today, providing for partial retention of a number of missiles in the course of nuclear disarmament. We believe this proposal deserves serious study. I hope it will be elaborated in greater detail by the Soviet delegation in the course of our future work, and that thereby we will be in a better position to evaluate it. I would like to assure Mr. Tsarapkin that as far as my delegation is concerned we have no desire to delay our negotiations by putting questions on pointless details. We wish to have only the clarifications and the details strictly necessary for a proper understanding of the scope of his proposal.
Thanks to the resumption of our study and thanks also to a sincere confrontation of the various proposals, with the co-operation of all delegations we will find a formula in harmony with the needs of all. We know that not one of the disarmament plans put before us is rigid and final. We know that, especially on the part of the Western Powers, it has also been claimed that any constructive and realistic proposal would be considered very carefully and with good will. Let us not forget that, at this hour when we resume our activities, the formulae that we seek are based necessarily on technical data which cannot be underestimated or ignored, otherwise an agreement would be deceptive and false. We cannot in any way diminish the importance of the clash of political wills, which can give rise to understanding. Such a meeting of wills is necessary, but such a meeting cannot be realized with blindfolded eyes. It would become a reality only if at the outset the basic technical elements were analysed in an adequate manner. This is an evident truth, I think, at this juncture of our debate, and even the Soviet delegation and other Socialist delegations should be convinced of the need to create a technical working party within the framework of this Conference. The absence of such a technical working party up till now has hindered progress in our work. Apart from a treaty on general and complete disarmament, as we all know, we have also to work out so-called "collateral" disarmament measures. This adjective in no way diminishes the value of these measures. We are of the opinion that work on certain collateral measures should be intensified, since not only would agreement in this field be facilitated but it would also prepare the road for the re-establishment of trust and therefore general and complete disarmament would also be facilitated.

Among these collateral measures, certain of them, including the question of war by miscalculation, have been considered in the course of preceding plenary meetings, but in a very preliminary manner. The Italian delegation would like to have work resumed on this matter with energy, and more time and attention than in the past should be devoted to it.

Among the urgent problems before us there is one of special importance, the problem of the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. Its priority is dictated not only by the gravity of the problem and its direct consequences on the fate of mankind, but also because the present moment seems to be especially propitious for agreement on this question. People are asking themselves whether new technical
systems could not facilitate agreement regarding inspection of underground tests. The Italian delegation has always been in favour of exploring ways and means and studying all possibilities, including those which modern technology could put before us. Better than ever before, we ought to realize now that whatever the system envisaged, the guarantee it offers is the key to the problem. If the studies are lengthy and difficult, why not prohibit forthwith those tests which do not require control? We would prefer the immediate signature of an agreement prohibiting all tests, but should such an agreement not be within arms' reach now, for what reason and by what right should certain delegations deprive the world of a certain advantage, a certain lightening of the burden today? These delegations assume a terrible responsibility vis-à-vis mankind, especially in regard to future generations who risk being born malformed? If it were possible to sign a first agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests during the present session, before Christmas, with what a sigh would mankind welcome the New Year.

The General Assembly has requested our Committee to present a report on 10 December, which means that we have little time at our disposal. Therefore, we will have to work urgently and perseveringly in order not to disappoint the hopes that converge on us. This is not the time to consider other collateral questions: they could be considered in detail in the course of our subsequent meetings. At this juncture I wish to put only general considerations before you. It would appear to me that certain collateral agreements, if they were to be rapidly implemented, would require executive or control measures, from which we cannot make exceptions. For such tasks we cannot have recourse to defence machinery because this would not have been established at this juncture. The collateral measures that would be the subject of an agreement before the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament would be in a legal void with respect to their execution. The absence of an appropriate organ would necessarily give rise to practical difficulties in the implementation of these measures. Similar difficulties arose in connection with the Cuban crisis when it was not possible to find an appropriate international body to which control over the evacuation of certain weapons could be entrusted. The International Red Cross was not able to overcome the difficulties, and indirectly this is a reflection of the uncertainty that arises in cases where no appropriate executive authority has been established in advance.
In our view one of the tasks of our Committee is to encourage by all means the rapid implementation of disarmament measures and in so doing we should look at this special problem. It would appear not impossible for our Committee, or a similar organ, to consider the possibility of undertaking certain executive or control tasks until such time as the interim disarmament organization is established and functioning. I do not think there would be any incompatibility between this and the terms of reference that were vested in us if such an extension of our activities could facilitate disarmament measures in general. In addition, the composition of a committee as established within the framework of the United Nations would assure it an objectivity and impartiality.

Those are the ideas which I wished to put before you. Of course, they would have to be developed and made more precise in the future, which we are ready to do if requested. We think that this meets a certain requirement which stares everybody in the face. The Italian delegation is specially attentive to it because, in our opinion, the first disarmament measures should not be delayed and should be efficacious from the outset.

I should not like to conclude this first intervention without solemnly reaffirming the firmest will of the Italian Government and delegation to do everything possible to arrive quickly at agreement on general and complete disarmament, thus reanimating the hopes of mankind in its destiny. These are the directives which the Italian Premier gave to our delegation before we left for Geneva. We will follow these instructions as best we can, with full confidence and sincere faith in the goal we have before us.
The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its eighty-third plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Tsarapkine, representative of the Soviet Union.

"Statements welcoming the delegations to the resumed session of the Conference were made by Mr. Epstein, Deputy Special Representative to the Conference, on behalf of the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations, by Mr. Tsarapkine as Chairman of the day and co-Chairman, and by Mr. Deen, co-Chairman of the Conference.

"After the conclusion of the open part of the meeting, statements were made by the representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and Italy.

"Letters from the Acting Secretary-General to the co-Chairman, transmitting resolutions 1762 (XVII) and 1767 (XVII) of the General Assembly, were tabled as documents ENDC/63 and ENDC/64.

"The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Wednesday, 28 November 1962, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 5.40 p.m.
- Page 41, paragraph 3, substitute the first sentence by the following:

"We agree that a strictly limited number of rockets should be maintained, because if many rockets are retained we will then have a situation which will not differ substantially from the present situation."
CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE EIGHTY-FOURTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday, 28 November 1962, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman  Dr. L.F. HASSAN  (United Arab Republic)

This provisional record contains the originals of speeches in English together
with the Conference room interpretation of speeches in other languages.

It is requested that any corrections to the originals of speeches be submitted
in four parts (preferably incorporated in four of the single-sided mimeographed
copies with which delegations are supplied) by the authorized Liaison Officer of
the delegation concerned to the Documents Office, Room A.206. If no corrections
are received within four working days from the date of distribution the final
version, in which the interpretations will be replaced by translation, will be
prepared and issued on the basis of the provisional record.

THE TIME LIMIT FOR CORRECTIONS TO THIS RECORD WILL BE 0900 HOURS ON
5 DECEMBER 1962.
PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:
Mr. ASSUMPCAO da RAIJO
Mr. FRANK da COSTA
Mr. J. LENGYEL

Bulgaria:
Mr. M. TRANOV
Mr. G. GUELEV
Mr. M. KARASSIMIROV
Mr. ISHRAIEV

Burma:
U TUN SHIN
U MLANG LIANG GYI

Canada:
Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. J.E.G. HARDY
Mr. J.P.M. BELL
Mr. R.H. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:
Mr. K. KURKA
Mr. M. ZMALA
Mr. J. SUCEK
Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:
ATO HADDIS ALAMZEHU
ATO M. HAMID
ATO M. GEBEYEJHU

India:
Mr. A.S. LALL
Mr. A.S. MENTHA

Italy:
Mr. F. CAVALLERI
Mr. A. C. VALENTINI
Mr. G. COSTA-RECHINI
Mr. F. LUCIOLI CITLARI
PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:
Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
Mr. D. GONZALEZ GOMEZ
Mr. A. de ICIZA

Nigeria:
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:
Mr. M. LUCHE
Mr. E. ST. NISZSKY
Mr. W. WIECZOREK
Mr. K. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:
Mr. G. MAEVESCU
Mr. H. FLORESCU
Mr. E. GLAESER
Mr. N. ECOBESCU

Sweden:
Mr. R. EDBERG
Baron C.H. von PLUTEN
Mr. P. KELLIN
Mr. B. FREIDMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
Mr. S.K. TSUBRAKIN
Mr. A.N. ROSCHIN
Mr. I.G. USACHEV
Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV

United Arab Republic:
Mr. A.F. HASSAN
Mr. M.H. EL-ZAYYAT
Mr. S. JIMED
PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

**United Kingdom:**

- Mr. J.B. GODBER
- Sir Michael WRIGHT
- Mr. J.K. WRIGHT
- Mr. J.M. EDES

**United States of America:**

- Mr. A.H. DEAN
- Mr. C.C. STELLE
- Mr. L.E. MARK
- Mr. V. BAKER

**Deputy Special Representative of the Acting Secretary-General:**

- Mr. W. EPSTEIN
The CHAIRMAN (United Arab Republic): I declare open the eighty fourth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Before calling on the first speaker for today I should like to inform the Conference that I have been requested by the Secretariat to point out to members of the Committee that more accurate interpretation of their statements would be possible if they were to supply the Secretariat with five advance copies of their texts. It would also be helpful in this regard if representatives would be kind enough to read their prepared statements slowly.

In my capacity as Chairman, may I suggest that the Conference might find it profitable if the members of the Nuclear Sub-Committee could provide the Committee with a report on the meetings held by them during our recess.

Mr. MACOVESCU (Romania): During our two- and a-half months' recess, mankind has passed through the most difficult moment in international relations since the end of the Second World War. The Caribbean crisis brought us to the verge of an outbreak of the most devastating war ever known - a thermonuclear conflict. This time again, reason triumphed and the danger was averted. But has it been completely averted? No affirmative answer can be given to this question as long as the most vital problem of our times, general and complete disarmament, has not been solved once and for all, that is, until a final solution has been found for the challenge that faces us in this Committee.

The resumption of the proceedings of our Committee proves that despite the tense international situation of a month ago, despite all difficulties, the will of the peoples for peace is more powerful -- that this will for peace is the essential determining element in international relations. Peoples want peace, they want the tranquillity necessary to create the material and spiritual assets which the present generation needs, which future generations will need for their progress. War cannot give them all this: on the contrary.

Returning to this conference table, the Romanian delegation is fully conscious of the great force which the will for peace of the peoples represents. At the same time it is conscious of the great responsibility incumbent upon this Committee. No government, no delegation, no representative can evade this responsibility, because the judgement of history, and of those who make history -- the peoples -- is just and inexorable.
The problems facing us are difficult and complex. Nobody denies this. But if we had not deemed their solution possible, we would not have started this Conference. We are persuaded that if we take into account the general interests of humanity at this moment when the danger of devastating and irretrievable destruction has grown immensely; if we approach the issues in a realistic and concrete manner; if, in debating the problems thoroughly and with courage, we sincerely unite our efforts in order to find solutions — then we shall fulfill the task entrusted to this Committee by the United Nations General Assembly.

As I have emphasized on former occasions, the main danger which menaces mankind is that of a devastating nuclear war. To safeguard the peoples from the calamities of a nuclear catastrophe, to take drastic steps meant to assure a lasting peace on our planet — this is the most urgent and the most burning problem of the contemporary world. The radical way to fulfill this aim is the implementation of general and complete disarmament under strict international control.
The main task of our Committee is precisely that of working out a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control.

It is not our intention to deny or to underestimate the existence, importance and urgency of other problems, such as the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests and the adoption of other measures which would lead to the improvement of the international situation, to the promoting of confidence between States and to assuring favourable conditions for general and complete disarmament; but the main issue and the principal task which today challenges the world and our Committee is general and complete disarmament under strict international control. Throughout our proceedings we must not for a moment overlook this. Nothing must deflect us from this paramount goal. Without a clear view of what is most important in the activities of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee we cannot ensure the correct orientation of our proceedings, which is indispensable for success.

The Romanian delegation is firmly convinced that general and complete disarmament must above all liberate humanity from the nightmare of nuclear war. This aspect of the problem has acquired an ever-growing specific weight during the eight months that have elapsed since this Committee began its work. Super-saturated stockpiles of nuclear weapons have remained untouched; none of those weapons has been destroyed; none of the plants manufacturing them has stopped working. On the contrary, to the existing stockpiles new weapons have been added. The process of the expansion, improvement and diversification of weapons has continued, and still continues. Consequently the nuclear stockpiles grow like \( 10^7 \). Obviously the danger that threatens to annihilate entire countries and peoples has become even greater. Hence the urgency of the abolition of the nuclear danger.

In our efforts to solve this imperative problem we must all keep in mind that time and tide wait for no man. Every day of delay entails untold risks.

The Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/11) submitted to this Committee offers a workable solution for the elimination of the nuclear danger from the very first stage of the process of disarmament. It provides for the elimination of means of delivery of nuclear weapons in the first stage. That is a radical solution, which corresponds to the qualitatively new military situation which mankind
is facing today. Obviously, without means of delivery the nuclear weapons are bound to rust in their stockpiles, proving thus their futility, and to lose all their importance. By approaching the problem in this manner we would solve it completely and in a short space of time, even down to the stage of destroying the nuclear weapons themselves, and thus mankind would be saved from great danger.

The Western nuclear Powers try to convince us that it is impossible to accept such a proposal, bringing forward arguments which never come up to the importance of the problem -- the immediate elimination of the danger of nuclear war and which never come up to the level of the great political and moral task of our time -- safeguarding mankind against the possibilities of destruction by the nuclear weapons now in existence and those which are being manufactured.

These arguments, accompanied by mathematical, geographical and strategic considerations, have not been able to convince us as to the essence of the issue. They are not able to demonstrate that the Soviet solution is not and does not remain the best one. Nevertheless, after re-examining the situation that has been created as a result of the categorical refusal of the Western Powers to destroy all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage, the Soviet Government has come forward to meet the positions of those Powers and has proposed, as an exception to the rule, that in the course of the process of destroying nuclear weapon delivery vehicles the United States and the Soviet Union should maintain on their territories a strictly limited number of intercontinental, anti-missile and ground-to-air missiles. In our opinion this is a proposal of exceptional importance, which opens up real possibilities for the conclusion of an agreement on this issue at an early date.

It is known that the United States opposed the abolition of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles during the first stage, invoking the reason -- which we believe is groundless -- that such a measure would unfavourably affect the Western Powers. In the new conditions such an objection can no longer have any justification. If the United States and its allies are guided by the sincere desire to reach agreement, they now have the opportunity to contribute to the positive and undelayed solution of this issue.
At the last meeting we listened to comments concerning the new proposal of the Soviet Government by the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and Italy. Those comments boiled down, in essence, to the voicing of certain demands for clarification regarding the ways of implementing that proposal, and especially the details of control over the measures proposed. Of course, should an agreement in principle concerning the new Soviet proposal be reached, one could pass to the examination of all further aspects of this issue connected with its implementation, including the number of the above-mentioned missiles and the methods of control over the carrying out of those measures. All these aspects are naturally important, but they are subordinate to the reaching of agreement in principle with regard to the new Soviet proposal. Solutions would not be difficult to find if all parties agreed to the proposed measures and co-operated in the working out of arrangements with regard to their implementation. That being so, would it not be more logical to let the clarification of the technical problems be preceded by the adoption by the Western Powers of a clear stand with regard to the new Soviet proposal?

General and complete disarmament will become possible only if we take into account to an equal extent the right of all States to ensure their security. This idea permeates the principles of the joint statement of agreed principles of 20 September 1961, unanimously endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly in resolution 1722(XVI) of 20 December 1961, by which we must be guided in our proceedings. Hence the logical conclusion that, parallel with the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, military bases on foreign territories must be liquidated and all armed forces stationed on the territories of other States withdrawn. One cannot conceive of the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles during the first stage without the simultaneous liquidation of all United States military bases located on foreign territories close to the borders of socialist States. To act otherwise would be tantamount to creating a situation in which the right to security of the socialist States would be disregarded, and that cannot be admitted. The logic of the facts demands that the United States, which recently evinced so great a concern for its own security, should understand the preoccupation of the socialist States with their security, which is threatened by the United States military bases located on the territories of other States.
While the problem of general and complete disarmament must concern us in the first place and above all, this does not, naturally, exclude the possibility and usefulness of certain measures being adopted intended to promote the lessening of international tension and to facilitate general and complete disarmament.

The establishment of nuclear-free zones in various areas of the world would constitute such a measure. The Romanian delegation considers that the establishment of nuclear-free zones on the European continent would be of great political importance. The Romanian People's Republic supports the proposal made by the People's Republic of Poland concerning the establishment of such a zone in Central Europe.

Being convinced that each country must make its own contribution to the cause of maintaining and consolidating peace, the Romanian Government had already proposed in 1957 that an agreement should be reached among the States of the Balkan area. The Romanian People's Republic has been and is striving to turn this area into a region of peace and co-operation. It is obvious that the conclusion of a treaty of mutual understanding and security, in order to turn the Balkan area into a zone of peace, free of nuclear weapons, foreign military bases and launching pads, would meet in the highest degree the interests of all the peoples of that area and would contribute to the improvement of the international situation as a whole.

The Romanian delegation is also in favour of the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the States which are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and those participating in the Warsaw Pact.

We attach a particular importance to the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. As we have repeatedly emphasized, the Romanian Government stands for the immediate cessation of nuclear weapon tests in all environments, by all States and for ever.

The recent debates on this issue that took place in the United Nations General Assembly have cast a spotlight on the urgency of this measure, on the possibility of its implementation and on the narrowing of the gap between the respective positions. The interests of the entire human race, the interests of international peace and security, as reflected in the recent debates of the United Nations General Assembly, demand the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests, irrespective of the environment in which they are carried out.
What mankind is asking for is the halting of the arms race, the halting of the process of perfecting nuclear weapons, the diminishing of tension in the world, the strengthening of international security. Obviously, the cessation of nuclear weapon tests in certain environments only does not answer those requirements. In fact, if the possibility is left open for the continuation of underground tests, the arms race and the improvement of nuclear weapons will continue, with all the risks this entails for peace and international security. New efforts must be made in order to overcome the last obstacles which still prevent us from reaching agreement and from fulfilling the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly that after 1 January 1963, no more nuclear weapon tests should take place.

At our last meeting opinions were voiced and suggestions were made regarding the improvement of the procedure of our work. To our mind, our procedure regulations are quite satisfactory. Of course, we, too, think it advisable that, besides official contacts, the technique of unofficial contacts also should be used between the co-Chairmen as well as between other representatives.

It is essential however that in the framework of the official meetings, and equally during our unofficial contacts, we should all be guided by the endeavour to reach an agreement acceptable to all parties. To find such solutions, good will and realism are required from all of us.

On 7 November 1962, while the Caribbean crisis was still going on, the President of the State Council of the Romanian People's Republic, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, made the following statement:

"We are of the opinion that State leaders must show wisdom, patience and perseverance in order to solve by way of negotiations all existing differences". These are the thoughts which will guide the activity of the Romanian delegation throughout our negotiations. The Romanian delegation wishes all the members of this Committee wisdom, patience and perseverance in order to reach the goal of general and complete disarmament.

Permit me, Mr. Chairman, before I conclude, to welcome on behalf of the Romanian delegation, the presence among us of the representative of Burma, Ambassador U Tun Shein, and of the representative of Czechoslovakia, Deputy-Minister Karel Kurka, with our good wishes for great success in their mission.
Mr. LINDBERG (Sweden): During the many years in which the question of the location of nuclear tests has been discussed, we have witnessed a strange shifting of positions -- retreats by one of the sides or by both in face of a threatened breakdown in the negotiations; an introduction of conditions, apparently unacceptable to the other side from the outset, in face of a "threatened" agreement.

Today, such an approach should no longer be possible. The assaults carried out during the last year against man's health, wind and nerves have made it clear that nuclear testing more than anything else is the acute, universal evil with which we have to deal right now. The General Assembly of the United Nations has, with profound justification, asked that this matter should be given absolute priority during our continued deliberations here in Geneva.

When I venture to intervene in this general debate, I therefore intend to confine myself to the question of a nuclear test ban, which, as the Acting Secretary-General pointed out in his message to the resumed Conference, must be regarded as "the indispensable first step to general and complete disarmament." (E/NDG/FV.83, p.5)

If we look at the situation today we can observe many facts which, more than ever, ought to accelerate and facilitate our efforts to reach an agreement. Let me point out some of these facts:

First of all, it should be emphasized that the positions of the two sides have been brought considerably closer to each other since we took our seats around this table last spring. East and West have now agreed that it is possible to ban all tests in the atmospheres, outer space and under water without an international machinery of verification. This is essential, since these are the tests most dangerous for man's life and well-being.

Thus, the whole problem of an agreement regarding the discontinuance of nuclear tests has, in fact, been reduced to the question of underground tests. However important those underground tests may be, they nevertheless do represent only the smaller part of the problem. At the same time, we are all aware that the key to a durable solution, banning all tests in all elements for all time, is to be sought here.
Here also the gap has become smaller. On the basis of the joint memorandum of the eight non-aligned States (EmDC/28) the Western Powers have accepted a detection system based upon nationally manned observation posts — something that they were originally opposed to. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has accepted the idea of an international commission — an idea previously rejected by it. Also, with regard to the difficult question concerning on-site inspection, it seems that the positions have somewhat softened. A keen ear might have heard at least some indications of modification in the debate this autumn at the United Nations General Assembly. In this connexion it is of interest to note the favourable reception given by the representatives of both sides to the proposal of an early cut-off date. Prime Minister Khrushchev could thus state quite accurately in one of his messages to President Kennedy at the beginning of November that the views of the Soviet Union and the United States of America regarding a discontinuance of nuclear tests "are very close to each other". At about the same time Prime Minister Macmillan declared: "The Western and Soviet positions do not appear to be far apart, though I must add that the small gulf has so far been unbridgeable".

My second observation is that the United Nations General Assembly recently paid great attention to the nuclear tests problem and adopted two resolutions on the subject. Thus the United Nations General Assembly has adopted, by an overwhelming majority, the thirty-seven Power resolution which, without reservations, condemns all nuclear tests and demands their immediate cessation, and at the same time calls upon the parties concerned, taking the eight-nation joint memorandum (EmDC/28) as a basis, to enter into an immediate agreement prohibiting nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space, accompanied by an interim arrangement to suspend all underground tests with adequate assurances for effective detection and identification of seismic events by an international scientific commission.

It is natural that this resolution contains stronger and more impelling language than any earlier resolution on this subject. It has to be regarded as an expression of world-wide opinion which has grown more and more restless and impatient and which, in spite of all previous appeals to the great Powers,
has witnessed still more poisonous mushroom clouds rise from nuclear explosions — explosions which, in times of peace, have released roughly 600 megatons of nuclear energy, or roughly about 200 times the amount of destructive energy released during the five years of the Second World War.

This resolution is far too serious to be allowed to become the object of sophisticated disputes of interpretation. Such disputes would be derisory to the hundreds of millions of human beings who stand behind this document. If we look at the resolution as a whole — and it should and must be read as a whole — its purport is crystal clear. The first section contains a moral and humanitarian appeal from the non-nuclear nations who have never recognized any right of the nuclear Powers to expose the environment of this earth to hazards. Behind this is the most ardent desire to achieve a quick ending of all nuclear tests, preferably before the end of this year.

The second section of the resolution urgently asks for a binding agreement which can free the world from continued nuclear tests for all time. The majority of the supporters of this resolution do not attach great importance to the formula for such an agreement: the main thing is that it should be effective and complied with. The details and modalities are left to this Conference — and, first of all, to the nuclear Powers themselves — to work out. This part of the resolution contains, above all, a strong endorsement and massive support of the eight-Power joint memorandum (ENDC/28) as an instrument to reach agreement. Therefore, we think that the non-aligned members of this Conference can return to this table after the recess conscious that they can speak in the name of an overwhelming and world-wide public opinion.

A third fact that should be recalled is the report, filled with facts, submitted this autumn by the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, a committee in which several of our most prominent experts on radiation have been represented. That report contains a very serious warning, expressed in strict and scientific language, against continued nuclear weapon tests. Nobody can indifferently pass over the Committee's remark that "any increase in radiation exposure may not be fully manifested for several decades in the case of somatic disease, and for many generations in the case of genetic damage".
The conclusion of the report speaks to us in no uncertain terms: "The Committee therefore emphasizes the need that all forms of unnecessary radiation exposure should be minimized or avoided entirely, particularly when the exposure of large populations is entailed. ... As there are no effective measures to prevent the occurrence of harmful effects of global radioactive contamination from nuclear explosions, the achievement of a final cessation of nuclear tests would benefit present and future generations of mankind."

Also outside the United Nations Radiation Committee a series of warnings have been voiced. The well-known Nobel prize winner, Mr. Linus Pauling, recently declared that, according to his estimates, 16 million children in the generations to come will die at birth or be born with serious defects because of the tests carried out until now. Even though all such estimates must of necessity be uncertain approximations, the scientists seem to agree that one cannot exclude the fact that the tests already carried out will have harmful consequences for millions of human beings not yet born. More tests will continually increase the risks.

A fourth element of significance is the technical development in the field of seismology which may have opened up certain new vistas.

Before adjourning at the beginning of September we were informed that Projects V.I.R. and Orpheus had indicated that considerable progress had been made as regards long range detection. It seemed to imply that, however large a country may be, it is possible to detect, from outside its borders, nuclear explosions and earthquakes of a corresponding size by means of advanced instrumentation. Certainly, detection is not equal to identification. But it was apparently concluded that deception had been rendered more difficult through the possibility of registering every phenomenon in many countries.

The Soviet Union and United States scientists who participated in the Pugwash Conference in London at the beginning of September, although proceeding along other lines, arrived at a similar conclusion, which was embodied in a common statement that attracted a great deal of attention. Both the Eastern and Western scientists had made the proposal of the eight non-aligned States their point of departure. On the basis of this proposal they examined the possibility
of developing a system "in such a way as to provide a minimal interference with the host country and still obtain a maximum amount of completely objective seismic information for the international control commission so that it will substantially reduce the number of necessary on-site inspections".
In the operative part of their resolution these scientists -- three from the United States and three from the Soviet Union -- proposed that automatic recording stations, so-called "black boxes", should be used. These should be sealed in such a way that they could not be tampered with, and they could be self-contained. The instruments should be periodically returned to the international commission for inspection, replacement, repair, and so on. There should be a sufficient number of stations to permit of seismic events being recorded on many instruments. The sealed automatic seismographs to be placed in the Soviet Union could be manufactured in the United States, and vice versa.

The United States and Soviet Union scientists at the Pugwash Conference concluded their common document with the following words:

"We think a system developed along these lines may provide a large enough mass of objective seismic data so that the international control commission will need to request very few on-site inspections. If this is true, it may provide a new basis for negotiations in the Geneva discussions and ease the problem of resolving the on-site inspection issue."

Similar ideas have been brought forward from other quarters, inter alia, by two prominent seismologists at Harvard University who, departing from the test ban plan and the Pugwash Conference, have developed a system for utilizing the "black boxes". Although such automatic stations are not capable of one hundred per cent identification, they may reduce the number of events which cannot be identified with a certain degree of accuracy. These "black boxes" do not per se solve all problems. However, they may be a rather useful complementary device for under water detection in the deep sea they seem to be the only possibility.

The question of inspection that up to now has been our stumbling block has not been removed from our agenda by the achievements made so far in the field of seismology. But the cumulative effect of these improvements has simplified the problem both as to control, which has been so strongly emphasized by one side, and as to the safeguarding of national security, which has been put in the foreground by the other side.

A fifth significant element when we now resume our debate is the existence at present of a factual discontinuation of tests in the atmosphere. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have recently concluded their extensive series of tests. Our deliberations in this conference room need no longer be conducted against the irritating background music of nuclear explosions in the East and the West. The
silence that has fallen over the testing grounds on Novaja Zemlja and in the
Pacific Ocean should promote sincerity and détente in our negotiations.
Providing that restraint is also exercised with regard to underground tests it
would seem that we are entering a period when testing has, in fact, ceased. It
is certainly our right to expect that this will be more than a passing period: that
the sudden silence over the testing grounds shall be used to hammer out a treaty
that will outlaw tests in all environments for all time.

Finally, there have been recently certain happenings in the international
arena that should have contributed to creating a more favourable political
atmosphere for our discussions. We are all very conscious of how close we were
to the fateful threshold not long ago, and how fraught with momentous consequences
even an incautious step or miscalculation could have been during those days.
However, at the same time, we felt relieved to note a responsible desire to solve
a difficult problem before the fatal circle had been inexorably closed. Both
these aspects should, I think, be useful to our work here.

All these elements which I have permitted myself to mention — the increased
and more impatient pressure of world opinion, the warning of the scientists, the
new technical achievements, the factual discontinuation of the tests which we now
have, and the conclusions which we should be entitled to draw from recent
events — ought to facilitate our negotiations and expedite the reaching of an
agreement. The real differences between the two parties are now so small that
they would not justify the two Powers ignoring world opinion by not taking
advantage of this situation to secure an effective and permanent agreement.

The General Assembly has requested a new report on this matter by 10 December.
This gives us no time for exercises in polemics, but only time for work — work in a
sincere spirit to reach concrete results.

Thus, what we should do today is to find a suitable point of departure for such
constructive work. This should be looked for, in the first instance, in a field
where there is a wide area of agreement between the parties.

If we study the verbatim records of the Conference and of its Sub-Committee —
and also of the meetings of the Sub-Committee during the recess — we find an evident
conformity of views on the scientific commission which is to be the heart and
nerv e centre of the control system. It is true that, so far, there has been no
detailed discussion with regard to the size and composition of a commission. It is
true also that there are different views on the question of inspection. But apart
from that there is a wide area of agreement in principle as to the functions of the commission as indicated in the memorandum of the non-aligned countries (HDC/28).

It should therefore be possible to establish a commission with those functions on which the parties can reach a preliminary agreement without awaiting the final drafting and entry into force of a comprehensive agreement.

This idea is not new. My delegation has touched upon it earlier on several occasions. I refer to statements at the plenary meetings on 8 June (HDC/PV.53), 1 August (HDC/PV.64) and 31 August (HDC/PV.77). With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I shall quote a few words from my statement on 31 August:

"Would it not be worthwhile to consider now the establishment, at least on an interim basis, of the commission proposed in the eight-Power memorandum, about which the Parties are in agreement, with, as a first task, the scientific examination of the question of how a control system should be organized? We believe that that would extend the area of agreement and thereby also facilitate our endeavours to arrive at a permanent test ban treaty." (HDC/PV.77, p.32)

At that time the idea was strongly endorsed inter alia by the delegations of Burma, Mexico and the United Arab Republic. It was further elaborated in a statement on behalf of the Swedish delegation by Mrs. Atina Lingman when the test ban question was discussed in the first committee of the United Nations. Similar views were then also expressed by inter alia Canada, Cyprus, Norway, Yugoslavia and New Zealand.

Then my delegation now reverts to this question our intention is to give that idea a more definite form than in our earlier interventions at this Conference. We consider that the time has now come directly to request the nuclear powers immediately and without awaiting the elaboration of a comprehensive agreement to call in a panel of scientists from different countries, especially seismologists, leaving it to this panel to act for the time being as an interim commission.
It is indeed difficult to see how we shall be able to comply with the task which has been assigned to us by the United Nations General Assembly without some arrangement of that kind. As I have just recalled, the United Nations resolution has two parts: first, a request that all nuclear weapon tests should cease immediately, and not later than 1 January 1963; and, secondly, a demand that a final agreement banning all tests above the earth’s crust should be worked out, accompanied by an interim arrangement suspending all underground tests. These two parts are interrelated and complementary; but they need to be cemented together. A panel of scientists entrusted with such authority that it could serve as an interim commission would be a link and a joining medium.

The situation when we parted in September was that both sides were prepared to enter into a final arrangement banning the most spectacular and dangerous tests. A condition of the Soviet Union was, however, that an understanding should be reached simultaneously to refrain from underground tests. The Western Powers replied that they could not accept an uncontrolled moratorium. Did these opposite views mean that the road had been blocked? Were we again in the well-known situation where each of the parties made conditions unacceptable to the other side when an agreement seemed "threateningly" close? We refused to accept such a conclusion and we refuse to accept it today. We felt — and I permit myself to quote again from my statement of 31 August —

"that there are still certain lines and combinations which the nuclear Powers could and should carefully consider in a serious effort to find a common platform." (EMDC/FV.77, p.25)

We imagine that it should be possible to reach agreement on a moratorium on underground tests limited in time while the details of a comprehensive test ban agreement are being worked out. A time limit seems realistic as it would hardly be technically possible to iron out a comprehensive agreement before 1 January, whereas, on the other hand, it would be unreasonable to have this work going on ad calendas graeicas. The vacuum between the positions of the two parties could, during such a provisional cessation of tests, be filled by the proposed scientific panel acting as an interim commission.
Probably such a panel should be given a direct mandate by the Eighteen Nation Conference. But it would be an advantage if the nomination of scientists from different countries could be made by some independent, purely scientific and non-political institution, such as the International Committee of Geophysics.

Such a panel would be of value by providing the Conference, and in the first place its nuclear Sub-Committee, with technical and scientific information and certain investigations. In view of what I have already said, it is, however, our opinion that its tasks should by no means be limited to such preparatory studies.

The panel should, under the auspices of the Conference and in co-operation with the Sub-Committee, be able to start building up the whole international machinery. It should be of essential importance in the technical elaboration of the detection system and the data exchange. It should be able to provide practical, valuable experience for the construction and detailed functioning of a more permanent commission. Here as in so many other fields of life there is certainly truth in the words of Mirabeau that a journey seems different to a man who makes it in reality from what it seems to one who undertakes his travels on a map.

In order that the panel should be able to act as an interim commission, it should explicitly be entrusted with certain basic functions which the eight-Power memorandum has envisaged for the permanent commission and on which there is agreement between both sides. Above all this is the case with the scientific and non-political evaluation of data from already existing --- and to a great extent also co-operating --- national observation posts.

In practice the functioning of such a system would mean that the measuring and detection of relevant geophysical phenomena would be carried out, just as now, by different national observation posts and that the data recorded, more or less processed, would be distributed to all interested research institutes throughout the world. Until the site for a permanent commission has been agreed upon, one of the existing research institutes --- in this connexion I may refer to the data centres, for instance, in Hev and in Strasbourg --- could serve as an interim commission and be responsible for the necessary processing and interpretation of the material received.
It would be up to the commission to judge the material from a test ban point of view and to consider the character of relevant data and the need for further information. Such a system would mean that only the small group of persons of which the interim commission would consist, together with a computation group, would be concerned with the test ban question itself. All the other personnel within the observation network and the research institutes would work for other purposes and would not have to think at all of the test ban as such.

To be able to fulfil its functions the interim commission must be furnished with modern electronic equipment for processing of data and be able to rely upon speedy communications. The organization of the meteorological data exchange could serve as a model. In fact this is the first point where there would be any substantial costs for the provisional organization. Whether these should be carried by the parties concerned or through internationally available means might be a question for negotiation. In any case the expenses would be small compared to the costs of the nuclear tests.

It would certainly be of interest if the interim commission, for its comparative studies, could be supplied with the geophysical records of the past two years, when a number of man-made underground explosions were carried out and recorded.

It should once more be emphasized that what I have tried to outline here refers only to an interim organization designed to fill a vacuum in connexion with a provisional and time-limited ban on underground tests. But at the same time it is evident that whatever road we choose, if we start our journey tomorrow or much later, we must start from certain provisional and temporary conditions.

Even if we could sign a final text tomorrow, that would not mean that we received the organization ready-made. It would not be born as Pallas Athena suddenly springing out of the head of Jupiter. With all respect for my distinguished colleagues here, I do not think that any one of them, not even among those representing the great Powers, considers himself in a position to compete with the gods of Olympus. Even under the Western proposal for a comprehensive agreement (ENDC/58) there would be a certain provisional stage before the system had been built up. According to the experts' proposal of 1958 (BRF/NUC/28) a building-up period of several years was envisaged. The Western draft of 27 August this year implies that the control machinery could not start functioning until at best six to twelve months after the entry into force of an agreement.
Under such circumstances it is difficult to see that any well-founded objections could be made against a time-limited moratorium during which a scientific panel acting as an interim commission would start building up the central control machinery. The advantages of such an arrangement seem obvious. Valuable experience could be gained while the elaboration of the agreement went on; a considerable amount of preparatory work would have been carried out once the agreement came into force; and no more time would be wasted. It would, at the same time, greatly reduce the risk which the Western nuclear Powers believe to be inherent in a so-called "uncontrolled moratorium", because there would be the amount of control that it is possible to achieve step by step in the course of a building-up period.
I have not spoken about verification *in loco* under a provisional test ban. It is natural that if the great Powers undertake to refrain during a certain time from all underground tests without having built up a control system legally inscribed in an agreement such verifications can only take place *in casu*. The Swedish Foreign Minister, Mr. Torsten Nilsson, touched upon this in his statement in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on 19 October last. After having recalled that there are different possibilities for bridging the remaining controversies in the control question, and after having pointed to the possibilities of a time limited moratorium while waiting for, *inter alia*, the further development of seismological instrumentation, he stated:

"It would also be possible to provide guarantees against the misuse of the obligation to subject oneself to a certain degree of inspection in such a way that a group of eminent scientists from politically independent countries could be entrusted with the task of deciding, on a purely scientific and technical basis, if an inspection was necessary in order to establish the nature of earth tremor". \(\text{A/C.1/PV.1252, p.22}\)

It is clear that if possibilities were opened for a scientific panel to make observations on the spot by a team specially assigned for that task, in case of doubt as to the origin of a recorded seismic event, this would be of great value from many points of view. It seems to me that the interpretation of the often-quoted statement of Mr. Kuznetsov in this Conference on 17 August last could well be that the Soviet side does not object to the opening up of such a possibility.

The establishment of a provisional commission of the kind I have tried to outline would mean the implementation of the recommendation of the General Assembly to the nuclear Powers about an interim agreement suspending all underground tests. It would comply with the demand that such an interim arrangement should include adequate assurances for effective detection and identification of seismic events by an international scientific commission. Consequently, it would also make it possible for the nuclear Powers -- in accordance with the request of the General Assembly -- to enter into an immediate agreement prohibiting nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.

Finally, it should perhaps be emphasized that a provisional arrangement under a temporary ban on underground tests, as asked for in paragraph 6 of the thirty-seven Power resolution, would in no way prejudice the final shape of a test ban agreement.
A scientific panel acting as an interim commission could give valuable practical experience but would not forestall the final organization, the elaboration of which would remain the task of the Conference and in the first place of the nuclear Powers.

I have here -- just as earlier when we have discussed a permanent agreement -- been anxious to emphasize strongly the purely scientific and non-political character of an international monitoring machinery. For the Swedish delegation this is essential. Scientists have shown a remarkable ability to co-operate across all national and ideological frontiers and to find out the scientifically objective truth even in cases where the basic material has been incomplete or pre-arranged. We must count upon science working and analysing objectively as our foremost ally.

A scientific panel with the tasks I have outlined here could be very useful and valuable during the difficult interim stage when an international machinery is to be set up. As to planning in the longer run, we should be able to take advantage of the developments now taking place in the seismological field. In international seismological circles a proposal has recently been put forward that a world centre should be established at which data should be collected from fifteen regional centres together covering the whole globe. This proposal is very much in line with an ECOSOC resolution at the General Assembly this autumn aiming at more effective international co-operation in the field of seismological research. Its main purpose is to create a readiness against damages caused by earthquakes and tsunamis -- seismic sea waves.

But such an organization is also of extreme interest in connexion with possible man-made explosions. To us who, just like the other non-aligned delegations at this Conference, have maintained that instead of building up an expensive separate monitoring system one should basically rely on the normal exchange of data motivated by scientific fervour and free from political side-glances, such a proposal seems almost like the answer to a prayer.

The extension of international scientific co-operation in this field should be stimulated and accelerated. It will nevertheless be a somewhat time-consuming process. This also speaks in favour of a provisional arrangement.

Above all, however, we have to explore the situation in which we find ourselves at present. A heavy responsibility rests here on four countries, three of which are represented around this table while the fourth is unfortunately not occupying a seat and not fulfilling its obligations here. It is those four Powers, and they alone, which have continued nuclear testing in spite of the alarm
which it has caused all over the world. It is high time that they listened to
the anguished voices of the billions of people living beyond their frontiers.

There are also voices of warning within their own countries. I recently
read a statement —it happened to be by a Soviet expert though it might just as well
have been by one of the scientists in the West. The statement was reproduced in
The Scientific World, Journal of the World Federation of Scientific Workers, and
reads:

"We must clearly understand that if testing of nuclear bombs is continued
to a point where the danger deriving from them is only too obvious to everyone,
it will be too late."

If we do not act very soon it might be too late because we do not know how long
the favourable circumstances will last which now seem to facilitate an agreement.
Too late because without a binding agreement we cannot feel sure that tests may not
be resumed. Too late also because new countries may then enter the "atomic club"
and complicate the issue still further.

History, which to a great extent is a graveyard of lost opportunities, has
much to teach us about the role of psychological moments. It may be that we have
just now such a psychological opportunity to remove the threat which hangs over
mankind.
Mr. KURKA (Czechoslovakia) (interpretation from Russian): As this is the first time that I have had the honour of addressing the Committee it is my duty to thank the Soviet representative who, as Chairman at our last meeting, welcomed those of us who were participating in the work of the Committee for the first time. I should also like to express thanks to all the other colleagues who subscribed to the kind words of the Chairman, including the United Kingdom representative who welcomed us in his own way, linking our presence in this Committee to certain hopes as to the wise course that the Committee would follow.

Speaking personally, we have no doubts whatever as to the wisdom of the membership of this Committee, including of course the United Kingdom representative who we know very well from sessions of the General Assembly in New York. I think, however, that the question of how successful we are in our attempts lies not only in the collective wisdom of the Committee but in the feeling of responsibility as well as the good will which all parties concerned should have. It is to this aspect of our efforts that almost all the preceding speakers directed our attention.

In the general debate that has taken place it is characteristic that almost all representatives justifiably pointed to the fact that the recent serious crisis which developed in the Caribbean area stressed once again how urgent is the problem that has been put on the shoulders of our Committee. That conclusion was fully borne out and found expression in the resolution passed at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly to the effect that general and complete disarmament represents the most urgent problem of the day. I submit that these recent events, when the world found itself at the very brink of a thermonuclear war, stressed how essential is the need to find a solution to the problem with which we are dealing as well as emphasizing the responsibility of our Committee.

Thanks to the consistent peaceful policy of the Soviet Union it was possible to transfer the crisis on to the plane of negotiations, and this we consider a very heartening factor for the future work of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.
No one can deny any longer the fact that today the danger of a nuclear war is the most serious problem for the entire world and its peoples. Therefore, the attention of the Committee should be directed at the elimination of this danger. We are convinced that as a matter of first priority the Committee should consider how it is possible to achieve agreement on such measures, the implementation of which in the first stage of general and complete disarmament would, in effect, eliminate the threat of a nuclear war. Together with the delegations of other socialist countries, we have assumed this position from the very beginning of the work of the Committee, and it is from this basic postulate that the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control submitted by the Soviet Union (ENDC/2*) is based.

The radical measures proposed for the first stage of general and complete disarmament, that is to say, measures covering the liquidation of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons as well as the liquidation of foreign bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other States, if implemented would ensure our arriving at the goal we seek. After all, the Committee has been considering these measures from the time it was first established. However, as yet no significant progress has been achieved, since in the past the representatives of the West systematically declined to adopt radical measures that would exclude the possibility of a nuclear war being started. The absence of a readiness on the part of the Western Powers to embrace a reasonable agreement led to the situation whereby the consideration of the Committee on general and complete disarmament was virtually non-existing.

The seriousness of the situation which has developed and the need for effective measures to lessen the danger of a nuclear war calls for the exertion of maximum efforts by us to overcome the difficulties and obstacles that now prevent us from achieving progress in our negotiations.

In accordance with resolution 1767 (XVII), it is necessary to engage in negotiations guided by a desire to reach a reasonable compromise, for it is only on such a basis that real progress can be achieved in this cause of general and complete disarmament as well as on other problems, the consideration of which has been undertaken by this Committee already. Agreement on such a complex and difficult problem as general and complete disarmament, which intimately affects the
security of States is obviously no easy matter. As I have already had occasion to say, it requires a demonstration by all participants in these negotiations of sufficient good will, boldness and decisiveness to satisfy the insistent demands of peoples throughout the world to eliminate the threat of a war and to ensure peace and security on our planet. Further, it requires patient effort to seek out means to reach mutually acceptable decisions for the purpose of achieving progress in our talks.

In their actions the delegations of the socialist countries have been systematically guided by that viewpoint, and in this connexion I should again like to draw attention to the changes which the Soviet Government has introduced, in agreement with the other socialist countries, to the original draft treaty on general and complete disarmament for the purpose of taking steps towards the position of the Western countries. The Soviet Government agreed to increase the period for the carrying out of the programme of general and complete disarmament as a whole as well as the period for the first stage. In so doing it also met the Western Powers in agreeing to the determination of the levels to which armed forces should be reduced in the first stage of disarmament. The Soviet Government also agreed that the process of liquidation of conventional armaments should be carried out by a percentage reduction, as desired by the Western Powers.

With respect to measures on the limitation of the danger of a new war, the Soviet Union included in its draft certain proposals which take into account the proposals of the Western Powers on this question. On the problem of the liquidation of nuclear weapons, the socialist countries emphasize their readiness to carry out the necessary measures in the first stage if the Western Powers would agree to this.

Finally, in September this year, during the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Gromyko, declared that, in a desire to achieve progress in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament, the Soviet Government had taken a new important step with respect to the elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Government expressed agreement that the United States and the Soviet Union should keep a strictly limited agreed number of intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles, and missiles of the ground-to-air type, to be kept exclusively on their
respective territories, which would be eliminated only during the second stage of general and complete disarmament after all nuclear weapons had been liquidated.

We evaluate this last step of the Soviet Government as fresh proof of its sincere desire to arrive at a mutually acceptable solution, and we would welcome it if the Western Powers were to demonstrate flexibility and good will similar to that shown by the Soviet Union in order to achieve agreement.
However, we must note that on the basic issues the Western Powers still seem to be keeping to their old positions, and I must confess with full earnestness that the statements made at our last meeting by the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and Italy have not given us any fresh hope. One might think that no recent crisis had occurred and that we had never listened to the insistent demands of world public opinion for the earliest possible achievement of general and complete disarmament; that no debate had occurred in the seventeenth session of the General Assembly leading to the adoption of resolution 1767 (XVII) calling for "the conclusion, at the earliest possible date, of an agreement on general and complete disarmament". (ENDC/64)

The representatives of the Western Powers not only have failed to submit new proposals on general and complete disarmament -- which, after all, is our basic and most important task -- but, in their interventions, they have tried to draw attention to all matters save that of general and complete disarmament. I should like to make it clear that we do not wish to minimize the importance of the questions raised by the Western representatives. However, in our view we should at the present time concentrate our efforts on the main problem bearing upon the vital interests of humanity, namely, the problem of eliminating the threat of a thermonuclear war.

In statements made at our last meeting the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and Italy again expressed their determination to achieve progress in the solution of the problem of disarmament. We welcome those statements, but at the same time I must say with all candour that we cannot but feel apprehension in the light of certain other speeches which reach us from the West which are in contradiction with the principle of disarmament. I am referring to certain information which has appeared in connexion with the forthcoming Paris meeting of NATO. As a part of the preparation for that session we hear about plans to strengthen the military power of Western and Central Europe. There is talk about deploying greater forces along the line where the NATO forces face those of the Warsaw Treaty Powers, in the spirit of what has been called a forward strategy. In this connexion we hear again voices on the need to act from positions of strength. As for the Federal
Republic of Germany, there is the announced intention to increase the strength of the Bundeswehr and to use the so-called tactical atomic weapons. I cannot but draw the attention of my colleagues to this information which has appeared in the Western Press and which is, of course, a cause of concern and apprehension to us.

While emphasizing the urgency of general and complete disarmament we are not losing sight of the importance of reaching agreement on the speedy cessation of all nuclear weapon tests. In our view, the best basis for reaching agreement on this matter is offered by the joint memorandum of the eight neutralist States (ENDC/28). Recent events have once again confirmed two basic facts. The first is that reaching agreement does not depend on solving technical problems but, first and foremost, on political decisions; on the general decision to put an end once and for all to the arms race in this field. The second is that it has been confirmed, as we have emphasized in the past, that there can be no half-way decisions which would not prohibit all nuclear weapon tests. That would be even worse than half of a decision, for under the guise of a partial solution of the problem the door would be thrown wide open for the continuation of the nuclear arms race. That is why we cannot agree with our colleague Mr. Cavalletti, who spoke in his very eloquent statement at our last meeting of the enormous responsibility of those who would not agree to a partial test ban. Our position is that the States parties would assume an even greater responsibility if by accepting a partial solution they did in fact open the door for the continuation of the nuclear arms race, with all its dangerous consequences.

A partial solution would not lead us to the goal, which remains the achievement of a speedy agreement on the unconditional cessation of all nuclear weapon tests. That has been repeatedly noted in the course of the seventeenth session of the General Assembly, and it must be taken into consideration. It was stated very clearly, for instance, by the representative of the Republic of Mali in the First Committee of the General Assembly, when he said that a treaty on the partial cessation of tests would only change the conditions of the competition, which, instead of continuing in the atmosphere and under water, would be
transferred under ground. What we are striving for is a general and complete treaty prohibiting all nuclear and thermonuclear tests, whether in the atmosphere, under water or under ground.

In conclusion I should like to state briefly our position with regard to the concrete measures the implementation of which would lead to a lessening of international tension and create more favourable conditions for general and complete disarmament.
Our delegation has, as always, paid the greatest possible attention to all proposals aiming at this goal and we will continue to do so.

We are even more convinced now than ever before that one of the most important and urgent measures for the lessening of international tension and thereby the elimination of the danger of nuclear war would consist in setting up a denuclearized zone in Central Europe. This has been already repeatedly put forward by the Government of Poland, by agreement with the Governments of Czechoslovakia and of the German Democratic Republic. The situation is therefore that three out of the four States which would be directly concerned with the implementation of that proposal have already indicated that they are unconditionally in favour of such a decision and we must note once more, with regret, that it is only the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany which has been opposing this very useful and fruitful proposal. This shows once again that the aim of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is not the implementation of peaceful proposals but, on the contrary, the acceleration and intensification of its military programmes.

A positive influence on the situation in the world and confidence in relationships between States would no doubt be brought about by the creation of other denuclearized zones in other parts of the world, as well as other concrete measures such as, for instance, the renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons, or a non-aggression pact between the member-States of NATO and those of the Warsaw Pact, and other similar measures.

In conclusion, I would like to assure the meeting that the Czechoslovak delegation, acting under the instructions of its Government, will make the greatest possible effort to help our Committee to attain real success. Our people, our society, similarly to the peoples of the world at large, are sincerely desirous of achieving general and complete disarmament. Permit me to express my hope and my confidence that the forthcoming stage of the work of our Committee will produce the desired progress. It is only in this way that we can fulfil the hopes of mankind; it is only in this way that our work, rather than being a waste of time, will be a positive contribution to strengthening peace and security in the world.

Mr. Dunn (United States of America): I should like to make just a few brief remarks on the very interesting suggestions made this morning by the representative of Sweden with regard to a nuclear test ban treaty. All the members of this Conference will recall that the United States and the United Kingdom have presented a draft
comprehensive treaty. That is before the Conference as document UNDC/58. That
treaty, which we presented on 27 August last, would ensure the cessation of all
nuclear tests in all environments for all time under effective international
supervision and control.

In addition to that comprehensive treaty, in response to appeals made on
humanitarian grounds by a number of representatives at this Conference, the
United States and the United Kingdom proposed a partial test ban treaty (UNDC/59)
which would ensure the ending of tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water,
without the need for additional measures of verification. We are prepared to sign
that treaty immediately. As should, of course, prefer to sign the comprehensive treaty
banning all tests, and we are also prepared to sign that treaty immediately.

The treaty which would end all tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under
water would stop all further danger from radioactive debris from such tests and those
dangers which many representatives here have desired should be eliminated would be
immediately terminated. But, unfortunately, the Soviet Union says "No!"

We believe that either of those treaties would, if signed, go far towards
reaching our goal of an effective test ban. We have, of course, as is well known,
had most unfortunate experiences in the past with unilateral pledges or obligations
to cease testing without effective international control. The last such arrangement,
as all delegations will recall, was ended by the massive series of Soviet tests
which began in the atmosphere in September 1961, and, if various conversations which
Chairman Khrushchev has had with several persons are correctly reported in the Press,
those Soviet tests apparently have not yet ended. We cannot repeat that experience
and accept unilateral pledges or obligations to cease testing without effective
control.

The proposal made by the delegation of Sweden includes some form of a moratorium
arrangement, although, as I understood it from the verbatim record, it also takes into
account paragraph 6 of the General Assembly resolution 1762 (XVII) which, in effect,
provides that any interim arrangement for the cessation of tests should include
"adequate assurances for effective detection and identification of seismic
events by an international scientific commission;" (UNDC/63, p.3)

In the absence of incontrovertible scientific evidence of the highest order to
the contrary, we continue to believe that the detection stations on various countries' territories and compulsory on-site inspection by the commission provide the most
effective and objective method for both detecting and identifying seismic events. This is not a new position on the part of the United States. It is one which we have constantly put forward.

The United States for its part has been spending a great many millions of dollars in an effort to improve the methods of detecting seismic events in order that we could arrive at a comprehensive treaty which would ban all tests in all environments. Not only are we prepared to sign that treaty but, last year, in August 1961, we told our friends in the Soviet Union that we were prepared to remove the threshold. The United States for its part has constantly endeavoured to advance this scientific area. We have made public all of our scientific research and have invited comment from all over the world. We shall continue to conduct research in this field in an effort to advance the scope of scientific knowledge in this area of seismology.
We are quite prepared to sit down together with scientists from the Soviet Union, or with scientists of any countries, in order to examine on a most objective basis anything that can be done to advance the field of scientific knowledge in this sphere; and, if it appears to be useful, we are quite prepared to see if it can be used in the drafting of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. Of course, we shall wish to study the precise written record of what the representative of Sweden has proposed, and we shall reserve our right to comment later on when we have been able to do that. However, any acceptable arrangement must include those measures of effective international control necessary to ensure the observation of any agreement— including the necessary detection posts and measures of on-site inspection of unidentified events, set up on an orderly and well-organized basis — in order that the entire public of the world can have confidence in its results.

It will be most helpful to us, in assessing and evaluating the Swedish representative's proposal, to have any further clarification which he may feel able to give us with respect to the means by which his proposal would provide, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1752 (XVII), "adequate assurances for effective detection and identification of seismic events", including — as we still believe to be necessary for appropriate identification — on-site inspection during the period in which he has proposed all testing, including underground tests, should cease.

I am sure that the representative of Sweden, and all the other representatives here, are fully aware of the stand the Government of the United States takes against uninspected, uncontrolled moratoria, and of our most unfortunate and unhappy experiences with such uncontrolled moratoria. Nevertheless we should like to thank the representative of Sweden for a most interesting contribution. I can assure him and our fellow representatives that we shall give this matter the most careful consideration.

The CHAIRMAN (United Arab Republic): Speaking in my capacity as the representative of the United Arab Republic, may I begin by stating the satisfaction of my delegation at the resumption of the work of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee. Furthermore, we must draw hope from the fact that this round of talks begins immediately after the deliberations of the United Nations General Assembly
on disarmament and nuclear tests — deliberations which have brought new elements to our study of those subjects. It may also be significant that this round of talks should begin on the heels of the recent world crisis, which impressed upon the whole world the urgency and the need for disarmament.

Inasmuch as the last recess of this Conference of two and a half months duration was not a vacation, and inasmuch as those new elements were added to the picture, my delegation would express the hope that our talks here at Geneva should mark the beginning of a new phase. They should be forward-looking and not a mere re-hash of oft repeated and well known positions. The world did not stand still during these two and a half months, as scores of States have expressed their ideas during the United Nations General Assembly debate on disarmament and nuclear tests. The United Nations General Assembly passed important resolutions affecting the course of our work here, and it should be only natural and practical not to overlook the contributions of those months.

As a small, non-aligned and non-nuclear State, the United Arab Republic is mindful of the fact that, when it comes to disarmament negotiations, the world, apart from the nuclear Powers, has rightly claimed its role as a very actively interested partner in the disarmament and test ban negotiations. Those deliberations at the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly have definitely shown this to be true. The delegation of the United Arab Republic is therefore aware of its responsibility to the United Nations General Assembly and to world public opinion at large. The representative of Sweden, Mr. Edberg, has eloquently expressed the feeling of, I dare say, all the eight non-aligned Member States of our Committee on this matter. We see value in the directives of the United Nations General Assembly and in its mandate.

If we turn our attention to the United Nations General Assembly's latest directives and resolutions we will find foremost among them a general concern over the continuation of tests, and a recognition of the fact that public opinion everywhere condemns tests and demands their cessation immediately, and in any case not later than 1 January 1963 — an acknowledgement of the fact that their continuation increases world tension and does not contribute to agreement on disarmament. Furthermore the United Nations General Assembly has endorsed the eight-Power joint memorandum (MDC/28) as a sound, adequate and fair basis for negotiations, as well as
for an interim arrangement suspending all underground nuclear tests to accompany an agreement prohibiting tests in the other three environments. Since both parties agreed in principle to the possibility of ending tests by 1 January 1963, should we not redouble our efforts during the coming weeks in order to be able to meet this target date and in order that our first progress report to the United Nations General Assembly, to be delivered by 10 December 1962, should be meaningful?

When we turn our attention to the question of general and complete disarmament, we find encouragement in the spirit of compromise that prompted modifications on both sides, especially the latest modification introduced by Mr. Gromyko at the United Nations General Assembly, which spurred general interest and a desire to explore it further in the light of more clarification. We are encouraged, furthermore, by the exchange of letters between Chairman Khrushchev, President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan, in which those three leaders reflected the world's determination to tackle the pending problems of disarmament with renewed determination and vigour in order to spare humanity the dangers of nuclear confrontation. Finally, the statements made at the eighty-third meeting of this Conference by the representatives of the nuclear Powers — although they harked back to their previous stands — were yet made in an encouraging and not too controversial tone. Along the same line, the decision to take the war propaganda item away from the pressures of the United Nations General Assembly debate is welcome.

Another source of gratification and hope is the fact that the United Nations General Assembly resolution on disarmament (A/RES/1767 (XVII)), which was co-sponsored by thirty-three States including my own, was adopted unanimously, even though France regretfully abstained. Once again this is a living proof and further evidence of the fact that world public opinion in all countries, large and small, has a direct and real interest in the outcome of these disarmament negotiations. And it is not without significance that the United Nations General Assembly should re-state in one breath its determination to "avert the grave dangers to the human race of nuclear confrontation, on which the recent crisis focused attention". It is the first time that this idea has ever been expressed as clearly and as straightforwardly by the United Nations General Assembly.
The Assembly has deemed it appropriate and necessary, also for the first time during the disarmament negotiations, to give specific directives on the urgent need for this Conference to turn its attention to collateral measures intended to decrease tension and facilitate disarmament.

The General Assembly has asked our Committee in paragraph 4 of Resolution 1767(XVII) to report periodically to it on the progress of our work in the field of disarmament. The Acting Secretary-General has brought this to our attention in document A/DC/64 which is now before us. We believe that there is great merit in the Assembly's directives on disarmament, and we urge this Conference to give urgent attention to these matters.

Finally, I should like to end by saying that we hope we will prove to be right in our estimation that the world is determined to draw profit from the recent crisis, and that since the world has come very close to annihilation it should be all the more necessary and possible to agree on ending tests once and for all, and to agree on practical measures intended to decrease tension and facilitate disarmament.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I had not intended to inflict a speech on my colleagues this morning, and I intervene now for the purpose of making just a few comments.

I was very interested in the speech of the Swedish representative, and particularly in his remarks on the question of nuclear tests. It is quite clear that he and his delegation have given a great deal of thought to this matter, and, therefore, any comments they make deserve our most careful attention. However, I should like to endorse what the United States representative clearly stated about the feelings of the United Kingdom, as well as the United States, in regard to the question of a moratorium.

We feel very strongly -- and recent events have borne this out -- that we must have clear and adequate assurances in relation to any agreement that is entered into. I listened with a great deal of sympathy to what the Swedish representative said when he reminded us of some of the dangers existing in nuclear testing. There are, of course, two different and distinct types of danger. He reminded us in particular of the danger of fallout and the risks -- the extent of which is debatable, although the fact that they exist is not -- that there can be therefrom, not only to those who live now but to generations yet unborn. That is one type of risk.
The other type of risk — and I think this is what is in the minds of my colleagues — is the risk that while any form of nuclear testing continues this must give added impetus to the arms race, which everybody wishes to halt.

But in regard to the first type of risk — and it is, I think, the most compelling one in the minds of many people because it has been referred to so many times round this table — I must remind my colleagues that the United Kingdom and the United States have tabled a draft treaty which could be signed tomorrow and which would eliminate that risk at once. We tabled that draft treaty in direct response to appeals made to us in this Conference room on many occasions and by many representatives. We tabled it in spite of certain anxieties we had that even in relation to three environments we could not be absolutely certain of its being carried out in certain circumstances. However, we felt it was our duty to heed the feelings and desires expressed here as well as elsewhere. We therefore tabled our draft partial treaty (ENDC/59). In doing so we made it clear that we looked upon it as an interim measure until such time as a complete treaty could be signed. I am frankly still very disappointed that this was not taken up at once while we continued to work on the other environment in which we must seek agreement. I again appeal to the Soviet representative to sign that treaty while we continue to work on the other environment. That surely is the right way in which to proceed, and it would surely provide added incentive towards solving problems in the underground sphere.

In so far as problems in the underground sphere exist — and this is where our difference of opinion lies — our position is still that we must have this degree of adequate assurance. I am well aware that the eight-Power memorandum (ENDC/26) which we have discussed on so many occasions contains three separate and distinct points. There is the question of detection, there is the question of an international commission, and there is the question of on-site inspection.

As I understood the Swedish representative this morning, he was directing his mind principally towards the international commission, and I shall wish to study very carefully the proposals and thoughts that he has advanced. This is clearly a complicated matter. It is — as the United States representative has so rightly said — a matter in which obviously we must have the fullest confidence. Regardless of whatever body is set up we must have the fullest assurance that adequate detection exists and that the information derived therefrom is properly correlated. This, I believe, is understandable, but I am perfectly willing to look at any suggestions in regard to the international commission. Indeed, on many occasions in the past I have invited the Soviet representative to look at this matter with us in the Sub Committee and to work with us towards achieving results on it.
Of course, the real key to our difficulties -- and I believe everyone realizes this -- lies in the field of on-site inspection. I listened with great care to what the Swedish representative had to say on this subject. I believe that at one stage of his speech he quoted the Swedish Foreign Minister as saying that a group of eminent scientists from politically independent countries could be entrusted with the task of deciding on a purely scientific and technical basis if an inspection was necessary. Immediately after that in his speech the Swedish representative went on to refer to what Mr. Kuznetsov said on 17 August. He said:

"It seems to me that the interpretation of the often-quoted statement of Mr. Kuznetsov in this Conference on 17 August last could well be that the Soviet side does not object to the opening up of such a possibility". (Supra. p.36)

Here again I would appeal to the Soviet representative. There has been a number of references to that statement at the General Assembly, but when one examines the statement itself it is highly ambiguous. All we ask is that the Soviet representative should tell us quite simply -- and I do not ask him to do so now, but at some stage -- whether in fact in these circumstances which the Swedish representative envisages the Soviet Union would automatically agree to inspection on every occasion that those scientists so requested. That is a key question. It is a question to which we have never had a clear answer. I believe a clear answer to it could help us materially towards getting an agreement.

These are delicate, difficult and involved matters. I certainly do not wish to make them more so. But I do want to assure the Swedish representative that I have listened with great attention to what he has said. I shall certainly study his speech most carefully to see if it can be of any assistance to us. But I do ask our colleagues to remember the basic, underlying matters of key importance to which I, equally with the United States representative, attach very great importance. We must have adequate assurance in relation to these matters, and we ask for assurance only that undertakings that have been freely given shall be carried out, and that we shall know that they are carried out.
That is what we ask for. In the light of recent events, I think it is not too much to ask for.

I am intervening this morning only to indicate that I have listened with some sympathy to what our Swedish colleague has said and to assure him and my other colleagues around this table that I shall certainly study his statement with care and that I shall look forward to further statements both from him and from others of our colleagues around this table seeking to help us to bridge this gap. I only ask them to understand clearly what the gap is and not to forget how far the Western nations have moved in trying to bridge it.

The CHAIRMAN (United Arab Republic): I have been informed by the co-Chairmen that they have recommended that the Conference hold its next meeting this Friday and that it be devoted to a general debate. I assume that that is acceptable to the Conference.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its eighty-fourth plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Hassan, representative of the United Arab Republic.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Romania, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, the United States, the United Arab Republic and the United Kingdom.

"The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 30 November 1962, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m."
CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN NATION COMMITTEE ON DISPLACED PERSONS

PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE EIGHTY-THIRD MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva

on Friday, 30 November 1962, at 11.30 a.m.

Chairman

Mr. J.R. GILDER (United Kingdom)

This provisional record contains the originals of speeches in English together with the Conference room interpretation of speeches in other languages.

It is requested that any corrections to the originals of speeches be submitted in four copies (preferably incorporated in four of the single-sided mimeographed copies with which delegations are supplied) by the authorized Liaison Officer of the delegation concerned to the Documents Office, Room A.206. If no corrections are received within four working days from the date of distribution the final version, in which the interpretations will be replaced by translations, will be prepared and issued on the basis of the provisional record.

The time limit for corrections to this record will be 0900 hours on 7 December 1962.
PRESEN'T AT THE TABLE

Brazil:
Mr. ASSUNCAO de ARAUJO
Mr. FRANK da COSTA
Mr. J. LANGYEL

Bulgaria:
Mr. M. TARANOV
Mr. G. GUELEV
Mr. M. KAJASSEVONOV
Mr. ISKRALEV

Burma:
U TUN SHEIN
U HAUNG ILUNG CYI

Canada:
Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. J.E.G. HARDY
Mr. J.P.M. HELL
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:
Mr. K. KURKA
Mr. M. ZENIA
Mr. J. BUCEK
Mr. V. VELNAR

Ethiopia:
ATO HADDIS ALEKAYEHU
ATO M. HADD
ATO M. GEBEYEHU

India:
Mr. A.S. LALL
Mr. A.S. MENTA

Italy:
Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI
Mr. C. COSTA-RECHINI
Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTERI
PRESEN T AT THE T A B L E (Cont'd)

**Mexico:**
Mr. L. A. WILLI AVARO
Mr. E. R. LIRIG
Mr. D. GONZALEZ GONZALEZ

**Nigeria:**
Mr. L. C. OBI

**Poland:**
Mr. H. LDZ
Mr. J. KULIGSK
Mr. W. KIECZOREK
Mr. A. KOWYRSKI

**Romania:**
Mr. G. LUCETSOU
Mr. H. LUCERSOU
Mr. E. GLAESER
Mr. O. HIDA

**Sweden:**
Mr. R. EBERG
Baron G. K. von PL A TEN
Mr. H. SKUL
Mr. B. KELDEN

**Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:**
Mr. S. S. TSARJKIN
Mr. A. ROSCHIN
Mr. I. G. ULIASHIK
Mr. P. P. SHAKHOV

**United Arab Republic:**
Mr. M. H. AN-LAY.T
Mr. S.-A. HIRED
Mr. M. KASSIM
PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

**United Kingdom:**

Mr. J.B. GODBER
Sir Michael WRIGHT
Mr. J.K. WRIGHT
Mr. J.N. EDES

**United States of America:**

Mr. A.H. DEAN
Mr. C.C. STILLE
Mr. D.E. MARK
Mr. V. BJER

**Deputy Special Representative of the acting Secretary-General:**

Mr. W. Eisenlin
The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I declare open the eighty-fifth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. Todorov (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): First I should like to take this opportunity to welcome our new colleagues, the Vice-minister for Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia and the representative of Burma. I believe that their efforts will make a fresh and constructive contribution to the work we have to do in this Committee.

My delegation shares the general feeling of satisfaction at the fact that this Committee has resumed its work after more than two months of recess, decided upon in September to allow the representatives here to follow the debate on the disarmament question in the General Assembly in New York. The recess has permitted the representatives around this table to draw profit from the views expressed in that debate. The very fact that the General Assembly of the United Nations has found it necessary to confirm the terms of reference of this Committee and to pass resolutions setting down the tasks assigned to it and indicating the possibility of solutions to certain problems, is encouraging. The commitment undertaken by the States members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee to continue their work in the same framework as in the past makes us hope that these countries do see better perspectives for the future work of this Committee. That commitment shows that the members of this Committee are quite aware of the responsibilities they have assumed.

The Eighteen Nation Committee takes up its work again at a very significant moment in the evolution of international affairs. During recent weeks the world has lived through moments charged with drama and with danger. A nuclear war might have followed the serious crisis in the Caribbean area, and if it was avoided it was thanks to the courage and sang-froid of the Soviet Government. It is, of course, comforting to note the unanimity with which the delegations have noted that recent events are in themselves a solemn warning of what the world must necessarily expect from an unbridled armaments race.
We agree with the words of the President of the United States in the message he addressed to the Conference: "The crucial developments within recent weeks have served to confirm both the need and the urgency of the task before the Conference." These events should encourage us all to exert all efforts in order to arrive at an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

The debates which have taken place in the General Assembly of the United Nations on the question of disarmament have shown the unanimity with which the delegations of all countries, great and small, have stressed that in the future a nuclear confrontation should be made impossible and that the nuclear danger should be eliminated once and for all. Emphasis was placed on the need to do everything possible in order to free the world from the spectre of a nuclear holocaust. While we draw gratification from this unanimity with respect to the need to do everything possible to avoid in the future situations and confrontations such as we have just lived through, we cannot but note the attempts being made by certain Western delegations to place on others the responsibility for recent events. However, although all representatives have expressed the unanimous desire to concentrate their efforts to avoid the serious dangers for the human race of a nuclear confrontation, opinions have differed as to the direction that should be given to the Eighteen-Nation Committee in order that it may accomplish the tasks that have been assigned to it by the United Nations. It is surprising to note that instead of following the general trend of the debate in the seventeenth session of the General Assembly as expressed in resolution 1767 (XVII) on general and complete disarmament — that is to say

"..... the need for the conclusion, at the earliest possible date, of an agreement on general and complete disarmament ....." (UNDC/64)

Certain delegations would like to lead us into a debate on questions that would rather draw us away from the task the gravity of which has been confirmed by recent events.

Is it not strange to note that according to the United States representative the lesson which should be drawn from the recent events and the crisis that developed in the Caribbean area is that special attention should be given to the question of control and to the affording to all parties of the assurance that the obligations arising from treaties will really be respected — even when there are no treaties? Instead of placing special emphasis on the danger that arises from foreign bases, proposing their immediate dismantling and proceeding to carry it out, the United States representative merely uses recent events in order to speak about control.
Now, control is necessary; it is an integral part of any agreement on disarmament and is part and parcel of the whole process of disarmament; but it is only a necessary complement to disarmament measures, a complement which can only be defined once the scope and breadth of disarmament measures are laid down in a precise manner, that is to say, when an agreement has been entered into between States on concrete measures of disarmament which they have agreed to carry out. Control, I submit, has always been one of the great obstacles when it has been discussed in abstracto independent of disarmament measures and without a prior agreement on the totality of disarmament measures which should be undertaken so as to arrive at a solution of the question. In the whole long story of the negotiations on disarmament, control, when detached from the corresponding measures of disarmament, has been the stumbling block on the road to agreement.

Of course, one should debate, negotiate and define the scope of control measures which would correspond to disarmament measures which the States would commit themselves to implement; but to stress the importance of control, to try to debate control measures, to rivet the attention of the Committee on the control question, without having defined the disarmament measures which the Governments have committed themselves to implement, would be tantamount to asking the Committee to debate in a vacuum, to distract its attention from the principal question before us which is, I submit, the question of general and complete disarmament.

If I have dwelt on the question of control, the reason is that, in his statement on the 26th November, Mr. Dean, representative of the United States of America, appeared to draw from the recent events in the Caribbean area the single conclusion, which unfortunately is an erroneous one, that it is necessary to deal with and strengthen control even before disarmament begins. Either by inadvertence or intentionally, in so saying he failed to draw the two conclusions which are necessary: firstly, that it is time to proceed to the elimination of nuclear weapons; secondly, that it is high time to carry out the dismantling of all foreign military bases. Those two conclusions, which have become so perfectly evident and logical in the eyes of world public opinion, seem for some reason to have dropped out of sight of our United States colleague, but we are quite convinced that neither the one nor the other can escape the attention of our Committee in its subsequent discussions if we are to have tangible results from our efforts aimed at saving humanity from the danger of a nuclear war.
Another question on which certain western representatives have spoken and to which they wish to attach priority in the light of recent events which have shaken the world is that of certain collateral measures. The Socialist countries have stressed on many occasions their readiness to discuss and their desire to arrive at an agreement on certain measures, such as, for instance, the creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world, and more especially in central Europe, as has been proposed by Poland and by other countries; the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the member States of the Warsaw Pact on the one side and the member States of NATO on the other; the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, etc. All these are measures, I submit, which could doubtless contribute to a détente and create an atmosphere of trust and by that means facilitate the conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament and especially on the first steps that should be taken in order to a.e.t the danger of a nuclear war weighing so heavily on the world.

But by themselves those measures could not save humanity from a nuclear war or avoid dramatic moments such as the world has lived through recently. What is necessary to create a true sense of security in the world of today is without doubt the elimination of nuclear weapons, which at the present time are the principal source of danger for humanity or, at least, the complete immobilization of such weapons. Now, this could only be done, I submit, within the framework of a treaty which would provide, within the very first stage of general and complete disarmament, for the liquidation of nuclear weapons, or, at the very least, the elimination of means of delivery, thus making it impossible to use those nuclear weapons in a possible conflict.

The certainty of elimination of the nuclear threat is provided in the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament submitted by the Soviet Union, as we have already pointed out in earlier meetings. What is of special interest at this stage of our debate, and more especially at this juncture when we are resuming our labs, is that, in the course of the seventeenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, taking into account certain objections raised by the Western Powers, the Soviet Union introduced new changes to articles contained in its draft treaty dealing with the means of delivery of nuclear weapons.
Even before our recess, as all present will remember, in response to wishes expressed by certain delegations in the course of an earlier debate in our Committee, the Soviet Union had expressed readiness, if the Western Powers so agreed, to transfer the elimination of nuclear weapons from the second to the first stage of general and complete disarmament. On the other hand, and this is especially important, in agreement with other Socialist countries, the Soviet Union expressed its readiness to leave in the possession of the Soviet Union and the United States, on a provisional basis, a strictly limited number of the intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and ground-to-air missiles which they possess at present. Those two changes, taken separately or together, offer enormous possibilities for the finding of a solution to the problem of the removal of the danger of nuclear war.

If humanity has really decided to avoid a nuclear confrontation in the future — and we for our part are convinced that this is pre-eminently the desire of humanity — it is necessary to try forthwith to spell out the provisions of a future treaty dealing with the elimination of nuclear weapons, or at the very least the elimination, from the very first stage of disarmament, of carrier vehicles for those weapons. The radical elimination and effective liquidation of the threat of a nuclear confrontation can only be achieved, in fact, by measures which would provide for the elimination of any means of waging a nuclear war, and this from the very outset of the application of the programme of general and complete disarmament.

It is, however, strange that some two months have elapsed since the last change proposed by the Soviet Union regarding the maintenance, during the destruction of delivery vehicles in the first stage, of an agreed but strictly limited number of missiles to be kept exclusively on the territories of the two great Powers, the United States of America and the U.S.S.R., without there having been any constructive response coming from the Western Powers. Of course it is true that the Foreign Minister of Canada reacted favourably to this proposal. In his statement in the United Nations General Assembly on 25 September Mr. Green said:

"Canada welcomes the announced intention of the Soviet Union to modify its proposals for eliminating nuclear weapons vehicles. In our view, this may help to remove the block to negotiations in Geneva which was created by the incompatible positions of the two sides on this particular question."

(A/7.1130, p.32)
However, it is regrettable none the less that, up until now, this has just been an isolated voice from among the Western Powers: it is an example of a realistic and constructive strand which has not been copied or emulated by representatives of other Western Powers, and especially not by the great Western Powers. The latter, on the contrary, continued to raise technical questions asking for clarification of secondary details. All these are facts that can only with difficulty be taken as being a firm intention on their part to tackle this question and to arrive finally at an agreement on this important matter -- namely, the elimination of the danger of a nuclear clash.

Of course, we do not intend to raise and develop all the advantages of the draft Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament submitted by the Soviet Union (UNDC/2 *) or dwell on all the changes which the Soviet Union has put forward in a spirit of good will and compromise. However, we would like to stress at the present juncture of our debate the fact that this draft treaty is the best basis for us to arrive at a rapid and effective solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament. It gives us the best possible guarantees for the practical and rapid elimination of the danger of a nuclear clash.

Among the questions which have drawn general attention in the course of the debate at the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, and which have in fact become the subject of detailed study there, is one of especial importance relating directly to disarmament -- namely, the matter of the cessation of nuclear tests.

Under this heading we wish to stress one point. Whilst emphasizing the need to put an end to all nuclear tests, all representatives have highlighted the fact that this measure would be a prelude to more definitive measures, which would be the elimination and the prohibition of nuclear weapons. All the representatives who have spoken in our Sub-Committee since the resumption of our work here have emphasized the need to find a solution to this important question. It was noted -- and rightly so -- that the respective positions of the partners have come closer to each other.

Now that the United States and the United Kingdom have declared that it is possible to put an end to all nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, without any need for international control, what remains is to agree only on the modalities and forms necessary for an agreement on the cessation of
underground nuclear tests is well. That would make it possible not only to save humanity from the harmful effects which nuclear tests have on the health of humanity and on future generations but also -- and this is just as important -- to halt the armaments race.

The Western representatives have insisted that, in accepting the cessation of nuclear tests in the three environments without international control, they have taken a great step towards meeting the views of the Soviet Union and have made great concessions. They ask for a response from the Soviet Union in the form of acceptance of compulsory on-site verification of the cessation of underground tests. No one can deny, however, that, in agreeing that control in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water should be carried out by national means, the Western Powers have not in fact made any concession to the other partners. They have purely and simply recognized scientific facts -- and this with a delay of six years on the findings of modern science. Will it be necessary for six more years to pass by before the Western Powers accept realities and recognize that it is possible to detect and identify underground tests by means of national detection systems?

This position taken by the Western Powers is, incidentally, in clear contradiction to the debates which took place at the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly and to the resolution adopted there, (A/RES/1752 (XII)) as well as to the demand of the peoples to see a cessation of all nuclear weapon tests.

It would like to recall that in their unanimous desire to see the ending of nuclear tests in all environments the peoples of the world insisted and demanded in this important resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, "that such tests should cease immediately and not later than 1 January 1963;".

It seems that in the sub-committee there has already been some discussion about the true meaning of this, and certain delegations have tried to interpret the paragraph in their own fashion. I would like to insist, however, that this paragraph states very clearly and unequivocally the desire of the peoples to have all nuclear tests cease not later than 1 January 1963. As the representative of Sweden said on 26 November 1962:

"If we do not act very soon it might become too late because we do not know how long the favourable circumstances will last which now seem to facilitate an agreement." (A/PCI/4, p.38-40)
To take a rigid stand today on the intransigent position adopted by the Western Powers, in spite of the opportunities for agreement offered by the eight-nation joint memorandum (INDC/26) -- which is a compromise solution between the positions of the two respective parties -- amounts to blocking the road leading to agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

Indeed, we must not forget, when the Soviet Union is asked to make new concessions, that the Soviet Union has already made an important concession in accepting the eight-nation joint memorandum, which is a compromise position.

In their sincere desire to contribute to the immediate cessation of nuclear weapon tests certain neutral countries have made suggestions which deserve our full attention. In his statement made on 26 November 1962 the representative of Sweden, Mr. Edberg, taking the principles of the eight-nation joint memorandum as a starting point -- and we shall study his speech very carefully -- made a proposal concerning the possibilities and the modalities of the immediate cessation of all nuclear weapon tests. These proposals, of course, deserve special attention and thorough study.

However, we must note that, to general surprise, the representatives of the Western nuclear Powers have immediately indicated their rather negative attitude with regard to these proposals precisely because they were based on the eight-nation joint memorandum and its principles. It is obvious that it is not by standing rigidly on the old positions and rejecting all compromise proposals that we can hope to solve the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests or facilitate the solution of the question of general and complete disarmament.
The serious events through which humanity has just passed leave no room for further procrastination and for adopting positions which could have incalculable consequences on the question of life and death which now faces humanity. In this regard I would like to recall the warning uttered by Mr. Dean himself on behalf of the United States delegation at our meeting on 26 November. He said:

"Let not our children look back at us and our Governments and say:
'They failed their moment.' Let them rather be able to say:
'They chose greatness rather than narrow prejudice and suspicion,
and unlocked the gates to the future which we now face without fear.'"

After the concessions made by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, it is now up to the Western Powers to say the word: to display their willingness to come to an agreement; and to show that some of their declarations are not pure rhetoric. It is really high time to act, and the sooner the better.

The Bulgarian delegation wishes to reaffirm the peaceful policies of the Bulgarian Government. These were reaffirmed at the recent Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Bulgaria, and it is our determination to make every effort in this Conference in order to achieve a speedy solution to the problem of general and complete disarmament, and to other questions before this Conference.

Mr. Burns (Canada): I should like to welcome, as other representatives who have spoken before me have done, the representatives of Burma and Czechoslovakia who have joined us since the recess. I am sure that they will contribute, as their predecessors have done, to the success of our deliberations.

I listened with attention to what the representative of Bulgaria has just said. He did the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs the honour of quoting from his statement in regard to the change of position announced by Mr. Gromyko at the General Assembly in regard to the elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles. The Bulgarian representative could not, of course, quote the whole of Mr. Green's speech, but I think it should be brought to the attention of this Conference that Mr. Green went on to say that those proposals would have to be carefully considered and studied to find out their true meaning -- or words to that effect, for I have not Mr. Green's text before me. I would submit that that is just about what the United States representative said in regard to those proposals in his intervention on 26 November.
I think it is necessary to say this in order to clarify the attitude of the Canadian delegation in regard to those modifications. We welcome then, but we realize that they require a lot of study and negotiation before their true meaning can become clear.

The Canadian delegation has listened to the statements made by the representatives of the nuclear Powers and the other representatives at this resumed session, and we have some suggestions to make, very respectfully, about what our programme of work ought to be for the next few weeks. It is our opinion that the Conference ought to concentrate all its efforts on assisting the nuclear Powers to reach agreement on a treaty for the cessation of nuclear tests by 1 January, 1963.

I wish to make it quite clear that the Canadian delegation fully recognizes the importance of our work on general and complete disarmament, and on the collateral measures which can be put into effect before such an agreement is reached. But it is a question of how we can best make progress: how we can achieve something concrete: how we can take the first step towards the goal of general and complete disarmament. Sitting in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, every time I heard a representative of a nation not represented here say that the Eighteen-Nation Committee had sat for six months and had produced no positive result I felt extremely unhappy, not to say a little ashamed, and I am sure that other representatives here felt the same. Are we going to report on 10 December -- only ten days away -- that we have reached "no results" and again "no results" at the end of this year? If we are to get results we have to concentrate our efforts, I would suggest, in the same way as in any other line of endeavour.

After listening to the debates at the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, and having spoken to many representatives who participated, the Canadian delegation believes that the practically unanimous opinion is that the stopping of nuclear tests is the first question relating to disarmament which has to be solved: that the present situation is favourable for reaching agreement, as many other representatives here have said: that the difference between the position of the United States and the United Kingdom on the one hand, and that of the Soviet Union on the other has become very narrow: and, finally, that unless agreement can be reached to stop nuclear testing, which would be a beginning of halting the arms race, there is not very much hope that agreement can be reached on any other disarmament proposal, at least not in the foreseeable future.
The preoccupations of the Governments which are Members of the United Nations are clearly set forth in resolution 1762 A and B which was adopted on 6 November -- a little over three weeks ago. Most of the heads of the delegations here were in the General Assembly at the time, and all the delegations here have some representatives who were there. We heard from the representative of Sweden, in his very valuable statement at our last meeting, a clear and accurate exposition of the essential features of resolution 1762 A. Nevertheless, I think it is worthwhile to call to mind again some of the cardinal points in that section and in section B of resolution 1762. I would first call to the Committee's attention certain key points in the five last preambular paragraphs of Part A which is derived from the draft resolution sponsored by thirty-seven nations. Representatives can follow them on page 2 of document 2/RES/1762 (XVIII). They read as follows:

"... basic agreement now prevails as regards the question of control of tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water," ... "the proceedings of the Eighteen-Nation Committee indicate a somewhat enlarged area of agreement on the question of effective control of underground tests"... "the [eight-nation] memorandum ... represents a sound, adequate and fair basis for the conduct of negotiations towards removing the outstanding differences on the question of effective control of underground tests". (ENDC/63, p. 2)
The next paragraph refers to the declared intention of Heads of State to find a speedy settlement of the remaining differences:

"Convinced that no efforts should be spared to achieve prompt agreement on the cessation of all nuclear tests in all environments ..." (ioig). I should like to call the attention of the Committee to operative paragraphs 2, 3 and 6 of the same resolution and operative paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1762 B, which was derived from the draft resolution sponsored by the United States and the United Kingdom. I do not intend to read these out, for everybody has the text available.

These together constitute a clear directive from the United Nations on what it expects the nuclear Powers to achieve at this resumed session of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

As all members of the Committee are aware, the "remaining differences" between the Governments of the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and of the United Kingdom and the United States, on the other, relate to verifying that an agreement to cease underground tests is being observed by all parties. This might be still further narrowed by saying that the question is precisely to what extent on-site inspection is required for ensuring compliance with a ban on underground nuclear tests. Operative paragraph 6 of resolution 1762 A says that if a complete agreement covering all four environments is not reached by 1 January — and this of course is the solution we hope for — then there should be an agreement to prohibit all tests in the three environments in which verifying the observance of obligations does not involve the question of on-site inspection. The paragraph goes on to say that this should be accompanied by an interim arrangement to stop underground tests, taking as a basis the eight-nation memorandum, and that the interim arrangement should include adequate assurances for effective detection and identification of seismic events by an international scientific commission.

The representative of Sweden, Mr. Edberg, suggested that it should be possible to establish the commission without awaiting the final drafting and entry into force of a comprehensive agreement. That is a suggestion which the delegation of Sweden has made before and which has been endorsed by other non-aligned members of the Committee. Canada supported the idea and still supports it. The question
of a commission for verifying the observance of obligations under a test ban treaty has been discussed between the nuclear Powers for the past four years, and a large measure of agreement was reached by mid-1961. The Canadian delegation can see no reason why, given that

"spirit of mutual understanding and concession in order to reach agreement urgently, bearing in mind the vital interests of mankind" (ibid., paragraph 5),

the nuclear Powers should not be able to decide on the framework of such a commission, at least on an interim basis, in a very few meetings.

Examining the fourth paragraph of the eight-nation memorandum (EnDC/28, of 16 April 1962, we find that the suggestion for

"an International Commission, consisting of a limited number of highly qualified scientists, possibly from non-aligned countries together with the appropriate staff" (EnDC/28)

is not very specific, and doubtless it was intended to be unspecific. Mr. Edberg made some further practical and useful suggestions on how the commission should be constituted and what its functions ought to be. The Canadian delegation feels that the essential point in setting up such a commission is that it should be so constituted that neutral scientists would have a decisive voice in determining whether or not an event recorded by seismic stations was of a character to require further investigation, including possibly on-site inspection. There are other points which require elaboration in connexion with the setting up of such a commission in order that it would be able to function effectively and speedily, but, as I have said, all these questions have been extensively considered by the nuclear Powers in the course of their past negotiations and should be readily solved if approached in the spirit called for by resolution 1762 A.

The representative of Sweden remarked:

"The question of inspection that up to now has been our stumbling block has not been removed from our agenda by the achievements made so far in the field of seismology." (EnDC/PV.84, p. 26)

I wonder whether he meant that we can expect that it will be removed by inevitable scientific progress. On the other hand, we have heard a number of statements
from the Socialist countries that the problem is really a political one and that the intervention of scientists in its solution would be unnecessary. Looked at rightly, the problem of whether on-site inspections are necessary in order to give assurance that no underground tests contrary to treaty obligations are being carried out requires both scientific advice and political decision. The question the scientists should answer is this: what is the probability of "x" underground nuclear explosions of "y" kilotons yield carried out over a period of "z" months not being detected and identified by the use of only external instrumentation? By "external instrumentation" I mean instruments and means of detection deployed outside the national territory of the country concerned. Now, if the answer is that the probability of those explosions not being detected and identified is negligible, governments can take a political decision to disregard this limited risk of evasion of the treaty. However, if the probability that they will not be detected is considerable, then other means of assurance must be provided: that is, on-site inspection. At this point another political decision enters. If a few on-site inspections are necessary to assure all parties that obligations not to test underground are being adhered to, is there a serious risk that the inspecting parties might acquire military information, in spite of the precautions against this which have been frequently explained and were explained again at the last meeting of the Sub-Committee by the representative of the United States? If so, does this risk that some military information might be acquired justify refusing all on-site inspections — that is, refusing a measure which can lead to agreement to sign a treaty to stop all nuclear testing everywhere and for ever?

Paragraph 6 of resolution 1762 A calls for an interim arrangement, and thus implies that arrangements suspending underground nuclear tests should be of limited duration — perhaps a year, perhaps six months or perhaps longer. The Canadian delegation feels that, failing total agreement on a comprehensive treaty, such an interim arrangement could be and should be made between the nuclear Powers. We believe that it could be made in very short order if the Soviet Union were prepared to agree to procedures which would provide satisfactory assurance of effective detection and identification of seismic events.
The Canadian delegation also notes that the representative of the United States has made it clear that his delegation — and this applies also to the United Kingdom delegation — is willing to consider any scientific demonstration or evidence that all significant underground tests can be detected and identified with the use of only existing national systems.
The international scientific commission, if set up, would be able also to evaluate such evidence and any demonstrations of how detection and identification would work. We were much interested in the statement by the representative of Sweden about how seismological information is now being centralized, which in his view should make it feasible to set up a system through which the proposed interim international scientific commission could work to determine whether any events which might be nuclear explosions had taken place.

The scientific information available to our delegation is that there are now between 125 and 140 stations in various parts of the world using instruments which incorporate improvements devised during the last five years — improvements originating largely as a result of United States research in this field. We further understand that the results from these and other stations are centrally and quickly processed by the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey. Of course, the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey is a national organization although it is working with records supplied by many other nations. However, the section of the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics, which is interested in seismology, is promoting the setting up of a truly international centre for central processing of earthquake records. The site of this centre has not yet been selected. We are also advised that a facility of this kind could be set up very quickly, perhaps in two months, in a country which possesses the right kind of computers, has good international communications and has competent seismologists.

The Canadian delegation earnestly hopes that the nuclear Powers and the Committee as well will find it possible to accept the suggestions we have put forward, and especially the suggestion that we should concentrate on a solution to the nuclear test ban problem, as in our view we are called upon to do by the very important resolution of the United Nations General Assembly from which I have quoted extensively. If we do so, and if that spirit of compromise and good will called for in the resolution are displayed, we can give the world something which will indeed make a Happy New Year for it. If we fail to do so, I do not like to speculate on what will be the future of this Conference — and more than this Conference.
Mr. LALL (India): May I first join with other representatives who have welcomed our new colleagues, the representative of Burma and the representative of Czechoslovakia, whom we are very glad to see in our midst. We know that they will continue the tradition established by their predecessors in contributing most valuably to our discussions.

I should like to divide my remarks into two parts. First, I will say a little on the question of general and complete disarmament, and then I will say something on the cessation of nuclear testing.

On the question of general and complete disarmament, we come back here, as has been stated by many delegations, after being present at the General Assembly and witnessing the strong sense of urgency which exists in the world today for results in disarmament. We return sobered by the fact that we have not yet made any tangible progress towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament. But we come back here in a mood which, I submit, is likely to be more practical than the one in which we left.

In this connexion I should like to draw attention to certain parts of statements which have already been made. I was particularly struck by what the representative of the United States said on 26 November. He said:

"... the world has been given dramatic demonstration that the earth's two greatest military Powers can reach agreement based on reason when a sufficient incentive to reach agreement exists on both sides."

(ENDC/PV.83, p.21)

A little later in his statement he said:

"... we all sense, I believe, that there is something different about the world of 26 November 1962 as compared with the world of 7 September 1962, when our Conference recessed." (ibid.)

We entirely agree with those observations. The same thought was, I believe, alluded to by the representative of the Soviet Union when, in his statement on the same day, he said:

"During this period a dangerous international crisis occurred, threatening to plunge the world into a thermonuclear war. These very dangerous events of recent times compel us to draw certain conclusions for the purpose of strengthening peace." (ibid., p.31)
Then he went on to say that it was necessary to speed up agreements on general and complete disarmament.

I believe that you, Mr. Chairman, also, in your first statement, drew attention to the changed situation and to the element of urgency which now exists. On that same day you said:

"Those of us who were present at the debates in the United Nations General Assembly will need no reminding of the urgency and importance which all the delegations there attach to our efforts here at this Conference;" (ENDC/FV.83, p.56)

I should also like in this connexion to draw attention to certain remarks of our Italian colleague. He said:

"The Italian delegation notes with satisfaction that the Soviet delegation, after having accepted the principle of controlled disarmament, has accepted concrete control in a specific case. This is why today one may hope that we will meet with fewer difficulties in trying to devise a general system of control and inspection." (ibid., p.71)

I should also like to say that the representative of Italy drew attention to the aggression against India, and that we are grateful to him for his remarks.

The situation which confronts us, then, in regard to disarmament is an extremely urgent one. To the remarks of those who have said that it is necessary that we should take urgent steps to put an end to the possibilities of a thermonuclear disaster I would add that all forms of aggression must be stopped. It is not only a question of putting an end to nuclear weapons. Disarmament must extend to conventional weapons as well, because we are witnessing today aggression of both kinds -- the possibility and the actuality -- and we in our delegation must certainly insist that, urgent though the need for nuclear disarmament is, it is also essential that due attention be paid to disarmament in its fullest sense.

In short, we must implement the resolutions of the General Assembly. We are not here just to have one particular kind of disarmament; we are here for general and complete disarmament, which affects all kinds of weapons of destruction, and it is in that spirit that the delegation of India will address itself to the issue of general and complete disarmament in the meetings that lie ahead.
Before I conclude the general portion of my remarks, I should like to say that we have been pleased to notice -- and I am sure other delegations have noticed this too -- that the spirit in which remarks have been made at this resumed session have come closer to the need for recognizing ourselves to be not a debating committee but a negotiating committee. We are established by the General Assembly to negotiate agreement on general and complete disarmament, not to debate matters. Of course, the element of debate cannot be absent when we are trying to negotiate, but we must never forget that the emphasis is and must remain heavily on negotiation and not on scoring debating points. Therefore, it would follow that there must be no absolute rigidities around this table because if there are absolute rigidities there can be no negotiation. If we intend to implement the resolutions of the General Assembly -- and I do not suggest for a moment that this is not the intention of every delegation at this table -- we must not allow ourselves to adopt positions of complete rigidity because, as I say, if we do there can be no negotiation.

Very interesting statements have been made here on general and complete disarmament. The Soviet representative again drew attention to the proposal made by Mr. Gromyko at the General Assembly that the United States and the Soviet Union each should retain certain agreed and strictly limited quantities of rockets, missiles and anti-missiles. That proposal was presented as a modification to the first stage of the Soviet draft plan. Mr. Gromyko then went on to suggest that, though we should continue the procedure of work as set out in document ENDC/52, we should come back to the relevant paragraph dealing with the means of delivery of nuclear weapons so that we might examine to what extent agreement could be reached on that issue, because undoubtedly it would colour our whole view of the first and subsequent stages of disarmament. And if I believe that you, Mr. Chairman, in your remarks of 26 November said that, in the realm of general and complete disarmament, you would have no objection to discussion being focused on this issue if that was generally agreeable.

Before I leave this subject I should like to make the following point. The representative of Bulgaria pointed out that the Foreign Minister of Canada had welcomed the
(Mr. Lall, India)

proposal made by Mr. Gromyko, but he said that that was an isolated voice among the Western delegations. I must say I do not think that is the case. Your own remarks, for example, Mr. Chairman, showed a certain interest in Mr. Gromyko's suggestion. Then, as Mr. Burns pointed out today, the remarks of the United States representative also showed a degree of interest in the suggestion. Furthermore, the suggestion was widely welcomed at the General Assembly by countries from all over the world. It was referred to as a suggestion which might open the door for negotiation on this issue. I would request that none of us, including the delegation of the country from which these new changes have been made, that is to say, the Soviet Union, should take as a negative attitude the desire expressed by certain delegations for a little more information regarding this proposal.

I have had occasion to mention this among friendly delegations outside the forum of this Conference. After all, it is not really possible for delegations to consider this issue, even in principle, unless it is clarified a little further. In short, if the delegation which made the suggestion is looking at this matter as the retention of, let us say, four rockets each by the Soviet Union and the United States, the feeling and the response of the United States and other delegations may be of one kind. On the other hand, if the Soviet delegation is thinking in terms of 300 rockets on each side -- though I hope it is not thinking in terms of such a large number -- then the response of the United States representative might be very different. In short, it is necessary to get some further information on this issue. Also, as you said Mr. Chairman, it is necessary for all of us to recognize that if something like that were done special problems of control and verification would arise which also would have to be solved. I am certain that the delegation which made the proposal would agree that there would be special problems of verification involved, but such statements would help consideration of this issue.

That is what I wished to say, and I should like to encourage the Soviet delegation to tell us more about this proposal, to go further into it with us, because it is a valuable proposal. It has been regarded as a valuable proposal not only by the Western delegations but also by many non-aligned delegations and we would welcome more information on it so that it might open the door fully to negotiation regarding a very important issue relating to general and complete disarmament.
I trust that these remarks will be taken as having been offered in a spirit of helpfulness and not as criticism of the position of any delegation.

I now come to the issue of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. We are faced with an extremely pressing time factor in this regard. We are to make a report on 10 December to the General Assembly, and I agree with those delegations which have said that we must give special consideration to this matter which is before us in terms of two General Assembly resolutions both of which draw attention to the urgency of the matter. I should like to state here also that, as is of course well known, the eight-nation memorandum contained in document ENDC/28 of 16 April 1962 has been before us for more than seven months. But now it is before us in a new sense because it is before us in terms of the massive endorsement which it received by the General Assembly. Resolution 1762 (XVII) states that the Assembly "Endorses the eight-nation memorandum of 16 April 1962 as a basis for negotiation;" (ENDC/63)

And neither resolution 1762 (XVII) nor any other General Assembly resolution endorsed any other basis for negotiation. That memorandum has been massively endorsed and is before us, and the delegation of India hopes that all those who are primarily concerned will take note of the fact that it is essential now that on the basis of that memorandum we should go forward. I should like to make it clear that this does not imply in the least that we would not welcome agreement on any other basis. We would do so: we would welcome agreement on the cessation of tests on any agreed basis, but we must go ahead on the best basis available. The General Assembly has endorsed this basis and we draw attention to the fact. In any event, because of the time factor in terms of the latest United Nations resolutions, and also because of the intrinsic importance and urgency of this issue, we would now urge both sides to join with the other members of the Committee in seeking a solution to this problem. We in our delegation have been looking carefully at this problem, as have other delegations. At our last meeting Mr. Edberg, speaking on behalf of Sweden, made a very important contribution which has been referred to by many delegations. We would recommend that study be given to the suggestion made by Mr. Edberg as a possible basis for making progress in this matter and in assisting towards an agreed solution.
We would ourselves like to offer certain observations in regard to this matter. These observations of ours should not be regarded as suggestions or proposals but as thoughts which we offer in the hope that they might be useful, because we feel that at this juncture it is necessary for all relevant thoughts to be given expression so that a solution may be found to this matter within the deadline, and so that we may be able to tell the General Assembly that after 1 January 1963 there will be no testing because we have found a basis for stopping all tests. The observations which we will make might be looked at separately or in combination, and we hope they will serve a useful purpose.

First, I should like to draw attention in this connexion to certain views or hypotheses which have been put forward at this table. There is, for example, talk -- both for and against -- of a quota of inspections. Secondly, there is insistence on invitations as a basis for inspections; and, equally, there is strong unwillingness to accept such a process of invitations as a basis for inspections. In this connexion, though, I would remark that it is a well-known fact that, whatever the modalities used, inspection could indeed take place only with the consent and active co-operation of the country to be inspected. That is, of course, common ground. Thirdly, there is on the one hand insistence on obligatory -- compulsory -- inspection, and on the other hand reference to inspection without a pre-committed obligation. But there is reference to inspection even on that side of the house.

We have been thinking over the various approaches made by different delegations to this issue and we wonder whether it might not actually be found that there is a meeting point in those various approaches: assuming, of course, that all the positions stated are directed to the same purpose, namely, to securing adequate assurance for both the detection and the identification of events by the international commission which has been agreed upon. I believe that, again, is common ground -- that there should be processes by which such identification could be made. In any case I should like to point out that this is an essential basis which has been stated in paragraph 6 of the first part of resolution 1762 (XVII) of the General Assembly. It would follow from this common element in the various approaches that it is the will of all countries concerned, and of all parties directly concerned, to facilitate inspection in some way -- to issue invitations for inspection. But all of them could anticipate that they would in fact issue if not a certain number of invitations then a number
of invitations within a certain range each year: of course, only if asked to do so by the international commission. They would not issue invitations in the abstract, but if the processes which are contained in the Eight Nation memorandum led to a situation in which an invitation seemed necessary then we believe it to be the case that on all sides of this house it would be agreed that invitations, in certain cases at least, to put it at its minimum, would be issued.

Could not all the States concerned agree to a certain quota of inspections per annum? Of course that quota could only be fixed in the first instance for the first year, because instruments might improve and other factors might arise which would justify a revision of the stated quota of inspections. Could it not then be agreed that the occasions and the places for which invitations would be issued would be determined after consultation between the country concerned and the international commission and agreement on those matters between the two -- that is to say, the country concerned and the international commission? They would determine the occasions and the places for which invitations would be issued for on-site inspections. Thus, in these terms, the country concerned would be bound to give its agreement to invitations within the preferred and agreed quota, and the commission, for its part, could undertake an inspection only when the country's agreement was forthcoming.

In fact the agreement of both the commission and the country is, I would suggest, axiomatic whatever form is chosen for the modalities of verification. That must be borne in mind. The nexus of agreement between the country concerned and the commission is an essential one no matter what system is adopted. We would ask whether those possibilities could not be considered within the terms of the Eight-Nation memorandum.

Secondly -- and I come to another suggestion which we think could be fitted into the Eight-Nation memorandum -- there is the issue of equity and responsibility which arises in the matter of breaches of the arrangements to stop underground testing, whether those arrangements are provisional or final. It will be recalled that the Eight-Nation memorandum speaks of an obligation on all parties "to furnish the commission with the facts necessary to establish the nature of any suspicious and significant event". (ENDC/28). Furthermore, the memorandum refers to the freedom of all parties to determine their action on the basis of the reports of the commission.
Could it not be agreed that the general intention of the memorandum here is not
to encourage any breach whatsoever of the provisional agreement or the final treaty
on the cessation of tests, and that it follows that any country or countries guilty
of breaches would be such breaches free the others from being tied any longer to the
agreement? The fact of a breach, that is to say, of non-co-operation in supplying
the commission with the evidence and in making available facilities of all kinds,
would be a breach of the agreement and would result in the agreement's ceasing,
because, after all, the eight-Nation memorandum puts an obligation upon all countries
to supply all that is required in order to establish the nature of an event.
Therefore under the normal rules governing equity and responsibility a country which
was in breach in this respect would in fact have broken the agreement, which would
no longer subsist.

Taking into account the above two main observations, with their ramifications,
could not the eight-Nation memorandum be put into operation for an agreed and limited
period? The period should not be so short that it would not give opportunity for the
issue of invitations for inspection in sufficient number, and it should not be so
long as to leave the whole matter in mid-air, as it were, without coming to a final
settlement. And, of course, I would like to point out that the agreed and limited
period could itself become shorter than the agreed period if any country, by breaches
of the kind to which I have referred, were to put an end to the agreement by its
actions.
How we could conceive that the further question might be asked -- and we put that question now -- could it not be agreed that, during the limited and agreed time within which the eight-nation memorandum could be in operation in the manner I have outlined, the international scientific commission, or this body adequately supplemented, could continue to examine all the technical aspects relating to underground test identification with a view to making suggestions for agreed improvements in the mechanism and modalities which, when put into effect, would lead to the conversion of the provisional and relatively short-term arrangements into final arrangements for the cessation of such tests for all time -- to use the phrase which we have become accustomed to using.

So it seems to us indeed that the time has come -- and this is not, I believe, dissimilar to the suggestions of our Swedish colleague -- when not only the agreed international scientific commission but the terms of the eight-nation memorandum should be put into effect in such a manner -- I will not go into the observations which I have made regarding what I mean by "such a manner" because I have tried to clarify that in this brief statement -- in such a manner that there would be adequate assurance to all countries in terms of paragraph 6 of resolution 1762 of the General Assembly. And during this period when the eight-nation memorandum would be in operation, the scientific endeavours would continue, in the manner which I have suggested, to strengthen, if necessary and to the extent necessary, the processes and modalities required to convert the provisional agreement into a final one.

We make these observations because it is urgently necessary for this committee to be able to report to the General Assembly that we have found some way out of the impasse in which we have been placed ever since April last and in which we would continue to be placed unless it should prove possible for both sides to move away -- if I may say this -- from their rigidity, or from their difficulties, genuine though those may be, to a position of actual accommodation. I feel that the suggestions made by the Swedish delegation and the observations which we have made today might be helpful in this regard. We would not, of course, in the least suggest that there might not be other and better ways of arriving at a solution. If there are, we would of course be very happy to join in discussions regarding those better ways of solving the issue. But in any event we hope and plead that this Committee will now try to reach agreement on the cessation of nuclear testing in some way or other taking into account the observations made.
Mr. Luděk (Czechoslovakia): Before addressing myself to the subject under discussion, I wish to join my other colleagues in welcoming the representatives of Czechoslovakia and Burma.

We have reassembled in this room after an interval of some weeks. Does this mean, however, that we take up our work where we left it on 8 September? Is the position only that we have grown a little older and have had time for reflection? I submit that there is much more in it than that; there is much more that we should have brought back to Geneva. In fact, the disarmament debate has never stopped. It has continued from the time when we parted; it has continued throughout the General Assembly. And also the world is richer by one experience which should be a very telling lesson in our future work.

Those two events, though not related to each other, have reflected the world situation in its most crucial and dangerous elements; it is those which constitute the very subject and objective of our deliberations.

One may, of course, argue that the disarmament debate in the General Assembly, which preceded the resolution on our deliberations, has become an annual affair. However, it would be erroneous to believe that this time it was similar to those of other years, for it was different both in quality and quantity. Most of the members of this Committee attended it; yet I believe it may be of some interest to evaluate it, to subject it to a closer scrutiny and to an analysis, in view of its importance for our future work.

That debate was impressive because of the present membership of the United Nations. Though there are still some empty seats there, the Organization can be regarded as an almost universal body. New States, new delegations from all corners of the globe made their voices heard. Now, what must have struck every impartial observer? I believe, first of all, the call for urgent action in the field of general and complete disarmament, heard and made clear much more than ever before, and this was reflected in the resolution which called upon us to resume our negotiations expeditiously and in a spirit of constructive compromise until agreement has been reached.

There were some other characteristic features of that discussion. No less important was the emphasis placed on a series of specific issues. Top priority was given to the cessation of nuclear tests, and rightly so. It ought not to escape our attention that the claim for urgency in dealing with general and complete
Disarmament was also linked with an emphasis on far-reaching steps to be taken in the first stage of the process. Almost half of the sixty-five States taking part in the debate stressed that priority should be given to nuclear disarmament. That was in fact the logical consequence of viewing the whole issue as extremely important. Small wonder that it received a very wide treatment in the debate.
Another item which figured prominently throughout our discussion in the United Nations General Assembly concerned foreign bases. Here again some figures may refresh the Committee's memory and be of interest. The claim for the winding up of foreign bases was advanced by no less than forty-nine delegations, of which twenty-three felt that all of those bases should disappear, while twenty-six made specific reference to nuclear rocket bases. These voices represented all continents, for fifteen came from Africa, thirteen from Asia, seven from Latin America, and fourteen from Europe.

Finally, the issue of the creation of demilitarised zones figured prominently in those debates at the United Nations General Assembly. Never before have so many delegations raised the issue and spoken in favour of this institution. Out of the sixty-five representatives who spoke, forty-seven -- representing all regions of the world -- supported the idea of demilitarised zones, some of them with specific reference to certain areas. However, all of them agreed that it was a most useful and constructive disarmament measure, worthy of speedy implementation. This leaves no room for doubt that the idea of demilitarised zones has become ripe for practical implementation.

I have attempted to analyse some of the elements of the proceedings of the United Nations General Assembly, for I feel that this should have an impact on what we are going to do here and now -- not only what was said and how many said it, but what its total meaning is. These voices in the United Nations do not create binding obligations. We know this. They represent the views of Member States; and they thus enable us to understand better the trend of political thinking prevailing in the world of today and the trend of political thinking in the policy-making bodies in international affairs.

I submit that this should be of decisive importance to us, being as we are a Committee reporting to the United Nations. For, I submit, we are not working within a vacuum but within the framework of the political realities of the world of today; and those political realities are reflected in the voices heard in the United Nations. The logical consequence, as a result of this, is that we have to consider those voices as a directive for our work, as it were. Indeed, that is the background of resolution 1767 (XVII); and it is only by evaluating the discussion in its true proportions that we can and will accomplish the tasks imposed upon us, each and all of us together.
out of the four issues singled out during the United Nations General Assembly debate, I wish to deal in this general discussion with three, leaving the fourth -- the issue of demilitarized zones -- for separate consideration. I shall do so in view of the special character of the idea and the measures involved as well as in view of the necessity to proceed to specific action in this respect.

In the forefront of all considerations stands the question of the cessation of nuclear tests, an issue which is undoubtedly overripe for decision, the differences in the respective positions of the Powers concerned having been considerably reduced, and this having been conceded by all concerned.

I submit that there are several proposals which could and should merit our immediate attention and decision. There is one which we discussed earlier, and which remains on our agenda, namely, the eight-nation memorandum, which -- recalling the proceedings of the United Nations General Assembly -- found full support in the discussions there. Also, I may recall that the efforts of the non-aligned countries met with widespread approval on the part of almost all members of the United Nations.

There is the other possibility of concluding an agreement concerning tests in three environments, with the proviso that negotiations on underground tests will go on, the parties concerned agreeing to abstain from any underground testing until agreement is reached. There is also the possibility of considering a control system, which was referred to in the discussions of the Sub-Committee, relying on what are known as "black boxes". Finally, we have heard from the representative of Sweden a suggestion which is worth studying.

With these proposals before us I think we have the possibility of deciding. But I submit that we should decide on the issue as a whole. We ought to bear in mind the fact that we have to bring an end to testing in all environments. To separate the environments and to split the issue would be neither wise nor practical. I feel that there is a lot from which to choose. So let us really choose, let us not delay agreement; for we are facing two important dates -- 10 December 1962 and 1 January 1963 -- and time is running short. For our part we would hope that essential progress will be made in this field very soon.

Turning to the issue of general and complete disarmament, in the light of the previous discussions and views expressed in the United Nations General Assembly, it becomes clear how important it is to free humanity from the most dangerous of weapons and to do so within the shortest possible time.
one of the possibilities envisaged at the earlier stages of our discussion was the elimination of all nuclear weapons as early as possible. Later, as representatives well know, the suggestion was made to eliminate all means of delivery of nuclear weapons at the first stage of the disarmament process. They would thus be immobilized. We realize that this immobilization does not solve the problem, for the mere existence of nuclear weapons, even after they have been immobilized, remains a danger. Therefore, the best thing would really be to do away with them as speedily as possible. This goal was indeed frequently voiced by many non-aligned nations. However, as will be remembered, in view of the objections raised by the Western Powers we submitted the compromise proposal concerning the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles. Strangely enough, even that was opposed.
It is suggested that it aims at disarming some nations only, but that I submit, does not correspond to its true intention, nor is it objectively justified. What is proposed is to take urgent action and realistic steps in order to eliminate the danger of a nuclear conflict.

The situation being as it is, and in a spirit of compromise, the Soviet Union made a new proposal in order to meet the objections raised. It is, as representatives know, to leave a determined and limited number of missiles on the territories of the United States and the Soviet Union. These would be eliminated later in the second stage, together with the liquidation of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons. I suggest that this proposal should dissipate whatever concern may still exist about the maintenance of what is called "the balance" during the disarmament process. This measure should be so designed as to make any adventure into nuclear war impossible, but at the same time increase the feeling of security in terms which a lawyer would call ex abundante cautela. We do not share the views concerning the part which the geographical factor is alleged to play in the strategic considerations of today, and we have voiced our ideas on this subject already. We hold that modern technology has made this concept a relic of the past. But if it is still maintained, as indeed it is, the new proposal submitted by the Soviet Union eliminates the last, I should say, fragile roots of this reasoning.

In the light of this new proposal international security will be safeguarded during the first stages of the disarmament process (1) by the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles in the widest possible manner, and (2) by the maintenance by both parties of a strictly limited nuclear and missile potential.

Let me recall that the new Soviet proposal was welcomed by many delegations at the General Assembly, and to mention only a few, by the representative of Iran, who called it "a gesture of conciliation"; and by the representative of the Philippines, who described it as "a gesture of compromise". I understand that, as the Bulgarian representative pointed out, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs also welcomed it, though Mr. Burns this morning qualified that welcome by referring to the need to study the Soviet proposal very closely. I confess, with all due respect, that I was unable to follow that point. The true meaning of the proposal was explained both by the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gromyko, in the General Assembly, and by Mr. Tsarapkin in Committee. Why then search in that proposal for something that is not in it? Why look into darkness when there is light? The proposal was made in daylight, and there is no secrecy about it.
I believe that the idea of compromise and constructive co-operation is reflected in that proposal. Why, then, these researches and doubts? I agree with the representative of India that the proposal requires detailed consideration and analysis. But this applies to all proposals, whoever makes them and wherever they are made, and from that point of view the Soviet proposal cannot be regarded as an exception. But before one looks into a proposal in detail, one welcomes it in principle, and that is what we are lacking. Of course, before we accept it in detail we have to negotiate and agree on certain aspects. But the principle is important, and the principle is clearly stated in the proposal as it stands today. I believe that principle should command our utmost attention.

Finally, I should like to deal with the issue of foreign bases which, as I indicated earlier, was put into the forefront of the discussion in the General Assembly. We have been dealing with that issue in close connexion with nuclear disarmament. But the problem has become particularly urgent in recent weeks.

For some years now, as representatives know, the socialist States have had to live in the shadow of nuclear bases close to their frontiers. I submit there is no valid reason for their continued existence as the countries in which they are situated are threatened by no one. Neither do these military bases find justification in the light of the present new relationship of forces. If we accepted the opposite reasoning we would arrive at the somewhat paradoxical conclusion that the formation of any new State with a different political and economic system should immediately be accompanied by the establishment around it of new bases for what are called defensive purposes.

The huge number of existing bases and installations on foreign territory cannot be regarded as other than a striking anomaly in present international relations. In this connexion it may not be out of place to recall what Mr. Walter Lippman said not long ago. He said that one: "cannot enforce the Monroe doctrine in the Western hemisphere and the Truman doctrine in the Eastern hemisphere".

I submit most respectfully, Mr. Chairman, that some political doctrines born into a specific world cannot survive while the world changes. They become ghosts of the past which cannot possibly be revived in the world of today. Small wonder therefore that the debates, both in the General Assembly and at this Conference, have indicated how many States are opposed to the continued existence of these bases. I recall that nearly fifty States have advocated their early dismantlement; for whatever their origin these bases have become a political problem, creating tension and adding to it wherever it already exists. They are a road block to international understanding.
Those two measures -- the first an important step towards nuclear disarmament and the second the abolition of bases -- would carry us a long way nearer to the goal of general and complete disarmament.

In the case of all the issues I have mentioned, and in the case of those mentioned by other speakers today and at our previous meetings, the time for decision has come. Let us finally make this table at which we sit a real negotiating table. Let us proceed to practical, concrete and constructive negotiations. In doing so we may usefully recall the words of a great authority on the subject:

(spoke in French)

"To bow before the conclusive logic of correct reasoning does not imply a confession of inferiority. To waive an unjustified claim after a full and courteous discussion seems neither impotence in having one's right respected nor encouragement to future infringements."

(continued in English)

What I have in mind are real negotiations the outcome of which will produce no winner and no loser. The only winner will be peace, and with it the survival of our civilization.

If this is to be brought about, strategic thinking must cease to dominate our views, and the policy of "from positions of strength" and the "deterrent" must be abandoned, for they, strangely enough, have sometimes in their search for efficiency the dangerous tendency to cease to serve but, on the contrary, to become masters of political thought. Thus we may be carried beyond the frontiers of rationality. We must move away from the abyss to which we are dangerously close, and we must do so rather quickly lest we be dragged into it. The events we faced a few weeks ago ought to have made us aware of the risks involved had wisdom and statesmanship not prevailed.

The other day Mr. Dean put the question: where do we stand? He answered it by saying that at present there is cause for concern and also cause for encouragement. I would go much further. Let us show determination and a real spirit of compromise in the interest of the survival of humanity. This is the appeal I would make to the Western Powers, for we now have an opportunity "to nobly save or meanly lose the last best hope on earth". These are not my words; they were spoken by Abraham Lincoln.
The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): Having listened to our Polish colleague, I am sure we all understand why he requires two microphones. The profundity of his thoughts, together with the prolixity of the language in which he addresses us, is obviously too much for one.

Mr. P. DILLA NERVO (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): I should like to associate myself with the words of welcome spoken by my colleagues here for the representatives of Burma and Czechoslovakia, who are participating for the first time in our work.

I have listened with great interest to the statements made by the speakers who have preceded me in this debate. It is important for our future work that we should study very carefully the suggestions which have been made here. For my part I would speak only on the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests and I should like to make a few remarks which I think deserve consideration by the other members of the Committee as being an expression of a thought which I submit to my colleagues with the best of intentions.

The General Assembly in its resolution 1762 (XVII), adopted on 6 November 1962 by an overwhelming majority and without opposition, on the urgent need to cease nuclear and thermonuclear tests, called upon the Eighteen-Nation Committee to report to the General Assembly by 10 December 1962 on the results achieved with regard to the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

The Governments of the nuclear Powers as well as other Members of the United Nations have recognized that it is indispensable and urgent to halt the arms race and that the most important effort should be made in this field in order to reduce the danger of a nuclear conflagration — that is, precisely in the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. The conclusion of an agreement putting an end to all nuclear tests is obviously the first requirement of our times and is the first task before this Conference. It is a task which must be given priority over all the others; it is a task to which we must devote all our efforts and without undue delay.

It seems to me that, if we wish to fulfill the request of the General Assembly and comply with the wishes of the people of the world, we must devote all our meetings
between now and 10 December exclusively to discussion of the problem of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. I believe that the representative of Canada also made this remark; and on this point I fully agree with him. Between today and 10 December we shall hold only four or five meetings, including the meeting of 10 December. I do not wish to pronounce on the matter of whether it is possible within this short time to make the desired progress so that we may report sufficiently completely to the General Assembly by 10 December, but it seems to me we should at least use the four meetings before us for the discussion of this problem as a matter of priority. Certain indications to be found in the General Assembly debate and in the resolutions adopted at the end of the debate require our attention here, and it is indispensable to know the attitude of the nuclear Powers, as well as of the other Powers represented here, in this respect.
I shall limit myself to a few concrete points included in the November resolutions of the General Assembly and which constitute or should constitute a new impulse, a new basis, for our negotiations.

In the operative paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of this resolution 1762 (XVII), we find confirmation of the aspirations of world public opinion. These paragraphs are really the expression of universal public opinion, which is opposed to nuclear weapon tests. We also find here support for the eight-nation memorandum and an appeal to the nuclear Powers to act in the sense of the aspirations of mankind.

As for paragraph 6 of the operative part of that same resolution, I believe it is necessary for us to know the interpretation placed on that paragraph by the representatives of the nuclear Powers and by the other members of this Conference. Other speakers who have preceded me have referred to this paragraph 6 and have quoted from it. I therefore need not quote from it anew, but I would like to put the following question.

Are the nuclear Powers prepared to enter into an interim agreement to put an end to nuclear weapon tests in the three environments, and would they agree simultaneously to suspend underground tests? What are the views of the nuclear Powers on the necessary guarantees which should be part of such an agreement with regard to the detection and identification of seismic events to be carried out by an international scientific commission? The General Assembly, in recommending such an interim agreement, requests the Committee to study all possibilities in order to overcome, at least on an interim basis, the difficulties and the obstacles encountered with regard to underground explosions, in particular with regard to compulsory inspection demanded by certain parties and rejected by others. Obviously, if the nuclear Powers could come to an agreement on inspection we would then have a final agreement and no longer an interim one.

The General Assembly has also asked that we study the possibilities of reaching an interim agreement on underground explosions, which should be accompanied by the prohibition of nuclear tests in the three other environments. I believe that we should study this recommendation with the utmost attention, and it seems to me that in this respect the suggestions made by the representative of Sweden form a valuable contribution to the search for a solution.
The role of such an interim agreement would, in my view, be two-fold. Firstly, it would make it possible to cease immediately nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water; secondly, it would enable the nuclear Powers to know that no one is carrying out underground tests in violation of commitments.

On-site inspection is not an end in itself. It is designed to avoid all suspicion in the case of a seismic event impossible of identification from a distance. Inspection is not a guarantee of compliance with the obligation. It is a guarantee in case of doubt caused by an unidentified event, and if there were an underground test this would be a violation. Therefore, the role of compulsory inspection is that of a radar instrument. It is designed to be used as a deterrent against clandestine violations.

Were all the parties to accept compulsory inspection there would be no longer any need for an interim agreement such as is referred to in paragraph 6 of resolution 1762 (XVII), because in that paragraph we read that the General Assembly:

"Recommends that if, against all hope, the parties concerned do not reach agreement on the cessation of all tests by 1 January 1963, they should enter into an immediate agreement prohibiting nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, accompanied" — I repeat, "accompanied" — "by an interim arrangement suspending all underground tests ... " (ENDC/63, p.3)

The question I would like to ask is this: what are to be, in the views of the nuclear Powers, the characteristics of such an interim arrangement which should include adequate assurances for the effective detection and identification of seismic events by an international scientific commission — an interim arrangement, something temporary and experimental, which would pave the way towards the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear tests in all environments? In my view, this should include the following:

(a) The setting up of an international scientific group with the functions suggested by the representative of Sweden in the statement he made on Wednesday (ENDC/FV.84), and in harmony with the functions assigned to the scientific commission in the eight-Power joint memorandum (ENDC/23);
(b) There ought to be a clause to the effect that if this international scientific group believes that in the case of a doubtful event on-site inspection is necessary, it would be part of the interim agreement that the party should invite the commission to visit its territory, failure to do so thereby freeing the other parties from their obligations.
What remains to be determined is which underground events could be dealt with by distant identification with sufficient reliability. We might perhaps fix a twenty kiloton limit or any other limit recommended by the scientists. However, we must consider that even in the case of a State party to the treaty refusing to invite the commission to visit its territory for on-site inspection in order to determine the cause of a doubtful event the other parties might still choose to abide by their commitments. The failure of a party to invite on-site inspection when this would appear to be the only means of identifying a doubtful event would amount to a violation, the effect of which would be the same as a violation discovered by means of compulsory inspection. We would then have a measure which would nullify the value of this agreement and would start again the nuclear armaments race. It may be assumed that no party would accept this heavy responsibility before world public opinion.

An interim arrangement for underground nuclear tests to include measures such as those I have outlined would also include provisional arrangements for continuing negotiations between the parties with a view to reaching final agreement. In the view of the General Assembly this would facilitate the prohibition of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.

I have just referred to the date of 10 December on which the General Assembly expects a report from us. I have already said that in my view we should devote all our meetings before that date to the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. I submit this suggestion to the Committee not because the other problems before us are less important but because I believe it to be our duty to give priority, as the General Assembly requests, to the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. It seems to me that between now and 10 December we should direct all our efforts and devote all our energies to this problem.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): In my capacity as United Kingdom representative, I should like to say that it seems to me we have had some very interesting thoughts expressed here today from a number of delegations, and it would certainly be invidious to single out any one of them. For my part I should like to study with care all the proposals that have been put forward today.
(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

I did notice with interest the comments of our colleague from India with regard to nuclear weapon tests, as well as those of the representative of Mexico, whom we are glad to have back with us once more. I shall certainly wish to look most carefully at the verbatim record of what they said.

With regard to the interesting references to inspection by invitation in one of the speeches we listened to there seemed to be a drawing together of this with the idea of the quota. It seems to me that one should try to distinguish between the two because in so far as a scientific body decides that inspection is necessary that is a purely scientific decision based on scientific data. In so far as it decides that inspection is necessary in the light of that scientific data, that is one thing. But as soon as one gets into the field of quota, one comes into the area of political decision. The suggestion of a quota, after all, was a political proposal put forward in relation to difficulties in negotiation. I just draw that distinction because I think that if one is to rely on a scientific body, and if one is to consider invitational inspection, that would clearly have to apply to every event which occurred and which came within the agreed criteria. If one were to talk in terms of a quota, then immediately political decisions would have to be taken by the opposing side whatever the basis. I merely put that as a passing comment, but I shall wish to study with great care all these various thoughts that have been put forward.

I was very interested too in the comments of our Polish colleague. He gave us a lot to think about. However, I did not quite follow him in his remarks in relation to the significance of the number of States whose representatives spoke in the General Assembly on the question of the abolition of foreign bases. As I see it, we are all in favour of the elimination of foreign bases, just as we are all in favour of general and complete disarmament. The point at issue is at what stage those foreign bases are to be eliminated. Our Polish colleague said that almost fifty States were in favour of eliminating foreign bases. As I indicated, this really does not amount to anything unless one considers the terms in which it is said and the knowledge of those concerned in relation to this difficult problem, which I think all of us in this Committee have come to realize more clearly since we started here in March. Therefore,
merely to say that they are in favour of the elimination of foreign bases is rather the same as to say that they are opposed to sin, and I am sure we are all opposed to that, in appropriate circumstances, anyway. I would say also that I was a little surprised too to find one with such a clear, analytical mind being so perturbed at the thought of clarifying anything. I always thought Mr. Lachs was interested in clarification to the utmost, yet he seemed extraordinarily coy about clarifying this important new Soviet proposal in relation to nuclear delivery vehicles. He was right in saying that it is important. We all accept that it is important, and that is why we wish to distinguish precisely what is proposed in this regard. When he said that we should welcome this proposal in principle and not go into detail, it is a question of where one sets one's principle, is it not? It could well be argued that this proposal is one of detail in relation to the principle of general and complete disarmament. It seems to me that it is illogical to erect this into a particular proposal of principle when in fact it is one element of a larger principle. Therefore, I say to Mr. Lachs that what we want is to know clearly what is proposed here, and -- whether it be detail, or whether one likes to erect it into a question of principle, which I do not think I could accept -- the important thing is to know just what is being proposed. That is certainly the attitude of my delegation towards it: we regard it as interesting and we want to know more about it. I would have thought that was a compliment to those who have brought it forward rather than otherwise.

Those are just some very preliminary remarks I wished to make on some of the most interesting statements made today, and I shall certainly want to study very carefully all these suggestions that have been put forward.
Mr. Liddle (India): Since you have been good enough, Mr. Chairman, to comment on certain aspects of my statement I think it is necessary for me to try to clarify a little why I thought of the quota in connexion with invitations. The reason is this: that even if the determination were purely scientific, which it should be undoubtedly — and I agree with you entirely that there is a distinction between determinations by the commission on a scientific basis and any political decisions — the fact is that the whole question is so much an inter-fusion of politics and science that I believe it to be true that it would help any commission, no matter how scientific it was, if there were a quota prescribed. It would give it an authority to do a certain thing within a certain quota. Without such a quota it might be difficult for it to operate, even if it were trying to operate on the basis of pure scientific objectivity. Therefore I would suggest that if the matter were to be more deeply considered there might be some wisdom in this sort of marriage of science and politics, even though I admit that in pure logic it would not appear to be necessary.

The Minister (United Kingdom): Thank you very much; that was most interesting. Does any other representative wish to comment?

Mr. T. R. B. Nov (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French) I am sorry to have to ask for the floor at this late hour, but I shall not take up much time. Since reference was made on at least two occasions to my statement I should like to clarify one or two points.

With reference to the modifications put forward by the Soviet Government, dealing with the very limited number of vehicles that would be set aside for elimination at a somewhat later stage, I did say that very few constructive comments had been made by the Western Powers, and that I was surprised at that. Some delegations — not those directly concerned but those which are, I should say, indirectly concerned — have thought fit to state that my comment was not very exact. I said:

"However, it is regrettable none the less that, up until now,
this has just been an isolated voice from among the Western Powers" — that was the voice of the Foreign Minister of Canada. I went on to say:
"it is an example of a realistic and constructive stand which has not been copied or emulated by representatives of other Western Powers, and especially not by the great Western Powers. The latter, on the contrary, continue to raise technical questions asking for clarification of secondary details. All these are facts that can only with difficulty be taken as being a firm intention on their part to tackle this question and to arrive finally at an agreement on this important matter --- namely, the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war." (suvs., p.16)

That is what I said this morning. I could, of course, have erred in my appreciation of the evaluation of the situation. I would be only too happy if I were wrong. I should like to know that the Western representatives, and the Western Governments, intend to get down to business and organize matters in such a way as to permit us to arrive at a positive result in this field.

I would like to add at this juncture that it is more than two months since the Soviet proposals were put forward, and the representatives of the Western Powers, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, associated themselves with them in a vague way: they said that they were interesting proposals. But, however interesting they may be -- and I must say in parenthesis that that last statement of the Western Powers is in itself interesting -- for some reason it has not been possible for the Western Powers to ask for detailed clarifications which would have given them the possibility of dealing with this matter in the interval of time since the proposals were made.

Each time we take the floor we declare that general and complete disarmament is really an urgent matter. This is borne out by the statements made today -- it was mentioned by the representative of India this morning. Each one of us says that time is short, that everything must be done to lay the ghost of a nuclear war and so free humanity from that danger, but, notwithstanding all that, the Western Powers have not thought fit to ask for information and clarification of detail, though we are faced with this urgency. On the other hand, the representative of India -- and I believe the representative of Poland as well -- has just pointed out that our Committee is not a debating circle but rather a negotiating body. If we are the latter, why can we not ask for the necessary detail? Not only are we, as a Committee, a negotiating body, but we have an additional negotiating body which meets almost every day -- the institution of the co-Chairmen. In the meetings of the co-Chairmen
surely clarifications could be asked for and provided, permitting us to move forward, rather than reserving the questions for plenary meetings. We have a third possibility: contacts between delegations, which should not be overlooked. It is in this sense that I hope my intervention at this juncture will have a certain weight.

I believe great possibilities are available to the Committee. Mr. Dean said on Monday when we resumed our work that in addition to what we do here in the Committee there was the institution of the co-Chairmen, "of which even greater use should be made during this session." (ENDC/FV.83, p.22). I am sure that was not a fortuitous phrase. I am sure that was an idea that had been carefully weighed and assessed, and that a possibility was seen for further expanding our progress without necessarily resorting to plenary meetings for achieving additional steps forward.

I, personally, would be the first to be gratified if I had been mistaken with respect to the intentions of the Western Powers when I said that very few of the Western Powers had stated that they considered the Soviet modifications as constructive.
I should be very happy to see the Western Powers demonstrate in the future work of this Committee that they are going deeper into this matter and that they do intend to press forward towards an agreement which would eliminate the nuclear threat weighing on humanity.

Mr. LACHS (Poland): One word only, Mr. Chairman, since you honoured me by quoting me and paid me some compliments which I do not really deserve. I wish only to make clear what I said on the question of bases. I think the States which pronounced themselves on the question of bases were more clear than you yourself, Mr. Chairman, on the subject of sin, because you qualified your statement on sin while they made it clear that they wanted the liquidation of bases as quickly as possible -- at least the great majority of them, which I mentioned.

As to the question of the new Soviet proposal, you entered on what was to my mind a kind of philosophical consideration of the relationship between principle and detail. Of course, in our rational thinking, walking up steps and stairs, a wider issue may be considered as a principle in relation to a smaller issue. We have principles on general and complete disarmament. In the matter of peace and war, we consider disarmament as a principle. But within the general scheme of disarmament we have principles and I believe that the new Soviet proposal may be considered as a principle in relation to the smaller issues involved.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I apologize to the representative of Poland. Of course, when I qualified my reference to sin it was only because I had said that I thought we were all opposed to sin and I thought the representative of Poland did not seem to be entirely with me on that point. That is why I qualified it; I wished to carry everybody with me.

Now, if no one else wishes to address the Committee, I have a message from the co-Chairmen. The co-Chairmen held a meeting yesterday and at that meeting they agreed to recommend that the plenary meetings on Monday 3 December and Friday 7 December should be devoted to the discussion of nuclear tests. The plenary meeting on Wednesday 5 December in their view should be devoted to discussion of items 5(b) and 5(c) of the agreed agenda (LDC/52). Is there any comment in relation to that?
Mr. Burns (Canada): In view of what I said at the outset of my remarks today and the instructions I have received from my Government, while I would not ordinarily wish to suggest anything contrary to what has been recommended by our co-Chairmen, in this particular instance I should like to propose that we continue to discuss in the three plenary meetings set for next week the subject of the cessation of nuclear tests. We have only those three meetings and the meeting on the following Monday before our report has to be submitted and at the moment while there are a number of suggestions which have been offered, suggestions which everybody agrees should receive full discussion here, there is not very much time to reach even any measure of consensus of opinion which might offer some hope to put in that report.

I would therefore suggest that we do continue during next week to discuss the cessation of nuclear tests at the three meetings. If it should happen that by the end of the Wednesday meeting there are no more speakers on that subject, then I would suggest that on the Friday we should go on to discuss general and complete disarmament; but, while there are delegations which would like to say something about nuclear tests and to have some of the questions posed by representatives who have spoken today answered, I think we should go on with that subject.

Mr. Cavallotti (Italy) (interpretation from French): I have asked for the floor in order to associate myself fully with the suggestion made by the representative of Mexico, namely, that we devote all our forthcoming meetings to the question of the prohibition of nuclear tests. I see now that the co-Chairmen have decided that next week we should devote two meetings to that problem, on which we must report in the very near future. I believe that there is no reason to change that recommendation of the two co-Chairmen, although the Italian delegation would have preferred that next week all our meetings should be devoted to the problem of nuclear tests. However, I would like to ask that any other meetings before 10 December should be devoted to the nuclear weapon tests problem.

We have two draft treaties which were submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom delegations to our Conference on 27 August. The Conference went into recess on 7 September; consequently there was not sufficient time to study those draft treaties thoroughly. We now have, in addition, substantial food for thought offered to us by the delegations of Sweden, India and Mexico. I believe that we should take up all this material and carry forward our studies.
It would be very unfortunate to submit a negative report to the General Assembly. It is my hope that it will be possible for us to reach agreement within the short time at our disposal, but in any case we must show to the Assembly in a concrete manner that we have made all possible efforts and explored all avenues which may lead towards agreement, and we must be in a position to say this in the report which we shall have to submit so very soon.

Mr. Padilla Harvy (Mexico)(interpretation from Spanish): I only wish to associate myself with the proposal made by the representative of Canada. The representative of Italy, I am happy to note, also believes that we ought to devote the balance of our meetings first and foremost to discussing the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. This is really important because, as I have had occasion to say, the General Assembly should receive a report which shows clearly that we have seriously considered the matter transmitted to us as one of top priority and of great urgency.

Of course we must realize that consideration of other questions on general and complete disarmament should not be delayed. Here I am referring to items 5(a) and 5(b) which we had taken up before the recess.
He might take them up in the future. But, whatever our efforts may be, there will be no progress made towards general and complete disarmament as long as there is no agreement on the discontinuation of nuclear weapon tests. Of course, this does not mean that we should cease considering the various aspects of the two draft treaties on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2 and ENDC/9). However, in order to have the possibility of submitting our report to the United Nations General Assembly by 1 December 1962 it is indispensable for us to devote the next four meetings—those that remain to us before 10 December—to following up the proposal made by the representative of Canada. I support that, just as I support the view of the representative of Italy. Those four meetings should be devoted to the consideration of proposals made concerning the discontinuation of nuclear weapon tests, allowing us to develop our views on these two questions.

Mr. El-Z. XX/T (United Arab Republic): My delegation joins the delegations of Italy, Mexico and Canada in suggesting that all of our next four meetings until 10 December should be devoted to the question of the cessation of nuclear tests as requested in the United Nations General Assembly resolution (A/RES/1762 (XVII) paragraph 2). I think that the reasons given by these delegations are very convincing in view of the fact that we have to report to the United Nations General Assembly by that date.

In this connexion may I suggest that we should have the benefit of a short report on the meetings of the Sub-Committee which sat here while we were in New York. I think it would be valuable for us, in opening our discussions on the cessation of nuclear tests, to have the benefit of a very short report of the Sub-Committee on a treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests.

Mr. Tsikhanov (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): I should like to give my support to the agreement reached by the Co-Chairmen to the effect that we should deal with the cessation of nuclear tests on Monday and Friday of next week, and that on Wednesday we should deal with our main problem, namely general and complete disarmament.

It was pointed out, quite rightly of course, that we have very little time left and that we should discuss the question of the nuclear test ban as thoroughly as possible. No doubt this is an important and urgent task. No one will deny this. However, I should like to put your minds at ease. We are dealing with the problem
of nuclear tests not only in the eighteen-nation Committee but also in the three Power sub-Committee as well. Furthermore, I must say that we do not avoid this subject in the meetings of the two Co-Chairmen. Therefore, we have sufficient opportunities for carrying forward the study of this question and making further attempts to reach agreement.

While bearing in mind the remarks I have just made, it seems to me that we should take into consideration the joint recommendation of the two Co-Chairmen (LMGC/52) which was mentioned by the Chairman today.

The question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, however urgent, cannot push our main task into the background. It would perhaps be a trifle odd if, for a whole week, we were to give all our time and effort to the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, setting aside completely our main problem, which is general and complete disarmament.

Mr. Dink (United States of America): I should like to support the Co-Chairman and shortly explain the philosophy at the back of our minds which led us to make our recommendation to this Committee.

As has been said, we have held long meetings of the Sub-Committee on a treaty for the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. Long meetings have been held between the two Co-Chairmen, much of the time being devoted to the subject of nuclear tests. We have agreed to hold the meetings of the Sub-Committee, on Tuesday and Thursday of next week. We have also agreed to hold the meetings of the Co-Chairmen, on Tuesday afternoon and Thursday afternoon of next week.

The representative of Bulgaria raised -- I think, very properly -- the question of when we were going to arrive at the question of the suggestions made by the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gromyko, at the United Nations General Assembly on 21 September 1962. That is why we suggested that the plenary meeting to be held on Monday, 3 December, should be devoted to the question of nuclear testing, that the meeting to be held on Friday should be devoted to nuclear tests, that the meeting to be held next Wednesday should be devoted to general and complete disarmament with simultaneous discussion of the reduction of nuclear and conventional arms. In the course of that discussion we would of course plan to go into the very interesting suggestion made by Mr. Gromyko.
It is quite correct that we have to submit our report to the United Nations General Assembly by 10 December, but I think that we have to put all of this into perspective. As everyone knows, in accordance with paragraph 4 of the procedure of work (ENDC/52) of 24 July 1962, which was drawn up by the two co-Chairmen and approved by the Conference, any member of the Conference has the right to bring up any subject at any time if he so desires. Thus, even if a meeting was devoted to general and complete disarmament on Wednesday, 5 December, if any representative desired to do so he could bring up the subject of nuclear testing. Therefore, I submit that the more orderly thing to do would be to adopt the proposal of the two co-Chairmen, and I support the representative of the Soviet Union in what he has said.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I have observed that there are others who wish to speak, but perhaps I might be permitted to say a word in my capacity as Chairman before calling on anyone else.

It does seem that a clear difference of view has emerged here. Quite clearly this Committee is the master of its own affairs and has the right to establish what matters it shall discuss. Nevertheless, in the past we have found it convenient to seek agreement in private discussion between the co-Chairman for the orderly regulation of our affairs. On this occasion there have been a number of views, expressed with conviction and sincerity, that perhaps the suggestions put before us by the co-Chairmen do not fully meet the wishes of the Committee.

However, I would remind representatives that, whatever there is disagreement about, there is at least agreement that our next meeting on Monday shall be devoted to nuclear tests. This matter is therefore not urgent from the point of view of procedure.

I would venture to suggest to the Committee, bearing in mind the time, that we should agree here and now that Monday's meeting should be held in relation to nuclear tests and that the co-Chairman should ponder on the suggestions that have been put forward here -- they have available to them the normal channels of communication which exist between missions -- so that possibly an understanding may be reached by Monday's meeting as to what in fact we shall do on Wednesday and Friday. Perhaps that might be to the convenience of representatives generally.
Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (interpretation from French): That is the precise point I was about to make. I believe on Monday we will have a meeting to discuss nuclear tests, and I feel certain that the co-Chairmen will take into account the feelings expressed by a number of representatives who wish to go more fully into the question of nuclear tests before 10 December.

Mr. TARIENOV (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): I have a suggestion which might perhaps be useful to the co-Chairmen and those considering this matter. Personally I have no objection to the last suggestion made, which is to decide this matter by Monday, but we agreed on a general pattern of meetings which was three meetings a week. Would it not be possible to meet more frequently and discuss all the questions which are outstanding? Surely this would settle the question in a very simple way. Why have a rigid rule which would not permit us to take up all the matters that are close to our hearts, and would not enable us to end our work by 10 December?

Since I have the floor may I add another point. In resolution 1762 (XVII) adopted by the General Assembly it is suggested that a report should be made by 10 December not only with respect to nuclear tests but also on general and complete disarmament. The resolution states:

"7. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to reconvene not later than 12 November 1962, to resume negotiations on the cessation of nuclear testing and on general and complete disarmament, and to report to the General Assembly by 10 December 1962 on the results achieved with regard to the cessation of nuclear weapon tests." (ENDC/63, p. 3)

May I make one more comment which would deal with what should be done by 1 January 1963. Of course, on nuclear tests we can continue our work even after 10 December 1962. Surely it is not intended that after 10 December and until 1 January 1963 we will not be doing anything? I am sure everything must be done between these two dates so as to respond to the decision of the General Assembly as outlined in paragraph 2 of resolution 1762. I would ask the co-Chairmen to take all these views into account, but I would submit that their proposal is the one which is of most interest to us since it allows us to deal with all questions of relevance.
The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): The proposal I ventured to put forward has been supported by the representative of Italy, as I believe it has been also by the representative of Bulgaria, who went on to make various other suggestions which I will formally draw to the attention of the co-Chairmen, asking them to give his observations the attention they deserve.

Does any other representative wish to comment? I would only add, for the information of the Committee, that the Sub-Committee has agreed to meet on Tuesday and Thursday of next week.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its eighty-fifth plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Godber, representative of the United Kingdom.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Bulgaria, Canada, India, Poland, Mexico, the United Kingdom, Italy, the United Arab Republic, the Soviet Union and the United States.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Monday, 3 December 1962, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.25 p.m.
CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE EIGHTY-SIXTH MEETING

PROVISIONAL
PRIVATE
ENDC/PV.86
3 December 1962
ENGLISH

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Monday, 3 December 1962, at 10:30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. A.H. DEAN (United States of America)

This provisional record contains the originals of speeches in English together with the Conference room interpretation of speeches in other languages.

It is requested that any corrections to the originals of speeches be submitted in four copies (preferably incorporated in four of the single-sided mimeographed copies with which delegations are supplied) by the authorized Liaison Officer of the delegation concerned to the Documents Office, Room A.206.
If no corrections are received within four working days from the date of distribution the final version, in which the interpretations will be replaced by translations, will be prepared and issued on the basis of the provisional record.

THE TIME LIMIT FOR CORRECTIONS TO THIS RECORD WILL BE 0900 HOURS ON 10 DECEMBER 1962.
Present at the table

**Brazil:**
- Mr. ASSUNÇÃO de ARAÚJO
- Mr. FLÁVIO da COSTA

**Bulgaria:**
- Mr. M. TARABALOV
- Mr. G. GUELEV
- Mr. ISHIRAIEV

**Burma:**
- U TUN SHEIN
- U MAUNG MAUNG Gyi

**Canada:**
- Mr. E.L.H. BURNS
- Mr. J.E.G. HARDY
- Mr. J.F.H. BELL
- Mr. R.M. TAIT

**Czechoslovakia:**
- Mr. K. KURKA
- Mr. K. ZEMLA
- Mr. V. VAJNAR

**Ethiopia:**
- ATO HADDIS ALAYEHU
- ATO H. HAMID
- ATO M. GEHEBEYEHU

**India:**
- Mr. A.S. LAL
- Mr. A.S. MEHTA

**Italy:**
- Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
- Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI
- Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI
- Mr. F. LUČIOLI OTTIERI
PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:
Mr. L. PáDilla DEI
Mr. E. CALDERÓN FUIG
Mr. D. GONZÁLEZ GÓMEZ

Nigeria:
Mr. L. C. E. OBI

Poland:
Mr. F. LACHS
Mr. E. STANIŚLAWSKI
Mr. W. TIECZKOWSKI
Mr. A. SKOWROŃSKI

Romania:
Mr. G. LACOV SCU
Mr. H. FLORESCU
Mr. N. BOVINESCU
Mr. C. SEDA

Sweden:
Mr. R. O. DEURING
Baron C.H. von PLATEN
Mr. N. STAHL
Mr. B. FRIEDHOF

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
Mr. S.K. TSAlAPKIN
Mr. A.A. ROSCHIN
Mr. I.G. USACHEV
Mr. P.F. SAKHOV

United Arab Republic:
Mr. I.H. El-ZAYYAT
Mr. S. AHMED
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. S. IBRAHIM
Present at the Table (Co't'd)

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODEER
Sir Michael RIGHT
Mr. D.N. BRINSON
Mr. R.C. BEETHAM

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. D.E. HARK
Mr. V. BAKER

Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament

Correction to the
Provisional Verbatim Record of the Eighty-Fifth Meeting

On page 42, in the seventh and tenth lines, instead of "inspections" read "invitations" (quota of invitations).
THE ELECTION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I declare open the eighty-sixth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

In my capacity as Chairman of this meeting and as co-Chairman of the Conference I should like to express on behalf of all the nations represented here that I am sure is the very general feeling of satisfaction at the unanimous election of U Thant of Burma as Secretary-General of the United Nations. I am sure that his election augurs well for the peace of the world and for the work of the United Nations and I should like to send to him the unanimous good wishes of all present at this meeting. Not hearing no objection to the contrary, I assume that to be the wish of this Conference.

Mr. TSHARPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)(interpretation from Russian): The Soviet delegation would like to associate itself with the congratulations which have just been offered by our Chairman to U Thant upon his unanimous election, first by the Security Council and then by the General Assembly, as Secretary-General of the United Nations.

In the message of congratulation which was sent by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev, the conviction was expressed that the high political maturity of U Thant and his concern for the preservation of peace among nations gave assurance that he would be able to fulfill the tasks of his high office successfully. This was further confirmed by the unanimity of his election.

The Soviet delegation, in the same way as the Eighteen-Nation Committee as a whole, which bears the responsible task of resolving the problem of disarmament, offers its congratulations to U Thant on the occasion of his election as Secretary-General of the United Nations, expressing at the same time sincere wishes for success in his high office, and fully supports the proposal that a congratulatory telegram should be sent to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, on behalf of the Committee.
Mr. LILLY (India): It gives the delegation of India great pleasure to associate itself with the remarks which have been made by our two co-Chairmen regarding the unanimous election of U Thant as Secretary-General of the United Nations. We do not wish to repeat the sentiments which have been expressed, as time is precious, but we share them fully and I should like to add that we see in this election also the important fact of agreement between all the Member States of the United Nations upon an issue involving a matter of principle. We in this Committee are dealing with important matters of principle and we realize that agreement on them can come only in the same spirit of accommodation that has led to the unanimous election of U Thant, and we hope that the Committee, in forwarding its congratulations to U Thant, will bear in mind that the same spirit which led to his election is the spirit which we need here in our work.
Mr. BURNS (Canada): The Canadian delegation is very happy to concur with the proposal, which has just been made by the Chairman with regard to the dispatching of a congratulatory message to U Thant.

Speaking as the representative of Canada, I would say that it is a matter of the greatest satisfaction to my country that U Thant, who has served for the past year with such distinction as the acting head of the executive branch of the United Nations Organization, should now be confirmed in that office for the full term from November 1961.

As we know, this past year has been a very difficult one for U Thant. He has had to face very complex problems indeed; and he has dealt with them with courage and wisdom.

We know of his great interest in the field of disarmament — and in particular in the cessation of nuclear weapon tests — and we welcome the statement contained in his speech of acceptance that he:

"may be able to play a role, however humble, in the easing of tension and in bridging the gulf between the major Powers."

We are also happy to underscore his wise remarks that:

"When the future of mankind is at stake no country or interest group can afford to take a rigid stand or claim that its position is the only right one and others must take it or leave it."

As the representative of India has remarked, there are important conclusions to be drawn from such a statement for our work at this Conference.

I think it would also be appropriate to extend congratulations on behalf of the delegation of Canada to our eminent colleague representing the country which U Thant formerly represented at the United Nations.

Finally, we would join other speakers in expressing the earnest and heartfelt wish that U Thant may have all success in the discharge of his very responsible and difficult functions in the high office to which he has been called.
Mr. EL-ZAYYAT (United Arab Republic): Once again I should like to express my thanks for the way in which what is in all our minds has been expressed, thus saving our time.

We want to express our gratification and pleasure at the unanimous appointment by the United Nations General Assembly, and by the Security Council before that, of U Thant as Secretary-General.

In sending our congratulations to U Thant — and in expressing our thanks to the country which produced him, namely, Burma — I should also like to think of his predecessor, Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld, and to express my feelings on this occasion to the representative of Sweden. I should be grateful if these two gentlemen would convey the feelings of the delegation of the United Arab Republic on this occasion to their respective Governments.

I should also like Mr. Epstein to convey to the Secretary-General, whom he represents here, our thanks and our great confidence that he will ensure that our Organization will continue in the course he has set for it in the cause of peace and security.

Mr. EDBERG (Sweden): The Swedish delegation wishes to join in the congratulations to U Thant on the high office to which he has been unanimously elected.

To us who represent the country of Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld it is a great satisfaction to know that his work, which was so abruptly brought to an end in September last year by the nocturnal tragedy in the North Rhodesian bush, will be carried on by a man like U Thant, who is so devoted to the high ideals of the United Nations and so inspired by the will to serve mankind in a critical time.

During one year in which he has served as Acting Secretary-General U Thant has been able to show his profile to the world: quiet, with deep roots in his philosophy, he has appeared as a man with great political wisdom and strength of will, paired with flexibility in his approach to difficult problems, with an impressive courage of his convictions.
When accepting his extended mandate U Thant expressed his belief -- as has already been stated here -- that he may be able "to play a role, however humble, in the easing of tensions and in bridging the gulf between the major Powers."

We, who represent a small non-aligned country in another corner of the world want to express our sincere hope that this distinguished son of Burma will be successful in his great and onerous task. We are particularly glad to note, in this connexion, the active interest which the new Secretary-General, from the very first moment, has shown in this Conference and in its work.

We fully support the proposal that this Conference should send a telegram of congratulations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant.

Mr. Padilla Nervo (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): On behalf of the Mexican delegation, as well as on my own behalf, I should like to express our great satisfaction at the election of U Thant as Secretary-General of the United Nations, and to associate myself with all that has been said by the representatives who preceded me.

I should also like to pay tribute to U Thant and add that it is a clear sign of the recognition of his qualities and qualifications that -- in an affirmative note that included the votes of all its permanent members -- the Security Council should have recommended his election to the General Assembly, where he was in fact unanimously elected by all the Members of the United Nations. The United Nations may be proud that it will be able to count for four more years on the services and devotion of U Thant to the cause of peace.

We are now living in an era of rapid change in science and technology. The forces which work for the freedom and independence of the peoples of the world cannot be blocked. Differences which persist are dangerous. However, we are fully aware of all these difficulties and we are happy to have at our service the wisdom and the diligence of a Secretary-General who has already proved, while he was Acting Secretary-General, that he was neither seeking nor accepting instructions from any single Power, and that he was serving exclusively the higher interests of the United Nations under the terms of the United Nations Charter.
Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): There is little that I can add to the expressions of pleasure which we had already heard and which I am sure we all endorse. I would only say that it is a deep personal pleasure to me to know that this election has taken place, and particularly the terms and the manner in which it has taken place.

Here I would endorse very strongly the words of the representative of India about the value of an example here of co-operation among the nations in agreeing on the election of U Thant in the manner in which they have.

As one who has had the privilege of working closely with U Thant on a number of occasions I would say how gratified I am that the manner of his election endorses so fully the feeling that one cannot help but have when working with him of the strength of his character, which emanates in every way. I am sure we would all agree that his stature has grown during the difficult period in which he has already occupied the office as Acting Secretary-General. I am sure that we are all delighted to be able now to drop the word "Acting" and to look on him as the Secretary-General and as a man occupying a difficult post -- one which he is occupying at very considerable sacrifice to himself, of course. Let no one forget that. The sacrifice of one's personal life, in accepting such a difficult and onerous duty is something which we should all deeply respect and be very thankful for.

On behalf of myself and my delegation I wish him every possible success in this most difficult task which he has accepted. If he goes forward with the good wishes of us all then I am sure that he will entirely fulfil the high hopes which we all have in his election.
Mr. LACHS (Poland): On behalf of the delegation of Poland I wish to join
you, Mr. Chairman, in what you have said concerning the election of U Thant as
Secretary-General of the United Nations. This election is indeed an event which should
make us rejoice, for by it we have secured for this most important post a man of
the highest quality, both in intellect and character. This may be an opportune moment --
us some of the speakers who have preceded me have indicated -- for reflection on decisions
concerning man and matter. The former are frequently much more difficult than
the latter, for when choosing a man for very high office one frequently decides
on the matter itself. That is why this wise decision by the United Nations should
be an encouragement to us in our work. It shows that in this world of ours, in
which we face so many complicated and difficult issues, we can still reach agreement
on very important problems when issues such as this are at stake. Let us,
therefore, accept the action taken in New York last Friday as an example for
ourselves. It is only fitting that we should wish the new Secretary-General,
in the highly complex and responsible task he faces, all possible success.

Mr. ASSUNÇÃO de ARAUJO (Brazil) (interpretation from French): I should like
to add my voice to the voices of those who have congratulated U Thant on his election to
the post of Secretary-General. U Thant, who has played such a wise and active
role in the past, merits all our trust and confidence.

HADDIS ALAMIYEHU (Ethiopia): I wish to express the gratification
of my delegation at the election of U Thant as Secretary-General of the United Nations.
I had the distinct honour of working with him in the United Nations in New York.
I found him to be a devoted servant dedicated to the cause of the United Nations,
and I am sure he is the best choice available to the Organization. I hope that
he will be successful in the difficult task that he has accepted, and I wish to concur
with your suggestion, Mr. Chairman, that this Conference should send a
congratulatory message to U Thant.

Mr. TIRUZANOV (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): I, too, on behalf
of the delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, would like to associate
myself with the warm congratulations which you, Mr. Chairman, and other speakers
have expressed upon the election of U Thant to the post of Secretary General of
the United Nations. We are especially happy to do so because my delegation,
like other delegations, has had the opportunity of working for quite a long time
with the man who has been elected to the post of Secretary-General, and we have
all appreciated his high qualities. We should like to hope, too, that the machinery
of the United Nations Secretariat would work in such a way under U Thant as to
facilitate the solution of problems which today weigh upon the world, allowing
us to arrive at solutions to these problems. We should like to hope that U Thant might
contribute, thanks to his high qualities and capacities, to the solution of pending
issues, within the limits of the possibilities of negotiation. Among these
problems is that of general and complete disarmament on which we in this Committee
are working. We should also like to congratulate the delegation of Burma, which
is our neighbour here, for enabling us to have such an important public official for
the high post of Secretary-General of the United Nations. I wish to participate
in the common tribute that has been expressed, and to support the proposal to send
a congratulatory telegram to U Thant.

Mr. KURKÁ (Czechoslovakia) (interpretation from Russian): On behalf of the
Czechoslovakian delegation I, too, should like to subscribe to the sentiments uttered
by previous speakers, and to express our satisfaction on the unanimous election
of U Thant to the post of Secretary General of the United Nations. We highly
respect his unbiased approach to problems and his high personal qualities. In
congratulating him upon his election we hope that he may have every success in
his future activities. I fully support your proposal, Mr. Chairman, to send
a telegram of congratulations to the Secretary-General.

Mr. CAVALLETI (Italy) (interpretation from French): In turn may I
associate myself with the words of congratulations which have been uttered on
behalf of other delegations upon the election of U Thant to the post of Secretary-
General of the United Nations. I consider this is a good augury for the
improvement of international affairs in general, and for the success of the work
we are doing here. The unanimity behind the election of U Thant shows that the
United Nations has become strengthened and is better able to work for peace. The
Italian delegation will fully support U Thant in his work as Secretary-General of the
United Nations.
Mr. ICOVESCOU (Romania): Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Romanian delegation I should like to join you in congratulating U Thant on his appointment as the new permanent Secretary-General of the United Nations. As you know, the Romanian delegation in New York was one of the six sponsors of the draft resolution submitted by the Security Council to the General Assembly recommending the election of U Thant. Here again we should like to congratulate U Thant and convey to him our best wishes for the successful accomplishment of his task.

Mr. OBIRI (Nigeria): On behalf of my delegation I should like to join in the expression of gratification and satisfaction at the unanimous election of U Thant as Secretary-General of the United Nations. This signal expression of unaniity and agreement will, it is to be hoped, be extended so as to facilitate our complex task here.

U TUN SHUIN (Burma): Certainly I am not going to join in extolling U Thant, for that would be highly immodest on the part of my delegation. All I wish to say is that all of us -- the twenty million people of Burma as well as the Revolutionary Government of the Union of Burma -- are extremely glad that Member States of the United Nations have reposed their trust and confidence in U Thant in electing him their full-time Secretary-General. We are grateful to each and every Member State for the support extended. We are confident that he will endeavour to the best of his ability to discharge his heavy responsibilities in the interests of peace, which the world so badly needs. At the same time, we are not unmindful of the fact that, in thus endorsing U Thant's appointment, nations of the world are convinced that the Union of Burma, a non-nuclear and non-armed country, steadfastly pursues a policy of peace and non-alignment.

The Chairman (United States of America): I should now like to call upon Mr. Epstein, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

Mr. EPSTEIN (Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General): It is a most gratifying experience to listen to this unanimous outpouring of sentiments of solidarity and support and good wishes for the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
In addition to the telegram which I am sure this Committee will decide to send to the Secretary-General, I myself shall immediately convey to him the text of the remarks made in this Committee today, and I am sure he will find much in them of encouragement and much to sustain him in the difficult work that lies ahead of him.

One or two of the representatives have quoted sentences out of the Secretary-General's speech of acceptance, and, with your permission Mr. Chairman, perhaps I can arrange to circulate informally to members of the Committee the full text of that speech.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I take it that it is the unanimous sentiment of the Conference that I, as the Chairman of the day, should ask the Secretariat to prepare a congratulatory telegram on behalf of the Conference to the Secretary-General, appropriately expressing the felicitations of the Conference, and also, as Mr. Epstein has suggested, that we should send to His Excellency a transcript of these proceedings so that he may see the precise words which each of the representatives here has spoken today on the subject of his election to the office of Secretary-General of the United Nations.

It was so decided.
PROGRAMME OF WORK

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): Pursuant to the discussion that took place at our last meeting, the two co-Chairmen have met and it is their recommendation that, subject to the approval of the Conference, today's meeting and the meeting to be held on Wednesday 5 December -- that is, the eighty-sixth and eighty-seventh plenary meetings -- should be devoted to the subject of nuclear testing. It is further recommended that, if the list of speakers on that subject has not been exhausted at the close of the eighty-seventh plenary meeting, the discussion should continue at the eighty-eighth plenary meeting, to be held on 7 December, until there are no further speakers on nuclear testing, after which the subject of general and complete disarmament will be taken up.

If I hear no objection I shall take it that the Committee decides to accept those recommendations.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): We shall turn now to the subject of nuclear testing.

U TUN SHEI (Burma): Mr. Chairman, since this is the first occasion on which I have taken the floor in this debate, may I say how honoured and privileged I feel to be participating in the work of this Committee. May I also convey to you and to the other representatives my sincere thanks for the kind words expressed in welcoming me to your midst.

The question of general and complete disarmament is a vital issue for mankind's survival. However, my delegation submits that there can be no realistic programme of general and complete disarmament unless the problem is contained, unless we prevent it from growing even as we consider it. We have taken this stand all along. In fact members of the Committee will recall that the Burmese Foreign Minister stated in this Committee:
"As my delegation sees it, the search for disarmament consists not only in looking for agreed ways and means of reducing and finally eliminating existing armed forces and armaments; we must also ensure that our task does not grow while we are busily engaged in looking for a solution."

(ENDC/PV.6, p.24)

That was stated on 21 March 1962, at the very outset of the Conference. It is for this reason that we have devoted so much of our time and attention to the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. If the essential first step of banning nuclear tests for all time is not taken, all our efforts to reach agreement on general and complete disarmament will not only be futile but even appear ridiculous. We are happy to note from the recent debates in the General Assembly that an overwhelming majority of nations endorses this view.

The two resolutions of the General Assembly before us are both important and urgent. It is, however, evident that the degree of urgency attached to resolution 1767 (XVII), relating to general and complete disarmament, is not as great as that attached to resolution 1762 A and B (XVII), dealing with the cessation of nuclear tests. The latter resolution, which expresses the wishes of millions of people, calls for the cessation of all nuclear tests immediately and in any case not later than 1 January 1963; recommends that, if by 1 January 1963 an agreement on the cessation of all tests is not reached, the parties concerned should enter into "an immediate agreement prohibiting nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, accompanied by an interim arrangement suspending all underground tests..." (UNCS/1762 (XVII), p.3);

and, further, requests this Conference to report to the Assembly by 10 December 1962. Thus we are pressed for time. In the circumstances my delegation would like to join those other delegations that have requested that the Committee should at this stage concentrate on the question of the cessation of nuclear testing with a view to arriving at an agreement.

During the course of the last few meetings valuable thoughts and suggestions have been offered to enable the nuclear Powers to overcome the present impasse. The Swedish delegation, in a carefully considered statement last Wednesday, suggested the immediate setting up of an interim commission composed of a panel of scientists with functions in line with those set out in the eight-nation memorandum (ENDC/28).
The Burmese delegation, even before the positions of the two sides had arrived at the present stage, had taken the stand that the setting up of an impartial international scientific body was indispensable to a successful test ban treaty. The Committee will remember that Mr. Barrington stated quite categorically on 2 April:

"... the existence of such an international scientific body would seem to be inseparable from a successful test ban treaty." (MDC/PV.13, p.7)

We, therefore, had no hesitation in supporting the suggestion made by the Swedish delegation on 31 August to the effect that the international scientific commission proposed in the eight-nation moratorium should be set up at least on an interim basis.
The present idea of the Swedish delegation is an extension of the previous one, in concrete form, and my delegation whole-heartedly supports it. It has the means of meeting the wishes of the General Assembly and we would request the nuclear Powers to give it their most careful and, we hope, favourable consideration.

To judge from Mr. Kuznetsov's statement of 17 August, which has been quoted so often, the Soviet Union does not appear to reject in principle on-site inspections by the international scientific commission. Such being the case, the suggestion of the Mexican delegation that invitation should be extended if the international scientific commission believes that in the case of a doubtful event on-site inspection is necessary is one which, together with the idea of an agreed annual quota of inspections suggested by the Indian delegation, merits, in the opinion of my delegation, earnest consideration by the nuclear Powers.

Several months have passed since the eight-nation memorandum (ENDC/28) was presented. The passage of time has convinced us all the more that that memorandum does serve as the basis for an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests. We feel that the nuclear Powers have not given the memorandum the kind of earnest attention it rightly deserves. We appeal to them to look at it again. Merely to stand on principles, without taking practical requirements into consideration, will get us nowhere. The international atmosphere is comparatively favourable and attempts should again be made with renewed vigour, in a spirit of "mutual understanding and concession", to reach agreement. We believe that if there is good will on both sides agreement is within easy reach.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): In my capacity as the representative of the United States I should now like to make a statement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests.

At our eighty-fourth meeting (ENDC/PV.84) the representative of the United Arab Republic, in his capacity as Chairman of that meeting, suggested that it might be profitable if the members of the nuclear test ban Sub-Committee could provide the full Committee with a report on the meetings held by the Sub-Committee during our recess. Again, at our eighty-fifth meeting (ENDC/PV.85), Mr. El-Zayyat of the United Arab Republic asked if it would be possible to have a short report on the meetings of the nuclear Sub-Committee.
by delegation was an active participant in those meetings, and in an attempt, in part, to meet the request of the Chairman of the eighty-fourth plenary meeting, and also to bring members of the Conference up to date on the recess proceedings of the Sub-Committee as we see them, my delegation would like to devote part of its statement today to a report of the Sub-Committee's activities.

It might be useful, to begin with, to recall for a moment the situation of the Conference with regard to the nuclear test ban question at the beginning of the recess.

The United States and the United Kingdom at that point had just completed tabling their two treaties of 2 August last — document ENDC/58, a draft comprehensive test ban treaty, and document ENDC/59, a draft partial test ban treaty. The comprehensive draft treaty would end all nuclear tests in all environments for ever. The partial treaty would end tests immediately in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water without the need for additional controls.

These two documents were tabled as a result of careful study and review by our two Governments and as a result of an evaluation of the findings of Project Vela, on which my Government has spent upwards of $100 million in an effort to improve the ability to detect, to locate and to identify nuclear events. The results of Project Vela were first published by the United States Department of Defense on 7 July 1962, and they are before the Conference as document ENDC/45. The comprehensive draft treaty also included many of the suggestions made by the eight members of the Committee in their joint memorandum of 16 April 1962 (ENDC/28).

All phases of the United States-United Kingdom comprehensive treaty draft were drawn up with the suggestions of the eight nations in mind. The treaty itself, as will be observed from study of it, reflects the primacy of the three important elements of the eight-nation memorandum — an international scientific commission, a detection system of observation posts throughout the world, and a number of necessary obligatory on-site inspections by the commission of otherwise unidentified events. Our two Governments still favour the comprehensive test ban treaty; that is the treaty we would prefer to work out and to sign.

The partial test ban treaty was evolved by our two Governments as a result of statements made in this Committee by a number of delegations, including those of the eight nations, asking for a partial ban. This partial draft treaty provides for the cession of all tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under the oceans
without the need for additional controls. The United States and the United Kingdom were ready on 27 August — as indeed we were when we submitted our earlier treaty (EMC/9) in April 1961, and as we are ready now — to cease all tests in these three environments for ever. Admittedly, this partial treaty is not a complete solution of the problem of ending all nuclear tests, but at the same time it would secure the end of all tests which cause radioactive fallout, and would go far towards halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons to States which have not developed them so far. Indeed, it would be a good beginning toward a cessation of all tests.

The principal features of the three proposals made by my Government on 14 August 1966 were incorporated in the comprehensive draft treaty (EMC/59). These proposals were:

1. A willingness on the part of our two Governments to consider a reduction in the number of on-site inspections by the commission from the previous yearly quota of twelve to twenty, such inspections proposed by the United States and the United Kingdom;

2. A willingness to consider a network of manned detection stations equipped with various types of modern instrumentation which:
   (a) would involve a number of stations world-wide substantially smaller than the number previously proposed, including a smaller number on the territory of the Soviet Union, and
   (b) would involve nationally-manned and operated, internationally co-ordinated and supervised observation posts instead of a network of internationally-manned and operated stations;

3. Acceptance of the obligatory nature of on-site inspections of otherwise unidentified events by the commission.
These basic proposals were incorporated into a draft treaty whose salient characteristic was an overall simplification of previous United States and United Kingdom draft treaties, including the draft treaty of 18 April 1961. Under the new comprehensive draft treaty proposal (ENDC/58), parties would undertake two primary obligations. First, they would agree to prohibit and prevent the carrying out of nuclear tests at any place under their jurisdiction or control. Secondly, they would agree to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of such tests anywhere at any time. Parties would also undertake to co-operate with a commission in the carrying out of all measures of control and in establishing elements of the system. These obligations are made clear in articles I and II on page 1 of document ENDC/58.

An international scientific commission, whose members, however, would not necessarily have to be scientists and whose functions are set forth in article III on page 2 of document ENDC/58, would have general responsibility for the collection of data and for the reporting of all events which could be suspected of being nuclear weapon test explosions. In addition, it would be responsible for making positive identification of the nature of the origin of unidentified seismic events as necessary.

Under article IV of the treaty the international scientific commission would consist of fifteen members — four from the Soviet bloc, four from the West, and seven from among parties nominated jointly by the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union. These last three States would be permanent members of the commission. All States serving on the commission would be free to appoint their own representatives to the Commission who, in keeping with its scientific character, could of course be highly qualified scientific experts. The commission itself would be assisted by a small, highly qualified scientific staff.

The second element of control — the system of observation posts or detection stations — is set forth in article VII on page 6 of document ENDC/58 and would be based upon existing national stations together with the addition of a number of high quality, newly constructed national stations. The quality of the instrumentation of these stations and their location is necessarily related to their number. These stations would be operated, as desired by the host government, by local nationals under international supervision. Internationally-nominated and operated stations might be set up if the commission deemed such stations desirable in agreement with the individual government concerned. Such stations might be useful if a particular
State felt its own personnel to be inadequate to handle the scientific problems involved or if for any other reason the particular State desired international support for the stations on its territory. The new national stations would be established at sites agreed upon by the parties to the treaty and the commission. The commission itself would establish the specifications for and would pay for maintaining, building, equipping and training personnel for these new nationally-manned stations. In addition, use would be made, as necessary, of national stations already in existence. During the earliest period in the life of the treaty control system, but for a very brief and limited time only, complete reliance would be placed on existing systems until the necessary new stations were built. It is emphasized that this period would be short.

Obligatory on-site inspections by the commission -- the third basic element of the control system -- would be as provided for in article VIII on page 7 of document NDC/56. Inspections by the commission would be carried out on the basis of carefully laid down procedures as set forth in the treaty. Events which had been located geographically and which remained unidentified in accordance with the scientific criteria written into the treaty would be eligible for inspection by the commission.

From a purely scientific standpoint, there should be no limitation on the number of inspections. However, in order to reach agreement it is suggested that there should be a quote. Therefore, inspection would take place under a quote arrangement which would permit an agreed maximum number of such inspections each year. Of course, there might well be fewer unidentified events inspected than provided for under the quote, since the quote would represent only a maximum limit on the number of inspections. The area which could be inspected around the epicentre of the seismic event would also be limited, in accordance with the provisions of the treaty, to a few hundred square kilometres.

The staffing of the on-site inspection teams of the commission in an objective, impartial and scientific manner is also set forth in great detail in the draft treaty. Together with other provisions of the treaty, the staffing provisions would constitute a real safeguard against any possible charges of espionage and, as we have said many times, we are open-minded about these staffing provisions in so far as they would not interfere with the true scientific character of the commission and its on-site operations.
(The Chairman, United States)

For maximum deterrence in advance to any State which might be led to violate the treaty, events to be inspected within the quota in the United States and the United Kingdom would be selected by the Soviet Union, while for events in the Soviet Union the opposite would be true. Although this means that not every unidentified event would be inspected by the Commission, it is correct that any unidentified event within the quota would be eligible for inspection. Putting the choice of events to be inspected in the hands of the other side ensures that the party most hurt by violations, and therefore most interested in deterring violations of the treaty, has the opportunity to exercise its judgment in the case.
If it were to be done on a truly scientific basis there ought to be no quotas. These features of our system, we believe, ensure that there would be maximum deterrence in advance to violations.

The treaty also contains provisions -- in Article XII, page 11 of UNO/55 -- for withdrawal from the treaty, in specific circumstances, if treaty obligations are not being fulfilled.

The United Kingdom and the United States have tried to draft this treaty as fairly, objectively and scientifically as possible. Subsequent to the presentation of the comprehensive draft treaty the Soviet Union accepted, apparently, a Mexican suggestion that there should be a cut-off date for nuclear testing: 1 January 1963. The United States provided arrangements for the inclusion of such a cut-off date in both of its draft treaties and President Kennedy indicated that the United States would be prepared to cease testing, under effective treaty controls, on 1 January 1963. In these circumstances it was proposed by the two Western delegations that meetings of the test ban Sub-Committee should be continued during the last recess of the Conference and while the subjects of nuclear testing and disarmament were being discussed at the United Nations General Assembly in New York. The Soviet Union agreed.

During the recess there were nineteen meetings of the test ban Sub-Committee in all. The United States and the United Kingdom hoped to receive constructive comments from the Soviet Union on the draft proposals for a treaty which they had submitted. Our two delegations hoped to enter into fruitful and constructive negotiations with the Soviet Union on many of the various aspects of the new treaty drafts. There were many areas where the two sides appeared to be close together, and it was those areas which the United States and the United Kingdom hoped would be broadened by the recess negotiations of the test ban Sub-Committee.

During the recess the United States and the United Kingdom attempted to work out with the Soviet Union arrangements concerning the operation and composition of the international commission, but were told by the Soviet Union that such detailed negotiations about the commission would have to wait until all outstanding issues had first been agreed upon in principle. Then it was proposed to the Soviet Union by the Western delegations to work out questions related to the world-wide control post system the Soviet Union insisted that that would not be necessary, since all the
control posts which would be required already existed and there would be no need for co-ordination and co-operation among the existing stations. However, the Soviet Union did not produce any scientific data to support its statements in this regard. I think we all know that the basic control system for any effective treaty must have a co-ordinated network of posts, with up-to-date instrumentation and with the means for the rapid communication of data as received from that co-ordinated network of posts. Without that the treaty simply could not work.

On the question of on-site inspection the United States attempted to find out from the Soviet delegation on what scientific basis the Soviet Union believed that existing systems of detection stations were adequate to detect and identify all seismic events. However, the Soviet Union refused to provide that information and still does refuse. Instead it has insisted on quoting extensively from Western newspaper clippings, proffering those quotations as the scientific proof of the correctness of its position. For example, it offered newspaper clippings with respect to a new digital computer which had been developed at the California Institute of Technology, which, while a useful tool, does not permit the identification of nuclear events by distant instrumentation. In addition, when the Soviet Union was asked how it believed on-site inspection would affect the national security interests of the Soviet Union, its delegation consistently failed to respond.

On its part, the Soviet delegation proposed to the West that agreement could be reached on three so-called bases. First, it said that the Western delegations could accept the Soviet position of 28 November 1961. Secondly, it said that the United States and the United Kingdom could reach agreement with the Soviet Union on the Soviet Union's unilateral interpretation of the eight-nation memorandum. In this connexion, at the twenty-sixth meeting of the Sub-Committee, on 14 September, Mr. Tserapkin said, in effect, that the eight nation memorandum was merely a further embodiment of the principles incorporated by the Soviet Union in its proposal of 28 November 1961. Under Mr. Tserapkin's own interpretation there was no major substantive difference between the eight nation memorandum and the position of the Soviet Union of 28 November. Finally, the West was given the choice of agreeing to its own partial test ban treaty provided it was accompanied by an unsupervised, uncontrolled moratorium on underground tests to last for an unspecified period of time. That final offer was, of course,
the scientifically unsupported Soviet position of 28 November 1961 in its third and final guise. At the same time the United States and the United Kingdom offered, time and time again, to negotiate on the terms of their carefully thought out and scientifically supported detailed treaties, and made it clear that they wished to discuss any of the basic difficulties and were prepared to bring their scientists to Geneva for the purpose. The Soviet Union declined to bring its scientists to Geneva and declined to discuss any of the detailed scientific questions.

It is clear to all why the Sub-Committee cannot report greater progress towards a test ban treaty. The great and basic differences between the two sides which stand in the way of stopping all tests are concerned with the problem of control over underground tests. On that question the United States and the United Kingdom have made it abundantly clear that they are willing immediately to set aside the most troublesome issues for later settlement and to record and implement agreement now on the banning of those tests the control over which is not a matter of dispute between the two sides. In addition the two Governments have made it clear that they are willing to settle the question of underground tests on the basis of truly objective scientific evidence. They still take that position. They have advanced their scientific evidence, but the Soviet Union has not advanced, and refuses to advance any scientific evidence on this point; and it has refused, and continues to refuse, to produce scientists to discuss this question.

The United Kingdom and the United States have always taken the position, and still do, that if it can be shown by objective scientific evidence that the scientists from their two countries are operating on incomplete or incorrect data they are more than willing to listen. The Soviet Union has continued to insist on a scientific position with regard to the identification of seismic events which is unsupported by the scientific evidence to hand and, at the same time, has refused to present any scientific evidence on its own side of the case.
The United States has appropriated and is continuing to appropriate money in order to increase the ability to detect seismic events and to make available results of this scientific research for the benefit of the entire world.

In spite of the less than auspicious note which the recess negotiations bring to our resumed negotiations, I can assure members that the delegation of the United States will do all it possibly can to find a workable and effective solution to this question.

Before closing, I should like to turn to another facet of our discussion of a test ban. In our recent plenary meetings a number of useful statements, suggestions, proposals and observations have been made by various delegations. Our position with respect to these proposals should be clear to all. First and foremost let me say that my Government distinctly welcomes those proposals urging an immediate signature of a partial test ban treaty in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space.

Second, I repeat what I said in my intervention at the eighty-fourth meeting, namely, that we will give all of those proposals, including the Swedish proposals, the most careful consideration. My Government is now engaged in studying them. We will, of course, pay careful attention to the provisions with respect to the necessary safeguards on underground tests, including obligatory on-site inspection. We believe that any agreement must contain measures for detection and inspection concomitant with the obligation to cease testing. An interim agreement in this respect should, to characterize General Assembly resolution 1762 (XII), be no less effective than a permanent ban. My Government will be prepared at a future time to indicate the results of its study of these proposals.

Third, our position on an uncontrolled, uninspected moratorium is crystal clear. We oppose such an arrangement and we will not enter into such an uncontrolled, uninspected moratorium arrangement again. We have had a sad and a bitter experience with an uninspected obligation or pledge to cease tests. Now, quite frankly, the shoe is on the other foot. Now is the time for the other side to come forward and to try an adequate and effectively controlled agreement banning all tests, just as we tried the uninspected, uncontrolled arrangement. I can assure my Soviet colleagues, it will be a much more pleasant experience than that to which the Soviet Government subjected my government in September, 1961.
Fourth, we believe the Swedish suggestion offers some interesting comments with respect to an international commission.

There is, indeed, as the Swedish representative pointed out, a large measure of agreement on an international commission. I refer members of delegations to the details on an international commission as set forth in our comprehensive draft treaty (EnDC/50).

A careful look at the United States-United Kingdom draft treaty will show that certain detailed proposals in this respect have been made. If members will look at article IV, on page 3 of Document EnDC/56, they will see that considerable detail has been included concerning the membership of an international commission, the means of appointment of its members and its mode of operation.

For example, the suggestions of the eight-nation memorandum (EnDC/23) for the inclusion of a large number of representatives from the States not committed to either side has been incorporated in this draft treaty. Both sides have also indicated that they accept the suggestions of the eight nations, and on this particular suggestion there has been little or no indication of divergency in the interpretation of the memorandum.

As will be noted, article IV of document EnDC/56 also calls for a commission divided along lines which reflect specific Soviet suggestions about the organization of a nuclear test ban commission. In particular, both the United States and the United Kingdom and their allies are to be represented in equal numbers with the Soviet bloc. As I noted earlier, each of the sides is to have four member countries on the commission.

In addition, there will be seven members chosen from among the States jointly nominated by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. This means of nomination will, of course, ensure that States not aligned with either NATO or the Warsaw Pact will fill these places. This will ensure that degree of impartiality which we all believe, I hope, ought to be characteristic of a commission. The commission we have proposed in article IV on page 3 of document EnDC/56 would ensure as well the parity with the West which the Soviet Union has always maintained would be necessary if the make-up of such a commission was to be acceptable to the Soviet Union.
It is important to remember that a commission administering a nuclear test ban treaty will have to deal with extensive administrative and financial problems. Indeed, any operating system will require expenditures which can probably only be met by Government contributions. We shall need to ensure, for this reason alone, that governments therefore have the primary role in the operation of the commission. I believe this is the only way that a such nuclear test ban commission can be made to operate effectively. This also represents a significant area of East-West agreement on this question.

There should be no question, then, that the major problems of the formation of the commission are apparently part of the wide area of agreement which now exists.

In addition to the question of the international commission, many delegations have touched on the problem of on-site inspections. I noted many statements at the eighty-fifth plenary meeting were devoted to this most difficult question.

I also detected, in my review of the verbatim records, a single thread running through all of those statements which appears to be extremely significant, particularly in view of the fact that many of the delegations which made the statements were among the sponsors of the eight-nation memorandum.

For example, the representative of Sweden took the trouble to quote from the speech of his Foreign Minister in the First Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations. With his permission I should like to repeat in particular the portion of Mr. Torsten Nilsson's statement which reads as follows:

"'It would also be possible to provide for guarantees against the misuse of the obligations' -- I repeat, obligations -- 'to subject oneself to a certain degree of inspection ...'" (EMDC/FV.86, page 36)

Further, in speaking of this subject, the representative of India had a number of interesting things to say. This one quotation, however, appears to me to make an important point:

"We have been thinking over the various approaches made by different delegations to this issue" -- the issue of on-site inspection -- "and we wonder whether it might not actually be found that there is a meeting point in these various approaches: assuming, of course, that all the positions stated are directed to the same purpose, namely, to securing adequate assurance for both the detection and identification of events by the international..."
commission which has been agreed upon. I believe that, again, is common ground -- that there should be processes by which such identification could be made. In any case I should like to point out that this is an essential basis which has been stated in paragraph 6 of the first part of resolution 1762 (IVII) of the General Assembly. (E/CN.4/35, p. 41).

The paragraph in resolution 1762 recommends that an interim agreement should include "adequate assurances for effective detection and identification of seismic events."
Another interesting and significant statement was made at our eighty-fifth meeting which also touched on this question of inspection. The representative of Mexico said a number of very important things at that meeting, but I should like particularly to quote the following:

"On-site inspection is not an end in itself. It is designed to avoid all suspicion in the case of a seismic event impossible of identification from a distance. ... It is a guarantee in case of doubt caused by an unidentified event, and if there were an underground test this would be a violation. Therefore, the role of compulsory inspection is that of a radar instrument. It is designed to be used as a deterrent against clandestine violations."

(EMDC/PV, 85, p. 57)

It seems to me that the common thread which runs through those statements, and which was also prevalent in the statements of other delegations in the most recent meetings of our Conference, is the fact that a certain number of on-site inspections is indeed necessary to assure identification and to deter clandestine treaty violations. If this position were to be accepted by all of the parties to our negotiations it seems to me we could quickly reach a solution to this problem and record agreement on what would be a momentous first step in our quest for general and complete disarmament.

Mr. TSKR.FKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): Today, Mr. Chairman, speaking as representative of the United States, you developed before this Committee your version of the course of the negotiations in the three-Power Sub-Committee and you formulated your evaluation of the respective positions of the sides. As in your earlier statements, the statement of this morning contains many inaccuracies and I think I may even say distortions of the true state of affairs. Certainly we shall study the text of the statement you have just made and will give a full reply later. What I should like to deal with today, rather than the old positions of the sides, are the new factors which appear in this field, and I should like to make a few remarks for the purpose of promoting progress in our negotiations.
Our Committee today, after our recess, resumes its debate on the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. Our task, of course, is to try to achieve a solution of this problem in accordance with the interests of peace and with the will of the peoples as reflected in the discussions of the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

We fully share the views of those members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament who, in the course of our general debate, emphasized the urgent need to find a solution to the problem of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. The cessation of such tests is important, not only as a step towards halting the nuclear armaments race and as a measure which to some extent would slow down the development of weapons of mass destruction, but the significance of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests lies also in the fact that it would facilitate the solution of our main problem, namely, general and complete disarmament. To reach agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests would be an excellent preparatory step towards the implementation of the most important measures bearing on the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons as part of general and complete disarmament. This awareness should act as a stimulus and should prompt us to double our efforts in order to overcome all obstacles.

One cannot but agree with the remarks made by several members of the Committee who have spoken before me to the effect that at the present time we have more favourable conditions for reaching agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. The negotiations which took place earlier in the Eighteen-Nation Committee were not wholly fruitless. Today, as it is clear for everyone to see, the differences between the positions of the main parties concerned have been narrowed down and that is what prompted the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev, to say in his message of 27 October to President Kennedy that the respective positions on the question of nuclear weapon tests are not so far apart. What is needed, consequently, is to make a few more efforts in order to travel the relatively short distance separating the parties, the nuclear Powers, and to come to a mutually acceptable agreement. We are convinced that such an agreement is now within our reach, provided there is good will on all sides.

There is a number of positive factors which may contribute to the success of the Eighteen-Nation Committee in this matter. The period of recess was not altogether a loss. The wide discussion on the question of nuclear weapon tests which took place in the General Assembly was useful. This is not only our opinion but is also the view of those Member States which took part in the discussion.
As a result of the debate at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, the direction emerged along which a solution to this problem must be sought. In the first place, the General Assembly debate has clearly shown that what must be prohibited is all nuclear weapon tests, of all sorts, without any exceptions. There must not be any exemptions. The so-called partial treaty, that is to say, an agreement which would in fact legalize the continuation of nuclear weapon tests underground, would not solve the problem and would only create dangerous illusions. In the First Committee of the General Assembly, in the speeches of many representatives we heard a thorough analysis which has shown that the so-called partial agreement, far from being useful, could, on the contrary, have harmful consequences.
This was a point made in particular by certain members of our Committee -- namely the representatives of Burma, Ethiopia, and others.

It is perhaps appropriate to remind the members of our Committee of the arguments and considerations which prove the inadequacy of a partial agreement. To allow the States which are parties to an agreement to be free to carry out underground nuclear tests -- and this would be a clear consequence of the partial agreement -- would create a situation whereby the nuclear armaments race would continue as before, and nuclear weapons would continue to be improved and perfected. By means of experimental explosions in pits and tunnels the existing types of nuclear weapons would be improved and new types would be created.

In the course of discussions at the United Nations General Assembly many representatives quoted a statement made by the representative of the United States, Mr. Dean, at the Eighteen-Nation Committee, in which he showed very clearly the wide possibilities for creating new types of nuclear weapons which are offered by underground nuclear tests. One of the main and perhaps decisive targets set before us, in striving for a cessation of nuclear weapon tests, is to erect a barrier in the path of the nuclear armaments race. A partial agreement, as a first step towards eliminating the danger of nuclear war, would obviously not achieve this goal. On the contrary, it might lead to a still more dangerous situation since the nuclear weapon competition, transferred underground, would continue under the guise of an existing agreement. Dangerous illusions would grow in the minds of the people. There would be an appearance of a movement towards lessening the danger of nuclear war while in fact that danger would be growing. A partial agreement cannot be the product of an agreement on mutually acceptable conditions, taking into account the interests of both sides. It would bring clear military advantages to the side which had made underground explosions one of its main methods of testing nuclear weapons and which had accumulated very considerable experience in that field.

At the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, on 15 October 1962, the representative of Mexico, Mr. Padilla Nervo, correctly evaluated this aspect of the problem. He said:
"Every series of nuclear tests that any Power carries out provokes in the nation that carried out the previous series the scientific and political need to analyze those tests, and in turn forces that Power to reply with new tests. ... And thus one series of tests will follow the other." (A/1153, p.92)

Indeed, how could one of the nuclear Powers accept an agreement which would afford to the other nuclear Power the possibility of continuing underground nuclear tests, thereby to acquire advantages in nuclear weapon technology? Clearly, the nuclear Power thus affected will not accept such an agreement.

There is another aspect of this question. If the underground nuclear weapon tests are to continue other States may be faced, for the sake of their security, with the need to start testing their own nuclear weapons, and they will consider themselves entitled to carry out such tests in the environment which they find more appropriate or more convenient. The representatives at the United Nations General Assembly who emphasized that the life span of a partial agreement — if it were to be concluded — would be very short, were right.

All this clearly shows that the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests must be comprehensive and universal from the outset. The danger of the nuclear arms race lies not only in the manufacture of new nuclear warheads and bombs but also in the fact that new States may be drawn into this race. This is something which will obviously make the solution of the problem of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, as well as general and complete disarmament, much more difficult.

Consequently, from every standpoint, a real significance and a real force may be seen only in an agreement which would prohibit all nuclear weapon tests without any exemptions — namely, in the atmosphere, under water, in outer space, and underground.

This simple truth was clearly recognized by the majority of the Member States of the United Nations and it was clearly expressed both in the discussion and in the resolution, as finally adopted, on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests (A/RES/1762 (XVII)). The objections of the overwhelming majority of the Member States of the United Nations to all attempts to impose, even in a veiled form, the possibility of the continuance of underground nuclear weapon tests were so determined that they prompted the United States and the United Kingdom to withdraw from their draft resolution its paragraph 2, which provided for the cessation of nuclear weapon tests in three
environments only -- namely, in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space. So far as the Soviet Union is concerned, we have always been, and are today, of the view that the future agreement must cover all nuclear weapon tests, and we shall continue to strive for such an agreement.

Another important conclusion reached by the Member States of the United Nations in the course of the discussion on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests lies in the fact that it is difficult, if not impossible, to reach agreement in conditions when the spiral of nuclear weapon tests is steeply rising. This is why the proposal put forward by Mexico that all nuclear weapon tests should cease by 1 January 1963 has met with such wide support. This desire of the overwhelming majority of the Member States of the United Nations found its expression in General Assembly resolution 1762 A (XVII).
Paragraph 2 of the operative part of this resolution asks that after 1 January 1963 no one anywhere should carry out any nuclear tests, whether there is an agreement by that date or not.

The Soviet Union gave its full support to this resolution. We voted for this paragraph because we considered that it tended to create a quiet and favourable situation for an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests everywhere and for ever.

As a result of the General Assembly's work we have also a more solid basis for drawing up an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. The eight-nation joint memorandum (ENDC/28) has met -- as certain speakers have pointed out -- with massive support. This means that the General Assembly expressed itself clearly in favour of control by means of national detection systems, and also that the General Assembly is opposed to any attempt to impose compulsory inspection.

Apart from these positive aspects of the General Assembly's work, which, in our view, increase our opportunities for reaching success in this Committee, I would like to note other circumstances which tend to facilitate our task.

The Soviet Union, in the course of the work of the seventeenth session of the General Assembly, in order to meet the Western Powers and in full agreement with the prevailing desire of the General Assembly to put an end to all nuclear weapon tests without exception, said from the General Assembly rostrum that it was prepared to sign immediately an agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space, including in such an agreement a simultaneous undertaking to continue negotiations on the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests. The Soviet Union said further that it would sign this agreement providing it contained an undertaking not to carry out such underground tests for the duration of the negotiations and until full agreement could be reached on the prohibition of nuclear underground tests.

In acting in that way we demonstrated our readiness to take into account, within reasonable limits, the viewpoints of the Western Powers, to make it easier for them to move away from their old and unrealistic positions, and to make joint efforts towards finding a mutually acceptable solution. We are satisfied with the positive reception given to that proposal by the rest of the United Nations Member States.
In order to complete the picture listing the new possibilities offered to the Eighteen-Nation Committee upon the resumption of its work, we would like to recall that Soviet Union, United States and United Kingdom scientists three months ago launched a new idea on using for the purpose of control over underground nuclear explosions automatic seismic stations which do not require the presence of foreign inspectors.

No doubt this proposal makes it possible to eliminate difference on the question of organizing control over the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, and the utilization of automatic seismic stations -- or, as some prefer to call them, "black boxes" -- widens even more the possibilities for detecting and controlling nuclear tests. As all know, the Soviet Union responded positively to this idea, and we are ready to take the considerations of the scientists in this regard into account with respect to the utilization of automatic seismic stations for control purposes.

Thus, if we are objectively to evaluate the present state of affairs, we can with full justification say that we are approaching negotiations in conditions when, in our view, we have additional possibilities; when before us we see favourable perspectives. The task, therefore, is to utilize these favourable conditions to the greatest possible extent, and, without further ado, to come to an agreement on the prohibition for all time of all types of nuclear tests.

However, we are compelled to note that the turn that the debate has taken on this question cannot but give rise to concern to those who sincerely wish to put an end forthwith and for all time to nuclear weapon tests. The Member States of the United Nations, in their resolution, called upon us to work in a spirit of constructive compromise. At the same time, in the statements made by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom we cannot find even a trace -- a grain -- of this spirit of constructive compromise. They call for the right to inspect; they continue to stick to their old positions which, in the past, have blocked the possibility of arriving at an agreement. If the Western Powers are going stubbornly to continue with their demand then, of course, agreement will not become possible, and this Committee will fail in the task that was assigned to it by the General Assembly of the United Nations.
But that is not the only source for concern on our part. In the light of the favourable prospects which we have mentioned earlier, we cannot but be struck by the direction that certain representatives wish to give to the present debate. Some representatives -- particularly the Canadian representative, Mr. Burns -- have expressed the view that we should concentrate our efforts on a so-called temporary agreement.

Generally speaking it is hard to understand why this Committee should now turn its attention to the consideration and elaboration of a temporary agreement. Why has this feeling developed all of a sudden at a time when the Committee has just resumed its work? We have failed to hear any convincing arguments to the effect that at this juncture we should give up the consideration of a comprehensive agreement, and concentrate on the elaboration of a temporary one.

Reference was made in the Committee to paragraph 6 of resolution 1762 (XVII), but we should bear in mind that if resolution 1762 (XVII) as a whole was adopted -- as some have reminded us -- without objection, the same cannot be said for paragraph 6. A number of delegations, including the Soviet delegation, voted against that paragraph because in it one finds, in a masked and camouflaged form, attempts to reduce the whole matter to a partial agreement that would open to the Western Powers the possibility of carrying out underground nuclear tests. I must say that the camouflage around paragraph 6 is very transparent, and we could even remind the Committee of the manner in which it saw light in the General Assembly. At the beginning this paragraph, proposed by the Canadian delegation, openly, without beating about the bush, spoke of the cessation of tests in only three environments.

Everyone knows, however, that this bald attempt to bring into this resolution a point which was dear to those States interested in continuing underground tests met with decisive objection in the General Assembly, and as a result those who favoured the paragraph were compelled to camouflage its true object.
However, the Soviet Union's attitude to this paragraph is clear and well known. In our statements we have explained our approach and our view and we have confirmed them by our vote, which was a negative one, on this paragraph. At any rate resolution 1762 A urges our Committee to arrive at a final solution of the question of the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, but even in the minds of the authors of paragraph 6 the question of a temporary agreement could arise only after it would have become apparent that it was not possible to arrive at a permanent solution. However, the turn that some representatives in the Committee wish to give to our debate by substituting some temporary measure for a final and permanent decision on the question of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests could only play into the hands of those who wish to avoid a decision on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests and thereby spoil the happy prospects before us. It is this position with regard to a temporary solution that was advocated by the Western Powers at the very beginning of our work in the autumn of 1958. However, later, under the pressure of world public opinion, the Western Powers had to give up that position, and it is with surprise that we note that this erroneous and unhappy idea has again been brought into the light of day.

The Soviet delegation is considering very carefully the considerations which have been expressed by various representatives around this table, but even at this juncture we can draw attention to those contradictions into which fall the proponents of temporary measures. The Canadian representative, H.R. Burns, pointed out that the memorandum of the eight unaligned Powers could be taken as a basis of a temporary agreement. We fail to understand how it is even possible to make such a statement. After all, the memorandum of the eight unaligned States was put forward as a compromise platform on the basis of which it might be possible to do away with the difference of view between the nuclear States. If one were to delve into the text of the memorandum, one could easily see that the authors, the eight unaligned States, put forward the document as a basis for a permanent prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests and not a temporary respite after which the testing of nuclear weapons would resume with renewed force. The introductory part of the memorandum calls upon the nuclear Powers

"to persist in their efforts to come as soon as possible to an agreement prohibiting nuclear weapon tests for all time." (UNDC/28. p.1)
The proponents of a temporary agreement try to justify it by alleging that it is necessary in order to come to a solution of the inspection issue. Of course the differences with regard to the inspection issue are very serious differences and do act as obstacles to our arriving at an agreement. The road to an agreement is blocked by the demand of the Western Powers for compulsory inspection on the territory of the Soviet Union. This demand affects the security interests of the Soviet State. On the other hand, the demand for inspection is outdated. It becomes superfluous in the light of recent scientific and technical achievements. If the Western Powers were to put into practice the idea put forward during the Pugwash meeting of scientists to use automatic seismological stations — the "black boxes" — for control purposes, then they should no longer have any doubts or fears.

In fact we are faced with a rather paradoxical situation. Some tell us that we cannot come to a final solution of this problem, since there is no agreement on the question of inspection. At the same time it is proposed that we come to some temporary agreement, but with the inspection on which we seem not to be able to agree. Is it not quite clear that here a vicious circle is being artificially concocted, as a result of which we necessarily come to the conclusion that no agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests will be arrived at? The logic of things points to the fact that a temporary agreement, with inspection to boot, as Mr. Burns and certain other representatives have proposed, would be truly a rich windfall for those circles that have not yet renounced nuclear war as a means of achieving their political aims and, because of this, are against the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. For these circles the call for inspection is truly a tried and true means of preventing an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests.

It is difficult to envisage a more difficult combination than a demand for a temporary agreement with a call for inspection. On the one hand, it is proposed that we substitute a comprehensive agreement by a temporary one the unacceptability of which is quite evident inasmuch as States that would be concluding this temporary agreement would have no guarantees whatsoever — I stress that they would have no guarantees whatsoever — that a temporary agreement would be substituted by a permanent and final one prohibiting all nuclear weapon tests. On the other hand, people try to impose inspection on us, knowing in advance that it is unacceptable to the Soviet Union — for inspection, irrespective of whether or not it is to be carried out in the framework of a final agreement or in the framework of a temporary agreement, does not lose its unacceptable aspects, inasmuch as it would give free
rein to the collection of information on the defence capability of the inspected State. At the same time, the other party, or the other State, would have the possibility at any time of putting an end to a temporary agreement and of launching a new series of underground nuclear weapon tests. That this is so might be seen from another statement made by Mr. Burns when he hazarded an estimate of the probable time duration for the agreement. He mentioned a year or six months. We are sufficiently aware of things to know that this is just the right period of time required to prepare a new series of nuclear tests. Thus a temporary agreement might serve as a simple respite or interval between two regularly scheduled series of nuclear tests. Thus we see that a temporary agreement along the lines mentioned by Mr. Burns boils down to control and inspection without a factual prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.
The former and the latter are in the interests of the Western Powers. They cannot serve as the basis for an agreement.

An objective analysis shows that considerations of so-called temporary agreements of the sort mentioned by the representatives of Canada, Mexico and India — and to a certain extent this was referred to by the representative of Sweden — do not lighten our task. Quite the contrary. These proposals create new difficulties. They do not serve our cause; they only complicate our problem. Of course the need arises for some sort of modus vivendi while negotiations are on foot for an agreement, but in this connexion we have a decision of the General Assembly of the United Nations and I have already referred to paragraph 2 of resolution 1752 (XVII) in which it is proposed that from 1 January 1963 all tests of nuclear weapons should cease if complete agreement has not been reached by that date. If all nuclear states were to pay the necessary respect to this proposal of the General Assembly, and if they would, from 1 January 1963, cease de facto all tests of nuclear weapons, that would necessarily create a favourable atmosphere for the successful conclusion of negotiations on an agreement prohibiting all tests of all nuclear weapons for all time.

In conclusion, we find it necessary to point to the fact that we have before us good possibilities for seeking mutually acceptable solutions of the question of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. We have already pointed to the readiness of the Soviet Union to utilize an idea put forward by the scientists at the Pugwash conference to use automatic seismic stations. The location of such stations and their use would enhance still further the capability of the existing network of national stations and would make control over the discontinuance of all nuclear tests even more effective. We call upon the participants in these negotiations, the members of this Committee, to follow this path, which would lead to an agreement, rather than to permit themselves to be shunted on to the side lines which consideration such as those put forward in this Committee by the Canadian and other delegations would necessarily lead us.

Mr. Cavallotti (Italy) (interpretation from French): The statements we have heard today have certainly brought us all new elements for reflection, and my delegation will study them carefully in the verbatim record.

In particular, I would like to thank the two co-Chairmen for the comprehensive report which they have submitted to us on the work of the nuclear
Sub-Committee during the recess of the Conference. Their report shows that efforts have not been spared by the Western nuclear Powers in order to come to an agreement, even if such an agreement was not possible. I hope that these efforts will finally meet with corresponding efforts on the part of the Soviet delegation, in spite of the negative attitude which Mr. Tsarapkin has unfortunately re-affirmed this morning. I have great hope that the discussion on nuclear tests, which we have just started, will show him that this negative attitude of the Soviet delegation is not understood or considered as justified by the great majority of the delegations represented here.

I have asked for the floor because, with particular reference to the debate last Friday, which in my view was very interesting, I should like at the present stage of our discussion to make clear once again the position of the Italian delegation on this fundamental question of the prohibition of nuclear tests.

The Italian delegation sees in tests in the atmosphere and in all other environments where explosions cause radioactive fallout, a threat to human health and a mortal danger to future generations. Professor Pauling was quoted here as saying that sixteen million deformed children may be born as a result of the explosions in the atmosphere to date. I do not know whether that frightening forecast is correct; no one knows that, but mystery does not alleviate this threat, it only adds to it frightening uncertainty. This is why the Italian delegation wants the immediate cessation without any control of all tests causing radioactive fallout.

The United States and the United Kingdom are prepared to sign at once a treaty prohibiting all such tests. To this appeal the Soviet Union has replied with unconvincing arguments which Mr. Tsarapkin has repeated this morning. These arguments are indeed valueless when compared with the strong reasons for an immediate prohibition of tests in the atmosphere. But Mr. Tsarapkin subordinates such an agreement, indispensable to the health of humanity, to the signature of another agreement which falls entirely within the field of the armaments race. Here is a clear responsibility which cannot be denied. We are in favour of the conclusion of the second agreement, to prohibit underground explosions as well. We strongly favour this and are prepared to support all arrangements or agreements in this field which would comply with the following principles:
1. There must be no uncontrolled moratorium, even for a limited period;
2. Compulsory inspection, however limited, must be included.

The reasons for these requirements are well known. If any doubts remain in this respect, recent events have shown that vigilance is necessary in the present circumstances, and as long as confidence is not restored by concrete proofs the Western Powers have the duty of protecting the security of their peoples.
When the eight delegations of the non-aligned countries submitted their joint memorandum to this Conference, the Italian delegation immediately welcomed it with satisfaction as a valuable effort to help in the solution of our problems. We noted, first, that it did not propose an uncontrolled territory, and, second, that in the view of the Italian delegation it provided for a limited, objective and scientific, but compulsory investigation. This last point, which seemed evident to the Italian delegation and to other delegations, has up till now been disputed by the delegations of the socialist countries which have thus prevented any concrete elaboration of the memorandum, of either a legal or scientific nature.

For these reasons it was impossible at our preceding meetings, despite the efforts of the Western and the non-aligned delegations, to explore further the practical scope of the memorandum or to translate it into terms of a formal obligation. But after the discussion in the General Assembly, the debate which has begun here, inspired by the Assembly's recommendations, is beginning to make clear to all the true meaning of the memorandum. It is too soon for my delegation to formulate a final judgement on the many remarks and proposals put forward in the framework of this memorandum in the course of our recent meetings: more study and thought are necessary. However, it seems to me that a trend is clearly emerging which tends to confirm the positive evaluation which the Italian delegation had made of this important document from the outset.

Last Friday the representative of India emphasized that all the proposals made within the framework of the memorandum were directed at

".... securing adequate assurance for both the detection and the identification of events by the international commission."

(ENDC/FV.85, p.41)

That corresponds exactly to the conviction held by the Italian delegation, which has repeatedly affirmed that in its view the purpose of the memorandum was to prevent by sure and reliable means all attempts at clandestine testing. We also heard last Friday some concrete proposals which were extremely interesting. A close study of the proposals outlined for the implementation of the memorandum, it seems to me, would confirm the view that on-site inspection as provided for in the memorandum constitutes an obligation for the contracting parties when there are no other means of identifying suspicious events.

It seems to me that by embarking on this path we are entering a constructive stage in the practical and legal elaboration of this memorandum, which has always appeared necessary to us if we wished to pass from sterile polemics to application of the memorandum.
The delegations which have helped the Committee to embark on this path have thus made a useful contribution to our work, and by so doing hope that they will continue to clarify and develop their ideas. The Italian delegation is happy to note that the Memorandum becomes clearer, thanks to the statements of its sponsors, its provisions conform more to the principles which the Italian delegation has always held is necessary for the conclusion of an agreement.

Certain delegations have spoken in favour of a temporary implementation of the Memorandum, or, if I have understood correctly, of its de facto implementation. I understand and share the feelings which inspired these delegations, but haste to achieve results must not reduce the chance of success.

In my opinion, the Memorandum must first be clarified and elaborated so that it receives the approval of all, and it is only then that it will be possible to implement it without fear. If certain provisions of the Memorandum which are clear to us and other delegations were not clear to all, its application would inevitably create misunderstanding. I believe that implementation of the Memorandum cannot be satisfactory unless there is certainty that there will be no controversy. On the other hand, I am in favour of setting up an advisory commission of scientists from the eighteen nations represented at the Conference, as proposed by the representative of Sweden, if such a commission is first given a mandate to help us in our task. As I have repeatedly stated, our task has complicated, scientific aspects. The reference made this morning by Mr. Pichay to the so-called "black box" seems to show that the Soviet delegation, which has always been opposed to this, would not agree that our Conference should carry out scientific and technical studies. That would constitute interesting progress. But not a committee of scientists collaborating with the Conference would be a valuable help to us. I have no doubt that such a group of scientists appointed by the eighteen countries would later form the nucleus of the future international commission provided for in the Memorandum, once it entered into force, but I do not think that this group of scientists could be called upon to supervise the implementation of an agreement before such an agreement had been signed and had entered into force because we would encounter the difficulties I indicated earlier.
My remarks are of a preliminary nature; I wished only to state my first impressions after Friday's debate. The discussion on nuclear tests has hardly begun. As you know, it is the wish of the Italian delegation that this discussion should be full and thorough, and that desire is shared by the large majority of delegations. New elements will be brought into the picture, but I hope that I am not mistaken when I say that if the delegations of the socialist countries wish to follow us, we will have entered into the stage of the concrete elaboration of the memorandum in conformity with the principles which I mentioned earlier and which my delegation considers indispensable.
Mr. Lachè (France): In embarking on the new stage of our discussions on a test ban agreement I think we should bear in mind certain undeniable and at the same time undisputed facts. First, that there has been a very important rapprochement of the positions of the nuclear Powers: whatever differences continue to exist concern one environment only. Secondly, that the extreme urgency of the issue has not only become manifestly clear but has also, I suggest, objectively matured for solution. These conclusions have been confirmed in recent statements made by the leaders of the three nuclear powers, as well as during the debate on the subject in the General Assembly of the United Nations.

One can, therefore, fully subscribe to the words of the representative of Sweden when, referring at our 48th plenary meeting to resolution 1762 (AVII) of the United Nations General Assembly, he said that it contained stronger and more impelling language than any earlier resolution on the subject, and added:

"It has to be regarded as an expression of world-wide opinion which has grown more and more restless and impatient ..." (A/DC/FV.84, p.21)

These facts -- objective facts -- should lead us to the following general conclusions.

First, that the nuclear arms race has reached a critical point which confronts us with a very dangerous situation, which in turn may lead us to unforeseen consequences. Nuclear tests themselves are a most important element in that race; consequently, any partial solution of that problem would not meet the requirements of the situation. Here I can hardly agree with the representative of Italy when he says that the arguments in favour of stopping tests in all environments are not convincing. By saying that they are not convincing he is not convincing anybody. I think we have to press for a solution in the matter of the cessation of tests in all environments. As one speaker in the General Assembly put it so well: what the man in the street wants, whether he be in the streets of Warsaw, Washington or London -- or, I would add, of any other place -- is the cessation of testing, without reservation and without delay. The only question which divides us is how to deal with the issue of underground tests.

Here, again, I cannot agree with the representative of Italy. I would say that we cannot minimize the importance of these tests, both from the military point of view and from the point of view of the other effects they produce. They are today certainly not negligible at all. Some scientists consider them even more important than tests in other environments. They are therefore -- and, I submit, must be considered as -- part and parcel of the whole transaction.
It has been suggested that some serious concessions have been made concerning control. That may be so but, bearing that in mind, I believe we are all bound to agree that those concessions have been preceded by gigantic strides in modern science. The development of science makes it possible today to record explosions from very distant areas -- explosions of very low yield. All this is well known, and I only refer to it in order to say that science is making much speedier progress than we are making in political decisions. We seem very much to be lagging behind. It has become manifestly clear that the margin of error or uncertainty on this very subject has been so considerably reduced that it should really cease to weigh on the scales when the question of inspection or non-inspection is considered.

Dealing with this issue I have to revert again -- and I wish to apologize for doing so -- to the statement of the representative of Italy. Speaking a few minutes ago he stressed the need for control and he linked it with the lack of confidence. I believe that when speaking in this Committee some time ago I made this point already, but I wish to reiterate it this morning: we all know that control is a child of distrust. Excessive control, instead of reducing distrust, increases it, because it creates new complications in the whole scheme. Thus by emphasizing this issue in a way which is not justified we are being made to move in a vicious circle between distrust, increased distrust and lack of confidence.

I think we ought to bear in mind, first of all, the essence of the problem which we face: that is, the risks and dangers of a continuous arms race as against those of an agreement, where there would be very little of the uncertain and very little of the doubtful or the unknown. This, indeed, is reflected in the document which has for some time constituted the basis of our deliberations: the eight Power memorandum. In this connexion one cannot but fully subscribe to what Mr. Lall, the representative of India, said at our sixty-seventh meeting, referring to the principles contained in that memorandum:

"These principles stand not only encased but also assailed of continuin validity by the scientific achievements of the recent past." (A/567, p.27)

That is the situation we face today? We have the eight nation memorandum, but we have also a new document - General Assembly resolution 1762 (.VII), addressed to the nuclear powers and to this Committee as a whole. As to that resolution I wish to address myself to two elements, and to draw those elements to the special attention of the Committee.
First, the resolution urges the nuclear powers here represented:
"...to settle the remaining differences between them in order to
achieve agreement on the cessation of nuclear testing by 1 January 1963 ..."

It endorses the eight-nation memorandum as a basis for negotiations which would lead to such an agreement and calls upon the parties concerned to negotiate in a spirit of mutual understanding and concession in order to reach agreement urgently.
However, should such an agreement not be reached by 1 January 1963, the General Assembly recommends a different type of agreement by which tests in three environments would be unconditionally and definitely prohibited, but underground tests would be covered by interim arrangement.

Keeping in mind all the reservations on this very paragraph 6 of the resolution, reservations which my delegation voiced in the General Assembly, may I comment on its meaning with regard to one aspect only. How is it to be understood? Does it mean that, by an interim arrangement these underground tests would be stopped for a limited time only and resumed at a later stage, their prohibition being only of a temporary character? I submit that neither this interpretation of the resolution I have mentioned nor any other implication of a temporary nature for the cessation of tests — in whatever environment they might take place — would meet the spirit or the letter of this and other documents.

The resolution itself recommends action aiming at the cessation of all nuclear tests for all time, which is borne out by its other provisions in both the substantive part and the preamble. What I have in mind in particular is paragraph 2 of that resolution to which reference was made earlier this morning; that paragraph makes it clear that tests should cease. In fact, as I said earlier, the resolution refers to the cessation of tests not later than 1 January 1963. This provision in paragraph 2 is to my mind of particular importance. I suggest to members of delegations that it stands on its own feet; it has an existence completely independent of all other paragraphs of the resolution. It is even stronger in its language and more mandatory, for whilst, in relation to the other steps to be taken as provided for by the resolution, the document uses the words "urges", "calls" and "recommends", we find in connexion with cessation of tests the word "asks". Those who are familiar with United Nations documents know that very rarely does the General Assembly use such strong language. That is why, by this very fact and by the place it occupies within the resolution, by its special character, this provision in paragraph 2 is of particular and I should say of paramount importance. The General Assembly, in other words, asks that all tests cease by the date indicated. Negotiations should of course go on; agreement on details should be reached; but it is the will of the General Assembly — and, indeed, should be the will of all — that there be no return to testing after the date of 1 January 1963.
This interpretation I submit to members of delegations today is confirmed by a statement made in the General Assembly by the representative of Indonesia, who stressed that "in case agreement cannot be reached by 1 January, paragraph 2 of the draft resolution requests the nuclear Powers to stop their tests."

It is clear, therefore, to my mind that the General Assembly has requested the unconditional cessation of tests on the date of 1 January 1963. It has done so as a result of its condemnation of all nuclear weapon tests, for in this resolution paragraph 1 condemns all nuclear tests. That is why, I submit, we face here a clear-cut provision which is to be read independently of all other stipulations in the resolution.

Finally, let us not forget that the idea of the cessation of tests by a specific date was born in this very Committee here at this table. It will be recalled that it was the representative of Mexico, Mr. Padilla Herrero, who early in our debates made this very suggestion. Its aim and purpose were clear — to stop all tests unconditionally and to continue negotiations until agreement was reached.

Therefore, this is I suggest one of the vital problems to which we ought to address our attention. The deadline thus provided for ought to be a stimulus to reach an agreement.

The other issue I wish to raise this morning concerns the eight Power joint memorandum. We did spend some time interpreting it prior to the recess of this Committee. Amongst others, members of delegations had to listen to what I had to say on this subject. The question of its implementation has been raised now in a somewhat different way. Some interesting ideas have been expounded. But let me put the following question: is it possible to adopt this document or, indeed, any other document on the subject as an arrangement for a fixed time limit only? Representatives at this Committee have its provisions well in their minds; they know, as I do, how elaborate they are, to meet the crucial question of co-operation of the States concerned. Now, facing the issue of putting an end to all nuclear tests — and I stress — for all time, should we and, indeed, can we make all these arrangements for a limited period only? By doing so, I suggest, we shall miss the real issue which we face. Is not this issue as I said earlier, that we have to agree on a definite cessation of tests for all time? Therefore, nothing short of that will do. It was not meant to at the time the memorandum was drafted and
submitted for our consideration, nor will it do today. Such an interim arrangement, with the sword of Damocles hanging over our heads, could not be satisfactory.

One can argue that such arrangements have been carried out in other fields, but they are where issues strictly delimited in time and space are involved. One can have an interim trade arrangement to operate until a wider trade treaty is concluded, or an arrangement for a limited period of time only. But with tests it is entirely different, and I would venture an analogy: one cannot conclude a peace treaty for a limited period of time. It is concluded permanently. One can have an armistice -- an armistice -- as provided for by The Hague Conventions of 1907 could at that time be concluded for a limited period of time. This does not hold today; every armistice concluded is permanent and has no limitation in time. Once concluded, it puts an end to all activities with which it is concerned. That is why I believe the same applies to tests. Once their cessation is agreed upon, it must be definite and for all time.
Now, coming back to the issue before us, the eight-nation memorandum, once implemented, is therefore to operate without limitation in time. It is of course possible to adapt or alter its provisions or the provisions of the agreement while it is operating; it will be possible to perfect or improve upon the provisions while they are in force. But there should be no possibility of declaring that it has expired because the alleged time limit has expired. That I submit would be contrary to the mandate entrusted to us.

We could conclude a pactum contrabendum, a preliminary agreement, but here again it should be guided by the provisions of paragraph 2 of resolution 1762. That is in no way contradicted by the provisions contained in paragraph 6 of the said resolution, for also, in relation to them, as I indicated earlier, paragraph 2 is over-riding and, to borrow a very well-known legal expression, I would say that paragraph 2 is higher law with regard to paragraph 6. There should be no room for doubt in this respect.

That being so, I believe we have to take those two documents and reasonably interpret them, interpret them according to their intention and to the rationale of their provisions. We take the memorandum of the eight nations as a basis for a permanent settlement of all the issues involved. Were we to do otherwise we should be acting contrary to its very spirit.

Those are some preliminary remarks on the subject which I submit this morning. But before I close I think I should revert to what I said at the outset of my remarks. We ought to bear in mind that time is running short and calls for urgent action on our part. The possibility of the further continuation of tests is fraught with incalculable danger. It may take us into an unprecedented arms race with all its consequences. That is why the great dilemma, to test or not to test, is coming ever closer to the dilemma "to be or not to be"; and I think we have to make it clear where our choice is.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I should like to consult the Committee. It is now 13 minutes past one. I have three more speakers on my list, the United Kingdom, Ethiopia and Bulgaria. The representatives of the United Kingdom and of Canada have also asked for the right of reply at this meeting to the statements by the representative of the Soviet Union. I should like to ask the
representatives of Ethiopia and Bulgaria whether they would be agreeable to their statements being deferred until our next meeting. I shall also ask the representative of the United Kingdom whether he wishes to speak today in the exercise of his right of reply or whether he wishes to reserve his remarks until the Wednesday meeting.

Mr. TARAARANOV (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): I agree that the best thing will be for me to speak on Wednesday.

Ata ALAWAYEHU (Ethiopia): I also agree to reserve my statement until Wednesday.

Mr. GODEER (United Kingdom): It certainly is not my wish to delay my colleagues round the table here; as the Chairman has pointed out, the hour is getting late. I should therefore like to reserve in the main the remarks I had intended to make to the Committee, in the course of which I wanted to draw one or two thoughts from the very interesting suggestions we have heard from delegations in our previous meetings.

However, I should like today to make a very short statement in exercise of my right of reply to what we have heard this morning.

Firstly, we have just listened to the representative of Poland. It is always fascinating to see the way in which he seeks to defend an indefensible case. On this occasion it was made much more difficult for him by the speech we had heard earlier on, to which I shall revert in a moment. But just one word of reply to the representative of Poland when he sought to analyse the resolution which we passed recently at the General Assembly and to give particular attention to one paragraph which he elevated above others. I will not reply to him in my own words. I will just reply in what I thought the very wise words of the representative of Sweden, speaking last Wednesday in our debate, when he said:

"This resolution is far too serious to be allowed to become the object of sophisticated disputes of interpretation. Such disputes would be derisory to the hundreds of millions of human beings who stand behind this document. If one looks at the resolution as a whole — and it should and must be read as a whole — its purport is crystal clear. (ENDC/PV.84, p. 22)
Those are the words surely of Solomon. Certainly I do not need to add to them. So much for the representative of Poland.

Now I come to the representative of the Soviet Union. I want to say quite frankly that I was deeply disappointed by the speech which he made this morning. I thought it was a deplorable speech in every possible sense of the word, and I say that having measured my words carefully. What was he doing? He said in the first place that the differences between the two sides have been narrowed down and what is needed is a few more efforts. Laudable words, had he gone on from there. What he did not mention to us was that the narrowing down has been done entirely from the West and not one iota of it from the Soviet Union, as he knows better than anyone else in this room.

However, the differences have been narrowed down. But what does he do to try to narrow them further? He starts with a sharp attack on the Western partial treaty, an attack which seemed to me to carry very little conviction, bearing in mind, as one must bear in mind, that the West has put forward this partial treaty not as an end in itself but as a step towards an end, and in that sense I believe it has been welcomed by very many people and would be welcomed by the whole world if the Soviet Union would only accept it in that sense. And in the course of his arguments against it, he used some extraordinary words. He talked about certain States using an environment which is more appropriate or more convenient to them for testing. In other words, quite clearly he was thinking in terms of not banning tests in the atmosphere because it was more convenient to the Soviet Union to use the atmosphere. More convenient, yes; but at what harm to people all over the world? We all know there are two distinct aspects of this. There is the harm from fall-out and there is the continuation of the arms race. Two entirely separate issues. Both are applicable to atmospheric tests but only one to underground tests. Therefore when he talked of it being more convenient, it seemed to me one could not get much more cynical than that.
The representative of the Soviet Union went on to discuss, amongst other things, the suggestion concerning the use of black boxes. He mentioned that that proposal originated at the Pugwash discussions this year. I understood him to say that it originated from Soviet Union, United States and United Kingdom scientists. In fact, it originated from Soviet Union and United States scientists.

However, the representative of the Soviet Union spoke of this suggestion and how it could lead to some solution. But he did not take the facts as set out by those six eminent scientists who produced the document. As I have a copy of the document here I should like to quote two very short excerpts from it. It reads:

"We have explored the possibility of developing this system in such a way as to provide a minimal interference with the host country and still obtain a maximum amount of completely objective seismic information for the international control commission, so that it will substantially reduce" -- and I should like to emphasize the words "substantially reduce" -- "the number of necessary on-site inspections."

It then goes on to give suggestions as to how the system could be built up. At the end of the document, which is quite a short one, it says:

"We think a system developed along these lines may provide a large enough mass of objective seismic data so that the international control commission will need to request very few" -- and I stress the words "very few" -- "on-site inspections."

These two quotations show quite clearly that it was not the intention of those scientists to suggest for one moment that adopting this proposal would obviate the need for on-site inspection.

The gentlemen who signed that document were: Academician Batsimovich of the Soviet Union, Professor Ruzichanko of the Soviet Union, Academician Tam of the Soviet Union, Professor Inglis of the United States, Mr. Leghorn of the United States, and Professor Ridge, also of the United States.

Following on comments about that, one of those signatories, Professor Ridge, sent a letter to the New York Times on 18 November. It is a fairly long letter and I will therefore read just one short extract from it. He said:
"In the original proposal it was suggested that the instruments would be installed by the host country and then periodically turned over to an international control commission for inspection and repair. If such a system can be perfected and made tamper-proof then it might decrease the number of necessary on-site inspections which the international control commission would request. However, we did not suggest in our proposal that the use of these automatic stations would eliminate the necessity on on-site inspections, as has been implied by several recent newspaper articles."

In view of the seriousness of this matter, and the way in which this has been distorted, I would formally ask that both these documents be circulated as conference documents. I have done this in order to clarify the position, because we must be clear about it.

I would say to the representative of the Soviet Union that we are willing to investigate with him this black box proposal. We have invited him before now to discuss it with us in the Sub-Committee. We are willing to investigate it with him precisely on the proposals as put forward by his own scientists. Does he agree with his own scientists or not? Does he agree with his own scientists that in fact there will be a need for some necessary on-site inspection, or does he not? If he does not, is this the reason why the Soviet Union has been so careful not to agree to the holding of meetings of scientists from both sides? I think that this does require a clear answer from the representative of the Soviet Union.

The representative of the Soviet Union said at one stage that if the call put forward at Pugwash was adopted it would lead to a solution. I say to him that I am willing to adopt this and to work it out on the basis suggested by those scientists. I ask the representative of the Soviet Union whether he is ready, too.

There is one last point which I should like to raise. The representative of the Soviet Union referred to the resolution 1762, and in particular to operative paragraph 6, which has aroused so much comment and attention. He made the point that the Soviet Union voted against that paragraph in company, I think he said, with a number of other States. Let us get our facts straight. Which were those other States?
According to my records the States which voted against it were as follows: the Soviet Union, the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Outer Mongolia, Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Albania and Cuba.

On the other hand, not only did the Western States vote for it but I think I am right in saying that almost all of the authors of the eight-Power joint memorandum (ENDC/23) also voted for it. Therefore, this paragraph was a genuine attempt to find a bridge between the two positions. Everybody knows that efforts were made in order to get the exact wording; and I still believe that it does provide the best hope for progress.

That is why I feel so bitter this morning after hearing the representative of the Soviet Union denounce it and say in effect to all those round this table who in the last few days have tried so hard to find some basis of agreement, "Keep off; the Soviet Union will have nothing to do with it." That is what he is saying to them all. This is why I say it is so deplorable.

I would have thought that we had an opportunity here to try to build a bridge; and here it has been rejected out of hand once more by the Soviet Union. I think that this is a very serious matter indeed. It is no good minimizing it.

I still hope that the Soviet Union will think better of this. I hope that, although there has been this immediate reaction, it will have some further thoughts and that it will approach us in a more realistic light. I cannot help but feel that the representative of the Soviet Union has made a very sad move indeed this morning.

I should like to raise one further small point with the representative of the Soviet Union. He talked about the dangers of having a short, interim arrangement. Dangers there may be. There are dangers in every respect here. However, he said in regard to this, if I noted his words aright:

"We happen to know that this six to twelve month period is exactly the time required to prepare a new series of tests." How well they know. Yes indeed. Here is the first free indication we have had from the Soviet Union that when it was negotiating with us and our United States colleagues in the summer of 1961 it was using its time to good effect in preparing that massive series of tests which it then carried out.
However, putting that on one side, I should like to look at the events in this period from another angle and say to the representative of the Soviet Union: "Maybe there is this opportunity; but there is also the fact that if during that trial period, whatever period of time it may be, the Soviet Union did have to endure a very small number -- and it would be a very small number in six months -- of on-site inspections, is that something so very terrible?" Does the representative of the Soviet Union really tell us that those two, three or four on-site inspections in six months would make any difference to Soviet security arrangements? I am inclined to suspect that if only the Soviet Union would try this it would find this idea not nearly so bad as it seems to envisage. If the Soviet Union did undertake this during a short six-month period it would be running very little risk. If the Soviet Union then found this system to be tolerable we could then continue with it. But the only alternative must be for the Soviet Union, if it claims to have this information which makes on-site inspection unnecessary, to provide this information to us.

The representative of Poland said that gigantic strides have been made in modern science in recent months. All right. We agree. Our draft treaties that we prepared and put forward were based on the latest of our strides. We now ask the Soviet Union to produce their strides and so help us to conclude an agreement.
If the Soviet Union is right in what it has told us then we could possibly conclude one on its terms, but if it will not in fact show us what its advances are, how can we do so?

That is all I want to say today. I apologize for having kept the Committee for a little longer than I intended, but I did feel it necessary to respond to what I thought was a damaging and unconstructive speech. I only hope that our Soviet colleague will have better news for us on a further occasion.

Mr. Burns (Canada): The Soviet representative did the Canadian delegation the honour of criticizing, rather extensively, the ideas which were put forward in our statement of last Friday. We shall study and reply to these criticisms if we think it wise, in so doing, we can help to forward the work of this Committee in reaching some agreement.

However, I feel it necessary to reply at this time in order to rebut what I took to be the suggestion that the Canadian delegation was not in favour of a treaty to ban tests in all environments for all time, if it can be arrived at. I believe that if the Soviet representative examines our speech again he will see quite clearly that we said that anything less than a comprehensive treaty would be a second best. Paragraph 5, of resolution 1752 A (XVII), which was put forward strictly as an alternative, and something to be done if full agreement could not be reached, appears to us -- as it seems to appear to a number of other delegations on this Committee to offer the most helpful way to proceed at the present time, because we do not see, to our regret, in the statements which have been made by the representative of the Soviet Union, any attempt to negotiate in the spirit of mutual understanding and concession so necessary if we are to reach agreement. In fact, we do not think that the Soviet representative's interpretation of our statements shows exactly a mutual understanding. We have listened carefully and we can see no signs of a concession from the Soviet side.

The Soviet representative, in his remarks, mentioned the spirit of constructive compromise. We feel that the Soviet Union's position, as shown here, is that it is perfectly willing to compromise constructively providing the compromise is based on acceptance of the whole Soviet Union position as set forth on 28 November 1961 (ENDC/11), in other words, on accepting the whole animal -- I might say, the whole hog, bones, meat, hide and bristles. We would hope at some time to hear something a little bit more in the nature of what we would consider to be a compromise.
The Canadian delegation had its unhappiness at being singled out for this criticism somewhat alleviated by what I took to be the association of the delegations of Mexico and India with the Canadian delegation as being those who seemed to be giving to the debate a tone which does not quite meet the ideas of the Soviet representative. We are happy to be associated with the other people mentioned in Annex C to this debate, the direction that it has taken.

Mr. LALL (India): I have just three or four remarks to make in exercising my right of reply. The Soviet representative was passionately in favour of banning all tests for all time, and he was against the idea of a short-term arrangement. I should like to make it quite clear that the statement we made was one which could be applied equally to a permanent test ban or to one for a shorter period.

We mentioned a shorter period simply because we thought that that might be easier for the two sides as a starting point -- that it would help them to embark upon this process. If, on the other hand, the two sides would prefer a permanent arrangement, taking into account the observations which we made, we ourselves would much prefer a permanent cessation of all nuclear testing in any acceptable way, whether taking into account our observations or other observations, or any other arrangements on which the two sides could agree.

We, therefore, wish to make it very clear that our remarks must not be taken as asking for a limited period test ban. On the other hand, if we mentioned a limited period it was only because we thought that that might make it easier. We ourselves favour a permanent test ban.

Secondly, on page 16 of resolution 1762 (1712), note I mention that we deleted by "we" I mean those who were engaged in the process of negotiation -- certain words in that paragraph which were to the effect that the interim arrangement should be for a limited period. It is true, and it is only fair to say, that those words "for a limited period" were deleted in the course of the negotiation, and our understanding of the words "accompanied by an interim arrangement" were that this arrangement would be a provisional one until a final arrangement could be found, but not necessarily one limited to a certain period; it would be provisional in the sense that while it was in force the efforts to find a more permanent arrangement would continue and would be given effect to as soon as they were agreed upon.
MR. TS. R. PKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): I would like to make a few remarks by way of reply. In his statement the United Kingdom representative confirmed the fears which we expressed to the effect that the interim agreement contains the seed of the danger that it may lead to the resumption of nuclear weapon tests. He confirms this, and I think that any further comment on my part is uncalled for.

With regard to the Pugwash Conference, I must say that however eloquently the United Kingdom representative tried to pin down the Soviet representative on certain aspects, the bare facts are that the Pugwash Conference, which took place in London three months ago, was not elaborating any concrete official proposals. That Conference discussed the possibility of using automatic stations for increasing the effectiveness of control. This is our subject as well, and I do not understand what the United Kingdom representative was seeking to find in my statement when he compared different bits of texts. Apparently he tried to find some contradiction. But there are no contradictions. We are speaking of the idea, and I said -- and I repeat -- that we are prepared to use the idea which was put forward and discussed at the Pugwash Conference.
My third remark is this. The United Kingdom representative attacked me and even accused me of cynicism because I said that, as everyone understood, the United States under its draft partial treaty intends to maintain the possibility of carrying out nuclear weapon tests underground. We pointed out the fact that, if nuclear weapon tests are to continue, other States might also carry out nuclear weapon tests, and the environment they will choose has little to do with the principle involved here. What matters here is the continuation of the nuclear weapon race and nuclear weapon testing. For what purpose? The United Kingdom representative spoke of cynicism, but I must say that that is where I see cynicism: in resisting the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests -- because nuclear weapons are being tested and prepared for killing millions of human beings.

Some say: "Let us rather test these weapons underground and not in the atmosphere, because the atmospheric tests affect genetics while underground tests do not affect genetics." But what will be the genetic situation if tens of millions of human beings are killed by nuclear war? This is the real cynicism. There is no cynicism in our attitude. We are fighting for the complete prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests, and for this you accuse us.

With regard to the remarks made by the representative of Canada, I can say only one thing. We took the eight-Power joint memorandum as a basis, and we consider that in doing so we have made an important concession, because this proposal by the neutral States is a compromise proposal. We accepted this compromise immediately. It was submitted on 16 April 1962, and three days later we officially made known that we accepted this joint memorandum as a basis for negotiation and as a basis for agreement. Was this not an important step towards meeting the views of the Western Powers? Because the substance of this joint memorandum is not the Soviet Union's position, and there are no hog's bristles in it as the representative of Canada said. Therefore, by accepting the eight-Power joint memorandum, we accepted a compromise proposal. However, the Western Powers still stand on their old position, compulsory inspection and an international control system. On this old basis there can be no agreement. Therefore they are opposing agreement. This is what we are accusing them of: of opposing possibilities of agreement.

Since the General Assembly accepted the joint memorandum as a basis, we accepted this joint memorandum. What does it mean in principle? In principle the joint memorandum means to accept national systems as a means of control over the compliance with an agreement on the cessation of tests and, secondly, to give up the idea of
compulsory inspection. This is the real substance of the joint memorandum. Now you pretend to implement the first principle of the memorandum in your own fashion and you reject the second principle of the memorandum. If we continue in this way, of course, we will reach no agreement.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I understand that the delegations of the United Kingdom, Ethiopia and Bulgaria will be inscribed in that order on the list of speakers for our meeting on Wednesday, there having not been time to hear their statements today.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its eighty-sixth plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Doan, representative of the United States of America.

All the representatives made statements of congratulation and good wishes to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on his election. The Conference decided to address an appropriate telegram to the Secretary-General.

Statements were also made by the representatives of Burma, the United States, the Soviet Union, Italy, Poland, the United Kingdom, Canada and India.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Wednesday, 5 December 1962, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.45 p.m.
CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE EIGHTY-SEVENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Wednesday, 5 December 1962, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. ASSUMPÇÃO de ARAUJO (Brazil)

This provisional record contains the originals of speeches in English together with the Conference room interpretation of speeches in other languages.

It is requested that any corrections to the originals of speeches be submitted in four copies (preferably incorporated in four of the single-sided mimeographed copies with which delegations are supplied) by the authorized Liaison Officer of the delegation concerned to the Documents Office, Room A.206. If no corrections are received within four working days from the date of distribution, the final version, in which the interpretations will be replaced by translations, will be prepared and issued on the basis of the provisional record.

THE TIME LIMIT FOR CORRECTIONS TO THIS RECORD WILL BE 0900 HOURS ON 12 DECEMBER 1962.
PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:
Mr. ASSUMPÇÃO de ARAUJO
Mr. FRANK da COSTA

Bulgaria:
Mr. M. TARABAROV
Mr. G. GUELEV
Mr. ISIMIRAEV

Burma:
U TUN SHEIN
U HAUNG HAUNG GYI

Canada:
Mr. E.L.K. BURHS
Mr. J.E.G. HARDY
Mr. A.B. COTLIED
Mr. R.H. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:
Mr. K. KURKA
Mr. N. ZEHLA
Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:
ATO HADDIS ALAMAYEHU
ATO H. AANID
ATO H. GUREBEYEHU

India:
Mr. A.S. LALL
Mr. A.S. HENNA

Italy:
Mr. F. CAVAGLITI
Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI
Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI
Mr. F. LUCIOLO OTTIERI
PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:
Mr. L. PADILLA VERO
Mr. E. CALDERON FUIG
Mr. D. GONZALEZ GOMEZ

Nigeria:
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:
Mr. M. LACHS
Mr. E. STANLE:SKI
Mr. W. NIECZOREK
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:
Mr. G. NACOVESCU
Mr. H. FLORESCU
Mr. E. GLAISER
Mr. N. ECOBESCU

Sweden:
Mr. R. EDBERG
Baron C.H. von PLATEN
Mr. H. STAHL
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. A.A. ROSCHIN
Mr. I.G. USACHEV
Mr. P.P. SHAKHOV

United Arab Republic:
Mr. M.H. EL-ZAYYAT
Mr. S. AHMED
Mr. H. KASSEM
Mr. S. IBRARIH
PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir Michael WRIGHT
Mr. D.N. BRINSON
Mr. R.C. BENTHAM

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. D.E. MARK
Mr. T.R. PICKERING

Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN
The CHAIRMAN (Brazil) (interpretation from French): The eighty-seventh plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is called to order.

Before calling on the first speaker for this morning I should like to read out the telegram which the co-Chairman sent yesterday to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on behalf of the Conference. It reads:

"To Secretary-General: U Thant

"At its eighty-sixth meeting on 3 December 1962 the Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament unanimously decided to convey to you its sense of great satisfaction and pleasure on your election as Secretary-General of the United Nations. All members of the Conference also desire to extend to you their sincere good wishes for success in fulfilling the important functions of your high office and their confidence that you will discharge your responsibilities with distinction in the interests of peace and of all nations.

"On behalf of the Conference

Arthur H. Dean, Semyon K. Tsarapkin co-Chairmen of Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference."

On the same evening the Secretary-General sent to the co-Chairmen the following message:

"I am most grateful to you both and members of Disarmament Conference for your warm message of congratulations.

U Thant, Secretary General."

I should also like to inform you that the press communiqué containing the inauguration speech of the Secretary-General, referred to by Mr. Epstein, has been circulated this morning.

I call now on the representative of the United Kingdom.

SIR MICHAEL WRIGHT (United Kingdom): At our last meeting we listened to an exceptionally discouraging speech from the Soviet representative. Since then many of my colleagues will, I expect, have had the time to look at the verbatim record of yesterday's meeting of the nuclear sub-committee. If they have, I am afraid that they will be no less discouraged by the further interventions of Mr. Tsarapkin recorded therein.
I have indeed been asked whether I think that it should be assumed that the Soviet representative, by his interventions during the past two days, has dealt a mortal blow to the hope of an agreed test ban in any of the three forms which ought to be possible by 1 January 1963 -- in other words, a comprehensive treaty, as urged by resolutions 1762 A and B (LVII) of the General Assembly or, failing that, permanent agreement on the three fall-out environments, with an interim agreement on the underground environment as recommended in paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 1762 A, or, failing either of these an agreement on the fall-out environments without conditions.

In the face of the statements made by Mr. Tsarapkin is is very difficult to be optimistic. But the strength of the world-wide desire for a nuclear test ban before the New Year is such, and so much of that desire is reflected in the interventions and initiatives of members of this Committee, that I for one, and my delegation, refuse to despair.

The purpose of my intervention today, therefore, is to see whether we cannot gather anything from the many valuable suggestions that have been made in the last few days to lead us forward to at least some temporary agreement, which might, in turn, lead to a permanent treaty.

I would put it to the Soviet Union that there is, in fact, much common ground between us in the suggestions and proposals now before the Committee, not only in the more recent suggestions, but also in the Western draft treaties, and, of course, in the eight Power memorandum (EMDC/28). After all, if we are to build, we can only build on a foundation of common ground. It is useless to single out and to emphasize points of difference. That will get us nowhere. It is also, I submit, useless to insist on agreement to a proposal without saying what that proposal is. It is no good for a farmer to expect another farmer to buy a pig without seeing it. English farmers, who are just like other farmers all over the world, have an expression for this. They say: "To buy a pig in a poke." That is to say, to buy a pig in a sack without being allowed to see what they are being asked to buy. It is one thing to say: "Let us look at the animal together and then we will decide whether to buy it." It is quite another to insist first on agreement to buy, and only then to look at the purchase.

Let me turn now to the positive suggestions before us. First let me say that I have particularly noticed the remark by the representative of India
at our meeting on 3 December. Mr. Lall then said:

"... the statement we made -- (at the previous meeting) -- was one which could be applied equally to a permanent test ban or to one for a shorter period." (EMDC/PV.36 p.37)

I believe that is the case with many of the constructive suggestions which have been made at our recent meetings and I welcome this.
I welcome it particularly because, I must repeat, the aim of the United Kingdom is a comprehensive treaty. The principal obstacle is the fact that we do not yet possess -- at least the United Kingdom and the United States do not yet possess -- the scientific knowledge of how to identify all underground events without on-site verification. At the twelve hundred and forty-sixth meeting of the First Committee in New York Mr. Zorin stated -- many representatives here, like myself, were present and heard him -- and he stated it not for the first time, that the Soviet Union possesses this knowledge. Mr. Tsarapkin has repeated this to us since we have come back here. However, Mr. Zorin added that in the present state of international tension the Soviet Union was not willing to communicate it to other governments.

I must appeal once again to the Soviet Government, through our Soviet colleague at this table, to make this knowledge available to us, if it has it, or, if it does not want to give it to us directly, then to furnish it to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. That would make possible the signature of a comprehensive treaty without provision for on-site verification. That is why -- with our deadline of 1 January in mind -- I repeat this appeal today. If, on the other hand, the truth is that further scientific research is required in this field, then I renew my appeal that the Soviet Government should join with us in conducting this research.

Even if these appeals remain unanswered, the comprehensive treaty could nevertheless still be signed in short order, containing such a modest and limited amount of international verification that the objections could not, in our view, justifiably be considered by any government to outweigh the benefits to the security of all of us which would flow from a permanent ban on all nuclear weapon tests in all environments.

Perhaps I may remind the Committee that the proposal for a small annual quota of on-site inspections so long as these are necessary -- which is all the assurance of observance we are asking for -- was put forward officially by Chairman Khrushchev himself. Members of the Committee who wish to refresh their memories might care to look again at Chairman Khrushchev's message to Mr. Macmillan of 23 April 1959, which Mr. Tsarapkin himself read into the record of the Conference.
on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests at its eighty-third meeting on 27 April 1959. In that message Chairman Khrushchev formally proposed a small annual quota of on-site inspections to be chosen by the other sides. To give expression to this proposal Mr. Tsarapkin, on behalf of the Soviet Government, introduced at the one hundred and eighth meeting of that Committee on 9 July 1959 a draft article expressing in treaty language Chairman Khrushchev's proposal. With the permission of my colleagues I will read the draft article, because I think that sometimes in our discussions we may err on the side of generalities and not always take account of the importance of actual, precise treaty formulation. In this case the treaty formulation was that of the Soviet Government itself. The draft article formulated by the Soviet Government and proposed by Mr. Tsarapkin read as follows. Mr. Tsarapkin said:

"... the Soviet delegation wishes to introduce the following draft article:

'For the purpose of preventing possible violations by States of their obligations under this treaty, there shall, in addition to the network of control posts, be carried out on-site inspection of unidentified events suspected of being nuclear weapon explosions.

'1. In order to carry out on-site inspection of such unidentified events on the basis of criteria set forth in Article ______, ... there may be made in each year on the territory of each of the original parties not more than ______ ... inspections at any place where, according to readings of instruments at control posts, an unidentified event suspected of being a nuclear weapon explosion has occurred.

'2. Inspections under paragraph 1 of this article shall be carried out -

(a) on territories under the jurisdiction or control of the United States or the United Kingdom, at the request of the Soviet Union;

(b) on the territory of the Soviet Union, at the request of the United States or the United Kingdom.

Inspection groups within the specified quota shall be despatched by the commission without delay, and agreement between the original parties to the treaty shall not be required.'"  (GEN/DNT/PV.108, pp. 3, 4)
The proposals made by Chairman Khrushchev in his letter of 23 April 1959 and the draft treaty article presented by Mr. Tsarapkin continued to be the declared policy of the Soviet Union until 28 November 1961, when we withdrew them. We were and we are negotiating, all of us, as free and independent Governments. We are of course, all of us, free to put forward proposals, and we are free to withdraw them. But what I am saying is that, if the Soviet Government were willing today to take the position that it took for two years until almost exactly a year ago, a comprehensive treaty could no doubt be signed by 1 January 1963. I am saying further that the idea of a small quota of inspections is not some unfriendly suggestion made by the West to the detriment of the Soviet Union but something which Mr. Khrushchev himself proposed as being fair and advantageous to both sides.

However, if the Soviet Government is unwilling today to make a binding and continuing commitment to accept what it was willing to accept a year ago, then I want to assure the Committee that, as a second best and as a step towards a comprehensive agreement, the United Kingdom is willing to sign a permanent agreement without international verification in the three fall-out environments and to conclude in the underground environment a temporary agreement as recommended by the General Assembly in paragraph 6 of resolution 1762 A (XVII) of 6 November. At our last two meetings emphasis has been laid by a number of delegations -- and in particular by the delegations of Sweden, Canada, India and Mexico -- on the desirability of such an agreement being concluded between the nuclear Powers, as a second best to a comprehensive agreement, by 1 January.

On behalf of the United Kingdom I repeat that we agree. The United Kingdom voted for this in the United Nations. We are prepared for it now. In deciding what form such an agreement would take, always within the framework of paragraph 6 of Assembly resolution 1762 A, the United Kingdom is willing, and more than willing, to take account of the suggestions put forward by, among others, the delegations of Sweden, Canada, India and Mexico.
We are willing to pursue this question with the Soviet Union either in private conversations or in the three-Power nuclear test ban Sub-Committee or here in plenary meeting. We are not so much concerned with methods; we want results.

The essential elements of such an interim arrangement are, in the view of the speakers I have named, firstly, the setting up of at least an interim international commission, whether or not that interim commission would take more or less the same shape as a permanent commission, and, secondly, as laid down in General Assembly resolution 1762 (XVIII), that there should be adequate assurances for the effective detection and identification of seismic events by the commission.

As to the form of an international commission, temporary or permanent, we are willing to discuss and to negotiate. In our view the essential point is that such a commission, whether temporary or permanent, should be of such a character as to command the confidence of all countries concerned. Until a year ago the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the United Kingdom and the United States, on the other hand, were agreed that a commission should consist of four representatives of one nuclear side, four representatives of the other, and three representatives of uncommitted countries. In the new Western draft treaty proposals we suggested four representatives of one nuclear side, four representatives of the other, and seven of uncommitted countries. Others have suggested that the commission should be composed entirely of neutral scientists.

All this can be discussed, but whatever the composition, either temporary or permanent, two basic propositions should, we submit, be kept in mind. On either basis the commission should be the body which alone decides whether an event qualifies for inspection. But the commission having so decided, there are two alternatives. The first is that a country would be under obligation to invite inspection of any event which the commission had thus decided should qualify for inspection and which the commission asked should be inspected. But if it is objected that such a system would result in too many inspections — perhaps forty or fifty a year in a given country — there is the second alternative of a quota, perhaps ten or twelve or fewer, which would amount to a deterrent inspection of, say, one in four or five events which by decision of the commission qualify for inspection. In this second case, of a quota, the decision by the commission on which of these events qualify for inspection, which of them should actually be inspected, should rest with the other nuclear side. That was the proposal of
Chairman Khrushchev to which I have already referred. It was the proposal put to
the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests by Mr. Tsarapkin in
actual treaty terms which I have already read out. It is one of those unfortunately
few matters on which both nuclear sides were agreed and had expressed their
agreement in writing.

Now let me turn again to our last two meetings. So far as the United Kingdom
is concerned, we find ourselves in agreement with most of the propositions which the
representative of India, Mr. Lall, put forward. Let me refer to the provisional
verbatim record of our eighty-fifth meeting, when Mr. Lall asked:

"Could not all the States concerned agree to a certain quota of
inspections per annum?" (ENDC/PV.85, p.42)

I would answer: the United Kingdom agrees.

When Mr. Lall said:

"Of course that quota could only be fixed in the first instance for the
first year, because instruments might improve and other factors might
arise which would justify a revision of the stated quota of inspections." (ibid.)

I would reply: the United Kingdom agrees.

When Mr. Lall argued that:

"In fact the agreement of both the commission and the country is, I would
suggest, axiomatic whatever form is chosen for the modalities of verification." (ibid.)

I would reply: of course, no country can ever be forced to accept an on-site
inspection. That was agreed long ago between the United Kingdom, the United States
and the Soviet Union in the three-Power Conference on the Discontinuance of
Nuclear Weapon Tests. There must be free consent, but that free consent must be
expressed beforehand in a treaty commitment, a commitment freely entered into but
none the less a commitment. This we ourselves are willing to do. The commitment
might be qualified in certain respects. It might be qualified, for example, as
regards numbers, that is to say, by quota. It might even be qualified as regards
the areas for which invitations would be issued -- to the extent, for example, of
saying something like this: 85 per cent of the Soviet Union is not an earthquake
area; there might be a very small number indeed of inspections a year in this vast
area, and indeed, unless there were man-made explosions, the probability is that
in this huge non-earthquake area there would be nothing for the instruments to
record. I myself cannot really see what unidentified event there could ever be in
a non-earthquake area, an area in which no earthquakes occur, and in which there is
no man-made nuclear test explosion. But in the fifteen per cent of the Soviet Union
where there are earthquake areas -- which is not in the heartland of the Soviet Union
but chiefly in the Kamchatka Peninsula in the Kuriles, and in the Pamir region --
there might be need for a few more inspections, although perhaps the number of
these could be reduced by the use of "black boxes" in these areas.

However that may be, one of the essential points is, as Mr. Lall went on to
say, that if any country or countries are guilty of breaches of the agreement, such
breaches would free the other members from being tied any longer to the agreement.

And Mr. Lall added:

"... non-co-operation in supplying the commission with the evidence and in
making available facilities of all kinds, would be a breach of the agreement
and would" -- or could -- "result in the agreement's ceasing, because, after
all, the eight-nation memorandum puts an obligation upon all countries to
supply all that is required in order to establish the nature of an event.
Therefore under the normal rules governing equity and responsibility a
country which was in breach in this respect would in fact have broken the
agreement, which would no longer subsist." (ENDC/PV.85, p.43-45)

I agree with Mr. Lall.
The United Kingdom is also in general agreement with the propositions which Mr. Lall put forward and which will be found on page 46 of the provisional verbatim record of our eighty-fifth meeting. I have further noted that the statements put forward by the representative of India were in the nature of explanations of the intention and meaning of the eight-Power memorandum, as I understood him, and this memorandum has of course been accepted by the United Kingdom as a basis for negotiation.

But these and other propositions put forward by Mr. Lall were not the only constructive and helpful suggestions which emerged at our last two meetings. I am happy to say that the United Kingdom is in general agreement with the remarks of the representative of Mexico. These were quoted with approval by the representative of Burma at our eighty-sixth meeting. The representative of Burma said that the suggestion that invitations should be extended if the international scientific commission believes that in the case of a doubtful event on-site inspection is necessary is one which, together with the idea of an agreed annual quota of inspections mentioned by the Indian delegation, in the view of the Burmese delegation merited earnest consideration by the eight Powers. The United Kingdom is not only prepared to give earnest consideration to that proposition, it agrees with it.

The principal purpose of my intervention today is to try, on behalf of the United Kingdom, to give further impulsion to these initiatives and suggestions, to the remarks made by the representatives of Sweden, Canada, the United Arab Republic, India, Mexico and Burma. I have made it clear that we, like they, prefer a comprehensive agreement. If so far as this requires a political act by the Soviet Union, I would urge the Soviet Government to take that act. But if it is not yet prepared to do so, if it requires more time, I join my voice to that of the delegations I have named and to the majority of the General Assembly of the United Nations in urging the negotiation of an interim agreement for the underground environment in the terms of operative paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 1762 (XVII) for whatever period may be agreed upon. That would surely have the advantage for the Soviet Union that if it found the terms of the agreement onerous, as I find it hard to believe, it could call a halt to it or re-negotiate it at the agreed moment. It would not thereby be undertaking permanently any commitment of which it might feel a doubt.
There is a further suggestion before us about the possible use of "black boxes", that is to say, of unmanned seismic stations for the detection of underground events. The question was raised recently in the Sub-Committee by our Soviet colleague himself. It was spoken of at our last plenary meeting, and my colleagues will no doubt have seen that it was further discussed in the nuclear Sub-Committee yesterday. In this matter also my delegation is seeking for common ground and not for points of disagreement. By all means let us discuss the possible use of "black boxes" and see whether it may help to narrow the gap between the two sides and to reduce the requirements both for the use of conventional detection stations and even perhaps, for the number of on-site inspections. The United Kingdom is ready and indeed anxious to take further part in discussion with the Soviet Union of this proposal. I should like, therefore, formally to propose that a meeting be called of competent experts from the West, from the Soviet Union and, if desired, from other countries which have such experts to examine where and how far the use of "black boxes" could be helpful in improving means of detection and identification. If there is a hope of making progress in this way, do not let us throw it away. Even without a meeting of experts, we are prepared to go into this matter with the representative of the Soviet Union as thoroughly as we can do without experts to help us.

Let me sum up in a few words what I have been trying to say. So far as the United Kingdom is concerned, we are suggesting at least four alternative forms of agreement.

If the Soviet Union can show us, as it claims to be able to do, how to identify all underground events by national detection systems, we ought to be able to sign a permanent and comprehensive treaty by 1 January 1963. That is our first offer.

If, on the other hand, more research is needed, in fact, into the identification of underground events, then let us sign a comprehensive treaty with the minimum amount of international verification still required, at least for the time being, and let this minimum be on the lines of Mr. Khrushchev's own earlier proposals. That is our second offer.

If the Soviet Union wants more time for negotiation on either of these proposals, then let us carry out the recommendation in operative paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 1762 A (XVII) and conclude a permanent agreement without international verification in the three fallout environments with an interim agreement on the underground environment. That is our third offer.
In seeking agreement on any of these lines, the United Kingdom proposes that we should follow up actively recent suggestions made by a number of non-nuclear or uncommitted delegations, including Canada, the United Arab Republic, Sweden, India, Mexico and Burma. But if the Soviet Union is not prepared for any of these three solutions, then let us sign a permanent agreement on the fallout environments by 1 January 1963 without international verification and without conditions while we are negotiating further.

I must again underline the heavy responsibility towards mankind which, in our view, any government must necessarily assume which declines any one of these four alternative ways of meeting the deadline of an agreement by 1 January 1963 which the United Nations General Assembly has laid down. I am still reluctant to believe that the answer "No" to all these proposals and suggestions is the New Year's present which the Soviet Union intends to give to the world.

Ato HADDIS ALAWYEHU (Ethiopia): On behalf of my delegation and myself I should like to welcome warmly the representatives of Burma and Czechoslovakia who have just joined us in this Committee. I am sure their contribution will be of great value to our endeavour, as were the contributions of their predecessors. I should also like to express the hope that our deliberations and our efforts in this resumed session will achieve better and more fruitful results. We are resuming our negotiations on the same subjects on which we were negotiating before our recess in September last, namely, general and complete disarmament and a nuclear test ban agreement, but we are resuming these negotiations in circumstances and an atmosphere that are somewhat changed.
I do not intend to enumerate all the factors which together must favourably influence our negotiations, as this has already been done by other speakers who have preceded me. I should like, nevertheless, to repeat some of them.

One of the factors is, as many representatives have already mentioned, the recent exchange of messages between the leaders of the three nuclear Powers, in which all three of them have affirmed their readiness to seek and to achieve agreement, particularly in the field of disarmament. It is true that similar messages, statements and affirmations of readiness to negotiate and to conclude agreements on disarmament and other controversial world problems have been made in the past by one or other of the leaders of the great Powers, but the recent exchange of messages, coming as it did after the dreadful events in the Caribbean, must be understood differently from all the other messages, because those events must have shown to the great Powers the full meaning of their nuclear armaments race.

The second of the factors to which I have referred is that on the subject of the nuclear test ban — and that is the subject to which I would limit my remarks today — there have recently been reports that the system of unmanned stations, or the so-called "black boxes", could materially reduce uncertainty in the detection and identification of seismic events. I am aware, of course, that certain reservations have been made and that there have been even outright assertions by some authorities that this system would be complicated, that it would be costly, that it would even be unreliable, and so and so forth. That may be so. It may be that the system might not give a full guarantee, or remove all doubts, as regards clandestine underground testing, but its value as an additional means, if not as an improvement over the existing system of detection and identification of seismic events, seems to have gained recognition.

The third and last factor which I should like to mention as improving the situation is the fact that we now have a clear instruction from the General Assembly of the United Nations on the time limit within which the testing of nuclear weapons should cease, on what arrangement or arrangements should be made to bring about such a cessation of tests within the fixed time limit and on the basis to be used to achieve that end.
With this and other new elements enumerated by other representatives before me as having favourable effects on the general situation, we in the Ethiopian delegation believe that we can achieve the objective which the peoples of the world urgently seek, namely, the cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear testing.

Of course the success or failure of our efforts to achieve that objective depends, and depends entirely, upon the will of the nuclear Powers to end this dangerous game. If there is a will on the part of the great nuclear Powers to agree, we believe that all the necessary elements for permanent as well as provisional agreements are provided for in one of the General Assembly resolutions, namely, resolution 1762 (XXVII). The question therefore is, are the great nuclear Powers willing to reach such an agreement? Are they willing to respond to the earnest and anxious appeal of humanity, or are they going to continue to disregard such appeal? That is the question. But the great nuclear Powers must be reminded, and reminded constantly, of their grave responsibility to the peoples of the world. Under Article 106 of the Charter of the United Nations the great Powers are specifically entrusted with the maintenance of the peace and security of the world, and it is the peace and security of the world, of which they are the trustees, that is now being endangered as a result of their own nuclear arms race. We would therefore ask the great Powers to honour their pledge, which they freely and voluntarily gave, and to agree to halt their nuclear testing, which has become a menace to the security of the peoples of the world, including their own.

I said a moment ago that the necessary elements for reaching an agreement to end all tests were provided for in resolution 1762 (XXVII) of the General Assembly if only the great Powers were willing to agree. In that resolution the General Assembly, after condemning all tests and asking the parties to end tests by 1 January 1963, recommended in paragraph 6 that if the parties had not reached an agreement banning all tests by 1 January 1963 they should enter into an immediate agreement prohibiting tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, with an interim agreement to suspend all underground tests on the basis of the eight-nation memorandum, such interim agreement to include adequate assurance for effective detection and identification of seismic events.
As we in the Ethiopian delegation see it, three major points seem to emerge from resolution 1762 (XVII): first, that all tests should in any event cease by 1 January 1963; secondly, that in order to achieve this and the parties should negotiate in a spirit of mutual understanding and concession; and thirdly, that if the parties do not reach a comprehensive agreement banning all tests by 1 January 1963, as a result of their differences in regard to underground tests, an interim arrangement should be made suspending all such underground tests.

Of these three points, the first — namely, the cessation of all tests by 1 January 1963 — seems to be the main objective. The other two — namely, negotiations for a comprehensive test ban agreement and an agreement on the three non-controversial environments accompanied by an interim arrangement in regard to nuclear tests — seem to be the means of arriving at the achievement of that main objective.
I should add in this connexion that our understanding of General Assembly resolution 1762 (XVII) is that if an agreement banning tests in the three non-controversial environments, accompanied by an interim arrangement to suspend underground tests, were to be reached, negotiations on the comprehensive and permanent treaty ending tests in all environments and for ever would be continued urgently and relentlessly until such a treaty were concluded.

If this is the case, as we think it is, the question arises: is it possible to negotiate and reach agreement on a treaty banning tests in all environments and for ever between now and 1 January 1963? If the nuclear Powers think that there is such a possibility, no one would be happier than the delegation of Ethiopia to continue discussion on such a comprehensive and permanent agreement. If, on the other hand, the nuclear Powers think that such a comprehensive and permanent agreement banning all tests for ever would prove difficult to attain between now and 1 January 1963, then it would appear to us to be advisable for the Committee to revert to the alternative means provided for in paragraph 6 of resolution 1762 (XVII) (A/DC/63) — namely, an agreement prohibiting nuclear weapon tests in the three environments with an interim arrangement suspending all underground tests — in order to arrive at the objective set forth in this document by the General Assembly, namely, the cessation of all tests by 1 January 1963.

In the event that the Committee and the nuclear Powers desired to concentrate the discussion on the interim arrangements provided for in paragraph 6 of resolution 1762 (XVII) between now and the end of the year, our view is that such an interim arrangement could be achieved on the basis of the eight-nation memorandum (A/DC/28). In fact, according to resolution 1762 (XVII) the eight-nation memorandum would serve as a basis for the conclusion of a permanent treaty as well as for an interim arrangement. The resolution states in relation to the proposed interim agreement that there should be adequate assurances for effective detection and identification of seismic events by an international scientific commission. Therefore, there must be a system providing adequate assurances against violation of the agreement, however interim or provisional such an agreement might be. But such a system might not be identical to a system providing for a permanent agreement; otherwise, there would be no need to enter into an interim agreement.
The only reason for entering into an interim agreement whilst continuing negotiations on a permanent treaty would appear to be to find -- through such continued negotiations and in a spirit of understanding and mutual concessions -- a better and more reassuring system than the provisional agreement. With this in mind, my delegation supports the proposal of the representative of Sweden made on 28 November when he said:

"We consider that the time has now come directly to request the nuclear Powers immediately and without awaiting the elaboration of a comprehensive agreement to call in a panel of scientists from different countries, especially seismologists, leaving it to this panel to act for the time being as an interim commission." (LCDC/V.84, op. 28-30)

and when he said further, in the same document on page 32:

"In order that the panel should be able to act as an interim commission, it should implicitly be entrusted with certain basic functions which the eight-power memorandum has envisaged for the permanent commission and on which there is agreement between both sides."

I should like to say here that the functions of the commission in the eight-action memorandum, which the representative of Sweden proposes for the interim commission and which my delegation supports today, has been the subject of extensive discussion during the last sessions of this Committee and, as all members will recall, each and every one of the representatives of the eight non-aligned countries has stated on many occasions the question of interpreting those functions and the application of all the provisions in the memorandum to the permanent treaty should be left for negotiation between the parties with a view to arriving at agreed and mutually acceptable terms. My delegation still holds this view.

With regard to the question of providing adequate assurance against violation of the proposed interim agreement, we believe that the interim commission, with the functions provided for in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the eight-action memorandum as they are, would meet the requirement of paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 1762 (XVII). Even if there are certain sections in the memorandum requiring agreed interpretation through negotiation, there are other sections clearly defining the task of the proposed commission and the rights and obligations of the parties.
requiring no interpretation -- for example, the processing by the commission of all data received from the agreed system of observation posts and of reporting on any nuclear explosion or suspicious event on the basis of a thorough and objective examination of all available data; the obligation of the parties to furnish the commission with the facts necessary to establish the nature of any suspicious event; the obligation of the parties to consult with the commission with a view to clarifying and facilitating the assessment of certain doubtful evidence; the reporting by the commission to the parties concerned of all the data and of all the circumstances, including its assessments and, lastly, the right of the parties to be free to determine their actions with regard to the treaty. All these seem to be among the clear functions requiring no interpretation.
The Swedish proposal, therefore, to establish an interim commission with functions such as are envisaged in the eight-nation memorandum seems, in the view of the Ethiopian delegation, a sound proposal and one which should be acceptable to the nuclear Powers. This agreement, although provisional and applicable only until replaced by a permanent one, will, I believe, have to be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations in accordance with article 102 of the Charter so that it will have the force of any other international treaty and so that its violaters will be considered as breaking their contractual obligation. It would not be right, therefore, to say that such an agreement would be an uncontrolled voluntary moratorium.

Finally, my delegation will continue to study very carefully the very interesting and useful suggestions made by the representatives of India and Mexico.

Mr. TURDJANOV (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): The General Assembly of the United Nations, concerned by the continuation of nuclear weapon tests and aware of the unanimous call by world public opinion for a cessation of all nuclear tests, launched a fervent appeal to the nuclear Powers to take the necessary measures so as to put a halt forthwith to all these tests and, at the same time, in resolution 1762, the General Assembly asked for an end to be put to those tests by 1 January 1963 at the latest.

It would be well to recall that urgent appeal by the General Assembly since it places heavy responsibilities upon the Eighteen-Nation Committee. In order to continue with our work we should take stock of where we actually are, as Mr. Dean himself called upon us to do when he spoke on the 26 November. We will follow that suggestion in our statement this morning before dealing with questions which have been raised quite recently.

In its desire to see an end put to all nuclear tests, the Soviet Union declared itself ready to give favourable consideration to the appeal made to the nuclear Powers. Its representatives stated repeatedly that the Soviet Union was ready to cease all nuclear tests if the Western Powers agreed to do the same and that it was ready to accept 1 January 1963 as the date after which there would be no more nuclear explosions. At the same time the Soviet Union declared itself ready to negotiate and sign the necessary agreements to that end.
The Western Powers on their side, after having for a long time urged international control over the cessation of all nuclear tests -- and I stress "all" -- presented, on 27 August 1962, two draft treaties, documents ENDC/58 and ENDC/59. The first, ENDC/58, covering all nuclear tests including underground tests, is made conditional upon the requirement of obligatory on-site inspection, something which, in the present stage of scientific development makes us believe that those conditions are raised with the sole purpose of impeding the conclusion of an agreement.

In his statement on 3 December 1962, the representative of the United States, Mr. Dean, alleged that the comprehensive draft treaty "included many of the suggestions made by the eight members of the Committee in their joint memorandum of 16 April 1962." [ENDC/PV.56, p.27] And he added:

"The treaty itself, as will be observed from study of it, reflects the primacy of the three important elements of the eight-nation memorandum -- an international scientific commission, a detection system of observation posts throughout the world, and a number of necessary obligatory on-site inspections by the commission of otherwise unidentified events." [ibid.]

Those are claims which we consider as arbitrary and as not corresponding to reality.

It is sufficient to refer to the text of the draft treaty of the United Kingdom-United States to see what they understand by an "international scientific commission". Further, Mr. Dean elaborated this point again in his intervention of the day before yesterday when he spoke of "the inclusion of a large number of representatives from the States not committed to either side," [ENDC/PV.56, p.42], while still maintaining the idea that the commission must include representatives of the nuclear Powers. Such an interpretation has nothing in common with the suggestion which was contained in the memorandum, and which subsequently has been generally adopted -- namely, that the commission might comprise only scientists from non-aligned countries. To be in keeping with the true sense of the eight-nation memorandum, there should not be any representatives of nuclear States on that commission.

Secondly, in his statement, Mr. Dean referred to the provision of the draft treaty relating to detection posts. He spoke of manned detection posts throughout the entire world, including Soviet territory, and so on. That provision of the Western draft treaty reflects the desire to go beyond the national networks of stations and, therefore, to go beyond the terms of the eight-nation memorandum.
As to the third principal element which the United States and the United Kingdom claim to have adopted from the eight Power memorandum -- "a number of necessary obligatory on-site inspections" -- it would be difficult indeed to find any such reference in the memorandum in question. Perhaps it might be useful to recall certain facts and statements of the Western representatives which show how far from the truth it is to assert in particular, that the obligatory inspection provided for in the Western draft treaty has been borrowed from the eight-nation memorandum. It will be recalled that, among the thirteen questions which the United States delegation thought it opportune to put to the authors of the memorandum the day after its presentation there was one, question number II formulated by Mr. Dean himself, in which we find the following sentence:

"... would there be some circumstances in which a party would have an obligation under the treaty to permit an on-site inspection or would the offer of an inspection under paragraph 4 always be a voluntary act?"

That question put by the Western delegations needs no further comment.

The representative of Italy was right in assuring us that the reply of the Western Powers came very rapidly, but surely, I submit, it had quite a different meaning from that claimed for it. It was, in fact, Mr. Macmillan, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, who took it upon himself to give the true response to the memorandum.

During the first part of our Committee's work in the spring of this year, we did indeed recall on many occasions a statement made by Mr. Macmillan in the House of Commons, the day after the presentation of the eight-nation memorandum, that in his view there was no provision for obligatory on-site inspection in the memorandum, and that that was why it was not acceptable to the Western Powers. That, moreover, was the reason why the Western delegations refused to accept the memorandum as the basis for our negotiations.
Their attitude was also clearly reflected in the first report that this Committee sent to the United Nations General Assembly (INDC/42). It was also reflected in the two Western draft treaties submitted by them on 27 August (INDC/56 and INDC/57) and which, to use Mr. Dean's words

"are a streamlining of earlier draft treaties, and an overall simplification of earlier draft treaties submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom, including the draft treaty of 15 April 1951."

Briefly, then, the Western Powers have not budged an inch from their initial positions based on obligatory on-site inspection, which is the stumbling block to all our efforts aiming at an agreement. It becomes quite evident therefore that the three elements that Mr. Dean alleges the United Kingdom and the United States borrowed from the eight-Power joint memorandum (INDC/20) cannot be found in the draft treaty submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom, or—and this is the same thing—the elements in the latter draft treaty do not correspond with those found in the eight-Power joint memorandum.

As we see it, the best possible solution lies in taking the eight-Power joint memorandum as a basis for an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests, especially since, as is made clear in resolution 1762, the United Nations General Assembly considers this memorandum to represent:

"a sound, adequate and fair basis for the conduct of negotiations towards removing the outstanding differences on the question of effective control of underground tests."

In paragraph 4 of the operative section of the same resolution, the eight-nation memorandum of 15 April 1952 (INDC/20) is adopted and recommended as a basis for negotiations.

If the Western Powers are not yet ready—even after having seen that the United Nations has adopted resolution 1762 calling for the cessation of nuclear weapon tests—to take the eight-nation joint memorandum as a basis for negotiations and for an agreement, another road is opened, by the willingness of the Soviet Union to conclude an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, as long as the same agreement contains provisions spelling out a commitment to obtain from any underground nuclear test a certain duration of the negotiations on underground tests, and until such time as final agreement is arrived at.
This second or possibility, presented by the Soviet Union would allay the fears of humanity with respect to the continuation of tests and the nuclear arms race because it would exclude any resumption of tests. But we cannot say this for the proposals made by the Western Powers, because their second draft, relating to nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (INDC/57), while making it possible for underground tests to be continued, gives free rein to the nuclear arms race.

Certain representatives of the Western Powers insist on the need to conclude an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests in the three fallout environments, in the desire to impress world public opinion favourably and to demonstrate to it that successes have been achieved with the cessation of nuclear weapon tests thanks to their good will and their spirit of compromise.

It is hardly necessary to underline the fact that the Western representatives who raised the question in this light know very well, and are fully aware of, the profound reasons that inspire the delegations who wish to put an end, once and for all, to all nuclear weapon tests and who do not strive only for a partial cessation of tests. A partial cessation would fulfill neither the need, the requirements nor the aspirations of the peoples. However, since this question has been raised in our debate, we should like to remind you of the replies given by certain delegations, and more especially the representative of [name], Mr. Barrington, who, when speaking before the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on 16 October 1962, said:

"At first sight, a treaty prohibiting tests in the atmosphere, under the water and in outer space, and leaving it open to the parties to test underground until agreement is reached on underground tests, would seem to have its attractions. ... But all this would be true only if such an agreement sticks, and my delegation has grave doubts whether it will in fact do so." (A/C.1/P.1, 124, p.7)

Mr. Barrington continued:

"It thus becomes clear that underground tests cannot be considered in isolation. They are closely and intimately related to the tests in other environments. As long as they continue, it will be difficult indeed to stop the others. That is why my delegation feels that a treaty prohibiting tests in the atmosphere, in underwater and/or outer space, which left the parties free to test underground..."
"could not last for long. It would have the most precarious, and in all probability, a very short life. What is worse, a partial test ban which can to grief could do more harm than having no partial ban." (Ibid)

When, a few days ago, we heard the representative of the United Kingdom taking exception to certain statements made here by the representative of the Soviet Union, we immediately thought of that reply which was given by the representative of Burma to all such questions repeatedly put by the Western delegations. These consider observations which were made by the representative of Burma -- a country sincerely desirous of seeing the end of nuclear weapon tests and of the nuclear arms race -- show in a relevant manner why it is dangerous to have a partial solution of the problem.

The fact that the aims of the Western Powers, in proposing a partial treaty on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, are not purely humanitarian appears clearly from the fact that they are using underground tests in order to continue the nuclear arms race. On the other hand, the representative of the United Kingdom, speaking in the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests on 20 November, recognized that, after the cessation of tests in the three environments, underground tests would continue. He said:

"... other underground tests may continue on both sides. We do not know the extent to which they will go." (EMDC/SC.I/PV.44, p.19)

We, too, do not know the extent to which they might go. But it is certain, with the preparations made in the United States, that these tests will continue on a large scale in that country and will result in the acceleration of the arms race.

Those who insist on the advantages of a partial treaty are in favour of the continuation of the nuclear arms race. In that way the Western Powers will supply the justification and the possibility for other States, which are not yet nuclear Powers, joining in the nuclear arms race. The continuation of underground tests will also be an obstacle on the road of the negotiations on the conclusion of a definitive treaty on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. By accelerating the spiral of nuclear arms race such a solution might even make the achievement of the task assigned to this Committee impossible.
Almost all of the delegations -- and mainly those from the non aligned countries -- have insisted that favourable conditions now prevail for an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. These conditions and those possibilities have been commented upon at some length in certain statements made since the resumption of the proceedings of this Committee. I have no intention -- and it is not necessary -- to dwell upon these favourable conditions. It is necessary, however, to take advantage of these conditions in order to fulfil the task assigned to our Committee -- namely, the cessation of nuclear weapon tests in all environments.
This task has been greatly facilitated by the most recent proposal of the Soviet Union for the conclusion of a treaty concerning the cessation of nuclear tests in the three environments, but including at the same time an undertaking not to carry out underground tests until the conclusion of a final agreement and without the need for compulsory on-site inspection.

This last possibility has been reinforced by the findings in different scientific circles of new prospects offered by scientific means for the detection and identification of underground tests. We will not dwell on the technical considerations formulated on this score — particularly the possibility afforded by the installation of automatic recording stations mentioned recently — nor on the various identification methods which can be used.

All these questions have been commented upon in detail by delegations which have studied them in a thorough manner. Such an interim solution could open up great prospects of satisfying the demands of a frightened humanity, and also the wishes expressed in the discussion in the General Assembly, by enabling the nuclear Powers to continue their negotiations in order to come to a final solution in the near future.

I should like to note in passing that the possibilities mentioned at international scientific conferences have been seized upon immediately by the Western Powers. For example, in his statement this very morning, the United Kingdom representative proposed the undertaking of technical studies, in which our Conference would become bogged down. Such proposals are made, without doubt, so that it shall not be possible to reach an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests with the least possible delay.

The Western Powers violently oppose any solution providing for the cessation of underground tests — pending the conclusion of a final treaty on this question — which does not provide at the same time for compulsory on-site inspection. They repeat endlessly, "We are not prepared to accept an uncontrolled and uninspected moratorium." Certain representatives are so in the habit now of using this formula that one has the impression that even if someone woke them up in the middle of the night they would repeat those hallowed words.

What are the reasons offered by the Western Powers in justification of their refusal to cease their underground nuclear tests until a final treaty is concluded? There are no such reasons. On the contrary, it is pertinent to point out that
throughout the duration of the voluntary cessation of nuclear tests the Western Powers never complained that the Soviet Union was carrying out clandestine tests. Furthermore, when the Soviet Union deemed it necessary to carry out nuclear tests in the interests of its security it declared its intentions openly before the whole world.

The intransigence of the Western nuclear Powers, which insist fiercely on the alleged need for on-site inspection to be compulsory, has created an atmosphere of anxiety and apprehension. The world fears that, this time too, it may not be possible to arrive at concrete and positive results on the cessation of nuclear tests. This impression has been reinforced this morning by the statement of the United Kingdom representative who insisted once again on the old position of compulsory inspection. This is perhaps the reason why certain ideas were recently put forward suggesting certain hasty solutions limited in time, and bearing on a "limited and agreed period." In our view such solutions would not solve our problem and might create new difficulties in the future. It would not be useful, nor is it necessary to work upon and to adopt, under the pressure of time, modalities concerning underground tests which, in the end, might lead us away from the fundamental principles of the eight-Power joint memorandum (ENDC/28).

Furthermore, some of these suggestions appear to be contrary to the spirit and even the letter of the General Assembly resolution on which they purport to be based. To demonstrate the extent to which these suggestions depart from the spirit and the letter of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly it might be useful to recall certain facts relating to the wording of General Assembly resolution 1762 A (XVII), and particularly to its paragraph 6.

When this matter was discussed in the First Committee, the Canadian delegation submitted several amendments to the original text of the non-aligned countries, one of which, after further modification, became paragraph 6 of the resolution.

The second Canadian version of this paragraph mentioned an agreement prohibiting nuclear tests in the three environments — in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space —

"... accompanied by an interim arrangement limited in time suspending all underground tests ..." (A/C.1/L.313/Rev.1 p.2)

The Canadian delegation was compelled to abandon the words "limited in time" because the desire of the great majority of the delegations was clearly expressed, namely that this "provisional arrangement" should remain in force throughout the further
negotiations on the cessation of underground tests and until the conclusion of a final agreement on all tests.

When the United States and the United Kingdom presented their sub-amendment to the Canadian amendment -- and I am referring to document A/C.1/L.316 -- they proposed a new sentence formulated as follows:

"Such limited interim agreement shall include adequate assurances for effective detection and identification of seismic events by an international scientific commission."

What must be noted is that the final text of paragraph 6 of resolution 1762 A (XVI) includes no fewer than three important changes in this sentence, and the representative of India and the Soviet Union have already referred to this. In the first place, the words "... an interim arrangement limited in time ..." (A/C.1/L.313/Rev.1 p.2) were replaced by the term "... such interim agreement ..." (ENDC/63 p.3). This represents not only the deletion of the words "limited in time", but also the substitution of the term "interim agreement" for "interim arrangement" in the last sentence of paragraph 6.
It is more precise to say "interim agreement". "Interim" means "as long as there is no final agreement". In other words, the word "interim" used in describing this agreement clearly means that this interim agreement must remain in force as long as there is no final agreement, which would include underground tests also.

The representative of India said the other day:

"It is true, and it is only fair to say, that these words 'for a limited period' were deleted in the course of the negotiation, and our understanding of the words 'accompanied by an interim arrangement' were that this arrangement would be a provisional one until a final arrangement could be found, but not necessarily one limited to a certain period ..." (SNEC/PV.36, B.37)

This is also supported by the deletion of the words "limited duration" which were included in the Canadian amendment and the words "of a limited nature" which appeared in the United States and United Kingdom amendment. Secondly, the United States and the United Kingdom considered it necessary to replace, under the pressure of the views expressed in the course of the discussion, the term "efficiency of on-site inspection" by the expression "effective detection and identification". The desires of the General Assembly on this score are also perfectly clear. This is also a concrete indication of the direction in which our Conference should continue its work.

Thirdly, the Assembly has defined the character of the international commission mentioned in the United Kingdom and United States sub-amendment by calling it an international scientific commission, which is perfectly in accordance with the terms of the Eight-Power joint memorandum.

These are the definitions which the Assembly has rejected from the original text of what became paragraph 6. It is in the light of these wise changes imposed by the General Assembly that the text of the present paragraph 6 must be interpreted. Any other interpretation would draw us away from the General Assembly recommendations and would make our task more difficult.

In brief, paragraph 6, which was originally a proposal of the three Western Powers and which was proposed by them with the sole purpose of approving the conclusion of a limited treaty on the cessation of tests in the three
Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria: Environments, with inspection for underground tests, has not produced the result expected by the Western Powers. Although insufficiently clear, being the result of an attempt by the Western Powers to oppose the wish clearly expressed in the original proposal and especially in paragraph 2, the present paragraph 6, after the amendments included in its text, does not allow for any wrong interpretations which certain Western delegations, probably with the same intentions in their minds, have been trying to place upon it -- for this text is also perfectly clear with regard to what has been deleted under the pressure of the majority of the General Assembly. The fact that the Western delegations have made such considerable efforts to change and, if possible, to deform the meaning of the draft resolution of the non-aligned States was already an indication of the manner in which the United States and the United Kingdom would interpret resolution 1762 A (XVII) and especially paragraph 6. The changes made in the amendment and in the sub-amendment of the United States and the United Kingdom show the spirit in which the great majority of the Member States of the United Nations wanted to see this agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests take shape. It is in accordance with this spirit that we should continue our work, and it ought to be possible to come to an interim solution which would make it possible to continue negotiations for the conclusion of a final treaty on the cessation of nuclear tests in all environments.

Any concession to the intransigence of those who would like to impose their concept of compulsory on-site inspection or those who would wish to have a provisional agreement of a limited duration, which would make it possible to continue underground tests and in this way to continue the nuclear armament race, would only increase the ill for which we are called upon to find a remedy. If there is insistence on an interim solution, this must be really a solution making it possible to continue the cessation of nuclear tests until there is a final agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests in all environments.

Mr. Dean (United States of America): I should like to make a brief statement today on the question of a nuclear test ban treaty, the subject now before us.
Before beginning my remarks I would urge all the representatives at this table to read very carefully the verbatim record of yesterday's meeting of the test ban Sub-Committee (BNDC/SC.1/46). I think they will find it rewarding and interesting. The United States delegation feels that — despite the most constructive attitude of the United States and the United Kingdom — the negative attitude adopted by the Soviet Union yesterday is, I am sorry to say, a very unfortunate indication of the possibilities for future progress in our negotiations.

I should like very briefly today to point out how one by one the Soviet Union has been closing the doors leading to possible areas of agreement.

Firstly, I am sure that every representative at this table, with the possible exception of the representatives of the Soviet bloc, is in favour of a comprehensive agreement or treaty ending all nuclear tests, "with effective and prompt international verification", as stated in United Nations General Assembly resolution 1762 B (XVII). Indeed — again with the exception of the representatives of the Soviet bloc — every representative here has said so many times. At our plenary meeting on Monday, however, the Soviet representative tried to make it appear otherwise; and he was quickly corrected by the representative of India.

In accordance with the desire of everyone to have an agreement ending all testing, the United Kingdom and the United States have prepared a comprehensive test ban draft treaty (BNDC/52) which would accomplish this purpose. That treaty includes the minimum requirements for a control and inspection system based on a thorough scientific study of the requirements for such a system, including obligatory on-site inspection of unidentified events by the international scientific commission which is provided for in article II. As is well known, that draft treaty was one of the proposals presented at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly and is mentioned in resolution 1762 (XVII).

The Soviet Union, on the contrary, without scientific support, has continued to maintain that national systems are sufficient for detection and identification of all tests. However, the proposals of the United Kingdom and the United States for an international control system are based on the experience that those two countries have gained from their own efforts in the field of detecting nuclear tests as well as on an extensive programme of research into the scientific aspects of the detection, location and identification of underground tests, the results of which we have made available to the world.
The Soviet Union has consistently rejected this minimum of necessary control. Thus the first door to agreement has been slammed shut.

Secondly, in view of Soviet opposition to an all-inclusive treaty -- and we ought all of us to be clear about why the United Kingdom and the United States presented the partial ban treaty; it was solely and wholly because of Soviet opposition to an all-inclusive treaty -- our two Governments also proposed a partial ban that would end all tests that cause radioactive fallout which is of great concern to humanity. That partial treaty (ENDC/59) would end all tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Our two Governments put forth their proposal for a partial ban in accordance with the express wishes and the express suggestions of various representatives including those of all the eight new nations at this Conference. I might quote, for example, the representative of Brazil, then Foreign minister de San Thiago Dantas, who stated at our third plenary meeting:

"The technicians of the nations most advanced in nuclear science are, I believe, agreed on the possibility of effective control of tests under water, in the atmosphere and in the biosphere, without more thorough on-site inspections and checks being necessary. We therefore consider that these tests should be suspended immediately. As regards underground tests, studies should be undertaken without delay to determine the minimum degree of on-site inspection that is essential to ensure that the undertakings given are being fulfilled." (ENDC/PV.3, p.2)

However, again the Soviet response was negative. The Soviet Union stated that it would not accept a partial ban without an un inspected moratorium on underground tests. Thus the Soviet Union clearly bears the moral responsibility for the continuation of testing in environments which cause radioactive fallout. In that way the Soviet Union shut a second door to progress.

Thirdly, at our plenary meetings last week various suggestions were put forth in the attempt to bridge the differences which remain on the question of verification of the cessation of underground testing. The position of the United States on those suggestions is well known and is set forth in its draft treaty, document ENDC/58. The United States is giving careful study to the various suggestions to see if they are consistent with the wording of operative paragraph 6 of the United Nations General Assembly resolution 1762 A (XVII), which provides for "effective detection and identification of seismic events by an international commission", or resolution
1762 b (XVII) which provides for "the conclusion of a treaty with effective and prompt international verification." While the United States believes that these suggestions merit careful consideration, the Soviet Union, on the other hand, has rejected them in categorical terms. For example, the representative of the Soviet Union stated:

"An objective analysis shows that considerations of so-called temporary agreements of the sort mentioned by the representatives of Canada, Mexico and India -- and to a certain extent this was referred to by the representative of Sweden -- do not lighten our task. Quite the contrary. These proposals create new difficulties. They do not serve our cause; they only complicate our problem." (ENDC/PV.86, p.66)

Thus another possible open door to progress was slammed shut by Soviet intransigence.

The United States has stated on several occasions that Soviet positions in fact have not changed one whit since the Soviet Union's proposal of 28 November 1961.

The only advance claimed by the Soviet Union is its so-called acceptance of the eight-nation memorandum of 16 April 1962 (ENDC/23). A person listening to the remarks of Mr. Zorin on 19 April last at a plenary meeting of this Conference and at a meeting of its nuclear Sub-Committee might well have believed -- if he just listened -- that the Soviet Union had advanced in its position. For at that time Mr. Zorin, as will be recalled, spoke, as will be seen from page 13 of the record of the ninth meeting of our nuclear Sub-Committee, in terms of abandoning the old Soviet position and accepting the new compromise proposal. But what in fact is the real Soviet position on the memorandum? Speaking of it Mr. Tarazkin has stated:

"This was the new approach proposed by the Soviet Union on 28 November 1961. This new approach has also been recognized as a basis for agreement by all the non-aligned States, and they have stated this in their joint memorandum of 16 April 1962 (ENDC/23)." (ENDC/3C.1/PV.26, p.21)

Thus it is abundantly clear that the Soviet Union did not really accept the principles of the eight-nation memorandum. The United States, on the other hand, quite honestly stated that although it accepted the eight-nation memorandum as one basis for discussion, and a very important one, it would not accept it as the only basis for discussion.
However, the fact is that the memorandum played an important part in the development of the United States—United Kingdom comprehensive draft treaty proposal (ENDC/58).

I should like also to quote the representative of the Soviet Union on this question of on-site inspections. At our meeting on Monday last he stated:

"On the other hand, people try to impose inspection on us, knowing in advance that is unacceptable to the Soviet Union -- for inspection, irrespective of whether or not it is to be carried out in the framework of a final agreement or in the framework of a temporary agreement, does not lose its unacceptable aspects, inasmuch as it would give free rein to the collection of information on the defence capability of the inspected State." (ENDC/PV.36, p.62)

The authors of the eight-nation memorandum state, on the other hand, that:

"3. They believe that possibilities exist of establishing by agreement a system for continuous observation and effective control on a purely scientific and non-political basis." (ENDC/28)

The position of the Soviet Union that international inspectors from the international commission would be spies for the Western Powers is not only ridiculous but is an insult to the trustworthy and dedicated international civil servants whom I am sure we all have known in Geneva, New York and elsewhere. Our treaty (ENDC/58) carefully provides for a truly impartial international staff, in its article VI on page 5. So we see very clearly that the Soviet Union has not really accepted the principles of the joint memorandum of the eight nations (ENDC/28) but in fact has remained firmly with its position of 28 November 1961, which remains unchanged. Thus the door to progress and negotiation opened by the efforts of the eight nations also has been closed by the Soviet Union.
In conclusion, every hopeful way towards fruitful discussion and negotiation of outstanding issues has been rather definitely rejected by the Soviet Union. It is the fervent hope of the United States that the Soviet Union will reconsider its position and permit us to explore further at least one of these various areas I have described.

I should now like to turn to another subject of interest. I noted, in reviewing his statement at the eighty-sixth meeting on 3 December 1962, that the representative of Poland attempted to prove that operative paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 1762 A (AVII) should somehow be paramount above all other portions of that resolution. But in that he was merely following the lead already given him by Mr. Israelpin in an earlier part of the eighty-sixth plenary meeting. I shall want to return in a few minutes to this effort by the Soviet bloc, but there are several other questions connected with the statement by the representative of Poland which I believe deserve some reply.

The crowning piece of evidence which the representative of Poland presents to wind up his rather difficult case on paragraph 2 of resolution 1762 A is based upon the fact that the date for a cessation of tests which figures in that paragraph, that is, 1 January 1963, was presented in this Committee by the representative of Mexico. In this connexion the representative of Poland said:

"Finally, let us not forget that the idea of the cessation of tests by a specific date was born in this very Committee here at this table. It will be recalled that it was the representative of Mexico, Mr. Padilla Nervo, who early in our debates made this very suggestion. Its aim and purpose were clear — to stop all tests unconditionally and to continue negotiations until agreement was reached." (EMDC/AV, 65, p. 82)

I note from the record of our thirty-fourth meeting, on 5 May, with the representative of Mexico first made his proposal, that the representative of Poland, Mr. Lach, who is with us today, was not present at that meeting, at least according to the records. But even so, I would have thought that before making such a statement to prove that was obviously a very difficult case before this court, whose high standards for scrutinizing the evidence are well known, the representative of Poland would at least have taken the opportunity to read the evidence which he presents as the final point in making his case. However, it is abundantly clear that he did not read the evidence.
(Mr. Dean, United States)

I should like to read just one paragraph from the statement by the representative of Mexico at the thirty-fourth meeting on 9 May, as follows:

"In view of this situation, it seems to us that it is becoming increasingly urgent and essential every day to draw up an agreement" — These are, of course, the representative of Mexico's own words and not mine, but I underscore the word "agreement" —

"fixing now — I repeat, now — the date for the discontinuance of nuclear tests, even if this cannot be before the conclusion of the series of explosions already begun and before the beginning of the answering series announced by the Soviet Union. The plans of both parties for carrying out explosions must have an end, and this end should be fixed now in a treaty," —

These are again the words of the representative of Mexico — "in a treaty" —

"because it is dangerous to wait until both series of tests are finished before negotiating an effective agreement that will put a stop to the nuclear arms race." (ENDC/PV.34., p. 16)

The Mexican proposal is of course a very far cry from what the representative of Poland said it was. The Mexican proposal was for an effective agreement and not, as the representative of Poland said:

"... to stop all tests unconditionally and to continue negotiations until agreement was reached." (ENDC/PV.15., p. 82)

Continuing with a discussion of the General Assembly resolution 1762 A (XVII), which has become a major subject of discussion with us here, it seems to me that the delegations of the Soviet bloc have been seriously intent upon trying to make some sort of case to the effect that the entire purpose of the resolution is to provide for an uninspected, uncontrolled moratorium to begin on 1 January 1963. In addition to the elaborate arguments advanced by the representative of Poland, to a portion of which I have just referred, the Soviet representative was trying to create this same sort of privacy for paragraph 2 of resolution 1762 A. But the Soviet Union, in its efforts to create some sort of special standing for paragraph 2 of this resolution above and beyond all its other paragraphs, and at the same time to degrade paragraph 6 as not having any importance at all, has actually run foul of itself.
For example, at the top of page 56 of the English version record of the eighty-sixth plenary meeting, we find that the Soviet Union supported the overwhelming desire, as it called it, of Member States that paragraph 4 of resolution 1762 A (XVII) be implemented whether there is agreement or not on 1 January 1963. One short paragraph later we find the Soviet representative praising the General Assembly's recommendation on the eight-nation memorandum (E/DC/23). But somehow or other the Soviet delegation has forgotten that the Assembly's recommendation on the eight-nation memorandum, in the operative part of the resolution at least, falls into paragraph 6, which the Soviet Union seems so anxious to degrade, as well as into paragraphs 4 and 5.
Of course, paragraph 6 of resolution 1762 A (XVII) also mentions the other proposals presented during the debate in the General Assembly, including the United Kingdom–United States comprehensive treaty, which was mentioned in resolution 1762 B (XVII) as well as in 1762 A (XVII). If the question were not so serious, the illogicalities of the Soviet position on resolution 1762 (XVII) would come close to being a farce. What, actually, is the Soviet Union trying to accomplish in its efforts somehow to make out of paragraph 2 the entire sum and substance of resolution 1762 (XVII) and to down-grade paragraph 6? As I said at yesterday's meeting of the test ban sub-committee -- the reading of the verbatim record of which I again recommend to members of the Committee -- it appears to my delegation that the Soviet delegation does not do these things lightly, or without purpose. My delegation, as soon as it realized what the Soviet Union was doing in this case, saw certain immediate consequences. In the first place, what the Soviet Union is apparently trying to accomplish is to turn resolution 1762 (XVII), which was most carefully drafted and formulated, into an uncontrolled accumulatorum on underground tests, which the Soviet Union has been trying to get the United States and the United Kingdom to accept for the past year.

Ever since the Soviet Union broke its last unilateral pledge -- made in the person of its highest authority on 14 January 1960 -- it has undoubtedly realized the great value to itself of broken pledges on nuclear testing. For example, Marshal Beriaev, who, I am informed, is head of the Soviet army's rocket force, in an article in Red Star on 3 December -- just a few days ago -- boasted that the peace-loving Soviet Union was -- and I quote his words -- "perfecting nuclear warheads which could be delivered to any part of the globe, the largest of them having a yield of 50-60 and more megatons". Just think of it: 60 megatons -- the equivalent of 60 millions tons of T.N.T. That is quite an accomplishment that the Soviet Union has been able to achieve since it broke its pledge not to test. No wonder the Soviet Union does not want a nuclear test ban treaty. If it keeps on it may be able to develop a warhead with such a megaton yield as would destroy the entire world.
On 14 January 1960 Chairman Khrushchev must have realized, in making his pledge not to renew nuclear explosions while his Western negotiating partners, the United Kingdom and the United States, did not renew their tests, that if the Soviet Union continued preparations and at the same time failed to reach agreement it might make some pretty important military breakthrough during future test series — as the Soviet Union, indeed, constantly boasts it has done. It appears to me that the Soviet Union is once more heading on such a course, and that is apparently the clue to the statements that are being made in our Committee.

The strong emphasis on paragraph 2 of resolution 1762 A (XVII) — which, as I have said, the Soviet Union wishes to turn into a General Assembly endorsement of an uninspected moratorium — leads my delegation to believe that we may once again be greeted with a unilateral pledge on the part of the Soviet Union. Maybe that pledge will again come from the highest authority, just as similar pledges have been given by the leaders of the Soviet Union with regard to a recent situation in the Caribbean with which we are all familiar. In the face of this apparent Soviet tactic of abandoning all pretence at actual negotiations to reach agreement we can only regret that it has decided it really does not want an agreement after all but is trying to manoeuvre the West in every possible way into some sort of uninspected, uncontrolled moratorium arrangement.

Our position, as we have made clear many times in the past, is very firm on this question: we will sign, and sign promptly — and promptly implement — a comprehensive treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests with effective and prompt international verification along the lines of the Western draft treaty (ENDC/58) and in accordance with operative paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 1762 B (XVII); but we cannot, in the light of the unfortunate events of September 1961, accept another uncontrolled, uninspected, unconditional cessation of nuclear tests. Let me repeat: we will sign a treaty banning all nuclear tests; we will not accept an uncontrolled, uninspected moratorium.

We sincerely hope that the Soviet Union will reconsider its tactic of abandoning negotiations in favour of this ill-considered course of once more engaging in unilateral declarations and so-called pledges, or of asking the West to buy — as the representative of the United Kingdom so aptly put it this morning — a pig in a poke. We say, cut the little pig out and let it see the light.
We believe it is fundamental that all disarmament arrangements should be under the necessary strict and effective international control. Soviet abandonment of this principle, while it has been implied in our continuing negotiations for the past six months or so, has never been so completely clear to us as it is now. We came to these negotiations with at least one agreed basis which applied across the board to all of our work towards general and complete disarmament. The joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations provides in paragraph 6 for the necessary strict and effective international control of disarmament measures. To abandon this basis for our continuing negotiations now would be a black augury for our future work.

So we ask that the Soviet Union reconsider this apparent course of irresponsible action and join with us, not in trying to force its position on other States but rather in negotiating a treaty banning nuclear tests in all environments, under effective international control, in the same spirit of compromise and willingness to try to see the other side's point of view that we bring to our side of the negotiating table. Perhaps then we could get somewhere.
Mr. NACOVESCU (Romania): The members of our Committee have, by unanimous consent, decided to concentrate their attention on the conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. This decision is based, on the one hand, upon the ever more urgent demand of the people to stop the nuclear weapon explosions in all environments and for all time and, on the other hand, upon the recent resolution of the United Nations General Assembly which, inter alia, asks that such tests should cease immediately and not later than 1 January 1963. (E/DC/63, p.3).

Where do we stand and what are we to do in order to carry out the mandate entrusted to us? After prolonged negotiations, the nuclear Powers have reached the conclusion that nuclear weapon tests could cease in the outer space, in the atmosphere and under water, the complicated and difficulty-engendering system of on-site inspection having become unnecessary.

As for the underground tests, an understanding has not yet been reached and it is here that the Gordian knot lies. The differences are still significant.

The Western nuclear Powers and their allies suggest that we conclude a partial agreement banning tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water and, as difficulties do exist with regard to the fourth environment, permitting underground tests to be continued.

This proposal is unacceptable not only because it does not provide for a solution of the problem, but also because it does not even bring us nearer to the solution as some people unfortunately believe; quite to the contrary. Of course, if we were to think in accordance with the saying "Better something than nothing", we should accept the idea of a partial agreement, but the wise, when creating their sayings, have never claimed to reflect the entire truth at any time and in all the circumstances. In our particular case, it would not only fail to reflect the truth but it would take us away from it dangerously and people would not call us wise.

What would happen if nuclear weapon tests in the first three environments were banned and underground tests were continued? The process of improving nuclear weapons would go on and thus the danger of a nuclear war would grow. The nuclear arms drive would continue, hence the danger of a nuclear war would grow. Conditions propitious for an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons would be created and thus the peril of nuclear war would grow.
It may be said that these assertions are groundless, coming as they do from one who is not an expert in the relevant field, and one who is the representative of a socialist State -- a fact which some in er means that we are interested in rejection ab initio any proposal coming from the other side. The truth is that the basic ideas behind these suggestions are not mine. In compliance with the obligations regarding the disclosure of copyright and recognition due to the author, I feel obliged to quote from what Mr. Paul H. Nitze, the United States Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs has said. On 17 September 1962 -- that is, two and a half months ago during our recess -- on the eve of the opening of the session of the United Nations General Assembly, Mr. Nitze, speaking before the Preparedness Investigating Sub-Committee of the Committee of Armed Services, declared:

"With a test ban treaty of a non-comprehensive nature, in which testing underground were permitted, many weapons design improvements of importance could still be carried out; there would remain some important uncertainties -- probably on both sides -- with respect to weapons effects. In essence, nuclear weapons development would continue ..."

I am convinced that the Chairman has noticed that in my statement I did nothing but repeat what the Assistant Secretary of Defense of the United States had said. I confess that the last part -- that is, the conclusion that in such conditions the danger of a nuclear war would grow -- is my own. Mr. Nitze did not say that, but I believe the conclusion is not mine alone; it belongs to all peoples of goodwill here in this Conference room and elsewhere, wherever they may be.

This being so, the suggested formula for a partial cessation of thermo-nuclear weapon tests is not satisfactory. It is imperative that we find the solution necessary for the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests in all environments. That means that we must remove the difficulties which prevent our reaching agreement on underground testing. What is the main and, apparently, the only difficulty? The stand taken by the Western Powers on the question of inspection. The Western nuclear powers and their allies plead that there is no guarantee for the discontinuance of underground tests unless international obligatory on-site inspection is accepted. In the draft treaty submitted to this Committee on 27 August 1962 (WDC/58) by the delegations of the United States and of the United Kingdom, this condition is clearly laid down.
To us, this condition appears to be unjustified and here is our explanation why we consider this to be so: it has been stated repeatedly in this Committee and outside it that the existing technical means, which are being improved speedily and continuously, cover the practical needs with regard to the detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions. The Western nuclear Powers and their allies have rejected this argument, voiced not only by the socialist delegations but also by the other side; and not only by politicians but also by scientists. In their insistence on the obligatory nature of international on-site inspection, the Western nuclear Powers and their allies state that in this way alone could they have a complete guarantee that no underground tests have been carried out. This claim is groundless.

If I am not mistaken, no one in this Committee has ever submitted that an environment exists in which there could be one hundred per cent detection and identification of nuclear explosions. It is obvious that the underground environment constitutes no exception in this respect. Hence, Mr. William C. Foster, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, who is a former member of the United States delegation and has numerous representatives in the present United States delegation, felt justified in stating on 18 September 1962 before the same Preparedness Investigating Sub-Committee of the Committee on Armed Forces, United States Senate:

"There is always the possibility of a threshold under which detection would be difficult, certainly on any isolated single test. One must always have in mind that it is unlikely that any single test will make any substantial difference in the strategic balance. It is also unlikely that any series of tests will fail of detection with modern methods which, we believe, are dependable."
Why I presume to dwell upon two aspects of outstanding significance contained in Mr. Foster's statement. First, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency admits the possibility of certain underground nuclear tests, taken separately, remaining undetected. But, given the responsibility and competence implied by the office he holds, Mr. Foster reaches the conclusion that "it is unlikely that any single test will make any substantial difference in the strategic balance". Secondly, from what Mr. Foster said, it follows that only a series of nuclear weapon tests is of real interest for us from the point of view of the problem with which we are concerned, or -- and here lies the essence of the matter -- that a series of underground nuclear tests cannot fail to be discovered.

In that case, what is the source of the categorical claim by the Western nuclear Powers to take extra safety measures, by any means and at any price? A 100 per cent coefficient of safety does not exist in any field. Local restrictions on a national and international scale have never proceeded and cannot proceed from the premise that in every specific case reality can be covered 100 per cent. Murder has been banned under the legislation of all countries, though nobody can deny that cases may occur when a murder remains undiscovered and the murderer goes unpunished. What could be said about a legislature which, because of the impossibility of discovering 100 per cent of all the cases of murder, refuse on those grounds to ban murder?

It has been repeatedly stated in this Committee that, in the present circumstances, when a treaty on general and complete disarmament has not been concluded and, consequently, the process of general and complete disarmament by stages has not begun, international on-site inspection with regard to the discontinuation of underground tests may create danger for the security of one of the parties, may create tense moments in an international situation which is already tense.

But it is not only this aspect of the matter, though of paramount importance, making obligatory on-site inspection unacceptable, upon which I want to dwell now, but I would call attention to another.
Let us assume that under the agreement on the discontinuance of underground nuclear tests provision is made for obligatory on-site inspection. Suppose that, during the implementation of the agreement, one of the parties refuses such an inspection. In that case, the other party, relying on the principle of *inadimplenti non est adimplendum* — that is, that if a signatory does not fulfil its obligations the other signatory is, in its turn, free from its obligations — will certainly find it proper not to respect its obligations any longer. Consequently it will resume its underground tests. By attaching such conditions of super-safety to an agreement which is meant to bring us together for the fulfillment of a great historical task, we run the risk of turning it into an instrument of disagreement, a source of disunion and of conflict. I think that we should weigh on a very fine and objective balance the advantages and disadvantages of certain proposals and courageously draw the necessary conclusions. On-site inspection does not render service to anyone who are really concerned with complete and final cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

Does it appear that we have got into a blind alley, with no way out, with no possibility of mutual understanding? It is the conviction of the Romanian delegation that, objectively speaking, all the necessary conditions do exist for the conclusion of an agreement to ban all nuclear weapon tests, without any exception and forever. For this purpose it is both necessary and sufficient that the Western Powers should give up their unjustified claim with respect to obligatory international on-site inspections. A situation could thus be ensured in which no nuclear weapon tests would take place after 1 January 1963.

In order to fulfil the task incumbent upon our Committee, it is necessary to start from a common platform, from a common basis of negotiations. We do have such a basis and I should like to insist now on the necessity to safeguard this basis; this common asset, all the more valuable as, notwithstanding the undoubted narrowing of the gap between the respective positions, there are still differences which prevent agreement being reached. This basis for negotiations is the eight-nation memorandum submitted on 16 April 1962. As is known, the Soviet and other socialist delegations had already, on 19 April, accepted that memorandum as a basis for negotiations. In our mind its principal merit consists in its spirit of compromise.
The significance of that document has become even greater after its endorsement by the United Nations General Assembly. Resolution 1752 of the General Assembly, "Considering that the memorandum..... represents a sound, adequate and fair basis for the conduct of negotiations towards removing the outstanding differences on the question of effective control of underground tests," proclaims, under point 4, that it "Endorses the eight-nation memorandum of 16 April 1962 as a basis for negotiation." (ENDC/43, pp. 2 and 3)

As has been stressed by other delegations, this basis for negotiations alone has received the endorsement of the General Assembly.

The time is ripe for earnest negotiations in the spirit of compromise represented by the eight-nation memorandum in order to reach agreement. I cannot refrain from noting that during the last week there have appeared certain tendencies to depart from the spirit and the letter of that document, a document which the Romanian delegation has accepted, as submitted, as a compromise formula. The Romanian delegation considers that proposals like those referring to the obligatory character of international control, and others, are apt to alter the very content of the memorandum.

I should like to make myself clear. The Romanian delegation is ready to support such proposals as tend to further the spirit of the eight-nation memorandum, proposals which facilitate finding a solution on that basis.
We are studying attentively the proposal of the delegation of Sweden submitted at the eighty-fourth meeting of the Committee held on 23 November 1962 and if we reach the conclusion that it contains elements which will help us to fulfil our task we shall gladly support them.

One hundred and twenty-five years ago, Lamartine, the French poet -- beholding the blue-green waters of Lake du Bourget -- exclaimed:

"O, temps suspendu ton vol,
Et vous, heureuses prop ses, suspendez votre cours!"

Here on the shores of Lake Leman we could address the same invocation to time. But time will not heed us, as it did not heed Lamartine. It flows unceasingly and is pressing on relentlessly. Nevertheless let us face it bravely.

Should we now be unable to sign a comprehensive agreement, there is still another possibility -- that of immediately concluding an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, whilst continuing the negotiations for the banning of these tests in the underground environment, too. The agreement in question should contain the mutual obligation not to carry out underground nuclear tests over the whole duration of the negotiations and up until the coming into force of an agreement banning those tests too.

Do we thus come closer to cutting the Gordian Knot? The delegation of Romania expresses both its hope and its conviction that we do.

The CHAIRMAN (Brazil) (interpretation from French): If representatives are agreeable I think we might adjourn now and hear the statements of the representatives of Brazil, Czechoslovakia, Italy and Nigeria at the next meeting.

Mr. LACHS (Poland): With the agreement of the Committee I should like to speak on a point of order. I shall be brief in view of the lateness of the hour.

I wish to refer to what the representative of the United States said on the subject of the statement which I made on Monday, 3 December, 1962 (ENDC/PV.66, pp. 76-86). I felt very honoured, as indeed I always do when the representative of the United States refers to my modest contribution to this debate.

I was particularly honoured when he said that he had noted my absence at one of these meetings at which the representative of Mexico made his statement. Although he noticed my absence, I most respectfully submit that he could not have known whether or not I read the statements made at that meeting.
To come to the point at issue, I wish to refresh the memories of representatives here by again quoting what the representative of Mexico said on 9 May 1962. I apologize for having made his speech a case at issue, and I trust that he will bear with me. At that meeting the representative of Mexico, Mr. Padilla Nervo, said:

"But although the nuclear powers have persisted in ignoring the universal demand of all the peoples, deceiving themselves with the Mirage of a lasting military advantage, we must all endeavour to help bring an agreed date now, before the end of the series of tests by the two parties, so that this year or the beginning of next year may see a definite end to the senseless nuclear competition." (\[1962/3\], 5-17)

However, the story does not end there because it has further chapters which were written both in this Committee and at the United Nations General Assembly. I think that the representative of the United States read the record of that meeting of the plenary meeting of the United Nations General Assembly held on 15 October 1962, at which the representative of Mexico again spoke and suggested to the General Assembly certain action on this very subject. The representative of Mexico then said:

"Resolves:

'(1) To urge the nuclear powers to suspend all nuclear and thermonuclear tests underground, in the sea, in the atmosphere or in outer space as soon as possible and, at the latest, by 1 January 1963.'"

I now come to the most important paragraph:

"'(2) To urge the nuclear Powers urgently to continue negotiations tending to achieve the conclusion of binding agreements banning such nuclear and thermonuclear explosions for ever.'"

"The cessation of nuclear tests on 1 January, at the latest," -- and this is a point I should like to emphasize -- "a date we suggested in Geneva, would have a very healthy effect on the world atmosphere and would help to settle many other collateral questions which appear on the agenda of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee." (\[7153\], no. 28-100/101)
I think this makes it clear that the date had to be fixed and that negotiations had to continue. That is the authentic interpretation of the remarks of the representative of Mexico. Although the representative of the United States may disagree with me, certain facts are undeniable, and I think I have cited them as they were.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I think that the record speaks for itself.

Mr. CAVALLITTI (Italy) (interpretation from French): Of course, I waive my right to speak today. However, I wonder whether the speech that has just been made by the representative of Poland can be considered as a point of order relating to today's order of business.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its eighty-seventh plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Assunção de Araújo, representative of Brazil.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United Kingdom, Ethiopia, Bulgaria, the United States, Romania and Poland."

"The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 7 December 1954, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 1.10 a.m."
CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE EIGHTY-EIGHTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Friday, 7 December 1962, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. N. T. RABAROV (Bulgaria)

This provisional record contains the originals of speeches in English together with the Conference room interpretation of speeches in other languages.

It is requested that any corrections to the originals of speeches be submitted in four copies (preferably incorporated in four of the single-sided micrographed copies with which delegations are supplied) by the authorized Liaison Officer of the delegation concerned to the Documents Office, Room A.206. If no corrections are received within four working days from the date of distribution the final version, in which the interpretations will be replaced by translations, will be prepared and issued on the basis of the provisional record.

THE TIME LIMIT FOR CORRECTIONS TO THIS RECORD WILL BE 0900 HOURS ON 14 DECEMBER 1962.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Present at the Table</th>
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</table>
| Brazil:      | Mr. ASSUMPÇÃO de ARAUJO  
               | Mr. FRANK da COSTA                                        |
| Bulgaria:    | Mr. N. TARABANOV  
               | Mr. G. GUELEV  
               | Mr. V. ISMIKALEV                                         |
| Burma:       | U TUN SEIN  
               | U HAUNG HAUNG GYI                                        |
| Canada:      | Mr. E.L.M. BURNS  
               | Mr. J.E.G. HARDY  
               | Mr. J.F.M. BELL  
               | Mr. R.M. TAIT                                             |
| Czecho-Slovakia: | Mr. K. KURKA  
               | Mr. K. ZEMLA  
               | Mr. V. VAJNAR                                            |
| Ethiopia:    | ATO HAD. IS ALAMAYEHU  
               | ATO H. HAMID  
               | ATO M. GREEBEYEHU                                        |
| India:       | Mr. A.S. LALL  
               | Mr. A.S. MEHTA                                          |
| Italy:       | Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
               | Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI  
               | Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI  
               | Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI                                     |
PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

**Mexico:**
Mr. L. PADILLA HERNANDEZ
Mr. E. CALDERON GURIO
Mr. D. GONZALES GOMEZ

**Nigeria:**
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

**Poland:**
Mr. H. LACHS
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. W. WIECZOREK

**Romania:**
Mr. G. LACOVESCU
Mr. H. FLORESCU
Mr. E. CLASER
Mr. N. ECULCESCU

**Sweden:**
Baron C.H. von PLATEN
Mr. M. STAHL
Mr. P. KELLIN
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

**Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:**
Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. A.A. ROSCHCHIF
Mr. I.C. USACHEV
Mr. P.F. SHAKHNOV

**United Arab Republic:**
Mr. H.H. EL-ZAYYAT
Mr. S. AHMED
Mr. H. KASSEM
Mr. S. IBRAHIM
PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir Michael WRIGHT
Mr. D.H. BRINSON
Mr. R.C. BEECHAM

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. D.E. MARK
Mr. V. BAKER

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN
The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): I call to order the eighty-eighth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Before calling on the first speaker I should like to inform the Conference that the two co-Chairman have distributed a draft report to the General Assembly on the negotiations in our Conference on the test ban.

The representative of Mexico has asked for the floor first on a point of order, and I call upon him.

Mr. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): I have asked for the floor not in order to intervene in the name of the Mexican delegation but to read out a statement which the eight non-aligned delegations have formulated in English on a common agreement and which I have been asked to read to the Conference:

(spoke in English)

"The suggestions and observations made in the past few days by the non-aligned delegations regarding a test ban have been offered in the Eighteen-Nation Committee in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 1762 A (XVII).

"These suggestions and observations must not be construed as individual interpretations of the eight-nation memorandum now endorsed by the General Assembly without a dissident vote.

"The eight delegations in this respect still abide by the statement made on their behalf by the representative of Ethiopia on 19 April last (ENDC/PV.24, p.5)."

(continued in Spanish)

I should like now to raise another matter, also in the name of the same eight delegations. We would like to see included in the report to the General Assembly, in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 1762 (XVII), a brief summary of the suggestions and observations made by our delegations with the object of assisting the Committee to comply with the terms of the said resolution of the General Assembly.
The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): We can now take up our scheduled work. The first speaker on my list is the representative of Brazil.

Mr. ASSIMPCAIO de ARAUJO (Brazil) (interpretation from French): I should like in the first place to welcome Mr. Tun Shoen and Mr. Kurka, the representatives of Burma and Czechoslovakia, whose presence will without doubt contribute to good results in our work.

The delegation of Brazil has devoted the closest attention to the important declarations made in our Conference since the resumption of its work, and desires to express rapidly today its points of view on the question which concerns us, the ending of nuclear tests.

So little time is left before the date recommended to us by the General Assembly of the United Nations that some concern is very properly felt. In fact, the bringing into accord of the points of view of the parties concerned still seems to be very far away. Our co-Chairmen traced on 3 December the evolution of the negotiations in the meetings of the Sub-Committee on the cessation of nuclear tests during the recess in the work of the plenary Committee, and it has to be plainly recognized that the results are scarcely satisfactory.
However, we should not lose all hope. The progress realized in the course of the last months, although modest, should encourage us. The numerous problems involved in the suspension of tests have been progressively concentrated in the question of underground explosions, since everyone now seems to recognize that no control system is necessary for tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. In addition, the changes in the international situation perhaps provide us with a much more favourable climate than in the past not only with respect to a de facto cessation of explosions but also for the negotiation of an agreement, be it provisional, on the cessation of tests.

Such a cessation of tests is of great importance for us because, as was stated at the beginning of the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly by Mr. de Melo Franco, the head of the Brazilian delegation.

"We are convinced that our possibilities for progress in the field of general and complete disarmament are very slim if we do not succeed at least in reaching agreement on the more direct question of a nuclear cease-fire". (International Legal Materials, p.11)

The seventeenth session of the General Assembly highlighted this question, and it is all the more important that our Conference should now orient its work within the framework of resolution 1762 (XVII). In that resolution the General Assembly -- which in this is only interpreting public opinion throughout the whole world -- condemns all nuclear weapon tests and asks the interested Powers to cease all tests immediately and in any case not later than 1 January 1963, in whatever environment; to arrive, before 1 January 1963, on an agreement on the prohibition of tests, if possible in all environments, or at least of those for which control is not necessary, in which latter case they should conclude also a provisional arrangement to suspend underground tests; and to conclude as early as possible a final treaty prohibiting explosions in all environments.

We have already seen that the suspension of tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water does not depend on any particular machinery but solely on the good will of the nuclear Powers and on their proper understanding of their true interests and the interests of the entire world. The role of our Conference in this field is therefore essentially that of expressing world public opinion to the nuclear Powers.
However, it is quite different with underground tests, a matter which raises not only political difficulties but also those of a technical nature. The eight-Power memorandum represents an attempt to emerge from the deadlock in which the negotiations find themselves. Unfortunately, as we stressed at the United Nations General Assembly on 20 September 1962, the eight Nations "follow with concern the effort towards a logical construction through which the representatives of the two major blocs seek to give different interpretations to the suggestions put forward, with the avowed purpose of reaching agreement". (UN/125, p.11)

The memorandum -- now endorsed by the General Assembly, which qualified it as being a solid, adequate and fair basis for negotiation -- stresses the existence of the possibility of establishing through agreement a continuous observation system with efficient control on purely scientific and apolitical bases. A commission of scientists would examine the data provided by the observation posts and could, in the case of suspicious events, be invited to visit the areas where there was doubt. The parties to the treaty would be free to fix lines of action on the basis of reports furnished by this international commission. Those are the elements available to us in orienting our work in its third phase.

I should now like to explain the position of the Brazilian delegation with respect to the various points which are of concern to us.

First: Brazil cannot admit the legality of nuclear tests, in whichever form they may be, and does not recognize the right of any Power to carry out such experiments, whatever the reason. We protested when the Soviet Union resumed its tests last October; we protested again when the United States announced last May its intention of conducting a new series of tests; and we protested anew when the Soviet Union began its last test series. As for as Brazil is concerned, all nuclear tests are reprehensible, whatever their origin. The first paragraph of resolution 1762 A (XVII), which "condemns all nuclear weapon tests", fortunately places the authority of the United Nations General Assembly behind our point of view.

Second: Brazil wishes to have a permanent and total suppression of nuclear tests in all environments, and does not forget that the final purpose of this Conference is the conclusion of a general treaty that will prescribe all tests for all time. However, present difficulties make us realize that this ideal goal can only be achieved after numerous and considerable obstacles have been overcome.
Third: consequently, Brazil will raise no objection to temporary or partial solutions so long as they represent real progress and do not constitute simple tactical or polemical manoeuvres as part of the process of the cold war.

Fourth: the General Assembly, in asking the nuclear Powers to end their tests as soon as possible and at the latest by the cut-off date of 1 January 1963, as stated in resolution 1762 A, paragraph 2, counts on our full support. We pointed out in the First Committee on 1 November last that it does not seem to us that the fact of a favourable response to the appeal for immediate suspension implies the setting up of an indefinite and uncontrolled moratorium by the nuclear Powers, as some allege to be so. In fact, the resolution calls for immediate negotiations for the purpose of agreements that would obviously be controlled. The immediate cessation of tests, if it were accepted, would be but a first step, with a beneficial psychological effect, designed to facilitate these negotiations.

Fifth: Brazil also considers that the idea should not be rejected of a limited moratorium whereby the nuclear Powers would agree to suspend testing as long as negotiations on a general treaty for the cessation of tests were in progress and would agree on the question of an effective control of that suspension. Naturally, we would welcome any agreement, whatever its nature, between the nuclear Powers on the duration of the moratorium and on the nature and degree of control necessary.

Sixth: It is in this spirit -- which we believe to be realistic -- of accepting partial solutions that the Brazilian delegation, from the time of its first statement on 16 May 1962, has asked the nuclear Powers why they did not seriously examine the possibility of immediately suspending tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, in connexion with which there does not seem to exist any insurmountable difficulty on the question of control or its uselessness. Paragraph 5 of resolution 1762 A (XVII) contains a provision in the same sense, although it links an agreement with a provisional arrangement suspending all underground tests on the basis of the eight-nation memorandum and taking into account other proposals presented at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly.

Seventh: With respect to underground tests, we hope that the differences between the two blocs will progressively diminish. From now on, we could envisage the possibility of extending the area of agreement to a definitive portion of the field of underground tests because it appears that the detection and identification of explosions beyond a certain yield no longer give rise to insurmountable problems.
Thanks to the progress of technology, that threshold could be progressively moved back to cover explosions which would be progressively lower in yield, and one could therefore come down to levels corresponding to an almost negligible military consideration. This point is extremely important, in our view, because such a progressive formula would permit us to do away, to a great extent, with the divergences of view that exist today and which essentially centre around the question of control.

Eight: all this does not in any way mean, of course, that Brazil would support an uncontrolled moratorium or a control established without a prior agreement. Our statements, both in the General Assembly of the United Nations and in this Conference, and our suggestion on the establishment of a technical committee for the scientific study of this problem have, I hope, rendered our position perfectly clear. Once again, our position is in harmony with the memorandum of the eight nations and with the recent resolution 1762 (XVII).

With regard to the last few questions, we have examined with much interest the suggestions formulated here by various delegations, and especially those of Sweden, India and Mexico. Mr. Padilla Nervo has provided us with interesting suggestions regarding the essential provisions which a temporary agreement -- or the final agreement which is our purpose -- could contain. As far as Mr. Edberg is concerned, he stressed in particular that it would be possible to establish a scientific commission without awaiting the final drawing up or entry into force of a complete comprehensive agreement. One of the advantages of such an international scientific provisional or interim commission would be that it would make clearer the question that is now being widely debated of the value of the detection and identification work of the nation stations that exist today. Such a system would fall squarely within the framework of the eight-nation memorandum. Mr. Lall rightly stressed the renewed importance of that document, in so far as it constitutes the only basis of negotiation recommended by the General Assembly of the United Nations, although other bases which we should not reject out of hand could naturally be forthcoming.

The Swedish formula merits our support, and it is fully in harmony with the ideas expressed by Brazil in the sixteenth and seventeenth sessions of the General Assembly, as well as around this table. Brazil has, in fact, always considered that control is both a political and a technical process, and were the latter aspect to be neglected the political aspect would suffer thereby. At the thirty-ninth meeting
of the Conference on 18 May Mr. de Mello Franco said:

"We think it would be advisable ... to set up, under the auspices of the Conference, a specialized technical body to study control problems and to submit suggestions on the subject in due course." [ENDC/PV.39 p.20]

That proposal was renewed on 12 June in the following terms:

"In our view, the political aspect of control merges with the actual negotiation of the disarmament treaty and is thus necessarily an essential issue at this Conference; but the technical aspect of control can, even to a certain extent, be the subject of scientific studies parallel to the work of this Conference, though they can, of course, be carried out under its auspices and supervision." [ENDC/PV.54 p.23]

During the initial phases of the general debate in the seventeenth session of the General Assembly, on 20 September, Mr. de Mello Franco declared:

"... we are more and more convinced that political negotiations on disarmament simply cannot continue to be carried out in a technical vacuum."

[UN/PV.1125 p.12]

Consequently we support the suggestion made by the representative of Sweden -- which, by the way, could be combined with other proposals. It appears to us to be an eminently practical proposal. For instance, one could advocate a system within the framework of paragraph 5 of resolution 1762 A (XVII), in accordance with which the nuclear Powers would enter into an agreement to suspend tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water and adopt a limited moratorium of, say, six months' duration regarding underground tests. During the same period of time the scientific commission could pronounce itself on the nature and degree of the truly necessary control for the permanent banning of that type of explosion.

The delegations of the eight non-aligned nations have done, and continue to do, everything in their power to facilitate negotiations between the nuclear Powers. It is for the latter now to pronounce themselves and to demonstrate the spirit of mutual understanding and compromise for which an urgent call is made in resolution 1762 (XVII). Either they will remain frozen to their present positions, rejecting the resolutions of the United Nations and disappointing the hopes of the entire world, alienating the greater part of the population of the world, or they will recognize that the divergences which separate them in this field are far from being essential, that solutions of wise compromise cannot threaten the requirements
of their sovereignty and security, and that the continuation of the armaments race constitutes a much graver risk than the risk that would flow from a suspension of their tests.

In addition to what I have said, resolution 1762 (XVII) of the General Assembly invites the nuclear Powers to reach an agreement in conformity with "the vital interests of mankind", and not with those -- which, by the way, are not well understood -- of their defence. Naturally, past experience does not allow us to be very optimistic, and that is why I repeat that we are open to all and any constructive proposals, whatever their origin and whatever their nature, be they for temporary or partial solutions. The same applies to the question of disarmament, where Brazil would prefer not to await the elaboration of a definitive treaty before announcing itself in favour of the demunuclearization of certain regions of the world, in particular Latin America. The two questions are closely interrelated, and if we cannot reach an agreement on the question of tests, which is at once so limited and so serious, we must recognize that discussions on general and complete disarmament are useless, utopian and vain.
Mr. Lipskii (Czechoslovakia) (interpretation from Russian): I should like to state our position on the question under discussion, to comment on the possibilities of solving this matter and to make a few remarks on certain points put forward during the course of the discussion.

In the statement I made on 28 November I have already said that we fully share the views of all those delegations who strive for the speediest agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests. In this connexion, I also mentioned the need to strive for a final solution of this problem based on principles and that we should not be content with partial or halfway measures which would not ensure the complete cessation of nuclear weapon tests but, on the contrary, would leave the door open for the continuation of the nuclear weapon race.

The position we have taken up completely in line with the views of the overwhelming majority of United Nations Member States as expressed in the oft-referred to resolution 1762 A (XVII) adopted by the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly. The resolution contains three main demands: first, it asks that nuclear weapon tests should cease immediately, not later than 1 January 1963; second, it calls on the parties concerned to continue to negotiate an appropriate agreement and, third, as a basis for such negotiations the resolution endorses the eight-nation memorandum of 16 April 1962 (EMDC/28). We give our full support to these demands contained in the resolution and, in particular, to paragraph 2 -- namely, that the nuclear weapon tests should cease immediately and not later than 1 January 1963.

However, in this connexion I should like to dwell briefly on one question to which the representative of the United States, speaking at the eighty-seventh meeting of this Committee, gave considerable attention. I am referring to the relationship between paragraph 2 and paragraph 6 of the operative part of resolution 1762 A (XVII) (EMDC/63). The representative of the United States, in his brilliant speech, accused the representatives of the socialist countries of trying to emphasize paragraph 2 to the detriment of paragraph 6, trying to show in this way that the real purpose of the resolution was to ensure a new moratorium to start on 1 January 1963. In order to make myself quite clear, I should mention that Mr. Dean did not use such improper terms -- in his view -- as "socialist countries" or "socialist States". He spoke of the "Soviet bloc", according to his terminology. But what matters is that in this instance Mr. Dean is addressing his arguments to the wrong people.
As everyone is aware, resolution 1762 (XVII) was not sponsored by the Soviet Union or by other socialist States; it was sponsored by an important group of thirty-seven neutral States. Consequently, it is the interpretation which they place upon this resolution which should be the determining factor. Perhaps I may be permitted, therefore, to quote statements made by certain representatives of the neutral countries in the seventeenth session of the General Assembly, in which they considered precisely the question of the relationship between paragraph 2 of the resolution and paragraph 4 of the Canadian amendments (A/C.1/PV.1261, p.31), the gist of which has since been included in paragraph 6 of this resolution.

The representative of Iraq, for instance, paid considerable attention to this matter and he stated, *inter alia*:

"We shall very carefully the statement of the representative of Canada yesterday in order to find the exact meaning of the new additional paragraph which he proposed, particularly in relation to paragraph 2 which he does not propose to amend. Paragraph 2, in the view of many, if not all, of the sponsors of the thirty-seven Power draft resolution is the key paragraph of the whole draft resolution. The sponsors of the resolution attach the greatest importance to the cessation of all tests by 1 January 1963. As the representative of India stated yesterday, this is the central fact which emerged from the whole debate in the First Committee this year." (A/C.1/PV.1262, pp. 47-50)

Similarly, the representative of Ethiopia, speaking during the course of the same meeting, stated:

"As far as I am concerned, I do not see any connexion between amendment 4 and the old operative paragraph 2. The cut-off date must stand as it is." (ibid., p. 66)

I could quote from other statements as well, statements made by some of the co-sponsors of this draft resolution. But it seems to me that the passages I have just quoted illustrate sufficiently the views of the sponsors of resolution 1762 (XVII) and of the overwhelming majority of the United Nations Member States with regard to the appeal contained in paragraph 2. The substance of this appeal in our view is as follows: that as from 1 January 1963 all nuclear weapon tests should cease, whether an appropriate agreement has been concluded by that date or not. The precise purpose...
is to achieve an actual cessation of nuclear weapon tests before the conclusion of a formal agreement in order to create a more favourable atmosphere for a final solution of the problem. This is an appeal which, in our view, reflects the feelings of the overwhelming majority of the United Nations Member States and it has our full support.

We are in complete agreement with the next provision in resolution 1762 (XVII) which describes, as a reliable basis for the negotiations on the final cessation of all nuclear weapon tests, the eight-nation joint memorandum of 16 April 1962. I shall come back to this question later.

In the course of the discussions in this Committee it has been stressed repeatedly that at the present time we have favourable conditions for reaching an agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests.
I believe there is sufficient ground for assessing the present situation in this way. There is really a general consensus of opinion that the time has come to cease all nuclear weapon tests. This can be concluded, at least, from statements made in this Committee by several representatives.

There has been considerable narrowing down of the differences between the two sides and this was particularly emphasized in the messages recently exchanged between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev, and the President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy. There are also agreed views on the possibilities for precise detection and identification of tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, without establishing an international control system and without compulsory on-site inspection. However, underground tests still remain an open problem because the Western delegations continue to advocate their view that such tests cannot be effectively distinguished from natural seismic events, and at the present time this is a main obstacle in the road to final agreement.

In our view, in the present stage of science and technology, the question of detection and identification of underground tests cannot be considered as insoluble. We believe that, in this connection, we have a positive factor in the possible use of the automatic seismic stations which have been referred to repeatedly in our discussions. Consequently there should be nothing to prevent a final agreement on the cessation of underground tests as well, provided all parties have sufficient good will for such an agreement.

We cannot omit mentioning the fact that, in view of the unwavering position of the Western Powers, the Soviet Union, in November 1961, stated its willingness to agree on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, it being understood that negotiations on the prohibition of underground tests would continue and that for the duration of such negotiations all the parties would renounce the carrying out of underground tests until such time as final agreement should be reached on a mutually acceptable basis. However, this offer by the Soviet Union has not met with support on the part of the Western nuclear Powers.
In this connexion, I cannot but draw the attention of the Committee to the stubborn efforts by our Western colleagues who, on the one hand, try to put the responsibility for the existing difficulties upon the socialist countries, and particularly upon the USSR, and, on the other hand, try to pose as advocates of a speedy solution of the complex problem of nuclear tests. We must note as particularly significant in that respect the statement of our United States colleague, Mr. Dean, in the course of our eighty-seventh meeting on 5 December, 1962. Our Western colleagues continue to assert that the narrowing down of the differences is entirely due to the flexible attitude of the West while, according to them, the position of the socialist delegations remains unchanged, and the United States representative, in the course of our meeting on 5 December, made amazing efforts in trying to prove that the Western Powers are prepared to accept any of the four alternative solutions for the problem of the cessation of nuclear tests while, according to him, the socialist countries close the doors to every one of the four possibilities.

Let us take a look at the facts and let us compare the alternative proposals mentioned by Mr. Dean with the basis of our negotiations, once again clearly specified in the United Nations resolution 1762 (XVII), namely, the eight-nation memorandum. As the first and second alternatives, the United States representatives referred again to the United Kingdom-United States proposals of 27 August 1962, one for the prohibition of all tests under international control, including compulsory on-site inspection, and the other for the partial solution of this problem which, as I mentioned earlier, would permit the Western Powers to continue underground tests. (EMDC/58 and EMDC/59).

But the United States is wrongly accusing socialist delegations of slamming the doors on the possibility of an agreement. It has been possible for us in the past to show that the Western drafts of 27 August, 1962 could not serve as a basis for an agreement because they were only new expressions of the old position to which the Western Powers stubbornly cling. The proposal as contained in document EMDC/58 is in contradiction to the eight-Power memorandum because it is based on the concept of international control including compulsory on-site inspection and the Western Powers know very well that on that basis there can be no agreement. Their second proposal is also unacceptable because it would make
it possible to continue the nuclear weapons race and this is contrary not only to the spirit and the letter of the eight-nation memorandum but also to the spirit and letter of resolution 1762 (XVII).

The position of the Western Powers in their proposal of 27 August could be summarized as follows: either cessation of all tests on the Western conditions, namely, including international control and compulsory on-site inspection, with the risk of espionage involved for the socialist States, or a partial solution which would enable the Western Powers to acquire unilateral military advantages in the field of underground tests, in which they are interested in their desire to perfect certain types of nuclear weapons. And this is what they call meeting the views of the other side.

And what has happened to the eight-nation memorandum which they assert is included in their proposals? There is no trace of it left.
I believe it is appropriate to recall that, while the Soviet Union and the other Socialist States immediately accepted the eight-Power joint memorandum (ENDC/28) as a compromise basis for our negotiations, the Western Powers refused to do likewise; and it is only under certain pressure that they recognize this memorandum as one of the bases of our discussions. Further, by setting forth their proposals dated 27 August (ENDC/58 and ENDC/59) they have thereby rejected this memorandum, and it ceases to be even one of the bases of our discussions.

The representative of the United States now sees a third alternative in the so-called "temporary solution", which certain other representatives have referred to here. Let us suppose for one minute that our main task at the present time is not to find agreement on a final and immediate cessation of all nuclear weapon tests but is rather to arrive at some temporary decision. A temporary solution, whatever its nature, if its purpose is to overcome the existing difficulties, cannot include the principle of compulsory on-site inspection. There is really no need to repeat once again that it is precisely the unjustified demand for compulsory on-site inspection which is now the main obstacle on the road to agreement. Consequently, the meaning of a temporary solution should be to avoid this roadblock.

It has already been said here at this Conference -- and we fully agree -- that the demand for compulsory on-site inspections tagged on to a temporary solution does not carry any logic; that it would not contribute towards overcoming the existing obstacles and would only postpone the achievement of our main goal, which is the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests.

I should like to emphasize the fact that in its proposal of 28 November 1961 the Soviet Union also put forward a temporary solution, namely the cessation of nuclear weapon tests until such time as complete agreement is achieved in the final solution. I therefore think that the representative of the United States is really trying, in and through his statement, to break down an open door.

However, I submit that the very limit was reached by Mr. Dean in the course of his statement when he came to his fourth so-called alternative. This was the qualification that he gave to the eight-Power joint memorandum. Surely the representative of the United States did not really believe he could prove that the socialist countries and the Soviet Union have not in fact adopted the principles contained in that memorandum.
Then, on the other hand, the representative of the United States reasserted the fact (ENDC/FV.87) that the eight-Power joint memorandum played an important role in the development of the comprehensive treaty of the United Kingdom and the United States (ENDC/58). However, it would be vain and a waste of time for me to demonstrate how threadbare are the arguments adduced by the representative of the United States.

However, in this connexion, I should like to quote from the first report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to the United Nations (ENDC/42). As we all know, that report was adopted by all delegations, including the United States delegation. Section V, paragraph 2, reads:

"Subsequently, on April 16, the delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, Nigeria, Sweden and the U.S. in the 21st Plenary meeting submitted a Joint Memorandum..."

The paragraph goes on to say:

"In its statement on April 19, 1962 (ENDC/32) the Soviet Government expressed its willingness to consider the proposals set out in the Memorandum as a basis for further negotiations. The United Kingdom and the United States accepted the Joint Memorandum as one of the bases for negotiations."

(ENDC/42, p.4)

Thus, ineluctably, we see the facts showing us who did, and who did not, adopt the eight-Power joint memorandum.

In fact, the Western Powers never adopted the eight-Power joint memorandum as a new -- and I stress the word "new" -- compromise basis for negotiations that would make it possible to move forward; they have stuck to their former positions, which today impede our progress towards an understanding or an agreement. Consequently, if any country has to revise or re-think its policy, "or the course of irresponsible activities", then I would ask that the representative of the United States, Mr. Dean, should rather turn to his own squad. That would really be something useful and would also be a response to the aspirations of the peoples who call for a once and for all solution to be provided to the question of nuclear tests.
The very discussion at the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly and resolution 1762 (XVII) have once again confirmed us in our beliefs, which have been repeatedly expressed here, that in the present atmosphere the most adequate and appropriate basis for the achievement of an agreement, and a comprehensive and final decision of the question is to be found in the eight-Nation joint memorandum of 16 April 1962. Therefore, we can only agree with the representative of India, Mr. Lall, to the effect that neither resolution 1762 (XVII) nor any other resolution puts forward any other basis for negotiations, and that we ought to take into account the fact that we should move forward on the basis of the eight-Power joint memorandum.

The positive aspect of this eight-Power joint memorandum, which in its first and sixth paragraphs calls for a final cessation of all tests, is the fact that it was put forward as a compromise platform with the purpose of overcoming the existing differences of opinion among the nuclear powers.

We are of the opinion that the only correct course is to stand fast on the compromise basis set forth in the eight-Power joint memorandum, which is the course that can and will lead us to the accomplishment of our task -- that is to say, the cessation of all nuclear tests -- and that any retreat from the essence of compromise contained in this memorandum, far from facilitating the solution of the problem, would destroy the acceptable compromise basis that we achieved and would consequently be a retrogression rather than a progression.
In conclusion, I would like to express just one more thought, and that has to do with the manner in which the Western press and radio report our activities. Some of these statements that we have listened to round this table seem to be an attempt to lend to our negotiations a failure psychosis, and to charge the Soviet Union with the responsibility for this failure, as a result of which it will not be possible to arrive at an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. We pose the question: Why is this propaganda campaign necessary? Surely it cannot provide us with a favourable climate in which we can work. This is far from being so -- though perhaps such a campaign is a psychological preparation for the continuation of nuclear weapon testing after 1 January 1963. If this were to be the case, this is a situation which cannot but cause apprehension in our minds.

However, we prefer to look forward with optimism, and believe that in the course of further patient negotiation, especially between the representatives of the nuclear Powers, it will be possible to seek out a mutually acceptable basis for an agreement. This optimism of ours, to a significant extent, is justified by one fact repeatedly stressed around this table, and that is that a significant reapprochement has taken place in the positions of the nuclear Powers, notwithstanding the fact that certain problems still remain pending.

In this connexion, I would like to call the Committee's attention to certain facts that we have learned about quite recently from the Press. Here I would like to refer to the joint declaration of the United States and the USSR with regard to the social and economic consequences of disarmament unanimously endorsed by the Second Committee at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly. I also have in mind statements made by leading representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union in the First Committee with regard to co-operation in the utilisation of outer space for peaceful purposes. We consider that such events can only encourage us to redouble our efforts, and give us fresh hope.

Consequently, I cannot agree with the rather pessimistic conclusions of the United States representative who said that all doors seem to have been closed. We have before us the eight-Power memorandum (ENDC/28), a document endorsed by the General Assembly as "a sound, adequate and fair basis for the conduct of negotiations" (ENDC/63, p.2), and one of the nuclear Powers, in this instance the Soviet Union, has adopted this memorandum as a basis for negotiations. In our view it would be far from wise on our part not to utilise to the maximum all the possibilities this memorandum
offers us in order to do away with the last obstacles, and thus create all the necessary conditions for a mutually acceptable agreement.

Mr. Cavalletti (Italy) (interpretation from French): In the course of our meeting on 3 December (ENDC/FV.86) the Italian delegation stated in a preliminary fashion its views on the question at issue. I would like to come back today to the question which occupies us, and to consider it in greater detail with the help of the important and interesting statements we heard in the course of the eighty-sixth and eighty-seventh meetings.

In the first place, I wish to refer once again to the draft partial treaty (ENDC/59) put forward by the United States and the United Kingdom on 27 August 1962 prohibiting nuclear weapon tests which produce radio-active fallout. As the Committee knows, our delegation, while hoping for an agreement prohibiting all nuclear weapon tests, attaches also considerable importance to this proposal because, if it were accepted, a serious danger to humanity would be eliminated, and also because an agreement not involving control should be easily implemented.

Unfortunately, this has not materialised so far. On the contrary, the Soviet delegation, with the support of the other Socialist delegations, has shown determined opposition to such an agreement. One might even say that the Soviet delegation is not sensitive to humanitarian considerations which militates in favour of the immediate prohibition of tests producing radioactive fallout. The Soviet representative, Mr. Tsarapkin, speaking at the eighty-sixth meeting, enumerated a long list of reasons why, in his view, there should be an agreement on the cessation of all nuclear tests. But he did not even mention in his list the danger of radio-active fallout, as if that terrible threat to human genetics did not exist. The other delegations of the Socialist States have also glossed over this question which, in my view, is most important. They endeavoured to find support for their negative attitude by drawing attention to the views of certain non-aligned States, but all those that have followed this debate know that it is the non-aligned States who have been advocating the prohibition of at least the most dangerous tests.

In this regard I should like to quote from a speech by the representative of Burma, Mr. Barrington, on 3 August in which he referred to tests causing radio-activity. Mr. Barrington referred to a speech made by the Foreign Minister of Canada and quoted him as having said on 24 July:
"All this testing is sheer madness, polluting the air human beings must breathe, endangering the lives of generations yet unborn and possibly leading to the destruction of civilization."  (ENDC/FV.65, p.14)

Mr. Barrington himself went on to say:

"In short, all nuclear tests are nothing short of aggression against humanity ... With the possible exception of the smallest underground tests, whose military value seems doubtful, nuclear tests have a habit of announcing themselves. If, with that tremendous advantage, we are unable to put an end to nuclear tests forever, it is difficult to see how we can hope to make any progress ... "  (Ibid. p.15)
I quote Mr. Perrington because on Wednesday last you, Mr. Chairman, speaking as representative of Bulgaria, referred especially to statements made by the delegation of Burma, but I could quote also the clear affirmations of other non-aligned delegations in favour of the agreement in question. Moreover, it was precisely to support and reinforce the desire of the non-aligned States that my delegation proposed on 15 August 1962 the conclusion of a partial treaty.

I said at the eighty-sixth meeting that my delegation did not consider convincing the arguments of the socialist States against the conclusion of a partial treaty. I should like to note in passing that the representative of Poland stated, also at that eighty-sixth meeting, that I had said that I did not find convincing the arguments advanced by the Soviet delegations "in favour of stopping tests in all environments" (PROV/IV.86, p.76), which is not the same thing. That I find unconvincing are the arguments against a partial treaty. I maintain this view in spite of the efforts by Mr. Tserapkin at the eighty-fifth meeting -- efforts which were supported by your statement, Mr. Chairman, and by that of the representative of Romania at the eighty-sixth meeting. Unless I am mistaken, the delegations of the socialist States have given the following reasons to explain their attitude.

First, a partial treaty, they say, would legalize the continuation of underground tests. This argument of the socialist States is tantamount to saying that the present state of affairs, in which there is no agreement, legalizes all tests. From a legal standpoint, this argument holds no water. Indeed, the existence of an agreement in one sector does not legalize anything in a different sector where no agreement exists. It is obvious that in the second sector the pre-existing and de facto situation would simply continue. In any case, if we cannot conclude even a limited agreement, the arms race will continue in all the environments, including the atmosphere, with the testing of weapons much more deadly than those which can be tested in caves.

Secondly, if underground tests continue, the representatives of the socialist States tell us, other States may consider themselves entitled to carry out tests in all environments. It seems obvious to me that the present situation, where there is no agreement at all, is much more dangerous, and that, in contrast, even a partial agreement would act as a valuable brake on other countries intending to begin tests.
Thirdly, the Soviet delegation stated that even if a partial agreement were concluded the arms race would continue and that, consequently our concern for the health of the human race was misplaced and tendentious. Mr. Tsarapkin asked:

"... what will be the genetic situation if tens of millions of human beings are killed by nuclear war?" (ENDC/FV.86, p.101)

I would reply to Mr. Tsarapkin that fortunately this danger is only hypothetical and we know that our rulers in their wisdom will do everything possible to avoid it. On the other hand, the genetic damage due to atmospheric tests constitutes a real and present danger even in time of peace and it often affects populations that are not participating in military alliances. These are human beings who dwell quietly in their own countries but, without any armed conflict or war, they are running a mortal danger.

Fourthly, Mr. Tsarapkin said that a partial treaty

"would bring clear military advantages to the side which had made underground explosions one of its main methods of testing nuclear weapons ..." (ENDC/FV.86, p.51)

That is a point which is worthy of consideration. It may be that the United States, mindful of the genetic dangers of atmospheric explosions, was at pains to limit such atmospheric tests by organizing experiments which were more costly but which did not produce radioactive fall-out, while the Soviet Union preferred the large and dangerous explosions in the atmosphere. If that is so it is still to be noted that the Soviet Union, in rejecting a humanitarian treaty, adduces purely military arguments which cannot be very well understood by the populations which have been subjected to the radioactive fall-out from fifty-megaton bomb explosions. However, for us in this Conference, the point raised by Mr. Tsarapkin cannot be ignored.

Indeed it seems that the Soviet delegation, in alleging inferiority on the part of the Soviet Union in underground testing, is invoking the principle of equality in armament, one of the principles accepted for the guidance of our negotiations. But, then, why does the Soviet delegation, which invokes here the principle of equilibrium, at the same time reject the principle of control which, together with the aforementioned principle, forms the basis of disarmament? If, instead of affirming that control is "outdated", while refusing to put forward any scientific proof of that affirmation, the Soviet delegation were to accept the necessary investigation in the case of underground tests, in the way it invokes the obligation of the principle of equilibrium
for its tests, no real problem of a limited agreement would even
be before us, because we could conclude, as we so keenly desire, an agreement
prohibiting all tests. But the Soviet Union is blocking the possibility of a
partial agreement by calling for a comprehensive agreement, and then blocking a
comprehensive agreement by rejecting any compulsory inspection. The Soviet
dlegation claims that it has come nearer to the Western position, that the
differences are smaller now and that it is up to the Western delegations now to
make concessions.
(PROVISIONAL)
ENDC/PV.33
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(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

The Western Powers, on the contrary -- in Mr. Tsarapkin's words -- "stick to their old positions."

What is the present position of the Soviet delegation? Mr. Tsarapkin told us last Monday -- and I quote from the verbatim record with certain abbreviations which do not alter the sense:

"The Soviet Union, in the course of the work of the seventeenth session of the General Assembly ... said ... that it was prepared to sign immediately an agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space, including in such an agreement a simultaneous undertaking to continue negotiations on the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests. The Soviet Union said further that it would sign this agreement providing it contained an undertaking not to carry out such underground tests for the duration of the negotiations ... ." (ENDC/PV.86, p.56)

Let us now see what was the position of the Soviet Union at the beginning of our Conference; I quote from the Soviet memorandum of 19 March last:

"... the proposals made by the USSR Government on 28 November 1961 ... provide for the immediate prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space, and for the exercise of mutual control through the national detection systems of States." (ENDC/73, p.14)

A little further on the memorandum states:

"... the Soviet Government proposes that a moratorium should be imposed on such explosions" -- that is, underground nuclear tests -- "until an appropriate control system has been developed ..." (ibid.)

I would now like to ask our colleagues from the socialist States, and in particular the representative of Czechoslovakia who spoke this morning to explain to us the difference between those two positions, that of 29 November 1961 and that which the Soviet delegation -- "desirous of meeting the Western Powers, and in complete conformity with the overwhelming desire of the General Assembly to put an end to all tests" -- put before the General Assembly. I should like to know what are the concessions which have been made by the Soviet Union on the problem of tests in the course of nine months of negotiation and what efforts have been made by the Soviet side which have made it possible to narrow the differences. In what
measures has the Soviet Union responded -- I will not say to the requests of the Western Powers, but to the efforts of good will of the non-aligned States. The Soviet delegation may perhaps answer that it accepted the eight-nation joint memorandum as a basis for negotiation. The representative of Czechoslovakia explained to us once again this morning the differences between the words "the basis" and "one of the bases". This is not new, but everyone could see the real and practical value of affirming "the basis" when, as I pointed out last Monday, the proposals of certain non-aligned countries are beginning to put the Conference on the road to a concrete elaboration of certain provisions of the memorandum, the Soviet delegation replies in substance that such proposals are dangerous and cannot help solve our problems. Is this really accepting the memorandum as "the basis" for negotiations?

I should now like to concentrate my attention on the proposals to which I have just referred. It seems to me that they can be divided into two categories. First, there are the proposals aimed at finding a concrete formula for an agreement. In this category can be included, in my view, (a) the Indian proposal to establish an on-site inspection quota while recognizing that for the implementation of these inspections the cooperation of the inspected country is required, (b) the Mexican proposal to establish that if the request for inspection is rejected the parties to the treaty regain full freedom of action.

The proposals could apply either to a final treaty or to an interim agreement of limited duration. I, for my part, consider these proposals to be very constructive because they make it possible to establish the imperative nature of the inspection without which no investigation would have any value and the treaty would not offer sufficient guarantees.

Secondly, there is the second group of proposals aimed at achieving a temporary agreement on underground tests, together with the complete prohibition of tests producing radioactive fallout. In other words, these proposals are aimed at giving effect to the recommendations of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The Italian delegation will naturally give its support to the conclusion of a temporary agreement if that can make it possible to cease immediately all tests, but provided there is a clear and certain agreement including all necessary guarantees. Indeed, it might prove easier to conclude an agreement of limited duration rather than a final treaty, so as to permit the parties to explore the functioning of the inspection and the executive organs before committing themselves finally.
However, such an agreement, if concluded before confidence is completely restored, must include appropriate guarantees; and if guarantees are forthcoming the lessening of tension will go hand in hand with the growth of confidence and with the improvement of detection techniques.

The implementation of a temporary agreement entails the problem of the executive organ. The memorandum, without going into many details, advises the appointment of independent experts, preferably not from the nuclear Powers. The United Kingdom-United States draft treaty suggests the appointment of experts representing governments. In my view, we should try to associate in harmonious collaboration independent scientists and scientists representing governments. We might first appoint a group of independent scientists, as proposed by the delegation of Sweden, and, secondly, invite them to make a report to this Eighteen-Nation Committee.

On a practical plane, our Conference should first study and elaborate the concrete proposals made with regard to inspection, because these might be extremely useful both for a temporary agreement or even for a final agreement. Secondly, we should set up immediately a group of technical experts to help us on the technical side of our work, a group which would then form an executive organ still co-operating with the Eighteen-Nation Committee if, as we hope, we succeed in concluding an agreement, at least a provisional one.

It is to be hoped that the Soviet delegation, which so far has been taking such a rigid and negative attitude, will take this into consideration and study the question of appointing a group of experts; and I believe that we should continue our efforts, without being discouraged, to prepare an agreement on the basis of the joint memorandum (ENDC/23) in the hope that the sense of responsibility which the Soviet Government has displayed in other fields will also be manifested in the field of disarmament.
Mr. OBI (Nigeria): It was the intention of my delegation to make a statement this morning on the subject of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. I regret to state, however, that owing to the unavoidable absence of my leader, Mr. Ibo, as a result of the London fog, my delegation cannot make its statement this morning as planned.

With permission, therefore, we would reserve our right to speak on this subject -- the cessation of nuclear weapon tests -- on Monday, 10 December. As this would be our first statement on this subject since the important deliberations of the United Nations General Assembly, and as my delegation has always been prepared to accord the highest priority and attaches the greatest importance to this subject, we should like to request that our statement on Monday be added to the other documents which are to be attached as an annex to the report submitted by us on Monday to the United Nations General Assembly.

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria)(interpretation from French): It is understood that the representative of Nigeria is to speak on Monday, and the Secretariat has taken note of this request.

Mr. El-ZAYAT (United Arab Republic): On 28 November last Mr. Hassan had occasion to express our delegation's satisfaction and hope -- our satisfaction because of the moderate tone of the statements with which the nuclear Powers opened this new round of talks in Geneva, and our hope that this Committee would be able, as requested, to report on real progress in its work to the United Nations General Assembly on 10 December. We hoped to report that the nuclear Powers were about to conclude the agreements and make the arrangements requested by the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 1762 A (XVII).

We had good reason to be hopeful. During our recess we had witnessed that more difficult, if not necessarily more serious problems had been solved by the nuclear Powers. Apparently there had existed the will to solve those problems; the way to solve them was found. It is not with satisfaction that we speak today. It is certain now that our report on 10 December will not be the report of progress we had hoped it would be.
We have before us the letter of the two co-Chairmen to the General Assembly. I think this letter proves what I have said.

We have listened most attentively to the statements made in this Committee and we have read the verbatim records of the recent meetings of the three-Power Sub-Committee. We were very grateful to Mr. Dean for the résumé he gave us of the work of the Sub-Committee during the recess. We noted that Mr. Taraspin took exception to parts of this résumé. After all this, our conclusion was easy and obvious. We are very far from achieving the goals which are defined in the operative paragraphs of General Assembly resolution 1762 and which are an expression of the hopes of the majority of the peoples of the world, including the peoples of the nuclear Powers themselves.

Had we, as a non-aligned nation, considered our task in this Committee to be that of a mediator or honest broker, our delegation for one would have been tempted, in the light of this conclusion, to announce that we had lost hope and that, in losing hope, we had lost our raison d'être, our reason for being in this conference room. However, we realize that we are entrusted with another duty. There is a fact that cannot be repeated too many times. It is that, together with the four nuclear States -- and one of them is unfortunately not present here -- we live on this planet too. We have the right to remind the nuclear Powers of this fact and to demand of them to stop their tests, which many in this Conference room have labelled as actual aggression against mankind. We cannot do much more, but we cannot do less. We have to go on repeating this again and again.

On 16 April 1962 the eight non-aligned countries in this Committee commended to the consideration of the nuclear Powers a few suggestions and ideas. Those eight nations invited the nuclear Powers to agree on the basis of those suggestions and ideas or, as Mr. Castro of Brazil had occasion to say, on any other basis mutually agreeable to them. The eight-nation memorandum is still valid. It still stands as it was presented, without revision or addition. It was not intended to be, and indeed it cannot be made to be, a weapon in the hands of any party. In our opinion, the only change this memorandum went through was its transformation from a memorandum of eight nations to a memorandum of eighty nations -- the nations which, on 6 November 1962, voted its endorsement in the present United Nations General Assembly.
On the basis of the suggestions and ideas offered in that document, on the basis of the General Assembly directives contained in its recent resolution mentioned above, and after having listened most attentively and appreciatively to all the statements made in this Committee, the United Arab Republic delegation believes that the one stumbling block which is obstructing agreement can be removed only if both sides resolve to carry it away together instead of each one standing off and arguing that it is up to the other one to lift that stumbling block from the way. The "failure psychosis" referred to by the representative of Poland will not be defeated except in this way. This block is well known. To achieve the cessation of all tests -- and my delegation is of the opinion that they are all dangerous and harmful and that they all must be finally stopped -- the two nuclear parties need to be assured that no clandestine tests can be conducted. In the three above-ground environments there apparently exists no difficulty in ascertaining this. In the field of underground tests, the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom tell us repeatedly that they know no way to ascertain this except by on-site inspection.
They concede, however, that science has made and is making every day new strides in the field of remote detection and verification of earth tremors. We now have the text, circulated at the request of the United Kingdom delegation, of the statement made in London in September by six prominent scientists—three from the United States and three from the Soviet Union. The statement clearly says that those scientists

"... have tried to develop new ideas and to formulate concrete suggestions which may facilitate our reaching a general and complete test ban agreement in a short time." (ENDC/66, p.1)

Using as a basis the proposal contained in the memorandum of the eight non-aligned countries regarding the utilization of a world-wide network of standardized seismic stations, manned by nationals of the host country, which would provide an international scientific commission with seismic records, they suggest the use of tamper-proof automatic recording stations, now known as the "black boxes"—a system which they state would "provide a minimal interference with the host country". The international scientific commission, they thought, would "need to request very few on-site inspections".

In earlier statements the delegation of the United Arab Republic has spoken of the practical arrangements which should facilitate agreement on any really necessary on-site inspection. On those occasions we quoted the statement made here on 17 August by the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Kuznetsov, to the effect that the Soviet Union did not exclude the possibility of inviting on-site inspection in certain concrete cases. On 15 August and again on 5 September our delegation proposed that the two co-Chairmen should

"... agree on the modalities and mechanics of on-site inspection in practical and concrete cases." (ENDC/PV.81, p.45)

We said that it might be

"... necessary and practical now to turn to the task of trying to define a little more clearly the conditions, mechanical attributes and modalities of inspection in such concrete cases." (ibid)

We further proposed that

"Among such practical subjects to be reviewed, our co-Chairmen may wish to give effect to Mr. Edsberg's proposal (ENDC/PV.77, p.32), supported by Mr. Barrington on 3 September (ENDC/PV.75, p.8), to discuss the possibility of establishing the international commission envisaged in the joint memorandum, as well as its functions and attributes." (ibid)
The eight-action memorandum further mentions that measures of verification in loco should be the subject of consultation. We submit that the area of difference is now even narrower than when the memorandum was signed. We submit that if the necessary political decision is taken by both sides, our diplomatic efforts will succeed. We also submit that without that political decision no diplomatic effort will succeed.

The representatives of the nuclear Powers have been gallantly defending their respective positions in our meetings during the last two weeks, and no doubt they could go on defending those positions and standing by them with the greatest tenacity and ability as long as it might seem necessary for them to do so. As long as they stick to their gallant stand, however, there will be no move towards agreement. There can be no success. On the other hand, when -- and only when -- the nuclear capitals take the necessary decision, the great abilities of their representatives here will move us quickly towards total and agreeable agreement.

We believe that it would not be useless to submit here for the consideration of the principal parties concerned our present thoughts. We believe that once the necessary political decisions have been taken by the two parties, will be able, first, to reach an agreement to cease immediately tests in all three above-ground environments, provided that they make arrangements to stop underground tests for a mutually agreeable duration; and, secondly, to agree on the establishment by the United Nations, or any of its agencies, of a provisional international scientific commission, which would avail itself of the services of the existing nationally manned observation posts and of all new technical developments in this field, including the suggested automatic recording stations now known as "black boxes". The scientific commission should be given specific terms of reference and powers on which the nuclear parties must agree, including the right to request verification, on the spot, of the nature of any suspicious significant seismic event. Such requests should be seriously and promptly considered by the State concerned, which might give the commission convincing reasons for declining to issue the requested invitation. If the State concerned should fail to give such convincing reasons and to issue the requested invitation, the international scientific commission should communicate that fact, together with its assessment of the given event, to the second party and to the United Nations. Such a communication would free the State or States concerned from the heavy moral obligations undertaken by all parties upon the conclusion and signing of such an agreement.
While the provisional arrangement remained in force for the mutually agreed duration, both nuclear parties would continue their negotiations for the conclusion of a permanent agreement to ban underground tests. It is hoped that before the end of the mutually agreed duration improvements, not only in the scientific field but also in the political-psychological atmosphere, would make on-site inspection, which is objected to by the Soviet Union, really unnecessary.

What would happen if the suggested provisional arrangement ended in failure because of the non-cooperation of one of the parties? What would happen when one party freed the other from its obligations? That question may well be asked. Our answer is simple: we would revert, unfortunately, to the regrettable situation in which we are now, but not to one that would be worse.

Almost at the time that we were leaving this hall after our last meeting, on Wednesday, without much hope of agreement being reached between the United States and the United Kingdom on the one side and the Soviet Union on the other, the Second Committee of the United Nations General Assembly in New York was unanimously approving a declaration made jointly by the delegations of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, urging all nations to plan for the economic and social adjustments that would follow world disarmament. That declaration called upon the governments of all States to multiply their efforts for "a prompt achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control".
We are told that a wave of applause swept the conference room. There was no need to take a vote; agreement was unanimous. In another room, on the same day, Mr. Adlai Stevenson of the United States and Mr. Abrokov of the Soviet Union announced in the First Committee the formal agreement of their Governments on peaceful uses of outer space. These events happened only the day before yesterday in New York on the East River. What is wrong with Geneva and Lake Leman?

We are confident that once such agreements for the banning of nuclear weapon tests are signed they will be respected by their signatories. The necessary climate of mutual trust will be gradually brought about; there will be no cause for the present mutual distrust. It is our conviction -- not only our wishful thinking -- that the nations of the world, including the nuclear Powers, will then be liberated from the fear which today breeds suspicions, necessitates water-tight precautions and thus hinders our progress towards the total banning of these terrible nuclear weapons. The world will be relieved of one of its greatest present worries. General and complete disarmament will then be nearer our reach. Our children may well have a brave new world to build and to enjoy.

Mr. LALL (India): I should like to clear up one small matter now. I am looking at document ENDC/PV.85, page 42, which is part of the record of the statement which I made on 30 November. The staff of the Secretariat and my own delegation tell me that they checked some of this statement against the tape recording which was made and they found that there was a slight error which might be of a material character on page 42. I should like to draw the attention of members of this Committee to this error. I will read what I am reported to have said:

"Could not all the States concerned agree to a certain quota of inspections per annum? Of course that quota could only be fixed in the first instance for the first year, because instruments might improve and other factors might arise which would justify a revision of the stated quota of inspections."

The tape recording shows that what I actually said was not "quota of inspections" but "quota of invitations" in the first instance and also I said at the end "a revision of the stated quota of invitations." That is a point which I believe will be clarified by a revision of the record which will be issued by the Secretariat, but I thought I should bring it out because frequently that part of my statement is referred to.
While I have the floor, may I add a few words. We have now heard statements from almost all the members of this Committee on this matter; we have of course heard that our colleague from Nigeria will make a statement on Monday, we shall look forward to hearing that and we shall do so with the greatest of interest.

I should like to take this opportunity to say that it is now for those directly concerned to consider the many observations and suggestions which have been offered in this room. We would express the hope that both sides might again study all the suggestions which have been made and do so not in a theoretical spirit and not regarding these suggestions as legalistic formulations which clearly they are not intended to be, but as pragmatic observations which might and, I believe, could, help in finding a way out. Indeed, the important thing now and the one that is incumbent upon us is to find a way out. We appeal to the two sides; we urge them to reach agreement in this matter in whatever way they can find mutually acceptable and not to use any observations, suggestions or proposals — including the eight-nation memorandum — as obstacles to agreement. None of these possible ways out has been offered in the spirit of the cold war. I would say to the two sides, "Please do not take them this way". We would ask them in any case to take action that will now result in the stopping of tests on a basis that will endure.

**Mr. TSARAPKHIN** (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): First of all, I should like to correct some representative of Italy in his statement made today. He constructed his intervention in such a way as to make the audience think that the representative of the Soviet Union is in favour of the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere alone. But this is wrong, because the Soviet Union is for the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in all four environments.

Another point I wish to make in the light of the statement made by the representative of Italy is that he said, that in essence he sees no difference between the position of the Soviet Union today in the matter of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests and the position which is set down in the proposal of 27 November 1961 made by the Soviet Union (GEN/DNT/122). I would recommend the representative of Italy to read through the Soviet proposal of 27 November to the very end. I am sure that then he will see a substantial difference between that and today's Soviet proposal. But I can help Mr. Cavalletti; in item 3 of the Soviet proposal of 27 November 1961 questions of control over nuclear weapon tests were considered as an integral part of the control over the implementation of an agreement on general and complete disarmament, whereas today we do not insist on this link-up.
Now I should like to turn to my prepared statement.

In the course of the negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee in Geneva it has become apparent that as yet there are no signs of readiness on the part of the Western Powers to find agreement on a mutually acceptable basis. The delegations of the United States and of the United Kingdom, as has been manifest, especially in the last meeting of the Committee, have tried to reduce the totality of our endeavours to a fruitless exercise in polarics, and the representative of the United Kingdom is constantly striving to fan the flames of the debate and to increase tension here. We should not like to follow his example in that respect, but we cannot ignore the distortions in the position of the Soviet Union which were made by the representative of the United Kingdom, Sir Michael Wright and the representative of the United States, Mr. Dean.

Sir Michael Wright, in the meeting of the 5 December, 1962, tried to present in the most palatable way the position of the West in regard to nuclear tests. He spoke about everything. He spoke of the readiness of the Western Powers to meet the position of the Soviet Union; he spoke of the great number of alternatives which the Western Powers put forward — four alternatives. The attempts of the United Kingdom representative to sugar the Western position might be compared to dipping a rotten apple in sugar candy and offering it for consumption.

Let us see what the representative of the United Kingdom really suggests; let us take those four alternatives one by one.

The first can be brought down to an appeal from the United Kingdom to the Soviet Union to demonstrate and prove how underground tests could be detected by national detection systems, on the understanding that if the Soviet Union could prove and demonstrate this to Sir Michael Wright's satisfaction then the Western Powers would be ready to subscribe to a permanent comprehensive agreement without inspection by 1 January, 1963.

That is a very false approach on the part of the United Kingdom representative and it has been made necessary as a means of technical camouflage of the refusal of the Western Powers to accept a comprehensive treaty based on national systems of detection. The falsity of the approach lies in the fact that the proposal to use national means of detection for purposes of control over the discontinuance
of nuclear tests does not require any special proof or demonstration. Its raison d'être is found in the advance of technical and scientific thought and development which has been confirmed by the subsequent theoretical studies of scientists of the United States, the Soviet Union and a number of other countries.

Moreover, the value and efficacy of national means of detection have been tested and proved by long experience of detecting tests in many environments, including underground. It is strange to hear any question raised by the United States in that connexion, since, over the course of many years, the United States has informed the world about tests carried out by other countries, in other territories, and which were recorded by United States national means of detection. The artificiality of the construction of this approach is painfully obvious.

The United Kingdom's proposed alternative is really aimed at a different objective -- while not binding the Western Powers by any commitment, and leaving the question of discontinuance in abeyance, to lead the sides into intense technical disputes. In effect it is a withdrawal from the principle that would put an end for all time to nuclear testing.

The representatives of the Western Powers, both in the Eighteen-Nation Committee as well as in the Nuclear Sub-Committee, are really using every weapon in their arsenal in order to cover up their retreat from that principle. Those means and methods are mainly of a technical nature, and that is quite understandable, because reference to science or technology is the best way of whitewashing before public opinion the true political essence of the question; and that is why we consistently hear from the West worrying and troublesome demands to the effect that, before a political conclusion can be arrived at, the technical experts of the three nuclear Powers should meet and arrive at a finding as to whether or not national means of detection are sufficient for the detection of all seismic events.

Well, we can imagine in advance what would be the results of such a meeting, especially if we recall that official representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom on many occasions have stated here that, in the opinion of their scientists, national means of detection are not sufficient for effective control and that such means should be complemented by an international system
of control plus obligatory on-site inspection of unidentified events. Given
that attitude of official Western representatives and their experts to the
proposal to use national means of detection, it is quite easy to foresee the
conclusions and results of a meeting of experts. Western experts would not
be satisfied by anything less than an international system of control and
obligatory on-site inspection.

Of course it goes without saying that such a meeting of experts would
necessarily become bogged down in endless disputes, questions, details, speculation,
and would mark time without being able to agree to anything. It is that sad
result which seems to be so highly desirable to the Western Powers, because,
being able to refer to the absence of agreement by the experts on questions of
control, they could then evade a political agreement in that context with respect
to nuclear weapon tests. Therein lies the principal danger of this Western manoeuvre.

Well, we do not wish to have that result in our negotiations. We are
against any attempts on the part of our Western colleagues here to shirk their
responsibility and to avoid a political agreement, placing the responsibility
therefor on the shoulders of technical experts. We propose to defer the
consideration of technical detail until such time as we and our Western colleagues
can agree on questions of principle, upon the main issues which should be the
skeleton of a final agreement on discontinuance for all time of nuclear weapon
tests. It is that approach which we urge, in the name of the success of the
cause we serve.

The sad experience of the past has taught us, in this regard. For instance,
we could remind the Committee of the meeting of the United Kingdom, United States
and Soviet experts for the consideration of the so-called new United States
findings or data. That meeting of experts took place in Geneva in November
and December 1959.
At that time the Soviet scientists disclosed the fragility, the erroneous nature, and often the lack of objectivity of the conclusions arrived at by the United States scientists. This meeting concluded, after endless discussions and disputes, without any conclusions having been arrived at. Although some time later the turn of events substantiated the opinions and stand of the Soviet scientists, at that time -- in December 1959 -- the fact that at this meeting between Soviet and United States experts, differences of view did occur and no agreement was arrived at, I submit, was utilised by President Eisenhower as a pretext for a decision taken by him on 29 December ending the United States obligation with respect to the moratorium on nuclear weapon tests. This decision on the part of the Government of the United States -- as well as subsequent actions taken by France, a NATO ally, which started to test nuclear weapons some months later -- began to form a chain of events or a catalysing agent which spurred the nuclear armaments race forward. We could also refer to certain other technical meetings.

This last experience taught us much and we do not intend to allow a screen of technical research to be used as camouflage by those who wish to prevent in one way or another the discontinuance of all nuclear weapon tests.

The arguments of the representative of the United Kingdom can be summarised as the desire that the Soviet Union should accept compulsory inspection with a quota. It is well known that this is unacceptable, and we have explained why a number of times.

The third alternative offered by the representative of the United Kingdom is to conclude a permanent agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space; while, with regard to underground tests, there would be a so-called interim agreement which could be denounced by the Western Powers at any time, thereby reopening for them the possibility of resuming nuclear weapon tests. Is with regard to the other proposals, Sir Michael Wright, in putting forth his alternative, does not say all. But from the other statements made by the Western representatives it is clear that in their view the interim arrangement should include inspection.

The Western representatives are using strange logic, indeed: they tell us that if the demand for inspection, on which the Western Powers insist, is unacceptable to the Soviet Union, and if this hampers the conclusion of an agreement on a permanent prohibition of nuclear tests, we should conclude an agreement, but that this must include compulsory inspection. Obviously, this cannot work.
Thus the third alternative given by Sir Michael Wright, far from being a forward step, is a backward step. In fact, this proposal for an interim agreement of this nature takes us back to 1958 when the Western Powers were advocating broadly an agreement of this nature, limited in time and with international control and inspection. His proposal would amount to sanctioning the continuation of underground explosions by the Western Powers. I need not reply in detail to this proposal. A reply has already been given by the overwhelming majority of the Member States of the United Nations who, at the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, asked in their resolution that nuclear tests should cease in all environments, and commented on the Western partial proposals.

All of Sir Michael Wright's suggestions lead to the inclusion of an international control system and to compulsory on-site inspection; and for this reason they cannot serve as a basis for agreement. Sir Michael Wright knows all this very well. Nevertheless he found it possible to put these alternatives forward. This is another proof of the complete lack of desire on the part of the Western Powers to conduct negotiations on a mutually acceptable basis.

The representative of the United States, Mr. Dean, was not so generous in putting forward his various alternatives. He told us that agreement is possible on the basis of the two drafts submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom on 27 August 1962. (ENDC/56 and ENDC/59) This means that the United States continues to demand international control and compulsory on-site inspection, and continues to threaten the world with the continuation of underground tests.

As you can see, the Western Powers still stand on their old positions, which preclude the possibility of reaching an agreement. This is the true state of affairs. In vain do the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom try to depict their alternatives as new proposals. Although Mr. Dean said that the eight-Power joint memorandum was taken into consideration in the Western proposals of August 1962, this is, in fact, not so. On the question of international inspection, as well as on certain other questions, the United States and the United Kingdom still maintain their old positions, which prevent the conclusion of an agreement.
Why is it that the United States and the United Kingdom refuse to conclude a comprehensive agreement to banning all nuclear tests on the basis of using national detection systems? They refuse to do so because an agreement based on the use of national detection systems for the purposes of control -- that is to say, without an international network of control posts -- would not afford any legal possibility to the Western Powers to send foreign agents on to the territory of the Soviet Union.

Why is it that the United States did not, in fact, accept the proposals contained in the eight-Power joint memorandum? The United States did not do so because the eight-Power joint memorandum proposes that an agreement should be made on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests on the basis of using, for the purposes of control, not an international control system but the national detection systems. That is the first point. The second point in this memorandum which is unacceptable to the Western Powers is that in fact this memorandum rejects the idea of compulsory on-site inspection -- an idea so precious to the hearts of the Western representatives. This principle is again rejected by the Western powers because it would not afford them any possibility of sending agents into Soviet territory.

We were told here by the representatives of the Western Powers that they have no intention of complying with paragraph 2 of resolution 1762 (XVII) which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 6 November 1962. In this paragraph there is a pressing appeal to the nuclear Powers that all nuclear tests should cease not later than 1 January 1963.
Why is it that the United States and the United Kingdom have openly declared their opposition to this appeal by the General Assembly? Precisely because this paragraph of the General Assembly resolution offers no possibility of sending agents into the Soviet Union, and without such a possibility they are not interested in an agreement. That is why they have clearly announced that they do not intend to comply with this paragraph of the General Assembly resolution but, on the contrary, will continue underground tests. That is why the United States and the United Kingdom have in fact rejected the Soviet proposal to use automatic seismic stations for the purpose of control. They declared at the meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on 5 December (ENDC/PV.87) and at the nuclear Sub-Committee meeting on 6 December (ENDC/SC.1/PV.47) that the question of using automatic seismic stations can be considered only in connexion with international control and compulsory on-site inspection. This position, taken by the Western Powers, amounts in fact to a rejection of the Soviet proposal to use automatic seismic stations for the purpose of control.

Why were the Western Powers in such haste to reject this Soviet proposal? They said that it was because it does not ensure the implementation of their demand for the setting up of a network of international control stations on the territory of the Soviet Union, and because it does not afford the possibility of sending agents into the Soviet Union.

We must note, therefore, that during all this period the Western Powers have not renounced their old position; they have not renounced their old and unacceptable demand for international control and compulsory on-site inspection. In contrast to the unyielding position of the Western Powers, which makes it impossible to agree on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, the Soviet Union has taken a series of steps towards a solution of this problem.

First, the Soviet Union has agreed to accept as the basis for negotiations on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests the proposals put forward by the eight neutral Powers in their joint memorandum of 16 April 1962 (ENDC/28). This memorandum provides for an agreement on a compromise basis since the provisions of the memorandum take into account, to a greater or lesser extent, the views of the West and of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union again confirms its readiness to conduct negotiations on the compromise basis of the joint memorandum.
Further, the Soviet Union, desirous of meeting the views of the Western Powers, announced in the General Assembly and in Geneva its readiness to come to an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water; this agreement to include the readiness of the parties to continue negotiations on the prohibition of underground explosions, as well as a commitment to abstain from conducting underground tests for the duration of the negotiation on the prohibition of such underground tests. This proposal took into account, on the one hand, the suggestion of the Western Powers for an immediate partial agreement, and, on the other hand, the universal demand that there should be no more nuclear tests of any kind anywhere.

The positive value of this proposal by the Soviet Union is obvious. It would make it possible to create a favourable atmosphere and favourable conditions for a speedy and complete solution of the question of the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

Thirdly, the Soviet Union stated its readiness to come to an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests as from 1 January 1963 in accordance with the appeal contained in General Assembly resolution 1762 A (XVII). In the meetings of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament the Western Powers made some attempts to place arbitrary interpretations on the General Assembly's appeal for the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests not later than 1 January 1963. But these attempts were clearly opposed in statements by many representatives here, who referred in particular to the statement by the representative of Mexico, Mr. Padilla Nervo. We need not comment in detail on the clear request contained in General Assembly resolution 1762 A (XVII) that all nuclear tests should cease immediately and not later than 1 January 1963, no matter what may be at that time the state of our negotiations on a final treaty. Commenting on the meaning of this particular paragraph of the resolution the Indonesian representative, Mr. Supeni, who submitted the draft resolution on behalf of its thirty-seven sponsors in the First Committee of the General Assembly, had this to say:

"In case agreement cannot be reached by 1 January, paragraph 2 of the draft resolution requests the nuclear Powers to please stop their tests."

(A/C.1/PV.1253 p.18)

That is the meaning placed on this provision by the co-sponsors of this resolution — the representatives of the neutral States. It was in this light
that this paragraph was adopted by the General Assembly.

Fourthly, in trying to meet the Western Powers and in order to facilitate the conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests, the Soviet Union, after our Committee went into recess, took a new and important step. It suggested that for the purpose of control over compliance with an agreement on the cessation of tests automatic seismic stations should be used as an addition to existing national detection systems.

It is regrettable that the Western Powers did not give an appropriate reception to this Soviet proposal which should facilitate agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. We can draw only one conclusion. The Western Powers keep rejecting all reasonable suggestions aimed at strengthening the effectiveness of control they are not interested in this proposal. There are interested only in compulsory inspection which would open up wide possibilities for intelligence and espionage.
Therefore, it is not by mere accident that as soon as we made our proposal on the use of automatic seismological stations the Western representatives hastened to scuttle this sensible proposal by tacking on to it their old ideas on international control and compulsory inspection. What is happening indeed? As soon as the Soviet Union makes a step to meet the desires of the Western Powers to increase the effectiveness of control, they immediately reply with a backward step, again bringing out compulsory inspection and thereby slamming the door on the possibility of agreement.

We consider that there are in existence adequate national detection systems. In our view, there is no very great need for additional means of control. It is only the Western Powers that still express doubts about the effectiveness of the national detection systems. Why is it, then, that when we try to allay their fears, when we try to meet their views and propose as an additional guarantee the use of automatic seismological stations, they draw away from consideration of our proposal? In fact, as I have shown earlier, they are rejecting this proposal by linking it to compulsory inspection.

For the purposes of control, the use of ideas brought forward at the Pugwash conference offers good possibilities for overcoming the remaining differences and bringing us to a final agreement on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests, but this is something that the United States and the United Kingdom political officials do not wish to recognize. However, it is widely recognized by scientific circles throughout the world. In this connexion it would be fitting for me to refer to a recently published letter from an outstanding British scientist and philosopher, Bertrand Russell. Of course he is not a seismologist, but it is well known that he has wide connexions with many scientists throughout the world. In a letter published in The New York Times of 5 December Lord Russell wrote:

"It is important for Americans to realize that their scientists and Russian scientists have already agreed upon the viability of this arrangement. It is important to recognize that the seismographic station of Harvard University has rigorously declared its confidence in the Pugwash proposal."

"No on-site inspection could give greater security, no on-site inspection is safe against paranoia. ... It is essential that we understand that the pretext for failure to agree has been removed."
"The 'black box' will show beyond doubt any potential violation
of a very small kind. These larger can be detected without it."

The Soviet Government has made the greatest efforts to remove the difficulties
in the way of achieving an agreement that would for all time put an end to all
nuclear weapon tests. We call upon our Western partners to ponder carefully the
state of affairs with regard to the discontinuance of nuclear tests and to revise
their negative position which impedes an agreement on the ending of nuclear weapon
tests for all time. If there is a full realization of the great responsibility
that lies on the shoulders of the nuclear powers, then the road to agreement will
be open.

An agreement on the discontinuance of all tests in all environments can be
facilitated by the four methods I have just outlined to you. That is the course
that will lead us to the quick settlement of all the outstanding questions. As far
as the Soviet Union is concerned, it will with unceasing energy strive for a mutually
acceptable agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, and the Soviet
Union considers that as of 1 January 1963 there should be a halt de facto to all
nuclear weapon tests including underground tests. On this score the General Assembly
expressed itself almost unanimously, as may be seen from paragraph 2 of resolution
1762 A (XVII). That decision should be implemented. All nuclear States should
carry it out unconditionally. The Soviet Union is ready to follow it. It is now
up to the Western Powers. All await their actions. Therefore we call upon the
United States and the United Kingdom to state whether they are ready for their part
to declare here that they will implement this request by the General Assembly.

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): I should like to
inform the members of the Committee that we have reached the hour when we normally
stop our discussion and give the floor to representatives who wish to speak in
exercise of the right of reply. If the Committee wishes to continue the discussion,
we may hear the representative of the United States, the next speaker on the list.
If the Committee wishes to stop the discussion now, we shall have to give the floor
to those wishing to exercise the right of reply.
Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (interpretation from French): On a point of order. I shall be very brief, if you will allow me to answer Mr. Tsarapkin now.

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): I have just said that when we have stopped the discussion we shall pass on to the replies. That is precisely what I said. I am now putting to the Committee the question whether we shall stop the discussion now until Monday or continue the discussion and hear the representative of the United States. I should like to ask the view of the representative of the United States.

Mr. DELAN (United States of America): We have one other important piece of business also: the report of the Committee. As you know, in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 1762 A (XVII) we are supposed to report to the General Assembly by 10 December. There is before the Committee the draft of a report submitted for the consideration of the Committee by the two co-Chairmen. There have also been some other suggestions made this morning with respect to that report. My remarks, if the Committee wishes to listen to them, will be very brief -- I think they will not take more than three or four minutes -- but I think that before we adjourn today we ought to give consideration to that report. Otherwise we shall not be able to report to the General Assembly by 10 December.

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): As the representative of the United States thinks that he can conclude his remarks in three or four minutes, I take it that there are no objections to giving him the floor. However, before doing so I should like to note that we have a draft report prepared by the co-Chairmen to be submitted to the General Assembly. Since we have had this morning certain proposals and suggestions from certain non-aligned countries, it seems to me that the two co-Chairmen should devote a little more work to this draft report and come back to this question on Monday. This would enable us to have a better discussion on this next Monday.
(The Chairman, Bulgaria)

It seems to me that if the two co-Chairmen have no opportunity of discussing the suggestion of the non-aligned countries it will be difficult for the full Committee to come to a conclusion. Does the Committee agree that we leave this question of the draft report to the General Assembly until Monday morning, thereby affording a little more time to the two co-Chairmen? First of all, do the co-Chairmen agree with that suggestion?

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): With great respect, I think we should be in default if we did not agree upon this report of the two co-Chairmen today. I would therefore suggest that we have an afternoon meeting in order to conclude this matter. It seems to me that we ought not to be in default in our report to the General Assembly. I am afraid it will be misunderstood there if we do not present our report in time for it to be circulated to the Members of the General Assembly by 10 December, as required by resolution 1762 (XVII).

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): Are there any other suggestions on this matter, which pertains to our order of business?

Mr. EL-ZAYYAT (United Arab Republic): I have a very short suggestion to make on the report, which I hope can be accepted immediately by the two co-Chairmen and, I hope, also by all the non-aligned countries.

On page 2 of the draft report which we have before us I suggest that we add, after the words "the Conference", four lines from the end of the draft report:

"At the request of certain non-aligned delegations, short precisions of their positions, as they themselves have prepared them, are attached to this letter as Addendum 1 (or Addendum 2) to this report."

It is obvious that the letter would have attached to it all the verbatim records of these meetings. From our experience in the General Assembly, to have about 400 pages circulated to the Members to be read and discussed in one day is really self-defeating. Perhaps, therefore, the two co-Chairmen would be agreeable to circulating the few pages of the draft put before us this morning and sending them as Addendum 1 or Addendum 2 to this letter. I cannot see any reason why they
should object to that. If they would agree, this matter would be disposed of.
I hope that my colleagues from the non-aligned countries will also accept this suggestion.

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): We now have before us another suggestion, from the representative of the United Arab Republic, to attach as an addendum to the report summaries prepared by the various non-aligned representatives of the proposals and suggestions they have made. This would consequently be a summing-up of their respective opinions, and not the report of the Committee. Are there any views or suggestions on this matter and on the suggestion made by the representative of the United States that we meet this afternoon to deal with the report to the General Assembly?

Mr. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): Representatives have heard the suggestion made in the name of the eight non-aligned States that a summing-up from each of them, with their remarks and suggestions, should be attached to the report, but we have not yet heard the views of the co-Chairmen on the suggestion I read out. I would like to hear what the co-Chairmen themselves think about it, and after I had heard them I might possibly wish to make a few remarks.

I myself have no objection to a meeting this afternoon to discuss the report. That, I think, is what you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Dean, if I understood him correctly, have suggested.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): We of course want to resolve this matter. It is one which is agreeable to everybody concerned. The suggestion of the representative of the United Arab Republic, however, does raise some difficulties which might require discussion, and I do want to make my statement today. As I have said, it is very brief. I would therefore like to renew my suggestion of an afternoon meeting in order that I may make my statement and also in order that we may have more time for considering and agreeing upon this report.
The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): The position appears to be that, after the remarks just made on the position of various delegations and taking into account the suggestion of the representative of the United Arab Republic, the representative of the United States, one of the co-Chairmen, proposes that in order that he may be able to make his statement and that we may discuss the various suggestions with regard to attaching additional texts to the report, we should meet this afternoon. Are there any objections? As I hear none, I take it that the Committee decides to meet this afternoon at 4 o'clock.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): I believe, then, that the replies could also wait until this afternoon, but perhaps it will be preferred to hear the replies now.

Mr. CAVALLETI (Italy) (interpretation from French): My reply will be very brief. It will perhaps be better to devote the whole of this afternoon's meeting to the report. I invite the Committee to read the provisional verbatim record of 3 December, where Mr. Tsarapkin said:

"The cessation of such tests" -- that is, nuclear weapon tests -- "is important, not only as a step towards halting the nuclear arms race and as a measure which to some extent would slow down the development of weapons of mass destruction, but the significance of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests lies also in the fact that it would facilitate the solution of our main problem, namely, general and complete disarmament. To reach agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests would be an excellent preparatory step towards the implementation of the most important measures bearing on the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons as part of general and complete disarmament."

(ENDC/PV.88, p. 47)
(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

I fully subscribe to all that, but, as the Committee will see, the danger of radioactive fall-out to the health of humanity is not even mentioned, in the long list of arguments in favour of the cessation of tests. It is from this that I have concluded that the Soviet delegation was not very sensitive to this danger which, in the view of the Italian delegation, is the principle danger. After the statement made by Mr. Tsarapkin this morning, I note that that is not so in fact, and I hope that this will make it possible now for him to try to accept a partial agreement.

As to the other remark he made on the alleged differences between the Soviet Union's position in November 1961 and its position today, I note also that the sole difference lies in the following: that if a system of controlling tests were found which was acceptable to the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union would be prepared to put it into force without awaiting the signature of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. If a system of control is devised acceptable to the Soviet Union, it would be prepared to enter into a treaty on general and complete disarmament without delay. Nine months of negotiation have brought us that one result, according to the statement of the Soviet delegation itself.

The Chairman (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): We shall now adjourn and meet again this afternoon.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its eighty-eighth plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Tarabanov, First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and representative of Bulgaria.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Mexico, Brazil, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Nigeria, the United Arab Republic, India and the Soviet Union.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 7 December 1962, at 4 p.m."

The meeting rose at 1.25 p.m.
CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE EIGHTY-NINTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva on Friday, 7 December 1962, at 4 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. M. TARABANOV (Bulgaria)

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This provisional record contains the originals of speeches in English together with the Conference room interpretation of speeches in other languages.

It is requested that any corrections to the originals of speeches be submitted in four copies (preferably incorporated in four of the single-sided mimeographed copies with which delegations are supplied) by the authorized Liaison Officer of the delegation concerned to the Documents Office, Room A.206. If no corrections are received within four working days from the date of distribution the final version, in which the interpretations will be replaced by translations, will be prepared and issued on the basis of the provisional record.

THE TIME LIMIT FOR CORRECTIONS TO THIS RECORD WILL BE 0900 HOURS ON 14 DECEMBER 1962.
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PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:
Mr. L. PADILLA KERVO
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
Mr. D. GONZALES GOMEZ

Nigeria:
Mr. I.C.N. OBI

Poland:
Mr. M. LACHS
Mr. E. STAHIEWSKI
Mr. W. WIECZOREK

Romania:
Mr. G. UACOVESCU
Mr. H. FLORESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. N. ECUBESCU

Sweden:
Baron C.H. von PLATEN
Mr. M. STAHL
Mr. P. KELLIN
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. A.A. ROSCHCHIN
Mr. I.G. USACHEV
Mr. P.F. SIAKHNOV

United Arab Republic:
Mr. M.H. EL-ZAYYAT
Mr. S. AHMED
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. S. IBRAHIM
Present at the Table (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir Michael WRIGHT
Mr. D.H. BRINSON
Mr. R.C. BETHAM

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. D.E. MARK
Mr. V. BAKER

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN
The CIL-DIAN (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): I declare open the eighty-ninth meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): Today I have just a few very brief remarks to make on the subject of the ban on nuclear weapon tests in all environments by treaty -- a result which my Government sincerely hopes will come about, and soon. At the forty-seventh meeting of the test ban Sub-Committee yesterday the Soviet representative spoke about a number of so-called alternatives that he was offering to the United States and the United Kingdom as bases for agreement on a nuclear test ban treaty. I would like to take this opportunity to emphasise once again that the Soviet Union could have agreement on a nuclear test ban treaty today. Our comprehensive treaty, ENDC/58, is on the table as a Conference document, ready for signature. We are prepared today to sign that treaty, which would ban all tests in all environments for all time. If the Soviet Union will not sign that treaty, which is our preference, we are also prepared to sign our partial treaty, ENDC/59, immediately.

With great respect I submit that the United Kingdom and the United States have made continuous and exhaustive -- and exhausting -- efforts to bring about a constructive agreement on a nuclear test ban treaty. We yield to no one in our desire for such an agreement. Our offer of treaties and our record of research and constructive suggestions in order to conclude a treaty is available for all to see and to read. We are open minded and we are willing to negotiate concerning the terms of a comprehensive treaty agreement as long as the essential principles of an adequate and effective system of detection stations, with modern instrumentation, and a number of obligatory on-site inspections by the commission, are included in it.

At a recent meeting of the Sub-Committee the Soviet representative spoke of the possibilities of using a number of automatic seismic stations on Soviet territory in lieu of detection stations and obligatory on-site inspection as one basis on which agreement might be reached. The Soviet representative was asked a number of pertinent questions by the United States and United Kingdom representatives about important details of that proposal. Each of those details is, of course, of extreme interest to our Governments, because it is only by knowing the details that we will be able to determine exactly what we are agreeing to do.
However, the Soviet representative has refused to answer any of our questions, and merely continues to repeat the negative and unhelpful statement that we should blindly agree in principle to the Soviet proposal -- whatever that may mean -- and that at some time later all the details could be worked out.

However, after a careful review of the verbatim records it appears that the Soviet representative is not proposing that we should merely set up a system of automatic seismic stations as a part of the overall control system. That is not the case at all: let us be clear about that. What the Soviet representative is saying is that the United States and the United Kingdom must agree in principle not only to accept some unclear, undefined system of automatic seismic stations to monitor underground weapon tests, without regard to where they might be located and without regard to the equipment in those stations or to how they would function, but also that the United States and the United Kingdom must accept at the same time, completely and unreservedly, the Soviet view that no on-site inspection would be necessary in any circumstances -- perhaps even that no manned detection stations in the Soviet Union would be required. He is saying that the United States and the United Kingdom must abandon their carefully worked out comprehensive treaty -- which they worked out only after the most careful consultation with their scientists.

Of course our two Governments cannot agree to any such blind arrangement. That would mean that they would be taking on an unknown quantity offered by the Soviet Union on a completely unclear basis and, at the same time, unequivocally giving up all that they and the scientists skilled in the field -- and I repeat "scientists skilled in the field", because there are many scientists -- know to be necessary for adequate, effective and scientific control over the cessation of underground nuclear weapon tests.
In our view, the details of any particular agreement on the cessation of underground tests in the work of the commission are of supreme importance, for only through negotiation of the details can we really know that adequate scientific control will be assured. In this connexion our comprehensive draft test ban treaty (ENDC/55) presents the full details for negotiation and agreement. For our part, we are not offering the Soviet Union some veiled or secret kind of agreement in principle. We have set down all of the details and we are quite ready to agree to them or to negotiate constructively upon them.

In this connexion, I should like to emphasize that we are completely willing to study in a scientific, objective and impartial manner any proposal which the Soviet Union would care to make on automatic seismic stations. Our scientists would be happy to meet the Soviet scientists to discuss how and in what ways automatic seismic stations might most usefully be employed in any control system or what useful purpose they would serve.

I might add that while we are open-minded on the subject of any scientific discussion on the precise usefulness and practicability of these automatic stations, there is no evidence so far available to our scientists, who are skilled in these matters, which indicates that a system of automatic stations could replace completely or substantially a manned network of control stations or could do away with the need for a necessary number of obligatory on-site inspections. Nevertheless, we are ready to study thoroughly and completely any proposal which the Soviet Union would care to make, setting forth in detail what it believes automatic stations should be used for and how it believes these stations can help us in our job of assuring adequate and effective control in the fields of detection, location and identification for the cessation of underground nuclear weapon tests.

I should like to emphasize again that although there has been a great improvement in the field of detection and although there has been improvement in the ability to identify some earthquakes, there has been little or no improvement in the ability to identify seismic events by instrumentation. Let us not be confused about the state of science with respect to the ability to identify seismic events by instrumentation. There has been little or no improvement in that field. We are only deluding ourselves when we confuse the improvements in detection, or our ability to eliminate certain earthquakes, with the ability to identify seismic events; they are a long way from the ability to identify seismic events.
As to these Pugwash papers, there were some brilliant individual scientists there, but if my information is correct some of the people who signed that paper (ENDC/66) were not seismologists.

This morning, at the eighty-eighth plenary meeting, the Soviet representative had some things to say about the Soviet position on on-site inspection. He referred to the statement made by the representative of the United Kingdom on pages 11 and 12 of the record of the eighty-seventh meeting, in which Sir Michael Wright had made it clear that there had once been an agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union on the need for on-site inspection on the basis of the Soviet draft treaty article introduced at the one hundred and eighth meeting of the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests (GEN/DNT/FV.106 p.3). Indeed, as the United Kingdom representative pointed out, in April 1958 Chairman Khrushchev had proposed that there should be a quota of obligatory on-site inspections in the territory of each of the nuclear Powers.

Sir Michael Wright then asked why the Soviet Union had abandoned this proposal for a number of necessary on-site inspections to assure identification of seismic events on 28 November 1961. The Soviet representative replied this morning that the scientific situation had changed since 1959 and that great progress has been made. But time and again we have pointed out that in United Kingdom and United States scientific circles we know of no scientific improvements which make it possible to identify by distant instrumentation all seismic events. We have asked the Soviet Union to send its scientists to meet our scientists in order to discuss and explore these improvements which the Soviet Union alleges have been made, to try to reach a satisfactory agreement. But every time we question the Soviet representative on this score he insists that we must take a political decision and that we must take it blindly; so, unfortunately, we are right back again where we started.

It seems to me that the statement of the Soviet representative is just one more proof of the fact that the Soviet Union, for reasons with which I am not familiar, is just not interested in negotiating a test ban agreement stopping all tests in all environments for all time. My view on this matter was reinforced by one other point made by Mr. Tsarapkin at this morning's meeting. While I do not have the precise verbatim record of the statement available to quote from, my recollection is that in the course of his statement he again tried to make the point
that the only purpose of the United Nations General Assembly resolution 1762 A (XVII) was to institute an un inspected, uncontrolled moratorium after 1 January 1963. In this connexion, he seems to have discarded completely all the other provisions of resolution 1762 A (XVII) and, in particular, paragraph 6 and to have discarded completely both or all of the United Nations General Assembly resolution 1762 B (XVII).

In addition it becomes even more clear from this morning's meeting, that the Soviet Union does not intend to try to comply with paragraph 3 of resolution 1762 A (XVII) (EMDC/53), which urges that a mutually acceptable comprehensive nuclear test ban be negotiated before 1 January 1963. Many of us in this Committee and many members of the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly have made statements concerning this resolution. On balance, the great majority of statements on this resolution have supported the view that the resolution must be read as a whole — each inter-related paragraph in conjunction with every other paragraph. That is the standard rule of construction. I think therefore the record is clear on this and that further Soviet attempts to try to raise some priority for paragraph 2 or to make it some higher law are doomed to failure on the basis of the record alone.
Nevertheless, the Soviet representative concluded his statement by saying just exactly what I had predicted at some of our earlier meetings that the Soviet Union would say. He attempted to make paragraph 2 into an uninspected, uncontrolled moratorium and he demanded to know whether the United States and the United Kingdom would cease tests in accordance with what he alleges to be the request of the General Assembly.

On behalf of the United States delegation, I can give him a clear answer to his question now. The United States will do its level best and will spare no effort to attempt to carry out what it believes to be the purpose and the spirit of resolutions 1762 (XVII) A and B, but the United States will not accept another uninspected, uncontrolled moratorium on underground tests. Our position on that is clear. We have had a sad and unfortunate experience with such unilateral obligations in the past, even though undertaken by the highest authority in the Soviet Union, and we do not intend to repeat that sad experience.

It appears that the Soviet Union has now abandoned all pretense at real negotiations and is trying to bring out some sort of uncontrolled, uninspected moratorium arrangement instead of the test ban treaty which we all desire, by these attempts to pervert the plain and clear meaning of resolution 1762 (XVII).

In further reply to the Soviet representative's question, I should like to ask him a question. Is the Soviet Union prepared now to enter into meaningful negotiations to comply with either paragraphs 3 or 6 of resolution 1762 A (XVII) so that by 1 January 1963 we may reach an effective and workable arrangement on a cessation of all tests? My delegation will await with the utmost interest the Soviet representative's reply to that question.

The Chairman (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): Are there any other speakers on the issue of the cessation of nuclear tests?

Sir Michael Wright (United Kingdom): I should like to reserve my right to intervene later on that subject if it should appear to me later that there is cause to do so.
The CHIRIKOV (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): If no other representative wishes to take part in the general discussion, we can proceed at once to discussion of the adoption of the report to the General Assembly.

Sir Michael Wright (United Kingdom): That is why I asked to speak on both subjects together, if my colleagues will allow me, should the discussion go that way.

The CHIRIKOV (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): There being no further speakers, perhaps I may be allowed to make a few remarks, as representative of Bulgaria, on this morning's discussion.

This morning, the representative of Italy intervened in order to develop certain matters which had been raised earlier by other delegations and he referred to certain statements which the Bulgarian delegation had made with regard to the conclusion of a partial treaty. As will be remembered, we have repeatedly referred to Western statements to the effect that it would be desirable, on humanitarian grounds, to conclude a partial treaty, and in reply to that point we quoted the representative of Burma. This morning, the representative of Italy tried to demonstrate that a partial treaty should be considered as a means of putting an end to tests in the three fall-out environments, in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, and that that would provide a respite for humanity in regard to tests. We have pointed out that the socialist delegations are as desirous as are the Western delegations of seeing the termination of testing in the three environments, so long as there is no danger of humanity being wiped out by a nuclear explosion due to underground testing, which would still continue. After all, if tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water were to end, preparations would still be continuing which might result in a catastrophe.

Is that the end purpose of a partial treaty? Is that what the Western delegations wish to achieve -- that preparations to wipe out humanity should continue quietly and calmly? There is no doubt that the maintenance of underground tests
would allow the nuclear arms race to go on, and if that is what the Western
delegations desire, let them say so clearly before world public opinion. A
partial treaty would necessarily lead to such a catastrophe. That point was
emphasized by various delegations this morning.

Moreover, in referring to certain suggestions made by the non-aligned
countries, the representative of Italy drew our attention to the attitude of
the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union has rejected the suggestions recently
put forward by the non-aligned countries, how does that fit in with the support
which the Soviet Union reiterates for the eight-nation memorandum? That is,
I understand the point which the Italian representative wished to make. I
see that he indicates agreement.

The non-aligned States have declared, in effect, in regard to the suggestions
they have put forward, that their suggestions and observations made in the course
of the recent meetings with regard to an agreement on the discontinuance of
nuclear tests have been made following upon resolution 1762 (XVII) of the General
Assembly of the United Nations. They have again stated that their suggestions
and observations must not be considered as individual interpretations of the
eight-nation memorandum which has been unanimously endorsed by the General Assembly.
Consequently the Soviet Union and the Socialist countries not only have the right to emphasize that they are in favour of the eight-Power joint memorandum (ENDC/28) but they also have the right to ask where the Western Powers stand and why it is that they do not accept the eight-Nation joint memorandum as a basis for negotiations on the discontinuance of tests.

So far as the delegation of Italy is concerned, I believe it should follow what the representatives of the non-aligned States have said and not place its own interpretation on the position they adopt, because the recent statement made by the non-aligned States fits in and should be taken within the context of the eight-Nation joint memorandum. This is the point I wished to make.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (interpretation from French): I merely wish to ask whether it is considered that the proposals referred to by me this morning, and which were put forward by the non-aligned States, are outside, or are in conflict with, the joint memorandum which was submitted by those same non-aligned delegations.

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgeria) (interpretation from French): I can reply to the question of the representative of Italy in one sentence. If he reads the declaration made this morning on behalf of the non-aligned States he will realize what the reply to his question is.

REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgeria) (interpretation from French): We come now to the question of the report to be presented by this Committee to the General Assembly on 10 December on the progress in the negotiations relating to the prohibition of nuclear tests. The two co-Chairmen met and held consultations on this question during the luncheon interval, and with respect to observations made this morning by the representatives of certain non-aligned countries they believe that the report to be presented to the United Nations General Assembly should remain as they have circulated it — in the form of a draft drawn up by the two co-Chairmen. Are there any comments on this?
Mr. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): Since this morning's meeting I have, on behalf of the eight non-aligned States, formally asked the two co-Chairmen to include in their report the suggestions and observations made by each of those delegations in connexion with the co-Chairmen's draft report. We do not agree at the present time to adopt the report as it stands. Consequently we should like to hear the response of the co-Chairmen to the request I addressed to them in the name of the eight delegations.

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): Does any representative wish to make any remarks? Do the co-Chairmen wish to comment on the observations of the representative of Mexico?

Mr. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): The situation is very complex. It appears that the letter from the Eighteen-Nation Committee to the United Nations General Assembly is to be presented as a report. The Chairman has asked representatives if they wish to make any observations with respect to the draft report. I have said that there are such observations to be made.

The delegations of the non-aligned countries are not in agreement with this report as they think that its substance is insufficient. Therefore, they have requested that this report should include the observations that have been circulated. Thus, there is no agreement on this report.

However, if the co-Chairmen refuse to give any opinion on the request we have made, it means that this report is not approved. I therefore request that the United Nations General Assembly should be informed that there was no report because of what happened here -- and our proceedings have been recorded -- and because we did not receive any answer from the co-Chairmen as to whether they did or did not accept the summary of our observations for inclusion in the report.

I think we have every right to know what the co-Chairmen think about this question or issue, which has been formally and officially raised in the name of the eight non-aligned Member States of this Committee.
Mr. DEAN (United States of America): In response to the remarks that have just been made by the representative of Mexico, I believe that the Chairman of this meeting has accurately set forth the agreed recommendations of the two co-Chairmen that the report should be left without addition. These are our reasons. Paragraph 7 of resolution 1762 (XVII):

"Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament ... to report to the General Assembly by 16 December 1962." (A/RES/1762 (XVII)

The report constitutes the Committee's response to the General Assembly's request; and, as you will notice, the provisional verbatim records of the six plenary and three Sub-Committee meetings are enclosed. It is the understanding of the two co-Chairmen, subject to correction, that certain summaries of remarks, which already appear in the verbatim records which are to be transmitted, were proposed to be added.

After careful consideration it did not seem to us to be proper parliamentary procedure to submit summaries of a portion of a provisional verbatim record without summarising the entire verbatim record. It seemed to us that that procedure would involve us in a great deal of time and work, and that this, therefore, would not be necessary to permit us to approve the report to the United Nations General Assembly by this afternoon. But of course the Committee is the judge of its own procedures, and the report is simply the recommendation of the two co-Chairmen.
Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): I also understood the situation as regards the opinion of the co-Chairmen was as conveyed to the Committee a short time ago by you Mr. Chairman. Therefore, I do not fully understand the meaning of the question raised by the representative of Mexico when he said that the Committee would like to know the opinion of the co-Chairmen. This opinion has already been brought to the knowledge of the Committee. That is my first remark.

Secondly, we are supposed to submit our report by 10 December, and obviously this report must be purely formal. Representatives know that there are different views in this Committee. There are different approaches to our problems, and on certain matters there are widely divergent views. There are certain views based on the eight-nation joint memorandum (ENDC/28). Others depart from this memorandum and develop certain views in connexion with certain paragraphs of General Assembly resolution 1762 (XVII) on which there was no unanimous decision. Still others develop their own views, not based on this or that document. Therefore, if we are to make a politically substantive report we will have to include summaries of other views as well. This will call for consultations with governments. This might require additional time -- perhaps a full week.

Therefore, it seems to us that the most reasonable solution would be to leave the report purely formal, as we prepared it. This would be in accordance with our previous reports, which were purely formal in this sense. Of course, I agree with the remark of my co-Chairman that the Committee is the master of its own procedure. The Committee is free to make a different decision, but at any rate these are the views and considerations which prompted us to recommend that the Committee should adopt a purely formal report.

Mr. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): What has just been said by the co-Chairman is, in fact, a negative answer. The answer that we have been given is that the co-Chairmen do not consider that this report should contain the remarks and the suggestions that have been made by the non-aligned delegations. The argument that it is necessary to sum up the 400 pages of the verbatim records of this resumed session does not seem to me personally to be very convincing, because it is not the Conference that does the summing up -- possibly inaccurately -- of what has been said by other delegations. Each of the delegations sums up its own statements -- and only those statements which refer to suggestions made during the last few days on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.
We know perfectly well that the verbatim records contain, among other things, suggestions which we have tried to come up. Those records are being sent to the General Assembly. Therefore there is nothing new in our request -- nothing that is not already on record.

We, all of us know that the verbatim records, comprising probably 400 pages, that are being sent to the United Nations have to be translated and circulated to the 110 delegations. We all know that it is difficult for the 110 delegations to read all the records completely.

What we wish to do -- and I think I have interpreted correctly the views of my colleagues who ask me to deal with this matter this morning -- is to underline our views in this report so that the report has substance. The representative of the Soviet Union says that we have submitted a formal report in the past; that is to say, in the past we have done nothing as regards submitting a report with substance. We transmitted verbatim records and indicated that unfortunately there had been no progress achieved in this regard.

The representative of the United Arab Republic suggested this morning another formula that might be acceptable. He saw no reason why the co-Chairmen should not accept it. It was to circulate the remarks and suggestions made by the non-aligned delegations as an official document and send it as an annex to the letter which the co-Chairmen have suggested should be sent to the President of the General Assembly, Sir Zafrulla Khan, in compliance with paragraph 7 of resolution 1762 A (XVII).

This could be a solution. We see no reason why the co-Chairmen should not accept it, because the letter would remain as they have drafted it, and they could simply mention that at the request of the eight non-aligned delegations an annex to the letter -- drafted by the eight-Powers -- is being sent containing the suggestions which the eight Powers wish to make.

Of course, we cannot believe that the co-Chairmen do not wish our delegations at the United Nations, or the General Assembly as a whole, to know of the suggestions put forward by the non-aligned States, because each of our delegations could send a copy of its statements to New York and ask that they be read into the verbatim records of the plenary sessions of the General Assembly so that they will be there in future as testimony to the efforts made by the eight non-aligned States towards reaching agreement.
Thus, if the co-Chairmen will not accept the suggestion made this morning by the representative of the United Arab Republic -- and it appears that they will not -- I ask that it be noted in the verbatim record that the co-Chairmen have refused to make known in the special form suggested the views advanced, with the best of intentions by the delegations of the eight non-aligned countries, and have refused to transmit these views to the Assembly as part of the work done in the Eighteen Nation Committee during this resumed session.
MR. TSARAPIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): I cannot agree with the assessment of the matter just offered to the Committee by Mr. Padilla Nervo, representative of Mexico. We have never denied, we are not denying and we do not intend to deny the possibility to other representatives in this Committee of asking that their views be included and reflected in the documents to be transmitted to the General Assembly under its resolution. However, the point at issue is that these views are already included and reflected in the documents being transmitted to the General Assembly: namely, in the verbatim records. You know our viewpoint. We have already stated it -- that we cannot agree with everything that has been said here by a number of representatives of the neutral States. If they wish to stress their views and have them attached to the report, this will open the way for other delegations holding different views to act in the same manner, to draw up summaries and to ask that these summaries be attached to the report. That would take some time. We worked on the assumption that our report would be a purely formal one. If we follow that course, other delegations also might wish to state their views in a form similar to that chosen by these particular delegations. That would require additional time. However, I emphasize once again that we have never opposed and we are not opposing the legitimate right of every delegation to have its views included in the documents being transmitted. We have never denied this right, and I can assure the representative of Mexico he need hold no fears in this respect.

MR. BURNS (Canada): I wonder whether this difficulty could be solved in accordance with the suggestion made this morning, as I understand it, by the representative of the United Arab Republic: by a request of the eight non-aligned nations that the document they produced this morning, setting forth their suggestions which were intended to try to find ways in which resolution 1762 (XVII) could be implemented and agreement could be reached, might be submitted as a conference document and accepted as such and forwarded by the co-Chairmen with their report.

The argument that these summaries are material which is already included in the verbatim records which are to be forwarded does not seem to me to be a very good one. I say this because, firstly, as mentioned already by the representatives of the United Arab Republic and Mexico, all of us who have had experience at the United Nations know that to reproduce the volume of material that is in these verbatim
records will take a considerable time, and it is not likely to be available to all delegations in the General Assembly or its First Committee before the conclusion of the present session. Therefore the representatives in New York who will presumably be discussing this report and taking note of it will not have the opportunity of seeing the valuable suggestions -- at least the Canadian delegation considers them valuable suggestions -- which have been put forward by the eight non-aligned members.

Another reason is this. We have had the joint memorandum (EDA/28) of the eight nations of 16 April 1962. This has been praised, I think, by a very large number of delegations during the debate in the First Committee and it has been highly eulogized by many delegations here. That was forwarded as a conference document with our report. If these documents which were put forward for our information with the request that they be forwarded with the report are treated as a conference document of this Committee at this time, the Canadian delegation can see no reason why they should not go forward with our report. Of course, if any other delegations feel that they need to add their comments, it seems to me that, by making their statements and asking that they be treated in the same way, they could receive the same treatment.

I should like to defend the proposal that has been made to the effect that these suggestions should go forward. Unfortunately, we have reached no agreement, but that is not for the lack of useful suggestions put forward by the eight nations in an effort to find agreement. I think that these suggestions should go forward with the report. I should like to hear the views of others concerning whether these papers submitted this morning could not be considered a conference document and be treated in the way suggested, following on the suggestion made, I believe, by the representatives of the United Arab Republic and Mexico.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (interpretation from French): I believe that the fundamental point is this. What the delegations of the non-aligned countries desire is that the summary of their views should be transmitted to the General Assembly. I wonder why this should meet with difficulties. Can we not find a very simple solution? The delegations in question have circulated their respective papers to the delegations in this Committee. It would suffice for the respective delegations to read out their texts to have them on the record of today's meeting.
The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): We have a proposal from the representative of Italy to the effect that the summaries prepared by the respective non-aligned countries should be read out and included in the record of this meeting. They would be part of the verbatim record of the present meeting, and this would be transmitted to the General Assembly together with the other documents.

Baron von FLATEN (Sweden): we are now confronted with four different proposals. First there is the proposal made originally on behalf of the eight by the representative of Mexico; then we have the proposal from the United Arab Republic; and then we have the Canadian version and, finally, the Italian version. First of all I should like to ask the Secretariat whether, from the point of view of United Nations procedure, precedent and rules, there is any difficulty in adopting any of these four proposals.
My second question is this. I would ask the co-Chairmen kindly to consider the possibility of accepting first of all, if possible, after reconsideration, either the Mexican proposal or the proposal made by the United Arab Republic; or, if neither of those is possible, then the Canadian version. I understand it may perhaps be useful for the two co-Chairmen to consult, and I wonder if it would be agreeable to the Conference to have a recess of fifteen minutes.

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): Are there any other suggestions or proposals on this matter?

Sir Michael WRIGHT (United Kingdom): I support the representative of Sweden.

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): We have the proposal, submitted by the representative of Sweden supported by the representative of the United Kingdom, of a fifteen minute recess to enable the co-Chairmen to consult together on the various proposals made, in the endeavour to return with a well-defined opinion on our present situation. Furthermore, if in the meantime the Secretariat can prepare any replies, assuming that a reply should be given, to the question put by the representative of Sweden, we shall have this additional element for our discussion. Are there any objections to this proposal? There being none, the Committee stands adjourned for fifteen minutes.
The meeting was suspended at 5.05 p.m. and resumed at 5.25 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): After having consulted together, the co-Chairmen have agreed to certain changes in the text of the draft report to be sent to the United Nations General Assembly. These changes relate to the last paragraph of the report which I will read out now, and then I will point out the differences.

(continued in English)

"The provisional verbatim records of the above mentioned 6 plenary and 3 subcommittee meetings are enclosed as Addendum 1 with this report for the information of the Secretary General and of the delegations of members of the General Assembly as to the nature of recent developments at the Conference. At the request of certain delegations, certain precisions of their position, as they themselves have prepared them without any comment thereto by the Committee, are attached as Addendum 2 to this report. The Committee will, of course, keep both the General Assembly and the Secretary General of the United Nations fully informed of future efforts at the Conference devoted to achieving agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests."

(continued in French)

There are, therefore, new phrases to be added. In the fourth line from the top of page 2 after the word "enclosed", add "as Addendum 1". At the end of that sentence add "at the request of certain delegations" and so on. I understand that with these changes the suggestions made are acceptable to the co-Chairmen.

Are there any comments on this revised version by the co-Chairmen of the draft report?

Mr. LALL (India): I should like to thank the co-Chairmen for having met our point of view and I think that this resolves the issue. I would request you, Mr. Chairman, to be so good as to read out again the new sentence beginning "at the request of certain delegations". If you will read that slowly we will take it down.
I am glad to see that this matter has been resolved so amicably and we take this as an indication that not only can the co-Chairmen agree with each other, which we were finding that they were doing quite often, but they can now agree with other delegations also. Certainly the prospects in our Committee have been improved by what has taken place today.

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): At the request of the representative of India I will again read to you the sentence which is to come after the word "Conference":

"At the request of certain delegations, certain precisions of their position, as they themselves have prepared them without any comment thereto by the Committee, are attached as Addendum 2 to this report."
Mr. Padillo Servo (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): I agree with the representative of India, and I would like to join in thanking the co-Chairmen for having accepted the suggestion of the eight non-aligned nations. I think that that resolves the issue — and, above all, it is an expression of the way in which the co-Chairmen are ready to listen to our remarks. I repeat the thanks addressed to the co-Chairmen, and I think this completely solves our problem on this issue.

Sir Michael Giltinan (United Kingdom): I also should like to express my appreciation to the co-Chairmen for their efforts, but before expressing a final view upon the form of wording which they have proposed to us there is a question which I should like, if I may, to address to the Secretariat.

The last paragraph of the statement submitted to us says:

"The provisional verbatim records of the above mentioned 6 plenary and 3 subcommittee meetings are enclosed as Addendum I with this report for the information of the Secretary General and of the delegations of members of the General Assembly as to the nature of recent developments at the Conference."

I should like to ask the Secretariat whether we can be assured that when the report reaches New York, and as soon as it is circulated, sufficient copies of the records of the six plenary and three Sub-Committee meetings which are to be enclosed as Addendum I will in fact be available immediately in New York for the information of delegations of members of the General Assembly, as is stated in the report.

It would help me if we could have an assurance from the Secretariat that in fact that will be possible, because, of course, if copies are not available for the information of delegations the whole purpose of our operation may be frustrated.

The C. J. Ivanov (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): The representative of Sweden put two questions. I believe that with the changes made in the report those questions now become obsolete.

I call upon the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General to reply to the question raised by the representative of the United Kingdom.

Mr. Epstein (Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General): It is my understanding, too, that the only question that I have to reply to now is that of the representative of the United Kingdom, because the Committee, as is the case
always, is master of its own procedures. In the first place, I wonder whether there are six or seven verbatim records of plenary meetings which should be mentioned in the report. My impression is that it should be seven.

In the second place, as soon as we received the draft of this report proposed by the co-Chairmen last night we forwarded to New York by pouch the provisional verbatim records of all meetings up to and including that of Wednesday. In the normal course of events, taking into account the fact that towards the end of the General Assembly there is a considerable pressure for the reproduction and circulation of documents, it is my estimate, judging from past experience, that it would take about a week, more or less, to reproduce and circulate the provisional verbatim records that have already been pouch. In addition we shall have to pouch, tonight or tomorrow, the records of yesterday's meeting of the Sub-Committee and of the two plenary meetings of today. Those should not take in themselves more than two or three days to reproduce. They should reach New York on Monday, and should be reproduced within two or three days.

So, answering the question with respect to Addendum 1, the provisional records could be reproduced and circulated in New York within a period of a week to ten days. As for Addendum 2, since it is very short, it could be reproduced much more rapidly, as could the report itself. They could be reproduced in New York on Monday, if they arrive as I assume they will, by then.

Mr. Tsarukin (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): In the text of the report before us I think there is a misprint -- or, at any rate, something of importance has been missed out -- and we would like to draw attention to it. In the first sentence on page 2 it is stated:

(continued in English)

"The provisional verbatim records of the above mentioned 6 plenary and 3 subcommittee meetings are enclosed as Addendum 1 with this report for the information of the Secretary General ...."

(continued in Russian)

Before "the Secretary General" we should add "the General Assembly and", and then have the present text follow, because paragraph 7 of the resolution obliges us to report to the General Assembly. It is in order to have consistency on that point that we make this suggestion.
Sir Michael WRIGHT (United Kingdom): Arising out of the reply of the representative of the Secretary-General, I should like to make the following point.

Speaking on behalf of the United Kingdom, I welcome, and welcome very warmly, the decision that in response to the request of certain delegations precisely of their positions, as they themselves have prepared them, are to be attached as Addendum 2 to the report. I welcome the decision, but I do not think it would be right or that it would give a correct impression of our proceedings if the report were to be circulated in New York either with Addendum 1 and without Addendum 2 or with Addendum 2 and without Addendum 1. I think that would give an unbalanced picture of our proceedings, and before committing myself to saying that I am perfectly happy with the procedure, I should like an assurance that the report will be circulated with both addenda together and not with either addendum before or without the other. I hope I have made my point clear to my colleagues.

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): Two points have been made. First, there is the Soviet proposal, in accordance with the General Assembly resolution, to make a purely drafting change in the first part of the last paragraph of the revised text which has just been circulated and to mention the General Assembly before the Secretary-General. I believe that in accordance with the terms of the General Assembly resolution that change should be made. Is there any objection to that suggestion of the Soviet Union? Since I hear no objection, I take it that the Committee has decided that the change suggested by the Soviet representative should be made. There was a simple mistake, so we will have the mention of the General Assembly preceding that of the Secretary-General.
The point has also been made that we shall be transmitting the records of seven plenary meetings and not six. Is there any objection to this amendment? As there is no objection the word "seven" will replace the word "six". Those two drafting amendments are approved.

The representative of the United Kingdom pointed out that the work to be carried out in New York should be done so that the two addenda are circulated together in order to prevent any misunderstandings which might arise in the minds of the representatives who might read these documents. On behalf of the members of this Committee, I think we should ask the United Nations Secretariat to make every effort to have Addendum 1 and Addendum 2 produced and circulated as soon as possible together, to prevent any misinterpretations. Are there any remarks or objections with regard to the reproduction of the documents at the United Nations Secretariat? If not, I would make a strong request to the United Nations Secretariat to make every effort to reproduce and to circulate these documents urgently to enable all the Member States to take full cognizance of our report with the addenda.

Mr. LALL (India): The representative of the United Arab Republic was good enough to suggest the word "precisions" and we have used it in this sentence -- "certain precisions of their position". But I am not sure that this is the correct word in English. In this connexion -- I would defer to the two delegations on the other side of the table -- I should have thought we ought to find another word. I suppose what is meant is that at the request of certain delegations, certain précis or summaries -- to use a more common word -- of the position are attached, etc. The word "summaries" would be the more correct word to use; the word "precisions" is not the accurate word in the English language.
Mr. El-ZaY.T (United Arab Republic): With all due respect to the representative of India, my delegation this morning did not suggest the use of the word "precisions". Rather, our suggestion was that it should read as follows: "At the request of eight non-aligned Member States, show summaries of the suggestions and observations of these delegations..."

Mr. Lall (India): I apologize profusely to the representative of the United Arab Republic, I must have misheard him. His suggestion is the same as mine.

The Chairman (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): We now have a proposal to replace the word "precisions" by the word "summaries" — in French, résumés. Are there any objections to this suggestion, firstly, on the part of the co-Chairmen?

Mr. Dean (United States of America): I have no objection but I am comparing some of these statements against the verbatim records; I think some of them are almost precisely the same as they are in the verbatim records and they are more "precisions" than they are "summaries", but if the Committee prefers the use of the word "summaries", I have no objection.

The Chairman (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): It would seem there are no objections, in spite of the fact that the "summaries" are "precisions", in the circumstances, we might very well say "summaries", as suggested by the representative of India. If I hear no objection I shall take it that the report as amended is approved by the Conference without objection.

It was so decided.

The Chairman (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): I have an announcement to make. The two co-Chairmen have agreed that, if the Committee concurs, Monday's meeting shall be devoted to points 5(b) and 5(c) of the procedure of work (ENDC/52). I am referring to the document prepared by the two co-Chairmen
and accepted by the Conference. The representative of Nigeria will have the opportunity of making his statement, if he wishes, at the beginning of that meeting or a little later. Are there any comments?

Mr. OBI (Nigeria): I only wish to observe that it is the understanding of my delegation, following my request this morning which the Chairman was kind enough to grant and which met with no objection from any quarter, that the statement and summary to be made by the leader of the Nigerian delegation on Monday, 10 December, on the subject of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests will be included as part of the report.

The Chairman (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): The request put forward by the representative of Nigeria is quite understandable, and if any other representative wishes to submit a summary of his opinions between now and Monday it will be open to him to do so.

If no one else wishes to speak, we shall pass to the communique.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament this afternoon held its eighty-ninth plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Tarekov, First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and representative of Bulgaria.

"Statements were made by representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Italy, Mexico, the Soviet Union, Canada, Sweden, India, the United Arab Republic and Nigeria.


"The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Monday, 10 December 1962, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 5.50 p.m."
Addition 1 to Addendum 1 to the Report to the General Assembly of the United Nations with regard to the Cessation of Nuclear Weapon Tests

Attached hereto as Addition 1 to Addendum 1 to the Report is the portion of the provisional verbatim record of the 90th meeting of the Conference containing the statement by the Representative of Nigeria on the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.
The CHAIRMAN (Burma): I declare open the ninetieth meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

As already agreed at our previous meeting, the first speaker today will be the representative of Nigeria, Mr. Mbu, whom I welcome again to this Committee.

Mr. MBU (Nigeria): Allow me to extend the belated though none the less very warm welcome of my delegation to you, Mr. Chairman, and to the Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Kurka. From your interventions we are assured that you will carry on the very valuable and constructive work of your predecessors.

I should also like to express my satisfaction that the Committee reconvened in Geneva as was agreed. It is true, of course, that it did so a fortnight behind schedule, but such delay as there was was necessitated by the fact that the subjects with which we are concerned here were receiving the fullest and most serious consideration in the United Nations General Assembly. Indeed, my delegation attached and still attaches the greatest importance to the wise and varied deliberations which took place in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on the subject of general and complete disarmament, and especially on the urgent need for the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, with which I intend to deal today.

My delegation, in its efforts to secure the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests, feels fortified by the deliberations at the General Assembly and by resolution 1762 (XVII) which emerged from those discussions and which gave this Committee not only a very clear mandate on the issue but also specific indications of how we should proceed about that task here. It is a matter of regret to my delegation that this most valuable resolution has already been subjected to the most rigorous test of hair-splitting, and, if one might say so, unnecessary diverse interpretations which seem to be the unhappy lot of any valuable document that comes before this Committee. It is irreverent to treat in such a manner an issue about which the majority of world opinion feels so deeply concerned. My delegation intends as far as possible to refrain from interpreting the resolution as it feels it would be presumptuous to do so. Moreover, is it not unnecessary to do so with regard to a document whose provisions are so clear? We would, however, make a few brief comments.
The most important thing about this resolution is that it condemns all nuclear weapon tests. It asks that all such tests should cease immediately and not later than 1 January 1963, at the same time admonishing the nuclear Powers to reach an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests by 1 January 1963 on the basis of the eight-nation memorandum. If, however, such an agreement is not possible, and bearing in mind the unequivocal condemnation by humanity of all nuclear testing which finds expression in the demand that all nuclear testing must cease not later than 1 January 1963, then an immediate agreement prohibiting nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space should be entered into. Such a partial test ban is however -- in operative paragraph 5 of resolution 1762 A (XVII) -- inextricably linked with, and must always be accompanied pari passu by, an, interim arrangement suspending all underground tests using as a basis the eight-nation memorandum and including adequate assurances for effective detection and identification of seismic events by an international scientific commission.
We would like to point out that there is absolutely no indication in this paragraph that such an interim arrangement should be limited in point of time. Of course it would be possible to have a more permanent agreement which would replace the interim arrangement. It is possible that in a short space of time a final scientific breakthrough would emerge that would be acceptable to the two nuclear sides and which would make assurance of effective detection and identification of seismic events by an international commission no longer necessary. It is pertinent to note, however, that whatever modalities are agreed upon, utilizing all the valuable suggestions outlined by the resolution, the world, the United Nations and my delegation expect that all nuclear weapon tests in all environments, and for all time, should cease immediately, and in any case not later than 1 January 1963.

The other very significant thing emerging from the deliberations of the United Nations and from resolution 1762 A (XVII) is that the eight-nation memorandum has grown considerably in stature. It was not only loudly acclaimed by almost all speakers in the First Committee but was endorsed as a basis for negotiations. After such unanimous endorsement, with no dissenting voice and only a few abstentions, the joint memorandum is no longer an eight-nation memorandum -- though that appears now to be its semi-official title -- nor an eighteen-nation or a seventeen-nation memorandum, but a universal memorandum.

The memorandum provides a just, adequate and equitable basis for negotiations. Above all, it takes account of the positions of the two sides, both political and scientific. It may be true, as the eight sponsors declared, that the memorandum is not a blueprint for the treaty as such. It may equally be true that in so far as it tries to bring the two sides closer together it is a political compromise. It may even also be true that it was aimed at getting the two sides to negotiate again. All this may be true, but it would be churlish of my delegation to place only such a value, important though it may be, on the memorandum and no more, especially after its political sagacity and firm scientific basis have been so well acclaimed and vindicated, both within and without the Committee, since its introduction on 16 April this year. While it may be a political compromise, it also takes account of very far-reaching and solid scientific considerations. The results of the United States Project Vela and of our informal discussions with the Western scientists -- for which we are grateful to Mr. Godber and Mr. Dean: -- on improvements in detection and identification by the use of distant instrumentation
and other seismological progress have, as it were, added force to our expressed belief that "possibilities exist of establishing by agreement a system for continuous observation and effective control on a purely scientific and non-political basis", which might be based and built upon already existing national networks of observation posts and institutions or, if more appropriate, on certain of the existing posts designated by agreement for the purpose together, if necessary, with new posts established by agreement.

It may be recalled that the recent London Pugwash Conference declared:

"In particular, we have used the proposal by the eight neutral countries as a basis upon which to find a compromise solution."

(ENDC/66, p. 1)

This distinguished body of Soviet and Western scientists then proceeded to examine various possibilities, and arrived at certain conclusions which somehow confirmed how solidly based scientifically the eight-nation memorandum is. It is still the hope of my delegation that the memorandum will receive the very serious and sincere consideration which it deserves.

Of course it is true that there have been various qualifications of the acceptance of the memorandum, to say the least -- for instance, whether it should be accepted as "a basis", "the basis", or "one of the bases but not the exclusive basis", and so on. Those fine distinctions might perhaps be of some significance, but to my mind the important thing is that after six months of virtual impasse a basis -- the only one, in fact, mutually acceptable to the two sides -- a common platform from which to erect the scaffolding and super-structure of an agreement, has at last emerged.

Furthermore, we have noted with satisfaction that as a result of the memorandum the gap between the two sides, as they have themselves acknowledged on various occasions, has become considerably narrower. The main obstacle is the question of whether on-site inspection should be obligatory or not. My delegation finds itself ill at ease at the reluctance of the two sides to bridge this narrow gap, and is concerned at the prospect of the widening of this small gap into an enormous chasm which could defy all ingenious efforts to bridge it. We are alarmed at the rigid adherence to and obduracy on principles that are little more than phantoms and at fears which have no relation to reality but which nevertheless keep the two sides so firmly apart. We fear that undue insistence on those so-called principles is fast hardening into a stand on prestige, with all the dangerous consequences which such an evolution would have on our negotiations.
I should like, therefore, on behalf of my delegation, to address a most solemn appeal to the nuclear Powers to come out of the quagmire in which they are standing, before it is too late. I would invite them to go back once more to the eight-nation memorandum and look at it honestly and thoroughly, in the light of its full worth. The memorandum has already achieved the near-miraculous feat of bringing the two sides closer together, making the one accept the concept of an international scientific commission and the other that of national seismic stations. It is capable of eliminating the remaining differences if considered as a whole, dispassionately and divorced from all preconceived notions and ideas and predetermined positions. If such an honest and dispassionate consideration of the memorandum were made, if it were viewed not even solely and necessarily in a spirit of compromise, but objectively, if the two nuclear sides would examine the memorandum as a whole -- and I submit respectfully that it should only be considered as a whole -- then they would find not only that the pieces neatly dovetail into one another but that the total result is a structure which provides the necessary assurances that such an agreement banning nuclear weapon tests in all environments and for all time would have all the necessary and realistic provisions for effective detection and identification, with the necessary guarantees against possible violation.

It is the view of my delegation that the impetus given to our discussions by the deliberations in the United Nations General Assembly and the resolution should not be vitiated by sticking to old positions. We had a right to expect that after the deliberations in the General Assembly there would have been a greater willingness to negotiate, more strenuous attempts at accommodation and a relaxation of old and rigid positions. We are distressed to find, however, that there is so far no evidence of this. If it is any consolation to us, we have observed that our distress is shared by the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Godber who, in an honest appraisal of the performance thus far, remarked at the forty-fifth meeting of the Sub-Committee:

"I think it is our duty to consider any proposals that come from other delegations, because in our Sub-Committee here -- I am sure you will agree with this, Mr. Chairman -- we do tend to become wrapped up in our own individual thoughts, particularly after two and a half months. Anybody who reads the reports of the Sub-Committee will admit that our views could do with a little new thought brought into them. Of course, I think that the Western thoughts are very good ones, but possibly you, Mr. Chairman, think the same about those of the Soviet Union."

(EHDC/SC.1/PV.45, v. 33-35)
My delegation attaches the utmost importance to that statement by Mr. Godber for it marks, I think, the first time any of the nuclear Powers has sincerely voiced a criticism that embraces itself instead of the usual one directed at the most tarnished rigidity and misdeeds of the other. It is an honest self-examination, the validity of which the other two nuclear Powers, in a similar honest self-examination bred of humility and not of self-righteousness, would no doubt acknowledge.
It is a plea we should like to make for a better display of an accommodating spirit and an honest consideration of the new thoughts and proposals coming before us.

My delegation believes that, in the spirit underlined by Mr. Godber’s statement, the Sub-Committee should give serious consideration to implementing the General Assembly resolution for cessation of tests by 1 January 1963 (E/11DC/63). As the only mutually and in fact universally acceptable basis at present available for either a permanent test ban or a partial test ban, and for the interim arrangement envisaged in paragraph 6 of resolution 1762 (XVIII) is the eight-Power memorandum this Committee, and in particular its nuclear Sub-Committee should give urgent consideration to the various and practical aspects of that memorandum. It is for that reason that my delegation fully supports the Swedish proposal that the international scientific commission, proposed in the memorandum and accepted at least in principle by the two nuclear sides, should be set up now at least on an interim basis. There is very great force in the arguments advanced by my Swedish colleague; I will not repeat them but I cannot help emphasizing the point that the commission must be scientific, and composed of highly qualified scientists, possibly from non-aligned countries. The scientific commission, in the opinion of my delegation, is the pivot around which everything else revolves, because if the scientific commission is set up as envisaged in the memorandum most of the other problems will be resolved or will be found to be not of overriding importance.

My delegation believes that instead of spending valuable time in wrangling over obligatory or non-obligatory on-site inspection, the Sub-Committee should spend its time more profitably by considering the other modalities required. For instance, it is necessary to determine what is a significant and suspicious event and the criteria necessary to qualify such a phenomenon for additional clarification. Practical consideration should also be given to the most effective means of transmitting data from the national seismic stations to the international scientific commission and of processing by the latter. Let us talk of such practical things which would lead us to agreement. Let us use the suggestions and ideas put forward by the eight non-aligned nations in their memorandum, which has been
endorsed by scientists and the General Assembly as a suitable basis for agreement. Let us also call upon the scientists from the three nuclear Powers to intensify their research into the "black box" theory and other theories that will contribute substantially to the reaching of an early agreement.

We understand that the reason for the actions of the two nuclear sides so far is their preoccupation with their national security. Far be it from me to make light of this, but I should like to submit most respectfully that such undue preoccupation which eschews everything else ill serves the cause of humanity and even does not serve their cause much better.

Speaking on 2 December in Baltimore, the newly elected Secretary-General, U Thant, declared:

"There may be many who may wish for a more complete and comprehensive solution of the Cuban crisis, but in this imperfect world we have, at least for the moment, to accept less than perfect solutions."

These wise words apply with equal force to our work here. We cannot be too perfectionist in our search for a suitable plan, for no plan on a nuclear test ban can either be perfect or fully eliminate all risk of violation or threats to national security. Afterwards, what real sanctions can there be against a possible violator in a world where there is as yet no world authority capable of enforcing order, even in the most watertight and foolproof agreement, except the right to resume testing by the offended party and the obloquy of world opinion on the violator.

What real guarantees have we that any nuclear Power on the threshold of what it might consider to be the most decisive and ultimate military breakthrough would do more than hesitate to violate the agreement, even with all the preconditions and so-called deterrents against possible violation? But, taking full cognizance of the ancient maxim "pacta sunt servanda" we are willing to believe that if an agreement is reached in good faith there is a reasonable chance that it will be complied with. Moreover, over and above the immediate relief which would result to humanity from a comprehensive agreement, is the fact that such an agreement would be essentially an expression of good will on the part of those particularly concerned, which would facilitate the overall progress towards achieving our main goal of general and complete disarmament.
We should also realize the fact that there can never be a watertight treaty. For instance, the United States–United Kingdom partial test ban draft treaty (ENDC/59) makes provision for withdrawal from the treaty in article III. There is a similar provision in article XIII of their comprehensive draft treaty (ENDC/56). I will read article III of the United Kingdom–United States draft treaty:

"1. If any Party to this Treaty determines

(a) that any other Party has not fulfilled its obligations under this Treaty,

(b) that nuclear explosions have been conducted by a State not a Party to this Treaty under circumstances which might jeopardize the determining Party's national security, or

(c) that nuclear explosions have occurred under circumstances in which it is not possible to identify the State conducting the explosions and that such explosions, if conducted by a Party to this Treaty, would violate the Treaty or, if not conducted by a Party, might jeopardize the determining Party's national security, it may submit to the Depositary Government a request for the convening of a conference to which all the Parties to this Treaty shall be invited, and the Depositary Government shall convene such a conference as soon after its receipt of the request as may be practicable. The request from the determining Party to the Depositary Government shall be accompanied by a statement of the evidence on which the determination was based ..." (ENDC/59, p.2)

I should like to make it very clear that I am neither discussing or criticizing the two drafts. I am merely using the article on withdrawal to show that any party that is itching to denounce the treaty in order to resume testing can do so, even legally, under any conceivable treaty. For instance, what would prevent any dastardly country, such as we hope does not exist, from itself causing a clandestine nuclear explosion -- behind Venus, let us say, if that were practicable and remaining undiscovered by the international scientific commission? What I mean is that there is nothing to prevent a country wishing to do such things from declaring that its own national security is threatened by its own clandestine tests, thus absolving itself from its treaty obligations in the most legal manner by invoking paragraph 1(c) of the article I have read out.
As I said earlier, that is by no means a criticism of the two drafts; in fact, we doubt seriously that they could be improved upon. I only wish to use them to illustrate the fact that even in such carefully prepared drafts, which two of the three nuclear Powers consider provide adequate assurances for them, there are possible loop holes which could be exploited by any determined violator. But my delegation feels that there is reason to hope that such great Powers — which, although they not only have mastered the secrets of the atom and outer space but have had such tremendous capabilities for mutual destruction, have nevertheless acted so far very responsibly and with commendable restraint — would not trifle with an agreement such as this if it were entered into with the reasonable assurance offered by the eight-nation memorandum.
It is the view of my delegation that it is not a search for national security that is preventing the nuclear Powers from reaching an agreement, for the leaders of the two sides have recognized that the present so-called security is precarious and that there can be no real security until we stop amassing, and perfecting by testing, and start eliminating deadly weapons of mass destruction. My delegation believes indeed that the obstacle to agreement is no longer purely scientific but largely political. As we declared at our nineteenth plenary meeting here --

"Although science and scientists have been quoted lavishly by both sides, it is our view that the issue with which we are concerned is essentially political; the aid of science is merely required to give the arguments added faith." (ENDC/FV.19, p.16)

What is required on the part of the nuclear Powers is a slight, though in the circumstances supreme, political act of good will. I hope that they will not be found wanting in that regard. It is our hope that this Committee will successfully plead with the nuclear Powers to discover their real interest and that of humanity, which pleads for the cessation of all tests in all environments, as eloquently expressed in United Nations resolution 1762 à (XVII).

Is it too much to expect President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev to bestow a Christmas present upon the world by reaching agreement on banning nuclear weapon tests? Is it demanding too much of "the two Ks" if we call upon them to use the Cuban formula to reach agreement on nuclear weapon tests? If they can do this supreme service to humanity, we shall all join in sponsoring their candidatures for the Nobel Peace prize for 1963.
CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
SUB-COMMITTEE ON A TREATY FOR THE DISCONTINUANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS
PROVISIONAL VERBAL RECORD OF THE FORTY-FIFTH MEETING

Hold at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday, 28 November 1962, at 3.30 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. S.K. Tselin (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)

This provisional record contains the originals of speeches in English, together
with the Conference room interpretation of speeches in other languages.

It is requested that any corrections to the originals of speeches be submitted
in four copies (preferably incorporated in four of the single-sided mimeographed
copies with which delegations are supplied) by the authorized Liaison Officer of
the delegation concerned to the Documents Office, Room A.206. If no corrections
are received within four working days from the date of distribution the final
version, in which the interpretations will be replaced by translations, will be
prepared and issued on the basis of the provisional record.

THE TIME LIMIT FOR CORRECTIONS TO THIS RECORD WILL BE 0900 HOURS ON
5 DECEMBER 1962.
Present at the Table

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. MAROKIN
Mr. A.A. ROXCHIN
Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. OGDEN
Sir Michael RIGHT
Mr. D.N. ARMSTRONG

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DUNN
Mr. C.C. STILLE
Mr. D. MACK

Deputy Special Representative of the Acting Secretary-General:

Mr. W. ZESTEIN
The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The forty-fifth meeting of the Sub-Committee is open. Does any representative wish to speak?

Mr. LEE (United States of America). This morning, at the eighty-fourth plenary meeting, Dr. Edberg of Sweden made an interesting proposal upon which I have already commented and about which I expect, after further study, to have more to say. Nevertheless, I cannot emphasize strongly enough that the United States and the United Kingdom have presented two complete and well thought-out draft treaties to the Conference. As I will make clear in my statement today, many details of control and the organization of an adequate control system have been thoroughly considered by the United States and the United Kingdom and have been drafted in complete treaty language in our comprehensive test ban treaty draft (BNDC/58). The Soviet Union can, by accepting this proposal today, end all nuclear tests in all environments for all time. The details have been thoroughly and objectively worked out and are, we believe, adequate to ensure effective and fair controls over the cessation of all nuclear tests. There is, therefore, really no need for delay, under these circumstances, in the conclusion of an adequate and effective nuclear test ban agreement. It can be done speedily and effectively under the detailed proposal we have made.

Now I would like to turn to my statement for today.

Recent events have, of course, had much to do with the atmosphere of this resumed session of our Conference. As President Kennedy noted in a statement to the Conference, the test ban is perhaps the issue on which we are nearest to agreement. The time is certainly right for a test ban settlement.

We enter upon these resumed negotiations with the feeling that there is a new note of urgency in settling our differences over a test ban -- because if we do not reach a settlement soon we may find that it will be too late to do so.

I can affirm at the outset of these resumed negotiations that my delegation has been instructed to do everything possible to reach an adequate and effective treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests in all environments for all time under adequate and effective international control. My delegation has been charged by the United States Government to seek such an agreement as a primary goal of our efforts in this Conference. We are prepared to work towards a workable agreement which will be a solution to the outstanding problems satisfactory to both sides.
This means, of course, that we must solve the basic problem of our differences over the adequate control for a cessation of underground tests.

Delegations will recall that on 27 August last my Government, in conjunction with the Government of the United Kingdom, made two significant offers and placed two very important treaty texts before the Conference which incorporated these offers in precise treaty language (EMDC/56 and EMDC/59). The first of these treaty texts is based in part on the eight-nation memorandum (EMDC/28) and contained within it many of the suggestions which the eight Powers incorporated in that memorandum.

This treaty was, of course, a revision of the treaty which we had previously tabled on 18 April 1961 (EMDC/9). For example, the comprehensive treaty draft of 27 August last (EMDC/56) incorporated the use of existing national networks of observation posts, together with such additional stations as might be necessary to constitute the world-wide control system for a nuclear test ban. In the Western treaty draft these stations will operate under the co-ordination and supervision of the international commission. They would, however, be nationally manned, with all operating personnel nationals of the States in which they were located to the extent to which each State so desired.

We have accepted as well the suggestion of the eight nations for the use of an international commission whose membership is to be made up in large part of States not aligned with either NATO or the Warsaw Pact countries — that is, States which would be jointly chosen by the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom.

We have also included in our treaty arrangements for the obligatory use of on-site inspections wherever necessary. These inspections will be scientifically necessary under circumstances where it is not possible, through distant instrumentation, to identify the precise nature or the origin of a seismic event. On the basis of the best available scientific information, this will happen in a significant number of places each year in both the United States and the Soviet Union.
In order to ensure that the international commission is able to make the fullest possible assessment of the facts in any given situation concerning a seismic event, the United States and the United Kingdom treaty draft provides for a quota of obligatory on-site inspections which represents only a small fraction of the actual number of events which will be eligible for on-site inspection. In the eight-nation memorandum there was no such quota.

This quota would, in our estimation, serve as an adequate deterrent to any State which might be tempted to violate the treaty by conducting clandestine underground nuclear weapon tests.
On 27 August the United States and the United Kingdom presented also a partial nuclear test ban treaty (ENDC/59). That draft treaty incorporated the suggestion originally made here at our Conference by the delegations of Brazil and the United Arab Republic for a partial treaty, and the suggestion of Mexico for a cut-off date for testing. I believe we have made it clear that such a treaty would be at best only a first step, an interim arrangement, leading to our comprehensive goal. But it would nevertheless be an important measure which would end immediately those tests on the control for which we could now all agree.

This partial test ban treaty (ENDC/59) would end nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in response to suggestions advanced by all the eight more recent members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament at one time or another during its first and second sessions.

What has been the reaction of the Soviet Union to these offers? How has it responded or failed to respond to these most recent constructive, forward moves by the United States and the United Kingdom?

Let us look for a few moments at the positions advanced by the Soviet Union during the nuclear Sub-Committee meetings held during the recess of our Conference. With respect to a comprehensive test ban treaty the Soviet Union, unfortunately, has apparently returned to the position it held before 19 April 1962, when it claimed to have accepted the suggestions of the eight nations. In effect, the Soviet Union has lately been saying to the West: "We do not care by what means you reach accommodation with us. We in the Soviet Union are extremely reasonable, but that accommodation can only be on the basis of our position of 28 November 1961. If you accept our position of 28 November hook, line and sinker, then you will find the Soviet Union to be very reasonable." This position, it will be recalled, provides for no international control whatsoever and is the most retrograde position the Soviet Union has ever taken on a nuclear test ban treaty.

With respect to a partial test ban treaty, the Soviet Union has said that it will agree to it only if the West will accept a simultaneous, unsupervised, uncontrolled moratorium on underground nuclear weapon tests in conjunction with such a ban. The Soviet Union has said that it does not care whether such a moratorium is written or unwritten, but that it must be an unverified, uncontrolled moratorium covering all tests in the underground environment for the indefinite future. It is clear that
what the Soviet Union has presented to the West, of course, is no choice at all. In effect, the Soviet Union is saying, "with respect to the Western comprehensive proposal to ban all tests for ever; "Yes, my friends, we are very reasonable; we stand firmly on our 28 November position". And what the Soviet Union tells the West with respect to the partial ban proposed by the United States and the United Kingdom, the acceptance of which would prevent any further radioactive debris in the atmosphere, is exactly the same thing — that, again, the West will find the Soviet Union very reasonable and that it stands firmly on its 28 November position.

These negative and unconstructive manoeuvres by the Soviet Union have left little room for negotiation, even given the great good will — as well as the tremendous amount of money which each of us has spent on improvement in scientific techniques for detecting underground events — which has been shown and will continue to be shown by the United States and the United Kingdom.

Let us look behind the Soviet position, if we may, at some of the reasons advanced in support of the Soviet Union's refusal to accept or to negotiate upon the recent offers made by the United States and the United Kingdom.

In the first place, the Soviet position on a comprehensive test ban treaty has been that national systems are completely adequate to ensure the detection, location and identification of all — I repeat, all — significant underground nuclear weapon tests. With the greatest respect, the United States and the United Kingdom have maintained that that is not the case. This is a dispute over the existence of facts, and a dispute over the extent of our present scientific knowledge. We have the Soviet statements which clearly indicate that the Soviet Government believes a certain factual situation to exist with respect to the capabilities of a certain type of detection system. United States and United Kingdom scientists have found the facts to be contrary to those which the Soviet Union continues to maintain. There is but one simple answer to this: let both sides present their scientific evidence here at the Conference and then let us discuss it.

In the last century there was a well-known country philosopher in the United States named Josh Billings. Josh used to say that it was not ignorance that caused all the trouble; it was "the things that her know that ain't so". A reasonable man ought to be able to reach a solution to a problem which is so clearly one of deciding on the basis of scientific evidence what the facts of the case actually are.
Delegations will recall that we have continually asked the Soviet Union to present its scientific evidence in this case, but thus far we have seen little or nothing from the Soviet Union to justify this point of view. The reply of our Soviet colleagues here to this question repeatedly asked by the Western delegations has been, to say the least, evasive. For my part, I cannot understand why it is that our Soviet colleagues wish to keep the light of their scientific colleagues under a bushel. Why not bring them here and let us hear what they have to say?

The best evidence and the best scientists available to the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom tell us that on-site inspections are absolutely necessary to identify the precise character of an unidentified seismic event. Let me point out here that the Western delegations have always been open-minded in regard to the subject of on-site inspection on a scientific basis which, after all, is only the means to an end and not an end in itself. For us, this is a scientific question and not a political one, and we have turned to science for its solution. If our best evidence as given to us by our best scientists can be shown to be incomplete, we are certainly willing to listen to Soviet scientists. But we do not believe that the Soviet version of the present scientific state of affairs is correct, or otherwise we would have been given the Soviet scientific evidence long ago and the control and inspection problem would have been completely settled.

The United States policy in this regard has always been and continues to be that we ask no more detection and identification capability than is required to give adequate assurance that the test ban agreement is being observed by all parties. The changes we made in our draft treaty of 20 April 1961 (TNDC/9) are ample evidence of this and we stand on this position, which we deem to be a very reasonable one.
The second position taken by the Soviet Union with respect to obligatory on-site inspection is that the Western Powers desire to have such inspection exclusively for purposes of espionage. But I submit that the West has consistently made it clear, in its concrete proposals, that this is not the case. Indeed, if the Western proposals were implemented today no reasonable man could, I believe, reach the conclusion that the West desired on-site inspections for any purpose other than to verify a test ban agreement. The West has, I submit, approached the limits of human ingenuity in devising the means to reassure our Soviet colleagues that inspections could not be used as vehicles for espionage. I think it is clear to all that under the Western draft treaty (ENDC/58) inspection could only take place in response to recorded seismic signals the origin of which might remain unidentified. That is a completely random factor, since in nature those signals can occur only when earthquakes take place.

The United States and the United Kingdom have no way to influence the occurrence of such signals. Moreover, the United States and the United Kingdom would have no assurance that any area which might be of interest to them for military security reasons would ever be eligible for an inspection. They would never know in advance from which area seismic signals might originate. Any espionage activity which relied on such a series of coincidences to produce the possibilities for collecting intelligence would have to wait from 2 to 10,000 years for even a chance to have a brief look at all of the Soviet Union under the most favourable circumstances. But those most favourable circumstances would themselves, of course, not exist.

The Western proposal would also limit the area to be inspected to no more -- I repeat, no more -- than a few hundred kilometres surrounding the scientifically determined epicentre of the unidentified seismic event. In addition, most events would take place, particularly in the case of the Soviet Union, in the very small portion of the country which was seismic. That would include, at most, 15 per cent of Soviet territory, which is located generally in remote and economically less-developed portions of the Soviet Union.
We have discussed this data with our Soviet colleagues and are prepared to go over it with them again in some detail. Even then, not every unidentified underground event would be inspected. The United States and the United Kingdom have adopted a Soviet proposal first made in April 1959. In line with this they have proposed that unidentified events should be looked at only on the basis of a quota system. That quota system would mean that while there would be the possibility of looking at any unidentified event — that is, any such event might be chosen to be the subject of an inspection — in actual fact only a small percentage of events would be inspected in any one year, and then always within the maximum of the quota. Such a system of random selection would act as an effective deterrent to clandestine underground tests in violation of a treaty, but at the same time it would ensure that States were not subjected to an unduly large number of inspections.

In addition to all these safeguards and limiting factors incorporated in the United States-United Kingdom draft treaty, specific proposals have been made with respect to the staffing of on-site inspection teams which should reassure completely any State which might question the impartiality and fairness with which inspections would be conducted. With respect to the membership of on-site inspection teams, the recent United States-United Kingdom draft treaty (ENDC/58) provides only that there should be no self-inspection. Thus there would be no United States inspectors permitted to examine events on United States territory and, similarly, no Soviet inspectors to examine events in the Soviet Union. There is also no requirement that United States or United Kingdom inspectors should look at unidentified events in the Soviet Union. We would hope, of course, that United States and other Western nationals who were competent in the necessary scientific skills would be included in inspection teams, based upon their scientific ability, but I would like to point out that an examination of the Western draft treaty will show that this is not a requirement of our proposal.

The persistence of Soviet charges of espionage in connexion with the Western proposals is in effect equivalent to a Soviet allegation that all possible representatives of non-aligned States who might serve on inspection
teams would be in fact, or would become, espionage agents for the host. That is so patently ridiculous as to defy understanding.

Finally, in order to ensure that the inspection teams would operate fully within the letter of their mandate the United States and the United Kingdom have proposed that certain arrangements with regard both to the means of access of the teams to the inspection area and to the functioning of the teams should be put into effect to safeguard the security of the host country. In the case of inspections in the Soviet Union we have stated that we are quite prepared to see the inspection teams taken from the Soviet border to the inspection area on a Soviet aircraft, flown by Soviet pilots over Soviet flight routes. The Soviet Union could provide for any special arrangements on the flight which it might think desirable to ensure that its national security was not jeopardized in any way during the flight over Soviet territory. That does not mean, of course, that the team should be delayed in reaching the inspection area; and, of course, the team would have to be assured that the area to which it was sent was actually the one designated as containing the epicentre of an unidentified event.
The United States and the United Kingdom have also stated that inspection teams could be accompanied by any number of Soviet observers in the Soviet Union to ensure that the teams acted strictly in accordance with the legitimate requirements of their task. The team could be watched, if the Soviet Union so desired, so that no one could have the slightest doubt that the team members engaged only in activities connected with their duty to examine the inspection area to determine the nature of the origin of the particular unidentified seismic event in question.

We have, I believe, done all that we possibly can to ensure that inspection teams would be fair and impartial, that they would not jeopardize any State's national security, and that no State could feel in any way that the admission of an inspection team carried with it any danger of espionage. Frankly, I cannot think of anything else which we might offer the Soviet Union to ensure that there could be no espionage danger with respect to an on-site inspection. The safeguards we have already offered should go far beyond what might be required to assure any reasonable person that inspection teams will not act or operate in a manner detrimental to the interest of the host State. If there is anything else which the Soviet Union believes is necessary, we are certainly prepared to examine it. Additional Soviet suggestions for safeguards on the operations of on-site inspection teams should not prove to be a difficult task to work out through negotiations if such safeguards can be worked out on a reasonable basis, and if this is what really stands in the way of Soviet acceptance of the few necessary obligatory on-site inspections by the international commission.

Thus far the Soviet Union has failed to indicate to us precisely what elements in the Western proposals which I have outlined might, in its view, constitute a danger to its national security. It is easy to repeat generalities about espionage dangers; but the repetition of such generalities does not really bring us any closer either to an understanding of the problem, or to an early agreement.

Real negotiations on the outstanding issues which remain to be solved require some time to give and take on both sides. This means in the first instance that the Soviet Union will have to indicate where it believes give and take are necessary. In the absence of constructive Soviet comment on this portion of our proposal, we can only conclude that the Soviet Union is putting forward any and all objections to hide its true motives. That is hardly conducive to serious negotiations for an effective, adequate, and workable test ban at the present time.
I cannot emphasize often enough that the Western draft treaties which we put before this Conference on 27 August 1962, are, in our view, sound, adequate and effective documents. We spent a great deal of time with our scientists in working them out; we did not put in anything which we did not think was necessary; we examined them with the utmost care in order to see whether we could eliminate anything. But let me assure the Committee they were not put forward on a "take it or leave it" basis. Rather, those draft treaties were presented as the best possible incorporation into treaty language of the proposals and principles which the West believes are fundamentally necessary in any test ban treaty in the absence of clear and controlling scientific evidence to the contrary.

In the changed international climate in which we find ourselves, it should not be too difficult for any Governments sincerely committed to the goal of a nuclear test ban to negotiate a sound and effective and therefore acceptable agreement.

The West has presented a number of very sound proposals, but thus far we have heard very little from our Soviet colleagues about the ways which might be found to break out of the present impasse in our negotiations. In this, and in our future meetings, we shall look forward with great interest to what the Soviet Union has to tell us about the ways in which it believes our deadlock can be broken, because the ball is clearly now in their court.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (Interpretation from Russian): If no other representative wishes to speak, I shall say a few words as representative of the Soviet Union.

On 26 November, in the meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, we were officially seized of the resolutions adopted in the course of the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly both on general and complete disarmament and on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. What is most important to our Sub-Committee is resolution 1762 (XVII) "L", the draft of which was submitted by the neutralist States. That resolution first condemns all types of nuclear weapon tests. I emphasize that, and it obviously includes underground tests. Secondly, it asks that all tests should cease not later than 1 January 1963. In its fourth paragraph the resolution endorses the eight-nation memorandum of 16 April 1962 and calls upon the parties to accept it as a basis for negotiation and agreement.
In the course of the discussion of that draft resolution in the General Assembly we heard, with all its force, the demand of the peoples of the world that all nuclear weapon tests should cease not later than 1 January 1963. The resolution shows to us the way along which we must travel if we wish to eliminate the threat to humanity, namely the continuation of the armaments race and the continuation of nuclear weapon tests.

As a particular characteristic of the work of the General Assembly, I should like to point out that, in spite of the greatest pressure by the Western Powers in favour of their so-called partial treaty, which would leave open the possibility of carrying out underground nuclear tests, the General Assembly rejected that idea and, in the resolution as finally adopted, it insists on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests without any exception. That thought is expressed with the utmost clarity in the draft resolution 1762 (XVII) "a" sponsored by the neutralist States.

Furthermore, the United States and the United Kingdom, which had submitted their own draft resolution, when faced with the determined objections of the overwhelming majority of the member States were compelled to delete from their draft the paragraph providing for the cessation of tests in three environments only, in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space.
The Western Powers thereby admitted that there was no likelihood whatsoever of the acceptance by the United Nations General Assembly of their views on a partial treaty.

It seems to us that there is no need to explain at length why proposals that would still permit the carrying out of nuclear tests in some environments are being so determinedly opposed by the Member States of the United Nations. Several representatives of neutral States spoke very convincingly about this. Everyone understands very well that if a possibility to carry out nuclear weapon tests is preserved nothing will have changed. The situation will be the same — namely, nuclear tests will continue and new and better types of weapons of mass destruction will be completed. This will inevitably lead to a situation where new States will join the armaments race and the danger of a nuclear war will be increased.

The fact that our negotiations at Geneva are dragging is a matter of concern to many peoples and States. It is no mere accident that the overwhelming majority of the Member States of the United Nations expressed the wish that all nuclear weapon tests should cease. A final date — 1 January 1963 — was put forward, after which no one anywhere should carry out nuclear weapon tests. As a result of the debate on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests at the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly we have now a better and more solid basis for reaching a mutually acceptable agreement.

At the beginning of the negotiations in the Eighteen Nation Committee the neutral member States of this Committee made great efforts to try to find a compromise proposal in order to break the deadlock in which our negotiations were. The result of those efforts has been, as you know, the eight-Power joint memorandum (EMDC/26) submitted on 16 April 1962. Now, when that memorandum has been approved as a basis for negotiations by the United Nations General Assembly, one may say that that document has received world-wide support. Not one representative at the United Nations General Assembly spoke against this memorandum. On the contrary, all speakers emphasized its positive importance as the sole, available compromise proposal for an agreement on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests.
Consequently, the United Nations General Assembly, having approved the eight-Power joint memorandum, recommends us to agree on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests, using, for the purpose of controlling compliance with such an agreement, the system of national detection of nuclear explosions. Having approved the eight-Power joint memorandum the United Nations General Assembly has thereby rejected the demand of the Western Powers for compulsory inspection.

In summing up, one may say that never before have we had such a clear perspective of what we should do here in this Committee. Can we do it? Of course we can. What is needed is good will on all sides.

When we listened to the statements made by the representative of the United States, Mr. Dean, and the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Godber, at the eighty-third meeting of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament held on 26 November, it seemed to us at the beginning that there was a ray of hope for an agreement. Both Mr. Dean and Mr. Godber began their statements with assurances that they were prepared to devote their efforts, with a new sense of urgency, to our negotiations on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. Mr. Dean even presented himself as a determined foe of the transformation of our discussion into an empty debate.

After these opening words the Soviet delegation was in a state of optimistic expectation, hoping that a serious change had occurred in the attitude of the Western Powers that would enable us to overcome all obstacles. However, what we heard afterwards, when the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom pressed on to the substance or core of the matter, has shown that the Western representatives, far from making progress in certain respects, have begun to move backwards.

The Member States of the United Nations -- the overwhelming majority of the peoples -- demand the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests. Yet now we see that the United States and the United Kingdom still insist that they should remain free to carry out nuclear weapon tests.

Again, at the meeting of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom publicized their so-called partial craft treaty (EMDC/59), submitted on 27 August 1962 -- a proposal which would leave underground nuclear tests outside the scope of the agreement.
The Western Powers still endeavour to make us accept this partial treaty in spite of the fact that the United Nations General Assembly very clearly rejected the idea.

This position taken by the Western Powers must be seen in the light of the fact that neither the United States nor the United Kingdom intends to cease underground nuclear weapon tests. Quite to the contrary, it is well known that in the United States further sites for underground nuclear weapon tests have been prepared in Nevada. Apparently both the United States and the United Kingdom intend to ignore the United Nations General Assembly resolution on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests as from 1 January 1963 (RES/1762 (XVII)); and they will thereby deal a heavy blow to the opportunities existing now for reaching agreement on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests. The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom must realize the heavy responsibility they will assume if they unleash this new chain of events.

The Western Powers now have wide possibilities to find a constructive solution to our problem. One of such possibilities is, to take the eight-Power joint memorandum as a basis for negotiations and to accept it without reservations and without any attempt to tailor it to the present position of the Western Powers.

There is another possibility. We could sign forthwith an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space, while, in the same agreement, laying down an undertaking by the parties to continue negotiations on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests underground, and to abstain from any underground tests for the duration of the negotiations and until agreement has been reached. That would be a candid and honest attitude. It would place no one in an underprivileged position. It would enable us to overcome existing differences in the course of negotiations and to come to a mutually acceptable agreement.

The question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests is one of the most burning and important international problems.
One might say that the question is more than ripe. A solution thus far has not been reached only because of the lack of the necessary good will on the part of our Western partners. We appeal to the representatives of the Western Powers to adopt a realistic attitude: to give up any attempt to prevent agreement; to show their good will: to waive demands for international control and compulsory inspection: and to make up their minds to come to an agreement on one of the bases to which I have referred, namely, either the eight-Power joint memorandum (ENDC/28) or an agreement to prohibit nuclear weapon tests in three environments, provided negotiations on underground tests continue and that, for the duration of those negotiations, there is a commitment to abstain from any such further tests.

Mr. CODEHR (United Kingdom): I listened, Sir, with interest to your comments as, of course, I did to those of the United States representative. I noted the United States representative's reference at the beginning of his speech to the interesting speech we heard this morning from the representative of Sweden. I think he is very right 'n saying that we shall all wish to consider that proposal and study it in order to see whether it contains anything of interest. I may be wrong, Mr. Chairman, but, although I listened with care to your remarks, I did not notice that you referred to that particularly important speech by the Swedish representative at all. If I am wrong, I apologize. But I was certainly surprised that there was no reference to it. I think that all of us, from whichever side we approach this problem, ought to look at any proposals that are put forward to see whether they can help us to solve our problems.

In the same way I was a little surprised that I did not hear any reference in your speech, Sir, to the problem of the "black boxes" which I understood was a matter of interest to the Soviet Union, and to which I referred earlier. Although we do not see in the "black box" the solution to all our problems, at least we were willing to discuss it, if our Soviet colleagues wished. However, I have no doubt, Mr. Chairman, that on future occasions you will consider this particular problem.

We have to examine every idea placed before us in an endeavour to overcome the impasse in which our negotiations now stand. In this connexion I was interested in the quotation given to us by the United States representative. I think it was from a graduate of Cornell University, a Mr. Josh Billings, who said, if I have the quotation right: "It ain't ignorance that causes trouble: it's the things people know that ain't so." There is a lot in that.
I wonder if Mr. Billings was responsible for that other little couplet which I am sure is well-known to both the United States and the Soviet representatives and which goes as follows:

"As I was walking up the stair, I met a man who wasn't there;
He wasn't there again today, I do so wish he'd go away."

It seems to me that this is comparable to some of the arguments which we hear in relation to the problems of espionage and the other stories which we are so accustomed to hearing from our Soviet colleague.

I recall that at this particular moment of time we are, as near as possible, exactly one year from the date when the Soviet Union introduced its last proposal in relation to nuclear tests. We always refer to it as the 26 November proposal. Today is 28 November, but actually in refreshing my mind on it I see that in this document the date is recorded as 27 November. I refer to document MNDC/11. I have been re-reading that document to see whether there was anything in it which I had overlooked, because, as it is the latest Soviet position, we ought to acquaint ourselves all the time with what is in it. In these discussions we are constantly urging the Soviet representative to come up with something new. When it is considered just how far the West has moved forward since that particular Soviet proposal was made, then I think it is difficult for the Soviet representative not to admit that the West is very, very much more flexible in these matters than the Soviet Union, particularly in view of the fact, as I have reminded the Soviet representative on so many occasions, that this particular proposal was a step backward and not forward.

However, on re-reading document MNDC/11 I was interested to note that on page 5 of the official copy there is one passage which is heavily underlined. I presume, therefore, that the Soviet Union attaches particular importance to it. The passage reads:

"With this in view, the Soviet Government submits for examination by the Governments of the Western Powers the following proposal: to conclude immediately an appropriate agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space, that is, in these environments where the implementation of control is not fraught with any serious technical difficulties."
That is rather like what the Western Powers are suggesting to the Soviet Union today. Our draft partial treaty (A.D.59) covers in fact exactly those points. It is true that at a later stage of that document, only two or three paragraphs later on, and in far less specific terms, the Soviet Union says:

"In regard to underground nuclear weapon tests, the Soviet Government is of the opinion that States should undertake not to conduct such tests until agreement is reached on a system of control ..."

That statement is in far less positive language than the emphatic declaration of opinion which appears at the top of page 5, and I would say to the Soviet representative that the very least he can do now is to agree to what the Soviet Union itself -- just a year ago yesterday -- felt was of such supreme importance, namely, to agree to abandon all further tests in these three environments. I very much hope that the Soviet representative has not altogether turned aside from that I drew to his attention the fact that in this Soviet Union document of a year ago far more importance is attached to banning tests in these three environments than is attached to that one should do in relation to underground tests. If, in fact, that was the view of the Soviet Union a year ago, then I would have thought that we could quickly conclude this partial agreement.

To turn from that, but still considering how we can make progress, either in relation to a partial agreement or to a wider one, I have been thinking about the suggestions put forward by the Swedish representative this morning. I do not wish to give a full considered view on those suggestions at this moment, but the more I think about it the clearer it becomes to me that the Western draft comprehensive treaty (A.D.56) is obviously on the lines on which we can and should get a final treaty banning all nuclear tests. Of that I think there is no question. I believe that we have brought forward in that document, in a simple straightforward way, requirements which ought to be possible of agreement. We have always indicated that it is there, ready for negotiation, and that it is not placed on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. I think that is the position between the United States and ourselves on this.

But having said that, and bearing in mind resolution 1762 (XVII) passed very recently by the General Assembly, I notice that the Swedish representative drew special attention to operative paragraph 6 of that particular resolution.
Operative paragraph 6 states:

"Recommends that if, against all hope, the parties concerned do not reach agreement on the cessation of all tests by 1 January 1963, they should enter into an immediate agreement prohibiting nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, accompanied by an interim arrangement suspending all underground tests, taking as a basis the eight-nation memorandum and taking into consideration other proposals presented at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly, such interim agreement to include adequate assurances for effective detection and identification of seismic events by an international scientific commission." (A/RES/1762 (XVII), p.3)

Those are the words of paragraph 6 of the resolution which was passed in New York only a few short weeks ago, and that is the particular paragraph to which the Swedish representative drew attention in his speech this morning. He then said quite clearly:

"... a provisional arrangement under a temporary ban on underground tests, as asked for in paragraph 6 of the thirty-seven Power resolution, would in no way prejudice the final shape of a test ban agreement." (ENDC/PV.34, p.36)

I take it that in his speech what he was looking at was simply an attempt to find a way to implement paragraph 6 of the thirty-seven-Power resolution as an interim measure pending the conclusion of the final treaty, which I still say should be on the basis of the draft comprehensive treaty (ENDC/58) submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom on 27 August 1962. If we are looking for a means of finding a way to do this, then this proposal of his is an interesting one.

I do not look on this proposal as being a proposal for an unqualified moratorium — not at all. I would certainly not support that in any form whatsoever. If I understand him aright, he is proposing that there should be this interim arrangement, in line with paragraph 6 of the resolution, to which he has specifically referred and which in fact, as I have pointed out, says that an interim agreement shall include adequate assurances for effective detection and identification by an international scientific commission.
If this is what he is seeking, and if we can make progress on the lines of some interim arrangement which does provide adequate and effective detection and identification while we thrash out the actual details of a permanent treaty, this is something which is certainly of interest and deserving of our attention. It is in that context that I refer to these proposals that were made this morning by the Swedish representative, and it is in that context that I asked this morning a particular question. I indicated then that I did not expect the Soviet representative to answer it at that moment but I think it does require an answer if we are to build anything on this idea of our Swedish colleagues. That question -- if I may refresh the mind of our Soviet colleague here -- related to the suggestion made by Mr. Edberg in his speech, when he talked about this group of eminent scientists which could be entrusted with the task of deciding whether an inspection was necessary, and went on to infer that his understanding was that the Soviet Union "does not object to the opening up of such a possibility" (ibid.)

The question that I asked this morning was: in these circumstances would the Soviet Union in fact accept inspection on every occasion when this group of scientists declared that inspection was necessary? That is a simple question.

In a different context, Mr. Chairman, I think that on Monday, speaking in the plenary meeting, you did indicate that it was important to accept a matter in principle before one went on to discuss details. What I am suggesting to you, Sir, is that you should accept in principle, and tell us quite categorically and frankly, that if we were to consider this Swedish proposal at all your country would in fact accept this decision of these scientists that an inspection was necessary and that you would invite inspection on each and every such occasion when those scientists in fact so declared. I think you will agree that this is a point of principle. By your own definition -- you said that we should accept a principle before discussing details -- it is perhaps fair that you should give us that clear answer. I hope that in answering this question you will not merely refer me to what Mr. Kuznetsov said on 17 August, for that statement was in fact capable of various interpretations. What we want is a simple and clear statement of the Soviet Union's point of view in regard to this. It would materially help us forward in our work if we were quite clear about what the Soviet Union meant in this regard.
That is an immediate comment with regard to the Swedish proposals. Of course they go into various other aspects, and, as I say, I think it would not be courteous to our Swedish friends to attempt to give a full analysis of what the Swedish representative said within two or three hours of his making his statement. However, with regard to his thoughts about an international scientific commission -- this interim body that he was thinking about -- I refreshed my mind again with the eight-Power memorandum (ENDC/28) and I found that that he proposed was very much in line with the first part of paragraph 4 of that memorandum. I also looked again at our own draft comprehensive treaty (ENDC/58) to see the references there to the international scientific commission, and again there is a great deal of common ground. This shows that in framing these proposals our Swedish colleague has given thought to suggestions that have come from various sources. As I say, we wish to consider very carefully what he has proposed in this regard. I think it is our duty to consider any proposals that come from other delegations, because in our Sub-Committee here -- I am sure you will agree with this, Mr. Chairman -- we do tend to become wrapped up in our own individual thoughts, particularly after two and a half months. Anybody who reads the reports of the Sub-Committee will admit that our views could do with a little new thought brought into them. Of course, I think that the Western thoughts are very good ones, but possibly you, Mr. Chairman, think the same about those of the Soviet Union.

Anyway I wanted it to be quite clear that, as far as a permanent solution is concerned, I am still convinced that the United States-United Kingdom draft comprehensive treaty does provide the real basis for an effective and lasting treaty. However, I am not opposed to any idea of trying to find some means of implementing paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 1742 (XVII), provided it clearly embodies the undertaking in the last phrase of that paragraph, which says that this interim agreement should

"include adequate assurances for effective detection and identification of seismic events by an international scientific commission"

(i./RES/1762 (XVII), 2.3).
In so far as any interim arrangement does that, then I am very willing to look at it and to see how it can help us to achieve results. This, as you yourself, Mr. Chairman, have reminded us, is a matter which was passed overwhelmingly by the General Assembly.

Your references to the Western partial treaty having been withdrawn from the United States-United Kingdom resolution are of course very much beside the point. They have no relation because the reason why it was withdrawn was that there was this direct reference in this paragraph to a partial treaty and there was no need to reiterate the reference to a partial treaty — so please do not let us have debating points of that sort. What really matters is that we are prepared to look with a fresh mind at any new suggestions which come forward. That is why I have made these initial personal comments on the proposal tabled this morning.

Therefore I do ask you, Mr. Chairman, to give further thought to this matter and to see whether you cannot come forward with some new proposals. As I have indicated to you, it is appropriate that you should do so on the anniversary of the proposals which you made which ran away from us. On this occasion perhaps you could make some new proposals which would come towards us, and that would, I am sure, give great joy to my United States colleague just as it would to me.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): Are there any other speakers this afternoon? If not, I have a brief reply to make in the light of the intervention to which we have just listened from the United Kingdom representative.

He expressed surprise at my not having said anything, either this morning at the meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee or at this afternoon's meeting of the Sub-Committee, about the latest proposal made by the representative of Sweden in his statement to the Eighteen-Nation Committee this morning. In reply to his point I have to say that we intend to scrutinize the Swedish proposal with the utmost care; but may I draw his attention to the fact that seven months ago, to be exact on 19 April, we declared that we accepted the Eight-Power memorandum (ENDC/26), one of whose co-sponsors is Sweden. If study of the Swedish proposal shows that it accords with the proposal contained in the memorandum of 20 April of the unaligned Powers, then I think I shall not err in saying that we will only welcome it.
With respect to the Soviet proposal regarding "black boxes", or automatic stations, I did not dwell on that this afternoon because it is for you now to speak. We tabled our proposal about the possible use of automatic stations, "black boxes", in order to take the maximum step towards meeting the Western Powers and facilitating the negotiations on the ending of all tests; and on the basis of that proposal it could be possible for us to arrive at an agreement rapidly were the Western Powers not to try to nullify our proposal by requiring an international control system and obligatory inspection.

In conclusion, I can assure you that we will study very carefully Mr. Godber's statement this afternoon in the hope of finding something to facilitate our progress towards an agreement.

Does anyone else wish to speak now? If not, shall we pass on to agreeing upon the date of our next meeting? According to an earlier sounding that we have had, I think we agreed to have our next meeting on Tuesday, 4 December, at 10.30 a.m. It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 4.45 p.m.
CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
SUB-COMMITTEE ON A TREATY FOR THE DISCONTINUANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS
PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FORTY-SIXTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 4 December 1962, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. J.B. CODEBER (United Kingdom)

This provisional record contains the originals of speeches in English together with the Conference room interpretation of speeches in other languages.

It is requested that any corrections to the originals of speeches be submitted in four copies (preferably incorporated in four of the single-sided mimeographed copies with which delegations are supplied) by the authorized Liaison Officer of the delegation concerned to the Documents Office, Rccm A.206. If no corrections are received within four working days from the date of distribution the final version, in which the interpretations will be replaced by translations, will be prepared and issued on the basis of the provisional record.

THE TIME LIMIT FOR CORRECTIONS TO THIS RECORD WILL BE 0900 HOURS ON 11 DECEMBER 1962.
PRESENT AT THE TABLE

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER
Sir Michael WRIGHT
Mr. D.W. BRINSON
Mr. R.C. ELEPHANT

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. A.S. ROBCHIN
Mr. F.F. JABHOV
Mr. I.G. USACHEV

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. D.A. MARX
Mr. T.R. PICKERING

Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN
The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I declare open the forty-sixth meeting of the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): Yesterday, at the eighty-sixth plenary meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, the Soviet representative made a number of what seemed to me to be somewhat negative and unhelpful statements to which I shall reply at this and at future meetings. In the course of his remarks, however, he put forth a proposal on the idea of using automatic seismic stations.

In essence, the representative of the Soviet Union said that the problem of adequate control over a cessation of underground tests could be solved by the use of the so-called "black boxes". My delegation and the United States Government will, of course, wish to study that Soviet suggestion in some detail. On the basis of what we have heard and seen of the Soviet representative's statement, and because of its general nature, we shall wish also to ask questions to clarify certain aspects of it in the course of this and future meetings. In the meantime, there are certain comments concerning his proposal which my delegation would like to make; and certain questions on it which we should like to put to him.

Yesterday the representative of the Soviet Union referred to the tenth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, which met in London in September 1962, and to the fact that his suggestion grew out of statements and papers given there. I believe that all of the delegations here have followed the proceedings of that Conference with some care. Certain statements made by the scientists at the Conference bear on this question of automatic seismic stations. For example, in a statement issued at the close of the Conference the scientists said:

"We have also paid special attention to the problem of stopping nuclear tests and to proposals on this subject made at Geneva by non-aligned nations. Novel suggestions were made at the Conference for improving the effectiveness of means of detecting nuclear tests by automatic sealed seismic stations. These would be put in places in agreed numbers by the host nation after being sealed by an international authority, and would not, we think, endanger the security of any country."
Apparently, then, the Soviet Union has taken note of this suggestion as a means of finding a way out of the impasse over effective control of the cessation of underground nuclear weapon tests. It should be noted as well that the scientists at the Pugwash Conference concluded that a rather large number of automatic stations might improve the means of detection. Of course, nothing was said about the question of improvements in identification, which is the primary problem we face.

The suggestion referred to in the statement I have just quoted was made by a group of United States and Soviet Union scientists in a paper at the Pugwash Conference called "A New Approach to the Test Ban Negotiations," to which the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Godber, referred yesterday and which he asked to have circulated as a Conference document. This Pugwash Conference paper first suggested the use of automatic seismic stations in speaking of the eight-nation joint memorandum (S/DC/28) in these words:

"Their proposal" -- that is, the eight-nation joint memorandum -- "suggests the utilization of a world-wide net of standardized seismic stations manned by nationals of the host country which will provide an International Control Commission with seismic records. We have explored the possibility of developing this system in such a way as to provide a minimal interference with the host country, and still obtain a maximum amount of completely objective seismic information for the International Control Commission so that it will substantially reduce the number of necessary on-site inspections. Our suggestions are along the following lines:
"1. Automatic recording stations will be used. These will be sealed in such a way that they cannot be tampered with, and they will be self-contained. The instruments will be installed by the host government, and periodically returned to the International Commission for inspection, replacement, repair, etc. A standard explosive blast can be used for calibration purposes. All the records from the instruments will be turned over to the Commission for analysis. Their location can be verified directly from the timing and phase of large seismic events."

This means, of course, that even if the Soviet Union were proposing a rather large system of these "black boxes", its own scientists recognize that at least two things will be true.

First, the automatic stations should be considered only as a supplement to and not as a substitute for, the nationally-manned detection stations in the host country. These automatic "black boxes" will not be able to take the place of such nationally-manned detection stations. This is clear from all of our preliminary studies, and from what Soviet scientists have said, and we see no way in which these stations could replace the necessary manned networks of control posts.

Secondly, this paper gives absolutely no support for the viewpoint that such stations would eliminate the need for a number of "necessary on-site inspections." On the contrary; it is specifically stated that such inspections would still be necessary. Our scientists continue to believe that they will be necessary.

In this connexion, therefore, we would like to ask the Soviet representative to clarify for us exactly what technical purpose the Soviet Union believes its proposal for automatic seismic stations will serve.

The Soviet proposal is not clear to us in that we do not know whether it envisages the scrapping entirely of all manned stations which are technically superior to the automatic stations, and which my delegation believes would be required in any event, as I have already said. It would be useful also to know what technical advantages the Soviet Union believes are inherent in the use of unmanned automatic stations, and whether the Soviet Union believes that these devices cannot be tampered with, or whether, in fact, they can be tampered with even though the seal remains intact. Or is the Soviet Union merely presenting this proposal as a device to escape the use of nationally-manned stations under international co-ordination and supervision?
Also, the sense in which the proposals were made by the Soviet Union leads my delegation to believe that the Soviet Union feels that automatic seismic stations might possibly be a substitute for obligatory on-site inspection. But initial studies of proposals involving automatic seismic stations lead us to believe that substantial numbers of these stations would be required before there could be any reduction in the number of required on-site inspections, and even then, even with these rather substantial numbers, an appropriate number of on-site inspections would still be required.

In all our preliminary studies of these stations we have found that even with a large number of such automatic stations, effectively designed, placed into operation, and incorporated into the detection control system, there will always be a residue of unidentified seismic events. Although the automatic stations may possibly reduce this number somewhat, there would appear to be no scientific foundation for the belief that all significant events which will be detected can be identified by a system incorporating automatic stations. If our Soviet colleagues have different information in this respect we would like to receive it.

It is also clear that both Soviet Union and United States scientists were in agreement that the "black boxes" would not eliminate the need for on-site inspection, since they speak of a "number of necessary on-site inspection." This fact is also borne out by the letter by Professor Alexander Rich in the New York Times, which the United Kingdom representative spoke about at our plenary meeting yesterday, and which he asked to have circulated as a Conference document.

It would seem to us, therefore, that there will need to be a number of obligatory on-site inspections in the territory of the country where the unidentified event occurs in order to ensure that there is the possibility of obtaining positive identification of the origin of any particular unidentified event. It is only through such a procedure that we can achieve a reasonable deterrent to clandestine underground tests in violation of the treaty.

The most basic and the most difficult issue with which we are confronted in these negotiations is the question of obligatory on-site inspections. The most basic question to the Soviet representative, accordingly, is simply this: How, in the opinion of the Soviet government, does its proposal on "black boxes" assist in the solution of the well-known and accepted problem of the scientific requirement for on-site inspection of unidentified events?
This question leads to a second general question: What are the technical characteristics of the "black boxes" or automatic stations which the Soviet Union has proposed be incorporated into the control system? Specifically, what types of instruments has the Soviet Union in mind for such "black boxes": how would they be connected up: and what type of communications or data processing arrangements does the Soviet Union propose? In addition, what would be the size of these individual "black boxes"? Is there any approximate cost for each of them? Or, is there any cost for the connecting up of such "black boxes" to the rest of the system?

That completes my preliminary remarks on the proposals made by the Soviet representative yesterday with respect to automatic seismic stations. My delegation will have more to say at future meetings with respect to the Soviet proposals. We very much hope that the Soviet Union will respond to the questions we have asked today regarding its proposals. The answers to these questions will go far towards facilitating our assessment of these automatic seismic stations.

We also noted that at the meeting of the test ben sub-Committee on 13 November last (ENDC/SC.1/PV.43) the Soviet representative paraphrased into the record certain portions of an article which appeared in the Soviet newspaper Izvestia on 11 September 1962. While we would prefer not to base any comments on Soviet scientific progress on a newspaper article, in the absence of timely scientific data, which has so far been withheld by our Soviet colleagues, we are forced to turn our attention to this newspaper article.
During certain of our test... Sub-Committee... meeting... have pointed out... certain inconsistencies... in this particular... Soviet Union newspaper... article in... Izvestia... Today I should like to consider some other points from it.

The article discusses certain alleged statements with respect to a digital seismograph made by Dr. Frank Press of the California Institute of Technology. In effect we have recognised that this instrument, which converts seismic readings into digital form for use with digital computers, while a useful research tool, does not add measurably to our ability to identify seismic events. It should be noted that at the moment we can quite reasonably translate normal seismograph readings to digital form for analysis as desired. The machine developed by Dr. Press of the California Institute of Technology is a step forward in making the processing of seismic data more rapid, but it does not change the substance of that data.

The Soviet newspaper article also misinterprets a memorandum (6/6/1/673) circulated by the United States at the United Nations with respect to the amplitudes necessary in order to separate clearly first motion from background noise. The United States maintains and has maintained that present methods of analysis require a peak amplitude—namely, the highest amplitude of a wave train—of the order of from ten to twenty times the background interference. The Soviet Union article errs when it states that the United States position requires

"that the visible first manifestation exceed the background interference ten to twenty times."

Quite obviously, the difference about which the United States was speaking was not the amplitude of the first appearance of the wave train but rather its peak amplitude, which is a decidedly different thing. On the whole we believe that first motion will be approximately one tenth the peak amplitude and that at least a 21 ratio of first motion to background level is required to determine the direction of first motion.

With regard to the question of determination of depth of focus of a seismic event, the Soviet Union in the Izvestia article claims unusual accuracies in the Pamir-Beikai region using what we know from public information to be a network of some twenty to thirty permanent stations in that region, while in some instances temporary stations are also added to those permanent stations. These figures are very interesting, for, taking the twenty to thirty permanent stations only, these are more stations than th...
the Soviet Union has ever been willing to discuss for monitoring the whole of the Soviet Union. Yet they had twenty to thirty permanent stations in this particular region, supplemented by temporary stations.

With a long and concentrated history of research in this limited region, it is unreasonable that travel times and propagation conditions should be known well enough, with a network as dense as I have described, to allow rather conclusive depth determinations. Even then, substantial numbers of events might occur in this region in the low magnitude range for which a focal depth could not be determined and which would thus be of critical interest to a control system if it is to detect successfully a violation of the treaty by a clandestine series of underground tests. The article indicates that these unidentified events may be as many as 30 per cent of the detected and located events.

So much for that particular article in Izvestia. Now I should like to turn to another subject.

At our eighty-sixth plenary meeting the Soviet representative and the Polish representative went to great lengths -- I do not know for what reasons -- to attempt to show that somehow or other paragraph 2 is the only paragraph in United Nations General Assembly resolution 1762 (XVII) by which the Committee should be guided in its work. If I understood the Polish representative correctly, according to him we could eliminate all the paragraphs in resolution 1762 (XVII) except operative paragraph 2. I believe that the United Kingdom representative made clear the important point, through his quotation of statements by the representative of Sweden speaking last Wednesday, that indeed the whole resolution -- as every competent court would hold -- must be read together and in its entirety, each paragraph being weighed against every other paragraph. Competent courts do not favour strained grammatical constructions or empty legalisms bearing no relation to substance.
Certainly paragraph 2 of resolution 1762 (XVII) must be read against paragraph 3. For example, while paragraph 2 asks that all tests should cease immediately, paragraph 3 notes that negotiations are continuing and it urges governments to send instructions to their Sub-Committee delegations still meeting in Geneva in order that agreement might be reached by 1 January 1963. By the same token, paragraph 2 of resolution 1762 (XVII) must be read against paragraph 6 which sets out in specific terms the type of an arrangement under which tests might cease by or after 1 January 1963, and the measures of control under which that cessation should take place.

One can read resolution 1762 (XVII) and one will not find anything in it which says that one paragraph has any greater importance than any other paragraph, and so it seems to me that this attempted and studied emphasis by Soviet bloc delegations upon this carefully contrived effort to try to create some sort of primacy for paragraph 2 of resolution 1762 (XVII) where such primacy does not exist, cannot and should not be ignored. Certainly we know that the representative of the Soviet Union does not make statements in this Sub Committee or in the plenary meetings of the Conference without due attention to the reasons why his Government may wish or may not wish to have him create a certain impression. This position taken by the Soviet bloc delegations with respect to this attempt to create some primacy for paragraph 2 of resolution 1762 (XVII) is, I submit, most unfortunate and one which we cannot allow to pass without comment.

It seems clear to my delegation that the Soviet Union is trying, in whatever possible way it can, to construe United Nations General Assembly resolution 1762 (XVII) somehow or other as being the uncontrolled, uncontrolled, moratorium on underground tests, which the Soviet bloc alone champions.

We know that the Soviet Union has indicated that it intends to cease testing in the relatively near future, at least for this series. At least it has led us to believe that it intends to do so — or indeed, whatever are the facts, that it has done so. But the United States will not, under any guise, enter into any agreement, unilaterally or otherwise, which will in effect be an uncontrolled, uncontrolled, moratorium on testing in the underground environment. As I have said many times, we had a very sad and very unfortunate experience the last time the Soviet Union proposed such an arrangement, and we do not intend to repeat it.
It will be recalled that on 14 January 1960 Chairman Khrushchev said:

"In this connexion, I would like to re-emphasize that the Soviet Government, with a view to safeguarding the most favourable conditions for the working out in the very near future of an agreement on the discontinuance of tests, will continue to abide by its pledge not to renew experimental nuclear explosions in the Soviet Union if the Western Powers do not start testing atomic and hydrogen weapons."

The Western Powers were the United States and the United Kingdom, and we did not so start. If the Soviet Union intends to repeat such a unilateral pledge, that is a decision for it alone to take. However, I can assure representatives once more that the United States will not enter into this type of arrangement again. One has only to compare the words of Chairman Khrushchev on 14 January 1960 with the actions of the Soviet Government on 1 September 1961 to understand why we are unwilling to cease underground tests without adequate and effective controls and without an adequate and effective system of obligatory on-site inspections.

We believe that we have presented, in our comprehensive draft treaty, document ENDC/58, a fair and effective basis for ensuring the cessation of all tests in all environments for all times. We are more than willing to discuss our draft treaty and its provisions with the Soviet Union. In response to the requests of other representatives and in response to requests from throughout the world, we have also presented a treaty (ENDC/59) -- which will end tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Let us be clear. We favour the cessation of all nuclear tests in all environments, and we would prefer to sign the comprehensive treaty (ENDC/58) which does exactly that. On this comprehensive draft treaty which, if signed, would stop all tests we remain divided from the Soviet Union primarily on the question of the necessary controls and inspection for the cessation of underground tests, but just a small effort on the part of the Soviet Union to match the many steps which the United Kingdom and the United States have taken towards reaching agreement on this difficult question could solve this problem now and give to us all the treaty which everyone desires, a treaty which would ban all nuclear tests in all environments for all time.
The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): Does any other representative wish to address the Sub-Committee? Very well; if our Soviet colleague is coy perhaps I might say just a few words in my capacity as representative of the United Kingdom.

I have listened with interest to what our United States colleague has just said to us on this problem and I, like him, was frankly disappointed, as I think was apparent yesterday, at the speech delivered to us in plenary meeting by the representative of the Soviet Union.

Why was I disappointed? I was disappointed because the representative of the Soviet Union began with such fair and honeyed words about the need to make progress, about the importance of making progress in this field, and even about the better atmosphere for making progress. But then, what did he proceed to do? He proceeded not only to attack the position of the Western States in regard to this matter but also to make an onslaught upon the various propositions which had been put forward by certain of the neutral States in this Conference, propositions which surely we must all realize were made with a genuine desire to help lead us forward to agreement.
(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

The Soviet representative spent a lot of time dealing with resolution 1762 (XVII) of the General Assembly and, as our United States colleague so rightly pointed out this morning, he attached quite disproportionate importance to one particular paragraph of that resolution, operative paragraph 2. In relation to that paragraph, I would ask him if he attaches such importance to it, why has he so consistently throughout the whole of the spring, summer and autumn of this year done all in his power to prevent agreement on a comprehensive treaty to ban nuclear tests? Not one single move forward has he made. He has reverted again and again to proposals which the Soviet Union put forward on 28 November last year, proposals which he should know better than anyone merely took us back and away from a treaty and not towards it. So his fair words really meant nothing at all.

I would say to him that if he does attach such importance to ceasing all tests by 1 January 1963, there is a very simple way of achieving that. The draft comprehensive treaty which the United States and United Kingdom put forward on 27 August this year (EMDC/59) contains a fair basis for the elimination of all tests for the future on the best scientific information known to anyone in the world that has been disclosed publicly. I say "that has been disclosed publicly" because the Soviet Union has made various claims during recent months, claims which it has never attempted to substantiate in any sense or any degree whatever, claims that it can not only detect but identify all underground explosions, as to whether they be tests or whether they be natural phenomena.

I have often asked why the Soviet Union should so deliberately prevent the conclusion of a treaty by refusing to give to the world information in this sense which it claims to have, and we have never had any adequate answer either here or at the General Assembly in New York. The only thing that was said in New York relevant to this was when Mr. Zorin told us that although the Soviet Union had this information it was not the sort of information which it could impart to other countries. An extraordinary statement to make. What possible damage to Soviet security could it be to show that the Soviet Union had this ability not only to detect but to identify? I would ask our Soviet colleagues, if they still have this incredible suspicion which seems to permeate their every activity, why could not the Soviet Union provide this information in confidence to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a man who has the complete confidence of all countries, as has been evinced within only the last few days, not least in that generous letter which
I saw Mr. Khrushchev sent to the Secretary-General expressing his confidence. If they do not trust us, surely they trust the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Let them show to him this evidence they have: let them show to scientists nominated by him, if he likes, some evidence that they have the information and then let them bring it forward and so enable us, if they have this information, to complete a treaty on their own terms. But if they are unwilling or unable so to provide it, then the Soviet representative must know from the acts of his own Government that the Western Powers cannot trust the word of the Soviet Union in regard to whether it would cease underground tests or not. Surely our Soviet colleague does not need reminding of the reasons why we cannot trust them, his Government—because we were hoodwinked in September 1961 and because, even more recently, the Western world and the United States in particular were hoodwinked in regard to Cuba. These are facts which I do not drag in front of the Soviet representative with any pleasure at all, but they are facts which have to be faced in order to understand why the Western Powers cannot and will not agree to any uncontrolled, unpoliccd moratorium. Our Soviet colleague knows them well. Therefore, he is being wholly unrealistic in pretending that it is possible to implement operative paragraph 2 of resolution 1762 (XVII) to which he attaches such importance. It is impossible to implement it without his ready co-operation, either in providing us with the scientific information which he claims makes on-site inspection unnecessary or in agreeing to that very minimum of on-site inspection which we and our United States colleague have offered in our comprehensive treaty of 27 August (35/58).

So, if there is to be no comprehensive treaty by 1 January 1963, the blame must fall absolutely, completely and categorically on the Soviet Union and on we or else. That being so, however much we may regret it, it is important that we consider the desires of the whole world as evinced in this resolution, to which so much attention has rightly been paid at the last few plenary meetings. I would remind our Soviet colleague about operative paragraph 5. "We have heard a great deal about certain other paragraphs, but paragraph 5

"Calls on the parties concerned, taking as a basis the abovementioned memorandum and having regard to the discussions on this item at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly, to negotiate in a spirit of mutual understanding and concession in order to reach agreement urgently, bearing in mind the vital interests of mankind;"

(35/63, p.3)
"To negotiate in a spirit of mutual understanding" — that is what we have been wanting to do, that is what we have been trying to do, and we are willing and ready now to consider any of those new thoughts and suggestions that have been put forward by the neutral States, just as we are willing to negotiate on the terms and the basis of our comprehensive treaty of 27 August, and just as we are also willing to sign immediately our partial treaty which we put forward as a "second best".

Speaking yesterday at the plenary meeting, the Soviet representative made a tremendous attack upon this partial treaty we had put forward. He sought to criticize it in every possible way. He sought to show that to ban tests in every environment other than underground was something which was wicked and evil and which would not help at all. Those were very extravagant words which do not bear investigation for one moment. But I would just remind him that this was not our main proposition; this was a subsidiary proposition because of the attitude of our Soviet colleagues and their unwillingness to accept any reasonable means of verification in relation to underground tests. If, therefore, for these peculiar reasons of their own they refuse a comprehensive treaty, they are the last people in the world who should be entitled to scoff at a partial treaty which could be obtained on terms which they admit themselves they could accept. It is they and they alone who are preventing the world from being eased of this dreadful burden of fall out which causes concern to people all over the world. It is the Soviet Union alone which is preventing a solution of that problem.
Bearing that in mind, is it not wrong to scoff at operative paragraph 6 of the resolution? Why should the Soviet Union say that paragraph 6 is a paragraph that should not be utilized? Why should it say that in fact there is something wrong in trying to make use of the idea of a partial treaty plus some temporary arrangements which could ease the problem of underground tests as well? The Soviet Union seems so determined not to have a treaty on any basis at all that it must reject in these harsh terms every effort made -- not only by the Western nations but by the neutrals as well. Operative paragraph 6 -- which, as our Soviet colleague told us yesterday, he and his delegation and those other delegations closely connected with the Soviet Union voted against -- was in fact supported not only by the Western Powers but, as I reminded him yesterday, by almost all of the neutral Powers represented at this Conference. I attach particular importance to that because, while it may be possible sometimes, by the use of extravagant language, to pull the wool over the eyes of some uncommitted nations it is very much more difficult so to do with those uncommitted nations which have had the opportunity of working with us and listening to our arguments over a long period of months. It seems to me very significant indeed that none of them voted against this particular paragraph and in fact almost all voted for it. It does therefore have, in my view, a very particular significance. It carries with it the weight of international opinion to a degree which the Soviet Union should not so lightly turn aside.

That being so, the proposals put forward by various of the non-committed countries since the Conference reconvened a short time ago do deserve something far better than the very rough treatment they received from the representative of the Soviet Union yesterday. It is true that throughout most of his speech he sought to heap his criticism on the head of our unfortunate Canadian colleague, who had dared also to say many of these things, but in fact -- as he showed towards the end of his speech -- his attack was not directed solely at our Canadian colleague: it was, as is shown in the verbatim record an attack on Maxier, India and Sweden as well. Those countries are genuinely trying to find some way out of the impasse, and what does our Soviet colleague say? He says:

"An objective analysis shows that considerations of so-called temporary agreements of the sort mentioned by the representatives of Canada, Mexico and India -- and to a certain extent this was referred to by the representative of Sweden -- do not lighten our task.
Quite the contrary. Those proposals create new difficulties. They do not serve our cause; they only complicate our problem." (ENDC/FV.36. p. 66)

That is an extraordinary statement for our Soviet colleague to have made, because all those proposals, as I understood them, were directed towards trying to find some interim way of halting underground testing while we worked out the modalities of a final solution. To reject them in this way, without even subjecting them to examination, really is not good enough. To reject them in this way is to say "We, the Soviet Union, want no part in a nuclear test ban treaty. We will have nothing to do with one. We do not care what harm this causes. We do not care what concern this creates for the vast majority of mankind". That is not the action of a responsible Government.

I therefore do urge our Soviet colleague -- and I do this very genuinely; I am trying to moderate my language as much as I can -- really to go into this again and to see whether it is not possible for the Soviet Union to find some ingredients in the proposals put forward by the neutral countries, as well as those put forward by Canada -- proposals put forward in a genuine effort to try to bridge the gap between us. We all recognize that there is a gap. Our Soviet colleague remarked yesterday that it had been narrowed. He did not have the grace to say that it had been narrowed by the movements of the Western nations, but we all know that is so. If this gap is there, but is narrower, surely it is the duty of all of us to try to find some means of bridging it. Therefore it is not good enough, I say, to turn aside these genuine attempts by our non-aligned colleagues to find some way to bridge the gap. I do say to our Soviet colleague that these proposals deserve examination.

I would make it clear that my delegation is in no way committed to accepting any of these proposals, but we believe they are worthy of examination. We believe that the suggestions put forward by our Swedish colleague have a number of interesting thoughts in them. I thought that his suggestions, which covered a wide field, did deserve real discussion in this Sub-Committee, and if our Soviet colleague is willing to discuss them we are more than ready to do so. Mr. Edberg went into considerable detail about the scientific commission; he indicated problems in relation to detection; and he talked of the way in which inspection could be dealt with. All those are very valid points. In addition our Mexican
colleague said interesting things in relation to inspection. I will not quote what he said, but there are various passages to be found in the verbatim record of the eighty-fifth meeting of the Conference, in the speech of Mr. Padilla Nervo. In the same way the representative of India has made genuine efforts, I believe, to try and help us along the road, and there again references will be found in the same verbatim record, in the speech of Mr. Lall. These, I say, do deserve our attention, as do the proposals of Mr. Edberg of Sweden, General Burns of Canada and Mr. Kasson of the United Arab Republic. The ideas of these people, I say, should not be thrown into the garbage bin. They should be looked at, to see whether we can develop anything from them. But if our Soviet colleague is going to continue in the manner in which he spoke yesterday he is saying that he is determined not to make progress, however much everybody else wants it; and if he is saying that I think it should be made clear to us all what in fact he is trying to do.

I think one aspect of our Soviet colleague's attack does need to have the fierce light of publicity thrown on to it in order to clarify just what he is saying and what he is seeking to do. It is with reference to the question of black boxes. Our United States colleague referred to this matter this morning, and I listened with great interest to his words, which I think were very apposite in this regard. At the last meeting of the Sub-Committee, on 28 November, in answer to me Mr. Tsarapkin said:

"We tabled our proposal about the possible use of automatic stations, 'black boxes', in order to take the maximum step towards meeting the Western Powers ..." (ENDC/SC.I/PV.45, p.37)

As far as I know, the Soviet Union has tabled no proposal at all in relation to black boxes. Certainly he made reference to them at a previous meeting, but if he wishes to table a specific proposal about black boxes we shall be very interested to look at it. We ourselves have indicated that we do not believe that black boxes could solve our problem. We accept the possibility that they could ease that problem and to some extent reduce it, and anything that could ease and reduce it and bring the sides closer together is worth looking at. Therefore we are willing to look at any proposal if our Soviet colleague does in fact table one; but, as I have indicated, although he made that remark at the last meeting of the Sub-Committee, I know of no specific proposal that has been tabled.
However, in relation to "black boxes", I think it is just as well to have this matter in perspective. I made it clear that as far as the United Kingdom is concerned we certainly do not reject the use of them as some ancillary means of trying to reduce the degree of on-site inspection that is required or possibly of the number of detection posts. We are certainly willing to look at this, but, as our United States colleague said this morning, of course one has got to know precisely what goes into the "black box"; one has to have some criterion on which to base any such thoughts.

I did want just to remind my colleagues that of course, although the name "black box" may be a new idea, the idea itself of an unmanned seismic station is certainly not new. I have been refreshing my mind from a document which is commonly known as the Berkner Report, produced in the original Committee which appears as document GXL/41/1/65 dated 23 July 1959. On page 25 of that document, one finds reference to what were then called "attended auxiliary seismic stations" -- not nearly such a fancy phrase as "black box" is, but it means the same thing. I will just quote two sentences:

"Use of unmanned seismic units as supplements to the control posts' attended equipment will improve the capability of the station to detect first-motion. In fact, consideration should be given to arranging small arrays of unmanned stations where this seems appropriate."

I merely recall it to show that this is no new magic formula; it is something that was thought about during those long, weary years in the Committee which was sitting long before the Eighteen Nation Committee came into being.

However, in relation to the "black boxes", our Soviet colleague said yesterday in his speech:

"The road to an agreement is blocked by the demand of the Western Powers for compulsory inspection on the territory of the Soviet Union. This demand affects the security interests of the Soviet State. On the other hand, the demand for inspection is outdated. It becomes superfluous in the light of recent scientific and technical achievements. If the Western Powers were to put into practice the idea put forward during the Pugwash meeting of scientists to use automatic seismological stations -- the "black boxes" -- for control purposes, then they should no longer have any doubts or fears." (LEDC/PV.86, p.62)
I took my Soviet colleague up yesterday on this straight away and I pointed out to him, as Mr. Dean has done again this morning, that in fact although these "black boxes" might be able to help, they cannot supplant the need for on-site inspection. This was stated by the three United States scientists and the three Soviet scientists who signed the particular document which I have now asked to be circulated as a document of the main Committee. I would ask Mr. Tsarapkina again what he means with regard to this proposal if in fact he is saying that it will obviate the need for on-site inspection, when his own scientists have repudiated such a statement. His own scientists, Academician Artsimovitch, Professor Riznichenko and Academician Tamm have all signed a document in which they clearly indicate that they believe the continuation of on-site inspection is necessary.

Now that runs entirely counter to all that the representatives of the Soviet delegation have said at this Conference since it convened in March. They have said that they have information which makes on-site inspection unnecessary. In this particular document, Soviet scientists have said that they do not regard on-site inspection as being unnecessary. We really should have a clear understanding of whether in fact our Soviet colleague is repudiating the word of his own scientists which they gave freely in the United Kingdom only a month or two ago. This, I say, is a serious matter and I think we should know precisely where the representative of the Soviet Union stands. Particularly do I think so in the light of the report in this morning's Journal de Genève, which has a report in it not only of our meeting yesterday -- as such reports were given to the Press from it -- but a report also of a meeting of a Press Conference given by a member of the Soviet delegation, Mr. Roschin, with regard to yesterday's meeting. He made one or two statements to which I should like to call attention. Firstly, before going into the question of the "black box", if the Press report is correct it would seem that at this Press Conference Mr. Roschin made much more of the fact that the attack made by Mr. Tsarapkina yesterday was on the neutral Powers than in fact Mr. Tsarapkina did in his speech, because he refers here particularly to the proposals put forward by Sweden, India and Mexico which he says "ne facilitent pas la tâche de la conférence, mais au contraire la compliquent." And poor Mr. Lall of India came in for it particularly
"En ce qui concerne plus particulièrement la proposition de
M. Arthur Lall (Inde) au sujet de l'établissement d'un quota d'inspections
sur place en cas de phénomène d'origine douteuse, elle s'écarte du mémorandum
des huit pays non engagés, déclare M. Roschine."

That indeed is a charge against one of those responsible for the eight-Power joint
memorandum, that he is deviating from it. As I understand it, the proposals which have
been put forward by the neutral States during these last few meetings are an
interesting development of the eight-Power joint memorandum and, as such, deserve
the careful attention of us all.

However, the point to which I was really wanting to refer in the
Journal de Genève was one of the five points put forward by Mr. Roschin as being
points developed by Mr. Tsarapkin at our meeting. It is the fourth point, in which
he says:

"4) Les 'boîtes noires': pour surmonter ces difficultés,
M. Tsarapkin rappelle les résultats de la conférence de Pugwash,
qui a conclu à l'efficacité des stations automatiques de détection
sismique ou 'boîtes noires', et déclare que l'URSS est prête à en
envisager l'utilisation."

The point seems to be that after Mr. Tsarapkin had made his speech, after I had
corrected him and pointed out so clearly that in fact Pugwash scientists had not
said that "black boxes" would obviate the need for on-site inspection, after this
correction had been made in this very room, the Soviet representative went outside
and continued this statement to the Press, a statement which seemed to me to be
totally contrary to the facts, and one which he must have known -- if not before
yesterday's meeting than certainly after my intervention and my submission of
this document -- was contrary to the facts. Yet the Soviet Union still seeks to try
to mislead and delude people. I see no excuse for this sort of behaviour whatsoever.
Let us stick to the facts, please, and let us not try to distort the issues in this
way.

I ask the representative of the Soviet Union to state quite clearly and
categorically after this Press report where he stands on this issue. It is one
thing to make a mistaken suggestion. We all make mistakes at times. But, having had
that corrected -- and I submit I corrected it with documents which show the error
of the previous statement -- then to repeat it to the Press outside afterwards I say
is a very irresponsible action to take. So I must ask my Soviet colleague formally to state where he stands in relation to this question. Does he accept the words of his own scientists which here clearly say that, in fact, although "black boxes" can help they do not reduce the need for on-site inspection, or, on the contrary, is he rejecting their word? We ought to know.
But of course if one took the interpretation that the Soviet Union, accepting that black boxes do not obviate the need for on-site inspection, accepting that there must still continue to be some degree of on-site inspection, still, in spite of that, says that black boxes can help to solve our problem, then I would welcome it, because that would mean that the Soviet Union was clearly acknowledging the principle of on-site inspection as being something which it would accept.

That is the alternative interpretation which I put to our Soviet colleague. If he can tell us that, then I will say that I am very happy to know that he is willing to agree that the black boxes will help us to our solution in the terms that it is already known that they will not get rid of the need for on-site inspection altogether. So I invite him to travel down that path with me and then I think we can make real progress. But if he is saying that black boxes will help us to reach a solution because they will get rid of all need for on-site inspection, then he is flying in the face not only of the facts but of the signatures of his own scientists.

This, I do say, needs some clearing up, and I think our Soviet colleague must agree that there is a certain degree of confusion here. As I say, I could have understood it had he made the statement and then, after I had drawn his attention to this document, withdrawn it. But to have repeated it publicly after I had drawn his attention to the document is something which I think calls for a full explanation not only to this Sub-Committee but to the whole Committee, which will wish to know exactly what the facts are.

I have developed this in a little detail because it did seem to me that it was a most important point; but I do not wish to belabour our Soviet colleague further because I want to try to get him into serious negotiation. I have only developed this point because I believe that misunderstandings of the kind can indeed be harmful. And so I say to him: "Do look at all these proposals which have been put forward since we reconvened. Look at them again. See if you cannot find some ideas in them which could help us to bridge the gap. And do try to find some means of implementing your own fair words at the beginning of your speech yesterday, when you talked about making progress and about the climate in which we could make progress. Words of that sort can only have effect and have meaning if they are followed up by actions, concrete actions, either in this Sub-Committee or in plenary, which will lead us forward to a solution."
As I have indicated before, the United Kingdom delegation is more than ready to make progress in examining any of these ideas, any of these proposals. Just as we tried so hard to get into serious negotiation on the eight-Power memorandum itself, so are we willing to investigate together with our Soviet colleague any of these new proposals. I hope we may have a more encouraging response from our Soviet colleague today than we had in that rather regrettable speech which he made to us yesterday.

Mr. Tsarapkin (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): This morning I would like to make a few observations of a general character with regard to the evaluation of the course of our negotiations and of the positions of the sides. Everyone recognizes that our respective positions have come nearer to each other. While earlier, the Western Powers' demand for international control and inspection was an absolute one—that is to say, they were asking for the establishment of a wide network of international control posts on Soviet territory and claiming the right for unhindered inspection of any seismic event on Soviet territory with regard to which they might have doubts, and were making similar demands with regard to nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, as well as underground—then we must note that at the present time the Western position has somewhat changed.

However, this does not mean that the change which occurred in the Western position is a concession to the views of the Soviet Union. It has been known for some time that all nuclear weapon tests can be detected and identified by national means of control which are at the disposal not only of the nuclear Powers but also of many other Powers which do not have nuclear weapons. Earlier, the Western Powers had insisted on their absolute demand for international control and international inspection on Soviet territory; only recently they were compelled to accept that their demands were not warranted and they conceded that the prohibition of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water might be controlled by national means. Consequently, they waived their demand that, for the purpose of detecting all those tests, there should be a complete network of international posts and international inspection on Soviet territory. However, they still insist on an international control system and inspection on Soviet territory with regard to seismic events, and the Western Powers
have adopted this position in spite of the fact that the scientific achievements with regard to the detection of seismic events as distinct from explosions are so great now that control over seismic events and underground explosions can be fully achieved with rational means, and the practice in recent years both of nuclear and non-nuclear Powers has confirmed this.

It is significant that now, when the Western Powers have found themselves compelled to abandon their old position with regard to comprehensive international control and international inspection on Soviet territory, they cling still more stubbornly to the only remaining possibility, namely, the demand to have international control and inspection on Soviet territory with regard to underground events. Their demand for international inspection with regard to seismic events is just as unwarranted as were their demands with regard to atmosphere, under water and outer space; but at the present time, when underground nuclear explosions, or, rather, seismic events are the only hitch in the Western Powers' position, they have changed their demand with regard to the control of underground explosions. What they want now is the possibility of verifying any seismic event, even the smallest -- because how many times have I heard from Mr. Dean and from the United Kingdom representatives that, allegedly, they have no guarantee with regard to any seismic event, that they may be sure that it was a natural event and not a nuclear explosion?

Anyone can see that such a demand on the part of the Western Powers is not reasonable and is not practicable. Since the Western Powers subordinate their acceptance of the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests to this demand, everyone can understand that in this way they are turning their backs on agreement, using this technical argument.
To sum up, the situation is not as follows. All the arguments are now well known. They are on the table. However, the crux of the matter is that the negative attitude of the Western Powers towards the cessation of nuclear weapon tests is their set policy. In the circumstances, arguments have no real importance for the Western Powers. The Western Powers are not interested in facts or arguments which point towards the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests. The representatives of the Western Powers are mobilizing their entire verbal arsenal: they are using all sorts of pretexts in order to confuse the political nature of the issue and to cover up their refusal to accept the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

The representative of the United States, Mr. Dean, this morning again did everything he could to complicate the matter in order to discredit the idea of the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests, trying to prove that it was not practicable. Mr. Dean again used the favourite method of drowning the political substance of the matter in technical doubts. In the question he raised Mr. Dean has shown that in fact he rejects the idea of using automatic detection stations. However, everyone understands that the problem now is not a technical one. The problem is connected with the policies of the parties. The absence of an agreement on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests can be explained today only by the lack of the requisite goodwill on the part of the Western Powers.

While we again note the deadlock in which our negotiations are at Geneva, in Paris at the same time there is feverish activity by the responsible leaders of the Western Powers with regard to the creation of a combined nuclear force for the NATO Powers. It has been announced that this will be the main subject of the talks to be held between Mr. Macmillan, Prime Minister of Great Britain, General de Gaulle, President of France, and President Kennedy of the United States. At the same time the Western Powers have now resumed negotiations on the setting up of an armaments pool.

The whole world has noted the fact that in Washington interest has been lost in an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. Informed political circles in the Western capital cities have learned that some important officials in Washington have expressed clear doubts about the value of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.
These are the causes of the deadlock in our negotiations, while the controversies which the Western representatives continue to raise here in Geneva are only a convenient camouflage of reality, which is the acceleration of the nuclear weapon race, the building up of the NATO nuclear forces, the continuation of nuclear testing, and the blocking of agreements on disarmament or on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. This course of events is there for everyone to see. The policies of the Western Powers are being fixed in Washington, London, Paris and Bonn behind closed doors, where they are drawing up plans for further increases in armaments and making preparations for a nuclear war.

It is now obvious to everyone that the negotiations at Geneva in the Eighteen Nation Committee and in the three Power Sub-Committee for the cessation of nuclear weapon tests are, for the Western Powers, a smoke-screen and a convenient camouflage to hide the true intentions of the Western Powers from world public opinion. Their real policy, which excludes an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests — and this is the true state of things — is something which we must note with the greatest regret.

Obviously we shall not achieve success unless and until the United States shows goodwill and until it agrees to accept the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests on the basis of using the national detection system. There is every possibility that this system could be used now. What is needed is goodwill on the part of the Western Powers.

Mr. O'CONNOR (United States of America): It seems to me that the speech made today by the representative of the Soviet Union is a sign once again of the inherent weakness of the Soviet position on a nuclear test ban treaty. Its inherent weakness on this question is its flat refusal to adduce any scientific evidence on the ability of national stations to identify seismic events and its complete unwillingness to submit to any on-site inspection those events which cannot otherwise be identified by the use of instrumentation.

The Soviet Union refuses, or is completely unable or unwilling, to justify its position with any scientific evidence; it is completely unwilling to discuss the matter on a basis of open give and take on the scientific questions involved.
I submit that the Soviet Union is resorting, as it so often has in the past, to red herrings about NATO, which is a completely defensive alliance, to unsupported newspaper articles, and to all kinds of chit-chat appearing in the Press -- space-fillers which reporters use to fill up their newspapers somehow. I submit that this completely negative attitude on the part of the Soviet Union, and its complete refusal to adduce any scientific evidence to support its position, just cannot rescue it from the fundamental weaknesses of its own position. What must now be apparent to everyone is that the USSR is simply not willing to negotiate a nuclear test ban treaty on any reasonable scientific basis.
Mr. T.S.R. Pbh (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): I must say that the weakness is apparent in the position of the United States. It does not want to go along with a political decision on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, and in order not to disclose before world public opinion this, its negative position, which is distasteful to the peoples of the World, the United States covers up behind a veil of pseudo-scientific terminology. Of course, this is a manoeuvre which is transparent, and we will see to it that those who may not understand this manoeuvre will be apprised of its true meaning.

This demonstrates the negative position of the Western Powers with regard to the cessation of underground nuclear tests. When we made a proposal to use automatic seismic stations for recording purposes and for the identification of seismic events, we proposed to you the adoption of this idea in principle. We do not claim to be able to dictate the technical details to the Western Powers. The technical details for the utilisation of these stations, their size, scope, their cost, the gaugery involved, the types of electronic relays, etc., all these will be agreed to subsequently. We do not claim to be scientific or technical dictators, placing this on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. That is not our stand. We propose co-operation. We have proposed the adoption of this idea. But the Western Powers do not wish to adopt it. They are unwilling to adopt this idea, and in response to our proposal they raise innumerable questions. They say: "You must first give us the answer to these questions." They say: "This is not feasible. It is too expensive, etc."

In essence the Western Powers are admitting that they are not even willing to adopt the idea of the possible utilisation of automatic seismic stations. Therein lies their weakness, and when they say it is the position of the Soviet Union that is weak they are running ahead of themselves. They are only trying to cover up their own weakness. I think that all possible arguments have already been adduced. They have been put on the table, and all can now see that there is no desire on the part of the Western Powers to come to an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. Well, you are sovereign States; you can pursue such policies as you deem fit.
The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I think I really must say a word in my capacity as representative of the United Kingdom after these two rather extraordinary statements by our Soviet colleague.

In his first statement he concentrated mostly on a general attack on the Western States, as such, in which he adduced not a single fact in support of his argument, but it seemed to me, with respect, pure propaganda which really does not help us forward in the least. There was no evidence of any desire to pick up any point of negotiation; no evidence of any attempt whatever to take up the serious points which I myself put to our Soviet colleague.

I must tell him frankly that I shall expect him at some meeting -- and I hope in the early future -- to deal with the serious point I put to him about the attitude of the Soviet Union in relation to its own scientists, and about the discrepancy between his statements and the actual facts contained in the prepared statement which I asked to be circulated yesterday in regard to the efficacy of "black boxes".

Going to his second intervention, he seemed to be making some rather heavy weather -- if I may put it that way -- in relation to the "black boxes". He now says he has put forward a proposal to us in relation to accepting "black boxes" in principle. I was not aware that he had put forward a proposal of that kind. We have indicated -- and I say this again now -- that we are ready to discuss any way in which "black boxes" can help us in relation to narrowing the gap between us.

Surely that is the only way in which genuine negotiations can proceed. When the Soviet representative says we have to accept "black boxes" in principle, that really is reducing the thing -- if he will forgive me saying so -- to absurdity. First of all, he has got to clear up the position as to whether, in fact, the Soviet Union claims in spite of the evidence of its own scientists, that "black boxes" could completely eliminate the need for on-site inspection. If he is willing to concede to agree with the proposals, the suggestions, the analysis put forward by the scientists of two different nations -- if he is willing to agree to the limitations which his own scientists say there are in relation to this -- then the way is surely open to discuss how these "black boxes" might be incorporated in any joint arrangement that was made, taking into account other means of detection and identification.
I do ask the Soviet representative to approach this matter seriously, as a serious negotiation. This is what the United Kingdom is seeking all the time to do. This is what I know the United States also is seeking all the time to do. And instead of accusing the Western nations always of bad faith, suppose, just for once, the Soviet representative shows us some evidence of his own good faith by seeking genuinely to enter into negotiations with us. I can keep my words in as reasonable a key as I can, but I must say that I have not had much encouragement from what our Soviet colleague has said this morning. I do ask him, however, to realize the responsibility that rests on him to enable us to make progress in this sub-Committee, because without his cooperation, even with the best will in the world, the Western nations cannot make progress here. My other colleagues in the Eighteen-Nation Committee expect us to engage in serious negotiation. I ask our Soviet colleague to join us in doing just that. If he would only do so and stop talking in these wide generalities, which get us nowhere at all, then we could even now make progress towards that solution of our problem which everybody is expecting us to do.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The word "absurdity" which you, Sir, used, cannot make our arguments absurd. Indeed, what is absurd is your position, and the absurdity of it lies in the following. You, Sir, know the position of the Soviet Union. That position is based on both scientific and technical achievements available in respect of seismic events, and you know that we stand on this position in the interests of the security of States. Those are the two reasons for our attitude on inspection.
It is now possible to settle our problem and come to an agreement on the basis of national detection means, something which is in fact now in existence. You are piling up difficulties, although today the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and several other countries that have these means are actually tackling very well the task of separating seismic events from nuclear explosions. This is going on without any great difficulties in the United States, in the United Kingdom and in the Soviet Union, and this in the absence of an agreement and in a situation where the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union are continuing their tests. The system of detection and identification and of separating seismic events from nuclear explosions functions very well. But when it comes to prohibiting all nuclear weapon tests it would appear that the system now functioning is powerless. We are told it would be inadequate and ineffective, if we concluded an agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests. This is really an astounding condition which no one watching the zigzags of your policy can understand.

Now the question seems to be to what extent automatic stations can prove that there is no need for on-site inspection. But what has this question to do with us, Mr. Chairman? I now our position on inspection and automatic stations. We say that compulsory inspection is unacceptable but, in order to create more favourable conditions for you, in order to give you greater certainty with regard to detection and identification, we are prepared to accept the idea of "black boxes". We are prepared to have these "black boxes" on our respective territories and we are prepared to discuss the question of the personnel that will be carrying the "black boxes" back and forth. That there should be some controllers -- we are prepared to discuss that. But the real crux of the matter today is not the question to what extent automatic stations may or may not replace inspection. You are here again turning our discussion into an impasse. We want to get out of the impasse; you are driving us back into the impasse. I drag out this question of whether or not "black boxes" can replace inspection? Inspection is not acceptable. In order to facilitate agreement we are prepared to accept automatic stations. So to connect automatic stations with inspection is an artificial manoeuvre again intended to drive us back into an impasse and to keep us there.
The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): That was interesting, but I am afraid it does not clear up the position. Our Soviet colleague says now that he is willing and ready to discuss the proposal of "black boxes". Well, by all means let us do so. I should be happy to hear his concrete proposals, either now or at a later meeting, concerning the numbers of "black boxes" he envisages, what type of equipment he thinks should go into them and to what extent they can help us in our problem. However when he says along with this that they could be used as the only means of identifying, I must remind him of this statement signed by his own scientists as well as by American ones which, as I have told him so many times in fact, says quite clearly that "black boxes" will not get rid of this need. So I ask him -- to clarify this position -- whether in fact he is saying that his country has additional scientific knowledge which will overcome this particular point and, if so, whether he will make it available. Or is he saying that in fact his own scientists were in error when they signed this particular document? I think we have to get this clarified if we are to make progress. I am very anxious to make progress. I am perfectly willing to discuss in detail the problems of "black boxes" -- number, location, all those matters -- but we must know to what extent they are going to help us, and we must clear up this point: that our Soviet colleague is in fact repudiating the manner in which this was put forward and the extent to which it can help us in our problems as put forward by scientists.

I do not press him at this meeting -- I realize that these are important issues -- but I do ask him to consider this afresh and to bring us definite proposals, and we shall gladly look at them.

Mr. DENN (United States of America): It is my understanding that all scientists of all countries, including those in the Soviet Union, believe that, on the basis of what we know at present about distant instrumentation, it is just not possible both to detect and to identify seismic events by distant instrumentation and that there will always be a small residue of unidentified events which can be identified only by on-site inspection.

Now what our Soviet colleague seems to be saying is that, despite this accepted scientific fact, nevertheless on-site inspection on Soviet territory is plainly unacceptable to the Soviet Union as a political matter. Therefore, he says, since it is unacceptable as a political matter, it is unnecessary as a scientific matter.
Mr. TSARPOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): I should like to offer an amendment to what the representative of the United States has just said. We speak of the unsuitability of inspection, not only from considerations of State security alone, because inspection in one or another form gives possibilities for carrying out intelligence and espionage operations, also because there is no need for inspection as such. It is this that is incontrovertible, because up to now you have been able to record and in fact proclaim throughout the world each time a test of nuclear weapons occurred, and we too were able to record tests in other countries. In fact such recordings were made in England, in Sweden, in Japan and elsewhere. So you see that the question of recording and identifying underground shots as opposed to seismic tremors is already a matter that has been solved. The arguments that you adduce are artificial ones that have a definite aim, which is to keep our negotiations in a deadlock. All are aware now that you do not wish to come to an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. If you allowed yourself the possibility of continuing with testing underground, that would be tantamount to there never being any agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, and in fact the situation would remain as it has been up till now. This is the first amendment I wished to offer.

Secondly, Mr. Chairman, when you allege that the Soviet representative says that automatic stations are the only means of identification, I would reply: "No, this is certainly not the only means of identification." If you were to take the trouble to see what is going on in the world in the light of the negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, you would be better aware of this argument. After all, I am even surprised that you use an argument which shows that you yourself in effect understand that this is not the only means of detecting. There are many ways and means of detecting with national systems of identification.
I will not list to you all these techniques. After all, everyone knows that automatic stations constitute only one of a whole series of methods of identification and detection. But here we are negotiating as representatives of States and should be governed by those considerations and positions that we put forward on behalf of our Governments. This in turn should lead the United Kingdom representative to abstain from bringing documents which are unknown to me as representative of my Government. I have never seen the paper that the United Kingdom representative constantly waves before my eyes in trying to substitute that for other documents and statements issued by governments. It is to this that we object, and I hope that Mr. Godber will in future abstain from these tactics in our negotiations.

One cannot substantiate a government position with documents and references to statements made by individuals who do not represent governments. I hope that it is recognized that we are, after all, representative of governments. We put forward the points of view of those governments and are bound by them. If you should have a different understanding of our task, that is indeed regrettable.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): May I just add one word. I do not think that our Soviet colleague has really helped us forward very much. On this last point I think we must be clear. As I understand it, our Soviet colleague first introduced this idea of "black boxes" after the Pugwash meeting. I therefore thought it right and proper to make use of the document which was prepared between Soviet scientists and Western scientists. We should have the clearest evaluation of the help which "black boxes" could give us. If our Soviet colleague has not yet seen the document to which I have just referred I am naturally sorry; that he has not done so, and I am sure he will therefore be gratified at the action I took yesterday in asking for that document to be circulated as a Conference document so that he and others will have full opportunity to study it. We shall therefore look forward to his comments on it later.

In so far as he said that we must negotiate as representatives of governments, I agree with him; of course we must, but if he brings forward a proposal which emanated not from governments, but from individual scientists of his own country and others, he must not blame me if I bring him back to the actual proposals, the suggestions, they made; because it was not I who originally introduced this idea.
of "black boxes", it was the Soviet Union which did so through the person, I think, of Mr. Tsarapkin himself. It is therefore quite reasonable for me to refer to the basis on which these proposals were put forward. Of course we negotiate as representatives of governments and of course we must act as responsible representatives of our Governments. But if proposals from outside are brought forward by one delegation it is not for that delegation to criticize other delegations for referring to the source of the information. That seems to me to be a logical position and one which I would not have thought our Soviet colleague would criticize. Therefore I hope he will study this document when circulated, and then perhaps he will have further comments to make in relation to this matter at a later meeting.

As I understood him, he was arguing in his last set of remarks that of course he did not envisage "black boxes" as taking the place of all means of detection.
Neither did I. I was assuming that his proposal was that these "black boxes" would fill the remaining gap, the gap which we, the Western representatives, have had to say still exists according to our latest scientific information, and which our Soviet colleague has been repeatedly saying does not exist. If he has previously said that this gap does not exist, why does he then introduce "black boxes" for filling a gap which he himself has said is not there? That is a strange argument. Moreover, I do not want to press him further in relation to it now. All I would say now is that we in the United Kingdom, and I am sure the United States also, are willing to discuss seriously with our Soviet colleagues the whole question of "black boxes" to see to what extent they can help us. But let us do so in the terms of the proposals put forward by those scientists, and let us recognize the limitations as well as look for the help which these "black boxes" can give.

That is all I wish to add to our discussion now.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): With regard to the statement made by our Soviet colleague that the United Kingdom Government and my own Government do not wish to sign a draft treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in all environments, I would most respectfully suggest to him that, as I understand it, both our Governments are quite prepared to sign the treaty we have put before the Conference as document (ENDC/38).
Article III, paragraph 9 of that draft treaty provides:

"The Commission shall conduct, and shall facilitate the participation of members of the Staff in, programmes of basic scientific research to improve the capability of the Commission to perform its functions under the present Treaty and to ensure the use of the most efficient and up-to-date methods of verification of the obligations undertaken by the Parties to this Treaty." (ENDC/58 p.23-2)

I have already assured our Soviet colleagues that we are not interested in intelligence.

The treaty contains other provisions defining the scientific data and scientific material.

Article VI provides:

3. The Staff shall include...qualified scientific, technical and other personnel..." (ibid. p.5)

Article VI also provides, in paragraph 5;

"In the performance of their duties, the Executive Officer and the Staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Commission." (ibid)

On this question of scientific knowledge, article XI provides:

"1. One year after the coming into force of this Treaty, and annually thereafter, the Commission shall review the Treaty and the operations of the Staff and System in order to:

....

b. Recommend any improvements in the System which the Commission deems desirable, ...

c. Review any changes in the quotas of on-site inspections which the Commission deems desirable." (ibid. p.10)

The same article provides, in paragraph 2:

"The Commission shall:

....

b. Consider any improvements proposed by any Party to this Treaty..." (ibid)
I submit that we, the West, are prepared to sign this treaty banning all nuclear tests in all environments, and that we are also prepared to improve the scientific work of the commission. I am sure, also, that if, in the course of operation under this treaty, we found it could eventually be proved -- contrary to what we believe today -- that all seismic events could be both detected and identified by distant instrumentation and that therefore on-site inspections were not necessary, our Soviet colleagues would find that both we and our Governments would be quite willing and prepared to listen to the relative objective scientific data and to evaluate them.
Mr. TSHUKHLA (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): I should first like to say that our proposal with regard to automatic stations is not intended to fill some gap which would appear in the system if inspection were absent. Not at all. This question was raised by us recently in order to make your position easier, in order to make it easier for you to accept our proposal for an agreement on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests since you attach so much importance to control. You keep talking of control, so we proposed to utilize this idea. We spoke of the idea which was put forward at the Pugwash conference three months ago. We proposed to use this idea of automatic stations, since it is obvious to everyone that it would increase the possibility and the effectiveness of detection. It was in that sense that we made the proposal.

As to the details, we are not asking you now about details. We are not asking you how you think these automatic stations should be organized, what should be the number, which parameters should be used, and so on. We are not putting such questions to you now. I think you should not put such questions now to us. As we see it, our task now if we wish to facilitate agreement, would be to accept the idea. Do you agree or not that the national control systems should be completed by such automatic stations? Is the idea acceptable to you in principle? Then we can get together on the details, and I suppose every delegation here would submit more detailed views -- we would discuss the number of stations, where they should be located, what should be the parameters, what would be the cost, and so on. That would come afterwards.

First, what is needed is agreement in principle. You well understand what is happening when you raise these technical questions, and why you do so -- in order to set aside or scuttle the idea of automatic stations, because you seem to be afraid of all proposals which might facilitate agreement. In fact, you are rejecting everything that works in that direction, and there is where I see a disturbing symptom of the situation in our negotiations. That is my first remark.

Secondly, Mr. Dean recalled that the United States had submitted a draft treaty in which it was proposed that nuclear weapon tests should be banned in all environments. Of course we know your draft comprehensive treaty. The trouble is that it is built from your position, with an international control post network, compulsory inspection, a single administrator, and the other ingredients which we have discussed at length and which have been rejected.
We know that on this basis there can be no treaty. A treaty must be built on a mutually acceptable basis, while the treaty to which Mr. Dean referred is built wholly on the Western position. Of course, this draft treaty does exist but it is not a basis for agreement, and this document is not a proof of your real desire for an agreement. It is only just another device at camouflage trying to show to the world that the United States is prepared to conclude a treaty to ban nuclear weapon tests everywhere. The United States has submitted a treaty to this effect, but it is known that it is unacceptable to the Soviet Union. Therefore, you are running no risk. As to a draft treaty that would be acceptable to the Soviet Union, you have tabled no such draft treaty and you have not and cannot wave such a treaty to show that you are prepared to conclude it. Therefore, those arguments are not convincing, and what we said on the negative position of the Western Powers in the matter of banning nuclear weapon tests still stands.

I must note this with regret but I believe that the danger involved in the continuation of nuclear weapon tests and the nuclear armaments race is too great. A missile nuclear war will bring upon humanity such calamities as to make it well-nigh impossible to foresee what would be the fate of humanity. Therefore, it seems to us that the Western Powers will find themselves obliged to reconsider their position and to renew the search for agreement with us rather than to stand back on old positions which we have rejected and which cannot serve as a basis for agreement. The basis for agreement between us can only be in a treaty which would prohibit nuclear weapon tests in all environments for ever, which would provide for no exemptions and which would include control over the compliance of such an agreement on the basis of the use of national detection systems.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): May I just take this one stage further with just a very short comment.

Speaking in my capacity as representative of the United Kingdom, may I say to our Soviet colleague that he does not really help forward either negotiation or the atmosphere for negotiation when he continues all the time to call in doubt the motives of the Western Powers. He has no right to do so, no right at all. We are prepared to negotiate seriously; that is our endeavour and our wish. When his every other sentence says we do not want an agreement he is being not in the least fair to either of the Western delegations represented here. He must know
that we are genuinely interested in making progress. This constant stream of abuse of the test in this regard does not help forward our discussions.

Hey I come back, then, to the "black box" question and make quite clear to our Soviet colleague, as I thought had been made clear before, that we are very willing to discuss it and to discuss it with our Soviet colleague in any way he chooses. We would be only too glad if we could be shown that it would help us forward to the conclusion of a treaty. I should like to ask him one question in regard to it.

In his intervention before last with reference to the use of these "black boxes" and to placing them in the Soviet Union, as well as in our own territories of course, did he say that that would be a task to be carried out by representatives of the international scientific commission—that they would have the duty of placing the boxes and bringing them out? I was not quite sure whether he said that or not. I would be happy if he could elucidate that point for me.
Mr. Tsarapkin (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): (interpretation from Russian) I said that we should agree between us on the principles involved. Can the Western Powers accept the idea that for the purposes of control automatic seismic stations should also be used? That is the principle involved. We have not asked for any details from them, in order not to complicate the situation, in order to facilitate agreement, and we would ask them to do the same. Do not burden the discussions now with technical details.

As for technical details on the construction of automatic stations — their dimensions, technical parameters, location, numbers — all those things can be discussed and agreed upon at a later stage, but first there ought to be agreement in principle.

We submit the following: let us agree to complete our agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests by such control means as automatic stations. If we can reach agreement in principle, if this can be successfully achieved, the next stage, of course, will be to study and discuss the details. The form of such negotiations on details is also something that could be discussed and agreed upon rather easily, I think. It is not the sort of question on which extraordinary difficulties or differences should appear.

The Chairman (United Kingdom): In response to that I would only say that we have repeated quite clearly that we are perfectly ready to discuss the question of the use of black boxes as part of a system of means of detection if that would help forward our negotiations. We are perfectly prepared to discuss that, and we are ready to discuss it at any time; but if we are to discuss it we must know more about what our Soviet colleague has in mind. As I have indicated, we think that black boxes could possibly help us to some degree but they must be a part of the general picture, in which national detection posts obviously will play an important part. And, for the reasons I have stated so clearly before, buttressed by the words of Soviet scientists as well as of Western ones, we have no indication that they would get rid of the need for a degree of on-site inspection.
Mr. DEAN (United States of America): We have submitted what we believe to be a very carefully thought out and well formulated system which would detect, identify and locate all seismic events. We have tried to make it as scientific and as reasonable as possible. We have tried to formulate a system costing the minimum amount of money — although it would cost a great deal. In setting up this system we have tried to say to our Soviet colleagues that we are prepared, if they would agree with us in putting a number of detection posts on the territory of the Soviet Union, to have those posts equipped with the most modern instrumentation: we thought that would help in cutting down the number. If they would agree to having those stations manned by Soviet Union nationals we would like to have the personnel at least trained by the international commission; we thought that would help in the running of the stations and in the dissemination and evaluation of the data. We think that there would still be a certain residue of unidentified events, with respect to which there would have to be a number of on-site inspections in the Soviet Union.

Our Soviet colleagues say that they do not accept that system at all, but they ask whether we will accept in principle the theory of having some of these black boxes placed, not on the territory of the Soviet Union itself in the first place, as I understand it, but on the territory of countries contiguous to that of the Soviet Union: in other words, in countries whose territory adjoins that of the Soviet Union. Then they say, "We would be willing to discuss with you the location of a small number of these black boxes — perhaps two or three — on the entire territory of the Soviet Union."

In a preliminary investigation of these black boxes — depending, of course, on how many there would be, where they would be located, the kind of seismometers they would have in them, whether they would be entirely self-contained, whether they would be connected electronically or by electric cables to other detection stations, to what extent it would be necessary to have a large number of them on the territory; to what extent, based upon the type of equipment in them, they would be able to detect events that might occur more than a few hundred kilometres away — we would be only too happy and ready to sit down with our Soviet colleagues and discuss all of these matters, in relation to our type of detection stations and on-site inspection. But what they say to us — and unfortunately I have had experience
on this subject before in negotiating with our Soviet colleagues -- is, "Will you accept this idea of black boxes in principle?" What they mean, I find, is that if one is foolish enough to say "Yes" to that then one has, in their view, automatically abandoned everything else that one's own scientists have ever said, and from that point on all one can do is discuss the fact that the only thing we can have as a part of the detection system are these black boxes, because they will come back to us again and again and say, "You accepted them in principle".

The question of how the black boxes could be tied into the system and how they could best be utilized, the question of whether or not the system would be improved by using them -- all these are certainly questions which we would be only too happy to discuss. But, just because I have had experience along these lines before, I want to make it clear that when we say we would be willing to discuss the black boxes we are not excluding the discussion of something which we ourselves have spent many years of research on and many hundreds of millions of dollars in trying to improve, and that we are not necessarily going to throw all those things out of the window merely because we say we are willing to discuss these black boxes. I myself dislike very much the idea of saying that I accept something in principle when I do not know anything about the details.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I understand that it has been agreed that the next meeting of the Sub-Committee should take place on Thursday, 6 December 1962, at 3.30 p.m.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.
CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
SUB-COMMITTEE ON A TREATY FOR THE DISCONTINUANCE OF NUCLEAR
WEAPON TESTS

CORRECTION TO THE
PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FORTY-SIXTH MEETING

On page 12-15, at the end of the fourth line, add the word "not",
(....it is not unreasonable .....).
CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
SUB-COMMITTEE ON A TREATY FOR THE DISCONTINUANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS
PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FORTIETH-SEVENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 6 December 1962, at 3.30 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. A.H. Dean (United States of America)

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This provisional record contains the originals of speeches in English together with the Conference room interpretation of speeches in other languages.

It is requested that any corrections to the originals of speeches be submitted in four copies (preferably incorporated in four of the single-sided mimeographed copies with which delegations are supplied) by the authorized Liaison Officer of the delegation concerned to the Documents Office, Room A.206. If no corrections are received within four working days from the date of distribution the final version, in which the interpretations will be replaced by translations, will be prepared and issued on the basis of the provisional record.

THE TIME LIMIT FOR CORRECTIONS TO THIS RECORD WILL BE 0900 HOURS ON 13 DECEMBER 1962.
PRESENT AT THE TABLE

United States of America:
Mr. A.H. DEAN
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. D.E. HARK
Mr. V. BAKER

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. P.F. SHAHOV
Mr. I.G. USACHEV

United Kingdom:
Sir Michael WRIGHT
Mr. D.H. ERIKSON
Mr. R.C. BATHAM

Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General:
Mr. W. EPSTEIN
The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I call to order the forty-seventh meeting of the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests.

If no other representative wishes to speak, I shall make a statement in my capacity as representative of the United States.

Before I begin, I should like to take note of the fact that this forty-seventh meeting of the test ban Sub-Committee of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is something in the nature of an anniversary. As Mr. Tsarapkin and Sir Michael Wright will recall, the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests at the time of its recess last January held its three hundred and fifty-third meeting. Now, if my arithmetic is correct, this is the four hundredth formal tripartite meeting on negotiations to end all nuclear weapon tests. I am sorry to say that this is not a very auspicious anniversary. If someone had told me at the three hundredth meeting that we would still be negotiating one hundred meetings later, I would have replied that I hoped he was wrong. In this connexion, I recall that I myself said at the three hundredth meeting:

"It taxes my imagination to think that the Conference might still be floundering in the same sea of indecision innumerable meetings hence."

(GEN/DNT/6V.300, p.10)
While the length of this Conference is a direct measure of our failure to reach agreement, and therefore a deep disappointment to my Government and to me personally, I am reliably informed that the negotiations for the Austrian State Treaty lasted for a similar number of meetings. I sincerely hope that our success can be measured in the same terms as those in which that conference was successful, and that we do not find ourselves here again without a test ban agreement after another 100 meetings.

But we know that the difficulties in Moscow with respect to the negotiation of the Austrian Treaty were not with its terms -- that is, with the terms of the Treaty -- as Chairman Khrushchev has since made known, but rather were connected with the opposition for political reasons of certain elements in the Soviet Union to agreeing to any treaty at all. We hope that the Soviet Union will realize very soon that a nuclear test ban treaty on sound lines is indeed required to end all nuclear tests in all environments and that it will speedily sign the United States-United Kingdom comprehensive draft treaty (ANNDC/58), the terms of which are, I submit, equally beneficial to both sides.

Yesterday, at our eighty-seventh plenary meeting, a number of interesting and important statements were made. I particularly noted that the representative of Ethiopia took the trouble, in the course of his comments, to point out, on page 28-30 of the provisional verbatim record, that paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 1762 A (XVII) should in effect be considered as a goal of our endeavours. Paragraph 3 on a comprehensive treaty, and paragraph 6 on an interim agreement, on the other hand, should be considered as the means for reaching that goal. This seems to me to be a very helpful reckoning of the intent of the General Assembly and an apt means of clarifying what our purpose here should be -- for which we thank the representative of Ethiopia.

In sum, it seems to me that we should all strive for an arrangement by which we could cease all nuclear tests in all environments for ever, under adequate and effective international control. That is the goal which both the United Kingdom and the United States seek. The way of reaching that goal is to agree on a comprehensive and effective treaty which will evolve as a result of a settlement of the remaining differences between the negotiating sides on the effective control of underground tests.
Or, failing this, let us hope we can reach agreement on an interim basis using the United States-United Kingdom partial treaty ban (ENDC/59) accompanied by a suspension of underground tests under "adequate assurances for effective detection and identification of seismic events by an international scientific commission", along the general lines we have proposed in our comprehensive treaty -- an agreement which would of course have to be adequately financed and staffed.

In either type of arrangement, whether permanent or interim, there will have to be certain essential features to ensure adequate control. Those features will fall into the three important areas of verification inherent in the eight-nation memorandum which have been incorporated in our draft comprehensive treaty (ENDC/58). To recall these for a moment, I am speaking about an adequate system of observation or detection posts around the world, an international scientific commission, and the necessity for adequate and effective identification by the commission of seismic events through a number of obligatory on-site inspections on the territory of the country in which the unidentified event occurs.

I should like to discuss in some detail what my delegation believes to be the essential features of each of these particular areas of verification. I should like to begin with what has apparently become the most difficult area, that is, the question of obligatory on-site inspections.

My delegation believes, as indeed it seems to me almost all the other delegations here believe, with the possible exception of the Soviet bloc for political rather than scientific reasons, that any truly effective system must include adequate means by which seismic events will be identified -- that is, distinguished. This procedure is based upon the premise that all States should be assured that no underground tests are taking place. The only means of which we know for giving that assurance is by providing for adequate and effective identification of seismic events.

This identification could be effected in one of two ways, as my United Kingdom colleague so lucidly pointed out at our eighty-seventh plenary meeting. First, we could look at or identify all of the unidentified events, as seems to me is implied in the eight-nation memorandum (ENDC/28). Or, secondly, we could look at only a selected number of these unidentified events on a quota basis, as was originally suggested by the Soviet Union and as is provided in article VIII of our draft comprehensive treaty (ENDC/58).
The reasons why we have to examine the actual geographical site of any unidentified seismic event should be abundantly clear. We now know that it is not possible through seismic means alone to identify, that is, to distinguish from earthquakes, an underground nuclear test. On this even the Soviet scientists, writing in Izvestia of 11 November 1962, apparently agree -- and this is in fact in accordance with our understanding of what the Soviet scientists do agree.

For these noted Soviet scientists indicate no means of identifying explosions, but rather discuss a number of means which are useful for the identification of earthquakes. We cannot identify explosions seismically because seismometers have no way of distinguishing between all earthquakes and explosions. Rather, seismometers can only indicate that some earthquakes take place. According to our scientific information -- and if I am wrong I would be very happy to be corrected -- there are generally three possible ways of doing this.
First, since nuclear explosions result in an outward movement of the earth around the particular event in all directions from the point of origin, seismometers in all directions should clearly indicate that a compressional wave was formed at the time of the detonation. But, unfortunately for our purposes, there are some earthquakes which also act in this way. On the other hand, a large majority of earthquakes involve movement in some directions at the source of the earthquake which is inward rather than outward. In the case of these particular earthquakes seismometers on some azimuths can distinguish this inward or rarefactive motion. These earthquakes with rarefactive first motion, as it is called among seismologists, can therefore be identified by instrumentation.

However, in many cases of small earthquakes and explosions, the signals at the site of a number of seismic observation or detection stations are too small in comparison with the level of normal background noise at the site to determine accurately whether these signals originated with a compressional or rarefactive movement of the earth. So this identification criteria can only point up the existence of some earthquakes, with all other events remaining unidentified.

Secondly, we can also generally determine the depth within the earth at which certain seismic events occurred, but on a world-wide basis we can only do this to within about plus or minus 50 kilometres accuracy. The usefulness of this technique would be expanded if we could determine depth with greater accuracy since normally man-made explosions cannot be set off as deep in the earth as most earthquakes generally occur. Therefore, we can by this technique identify many large, deep earthquakes, but we cannot determine the exact depth of those events which take place within the margin of error of the technique, that is, the exact depth of events 30 to 60 kilometres below the earth's surface. So this technique is useful for identifying those earthquakes which take place at rather large depths, but unfortunately it is not well enough refined at present to discriminate precisely those events which take place below the limits to which man can now penetrate the earth from those above that limit.

One final technique is also useful in solving this problem. Large earthquakes are usually preceded and followed by fore-shocks and after-shocks, and these fore-shocks and after-shocks can usually be identified by their strength and location.
With all three techniques it is clear that there will be some residue of unidentified seismic events which cannot be identified by instrumentation. This unidentified residue will include both earthquakes and events which might be nuclear explosions. According to our scientific information — and again I stand subject to correction — the only positive way which is left to identify the remaining seismic events is to examine physically the site of the event.

The occurrence of a nuclear explosion can only be satisfactorily proved by the collection at the site of radioactive debris resulting from the explosion. Again, this collection of radioactive debris can only be satisfactorily accomplished for underground tests by physical on-site inspections. The timing of such inspections after the event is important. Therefore, we believe inspections must be obligatory, and our comprehensive disarmament treaty (ENDC/58), under article VIII, provides for this.

But in order to avoid the problem and the burden of inspecting every such unidentified event, and in order to get agreement with the other side, we have agreed to an annual quota of such inspections, provided only that each side, for reasons of maximum deterrence, is permitted to choose the particular events to be inspected in the territory of the other side. This formula, as my United Kingdom colleague pointed out yesterday, was originally a Soviet proposal and is one which we have adopted as a good way of ensuring that States will be deterred from carrying out underground tests in violation of the treaty.

In sum, therefore, to be workable the treaty must provide for some positive means of identifying those seismic events which could be underground nuclear explosions. Since distant seismic equipment is incapable of identifying explosions, this will have to be done by physical on-site inspection. In order to get agreement with the other nuclear side there may well be an annual maximum quota of such inspections, but the actual choice of events within this maximum quota should neither be random nor subject to chance or political pressures, but rather should follow, in any test ban treaty for maximum deterrence, the actual selection of an unidentified event for on-site inspection by the other nuclear side.
(PROVISIONAL)
ENDC/SC.1/PV.47

(The Chairman, United States)

The second basic feature which any agreement would have to have is an adequate system for the detection of seismic signals. We know that a number of properly and scientifically placed seismic detection stations, or observations posts, would be needed to record signals from the movements of earthquakes which take place every year around the world. The United States and the United Kingdom have indicated that they believe, on the advice of their scientists -- and again we would be glad to discuss this advice with our Soviet colleagues -- that the type of system proposed in their treaty of 27 August (ENDC/58) includes provisions for an adequate detection of seismic events. It will be noted that I use the word "detection" and not "identification". We have carefully studied the number of events which would occur annually in the areas of significant interest and we believe our proposals on detection or control posts would ensure a sufficient degree of worldwide coverage, so that significant events would not escape detection.

The United States and the United Kingdom have proposed that there should be substantially fewer observation or detection stations of all types in the Soviet Union than the 19 stations formerly proposed. In addition, they envisage that the worldwide network would be considerably smaller than the 180 stations of all types proposed by the Geneva Conference of Experts. In fact the worldwide network might consist of as few as 80 stations, provided that adequate locations in good sites could be found and agreement reached on modern instrumentation and the training of personnel.

Observation or detection posts for the detection of underground nuclear tests must be of extremely high quality. Those stations, if they are to do an efficient job, must be equipped with the latest and best instruments. The stations must be located, on the best scientific advice, in quiet sites or areas -- and I cannot stress strongly enough the importance of their location. Most existing seismic stations are not sufficiently well located, from the standpoint of noise ratio, to do the job of detecting very small seismic events well. In fact most such detection stations around the world were originally built to study the large earthquakes which cause property damage and which have been of concern to seismologists over the years. Now we are concerned with the spectrum of seismic waves which lies in the smaller magnitude range. To find appropriate locations for such stations requires considerable research.
The reason why it is necessary to look for such stations carefully is that there are present in the earth's crust small seismic waves, set up by such natural phenomena as the wind and the waves and by such cultural phenomena as railroad, highway and industrial noise. These noises, called background noises, tend to obscure the signals from such seismic events as earthquakes and nuclear explosions. In the whole of the territory of the United States there are perhaps only one or two existing stations which meet the highest standards of both instrumentation and site location for control posts. These are, of course, the stations built under project 90 which the United States is now financing and carrying on in an effort to improve the ability of those stations to detect and identify nuclear explosions. For this reason our draft treaty (ENDC/58) provides for the construction of new national stations as well as for the use of existing stations. The new stations would be constructed in regions where they were necessary to fill gaps in existing systems and also in places selected for their quiet location.

It is also clear that the loss in quality in accepting stations in less quiet locations could not necessarily be made up by increasing the number of poorly located stations reporting to the system. In the United States—United Kingdom draft treaty (ENDC/58) primary reliance would be placed on newly constructed national stations, for precisely the reasons which I have outlined. Preliminary surveys conducted by the United States in Project Vela show in fact that large numbers of existing stations throughout the world would not be adequate for the task, even if they were re-equipped with modern instrumentation.

Nevertheless, those existing stations, properly supplemented by the new national stations I have just described, would be useful for two major tasks, as we see it. First, they would help to fill in the gap in the time period when new national station sites were being selected and the stations built and put into operation. In our draft treaty we have proposed that those stations should be relied upon for approximately six months in the early life of the treaty—a period to begin six months after the entry into force of the treaty and to last until the new stations were finished, which would be twelve months after the treaty's entry into force. Secondly, the existing university and government stations would serve as a useful supplement in cases where the additional data which they might have collected could be used in the evaluation of a particular event.
The new stations, on the other hand, would be funded by the international commission and built to commission specifications, and their personnel would be trained by the commission. Those stations would, however, be nationally manned and operated under international supervision. The new national stations would have to be located in very quiet areas or sites to ensure maximum operating effectiveness.

There is also provision in the United Kingdom-United States draft treaty for such international stations as might be deemed necessary by the commission and agreed to by the parties or governments concerned. Internationally manned and operated stations might be useful in the further promotion of international cooperation in seismic research and in training seismologists from less well developed areas, so that national seismic services might be begun or up-graded. It would be necessary also to continue programmes of seismic research for improvement in the detection system, and those research programmes might well be facilitated by the addition of several new truly international stations to the network.
In addition, seismic data will need to be reliably and accurately reported. A functioning network of posts must act as a system, and to use the words in the eight-nation memorandum, there must be "continuous observation". This phrase or stricture means that stations in the main system will have to report around the clock the continuous observations which they make. While reports flow into the international scientific commission headquarters there will also be a need for arrangements to provide for a two-way flow of information. In order to analyse data properly, the commission will also need to know the types of instruments on which the data has been recorded. In addition, the report will have to be processed on a rather rapid and continuous basis so that unidentified events can be picked out from the mass of other data for possible selection for on-site inspection.

The question of the use of automatic seismic stations has been suggested. In contrast to the seismic arrays which will most likely be installed at the now nationally manned detection stations or observation stations, these automatic seismic stations might prove to be a supplement rather than a replacement for the necessary manned stations.

Arrays, we have found, are superior to automatic stations in that they have the advantage of combining the output from a number of stations while at the same time effecting a certain cancellation of the background noise. Under normal circumstances, a ten-element array should increase the signal-to-noise ratio by about a factor of three and detection capabilities in the first seismic zone by approximately a factor of 1.5 in distance. Similarly, an array station at only an average location in terms of background noise would be as good as one could reasonably expect the best automatic station to be.

Finally, because of the combination of several recording instruments as compared with a single instrument in a black box, we have found that arrays give much more confidence in the quality and reliability of conclusions drawn about a particular signal. For example, a single weak pulse showing on a black box instrument could well be in doubt. But if one also has the confirmation of having recorded the same signal on the several instruments of an array, then interpretation should be much more reliable.
Nevertheless, there will be important problems to be considered in connexion with the possible linking electronically or by electrical cable of automatic stations with manned array stations. Perhaps a certain number of automatic stations will be useful in recording aftershocks of earthquakes which, as I have already indicated, is a promising means of assisting in the identification of earthquakes and distinguishing them from nuclear events.

Work will also have to go forward on the problem of calibrating any automatic stations which we might find it would be useful to incorporate into an overall control system. This will be a particularly difficult problem to solve, as will that of ensuring that the automatic stations are properly located. We have asked the Soviet delegation for its answers to such questions and we hope it is studying the answers to these questions; until we are able to see a little more clearly what its proposal might involve, it will be extremely difficult for us to reach a meaningful evaluation of it.

Nevertheless, I should like to emphasize at this point that nothing we have seen or read or which our scientists have seen or read leads us to believe that automatic stations can be used to replace a system of manned control posts with suitable arrays of seismic instruments, or to reduce significantly the number of necessary, obligatory on-site inspections required to identify seismic events.

It thus seems from my review of the control system that an adequate control system must satisfy several important parameters: first, with regard to individual stations, there must be a number of high quality stations at quiet sites. These stations for the most part just do not exist at the present time. Use should also be made of existing stations to supply supplementary data and these stations, in some cases, could be upgraded and incorporated into the system. There would have to be a uniformly high quality of instrumentation. The posts would have to be manned by able, well-trained local nationals and would be operated on a standardized and internationally co-ordinated basis. Stations should operate instruments continuously.

Second, with regard to the system, there must be a communications network for the interchange of information. Standard reporting forms would be necessary and all data must be adequately centralized for rapid processing and analysis.
These particular specifications would apply to any system of detection stations for the monitoring of nuclear weapon test cessation in the underground environment. Such a system would be built and based on existing networks wherever possible but would involve a high degree of international co-operation and supervision.

The third area which I would like to examine for a moment is the international commission, which will be the central governing body for a test ban control organization. Such a body will be charged with the paramount responsibility for ensuring the proper functioning of the overall control system. This commission will be concerned with the appointment of officials, the raising of finances, the processing and evaluating of data, the issuing of necessary reports and the appropriate relations with the United Nations and with the parties to the test ban treaty.

In addition, we believe that basic to any commission's task should be the question of assuring that truly objective research is conducted at all times and that the results of such objective research are properly incorporated into the system as rapidly as possible.
The Chairman, United States

All those general principles underlying the areas of an effective verification system which I have just discussed are, I believe, suited to any type of agreement we may reach concerning a cessation of underground tests.

Those principles would have to underlie any permanent arrangement on testing into which we might enter. At the same time, similar principles of effective detection and identification of seismic events would also have to be followed, my Government believes, in the solution of the question by an effective interim agreement. This position of my Government does not, of course, mean that the exact modalities would have to be the same in each case, or precisely the same, nor does it mean that the size and scope of the control system as it relates to the environments other than underground would necessarily have to duplicate in all phases in an interim agreement the features of a permanent arrangement. But the imperative is clear, and that is that effective control under this system be assured at all times either in an interim arrangement or a permanent arrangement.

Yesterday the representative of the United Kingdom made some very important points in regard to what the United States and the United Kingdom would be able to accept and what they would not be able to accept. In my statement today I have talked of the principles underlying any effective control arrangement, and, by way of example, I have mentioned and discussed particular modalities of control. Certainly, it is clear that the Soviet Union now has before it the four alternative arrangements for reaching agreement set forth yesterday by the representative of the United Kingdom. Those alternatives are:

First: a comprehensive treaty without on-site inspection, if the Soviet Union can produce clear and satisfactory scientific evidence that all underground events can indeed be satisfactorily identified by existing national detection systems;

Second: the United States-United Kingdom comprehensive treaty (ENDC/58) with its minimum amount of necessary control, together with the continuation of additional necessary seismic research;

Third: the United States-United Kingdom partial ban treaty (ENDC/59) together with the interim arrangement for effective detection and identification recommended in paragraph 6 of resolution 1762A (XVII);

Fourth: a partial ban treaty, as suggested by the United Kingdom and the United States, to stop tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, while negotiations continue for an effective cessation of underground tests along the general lines of the draft comprehensive treaty (ENDC/58).
The United States and the United Kingdom would prefer, of course, to ban all tests in all environments for all time under effective international control along the lines of the draft comprehensive treaty. The Soviet Union can accept any one of those alternatives or can choose several for further exploration or further scientific research and for further discussion if it wishes to discuss them in detail with us. But only in this way, through a careful exploration and discussion of the issues so cogently set forth in the statement of the United Kingdom and along the general lines of the United States-United Kingdom draft comprehensive treaty, can we hope to make progress. We can then break free of the curtain of silence which the Soviet Union seems to have dropped over all of the answers to our many carefully framed questions, answers which we need in order to begin real negotiations. I submit that now is the time to lift that curtain and to get on with the job of negotiation.

Sir Michael WRIGHT (United Kingdom): In my intervention yesterday in the plenary meeting I outlined in some detail and in the most friendly manner to our Soviet colleague four alternative forms of agreement, any of which, in the view of the United Kingdom, would be within our grasp to conclude before 1 January 1963. Today Mr. Chairman, you, in your capacity as representative of the United States, have spoken of those four alternatives and I think it must be clear to our Soviet colleague that those four alternatives, in so far as the United Kingdom and the United States are concerned, are open to his Government.

We are approaching now the date on which we have to report the results of our negotiations to the United Nations General Assembly, and only three weeks beyond that we shall arrive at the date of 1 January 1963. It is my hope that our Soviet colleague, after having heard the intervention of our Chairman on behalf of the United States and my own intervention, finds himself today in the position to give us a positive response to what we have offered to him. I should like to ask him to give us the favourable word which I await and which I know that our Chairman, as representative of the United States, is also awaiting. Depending upon his reply, I might wish to make some further remarks.
Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): Today, speaking as representative of the United States, our Chairman re-stated once again his delegation's old position, which is unacceptable to the other side. He insisted once again on compulsory inspection, on an international control system. We are very much saddened by this. It also shows that the Western Powers are not ready to come to an agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests in all environments.
Of course, we note this with the deepest regret: all the more so because the Western Powers now have before them four possibilities of coming to an agreement on a mutually acceptable basis — and I emphasize the words "on a mutually acceptable basis".

The first possibility is to conclude a comprehensive agreement on the basis of the eight-Power joint memorandum (ENDC/28), which provides for the utilization of national detection systems. The second possibility, on the basis of a partial agreement, which has been put forward by the United States, is an agreement prohibiting nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, with the addition to the effect that the States which are parties to the agreement assume simultaneously with the conclusion of this partial agreement, the obligation not to carry out underground tests as long as the negotiations on the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests continue, and until the conclusion of an agreement thereon.

The third possibility — acting in accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution 1762 A (XVII) which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 6 November 1962 — is to cease all nuclear weapon tests as outlined by that resolution, and to continue negotiations between ourselves with the aim of reaching an agreement on a comprehensive treaty prohibiting all nuclear weapon tests and all nuclear explosions. Consequently we again clearly have a perfect possibility for reaching complete agreement by continuing our negotiations towards a comprehensive treaty.

The fourth and final possibility is to agree on a comprehensive treaty on the basis of national detection stations, using the automatic stations — the black boxes — to which we have already repeatedly referred.

These four possibilities remain open to the Western Powers; and it is still our hope that the Western Powers will alter their rigid and unacceptable position, will take a forward step, and will take one of these four roads leading to final agreement on a mutually acceptable basis.

The representatives who have spoken so far today have mentioned only the Western position, which has remained the same since 1958 and on which agreement cannot be achieved whatever the number of meetings we hold. I believe that there is the possibility of 400 more meetings being held between us. This is a figure which was referred to by the United States representative this afternoon.
If the Western Powers continue to insist on making demands which are unacceptable to the other side we may very well continue, perhaps, until the 800th or 1000th meeting, and there will still be no agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. What we must do is to seek mutually acceptable solutions; and here I should like to emphasize once again the utmost peculiarity of the situation in which we find ourselves.

On the one hand, there is no abyss between us. The only remaining difference concerns the question of underground tests. We already have a common viewpoint. The Western Powers have now accepted the Soviet view that nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space can be effectively recorded and identified with the help of existing national systems, and that for this purpose there is need neither for an international observation system nor for any on-site inspection. Only one difference remains between us, and this is related to underground tests. This difference is not so great and we are prepared to move towards meeting the Western Powers.

Although the Soviet Union considers it could agree on underground tests with the help of existing national detection systems, without any new or additional control systems, it is in order to meet the views of the Western Powers that it proposes that we should set up additional means of control -- namely, the automatic seismic stations. When the Soviet Union made this proposal it was not because we wanted it. We are prepared to sign an agreement even without the inclusion of these automatic stations. We made this proposal in order to try to meet the views of the Western Powers, but we were met with something which I would call a negative reaction from the side of the Western Powers.

The Western Powers seem to reject this proposal, in which we are not so greatly interested. We made this proposal solely in order to try to meet the position adopted by the United States and the United Kingdom -- namely, to strengthen control. The Soviet Union is surprised by the negative reaction of the Western Powers to its suggestion. On the other hand, however, the Western reaction to the Soviet proposal concerning automatic seismic stations appears to show that the Western Powers are not interested in any system of control that does not include the dispatching of on-site inspection teams, which might include some foreign agents.
Only a way by which foreign agents can be sent to Soviet territory will be acceptable to the Western Powers. However, when we propose another method, which would strengthen and improve control but which would not include the sending of foreign agents to Soviet territory, the Western Powers immediately have doubts. They use all sorts of arguments and pretexts in order to minimize the value of this proposal, and so on.

This shows once again that what the Western Powers are really interested in is the possibility of sending foreign controllers on to Soviet territory in order to penetrate into it, and nothing short of that. Any means which would increase the effectiveness of control but which would not involve sending foreigners on to Soviet territory -- and whatever they were called, controllers, inspectors or anything else, they might still be information agents -- is not accepted.

Therefore, to sum up again, the Western Powers have before them the four possibilities which I have just enumerated, and those possibilities remain open to them. They can choose any one of these possibilities, or any combination of them. What is needed now is some good will on their part. If that good will is forthcoming, and if there is the necessary political wisdom and foresight, then of course all these possibilities for reaching an agreement will be there.

Sir Michael WRIGHT (United Kingdom): I do not know whether it was my sorrow or my astonishment that was greater as I listened to the statement which has just been made by the representative of the Soviet Union.

In the first place, I made the same appeal to him yesterday as I made at the United Nations General Assembly in New York to Mr. Zorin, namely, to give -- either to us or, if the Soviet Government feels some hesitation about that, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations -- the knowledge, which both Mr. Tsarapkin and Mr. Zorin have publicly claimed that the Soviet Government possesses, of how to identify all underground events. Mr. Zorin was silent in response to my appeal. Mr. Tsarapkin is also silent in response to my appeal. I can only note that with regret.

Secondly, if I heard Mr. Tsarapkin correctly, he said that the Western Powers, the United States and the United Kingdom, were turning down, or had turned down, the Soviet proposal concerning the "black boxes".
I do not know how Mr. Tsarapkin can reconcile what I understood him to say with my own statement of yesterday. I will read again one or two extracts from that statement. I said:

"By all means let us discuss the possible use of 'black boxes' and see whether it may help to narrow the gap between the two sides and to reduce the requirements both for the use of conventional detection stations and even, perhaps, for the number of on-site inspections." (ENDC/PR.87, p.22)

I went on to say:

"I should like, therefore, formally to propose that a meeting be convened of competent experts from the West, from the Soviet Union and, if desired, from other countries which have such experts to examine where and how far the use of 'black boxes' could be helpful in improving means of detection and identification. If there is a hope of making progress in this way, do not let us throw it away. Even without a meeting of experts, we are prepared to go into this matter with the representative of the Soviet Union as thoroughly as we can do without experts to help us." (ibid.)

Those were my words yesterday. How it is possible to reconcile with those statements what I thought I heard Mr. Tsarapkin say to the effect that we refused discussion or consideration of the "black box" proposal is absolutely beyond my comprehension.

Next, I noted that the Soviet representative put forward what he said were four alternative possibilities for reaching agreement by 1 January 1963. I listened to them attentively -- and, of course, I will examine them carefully when I see the verbatim record -- but as I heard them they all seemed to have one thing in common, and one most remarkable factor in common, namely, that all four of them were in contradiction to paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 1762 B (XVII), or to paragraph 6 of Assembly resolution 1762 (XVII). As I heard them, each of his four alternatives was directly contrary to the resolution which the United Nations has just passed.

I was even more astonished when he went on to say that the factor which common to the Western offers represented a purely Western position. For a representing a purely Western position, the factors which underlie our four offers represent the views of all those countries which voted in the General Assembly for resolutions 1762 A and B (XVII).
So much for any helpful or constructive aspect of what our Soviet colleague has just said to us. So far from being helpful and constructive, I am afraid I find it disappointing and negative, and for that reason I am bound to make some additional remarks which I had hoped it would not be necessary for me to make today.

These remarks are inspired by the thought that we have been called upon by the United Nations General Assembly:

"... to negotiate in a spirit of mutual understanding and concession in order to reach agreement urgently, bearing in mind the vital interests of mankind;" (ENDC/63, p.3)

I have been casting my mind back in order to recall the attitude which the Soviet Government has been taking in this matter since we assembled here at the beginning of the Eighteen-Nation Conference, and to see how far that attitude matches up with the attitude which is enjoined upon us by the United Nations. I do not want to go into too great detail, but I am constrained at least to say this. We came here in March 1962 prepared to negotiate on the basis of our draft treaty of April 1961 (ENDC/9) as modified to meet Soviet objections. The Soviet representative refused. We offered to negotiate either about the details or about the main principles involved in the eight-Power memorandum (ENDC/28). The Soviet representative refused to engage in such negotiation. He continues to refuse now, even in the light of some of the interpretative comments made during the last few meetings by some of the sponsors of the eight-Power memorandum. We carried out research without Soviet co-operation -- co-operation for which we had asked but which was refused -- and on the basis of that research we produced a new draft comprehensive treaty on 27 August (ENDC/58). We did not put it forward on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. We offered to negotiate upon it. The Soviet representative refused. We offered as an alternative, and as a step towards a comprehensive treaty, a draft partial treaty (ENDC/59), and we offered to negotiate on that. The Soviet representative refused. We offered to discuss in detail Soviet objections to international on-site verification, and to do what we could to meet them. The Soviet representative refused. We offered to discuss in detail the information available to us and to the Soviet Union about the capability of existing detection stations. The Soviet representative refused. We have offered to
discuss the possibilities inherent in the use of "black boxes". The Sub-Committee has heard today the refusal of the Soviet representative to pursue my offer of yesterday to conduct such discussion. Finally, we have offered to discuss the suggestions put forward for an interim agreement covering underground tests in the terms of paragraph 6 of resolution 1762 A (XVII). The Soviet representative has refused.

In the last few months that we have been here, this makes at least a total of eight plain, blunt categorical "noes" -- categorical "nyets" -- from the Soviet Government to constructive initiatives on our part. Moreover, those refusals have not been accompanied by any real attempt on the part of the Soviet representative to justify them. On the contrary, they have been accompanied by sweeping and unsubstantiated statements about the arms race, about warmongering in the West, and about a great many factors totally beyond the scope of our discussions here and totally unjustified.
I feel constrained today to put this situation clearly on the record. We know of course that the Soviet Union finds the concept of international inspection on Soviet territory difficult to accept. We understand that this objection is based on a fear of espionage — we do not share it but we understand it — and that is why we on our side have taken these arguments of the Soviet Union seriously into account and have attempted to meet them as we shall go on attempting to meet them. That disturbs us and discourages us so profoundly is the way in which our efforts are brushed aside. How can we draw any other conclusion but that the Soviet Union does not — at any rate for the moment, and I hope it is only for the moment — want a test ban treaty?

I will not repeat at any length what I said yesterday about our position, which I think is in such striking contrast to the record of the Soviet Union, but I would repeat, as the United States representative has repeated today, that there lie before us alternatives which are plainly in accordance with the views expressed by the overwhelming majority of the United Nations General Assembly, proposals which would enable us to meet the deadline we have been asked to meet and which would give us an agreement by 1 January 1963. I think it is not too much to ask of a Government which has claimed to support so whole-heartedly the objectives for which the United Nations stands that it comply with these United Nations resolutions and accept the alternatives based upon them which we are offering in an attempt to meet the deadline before us.

**Mr. Tsarapklin** (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The United Kingdom representative has just told us that his delegation and his Government are, according to him, striving for an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, but I have heard no other statements from the United Kingdom representative, and of course it cannot be expected to be otherwise. Of course he must keep repeating that he wants an agreement, but his position, his actions and his demands are such that the agreement should afford compulsory inspection and an international control system. All this unmasks him as really being opposed to an agreement.
Even on the question of the automatic stations, the representative of the United Kingdom has just said that he is not rejecting this idea and, on the contrary, he is prepared to accept it, but how does he accept it? He himself has just quoted something which runs counter to his statement. He has just quoted from his statement yesterday that he is prepared to consider the proposal on the automatic seismological stations from the standpoint of the extent to which these "black boxes" may make it possible to reduce the number of control posts and perhaps of on-site inspections, and he suggests that experts be called. So again he tacks on to this proposal on automatic stations the question of international control and of on-site inspection, thereby nullifying this proposal. In other words, he tries to bend this new proposal to his old position: international control and compulsory inspection.

The United States representative told us today, as he stated earlier, that automatic stations can serve only as an addition to the system proposed by the Western Powers but not as a substitute for this. What does this mean? It means that you might accept the automatic seismological stations only as an addition or an integral part of your system, which is based on compulsory on-site inspection and international control posts. This is the true nature and the core of your position, and this remains unchanged. This is the substance of the same old position that you have held since 1958, and this is what kills any possibility of an agreement on a mutually acceptable basis.

The General Assembly in its resolution 1762 (XVII) called upon the Governments of the nuclear Powers to conduct negotiations in a spirit of mutual understanding and to make concessions. The Soviet Union has made a very important concession. We accepted the eight-Power joint memorandum (ENDC/28) as a basis for our negotiations. This means that, assuming that you can also accept this eight-Power joint memorandum, we should conclude an agreement, and this should be on the basis of the national systems and without compulsory inspection. However, the Western Powers reject such an agreement, and in fact this possibility has been shelved.

Now you have advanced the idea of a partial treaty. To this we add only one request: to add to such a partial treaty provisions to the effect that, while negotiations on the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests continue,
the States parties to the treaty should assume the obligation not to indulge in such
tests. Therefore what we wish is that as long as our negotiations go on they
should not be held against the background noise of underground nuclear explosions.
Let the earth go on spinning quietly in space without being shaken by nuclear
explosions at great depths. But you rejected this again. However, our proposal
that during our negotiations there should be no underground explosions is fully in
agreement with paragraph 2 of resolution 1762 (XVII). Therefore, when you reject
this proposal of ours, you are by the same token rejecting the resolution adopted
almost unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly on 6 November. In doing
so you assume a heavy responsibility by rejecting the humane and acceptable proposal
of the Soviet Union.

You have rejected also the possibility to implement paragraph 2 of the General
Assembly resolution as it stands without connecting it with any other agreement —
just to put into force paragraph 2 and to continue our negotiations. You also
reject the possibility of using the proposal concerning automatic seismological
stations.
I have already explained how you do this. You do it by connecting this proposal with your demands for inspection and international control, in this way nullifying this proposal as well.

These are your positions, your phraseology, your references and observations on technical themes and aspects. All this is designed to throw a smokescreen around your true position, which is basically negative, basically opposed to the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests in all environments for ever.

We have already pointed out repeatedly that United States seismic instruments are no worse than Soviet instruments, and specialists as well as the political representatives here from the West have been repeatedly trying to throw doubt on the technical aspects of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests; and at the same time you use these supposedly hypothetical difficulties as if they were real difficulties.

All this taken together of course creates a very unfavourable atmosphere for our negotiations, and all the attempts of the West in this respect, especially those mentioned by the United Kingdom representative, make the atmosphere in which we work heavier, as do some of the words and language used, and attempts to launch accusations against the Soviet Union. The United Kingdom representative has just listed eight Soviet refusals. That is a demagogic attitude, Sir Michael. You take the Soviet position which you do not wish to accept, you divide it into eight elements and in that way list eight refusals. But all this resolves itself into one single point. It is compulsory inspection which we reject. You could divide it into 128 components or ingredients and try to allege that we have rejected 128 proposals. But they are all one and the same. We reject your demand for inspection, your demand for an international control system. You may divide it into many parts, but it is still the same thing.

Sir Michael [RIGHT] (United Kingdom): I note with regret the statements of the Soviet representative, but I am more than content that his remarks and mine at yesterday's plenary meeting and at this present meeting of the Sub-Committee should stand on the record.
The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): If no other representative wishes to speak I will make some brief remarks in my capacity as representative of the United States.

It seems to me abundantly clear that the delegations of the United Kingdom and the United States have said, and I think I can repeat it -- but if the representative of the United Kingdom did not say so today he will correct me -- that we are quite prepared to sit down with our colleagues from the Soviet Union and negotiate our comprehensive draft treaty (ENDC/58). We are also quite prepared to bring our scientists here and to explore all means and methods for detecting and identifying seismic events and trying to work out ways and means of actually identifying a seismic event short of physical on-site inspection -- which, according to the advice of our scientists, will always be necessary with respect to a certain residue in each year of unidentified events. We are quite prepared to sit down with our Soviet colleagues and examine the existing national systems, the instrumentation of those systems and the personnel.

It may be that I did not understand the procès-verbal correctly, but I understood my Soviet colleague to say that the eight-nation memorandum (ENDC/28) provided only for the setting up of a system on the basis of existing posts. Of course, the second sentence of paragraph 3 of that memorandum reads:

"Such a system might be based and built upon already existing national networks of observation posts and institutions, or if more appropriate, on certain of the existing posts designated by agreement for the purpose together, if necessary, with new posts established by agreement." (ENDC/28)

The last sentence of that same paragraph reads:

"Improvements could no doubt be achieved by furnishing posts with more advanced instrumentation." (ibid.),

as I tried to indicate in my first statement today.

As to the Soviet representative's statement that the eight-nation memorandum provides only for on-site inspections by invitation, I would point out to him that the second sentence of paragraph 4 reads:

"This Commission should be entrusted with the tasks of processing all data received from the agreed system of observation posts and of reporting on any nuclear explosion or suspicious event on the basis of thorough and objective examination of all the available data." (ibid.)
The next sentence reads:

"All parties to the treaty should accept the obligation to furnish the Commission with the facts necessary to establish the nature of any suspicious and significant event," (ibid.) -- that is, all parties to the treaty should accept the "obligation" to furnish the commission with the facts necessary.

Paragraph 5 reads:

"Should the Commission find that it was unable to reach a conclusion on the nature of a significant event it would so inform the party on whose territory that event had occurred, and simultaneously inform it of the points on which urgent clarification seemed necessary. The party and the Commission should consult as to what further measures of clarification, including verification in loco, would facilitate the assessment." (ibid.)

As I read the words "including verification in loco" they are supposed to mean the same thing as a physical on-site inspection.

The last sentence of paragraph 5 reads:

"The party concerned would, in accordance with its obligation referred to in paragraph 4 above, give speedy and full co-operation to facilitate the assessment." (ibid.)

This, as I have just said, might include "verification in loco" pursuant to the obligation of the party to give speedy and full co-operation to facilitate the assessment.

As I read paragraph 4, the last sentence has nothing to do with the fact that the party is under obligation to invite the commission to make an on-site inspection; that last sentence merely means that if a party itself wishes to clear its own good name it could invite the commission; but I do not read the last sentence of paragraph as subtracting from the obligatory nature of the party to invite the commission to make an on-site inspection. I think I am correct in saying that quite a number of the eight non-aligned countries read the memorandum in the same way.
(The Chairman, United States)

As to these automatic stations, to which I also adverted in my statement today, we are quite prepared to sit down and to discuss them with our Soviet colleagues. I have already, at various meetings, asked them a number of questions about these automatic stations, and their sole answer so far, as I recall it subject to correction, is that we should agree on them in principle, and that then, after having agreed upon them in principle, we could then discuss the details.

An old colleague of mine once said that when you agreed to something in principle, you agreed, for example, that somebody, somehow or other, would borrow some money. You did not know who, you had not agreed on the interest rate or what property would be pledged for it, or when it would be paid back, or how, or in what kind of currency, but otherwise you had agreed in principle.

As I say, we are quite prepared to study those automatic stations. I have been trying to get a good deal more information from our scientists and from the scientists of the non-aligned States which are new to this Conference. I have been trying to find out what kind of arrays of seismometers, or how many, would be put into one of these automatic stations, and how much they would weigh. I am told that perhaps each automatic station would weigh from 4,000 to 5,000 lbs, and that we would have to know whether there would be airfields in the Soviet Union where the aircraft which would carry these automatic stations to their sites and take them back to the headquarters in Vienna for processing could land, or whether there would have to be hoisting equipment there to unload them and to put them into place.

Again, I have been looking into the question whether, in trying to find the best place for the location of these automatic stations, that it might not be possible to place some of them in the most desirable parts of the Soviet Union because of the noise ratio, because of snowfall, because of conditions in the spring, because of temperature, because of lack of roads, or as I have said, because of lack of suitable airfields. I have been trying to determine also whether one or more of these automatic stations ought to be connected electronically or by electric cable with one or more of the other detection or observation posts, and so on.

According to the information we have received from our scientists so far, it would seem that these automatic stations would materially complicate the system. They would, I am informed, make the system considerably more expensive, and, except perhaps in the case of a small number of earthquakes, with respect to the criteria of first motion, would not add materially to solving the problem of identification.
In fact, taking into consideration the manpower and the expense involved, the job could be done on a much more efficient and effective basis by a small number of observation posts placed in quiet locations with modern instrumentation and properly trained personnel. Those detection stations, so instrumented and so located, would provide a more efficient system and perhaps, after they had been experimented with for a number of years, might even eventually be more efficient in cutting down on the number of actual physical on-site inspections that might have to be made.

I am not approaching these automatic stations in any dogmatic sense or in any sense of suggesting that we know the answers relating to them. Our scientists tell us that, as things stand at present, they do not think they would be a substitute for modern array stations because it would be possible to have many more arrays in a normal station than would be possible in one of these automatic stations. It is my further understanding that if anything were to happen to any of these automatic stations, and if for any reason they were not vertical, they might not work very effectively, and in their ability to identify certain signals, if they comprised only single seismometers as against an array of seismometers, they would not be as efficient.

But let me be clear. As far as we are concerned, we are quite prepared to bring our scientists here, as I understand the United Kingdom is, to discuss this whole question of automatic stations until we have fully explored it with the scientists from the Soviet Union. We do not intend in any sense to be dogmatic or in any sense to be laying down the law with respect to these automatic stations. We are quite prepared to discuss our scientific evidence. We are quite prepared to discuss the draft of our comprehensive treaty. We think it is correct, but if the Soviet representatives can prove to us that the theories on which it is drafted are not correct, we are quite ready to listen to any additional scientific data that they may wish to adduce.

We do believe that on the basis of our Project Vela of the work done by United Kingdom scientists and our own scientists, we have produced a draft treaty providing for a relatively small number of detection stations and a relatively small number of on-site inspections which, as I have said before, we are quite
willing to pro-rate between seismic and aseismic areas on the territory of the Soviet Union. We are quite willing to listen to anything within reason which will enable us to get together on this question of how we can sign a comprehensive treaty which will ban all tests in all environments.

Since we first submitted our draft treaty (ENDC/9), on 18 April 1961, we have made a large number of changes. There was the so-called veto list (GEN/DNT/29). We understood that if that were met the Soviet Union would be willing to sign, and I submit we have met that veto list in so far as it can be interpreted on any reasonable basis. And there was the fact that the original treaty did not apply to those seismic events which registered on the seismic scale of magnitude below 4.75. It was indicated to us that if that threshold could be removed a major obstacle to signing the treaty also would be removed. That threshold has now been removed. There were various representations made to us with respect to the appointment and the removal of the administrator. The views of the Soviet Union have been met on those counts, as indeed they have on the count of equal representation on the scientific commission, and on a number of other points.

We still have to work out this question of how the treaty would be financed. We have made a proposal to the Soviet Union on that score which, to the best of my recollection, it has so far not answered. I do not quite see how we could be any more open-minded or any fairer than we have been, and how it could normally be expected that we would be willing to sit down here and to agree in principle upon the working of automatic stations, without having both the Soviet scientists and our own scientists here to advise us what is the latest and most advanced scientific knowledge in this field. That is something which I do not really believe any of the eight non-aligned nations, or indeed any reasonable person, could logically expect either the United Kingdom or the United States to do. But in so far as there is any reasonable basis or any reasonable method of negotiation, that the United Kingdom and the United States are quite prepared to conduct such negotiations.
Mr. TSARAPKHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The United States representative has just said that in his view the joint memorandum states that the observation system could be organised not on the basis not only of the existing national networks of posts but also of certain new posts. We do not deny this. We have already stated repeatedly that we believe we could agree when it was necessary, on new, additional posts, but we consider that such posts also would be national posts. They would be a part of the national observation system and would not have a special international status. That is my first remark.

Secondly, with regard to Mr. Dean's attempt to depict the situation as though the eight-nation memorandum provided for compulsory inspection, it does no such thing and such an allegation is not in accordance with the text of the memorandum. In order not to create unnecessary differences here I shall read out the appropriate passages from the English text of the memorandum. In paragraph 4 we find the following:

(continued in English):

"All parties to the treaty should accept the obligation to furnish the Commission with the facts necessary to establish the nature of any suspicious and significant event." (ENDC/25, p.2)

(continued in Russian)
Further we read:

(continued in English)

"Pursuant to this obligation the parties to the treaty could invite ..." (Ibid)

It is not "should invite": it is "could invite".

(continued in Russian)

It is not my business to teach you English. It is quite clear that there is no obligation for compulsory inspection here.

Let us take paragraph 5 -- and again I shall read it in English:

(continued in English)

"... should consult as to what further measures of clarification, including verification in loco, would facilitate the assessment." (Ibid)

(continued in Russian)

There is one more phrase:

(continued in English)

"... would, in accordance with its obligation referred to in paragraph 4 above ..." (Ibid)
And paragraph 4 above reads:
"... the parties to the treaty could invite the Commission..." (Ibid)
That is all. It seems to me it is quite clear.

(continued in Russian)

I would like to draw attention -- in particular the attention of the United Kingdom representative -- to the fact that the United Kingdom Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan speaking in the British House of Commons, formulated an assessment of the eight-nation memorandum in the course of which he said that the memorandum did not provide for compulsory inspection. Those were the words of the United Kingdom Prime Minister. I quoted that passage earlier and it can be found in the verbatim records.

So in this respect I believe the situation is perfectly clear: the eight-nation memorandum refers to inspection by invitation and not to compulsory inspection.

The United States representative said with regard to the automatic seismic stations that before giving agreement in principle the United States would like to have a number of details with regard to the size of stations, their weight, whether the form of the stations would cause difficulties in loading and unloading, where they would be located, what would be the mean annual or monthly temperature, whether there might be deep snow, whether they would be connected electronically or by electric cables. I would like to ask Mr. Dean whether all these technical details would be an obstacle to the United States's saying "We are prepared to accept the proposal in principle." Let us first agree in principle and then let us pass on to study details. Had the United States acted in that way, that would really amount to businesslike, concrete negotiations, and agreement would come pretty soon.

Obviously if we had an agreement in principle to the use of automatic stations many technical details would have to be discussed and settled. We do not refuse that at all. But why does the United States put technical discussion ahead of agreement in principle, which amounts to putting the cart before the horse? When we speak of control and certain principles relating to control, when we speak of our proposals for using automatic seismic stations -- when our discussion is on principles -- we are not asking more from you and we are not prepared to offer more than what we ask from you. I believe that is quite a reasonable approach and a reasonable basis for our conversations and negotiations; and I think that perhaps after some more thought on the subject you will give your agreement to the use of
automatic seismic stations as an additional method designed to afford the Western Powers additional guarantees with regard to control. I must emphasize that they would not be in addition to inspection, as the United States representative said, but this is something which we are prepared to do with reference to the provisions for a control system in the eight-nation memorandum -- namely, that the national observation networks should be used and that there would be no room for compulsory inspection.

Therefore, in an effort to meet the Western views, to facilitate agreement and to create the most favourable conditions for the greatest measure of effectiveness of control -- with all these purposes in mind -- we put forward the idea of using automatic seismic stations.

You say that we should first consider what is in the bag, but we say there is nothing hidden in the bag. What we suggest is that we should agree in principle to the use of automatic seismic stations and then study the matter together. Our suggestion is that if the idea of using the "black boxes" is acceptable we should discuss the parameters and the details of location. We have already made some remarks on the location of the automatic stations -- that is part of our proposal -- so when you say you do not know where they would be located I would remind you that we have said no nor which cities they would be located. You know our views on that score.
(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

The question of where they should be located in other countries is also something which has to be discussed and agreed upon in consultation with the countries concerned. That is no obstacle to agreement.

Those are only artificial obstacles and the minute we tackle them in a practical and businesslike manner, the obstacles will disappear.

That is the situation; I hope that the Western representatives will study and will reflect upon the situation and if they have a real desire to find a solution -- and it is our hope that that is so -- then we shall be able to reach agreement.

Sir Michael WRIGHT (United Kingdom): I should like to make one remark: the fact that at this late hour I am not proposing to comment upon the last intervention of our Soviet colleague does not imply that I agree with his statement. I reserve the right to revert to some of his remarks at a later date.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): If no other representative wishes to speak, I suggest that the next meeting should be held on Tuesday, 10 December 1962, at 10.30 a.m. If anybody wishes to suggest a change in the date later on they are at liberty to do so, but at present we are agreed that that will be the date of the next meeting.

The meeting rose at 5.35 p.m.