NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

The present volume contains the report of the Conference and annexes I, III and IV. Annex II appears in volume II.
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INTRODUCTION

1. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament submits to the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Disarmament Commission a progress report on the Committee's deliberations on all questions before it for the period 31 January to 31 August 1978, together with the pertinent documents and records.

2. This report includes an account of the organization of the Conference (part I) and of the Committee's work during 1978 based on its agenda as well as on the recommendations contained in the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly (part II).

3. A special report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament 1/ was submitted to the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament on 11 May 1978, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 32/88 B of 12 December 1977. By that resolution, the Assembly endorsed the recommendations of the Preparatory Committee for the special session, 2/ including a recommendation that the Assembly request the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to submit to it, at its special session, a special report on the state of the various questions under consideration by the Conference. The special report was prepared in direct response to that request. Its preparation and adoption represented an important activity of the Committee during its 1978 session.

I. ORGANIZATION OF THE CONFERENCE

A. Procedural arrangements

4. The Conference was in session from 31 January to 11 May and from 11 July to 31 August 1978. During this period, the Committee held 39 formal plenary meetings at which members set forth their Government's views and recommendations for progress on the questions before the Committee.

5. The Committee also held 43 informal meetings without records on various subjects, including in its schedule of work, organization and procedures, a comprehensive programme of disarmament as well as the terms of reference for the Ad Hoc Working Group to Discuss and Elaborate a Comprehensive Programme for Disarmament, cessation of nuclear tests, prohibition of chemical weapons, prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, the special report to the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the reports of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events and the report of the Conference to the thirty-third session of the General Assembly.

6. In addition, members of the Committee met frequently for informal multilateral consultations on disarmament questions of common interest.

7. The Committee continued to operate in accordance with the procedural arrangements adopted by it on 21 April 1977. 3/

B. Participants in the Conference

8. Representatives of the following States continued their participation in the work of the Committee: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Hungary, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

II. WORK OF THE CONFERENCE DURING 1978

9. Pursuant to the decision taken by the Committee in 1975 that in the future it would discuss the organization of its work each year at the beginning of the session and thereafter as the need arose, the Committee held three informal meetings on its agenda and schedule of meetings for the spring session and, based on recommendations of the two Co-Chairmen, took the following decision at its 772nd meeting on 16 February 1978 (CCD/551):

**Plenary Meetings**

Plenary meetings will continue to be held on Tuesday and Thursday at 10.30 a.m. unless decided otherwise. The agenda for the plenary meetings, adopted on 15 August 1968, reads as follows:

1. Further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.
   
   Under this heading members may wish to discuss measures dealing with the cessation of testing, the non-use of nuclear weapons, the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons use, the cessation of manufacture of weapons and reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear stockpiles, nuclear-free zones, etc.

2. Non-nuclear measures.
   
   Under this heading, members may wish to discuss chemical and bacteriological warfare, regional arms limitations, etc.

3. Other collateral measures.
   
   Under this heading, members may wish to discuss prevention of an arms race on the seabed, etc.

4. General and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

The Co-Chairmen note the recognized right of any delegation to raise and discuss any disarmament subject in any meeting of the Committee.

Further, pursuant to the discussion of 29 April 1977, as well as the relevant discussions of this decision in the Committee, it is noted that the Committee can establish an **ad hoc** working group whenever it deems it appropriate to do so under the procedural decision of 21 April. It is noted that on 25 August 1977 the Committee agreed that, at the beginning of the 1978 spring session, an **ad hoc** working group would be established to discuss and elaborate a draft comprehensive programme of disarmament to be submitted to the Conference for consideration.
**Informal Meetings**

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<td>10-14 April</td>
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End of spring session 6/  

10. After the reconvening of the Committee at its summer session on 11 July 1978, the Committee discussed its schedule for the summer period in two informal

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4/ During the period from 27 February to 10 March, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events will hold its final session.

5/ In case the spring session ends after 14 April this consideration will take place during the last week of the session.

6/ The Committee will decide subsequently when the spring session will end, and on the question of a brief recess in April.
meetings, and took a decision at its summer session on 11 July 1978, the Committee discussed its schedule for the summer period in two informal meetings, and took a decision at its 795th meeting on 27 July (CCD/574) that the plenary meetings of the Committee would continue to be held at the same time as previously and under the same agenda, and that informal and other meetings would be scheduled as follows, based on recommendations of the Co-Chairmen:

Informal Meetings

11-27 July

Informal meetings, as required to discuss the summer session schedule of work

31 July-4 August

Informal meetings to consider the progress in the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts from 24 to 28 July

7-11 August

Informal meetings on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. It is understood that there will be a statement on the status of the trilateral negotiations on the subject

14-18 August

Informal meetings, with participation of experts, on new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction

21-25 August

Informal meetings on chemical weapons. It is understood that there will be a statement on the status of the bilateral negotiations

Week prior to Adjournment

Informal meetings to consider the draft report to the General Assembly

11. The Committee also had before it a letter dated 16 January 1978 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations (CCD/547), transmitting the resolutions on disarmament adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-second session in 1977, in particular those entrusting specific responsibilities to the Conference of the

7/ During the period from 24 to 28 July, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events will meet to study the scientific and methodological principles of a possible experimental test of a possible global network of seismological stations for the international exchange of seismological data under a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests, and a protocol, which would be an integral part of the treaty, covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

8/ On 10 April 1975, the Committee decided, inter alia, that the report of the Conference on its activities shall be transmitted to the General Assembly on the last Thursday in August unless decided otherwise. Also, the Committee is free to convene at any time during the remainder of the year upon recommendation of the Co-Chairmen after full consultations with Committee members, in order to conduct negotiations on the priority items on its agenda.
Committee on Disarmament, namely: resolution 32/77, "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons"; resolution 32/78, "Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban; conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests"; resolution 32/80, "Effective measures to implement the purposes and objectives of the Disarmament Decade"; resolutions 32/84 A and B, "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons"; and resolution 32/87 A, "General and complete disarmament".

12. In the same letter the Secretary-General drew attention, in particular, to the following provisions of those resolutions:

(a) In resolution 32/77, paragraph 2, the General Assembly requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue negotiations and, as a matter of high priority, to undertake the elaboration of an agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and for their destruction, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives submitted for its consideration; and in paragraph 5 it requests the Conference to report on the results of its negotiations to the General Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament, to be held in May and June 1978, and at its thirty-third session;

(b) In resolution 32/78, paragraph 4, the General Assembly urges the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to expedite their negotiations with a view to bringing them to a positive conclusion as soon as possible and to use their best endeavours to transmit the results for full consideration by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by the beginning of its 1978 session; and in paragraph 5 it requests the Conference to take up the agreed text resulting from those negotiations with the utmost urgency, with a view to the submission of a draft treaty to the General Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament;

(c) In resolution 32/80, paragraph 2, the Assembly requests the Conference to continue its work on a comprehensive programme for disarmament and to submit a progress report to the General Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament.

(d) In resolution 32/84 A, paragraph 1, the General Assembly requests the Conference to continue negotiations, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, aimed at working out the text of an agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons and, when necessary, specific agreements on this subject; and in paragraph 2 it requests the Conference to submit a report on the results achieved to the General Assembly for consideration at its thirty-third session.

(e) In resolution 32/84 B, paragraph 5, the General Assembly requests the Conference, while taking into account its existing priorities, to keep under review the question of the development of new weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and to consider the desirability of formulating agreements on the prohibition of any specific new weapons which may be identified; and in paragraph 6 it requests the Conference to report on its review to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session.
In resolution 32/87 A, paragraph 4, the General Assembly requests the Conference, in consultation with the States parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof and taking into account the proposals made during the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty and any relevant technological developments, to proceed promptly with the consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race in that environment; and in paragraph 7 it requests the Conference to report on its negotiations to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session.

13. All the matters dealt with in the above-mentioned resolutions of the General Assembly were considered by the Committee and are covered in this report, as follows:

- **Resolution 32/77** (considered in both plenary and informal meetings)
  part II, sect. B;

- **Resolution 32/78** (considered in both plenary and informal meetings)
  part II, sect. A;

- **Resolution 32/80** (considered in both plenary and informal meetings)
  part II, sect. D;

- **Resolutions 32/84 A and B** (considered in both plenary and informal meetings with experts)
  part II, sect. B;

- **Resolution 32/87 A** (considered in plenary meetings)
  part II, sect. B.

14. At the opening plenary meeting of the 1978 session, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations conveyed to the Conference a message from the Secretary-General. In his message, the Secretary-General stated that the Committee's decision to resume deliberations earlier than usual in 1978 was a recognition of the urgent agenda that was before it, which included such vital matters as the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests and the prohibition of chemical weapons. The General Assembly had also requested the Conference to submit a special report on the results of its work to the Assembly's special session on disarmament, which would be convened at United Nations Headquarters in May that year.

15. During the past decade and a half, the Secretary-General went on, there had been some notable achievements, but they had been directed towards arms limitation rather than disarmament. They had been aimed at proscribing certain particularly undesirable developments but had not resulted in a substantial reduction of important weapons systems, nor had they restrained the pace of the arms race. Indeed, the world had witnessed an acceleration of the arms race in the midst of political détente.

16. In this connexion, he suggested that disarmament considerations must become an integral part of international efforts towards détente. Undoubtedly, it was dangerous to assume that military developments could always be kept under control and a stable balance of deterrence maintained.
17. There was now general agreement, the Secretary-General continued, that the threat of nuclear war was the greatest single peril to the survival of mankind. Consequently, nuclear disarmament remained the overriding priority, and responsibility for progress here fell predominantly on the nuclear powers, and on the two largest in particular. In this regard, the success of the strategic arms limitation talks was of crucial importance in helping to build an atmosphere of international confidence. Also, in order to control the development of nuclear weapons, an end to nuclear tests would be an essential first step. He, therefore, welcomed the negotiations entered into in 1977 by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States with a view to reaching an agreement on that subject.

18. The Secretary-General also stressed the importance that the General Assembly placed on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons, the need for barriers to prevent scientific and technological progress from being applied to the development of new weapons of mass destruction, and the consideration of additional measures towards the complete demilitarization of the sea-bed and ocean floor. He also referred to the need for measures of disarmament in the field of conventional weapons. As their accuracy and destructiveness grew, there was an increasing awareness in the international community, he noted, both of their destabilizing effects - mainly at the regional level - and of the economic and social burdens they imposed on the peoples of the world.

19. The Secretary-General concluded by saying that partial and collateral disarmament measures could play a role in halting and reversing the arms race only if they were conceived as part of a broader programme. The Committee had agreed that at the beginning of the 1978 session, an ad hoc working group would be established to draft a comprehensive programme of disarmament. Such a programme could make a valuable contribution to the international community's over-all disarmament efforts.
A. Further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament

20. During 1978, questions related to the halting of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament continued to remain under active consideration by the Committee. Members who addressed themselves to those issues almost unanimously underscored the need for early and substantial progress towards the goal of nuclear disarmament, which they considered to be the priority item of any disarmament effort, including the cessation of nuclear tests.

21. In its first statement at the 1978 spring session, the Soviet delegation described three proposals put forward in late 1977 by Mr. L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of USSR, relating to the cessation of production of nuclear weapons, the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, and mutual renunciation of the production of neutron bombs (CCD/PV.767).

22. The Soviet delegation explained that the proposed production ban would apply to all nuclear weapons - whether atomic, hydrogen or neutron bombs or missiles - and, simultaneously, the nuclear States could undertake to initiate a gradual reduction of the existing stockpiles of such weapons leading to their complete destruction. The delegation pointed out that the proposal would put an end to the quantitative accumulation of nuclear weapons and declared the readiness of its Government to begin negotiations with all other nuclear States to work out a practical solution of the problem. It added that the Soviet Union had no objection to the participation of non-nuclear States in such negotiations in view of the universal interest in nuclear disarmament.

23. The delegation of Romania stressed the view that any genuine disarmament effort must start with an examination of the motive factor of the present arms race in nuclear weapons, since the accumulation and continuous technological refinement of such weapons were at the root of the insecurity existing in the world today. Romania had also stressed that it would continue to urge that problems of nuclear disarmament should be placed at the centre of the Committee's activities. In that respect, the delegation of Romania reiterated its previous proposals and priorities on which the Conference should concentrate its work (CCD/PV.768).

24. The delegation of Poland stressed the significance of the new Soviet initiatives (ibid.). The delegation of Hungary, noting the concern of world opinion, held that the Committee's most important task was to conclude its current negotiations, particularly in the nuclear field, beginning with a full test ban followed by a halt in the production of nuclear weapons and their destruction. Hungary also held that it would be difficult to overestimate the importance of a nuclear test ban from the point of view of the preventing of dissemination of atomic weapons and the success of future negotiations on other disarmament questions (CCD/PV.770). The delegation of Mongolia, emphasizing the view that there was no alternative to nuclear disarmament, shared the view of the Soviet Union in the matter (CCD/PV.773). The German Democratic Republic also attached great importance to efforts to halt the nuclear-arms race and prohibit the production of any types of nuclear weapons, noting that the socialist States had submitted specific proposals in that field, such as those in the memorandum of the USSR on questions of ending the arms race and disarmament submitted in
1977 9/ and in a recent working paper (CCD/552) on a comprehensive disarmament programme (CCD/PV.781).

25. In its concluding statement at the spring session, the Soviet delegation set forth new proposals in the field of disarmament put forward in April 1978 by Mr. L. I. Brezhnev. These proposals provided for the following measures to be put into effect within a definite time-limit: (a) halting the production of all types of nuclear weapons; (b) halting the production of and banning all other types of weapons of mass destruction; (c) halting the development of new types of highly destructive conventional arms; (d) renouncing the expansion of armies and increases in the conventional armaments of the permanent members of the Security Council and of countries associated with them under military agreements. In those proposals, it was pointed out that the process of disarmament could be started with the cessation of the production of nuclear arms. It was also stressed therein that, in order to remove the peril of the use of nuclear weapons, joint efforts of all the nuclear Powers were needed. The Soviet Union was opposed to the use of nuclear weapons and it was doing and would continue to do its utmost to prevent an atomic war. That was a firm line by which the USSR would be guided in its action. In line with its fundamental policy aimed at reducing the threat of a nuclear war, the Soviet Union had also decided to accede in due manner to the Treaty banning nuclear weapons in Latin America. 10/ Thus the Soviet Union, like other nuclear-weapon Powers, would assume the obligation not to assist any Latin American States in gaining access to nuclear weapons and not to use such weapons against States parties to the Treaty (CCD/PV.789 and 790).

26. The delegation of the United States stressed that the United States was not seeking disarmament agreements which merely channelled competition in convenient directions, but significant disarmament. In support of this point, the delegation reiterated its willingness, as announced by President Carter in 1977, to reduce the number of nuclear weapons, on a reciprocal basis, by as much as 50 per cent (CCD/PV.767).

27. The delegation of Sweden also underlined the priority of nuclear disarmament, stressing that every country was affected by the nuclear arms race and, accordingly, by every nuclear disarmament measure or lack of such measures. That fact was one justification for a multilateral negotiating body such as the Conference, as well as an incentive for middle-sized and small non-nuclear-weapon States to be active in disarmament work. Moreover, nuclear disarmament was a key to real progress in other areas of disarmament, such as that of conventional arms. The delegation held, however, that prior to the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Committee could not conceivably accomplish more in the nuclear field than a total test ban and that any additional progress in the field during that period would have to be made at the bilateral strategic arms limitation talks (ibid.).

28. The Nigerian delegation stressed that after years of devoting attention to collateral measures, world opinion was now demanding direct measures of real


disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament. The delegation stressed that the danger of nuclear holocaust had not been significantly averted by such measures as changing the environment for nuclear tests, nor by measures to prevent horizontal proliferation while vertical proliferation proceeded unchecked. A comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty would be the first positive measure indicating that the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons intended to implement article VI, providing for effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament (CCD/PV.769). The delegation of India cited from the communique issued by Prime Minister Desai of India and President Carter of the United States to the effect that stockpiles of nuclear weapons must be reduced and eventually eliminated and that the danger of the proliferation of such weapons must be arrested. In that connexion, the Indian delegation also stressed the importance of an international agreement not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons. Noting that, in its resolution 1653 (XVI), the General Assembly had declared such actions contrary to international law and a crime against mankind, the delegation held that the special session of the General Assembly should reaffirm that view with regard to all countries, without distinction as to whether they belonged to a nuclear-weapon-free zone or not. In fact, the delegation would support a general ban on the possession of nuclear weapons, the most cruel and indiscriminate weapons in existence (CCD/PV.771 and 786). The delegation of India added that India had set an example by unilaterally renouncing the manufacture of nuclear weapons, and called on the major nuclear-weapon States to work out some agreed immediate steps that would be taken within a reasonable time (CCD/PV.786).

29. In its opening statement at the summer session, the Soviet Union proposed the implementation of several specific measures both in the field of nuclear disarmament and in the field of conventional armed forces and armaments. It stressed, however, that since the main danger stemmed from the accelerating nuclear arms race, priority among disarmament measures should be given to ending the production of nuclear weapons so that stockpiles of such weapons could be gradually reduced and ultimately completely liquidated. The delegation added that the process of achieving nuclear disarmament should be inseparably connected with the strengthening of international legal guarantees for the security of States, including the conclusion of a world-wide treaty on the non-use of force in international relations. With specific reference to the possible use of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union stressed that it was against the use of such weapons and that only emergency circumstances, such as aggression against the USSR or its allies by another nuclear-weapon Power, could force it to use such extreme means of self-defence. This had been stated in April 1978 by Mr. L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of USSR (CCD/PV.790 and 805).

30. The delegations of Czechoslovakia (CCD/PV.792) and the German Democratic Republic (CCD/PV.795) strongly supported the Soviet proposal to start negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they had been completely destroyed. The delegation of Czechoslovakia added that the implementation of the proposal would pave the way to the solution of the problem of nuclear arms.

11/ General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex.
31. A number of delegations including those of Mexico (CCD/PV.790), Czechoslovakia (CCD/PV.792), Poland (CCD/PV.793), Sweden (ibid.), German Democratic Republic (CCD/PV.795), Egypt (ibid.), Iran (CCD/PV.796), Canada (CCD/PV.799) and Yugoslavia (ibid.) alluded to the high priority which had been accorded by the General Assembly at its special session to the question of nuclear disarmament.

32. Thus, Czechoslovakia stated that the discussion at the special session on the question of nuclear disarmament had revealed a deep concern of participating States about the continuing qualitative and quantitative growth of nuclear potential in the world. Nuclear weapons, the delegation stressed, posed the greatest dangers to mankind and to the survival of civilization. A basic condition for a full and real solution of the problem was the participation of all nuclear States in the elaboration and implementation of efficient measures.

33. The German Democratic Republic declared that the useful impetus provided by the special session on disarmament had to be effectively utilized without any delay, particularly with respect to the implementation of measures which were aimed at putting an end to the arms race in the field of nuclear weapons.

34. The delegation of Poland stated that the upward spiral of the nuclear arms race and the resultant expansion and sophistication of nuclear arsenals brooked no further delay in the determined pursuit, in the Committee and elsewhere, of meaningful measures capable of stopping and reversing that trend. The delegation emphasized that the possible consequences of inactivity were only too obvious.

35. Hungary observed that while more substantial progress should be made towards the limitation and reduction of nuclear-weapon stockpiles, it attached great importance to parallel efforts towards prevention of the outbreak of nuclear war and the elimination of the threat to use nuclear weapons. In this connexion the delegation noted that a clear-cut scheme of nuclear disarmament had been outlined in the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly 12/, already quoted by previous speakers, concerning the cessation of the qualitative development and the production of all kinds of nuclear weapons, and the progressive reduction and subsequent complete elimination of their stockpiles (CCD/PV.797).

36. The delegation of Yugoslavia also underscored the imperative necessity of removing the threat of nuclear weapons, and of halting and reversing the nuclear arms race until the total elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems had been achieved.

37. The delegation of Sweden, referring generally to the subject of non-strategic nuclear weapons for possible use against targets in Europe, asked the following questions as a follow-up to the questions which it had posed in 1973 to the nuclear Powers participating in the work of the Conference, taking into account subsequent developments: (a) Were preparations being made for further development of systems of nuclear weapons of subkiloton yield within existing modernization plans? And would such preparations, if undertaken, substantially contribute towards abolishing

12/ General Assembly resolution S-10/2.
the distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons? (b) Did the Soviet Union possess or even deploy nuclear weapons of subkiloton yield, or their means of delivery? (c) Was production or deployment foreseen of nuclear-weapon systems with another balance of characteristics than those now deployed, and with the purpose of reducing collateral damage by such changed or new characteristics? (d) Did present modernization plans foresee further deployment of intermediate range ballistic missiles and medium-range ballistic missiles, in substitution of older versions of such weapons, or in addition to the total yield so far deployed? (e) Against that background, would nuclear weapons also be deployed in areas of Europe where they so far had not been present?

38. Addressing itself to those questions at a subsequent meeting of the Committee, the United Kingdom delegation stated that, as regards tactical nuclear weapons, the United Kingdom had no plans and had taken no decisions which would require the delegation to register an affirmative response to the Swedish delegation's first, third, fourth and fifth questions (CCD/PV.801).

39. Reiterating its long-standing conviction that the need to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race was the highest priority, the delegation of Canada recalled the proposals made by the Canadian Prime Minister during the special session on disarmament, 13/ for a "strategy of suffocation", listing the four measures suggested by Mr. Trudeau: a comprehensive test ban; an agreement to stop flight testing of all new strategic delivery vehicles; an agreement to prohibit production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; and an agreement to limit and progressively reduce military spending on new strategic nuclear-weapon systems.

40. The delegation of the Netherlands stated that it could imagine discussions in the Committee on Disarmament regarding the recommendation of the special session concerning the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and of the production of fissionable materials for such weapons, in particular the verification of such agreements (CCD/PV.799).

41. Japan stated that another realistic step to be considered by the negotiating body, in arresting the nuclear arms race, would be the cut-off of the production of nuclear fissionable materials for weapons purposes. Japan had promoted this idea ever since 1969. The delegation urged that the nuclear-weapon States should halt the production of nuclear fissionable materials for weapons purposes as the first step towards the cessation of the production of nuclear-weapons to be undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States in the near future and also urged the United States and the Soviet Union to start, promptly, an exploratory talk on that question. The delegation emphasized that, in order to assure compliance with such measures, the nuclear-weapon States should accept safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency similar to those which were applied to the non-nuclear-weapon States under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other international agreements (CCD/PV.801).

42. The delegation of Mongolia, pointing out that, at the special session on disarmament, the majority of States had concluded that measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war had the highest priority, the

13/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Plenary Meetings, 6th meeting.
delegation drew attention to the importance of the appeal contained in the final document of the special session of the Assembly for urgent negotiations concerning cessation of the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and the preparation of a comprehensive, phased programme for progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination. The time factor and the importance of the problem made it urgent to begin negotiations on this key problem without any delay, with the participation of all States which possess nuclear weapons, and which must bear special responsibility for nuclear disarmament. The delegation further considered that other States having an important military and economic potential - the so-called "semi-nuclear" States - should define their attitude towards such negotiations, recognizing that their responsibility was no less for attaining nuclear disarmament and for the maintenance of peace and international security (CCD/PV.802).

43. Italy noted that the problem of nuclear disarmament was a factor of paramount importance as far as the fate of the arms race was concerned. The Italian Government attached particular significance to any political move or event conducive to reassuring confidence and hope as to a limitation and the gradual elimination of nuclear arsenals (CCD/PV.804).

44. With particular regard to the strategic arms limitation talks, the delegation of the United States, noting that negotiations both at the bilateral talks and in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament were parts of a coherent whole, pointed out that the Soviet Union and the United States had recently agreed to extend the validity of the first arms limitation agreements until a second accord could be achieved. It added that the latter agreement was taking shape, which it hoped would lower the level of strategic arms on both sides, impose certain qualitative constraints on potentially destabilizing weapons development and set the stage for even more substantial limitation in a third agreement (CCD/PV.767 and 781). The Federal Republic of Germany expressed the hope that both qualitative and quantitative limitations would soon be incorporated in a second agreement (CCD/PV.771).

45. The delegation of Mexico stressed the importance of General Assembly resolution 32/87 of 12 December 1977, adopted by 134 votes, including those of the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and France, in which the recent statements of the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union favouring broader nuclear disarmament were cited and in which the General Assembly urged those two States to implement those declarations as soon as possible (CCD/PV.767).

46. The delegation of Hungary expressed satisfaction that it had learned from the statements of the parties directly involved that the second round of arms limitation talks offered favourable prospects and stressed the beneficial influence that a successful outcome of the talks could have on the international climate, on strengthening existing agreements and promoting the rapid solution of other questions (CCD/PV.770). The delegation of Mongolia stressed the importance of the successful conclusion of the talks (CCD/PV.773). The German Democratic Republic pointed out that a successful conclusion of a second agreement would
contribute significantly to the consolidation of the process of international détente and also to the solution of the problems facing the Committee. The German Democratic Republic was therefore sincerely interested in achieving real progress and resolutely opposed actions by forces hostile to détente, which were designed to prevent agreements on the limitation of the arms race as well as the transition to real disarmament (CCD/PV.775).

47. Later, during the Committee's summer session, the Soviet Union stated that the interests of strengthening peace and security would be served by the conclusion, as quickly as possible, of a second agreement on the limitation of strategic arms. The Soviet side was in favour of achieving agreement without delay and proceeded from the premise that, as a result of efforts by the two sides, an agreement could be reached, provided it took into account the security interests of the sides in a balanced manner (CCD/PV.790). Poland (CCD/PV.793) and the German Democratic Republic (CCD/PV.795) stressed the critical importance of the negotiations on that agreement and Poland recalled, in particular, that the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gromyko, had stated at the special session on disarmament 14/ that, immediately after the signing of the agreement, the Soviet Union would be ready to enter into negotiations which would lead to a substantial reduction of the level of strategic arms and to a further limitation of their qualitative improvement.

48. Sweden emphasized that a second agreement was needed without delay and hoped that it would go beyond a modest time-limited qualitative restraint and very limited reductions of existing arsenals. So far, Sweden pointed out, improvements in strategic weapon performances had been left practically free from any constraints; furthermore, both leading military Powers had raised the number of nuclear weapons at an accelerating speed in the 1970s. Sweden also held that a second agreement should be followed by a third. A second agreement, in its view, should result in substantial quantitative and qualitative reductions and limitations. Finally, Sweden argued in favour of a gradual and, if necessary, selective inclusion in the framework of existing negotiations of those "grey-area systems of nuclear weapons" (theatre nuclear weapons, intermediate range missiles, etc.), which in fact had been kept outside the first round of negotiations and continued to stay outside the second round. They had for all practical purposes been insufficiently dealt with also in other multilateral arms control fora, including the Vienna talks. Nobody should underestimate, Sweden said, the political and technical complexity of the issues involved. It was a fact, however, that among such grey-area systems there were clearly those - including cruise missiles with nuclear warheads - which could erode any agreement that might emerge from the second and third rounds of negotiations, unless they were duly covered (CCD/PV.793).

49. The delegation of Iran, while expressing its impatience with the frequent delays in reaching an agreement, continued to hope that a treaty would finally be realized. Unfortunately, the delegation added, with respect to nuclear measures, there was no alternative to super-Power agreement (CCD/PV.796).

50. The delegation of the Netherlands strongly hoped that an agreement could be achieved and ratified in the near future as a step towards real reductions and qualitative restrictions on the strategic nuclear-weapon systems of the main Powers (CCD/PV.799).

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14/ Ibid., 5th meeting.
51. The United Kingdom declared that the agreement which now seemed to be emerging would formally establish a strategic parity and thus maintain stability and it would have its Government's full support. The world must be spared the risks of an uncontrolled strategic nuclear arms race, the delegation added. The United Kingdom was already beginning to look ahead to a third agreement to follow its conclusion; it should aim to reduce significantly the number of strategic systems, and to limit their development and refinement (CCD/PV.801).

52. The delegation of Mongolia reaffirmed the importance it attached to the bilateral negotiations and considered that a successful conclusion which should be followed by further negotiations, would be an important step on the road towards the attainment of practical measures in the sphere of nuclear disarmament (CCD/PV.802).

53. Italy observed that criticism regarding the non-proliferation régime established under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was centred upon the ongoing nuclear arms race between the major Powers. The delegation believed that a positive outcome of the second round of negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union could significantly contribute to the lessening of distrust and concern which were increasing among the members of the international community (CCD/PV.804).

Question of a comprehensive test-ban agreement

54. In its resolution 32/78, the General Assembly had noted with satisfaction that negotiations had begun among three nuclear-weapon States with a view to the drafting of an agreement on the subject and had urged those three States to expedite their negotiations with a view to bringing them to a positive conclusion as soon as possible.

55. In its statement on the subject of a nuclear-weapon test ban at the opening of the Committee's 1978 spring session, the delegation of the Soviet Union, continuing to stress the importance of such a ban, cited the 1977 statement by Mr. L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of USSR, to the effect that the Soviet Union was ready to agree that, together with a ban on all nuclear-weapon tests for a definite period, a moratorium should be declared on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The delegation hoped that the new position would clear the road for the conclusion of a treaty which the world eagerly awaited. Noting the ongoing trilateral negotiations on the subject, the delegation stressed that its position in those talks was based on Mr. Brezhnev's recent initiative and hoped that the negotiating partners would adopt an equally constructive approach (CCD/PV.767).

56. At the same time, the delegation of the United States, holding that the elusive goal of a comprehensive test ban at last appeared to be near, cited a recent statement of President Carter before the General Assembly advocating an end to all explosions of nuclear devices, whether for peaceful or military purposes. The delegation added the view that any treaty on the subject should be applicable to nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike and that, for the former, such an agreement would inevitably lead to a reduced dependency on nuclear weapons and, for the latter, it would substantially reduce the incentive to develop a technology leading to a capability to carry out nuclear explosions; for both
groups, the delegation held, an agreement on a full test ban would strengthen collective non-proliferation efforts. With particular regard to the trilateral talks, the United States delegation reported progress. It noted that the complexity of the question had thwarted previous efforts to achieve such a ban, but hoped that the results of the trilateral talks could soon be presented to the Committee so that it could complete its work on a multilateral agreement which would attract the broadest possible adherence. The United States also expressed the view that a comprehensive test ban would help to bring a halt to the qualitative nuclear arms race and serve as an important measure which would support collective non-proliferation efforts (ibid.).

57. The delegation of the United Kingdom, noting the great importance the Committee placed on the quick completion of the trilateral negotiations, expressed similar views with regard to the early presentation of the results of the talks to the Committee so that it could elaborate what could prove to be an historic arms control measure (CCD/PV.768).

58. The delegation of Mexico, citing various paragraphs of General Assembly resolution 32/78, and noting that it had been supported by the three nuclear-weapon States participating in the trilateral talks, regretted that the talks had not had the desired results, thus reducing the Committee to enforced inactivity, which the delegation hoped would be only temporary (CCD/PV.767).

59. The delegations of Sweden (ibid.) and the Netherlands (CCD/PV.779) expressed views similar to those of Mexico. Sweden stressed that world opinion expected the special session on disarmament to initiate a more fruitful phase in disarmament negotiations and that the Committee had a special responsibility to report substantial progress on the main issues to the special session if it was to continue to be considered a credible negotiating body. The delegation, accordingly, formally proposed that the Committee remain in permanent session during the spring of 1973 until it had fulfilled the request of the General Assembly. The delegation added the view, however, that a comprehensive test ban could be truly significant only in combination with other nuclear disarmament measures.

60. The Romanian delegation shared the view that the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests was one of the most urgent items on the agenda of the Committee which could certainly prove to be an important step on the way to nuclear disarmament. It also stated that the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons would not in itself eliminate the danger of a nuclear war since large quantities of such weapons were accumulated in the world. Accordingly, that delegation viewed the true significance of the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests in direct relationship with other radical measures which must follow on the way to nuclear disarmament (CCD/PV.768).

61. The delegations of Poland (ibid.), Hungary (CCD/PV.770), Czechoslovakia (CCD/PV.771), Bulgaria (CCD/PV.772), Mongolia (CCD/PV.773) and the German Democratic Republic (CCD/PV.775) welcomed the reports of progress in the trilateral talks, stressing the importance of the various Soviet concessions in making the current favourable situation possible and urging a show of equal flexibility on the part of the other two negotiating partners. While recognizing, however, that the prospective agreement of the three nuclear States was of considerable significance, most of those delegations noted that such an agreement would constitute only a further step towards a general and complete test ban with the participation of all
nuclear-weapon States, including China and France. Hungary hoped that the participants in the talks would shortly be able to resolve outstanding problems and that the much desired treaty would at last be signed; such an outcome could have a beneficial influence on the international climate and on the strengthening of existing bilateral and multilateral agreements, and might promote the rapid solution of other questions. Poland stressed that the impact of such a development on the slowing down of the nuclear arms race would be dramatic, even though it was generally recognized that any long-term objectives of such a comprehensive treaty could be secured only with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States. Mongolia emphasized the view that partial solutions of the problem had led to further improvement of new weapons of mass destruction such as the neutron bomb. In presenting its views, the German Democratic Republic stressed the importance of the preliminary work already accomplished by the Committee on the subject of a nuclear-test ban.

62. The delegation of Nigeria, while encouraged by the statements of the participants in the trilateral talks, regretted the absence of a definite indication of the date when an agreed text of an agreement could be expected by the Committee. Accordingly, it supported the Swedish proposal for the Conference to remain in permanent session during the spring as the only possible alternative (CCD/PV.769).

63. The delegation of India also stressed that a comprehensive test ban should not be seen as an end in itself but only as a means towards the ultimate goal of a nuclear-free world and that such a ban without the participation of China and France could not be truly effective. It pledged itself, however, to study carefully the results of the trilateral talks and to participate actively in the Committee's efforts to elaborate a treaty acceptable to all. In this connexion, it noted India's ceaseless efforts to bring a halt to nuclear testing and its participation in the Ad Hoc Group of seismological experts. It again stressed that India's nuclear energy programme was devoted exclusively to the peaceful uses of such energy and that it had not and did not intend to carry out any nuclear-weapon tests (CCD/PV.771 and 786). The delegation of India also stressed the importance India attached to the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty acceptable to all and welcomed the current trilateral talks (CCD/PV.786).

64. The delegation of Iran, stressing the importance of presenting a comprehensive test-ban treaty to the special session on disarmament, noted the temporary solution to the peaceful nuclear explosions problem provided by the new Soviet position. It was to be hoped that the negotiators in the trilateral talks, having taken responsibility for this issue, would soon submit an agreement to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament; otherwise, Iran would insist that discussion be brought to the multilateral forum (CCD/PV.778).

65. The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany (CCD/PV.771) and the delegation of Japan (CCD/PV.776) also welcomed the hopes expressed by the participants in the trilateral talks. Japan urged the early conclusion of consultations on both a best ban and chemical weapons so that the Committee could elaborate treaties on the subjects, holding that undue delay would create a general dissatisfaction that might discourage adherence to the future treaties. If unable to reach full agreement on key elements of a comprehensive test ban despite urgent efforts, the delegation suggested, the participants should declare, at the special session, a moratorium on nuclear test explosions including peaceful explosions, at least until a comprehensive treaty was achieved. They should also make a joint
declaration of intent to present the elements of such a full ban to the Committee at its summer session, at the latest. The delegation of the Netherlands held that any agreement on the subject should be of substantial duration, aiming at the cessation of tests for all time; the treaty should also be so designed as to encourage the adherence of as many non-nuclear-weapon States as possible (CCD/PV.779).

66. With regard to the drafts of test-ban treaties submitted to the Committee by the Soviet Union 15/ and Sweden, 16/ several socialist States members mentioned the Soviet draft as one of the principal contributions to a solution of the problem, while Sweden and several other countries referred, in particular, to the verification provisions of the Swedish draft.

67. On 16 March 1978, the delegation of the United Kingdom, speaking on behalf of all three States participating in the trilateral talks, reported to the Committee that substantial progress had been made towards agreement on a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests and a protocol covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes which would be an integral part of the treaty. A number of important points had already been agreed; and on some outstanding issues, the differences between the positions of the participants had narrowed. The three nuclear-weapon States were keenly aware of the great importance that the members of the General Assembly and the Committee attached to the earliest possible conclusion of a treaty and would continue their best efforts to complete the trilateral negotiations as soon as possible (CCD/PV.780).

68. The delegation of the United States, noting that the joint statement had been cautiously worded because of the critical stage of the negotiations, assured the Committee that the United States, for its part, was pressing strongly for an early test-ban agreement and believed its two negotiating partners were doing the same; it hoped, accordingly, to reach a point soon where the Conference could play an important role in the consideration of the agreement (CCD/PV.781). Similarly, the Soviet Union assured the Committee that the three participants were keenly aware of the great importance that the General Assembly and the Committee attached to the earliest possible conclusion of a test-ban treaty and that they would continue to exert their best efforts to that end (ibid.).

69. The delegation of the German Democratic Republic welcomed the news that substantial progress had been achieved in the trilateral negotiations on the comprehensive and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. An early successful conclusion of a treaty on the subject would considerably help to reduce the threat of nuclear war, and the security of all States would thus be strengthened. The delegation therefore hoped for such a conclusion, which should be followed by further agreements on a complete halt to the production of nuclear weapons (ibid.).

70. The delegation of Canada, noting its satisfaction with the progress achieved in the trilateral talks, stressed the importance of the Committee's contribution to the common tasks (CCD/PV.782).


16/ Ibid., document CCD/526/Rev.1.
71. The delegation of Sweden, noting that the statements of various representatives of the three Powers participating in the trilateral talks had been somewhat encouraging, but at the same time inadequate, stressed that the non-nuclear States had good reason to be impatient in the light of the continuing arms race and their experience with the past history of disarmament negotiations, as well as their insight into the test-ban problem. Again reminding the three States of General Assembly resolution 32/78, adopted with their support, the delegation queried whether the political will expressed in that resolution still existed. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden had recently stated that the three States had the responsibility to conclude their test-ban negotiations in time for the Committee to elaborate a draft treaty for submission to the General Assembly at its special session. That view was shared by many other Governments and the three States concerned must be aware that a full test ban was long overdue (CCD/PV.783).

72. The delegation of Ethiopia, noting its long-standing position to help achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control and welcoming the five treaties and conventions which had resulted from the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the important negotiations being undertaken, stressed that much remained to be done to achieve a comprehensive test ban (CCD/PV.786).

73. At the last meeting of the spring session, the Soviet delegation noted with satisfaction that some progress had been recently achieved in the negotiations and expressed the hope that the matter would be brought to completion and that a corresponding treaty would be signed in the near future which would contribute to an appreciable achievement in the struggle for peace and security. The delegation also hoped that the Ad Hoc Group of Seismological Experts would fulfil successfully also the new task entrusted to it, namely, the task of studying scientific and methodological principle of a possible testing of the global network of seismic stations which could be set up in the future for the purpose of international exchange of seismic data under a treaty banning all nuclear-weapon tests (CCD/PV.789).

74. The delegation of Yugoslavia recalled General Assembly resolution 32/78 and stated that the participants in the trilateral negotiations had not yet, even at the close of the spring session, submitted to the Conference their concrete results and proposals and that consequently the Committee had not been in a position to respond to the request formulated by the General Assembly, namely, that it commence with the elaboration of the text of a convention on a comprehensive nuclear test ban, with the greatest urgency (ibid.).

75. During the Committee's summer session many members, including the United States (CCD/PV.790), the Soviet Union (ibid.), Mexico (ibid.), Czechoslovakia (CCD/PV.792), Poland (CCD/PV.793), Sweden (ibid.), German Democratic Republic (CCD/PV.795), Egypt (ibid.), Iran (CCD/PV.796), Hungary (CCD/PV.797), Canada (CCD/PV.799), Netherlands (ibid.), Yugoslavia (ibid.), and Mongolia (CCD/PV.802) reiterated that they attached great importance to the solution of the problem of the prohibition of nuclear tests.

76. The Soviet Union said that, in order to attain this objective and to complete the tripartite negotiations, it had taken a number of specific steps to meet the positions of its partners in the negotiations and that it would continue to make every possible effort to make headway towards a solution of the question (CCD/PV.790 and 805).
77. Mexico, while expressing the hope that the three negotiating Powers would make a special effort to transmit to the Conference the preliminary draft of a treaty in time to allow the Committee to consider it thoroughly and submit it to the General Assembly at its thirty-third regular session, said that, should the three negotiating Powers consider it impossible to complete their preliminary draft in time, it would be advantageous to all parties concerned if the Conference were allowed to take cognizance of all those articles in the preliminary draft which had already been completed, provided that the remaining articles were also submitted to it as and when they were completed. Thus, the three nuclear-weapon Powers would have the benefit of the views of the members of the Group of 15, who, because of their impartiality, could perhaps help to provide some elements of conciliation or negotiation which might very well elude the three Powers, due to the fact that they were bound to concentrate too much on the interests of their respective military alliances (CCD/PV.790 and 798).

78. The delegation of Iran, noting that the trilateral negotiations were in their final stages, thought it might not be wise to undermine the progress made so far. While there was no question that nuclear testing could have ceased long ago, and the majority of States Members of the United Nations had voted innumerable times for such a cessation, under the circumstances when agreement on verification seemed near, it was preferable to await a complete treaty. The delegation explained that if a treaty with provision for adequate verification and the mechanisms for carrying it out could be agreed upon, there should be a much better chance of achieving a permanent accord. Although verification was the familiar sticking point, the delegation added, it appeared that the problems to be resolved were mostly of a technical nature and that agreement was really within reach. Given this situation, a progress report on this most vital and important subject before the Committee would have been preferable (CCD/PV.796).

79. At the Committee's meeting on 8 August, the delegation of the United Kingdom made a statement on behalf of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom about progress in the trilateral negotiations on a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests and its protocol covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The delegation recalled the joint statement of 16 March 1978 and said that, since then, negotiations had continued intensively. In reviewing the significant progress made in recent months, it stated that the three negotiating parties had agreed that the Treaty should establish a ban on any nuclear-weapon-test explosion in any environment, and that the provisions of a protocol, which would be an integral part of the Treaty, would apply to nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Reaching agreement on effective measures of verification was a complex process involving many technical issues. The three negotiating parties naturally wished to satisfy themselves that the Treaty would provide for adequate verification, and also that the provisions for verification would not go beyond what was required by the Treaty. The three parties believed that after a certain period the parties to the Treaty would wish to review its operation. The Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States were making every effort to achieve an agreement which would attract the widest possible international adherence. They were aware that the members of the Committee had a strong interest in the earliest completion of the negotiations. The present phase of the negotiations was producing results, and the three parties were pressing ahead as fast as they could (CCD/PV.798).

80. On 10 August, the delegation of Ethiopia made a statement on behalf of the Group of 15 in which it expressed the Group's deep concern and disappointment with
regard to the current status of the comprehensive test ban issue and regarding
some points of view put forward in the statement of 8 August by the United Kingdom
on behalf of the three negotiating parties. In the view of the Group of 15 the
elaboration of a draft treaty on a comprehensive test ban was the most urgent task
of the Committee. The Group also believed that it was necessary that the only
multilateral negotiating body on disarmament be informed without further delay about
the details of the substantive problems facing the negotiations. Members of the
Committee should be in a position to participate on an equal footing in the
negotiating process, including technical aspects. This would, among other things,
ensure the widest possible support for the draft treaty (CCD/PV.799).

81. The delegation of Bulgaria welcomed the joint statement of the USSR, the
United States and the United Kingdom on the trilateral negotiations and expressed
satisfaction that significant progress had been made in recent months in several
areas of the negotiations. The delegation also recalled the constructive proposals
made by the Soviet Union for removing the obstacles to the positive outcome of the
negotiations and expressed the hope that the other partners in the negotiations
would respond even more actively to the constructive approach of the Soviet
Union (ibid.).

82. Commenting on the joint statement, the delegation of the Netherlands
expressed gratification that the negotiating parties were making every effort to
achieve an agreement which would attract the widest possible international
adherence. The delegation emphasized that while it was of the greatest importance
that the nuclear-weapon States stop testing as soon as possible, it was also
important that a viable multilateral treaty be achieved, which would constitute,
inter alia, one more barrier against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The
delegation also noted with interest that the negotiating parties envisaged some
kind of review procedure and hoped that such a procedure would ensure that the
treaty would not cease to function automatically under certain conditions (ibid.).

83. Later during the summer session, the United Kingdom stated that, as a
nuclear-weapon State, it recognized and accepted that it had a special
responsibility to curb the so-called vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons.
It was making strenuous efforts towards that end, especially in its negotiations
with the United States and the Soviet Union on a comprehensive test-ban treaty,
the delegation added. The British Government remained determined to bring the
negotiations to an early and successful conclusion and was making every effort to
achieve the aim of a comprehensive test-ban treaty which contained adequate
verification provisions to give maximum confidence that parties would comply with
their obligations and which would attract the widest possible international
adherence. In the light of the substantial progress made in recent months, the
delegation believed such a treaty could be achieved soon (CCD/PV.801).

84. The delegation of Japan stated that whether or not a comprehensive test-ban
treaty could be achieved at an early date solely depended upon the political will
of the parties to the trilateral negotiations and requested that the three parties
to the negotiations should make the utmost effort to present to the Conference
the results of the current negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban. The
delegation appreciated the considerable efforts made by the parties to the
negotiations; but if the conclusion of the negotiations was not ready for the
current session, but would be ready at some time in autumn, the delegation would
be ready at any time to participate in the negotiations at the Conference (ibid.)
85. Nigeria stated that a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests still seemed to be far away, and that such a development was completely contrary to the prevailing mood of the General Assembly at its special session on disarmament. If a moratorium on nuclear testing had not been written into the final document of the session, it was, in the view of the delegation, due to the belief, at the time of the special session, that as a comprehensive test-ban treaty was around the corner, such a moratorium would not be needed. It seemed, however, that a comprehensive test-ban treaty might not in fact be around the corner, the delegation noted, and that in the interim the nuclear-weapon States might be persuaded to revise their position on important points of the negotiations on such a treaty. This was a rather disappointing beginning to developments following the special session, especially since it had been thought that the contradictory statement contained in the last two sentences of paragraph 51 of the final document would not be exploited. Accordingly, in a situation where one could not rely on self-restraint by the nuclear-weapon States, and particularly the leading nuclear-weapon States, the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty had become more urgent. The delegation, therefore, called for the implementation of the non-contradictory third sentence of paragraph 51 of the final document which had stated that the negotiations now in progress on "a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests, and a protocol covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, which would be an integral part of the treaty", should be concluded urgently and the result submitted for full consideration by the multilateral negotiating body with a view to the submission of a draft treaty to the General Assembly at the earliest possible date. Continuing, the delegation declared that it had expected more than a statement on the status of the trilateral negotiations; it had looked forward to the submission of the tripartite draft so as to start the Conference on the course expected after the commitment made at the special session. It, therefore, subscribed fully to the comment on the tripartite statement, made on behalf of the Group of 15, by the delegation of Ethiopia. The delegation noting that it was now too late to expect the submission of a draft to this session, suggested that the Committee on Disarmament should be given a birthday present of a draft comprehensive test-ban treaty, or that part of it on which work on the negotiations had advanced (ibid.).

86. The delegation of Mongolia expressed the view that the rapid conclusion of an agreement on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests would close off the main avenue for the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons. The recent tripartite declaration on the considerable progress made in agreeing on a number of questions had given rise to hopes for the successful outcome of the negotiations, so that an appropriate treaty might soon be concluded. The preparation and signature of such a treaty would undoubtedly serve as a useful basis for reaching agreement on conducting specific negotiations on the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons until they were completely eliminated, the delegation added (CCD/PV.802).

87. The Federal Republic of Germany welcomed the statement delivered by the United Kingdom on behalf of the three negotiating parties and hoped that it would be possible to overcome the remaining difficulties and to submit a joint initiative to the Committee soon. Such an initiative should be acceptable to both the nuclear-weapon States and all other States. The success of the work in the Committee would be measured, inter alia, by the number of States which would accede to the comprehensive test ban (ibid.).
88. Italy stated that the early conclusion of a treaty banning nuclear tests in all environments would have an even greater impact over future developments in the disarmament process. In this connexion it noted with satisfaction that the trilateral negotiations had continued unabated and that considerable effort and expertise were expended in trying to find viable and mutually acceptable solutions to the key issues concerning the comprehensive test-ban problem. The delegation added that it now looked forward to an early and successful completion of the trilateral talks so that multilateral negotiations on a widely acceptable agreement might be launched promptly (CCD/PV.804).

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89. Members of the Committee continued to devote attention to various issues arising in the context of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, namely, verification, the participation of nuclear-weapon States in the treaty and the question of peaceful nuclear explosions.

90. On the more general aspects of verification, the delegation of Mongolia continued to maintain that national detection devices, supplemented by international co-operation in an exchange of seismological data, should be sufficiently effective, particularly when also supplemented by the possibility of on-site verification, as proposed by the Soviet Union (CCD/PV.773).

91. The delegation of India was of the view that verification should not be rigid. Insistence on only one type of verification or a set of verification methods would only reduce the credibility of the principle of verification. Verification should be a judicious combination of national and international means. India's active participation in international co-operation in detection of seismic events, the delegation of India noted, dated back to as early as 1958. In the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Group of seismological experts set up in 1976, India had taken an active part (CCD/PV.786).

92. Noting that the Ad Hoc Group would soon submit to the Committee its final report, based upon its present mandate, the Swedish delegation urged an early Committee decision concerning the continuation of efforts to establish an international data exchange system. It welcomed an earlier suggestion by Japan that an 'experimental exercise' might be carried out, but cautioned that such an exercise should not delay the establishment of the international system, which should be fully operative by the time a comprehensive test-ban treaty entered into force. The delegation believed further that verification by non-seismic means, such as by on-site inspections or by satellite observation, should also be carried out with genuine international participation, such as the consultative committee proposed in the Swedish draft treaty on the subject. The consultative committee, it added, would play an advisory role, should meet fairly regularly and should maintain a close liaison with the international seismic data system (CCD/PV.767).

93. The delegation of Czechoslovakia stressed the importance of establishing, through close co-operation among selected national seismic stations, a world seismic network capable of contributing effectively to the verification of a nuclear-weapon test-ban agreement (CCD/PV.771). The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany also considered the establishment of such a system as a prerequisite for the elaboration of an effective treaty verification procedure (ibid.).
94. The delegation of Japan also held that the organization of international data exchanges would be the most important and valuable contribution that the Committee could make towards facilitating the early conclusion of a comprehensive test ban and praised the Ad Hoc Group for its intensive work. The delegation urged a continuation of its work through the conduct of experimental exercises and offered to host informal technical meetings of the experts to make preparations for them. While recognizing that the possible creation of an international verification organ, such as the consultative committee proposed by Sweden, might have to await the results of the trilateral negotiations on a test ban, the delegation stressed that preparations could be made now for the operation of the international data exchange system and that the proposed exercises could be carried out simultaneously with the trilateral talks so that the desired exchange system might become operative whenever the required political and legal decisions were made. In this way, the delegation concluded, the Committee would make a great contribution to the process of achieving a comprehensive test ban, and the data exchange system would also be useful for the supervision of a moratorium on nuclear tests (CCD/PV.776).

95. During formal consideration of the Ad Hoc Group's report (CCD/558) after its submission to the Committee on 9 March 1978, the delegation of Sweden reminded the Committee of its willingness to finance, establish and operate in Sweden an international data centre of the type proposed by the Group. The delegation added that it envisaged that, as part of the continued work of the Group, one data centre would be established and operated on a temporary basis, and Sweden was prepared to put such a temporary centre into operation in the course of 1978 at its own cost, assuming that the anticipated test-ban agreement involved a monitoring system. The delegation considered such experiments indispensable for the further elaboration of a monitoring system under a comprehensive test-ban treaty that would ensure full access to all relevant data to all parties to the treaty. The delegation also considered the report a valuable contribution to efforts to establish a monitoring system acceptable to all and expressed its appreciation for the work of all participants in the Group, both members of the Committee and non-members (CCD/PV.79). Sweden also submitted a working paper containing suggested terms of reference for the continued work of the Group (CCD/562).

96. The delegation of the Netherlands, sharing the Swedish view that treaty negotiations must be carried out by the international community as a whole, considered the results of the Ad Hoc Group not only satisfactory, but in a sense unique in that it proposed for the first time a system of international verification measures primarily directed towards nuclear-weapon States. The delegation hoped that more countries in the southern hemisphere would participate in the seismic system. It also wondered what kind of arrangements with the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) were necessary in order to use its telecommunications system. The delegation of the Netherlands also noted with great interest Sweden's offer to set up an international data centre, adding that the establishment of an international seismic system could bring additional benefits, such as observations of earthquakes to assist the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator and for scientific work. Expressing appreciation for the Group's work, the delegation also supported the Swedish proposal that the Group be given a new mandate and that a decision be taken by the Conference to plan the recommended tests so that the system could become operational as soon as possible after a test-ban agreement was reached (CCD/PV.779).

97. In reporting to the Committee on the status of the trilateral negotiations, the delegation of the United Kingdom, still speaking for all three participants,
added that they shared the widely held view that an international exchange of seismic data would play a major role in verification of compliance with the treaty. They considered that all parties to the treaty should have the right to participate and to receive seismic data provided by the international exchange, whether or not they contributed seismic stations to the global network. The three negotiating partners had actively participated in the work of the Ad Hoc Group of seismological experts and had carefully studied the report, to which experts from a substantial number of States had made valuable contributions. They agreed that the guidelines for setting up and running the international seismic exchange should be laid down in annex to the treaty, and that the detailed organizational and procedural arrangements for implementing the international exchange should be worked out after the entry into force of the treaty, drawing on the recommendations contained in the report. Speaking for the United Kingdom alone, the delegation also supported the Swedish proposal to continue the work of the Group in order to carry out its experimental exercise (CCD/PV.780).

98. The delegation of the Soviet Union hoped the Group's report would be valuable and useful and, while agreeing in principle to the conduct of an experimental exercise, considered it obvious that since the international network of seismographic stations was being set up in connexion with the tasks of verifying compliance with the treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, the exercise could in practice be carried out only after that treaty had been concluded and when it was known which principal States Parties would decide on the exercise and place their seismographic stations at the disposal of the global network. However, it might be useful to start preparatory work for such an exercise even before the treaty entered into force and that work could be undertaken by the Ad Hoc Group. The Committee might therefore consider the prolongation of the Group's work and the definition of a mandate in terms of principles and methods to be used for the possible experimental exercise (ibid.).

99. The delegation of the United States commended the report and supported its recommendations to conduct an experimental exercise, as well as the renewal of the Group's mandate to carry out preliminary preparations for such an exercise. It noted, however, that the Group's current mandate did not permit assessments of the adequacy of any system of international seismic data exchange. With particular regard to the statement of the Soviet delegation, the delegation stated that the tripartite agreement should not be interpreted as implying that the recommendation of the Group that they be authorized to carry out an experimental exercise should not be carried out now. The United States, for its part, would be prepared to extend the Group's mandate and join with others in the proposed exercise (CCD/PV.779, 780 and 789).

100. The delegations of Egypt (CCD/PV.782), the Federal Republic of Germany (CCD/PV.780), India (ibid.) and Italy (ibid.) also welcomed the report. The Federal Republic of Germany also supported the proposal to extend the Group's mandate and noted that its seismological centre in Graefenberg had proved its capability to co-operate in international seismic experiments. The delegation of India was particularly impressed that experts from 23 countries had reached consensus on the report and considered the timing opportune, as it came in the midst of the very active trilateral negotiations on a test-ban treaty and its significance had been recognized by the three participants. The delegation also observed that the report had rightly noted the weakness of the southern hemisphere in numbers of seismic stations. India was happy that it had several such stations. That fact clearly

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brought out the active participation that India had always had in the test-ban field since 1958, when the first group of seismological experts had met in Geneva. The Italian delegation expressed the view that the report had the merit of bringing out in a clear light a number of questions fundamental to the solution of the problem of verification. Italy supported the idea of planning an experimental exercise on the basic elements of the system of international co-operation to detect and identify seismic events proposed by the Group. The delegation of Egypt welcomed the report, particularly in so far as the Group found evidence of prospects for a further reduction of uncertainties and for narrowing the remaining areas of differences.

101. The delegation of Japan, urging early conclusion of a test-ban agreement, with negotiations in the Committee not later than the 1978 summer session, held that further work in the seismic field could constitute an accelerating factor in that process if the Committee proceeded promptly with the technical establishment of the recommended seismic data exchange system. To that end, the experimental exercise should be conducted, purely on a technical basis, even before the treaty came into force. If the exercise was delayed until after the entry into force of the treaty, as proposed by the Soviet Union, a complete verification system would not be able to function until over a year after that date, a delay which caused Japan real concern. Moreover, the delegation continued, since the Group had not been able to assess the adequacy of any proposed system, such adequacy would be assessed only by the parties to the treaty after its entry into force, and the experimental exercise would provide the necessary data for working out arrangements for a later international exchange of seismic data. As a possible compromise to meet the position of the Soviet Union, the delegation suggested that the Group first be requested to submit to the Committee a report on the preparatory stage of the proposed exercise, including a detailed programme of experimental testing. The Committee could then decide whether such testing could be carried out without giving rise to political difficulties and, if so, could request the Group to proceed with a second stage, which would in turn be approved by the Committee before the final evaluation. Lastly, the delegation confirmed its readiness to host an informal technical meeting of experts in Tokyo during 1978 (CCD/PV.781).

102. The delegation of Canada, observing that it fully supported the report, felt confident that an international exchange of seismic data could play an important role in a future test-ban treaty and saw a need to create a network for such an exchange, which the Group had indicated was technically feasible. Although not all countries had an equal capacity to monitor seismic events, an international network would put all parties on an equivalent footing in terms of the availability of data (CCD/PV.782).

103. The delegation of Egypt, also welcoming the report as a helpful contribution towards a verifiable test-ban, supported the conduct of the proposed experimental exercise and the draft terms of reference for the Group's future work submitted by Sweden. At the same time, the delegation observed that, however important agreements on verification procedures might be, it was important that negotiations on the treaty itself should not be allowed to drag on indefinitely (ibid.).

104. The delegation of Sweden expressed satisfaction that the three States participating in the trilateral talks had made it clear that they agreed that an international seismic data exchange would play a major role in verifying compliance with a nuclear test-ban treaty and that all parties to the treaty could have equal
rights to participate and receive the data provided. Confirming its support for the report of the Ad Hoc Group, the delegation held that the next obvious step was to obtain practical experience in setting up such a system and, to that end, Sweden had proposed a new mandate for the Group and hoped for an early decision so that it could resume its work at the beginning of the summer session. Noting that Canada, Egypt, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States of America had expressed support for the new mandate, the delegation shared the concern expressed by the Japanese delegation over the position of the Soviet Union that parties to the treaty should decide whether to conduct experimental testing. Holding that such a decision would mean that the treaty would lack its main instrument of verification for one year, the delegation also suggested that the proposed further work of the Group be carried out in two phases, beginning with a preparatory phase after which the Committee would consider the desirability of carrying out the actual experimental exercise. The delegation concluded that the outcome of the test-ban negotiations, including the renewal of the Group's mandate, would affect the possibilities for a multilateral negotiating body such as the Disarmament Committee to function constructively in the future (CCD/PV.763).

105. On 2 May 1978, when the Committee reviewed the mandate of the Group, the delegation of Japan stated that it had not prevented the consensus in order to allow the Group at least to go ahead with its preparatory work. But the delegation stressed that did not mean that it had changed its position that the experimental exercise should be executed as soon as the preparatory work by the Ad Hoc Group was completed, regardless of whether a comprehensive test-ban treaty had already come into force, and further, that it reserved its right to raise that point at the Conference at any time after the preparatory work of the Group was completed (CCD/PV.786).

106. At the summer session, the United States stated that, although the development of effective measures of verification, which would promote stability and mutual confidence among the participants in a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing, was an exceedingly detailed and technically complex process, steady progress continued to be made in the trilateral negotiations and, as soon as an agreement on the remaining unresolved issues had been reached, the Conference would be duly informed (CCD/PV.790).

107. On 15 August 1978, the Ad Hoc Group of seismological experts submitted a sixth progress report (CCD/576). In the report, the Group suggested, inter alia, that a representative of the WMO be invited by the Conference to participate informally in the work of the Group in relation to the transmission of data through the WMO communication network. The Group also established a draft agenda for its seventh and eighth sessions tentatively to be convened at the end of February and the end of April 1979, respectively. In particular, the Group suggested, subject to approval by the Conference, to hold its seventh session from 19 February to 2 March 1979. Subsequently, the Conference took note of the progress report; agreed that the work of the Group should be continued; decided to include the report in the Committee's report to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session; agreed to invite a representative of the WMO to participate informally in the work of the Group; and expressed the hope that the above-mentioned arrangements would be continued under the Committee on Disarmament, the future negotiating body.

108. The delegation of Japan, commenting once again on the subject, stated that it was important that, in addition to the political decisions by the nuclear-weapon
States on a comprehensive test ban, an international seismological data exchange system, as well as national means including a mutually agreed establishment of "black-boxes", should be promptly established. This would be one of the means to verify objectively whether or not obligations under a comprehensive test-ban treaty, based upon such political decisions, were fully complied with. By having sent experts to the meetings of the Conference ever since the first meeting of the Ad Hoc Group of seismological experts, Japan had made positive contributions to the works of this Group, the delegation noted. As it had often stated, the delegation believed it necessary to conduct, without delay, experimental exercises to complete the seismological data exchange system. According to the Group's report (CCD/558), in addition to at least six months needed for preparatory work, approximately one year would be required for the execution and evaluation of the experimental exercise. It was therefore imperative for the successful conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and for its implementation that the work of the Group be transmitted without delay to the new negotiating body (CCD/PV.801).

109. The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany welcomed the new report by the Ad Hoc Group and noted that the Group, under its current mandate, would have to prepare a practical test run of the seismic data exchange. The delegation considered it important that those preparations be carried out without delay. It also reaffirmed that the Federal Republic would continue to support all efforts designed to develop a system for comprehensive test-ban verification and that its seismological centre in Graefenberg would actively contribute to preparations for such verification (CCD/PV.802).

110. The Italian delegation welcomed the adoption of the recommendations, contained in the new progress report of the Group and expressed confidence that the Committee on Disarmament would endorse those recommendations and that the Group would be able to conclude its important work within the allotted time, in order to assist the Committee in its deliberations over the crucial issue of verification and control of a comprehensive test ban (CCD/PV.804).

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111. With respect to the question of participation of nuclear-weapon States in a future treaty, the delegation of Poland (CCD/PV.768), Hungary (CCD/PV.770), Czechoslovakia (CCD/PV.771), Bulgaria (CCD/PV.772), Mongolia (CCD/PV.773) and the German Democratic Republic (CCD/PV.775), while welcoming progress in the trilateral negotiations on the subject, pointed out that, whereas the prospective agreement of the three nuclear-weapon States was of considerable significance, such an agreement would, in fact, constitute only a further step towards a general and complete test ban with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States. Poland further stressed that it was generally recognized that any long-term objectives of such a comprehensive treaty could be secured only with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States.

112. Pronouncing itself on this subject, the delegation of India also declared that a comprehensive test ban should not be perceived as an end in itself but only as a means towards the final goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and that such a ban could not be truly effective without the participation of China and France (CCD/PV.771).
113. Later in the session, the Soviet Union reiterated that it was essential that nuclear tests should be completely halted in all media and by all those who conducted them (CCD/PV.790). Similarly, Poland stressed that the long-term effectiveness of the future test-ban treaty - as, indeed, of any multilateral agreement in the area of arms limitation and disarmament - would be largely impaired without explicit and universal support, in the first place the support of all the nuclear-weapon Powers and of other militarily important States (CCD/PV.793). Hungary also underlined the crucial importance of adherence to a test-ban treaty by all nuclear-weapon Powers and militarily significant States. Such a position, it emphasized, fully corresponded to the principle of the universality of disarmament agreements and was relevant to other treaties under consideration as well (CCD/PV.797).

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114. With particular regard to the treatment of the question of peaceful nuclear explosions in the context of a nuclear-weapon test ban, the delegation of Japan, holding that peaceful explosive devices were indistinguishable from nuclear devices used for military purposes, proposed that the following should be provided in a comprehensive test-ban treaty: "Any State Party to the Treaty shall not conduct any nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes unless agreement is reached on appropriate international supervision and procedures which will ensure that no weapons-testing can be carried out under the guise of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes" and "The States Parties to this Treaty shall undertake to continue in good faith negotiations on the appropriate international supervision and procedures referred to above, and shall make a periodic review of their achievements" (CCD/PV.776 and 801).

115. The United States continued to advocate the prohibition of all nuclear-explosive devices (CCD/PV.767). The Netherlands also believed that the treaty should prohibit nuclear-explosion activities for any purpose (CCD/PV.779).

"Nuclear neutron weapon" or "Reduced blast and enhanced radiation weapon"

116. Early in the Committee's 1978 spring session, the USSR and other socialist States members proposed the specific prohibition of the neutron bomb as a particularly inhumane weapon of mass destruction. The United States and a number of other members did not accept the definition of that weapon as a new weapon of mass destruction.

117. In proposing the mutual renunciation of production of such bombs, the delegation of the Soviet Union held that the cause of world peace was threatened by the emergence of the new and inhumane weapon and that it was particularly dangerous because it was being described as a "tactical" and "harmless" weapon. Such a position tended to efface the dividing line between conventional and nuclear weapons, making use of the latter weapons more likely. The delegation stated that the position of the Soviet Union on that matter had been clearly expressed as follows by Mr. L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR:

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"The Soviet Union is decisively against the development of a neutron bomb ... but if this bomb is developed in the West - developed against us, which no one even attempts to conceal - then it should be clearly understood that the USSR will not stand by as a passive observer. We shall be faced with the necessity of meeting this challenge in order to ensure the security of the Soviet people and its allies and friends. In the last analysis all this will raise the arms race to an even more dangerous level. We do not wish this to happen and therefore we propose that agreement be reached on the mutual renunciation of the production of the neutron bomb so as to save the world from the emergence of this new weapon of mass destruction of human beings. Such is our sincere desire, such is our proposal to the Western Powers."

The delegation urged the Western countries to treat the Soviet proposal with all seriousness and responsibility (CCD/PV.767). The Soviet position on banning the neutron bomb was strongly supported by Poland (CCD/PV.768 and 783), Hungary (CCD/PV.770 and 783), Czechoslovakia (CCD/PV.771), Bulgaria (CCD/PV.772), Mongolia (CCD/PV.773) and the German Democratic Republic (CCD/PV.775 and 783).

118. India believed it was equally urgent to ban development and deployment of new weapons or systems based on existing and available knowledge and principles of science and technology. Thus India believed that the development and deployment of the new weapon called the "neutron bomb" or the "reduced blast and enhanced radiation" bomb should be banned. Any development which would lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons should be strongly resisted (CCD/PV.771). The delegation of Ethiopia thought that, unless measures were taken to avert the trend towards production and deployment of the neutron bomb, the arms race might be intensified and the ongoing disarmament negotiations jeopardized. It was in that vein that the delegation viewed the concern expressed by many delegations in connexion with the production and deployment of the neutron bomb (CCD/PV.786).

119. Among the principal arguments put forward in favour of such a ban by the socialist States were the following: (a) the neutron bomb was an indiscriminate and particularly cruel weapon of mass destruction, which could be used offensively as well as defensively and, eventually, strategically as well as tactically; (b) deployment of such weapons in Europe would be incompatible with détente and the spirit of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and would impede disarmament negotiations in other forums; (c) its development and deployment would result in countermeasures, thus escalating the arms race to a new and more dangerous level without any military or security advantages to either side; (d) the deployment in Europe of supposedly "clean" tactical nuclear weapons would lower the threshold of nuclear conflict; (e) the neutron bomb was not "clean" and, on the contrary, would produce persistent radioactive fallout; and (f) introduction of the bomb would have a destabilizing effect on the current politico-military situation and on disarmament negotiations. Mongolia spoke of the special responsibility of all members of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and called for more action in the matter of the neutron bomb by certain States of Western Europe in order not to violate the principle of equal security and alter the existing military and strategic balance.

120. On 9 March 1978 the delegation of the Soviet Union on its behalf, and on behalf of the delegations of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and Romania, submitted for consideration of the Committee
a draft convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons (CCD/559). In introducing the draft, the delegation of the Soviet Union stressed the view that the neutron bomb was on a par with such cruel and barbaric weapons as biological and chemical weapons, but that its true nature was being concealed. The explosion of one neutron bomb, it maintained, was equivalent in destructive power and unfavourable genetic effects to some dozens of traditional nuclear weapons of a similar yield. The delegation again emphasized that it was easier to prevent emergence of a new weapon than to ban it once it was in the arsenals of the States and held that a decision to produce and deploy neutron bombs would be as significant as the earlier decision to develop the hydrogen bomb. With particular regard to the draft convention, the delegation urged immediate joint work on the preparation of an agreed text as another major contribution towards limiting nuclear arms and saving mankind from the threat of nuclear war (CCD/PV.778 and 782).

121. In rejecting the Soviet draft convention banning what the Soviet Union had called nuclear neutron weapons, the delegation of the United States charged the USSR with engaging in a propaganda campaign which focused on a single aspect of the dangerous confrontation of conventional forces and nuclear weapons deployed in Europe and with attempting to divert the Committee's attention from serious attempts to develop arms control agreements that would contribute to international security. The United States delegation explained, in plain talk, that the reduced blast and enhanced radiation weapon was a nuclear weapon and, as such, a weapon of mass destruction specifically mentioned in the United Nations 1948 definition of mass destruction weapons. Neither the scientific principles underlying the reduced blast and enhanced radiation weapon nor the concepts of their application were new, the delegation pointed out, and therefore, it should be discussed in the context of limitations on nuclear weapons, not new weapons of mass destruction. The delegation also explained that, in the light of the three-to-one tank advantage enjoyed by the Warsaw Treaty in Central Europe, the reduced blast and enhanced radiation weapon was being considered as defence against a possible massive tank attack in that theatre, by emitting a higher proportion of its total energy as prompt radiation than did the tactical nuclear weapons presently deployed, it would be effective against hostile forces, such as tanks, while greatly reducing the extent of damage caused by blast, heat and fallout outside the target area. It would, therefore, strengthen deterrence. The delegation categorically rejected the contention that if the reduced blast and enhanced radiation weapon were deployed it would become easier to cross the nuclear threshold in case of war. It was also pointed out that no decision had as yet been made regarding either the production or deployment of the weapon. The delegation reiterated the hope expressed by the President of the United States of America that the Soviet Union would agree to begin addressing the whole question of tactical, or theatre, nuclear weapons in Europe, including reduced blast and enhanced radiation weapons and the SS-20. Several thousand tactical nuclear weapons were already deployed in Central Europe on both sides, the delegation pointed out, and it was only appropriate to address this issue in its entirety rather than one weapon at a time (CCD/PV.778).

122. The delegation of the United Kingdom stated that the United Kingdom Government considered that the highest priority should be given to nuclear disarmament. The draft programme of action for the special session on disarmament (CCD/549), of which the United Kingdom was a sponsor, called for the halting and reversal of the nuclear arms race. The delegation therefore regretted that the Soviet Union had
made a one-sided propaganda attack on enhanced radiation weapons, whilst going ahead with the deployment of devastating new weapons systems of its own. The delegation considered that the reputation of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament as a serious expert body should be carefully preserved. The delegation hoped that, instead of hearing any more of the draft convention proposed by the Soviet Union and its allies, the Committee should be getting from them serious proposals for balanced and realistic steps towards the control of the nuclear arms race (CCD/PV.779).

123. The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany expressed similar views, stressing that the Soviet Union, while mounting a propaganda attack against enhanced radiation weapons, was going ahead with the deployment of its far more deadly SS-20; the delegation also held that the new bomb had been developed for defence use against military targets, such as tank forces, that only an aggressor would have to fear its use and that it could not accept the singling out of one weapon in a one-sided manner without putting it in its proper context of the East-West balance of military forces.

124. The draft convention to prohibit the bomb was vigorously supported by Mongolia (CCD/PV.773, 783 and 802), Bulgaria (CCD/PV.774), Czechoslovakia (CCD/PV.775 and 785), the German Democratic Republic (CCD/PV.775 and 781), Hungary (CCD/PV.783) and Poland (ibid.). In addition to arguments previously put forward against deployment of the bomb, Bulgaria held that the draft convention was in accordance with the spirit of General Assembly decisions on the prohibition of new weapons of mass destruction and with world opinion. The German Democratic Republic held that the draft convention provided for equal obligations for all parties with no unilateral advantages for anyone. In reply to charges that the Soviet Union possessed more dangerous weapons, the delegation maintained that there was an approximate military balance in Europe and the deployment of the neutron bomb represented an attempt to upset that balance to the unilateral advantage of the West. The German Democratic Republic delegation stated that the neutron nuclear weapon was a weapon par excellence for the aggressor who had the intention to conquer intact towns and industrial centres of another country. It also stressed that deploying that cruel weapon in the European States of NATO, including a neighbouring State of the German Democratic Republic, would constitute an open threat to the physical existence of the people of the German Democratic Republic. Mongolia emphasized that in submitting the draft convention, the socialist States members of the Committee were guided by a sincere desire to contribute to the halting of the arms race, particularly in the field of means of mass destruction of people, for they were deeply aware of the danger which nuclear neutron weapons presented to peace and international security.

125. Hungary held that the declared aim of deployment of the bomb was to change the balance of conventional forces in Europe and that its deployment would be an attempt to create a direct link between the conventional and the nuclear phase of military conflict. Hungary believed that criticism of the slow progress of nuclear disarmament, in disregard of article VI of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, might increase if the neutron bomb was deployed and that near-nuclear States might be tempted to develop such a usable nuclear weapon.

126. Poland agreed that such deployment might have an impact on the non-proliferation régime. Bulgaria and Poland stressed that the Committee on Disarmament was the appropriate place to discuss the problem. Poland added that the neutron bomb could not be considered as a "bargaining chip" in another disarmament forum. Bulgaria
urged that Committee discussions on the question begin without delay so that a new disarmament measure, filling a threatening gap in the field, might be submitted to the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. Hungary expressed the view that besides the harmful and dangerous consequences of the eventual deployment of the neutron weapon, it had also become clear that the weapon would not offer lasting advantages for those who were pressing for a decision on its production and deployment. There was, therefore, no doubt that attempts would be made to use the weapon as a "bargaining chip" at arms limitation and disarmament talks and to increase economic and political pressures on other countries. For those reasons, the Committee should conduct urgent negotiations on the mutual prohibition of the neutron weapon. Poland observed that, whether or not the neutron bomb was based on a new scientific principle, it was a new weapon of mass destruction and the Committee was duty-bound to seek to prevent its emergence, as it had banned the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the sea-bed and the hostile use of environmental modification techniques. Czechoslovakia described several characteristics of the neutron weapon, clearly indicating that it was a new weapon of mass destruction and an offensive weapon that might be used especially for the suppression of national liberation movements in local conflicts in any part of the world (CCD/PV.785).

127. The delegation of Egypt also referred favourably to the draft convention of the socialist States members, holding that recent developments in the production of new weapons of mass destruction had already cast a shadow over the Committee's present session, as well as over arms control negotiations outside the Committee. The delegation considered those developments particularly alarming since they had taken place after the Committee had begun serious efforts to achieve a ban on all weapons of mass destruction (CCD/PV.782).

128. The delegation of the Netherlands said that its Government shared many of the concerns and doubts which had been expressed with respect to the enhanced radiation and reduced blast weapon, also called the neutron bomb. The debate on the weapon could be welcomed in so far as it focused the Committee's attention again on the place and role of nuclear weapons in the security system. The Committee should, however, accept the facts as they really were and not indulge in disregarding the complexities of the problems involved. The Netherlands Government would whole-heartedly welcome a situation in which it would be possible to prevent the introduction of the enhanced radiation and reduced blast weapon. That implied that all aspects of the balance of forces should be taken into account, the Netherlands delegation concluded (CCD/PV.783).

129. Later in the course of the spring session, the delegation of the Soviet Union stated that, should its new initiative be implemented, all States of the world would be on the winning side. The delegation decisively rejected attempts aimed at justifying the development and deployment of neutron weapons based on references to changes in the military balance of forces in Europe. Those efforts, the Soviet delegation stressed, were groundless because, as it had been recently clarified once again at the most authoritative level in the Soviet Union, the USSR had not been enlarging its armed forces in Central Europe for a long time and did not intend to increase them in the future by a single soldier or by a single tank. Having noted the statement by the United States to the effect that it had put off a decision on the manufacture of nuclear neutron weapons, the Soviet delegation noted that, in that connexion, the Soviet Union had also expressed its intention not to begin production of neutron weapons if the United States did not produce it. It also held that this created the necessary prerequisites for the fruitful examination
of the question of the prohibition of nuclear neutron weapons in the Committee (CCD/PV.789).

130. The delegation of Yugoslavia stressed that it had always determinedly upheld the prohibition of all types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, including the nuclear neutron weapon or reduced blast and enhanced radiation weapon. The production of such weapons could only give added impetus to the nuclear arms race and thus take the world even farther from the ultimate goal it was striving for, namely general and complete disarmament under strict international control. In the opinion of the Yugoslav delegation, the solution of problems concerning the maintenance of international peace and security on a durable basis could not be sought by creating new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, but primarily by taking vigorous measures for disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament (ibid.).

131. In the course of the summer session of the Committee on Disarmament, the delegation of the Soviet Union, touching upon the question of the prohibition of nuclear neutron weapons, noted that the presentation to the Committee, on 9 March 1978, of a draft convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons by eight socialist countries had been dictated by the desire to prevent the opening up of a new channel in the arms race. The conclusion of an international agreement on that question would demonstrate most vividly the sincere desire of all States to follow the path of scoring real successes in the field of disarmament. As for the Soviet Union, it intended to keep to its statement that it would not start the development of neutron weapons as long as the United States did the same.

132. The Soviet delegation called upon the United States and other Western countries to proceed, without delay, to negotiations for the purpose of a complete and unconditional renunciation of the development and deployment of nuclear neutron weapons (CCD/PV.800).

133. During the session, the Soviet Union (CCD/PV.790), Czechoslovakia (CCD/PV.792), Poland (CCD/PV.793), Bulgaria (CCD/PV.794), the German Democratic Republic (CCD/PV.795 and 801), Hungary (CCD/PV.797) and Mongolia (CCD/PV.802) renewed their call for the conclusion of a convention on the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of neutron nuclear weapons. Any further delay in this matter, the Soviet Union held, was fraught with very serious consequences for the cessation of the arms race and for the cause of disarmament in general. If the neutron weapon was not prohibited, a channel for another spiral in the arms race would be opened. Expressing a similar view, the delegation of Hungary stated that its sense of urgency regarding the question was heightened by the reported preparation for the production and deployment of the neutron weapons. His delegation urged a constructive discussion on the draft convention submitted by eight socialist States during the spring session.

134. Sweden stated that the neutron weapon was a sophisticated nuclear weapon which might very well lower the nuclear threshold and that a decision to refrain from the production of the neutron weapon at this stage should be welcomed as an important unilateral contribution to the constraining of the qualitative arms race. In this same context, Sweden referred to the Soviet missile SS-20 as an example of the apparently continuing development of nuclear intermediate and medium-range missiles, which caused deep international concern because, if deterrence failed, those missiles would be as lethal a threat to Europe as the strategic
intercontinental weapons were to the territories of the super-Powers. Both the neutron weapon and the SS-20, Sweden said, formed concrete arms race factors, because of the nature of the political and military interaction between the leading Powers and the military blocs (CCD/PV.793).

135. The United Kingdom observed that nuclear warheads with yields of less than one kiloton - sometimes called "mininukes" - had been known about for years, as had the principles of nuclear warheads with tailored effects, including enhanced radiation warheads (ERWs). None of them represented a radically new or futuristic weapon. Nor, the delegation noted, should attention be diverted by reference to size or the arrangement of their effects from the fact that they were nuclear weapons. They produced the same destructive results as other nuclear weapons, the delegation pointed out. In its view, the value of nuclear weapons would continue to be assessed primarily in their utility, unused, as instruments of deterrence and not of fighting wars (CCD/PV.801).

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

136. During the 1978 session several delegations once again referred to the question of the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The delegation of Romania pointed out that the objective of preventing such proliferation could be achieved only by eliminating the cause of the danger of proliferation and, in particular, by destroying existing nuclear weapons and at the same time taking decisive measures for nuclear disarmament (CCD/PV.768).

137. With regard to the question of non-proliferation, the United States announced that on 10 March 1978 President Carter had signed into law the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. The delegation stated that this was an attempt to balance concern over the dangers of nuclear proliferation with the important need for nuclear power to meet energy demands throughout the world. The delegation stated that the Act provided for a system of controls and incentives to give the world time to improve and strengthen mechanisms which would safeguard against misuse of nuclear energy technology by emphasizing the importance of fuel cycle safeguards as a condition for continued United States co-operation with non-nuclear-weapon States. One of the ways the Act did so, the delegation pointed out, was by exercising positive control - in the long term - over the retransfer and reprocessing of materials produced through any transferred sensitive nuclear exports from the United States. The United States also re-emphasized its commitment to make every reasonable effort to assure that the benefits of nuclear energy were available to all (CCD/PV.781).

138. The delegation of Sweden also noted that nuclear disarmament was crucial in the battle against nuclear-weapon proliferation and that the main reason for the lack of universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was the fact that the major nuclear States had not accepted the full consequences of that Treaty (CCD/PV.767).

139. The delegation of Nigeria, referring to the issue of non-proliferation, observed that a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty would be a more persuasive argument for wider adherence to the non-proliferation Treaty than verbal appeals. A comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, the delegation held, would be the first positive indication that the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty intended to implement Article VI, which provided for effective measures relating to the
cessation of the nuclear arms race (CCD/PV.769). The delegation of Hungary expressed similar views with respect to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (CCD/PV.770).

140. With regard to the possible adverse effect on the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime resulting from the delay in the trilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test ban, the delegation of Japan stated that at the special session of the Assembly on disarmament many non-nuclear-weapon States would criticize the delay as indicating a lack of effort on the part of the nuclear-weapon States in the field of nuclear disarmament and there was a danger that such delay would lead to the erosion of the non-proliferation régime and thus encourage, perhaps, further horizontal nuclear proliferation (CCD/PV.776).

141. Following the special session of the Assembly on disarmament, the Soviet Union made further comments on the question of non-proliferation. Recalling that 10 years had elapsed since the signing of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Soviet Union said that this Treaty had played and continued to play a positive role in the solution of the problem of non-proliferation and that it must be constantly strengthened and made truly universal in order to block avenues for the emergence of nuclear weapons in those States which did not yet possess them. In this context, the task of preventing the emergence of nuclear weapons in the hands of the Republic of South Africa and Israel was of primary importance. As for the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, the Soviet Union advocated broad international co-operation in this sphere and was ready to share experience and scientific and technological knowledge in the field of modern nuclear technology. It was, however, important to prevent nuclear exports from becoming a channel for the proliferation of nuclear weapons (CCD/PV.790).

142. Furthermore, the Soviet Union stated that in recognizing the need to ensure the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime by a large number of States, including the non-nuclear-weapon States, it took into account the wishes expressed by other countries in that respect. Those wishes concerned, first of all, the consolidation of security guarantees. The Soviet Union had declared at the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament that it would never use nuclear weapons against those States which had renounced the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and did not have them on their territory. The USSR had also declared that it was ready to conclude an appropriate bilateral agreement with any of the non-nuclear-weapon States to that effect. At the same time, the Soviet Union had called upon all the other nuclear-weapon Powers to follow its example and assume similar obligations. The Soviet delegation expressed the hope that such a measure would ensure the most active and broadest participation of States in strengthening the non-proliferation régime.

143. Also, the Soviet Union saw the question of strengthening the nuclear-weapon non-proliferation régime as being directly linked with another no less pressing issue – that of the non-deployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present. In this connexion, it held that States which had no nuclear weapons should undertake to prevent the emergence of nuclear charges on their territory, while the nuclear-weapon Powers, in turn, should promise not to emplace nuclear weapons – nuclear warheads, bombs, shells and mines – in those countries where there were no such weapons at present. Such a step, by itself, would be an important measure preventing any possible destabilization of the strategic situation, provided it would apply to any non-nuclear weapon State on whose territory there were no nuclear weapons at
present and regardless of whether a particular nuclear-weapon Power was or was not an ally of that State. The Soviet Union declared its readiness to assume such an obligation and called upon other nuclear-weapon Powers to do the same. Agreement in principle among the nuclear-weapon Powers on that point would make it possible for them to hold an exchange of views on the form such an obligation should take.

144. Poland found it particularly disturbing that only about two thirds of the States Members of the United Nations had so far deemed it in their best national interest to become parties to the Treaty and hoped that this situation would not continue indefinitely. In its view, the universalization of the Treaty as well as an enhanced efficacy of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards systems were important prerequisites for the setting up of a workable barrier against the spread of military nuclear potential, especially to some of the world's most troubled areas (CCD/PV.793). Similarly, Bulgaria recalled that the non-proliferation Treaty was still not adhered to by nearly 50 State Members of the United Nations, including some of the members of the Conference, the organ that had elaborated this major treaty (CCD/PV.794).

145. The delegation of Egypt stated that the achievement of the goal of non-proliferation was a national aspiration for Egypt, and that the frightening prospect of the acquisition of nuclear armaments by the racist régime in South Africa and the Government of Israel made it imperative for Egypt to spare no effort to prevent such developments and to ensure that the non-proliferation Treaty would become universally binding (CCD/PV.795).

146. Hungary expressed its support for the Soviet proposal regarding the non-deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of States where there were no such weapons at present and described it as a valuable addition to the non-proliferation Treaty régime and to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. In that connexion, the delegation emphasized again the importance its Government attached to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and in the first instance, to the consolidation of the non-proliferation Treaty régime (CCD/PV.797).

147. Canada pointed out that at the special session of the Assembly on disarmament it had also stressed its concern that the international non-proliferation system must be strengthened. At the same time, subject to the conditions of that objective, it had been made abundantly clear that Canada accepted its share of responsibility to ensure that nuclear energy would increasingly help to satisfy the international community's insatiable hunger for energy (CCD/PV.799).

148. The delegation of the United Kingdom expressed the hope that more States would seriously and urgently consider acceding to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. But some States had reasons of their own for not doing so, the delegation noted. It urged them to renounce nuclear weapons in other ways - in particular by accepting the International Atomic Energy Agency full-scope safeguards on their nuclear facilities. The delegation also considered it appropriate for nuclear-weapon States to accept Agency safeguards on civil nuclear facilities as the United Kingdom, the United States and France had done. The agreement between the United Kingdom and the Agency had, in fact, come into force on 14 August 1978, the delegation pointed out (CCD/PV.801).

149. The delegation of Japan stated that it had repeatedly appealed to China, France and other non-nuclear-weapon States, which were not parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, to accede to it at an early date in order to strengthen the non-proliferation régime (ibid.)
150. The Mongolian delegation also supported the view that the acceptance by all nuclear-weapon Powers of the obligation not to deploy nuclear weapons in countries where there are no such weapons at present, and not to use nuclear weapons against States which refrain from the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and have no nuclear weapons on their own territory, would serve the cause of reducing the threat of nuclear war, strengthen guarantees for the security of non-nuclear-weapon States and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this connexion, the Mongolian delegation stressed the fact that not all nuclear-weapon Powers and not all the so-called semi-nuclear States were parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and underscored, therefore, the necessity for further strengthening the effective implementation of that international instrument and the Agency system of safeguards (CCD/PV.802).

151. Italy stressed that the non-proliferation Treaty represented the basic instrument in the pursuit of efforts to halt both vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. It, therefore, regretted that the final document of the special session on disarmament had not placed enough emphasis on the importance and role of that instrument, to which a large majority of States was already committed. The delegation reaffirmed its conviction that universal adherence to the non-proliferation Treaty should be actively encouraged and that all States should be urged to ratify the Treaty or at least to abide by its provisions and objectives. The delegation also stressed that parallel efforts should be undertaken by nuclear-weapon States, in view of their obligations under article VI of the Treaty. With respect to the over-all system of non-proliferation, the delegation further emphasized that substantive and timely measures should be devised in order to guarantee to all States - as provided by article IV - the exercise of their inalienable right regarding research production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the enjoyment of the benefits thereof, under a system of appropriate internationally agreed safeguards and through increased international co-operation (CCD/PV.804).

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

152. Some members also commented on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones. On 27 April 1978, the delegation of Mexico welcomed the Soviet Union's announcement of 25 April that it would adhere to Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco (CCD/PV.785). The delegation of Ethiopia stressed its support for the Declaration on the denuclearization of Africa and for the Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace and urged the nuclear States to refrain from assisting South Africa (CCD/PV.786).

153. The Soviet Union stressed that it was essential to support in every way the desire of States not to allow the emplacement of nuclear weapons in certain geographical areas and it was in accordance with this principle that it had signed Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The USSR proceeded from the premise that the status of that nuclear-weapon-free zone would also be respected by other nuclear-weapon countries, and that its participants would ensure a genuinely nuclear-weapon-free régime in that zone. The Soviet Union would henceforth take such a line with regard to the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions of the world, on the understanding that such zones would be truly nuclear-weapon-free (CCD/PV.790).
154. Mexico recalled the provisions on nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Programme of Action of the final document as adopted by the General Assembly at its special session on disarmament and stressed that it was the first time that the Assembly had found it possible to adopt by consensus provisions such as those contained therein, i.e. provisions which were not subject to any limitations or more or less arbitrary conditions and requirements (ibid.).

155. Egypt stated that the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East was a matter of special concern to it and regretted that this cherished goal was unfortunately frustrated by the single dissenting position of Israel, which not only blocked the establishment of the zone but also refused to be bound by the non-proliferation Treaty or to subject its nuclear activities to the safeguard system of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The special session on disarmament, in its final document, had recognized that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would be especially desirable because it would greatly enhance international peace and security. Pending the establishment of such a zone, the Assembly had recommended that States of the region should solemnly declare that they would refrain on a reciprocal basis from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices, and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party and agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards (CCD/PV.795).

156. The delegation of Iran observed that one of the positive elements of the Programme of Action in the final document of the special session was the agreement on the relevance of nuclear-weapon-free zones as an important measure of nuclear disarmament. In view of the position which the delegations had consistently taken regarding the obligations of the nuclear-weapon States towards nuclear-weapon-free zones, it was satisfied with the undertakings the nuclear powers were asked to give. It was a significant step forward to have included those obligations in a consensus document. The specific reference to a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East was particularly gratifying, the delegation of Iran noted, as was the endorsement of the proposed preliminary declarations which the States of the area should make. Furthermore, the suggestion that the Security Council might be given a role in the implementation of this measure could also help to launch this initiative, the delegation added (CCD/PV.796).
B. Non-nuclear measures

Question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons

157. In its resolution 32/77, the General Assembly, inter alia, requested the Committee to continue negotiations and, as a matter of high priority, to undertake the elaboration of an agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production, and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and for their destruction, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives submitted for its consideration. In accordance with that resolution, the Committee continued its consideration of the question of the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction, and most members stressed the importance and urgency they attached to the matter as a priority issue before the Committee.

158. The Soviet Union reminded the Committee that it had long advocated a complete and radical solution of the problem of both biological and chemical weapons. It advocated that an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons should provide simultaneously for the renunciation of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, as well as for the destruction of all stockpiling of such weapons; only such a fundamental solution of the problem could finally and entirely eliminate the threat of the use of chemical means of warfare and place on an equal footing all countries, whether or not they possessed that type of weapon (CCD/PV.767).

159. The United States stated its belief that a chemical weapons convention would directly engage any country with a modern chemical industry and post new challenges in the area of verification. These challenges, the delegation said, created an opportunity to work out innovative forms of international co-operation which, in turn, could build the confidence of States parties that the future convention was being fully complied with by others and lead to further general confidence which would enable active pursuit of broader multilateral disarmament measures in the years ahead. The United States provided assurance that it was making every effort to reach agreement on a joint initiative at an early date (ibid.).

160. While urging the Committee to start negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, the Romanian delegation regarded a ban in this field as a stage in the long-term process of general and complete disarmament. It also stated that the importance of the prohibition of chemical weapons should be evaluated in a clear-sighted manner, in relation to the present dynamics of slowing down and halting the arms race (CCD/PV.766).

161. In reviewing the current situation, the Soviet Union pointed out that very useful and extensive preparatory work on the prohibition of chemical weapons had been carried out in the Committee. The delegation mentioned in that connexion the great number of working documents submitted on the subject by member States as well as non-member States, and the three draft conventions on the subject now before the Committee. It further stressed that the Committee had not only persistently pursued the goal of a chemical weapons ban, but had intensified its efforts to achieve progress in that respect. The delegation concluded that the necessary prerequisites for the Committee's further productive work had been created in the current bilateral Soviet-American negotiations aimed at preparing a joint initiative on the subject in the Committee (CCD/PV.761). The delegation of Ethiopia observed that much remained to be done to achieve a ban on chemical weapons (CCD/PV.766).
162. At the beginning of the 1978 session, the Soviet Union and the United States informed the Committee that bilateral negotiations on the subject were continuing, with a view to the elaboration of a joint initiative to be submitted to the Committee. Both countries also reported that some progress had been achieved in those talks, both with regard to the scope of the agreement and to its verification, but that several important questions still remained to be resolved. The Soviet Union stressed that the problem was a complex one and that time would be needed for its solution, while the United States conceded that it could not predict with certainty when the joint initiative might be completed. The United States assured the Committee, however, that it was continuing to make every effort to reach a prompt agreement on such an initiative, to be followed by the elaboration in the Committee of an agreement eliminating all chemical weapons (CCD/PV.767).

163. The delegations of Poland (CCD/PV.768), Hungary (CCD/PV.770 and 797), Czechoslovakia (CCD/PV.771), India (ibid.), Bulgaria (CCD/PV.794), the German Democratic Republic (CCD/PV.795) and Mongolia (CCD/PV.802) specifically welcomed the information on the progress of the bilateral talks and hoped for an early agreement on the remaining points of the joint draft to be submitted to the Committee for elaboration. Poland believed that the fact that the two Powers had been able to register a large measure of understanding on such difficult questions as the scope of the ban, the elimination of stocks and the dismantling of manufacturing facilities, as well as on certain verification issues, augured well for an eventual broad-range agreement. Hungary, noting that its basic position was still that reflected in the draft convention submitted by the socialist States members in 1972, 17/ was pleased to learn that the joint draft under preparation provided for the broadest possible ban on chemical weapons. Czechoslovakia also expressed particular satisfaction that agreement had been reached that the ban would be comprehensive in scope, prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and the destruction of stocks. The delegation of Mongolia also reaffirmed its interest in a comprehensive solution of the problem and urged other participants in the discussions on the subject to make more constructive efforts to achieve that goal, which would be a genuine measure of disarmament (CCD/PV.773 and 802). The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany also considered that a comprehensive approach to the subject was now possible and hoped the joint initiative would soon be forthcoming (CCD/PV.771). The delegation of India, stressing the high importance that the General Assembly attached to the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, also expressed satisfaction that the bilateral talks on chemical weapons had reached a promising stage and urged every effort to bring the talks to a successful conclusion. Recognizing that negotiations on a chemical weapons agreement would be complex, it urged that the Committee be enabled to begin its work at an early date. The delegation further noted that India had always favoured a comprehensive ban on all chemical weapons and affirmed that it had no intention of acquiring such weapons (ibid.).

164. The delegation of Japan stated that if general agreement had already been reached between the United States and the Soviet Union on the scope of the chemical agents to be named in a chemical weapons agreement, Japan urged those two States to present those key elements of agreement to the Committee; if no agreement had been reached, at least the basic positions of the two States should be explained to the Committee (CCD/PV.776).

165. The delegation of Iran, in welcoming the news of progress at the bilateral talks, stressed the note of doubt it had detected concerning prospects for overcoming the remaining differences. The delegation had hoped that the joint initiative would be easier to realize than a full-scope treaty but, if this proved not to be the case, the advantages of focusing on a first-step approach might be lost. The issue was vital to future disarmament talks, was highly political and technical and involved potentially more countries than most measures discussed previously; therefore, work on the issue must be pursued in the Committee pending the results of the bilateral talks (CCD/PV.778).

166. On 21 March, the delegation of the United States again stated that considerable progress had been made towards a Soviet-American joint initiative in the matter and that the pace of the bilateral work was being accelerated, but that there were still major issues to be resolved, particularly with respect to verification of compliance with a treaty (CCD/PV.781).

167. Later on, the delegation of the Soviet Union stated that during the spring session of the Committee negotiations had continued on questions related to developing a joint Soviet-American initiative on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The delegations of the USSR and United States, in their joint statement of 9 May, had already informed the Committee that, in the course of the negotiations, further progress had been achieved, particularly from the viewpoint of reaching agreement on the scope of the prohibition and on all related questions. The area of mutual understanding had also become broader on verification problems pertaining to a very difficult and complicated sphere which was so sensitive for States. The Soviet delegation expressed its conviction that on some still outstanding aspects of those questions there could be found a solution of the kind which, while ensuring a reliable fulfilment of all obligations of States parties assumed under the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, would not, at the same time, infringe upon the sovereign rights of those States and would not lead to disclosing State or industrial secrets of one kind or another (CCD/PV.789).

168. The delegation of Ethiopia stated that if would give full support to the joint initiative of the Soviet Union and the United States to assist the Committee in achieving early agreement on a prohibition of all chemical weapons. The delegation observed that, having once been a victim of the horrors of chemical weapons, Ethiopia attached special importance to the urgency of an agreement on the subject (CCD/PV.786).

169. The delegation of Yugoslavia recalled General Assembly resolution 32/77 and stated that during the spring session it had not been possible for the Committee to respond to the request contained in that resolution because it was still waiting for the participants in the bilateral negotiations to submit their joint, concrete proposals (CCD/PV.789).

170. On 11 July 1978, the delegation of the Soviet Union recalled the joint statement made earlier during the year by the Soviet Union and the United States regarding the status of the bilateral talks between the two Governments and noted further that those talks would continue parallel to the resumed session of the Committee. The delegation also pledged itself to do its utmost in providing further progress towards the elaboration of the expected joint initiative (CCD/PV.790 and 805).

171. At that same meeting, the delegation of Mexico pointed out that the Programme of Action adopted at the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament had referred to the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction as representing one
of the most urgent measures of disarmament. Hence, there was no difficulty whatever,
the delegation noted, in selecting from among the measures mentioned in the
Programme of Action the one which after the question of a comprehensive test ban
should receive priority attention from the Conference at its summer session
(CCD/PV.790). The delegations of Poland (CCD/PV.793) and Egypt (CCD/PV.795) also
referred to the fact that the Assembly, at its special session, had accorded high
priority to the question of elimination of chemical weapons.

172. The delegation of Mexico also made a recommendation to the Soviet Union and the
United States that, if there was no early prospect of a joint agreement, the best
course of action might be for them to present a progress report on the subject so
as to enable the Committee to take cognizance of those articles which had already
been completed in the preliminary draft, provided that the remaining articles were
also submitted to the Committee as and when they were ready (CCD/PV.790). Egypt
was also of the opinion that it was essential that the Committee be informed about
the stage of the bilateral talks on chemical weapons and expressed its preference
for scheduling informal meetings of the Committee to receive and consider such a
report (CCD/PV.795).

173. Addressing itself to the subject, the delegation of Iran urged the United
States and the Soviet Union to redouble their efforts towards their joint initiative
for a ban on chemical weapons. While acknowledging the serious verification
problems involved in the field, the delegation, nevertheless, expressed the hope
that some progress could soon be reported to the Committee (CCD/PV.796).

174. The delegation of the Netherlands stated that there was no valid reason to wait
until the United States and the Soviet Union had completed their negotiations on all
aspects of a treaty on chemical weapons. In the delegation's opinion, there were
many detailed questions which could already be discussed in the Committee, thus
saving time for later consideration of the treaty as a whole. A chemical weapons
ban was not a typical bilateral question, it involved other countries and regions
of the world and it touched on the chemical industries of all countries that
possessed such industries. The delegation reiterated its view that the major
powers should open up their discussions or in any case should not object to the
Committee beginning specific work on that complicated matter (CCD/PV.799).

175. The United Kingdom expressed the hope that the draft chemical weapons
convention it had tabled in August 1976 18/ would again be of use in discussing
treaty language when the subject was remitted from the current discussions between
the United States and the Soviet Union for multilateral negotiations. Thanks to the
efforts of the members of the Committee, important steps had been taken towards
overcoming one of the main problems of chemical disarmament - the question of
definition. But verification remained the key. The delegation welcomed the fact
that the joint statement of 9 May by the United States and the Soviet Union on their
bilateral negotiations had laid stress on the important requirement of verification.
Apart from ensuring that testing or field trials were no longer taking place, the
two main verification problems to be overcome in concluding any effective chemical
weapons convention, were to ensure that production of chemical weapons had ceased
and that existing stocks had been destroyed. The Federal Republic of Germany had
taken a major step forward in the first area in June 1978 when it had invited
States Members of the United Nations to send relevant experts to visit
representative German chemical plants. Clearly, visits such as these could have a

18/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-first Session,
major confidence-building effect and would help achieve progress on that priority disarmament subject. The United Kingdom Government was giving thought to how best to reinforce these useful steps, and hoped that other Governments would follow such a path. In conclusion, the delegation stressed that nothing would be a more fitting monument to the work done in the Conference than decisive progress on chemical disarmament in the early stages of the new Committee on Disarmament. The United Kingdom would, for its part, continue to give priority to that aim (CCD/PV.801).

176. The delegation of Japan stated that judging from the recent deliberations of the Conference and the progress report of 9 May 1978 on the Soviet-American bilateral negotiations, the following appeared to be the main thoughts on how the question of banning chemical weapons should be treated: (a) all chemical warfare agents to be banned should be divided into three categories, namely, "single-purpose agents", used solely for warfare purposes, "dual-purpose agents", used for both warfare and peaceful purposes, and the precursors; (b) the chemical warfare agents to be banned should be all lethal chemical agents, including incapacitating agents. Their scope should be specified by a general purpose criterion supplemented by a toxicity criterion; (c) the scope of agents to be banned should include precursors and should exclude agents for riot control such as tear gases; (d) the listing of the chemical warfare agents to be banned could not be exhaustive, but it was desirable that they should be amply illustrated in a positive or a negative list; (e) all lethal chemical warfare agents should be banned both with respect to their production and stockpiling and the destruction of existing stockpiles in arsenals should be executed step by step; (f) any treaty on the prohibition of chemical weapons should not obtrude upon the activities of chemical industries for peaceful purposes. The delegation went on to note that since the threshold to be applied to chemical agents to be banned and verification procedures for dual-purpose agents involved technical, specialized and complicated problems, each country was concerned over the strong possibility that such verification procedures might obtrude upon its chemical industries for peaceful uses, and would therefore need to conduct detailed examinations in relation to national laws and regulations. Hence, even after the Soviet-American joint initiative was presented to the negotiating body, sufficient time would be needed to examine it. The delegation therefore hoped for an early presentation to the Conference of the general agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, especially since complex and time-consuming work was foreseen for the negotiating body. The delegation reiterated its earlier proposal to the effect that, if it was difficult for the two States to present the whole agreement to the Conference in the near future, the two States should present at least the part agreed upon in their current negotiations, for example, the scope of agents to be banned, which was thought to have been agreed upon in principle by the two States, and that the negotiating body, including its working group, should be able to start on its work of forming a draft treaty by the technical examination of that particular part (CCD/PV.801).

177. On 22 August 1978, the delegation of the United States made a statement on behalf of the United States and the Soviet Union regarding their bilateral negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons which had resumed on 18 August 1978. The joint statement recalled that on 9 May 1978, the United States and the Soviet Union had made a statement to the Conference on the progress in their bilateral negotiations on a joint initiative for the prohibition of chemical weapons. That statement still accurately reflected the status of the negotiations. The statement further noted that the issues involved in complete and effective prohibition of chemical weapons were extremely complex. The political and technical issues involved were directly linked and thus must be dealt with at the
same time. Developing an adequately verifiable disarmament measure which was
designed to eliminate an entire class of weapons from the arsenals of States and
which also affected one of the major industries in many countries was a task which
required great care. The statement concluded that the two sides, aware of the
interest of many States in the earliest possible resolution of the problem of the
prohibition of chemical weapons, would exert additional effort in order to complete
the elaboration of a joint initiative on such an important and complex question as
soon as possible (CCD/PV.802).

178. The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany continued to hold that the
conclusion of a complete and effective ban on development, production and
stockpiling of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles was
one of the most urgent disarmament measures and recalled that from the very
beginning the delegation had stood up for the elaboration of a complete chemical
weapons ban (ibid.).

179. On 24 August 1978, the delegation of Iran made a statement on behalf of the
Group of 15, concerning the progress report on the Soviet-American bilateral
initiative on chemical weapons made on 22 August by the representative of the
United States on behalf of the two negotiating Powers. The statement noted that
the Group found it most regrettable that seven years after the conclusion of the
negotiations on a biological weapons convention, multilateral negotiations on the
complete elimination of chemical weapons had not yet started, in spite of valuable
contributions made by the members of the Conference (CCD/PV.803).

180. Referring to the joint statement of 22 August on the status of the Soviet-
American bilateral talks on chemical weapons, the delegation of Italy reiterated
its view that the negotiating multilateral body was in a position to provide a
meaningful contribution to finalizing that important disarmament measure. Yet, the
devigation pointed out, after the Committee had devoted quite a number of years to
investigating the juridical and technical implications of a chemical weapons
convention, the delegation consistently believed that further inaction was hardly
justifiable and would only contribute to scepticism regarding the effectiveness of
the Geneva forum (CCD/PV.804).

181. With regard to the specific issue of the scope of a possible agreement, those
devigations which addressed themselves to the subject continued to favour a
comprehensive approach to any prohibition of chemical means of warfare, Hungary,
for example, pointing out that its basic position was still that reflected in the
draft convention submitted by the socialist member States in 1972, was gratified
to learn that the joint draft under preparation provided for the broadest possible
ban on chemical weapons (CCD/PV.770). Czechoslovakia also expressed its
satisfaction that agreement had been reached that the ban would be comprehensive in
scope, prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical
weapons and the destruction of stocks (CCD/PV.771). Addressing itself to the
question, Mongolia similarly reaffirmed its interest in a comprehensive solution of
the problem and urged other participants in the discussions on the subject to make
more constructive efforts to achieve such a goal (CCD/PV.773).

182. The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany was also of the opinion that
a comprehensive approach to the subject was now possible and hoped the joint
initiative would soon be forthcoming (CCD/PV.771).

183. In the course of welcoming the bilateral talks on chemical weapons, the
delegation of India noted that India had always favoured a comprehensive ban on all chemical weapons and affirmed its intention not to acquire such weapons (ibid.).

184. Speaking also on the subject of the scope of a future prohibition of chemical weapons, the delegation of Sweden recalled that the acquisition of chemical agents, weapons and delivery systems was not the only decisive factor involved in achieving an offensive chemical warfare capability, because it was equally important to acquire the necessary training, planning and organization to enable operational use of those weapons. Therefore, any international convention on the subject should not only prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of such weapons but also other preparations for offensive chemical warfare (CCD/PV.785).

185. Regarding the question of compliance with a prohibition of chemical weapons, the delegation of Czechoslovakia held that the only suitable solution of the verification problem lay in a combination of national and international procedures as proposed in a variety of documents, including the 1972 draft convention of the socialist countries. The delegation added the view that on-site inspections would be technically immensely demanding and could not be carried out without negative consequences for the sovereign rights of contracting parties (CCD/PV.771).

186. The delegation of India held that verification procedures for all disarmament agreements should be flexible. Insistence on only one type of verification method would only reduce the credibility of the principle of verification. At the same time, verification should not be used as a pretext for affecting security or other interests of States (ibid).

187. The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany stressed that the experience it had gained with international controls, connected with the ban it had accepted on the production of chemical weapons, had not hampered development of the German chemical industry and that it wished to share that experience to help develop a control system for a multilateral chemical weapons ban (CCD/PV.771 and 802).

Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction

188. In its resolution 32/84 A, the General Assembly requested the Committee to continue negotiations, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, aimed at working out the text of an agreement on the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction and, when necessary, specific agreements on the subject. In its resolution 32/84 B, the Assembly requested the Committee, while taking into account its existing priorities, to keep under review the question of the development of new weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and to consider the desirability of formulating agreements on the prohibition of any specific new weapons which might be identified. Both resolutions requested the Committee to report to the Assembly on the subject at its next session. In accordance with those resolutions, the Committee continued to keep the question under active discussion during the 1978 session.

189. From the beginning of the 1978 session the Soviet Union, noting that 110 States had supported General Assembly resolution 32/84 A, urged a comprehensive ban
on all new weapons and systems of mass destruction on the basis of its revised
draft agreement, which it had submitted to the Committee on 8 August 1977 19/
(CCD/PV.767 and 781). The Soviet position was strongly supported by the
degradations of Poland (CCD/PV.768 and 783), Hungary (CCD/PV.770), Czechoslovakia
(CCD/PV.771), Mongolia (CCD/PV.773) and the German Democratic Republic (CCD/PV/775
and 783). For example, the German Democratic Republic noted that the NATO
countries seemed ready to negotiate a ban on a new weapon of mass destruction only
when the development of such a weapon could be clearly identified and wondered if
that position meant that negotiations in the field could begin only after such
weapons had been developed and were already in the arsenals of States. It
specifically opposed such a position, holding that the development of new types and
systems of weapons of mass destruction, which were likely to be misused as an
instrument to change the military balance, must be prohibited from the very
beginning by a comprehensive and preventive agreement (CCD/PV.775 and 783).

190. The delegation of Romania declared that it continued to favour the prohibition
of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction and said that the time
had come for the Committee to proceed forthwith to the negotiation of the text of
an agreement within the framework of adequate structures (CCD/PV.768).

191. India supported the Soviet initiative to ban the development and production of
new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction in conformity with its
principled opposition to all weapons of mass destruction including those in
stockpiles of nations at present. India was of the view that it was important that
the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should lend its support to all
efforts which would nip in the bud the development of future generations of weapons
and systems of mass destruction. India also believed it would not be enough to
prevent the development and deployment of weapons and systems based on new
scientific principles and that it was equally urgent to ban the development and
deployment of new weapons or systems based on existing and available knowledge and
principles of science and technology; otherwise, the banning of new weapons and
systems of mass destruction would become meaningless (CCD/PV.771).

192. In direct response to the view of the Western countries that it was difficult
to reach a comprehensive agreement on the matter because the possible areas of
development of new weapons of mass destruction could not be foreseen, the Soviet
Union stressed that it could not accept such a view, since it was precisely an
agreement in principle that was needed, to be followed, when necessary, by
additional specific agreements to ban particular types of weapons. The revised
draft convention submitted by the Soviet Union fully met that need, the delegation
maintained (CCD/PV.782). The delegations of Hungary (CCD/PV.783) and Poland
(ibid.) also stressed that a comprehensive agreement on the subject would not
preclude the possibility of future agreements to ban specific types of weapons. A
number of socialist States members also stressed that the General Assembly, in its
resolutions 32/84 A and B, had given a clear and unmistakable mandate to the
Committee for achieving a ban on new weapons of mass destruction. The delegation
of Egypt also referred to the two resolutions and stressed that it looked forward
to meaningful discussions of the problem in the Committee (CCD/PV.782).

193. The Hungarian delegation maintained that the appearance of new sophisticated

19/ Ibid., Thirty-second Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/32/27), vol. II,
document CCD/511/Rev. 1.
weapons, among others the cruise missile and the neutron weapon, testified to the
expansion of a concept that each weapon made possible by scientific and
technological progress should be developed and deployed. It emphasized that new
achievements were at the threshold of military application and that, in these
conditions, the tendency of a technological race would inevitably lead to a
qualitatively new phase in the arms race. The foreseeable dangers of this coming
phase for peace and stability and for disarmament were substantially greater than
before, the delegation held. In the delegation's view, another example was the
development of weapons which, by the manner of their deployment, were difficult or
impossible to verify with means and devices used for the verification of existing
arms limitations agreements. Efforts to halt and reverse the arms race would
inevitably fail if disarmament forums did not follow closely development of that
type (CCD/PV.783).

194. The Mongolian delegation, in reiterating its position, stressed the urgent need
to place a reliable barrier in the way of the technological arms race, which today
was becoming more real than ever before (ibid.).

195. The Polish delegation stated that by adopting its resolutions 32/84 A and B on
the prohibition of the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction and
of new systems of such weapons, the General Assembly, at its thirty-second session,
had handed down to the Conference a clear and unmistakable mandate, even though it
came in a two-part document. The essence of that mandate derived, in the
delegation's view, from the statement in resolution A that "... modern science and
technology have reached the level where a serious danger arises of the development
of new, still more destructive types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems
of such weapons". That mandate was further reinforced in resolution B by the call
upon States to apply scientific discovery for the benefits of mankind (ibid.).

196. In the course of statements on the subject, the Soviet Union referred to the
fact that the general question of the prohibition of new types and new systems of
weapons of mass destruction and of radiological weapons was being examined
bilaterally by the Soviet Union and the United States (CCD/PV.767 and 781).

197. The Federal Republic of Germany recalled resolution 32/84 B on mass
destruction weapons "based on new scientific principles" which had been sponsored
by 10 countries, including the Federal Republic of Germany, in the General Assembly
at its thirty-second session and adopted on 12 December 1977 with a majority of
more than 100 votes. The invitation to the Committee contained in paragraph 5 of
that resolution, which stated, "while taking into account its existing priorities,
to keep under review the question of the development of new weapons of mass
destruction based on new scientific principles and to consider the desirability of
formulating agreements on the prohibition of any specific new weapons which may be
identified", was a good basis for further intensive discussion (CCD/PV.771).

198. Addressing itself again to the subject under consideration, the Soviet Union
stated that it would continue to urge the need for further efforts to achieve a
comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of the development of new types and
systems of weapons of mass destruction. Together with a comprehensive agreement,
the Soviet Union also advocated the conclusion of special agreements on the
prohibition of the development and manufacture of particular new types and systems
of weapons of mass destruction. In that connexion, it drew attention to the new
initiative of the socialist countries concerning the conclusion of a convention
on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons. In the opinion of the Soviet Union, the urgency of the problem of the earliest possible conclusion of such a comprehensive agreement and of such special agreements had recently not only not diminished, but on the contrary, increased. It pointed out the course of modern scientific and technological progress bore witness to the fact that, by reason of the latest successes in the fundamental sciences and the high level of technology, the probability of the emergence of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction was increasing. All that was causing growing concern in the world over the danger of the creation of new types of weapons of mass destruction. In order to make more purposeful and thorough the Committee's work of establishing the agreed text of a comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, and particularly its work on the definition of the prohibition's scope, a group of qualified governmental experts should be established under the auspices of the Committee to consider the question of possible areas of development of new types of weapons of mass destruction to be included in the initial list of the types of such weapons to be prohibited under a comprehensive agreement. To that end, the delegation submitted on 28 March 1978 a draft decision (CCD/564) for the Committee's consideration, noting its belief that the setting up of such a group would meet the wishes of the General Assembly in the matter and also narrow the divergencies of views on the subject in the Committee (CCD/PV.782). The Soviet proposal was supported by the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and Mongolia (CCD/PV.783 and 802) and Czechoslovakia (CCD/PV.785).

199. In referring to the question, the delegation of Egypt thought that meaningful discussion might lead to the establishment of a working group with the task of elaborating an agreement or agreements on the subject (CCD/PV.782).

200. The delegation of Ethiopia stated that, in keeping with the goal of getting closer to genuine disarmament, the nuclear Powers should take concrete steps to avoid the development and production of increasing numbers and more devastating types and systems of weapons of mass destruction (CCD/PV.786).

201. In its statement of 11 May 1978, the delegation of the United States of America reiterated its conviction that the most effective approach to the issue of new weapons of mass destruction was by negotiating individual agreements on specific new types of such weapons as they were identified. The delegation emphasized that dealing in a loose, even vague manner, with principles not clearly understood or relationships among known principles that had not yet been conceived would merely create the illusion of having dealt with the problem of new weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, it pointed out, the omnibus treaty approach supported by some members of the Committee would inevitably lead to continuous haggling over the designation of new weapons as new weapons of mass destruction. The United States believed the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should keep the issue under continuing review in the course of its informal meetings on the subject and opposed establishment of an ad hoc working group to consider the question as proposed by the delegation of the Soviet Union (CCD/PV.789).

202. After the Committee resumed its work at the summer session, the Soviet Union once again reiterated its view that the present level of science and technology created the danger that, in a number of areas of military technology, new and even more sophisticated and destructive types and systems of weapons of mass destruction would emerge. The emergence of every such new type and every such new system made the arms race more dangerous, raising it to ever higher qualitative levels. As a result, the delegation stressed, the arms race might reach a point
beyond which it would be impossible to conclude agreements for its limitation based on reciprocal control. Hence, one of the most important problems within the whole complex of disarmament questions was that of the prohibition of the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction and of systems of such weapons and the best way of solving that problem was to conclude a comprehensive agreement for the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. The establishment of an ad hoc group of qualified governmental experts to consider the question of possible areas of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction under the auspices of the Conference, as proposed by the Soviet delegation earlier during the year, would facilitate achievement of such an agreement. Noting that a number of delegations had already expressed their positive attitude to that proposal, the Soviet delegation hoped that those delegations which had not yet defined their position on the question would do so in the very near future in order to enable the group of governmental experts to embark upon practical work as soon as possible. This did not exclude the possibility that, in cases where there appeared that a new type of weapon of mass destruction might emerge, it would be possible to conclude individual specific agreements (CCD/PV.790 and 805).

203. Czechoslovakia (CCD/PV.792), Poland (CCD/PV.793), Bulgaria (CCD/PV.794), the German Democratic Republic (CCD/PV.795 and 801), Hungary (CCD/PV.797) and Mongolia (CCD/PV.802) once again expressed their strong support for the Soviet proposal to set up an ad hoc group of qualified governmental experts to consider the question of possible areas of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.

204. Summing up its position on the problem late in the summer session, the delegation of the Soviet Union affirmed that the course of events in recent years had proved most convincingly the need for concluding a comprehensive international agreement on the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, since only such an approach to the decision of this problem would put a reliable barrier in the way of the emergence of new, even more destructive types and systems of weapons of mass destruction (CCD/PV.800).

205. At the same time, the Soviet Union's position, which allowed also for the possibility of concluding specific agreements on the prohibition of particular new types and systems of mass destruction as they were identified, ensured the condition for a most effective solution of the task of eliminating the danger of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. The delegation further stated that, taking into account the approach of Western countries to the solution of the problem of the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, the Soviet Union had taken another constructive step in order to meet them halfway and, on 28 March 1978 (CCD/564), it had made a proposal to establish under the auspices of the Committee, an ad hoc group of qualified governmental experts to consider the question of possible areas of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction to be included in the final list of prohibited types of weapons of mass destruction under a comprehensive agreement. In that way an even more profound and complete study, and identification, of potentially dangerous areas of the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction would be ensured. Such a group could keep under continuing review the developments in this field and it could make relevant recommendations to the Committee regarding the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction at the earliest possible stage of emergence of such weapons. The USSR delegation called upon all the members of the Committee to exert efforts in order that such a group of qualified experts on new types of weapons of mass destruction could begin its work in the immediate future.
206. On 14 August 1978, the delegation of Hungary submitted a working paper on infrasound weapons (CCD/575). In introducing the paper, the delegation stated that the development of infrasonic weapons was within reach of technological and scientific capabilities, and expressed the hope that the working paper would facilitate further study of that subject within the Committee and would promote the preparation of a preventive, international agreement to prevent the possible emergence of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction (CCD/PV.801).

207. The delegation of the German Democratic Republic declared that the conclusion of an international agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction would ensure that new achievements in science and technology were used exclusively for peaceful purposes. The delegation was of the view that there were sufficient reasons for the committee to redouble its efforts with a view to reaching such an agreement. The use of enormous material and intellectual potential for the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction should be prevented in time, the delegation emphasized. Furthermore, the delegation noted, the development of such weapons had a negative impact on international relations, particularly on the ongoing disarmament talks. It had become increasingly evident that, for example, the development of the nuclear neutron weapons was not likely to strengthen the security of States. On the contrary, the delegation stressed, it had contributed to an acceleration of the arms race, and talks on disarmament would be impeded or even made impossible (ibid.).

208. The United Kingdom declared that its determination that new scientific discoveries should not be used to create new weapons as terrible as those already recognized as weapons of mass destruction was demonstrated by its sponsorship of General Assembly resolution 32/84 B. It believed that the best way to achieve that aim was for the Conference, and from next year, the Committee on Disarmament, to remain vigilant so that appropriate conventions could be negotiated if any potential new weapons of mass destruction based on a new scientific principle should be identified. The delegation observed that it had not yet been persuaded to draft a comprehensive treaty would be helpful. Nor was it prepared to confuse the discussion of the priority items, namely, the weapons of mass destruction recognized in 1948 - atomic, biological, chemical and radiological weapons - by allowing discussion of new weapons of mass destruction to overlap them. The comprehensive approach, the delegation emphasized, carried such a danger (ibid.).

209. The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany recalled that the formulation contained in paragraph 77 of the final document of the special session of the Assembly on disarmament provided for the conclusion of specific agreements on particular types of new weapons of mass destruction which might be identified. The Federal Republic had agreed to this text because, otherwise, it would not seem possible to meet the specific characteristics of a given weapon in an effective ban, which also had to include an effective verification system for the particular weapons (CCD/PV.802).

210. In the view of the Mongolian delegation, the informal meetings on the question of the prohibition and development of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction, held in the Committee at the summer session, with the participation of qualified governmental experts, had reaffirmed the importance and urgency of preparing an international agreement on that subject. The delegation considered that the discussion of the problem in its entirety, or the examination of its
individual aspects, should be directed towards concluding agreements which would reliably block the path to a further technological arms race. That would mean the achievement of an agreement on the prohibition of both the development and the production of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction (ibid.).

211. Italy expressed the view that the debate held so far on the question of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction had shown and eventually confirmed the existence of different approaches to that delicate question, and noted that at the present stage it believed that the most appropriate course was to keep the issue under constant review in order to be ready to negotiate specific agreements dealing with specific categories of weapons as soon as they might be identified. A positive step in such a direction might be the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons, presently under consideration in bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union (CCD/PV.804).

* * *

212. The United States stated that considerable progress had been made towards a joint initiative on radiological weapons, holding that such a ban, while relatively less significant than a comprehensive test ban or a chemical weapons convention, would be a logical step to fill a gap in the panoply of existing arms control measures and to head off possible development of hitherto untied weapons of mass destruction mentioned in the 1948 United Nations definition. The delegation believed the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament could consider a comprehensive prohibition on radiological weapons without interfering with higher priority issues before it, and thus effectively guard against this potential threat by acting promptly and dealing with such weapons before rather than after they were in the arsenals of States. The negotiations of such a ban would be an appropriate task for the Committee (CCD/PV.767 and 781).

213. Speaking on this item, the Soviet Union emphasized that it was difficult to remove weapons of one kind or another, which had already been developed, from the arsenals of States, and that, consequently, it was much more reasonable, advisable and correct to prevent their emergence in advance and called upon the Committee to take into consideration that circumstance. In that connexion, it stressed the possibility and need for concluding specific agreements on the prohibition of specific types of weapons which were not yet in the arsenals of States but which could be developed and produced, in cases when the danger of the development of such weapons became clear. The Soviet Union pointed out that radiological weapons, the prohibition of which was being now negotiated between the USSR and the United States, was precisely such a specific case (CCD/PV.781).

214. On 11 May 1978, the delegation of the United States reported that the two sides were close to full agreement on a possible joint initiative for the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, but stressed that the United States shared the view that work on a possible radiological weapons convention should in no way interfere with the work of the Committee on other tasks with which it was seized (CCD/PV.789).

215. At the start of the summer session (CCD/PV.790) and again later during the session, on 15 August 1978, the delegation of the Soviet Union informed the Committee that after a brief recess, the two sides had begun another round of negotiations on the question of prohibition of radiological weapons. The delegation further stated that as a result of the exchange of views, the two sides had succeeded in bringing their approaches to that problem closer. They had
now practically reached agreement on the provisions of a possible instrument on the
prohibition of radiological weapons (CCD/PV.800).

216. The delegation of Hungary welcomed the information on the new round of bilateral
talks and said that it looked forward to a successful and early completion of those
negotiations. It pointed out, further, that while the subject had already been
raised and discussed several years ago, the necessity for action had not generally
been felt at that time. In the meantime, however, conditions had changed, from
both the technological and the arms-limitation point of view and, due to various
developments, which the delegation enumerated, the need for a preventive measure
was clearly evident and, hence, Hungary supported the efforts aimed at the
preparation and conclusion of a radiological weapons convention (CCD/PV.797). The
delegation of the German Democratic Republic also welcomed the fact that the
bilateral negotiations between the USSR and the United States on the prohibition of
radiological weapons were being carried on intensively, and stated that their early
successful conclusion could positively influence the solution of other questions
related to the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types and
systems of weapons of mass destruction, as well (CCD/PV.801).

217. The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany considered a complete ban on
radiological weapons important and also possible and hoped for an early joint
Soviet-American initiative, which could be dealt with further in the Committee. In
this respect, the delegation stated that it had been encouraged by the positive
statement of the Soviet Union on 15 August (CCD/PV.802).

Further measures for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed

219. With regard to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear
Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and on the Ocean Floor
and in the Subsoil Thereof, 20/ the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics stated that the 1977 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty had
reaffirmed the commitment undertaken by the parties to the Treaty in article V to
continue negotiations in good faith concerning the demilitarization of the sea-bed,
and it had requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, in consultation
with the States parties to the Treaty, to proceed without delay to the examination
of further measures aimed at preventing an arms race on the sea-bed and ocean floor
and in the subsoil thereof. The delegation also noted that the General Assembly

20/ General Assembly resolution 2660 (XXV), annex.
at its thirty-second session had adopted resolution 32/87 A on the subject. The
Soviet Union was an advocate of the complete demilitarization of the sea-bed.
Proceeding from this, it supported the Conference's decision and was ready to begin
consultations with other States members of the Conference of the Committee on
Disarmament concerning the procedure for starting in the Committee the discussion
of the problem of the demilitarization of the sea-bed (CCD/PV.767). The delegation
added that the Treaty, to which over 60 States were parties, should be regarded as
a link in the chain of international limitations restraining the nuclear arms race,
since it limited the possibilities of deployment of nuclear weapons in an
environment which constituted most of the surface area of our planet. At the same
time, it created the prerequisites for the complete exclusion of the sea-bed and
the ocean floor and subsoil thereof from the sphere of the arms race by committing
States parties to continue negotiations on the further demilitarization of the
sea-bed and the ocean floor (CCD/PV.761).

220. The delegation of Poland, referring to the sea-bed Treaty and to General
Assembly resolution 32/87 A, wished to alert the Committee to the fact that under
the terms of that resolution the Committee was expected to proceed promptly with
the consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the
prevention of an arms race in the vast sea-bed and ocean floor environment. In
presenting the draft of that resolution to the First Committee of the General
Assembly, Poland had stressed that what actually was at stake was a blueprint for
the Committee's further crucial new step towards full demilitarization of the
sea-bed. In Poland's opinion, any comprehensive programme of disarmament the
Committee might elaborate in the future must provide for early and constructive
efforts to discharge the responsibility resting on the Committee in that regard.
The delegation expressed the hope that the readiness of the Soviet Union to begin
consultations with other States on the most effective implementation of the request
of the General Assembly would soon be emulated by other States members of the
Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and States parties to the sea-bed treaty
(CCD/PV.768). Similarly the delegation of Mongolia said it presumed that, in
accordance with the General Assembly resolution on the subject, the Committee would
proceed promptly with consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament
for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor (CCD/PV.773).

221. The delegation of the United States expressed the view that the sea-bed arms
control treaty had not only achieved its primary purpose, but had also played a
broader role in preventing the emergence of an arms race on the sea-bed. The
United States stated that it had seen no evidence of an arms race on the sea-bed to
date, and saw little prospect for one in the future. In light of that fact, the
delegation stated, it did not believe that it was necessary for the Committee, or
any other forum, to consider further disarmament measures in this area at the
present time; however, it believed that this subject should be kept under careful
review (CCD/PV.789).

222. Following the special session of the Assembly on disarmament, the Soviet Union
recalled that, in addition to the decision taken by the 1977 Review Conference of
the Parties to the Treaty and the resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its:
thirty-second session, in which it had entrusted the Committee with the task of
proceeding promptly to the consideration of further measures aimed at preventing
the arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereon, the
Assembly, at its special session, had also adopted an appropriate recommendation to
that effect. The delegation noted that during the spring session it had affirmed
its readiness to begin consultations with other States members of the Committee on

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possible ways of initiating discussions regarding the problem of demilitarizing the sea-bed and the ocean floor. That proposal had met with the support of a number of delegations and the Soviet delegation now awaited a response to its proposal from other delegations (CCD/PV.790 and 805).

223. The delegations of Poland (CCD/PV.793), Bulgaria (CCD/PV.794), the German Democratic Republic (CCD/PV.795) and Hungary (CCD/PV.797) also underscored the need to undertake consultations on this subject and noted that the final document of the special session had unambiguously and specifically spelled out a recommendation to that effect. Hungary added that as far as the Committee's work was concerned, the renewal and reconsideration of the different proposals made at the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty could offer a point of departure (CCD/PV.797).
C. Other collateral measures

224. A number of members also focused on various collateral questions, such as limitations on conventional weapons and the arms trade, the reduction of military budgets, European security and reduction of forces in Europe, and confidence-building measures.

225. With respect to conventional weapons, the delegation of the United States, in pointing out that the danger posed by nuclear weapons was most likely to result from escalation of a military conflict initiated with conventional weapons, expressed its belief that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should devote some of its energies to dealing with the problems associated with conventional arms. The United States was of the view that much more should be said and done about the massive diversion of resources to the accumulation of conventional arms and that the responsibility of curbing the horizontal spread of conventional weapons must be shared between suppliers and recipients as well. In the United States delegation's view, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament possessed both the expertise and political representation to consider and develop measures in this area which would increase stability in a number of regions in the world and contribute significantly to the advancement of ultimate disarmament objectives (CCD/PV.781).

226. The delegation of Italy expressed the view that, in parallel with nuclear disarmament, urgent measures of co-operation should be promoted with a view to bringing the conventional arms race to a halt. To that end, Italy envisaged the establishment, under Article 29 of the Charter of the United Nations, of a commission divided into regional sub-commissions, entrusted with the task of controlling the international transfer of conventional weapons (CCD/PV.767, 778 and 784).

227. India took the position that while it was not opposed to a discussion of the question of conventional weapons in the context of general and complete disarmament, it would oppose any attempt to divert attention from the highest priority items that could only be discussed on a global basis. Furthermore, India could not accept the proposition that nuclear weapons and conventional weapons should be weighed in the same scale (CCD/PV.771).

228. The delegation of Ethiopia also thought that conventional arms control should be carried out in the framework of general and complete disarmament and should not divert attention from priority issues of nuclear disarmament (CCD/PV.786).

229. Hungary felt that the full recognition of the dangers of the nuclear-arms race, and the correctness of the priorities in disarmament as confirmed by the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, did not overshadow the question of the volume and pace of conventional arms build-up. The delegation pointed out that the predominant part of world military expenditure was spent on conventional weapons and armed forces. The technological race in that field was no less intense than with respect to nuclear warheads and means of delivery. Technological development had resulted in more and more sophisticated conventional weapons with destructive capabilities approaching those of weapons of mass destruction. In regions of actual and potential conflict, a growing accumulation of highly sophisticated armaments could be observed. Furthermore, the delegation added, a rapid spread of modern conventional weapons production capabilities was also a part of the same situation (CCD/PV.797).
230. The delegation of the Netherlands was also of the opinion that the Committee on Disarmament could be involved in some questions related to the conventional arms race - including the international weapons trade - and try to get a grip on military research and development (CCD/PV.799).

231. Canada pointed out that despite its deep concern for nuclear weapons issues and its insistence on their clear priority, it had also underscored, at the special session on disarmament, other anxieties, notably with regard to the dangerous spread of ever greater quantities of conventional arms. At a time when human and environmental needs were crying out for additional resources, and were largely ignored in many areas, it could not be acceptable that about 80 per cent of the grossly excessive billions spent on military power was devoted to non-nuclear weapons. Moreover, since 1945, something like 133 wars, or armed conflicts, had been fought with conventional weapons, probably costing the lives of over 25 million people, the delegation added (ibid.).

232. Noting the various factors involved in this question, namely, the enormous and increasing amount of world military expenditure, particularly the large sums spent for conventional armaments, its serious impact both on the maintenance of international peace and security and on the economic and social development of the world, and the necessity of a careful approach to the question due to its delicate nature, the delegation of Japan stated that based upon the fundamental position of its devotion to peace, it had prohibited its nationals from exporting weapons, particularly to parties in international disputes or to countries which might become involved in such disputes. It had also discouraged arms exports in general, thus maintaining a unique position which was highly exceptional amongst the advanced industrialized countries, and had taken the initiative in advocating the commencement of international studies with the aim of restraining the unlimited international transfer of conventional arms, whilst appealing to the major arms suppliers to start consultations with a view to voluntary restraint on arms exports to areas of conflict. The delegation expressed its appreciation that, in positive response to that appeal, the United States and the Soviet Union had begun consultations aimed at curbing arms exports. The delegation hoped that the United States, the Soviet Union, as well as other major arms suppliers would initiate consultations, as appropriate, together with recipient countries and also hoped that an international study by experts within the framework of the United Nations on the restraints of international transfer of conventional weapons would be started as soon as possible. The delegation believed that such studies should be conducted, taking into consideration all relevant factors including security of individual countries and that it would be practical that when it would be judged appropriate that an international agreement or a guideline on a regional or a global basis should be made, the question should be, as appropriate, brought into the Committee on Disarmament and such an agreement should be possibly negotiated at the Committee (CCD/PV.801).

233. Addressing itself to the question of conventional weapons, the delegation of Italy stated that while it recognized the importance of nuclear disarmament, in its view, peace and security of all States could only rest on a balanced reduction of both nuclear and conventional weapons. Such reduction should be pursued through bilateral agreements or multilateral accords on a regional or world-wide basis, with the objective of lowering to a minimum level, the total volume of armaments in different areas of the globe (CCD/PV.804).
234. On the question of reductions of military budgets, the Soviet Union reiterated its conviction that the reduction of military budgets would be an important milestone along the road towards limiting the arms race. It recalled that the General Assembly's recommendation, adopted on the basis of a proposal of the USSR, that the military budgets of States which are permanent members of the Security Council should be reduced by 10 per cent still remained to be implemented. With a view to facilitating the solution of that question at the special session of the Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Soviet Union had come forward with a new initiative and had proposed that all States that were permanent members of the Security Council should reach agreement on the specific amounts of reductions, each in its own military budget, not in terms of percentages but in absolute figures. That proposal was reflected in the final document of the special session, the delegation pointed out (CCD/PV.790).

235. Addressing itself to the same subject, the delegation of Sweden emphasized the importance of a gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, as a significant potential contribution to trust between nations. The delegation further stressed that within the efforts of pursuing a purposeful policy of détente, different methods should be tried in order to increase confidence, including widening contacts and broadening information over the frontiers (CCD/PV.793).

236. The delegation of the United Kingdom pointed out that the final document of the special session of the Assembly on disarmament had drawn attention to the fact that gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis would make a contribution to the curbing of the arms race and would increase the possibilities of reallocating resources, now being used for military purposes, to economic and social development. However, a means of implementing such a desirable measure still had to be found. The first step was to agree on the system of measuring and comparing military budgets which had been worked out by the group of experts appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The United Kingdom had already made known its willingness to take part in a pilot test of the reporting instrument devised by that group, if this were in company with a fair sample of States, including both developing and developed countries, and States with centrally-planned economies as well as those with market economies. The potential benefits were so great that delay should no longer be accepted in pressing ahead with steps to achieve a universal and balanced reduction in military budgets, with appropriate verification provisions, the delegation stressed (CCD/PV.801).

237. The Federal Republic of Germany referred to the question of the comparability of military budgets as an important confidence-building measure, which should be pursued further (CCD/PV.802).

238. With respect to the question of reduction of forces in Europe, the delegation of the Soviet Union reaffirmed the recent proposals made by the USSR and a number of other socialist countries at the Vienna negotiations on the mutual limitation and reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, the proposals on

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21/ General Assembly resolution 3093 A (XXVIII).
confidence-building measures put forward at the Belgrade Conference on Co-operation and Security in Europe, as well as a number of other proposals on various specific questions of disarmament presented at bilateral and multilateral talks (CCD/PV.790).

239. The delegation of Poland pointed out that Poland's vital interest in and dedication to disarmament found practical manifestation in its deep and serious involvement in the Vienna talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. It was well known that, as a result of the recent constructive initiative of the participating socialist countries, that forum was now increasingly coming to grips with some of the most complex issues involved. In the delegation's view it was most significant that the special session of the Assembly on disarmament had seen fit to recognize in an unequivocal way the unique role and the special place of the Vienna forum in the over-all disarmament effort (CCD/PV.793).

240. The delegation of Hungary, also referring to the recent proposals put forward at the Vienna negotiations by the socialist countries, expressed the hope that a positive response to those far-reaching proposals would be forthcoming on the part of the Western negotiators (CCD/PV.797).

241. Outlining a series of short-term measures which it considered as important interacting elements of a concrete action programme, the delegation of Sweden regarded, among such measures, the intensification of efforts to facilitate and supplement possible force reductions in Central Europe by negotiations of measures of constraint, such as limitations in the peace-time deployment of military forces. Those could constitute an integral part already of a first stage agreement in the Vienna talks. They could, as the Government of Sweden saw it, become a useful contribution to longer-term purposeful efforts to limit grey-area systems (theatre nuclear weapons, intermediate range missiles, etc.) and reduce nuclear weapons in Europe.

242. Another such measure was a call for a pragmatic link between efforts in the Vienna talks and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe taking full advantage of the fact that some positive developments in the negotiations in Vienna had lately been reported. This link would be one between, on the one hand, intensified discussions of military constraints in the context of the Vienna talks and, on the other, efforts to reach agreement on improved confidence-building measures at the next follow-up conference of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in Madrid in 1980.

243. Elaborating on this point, the delegation explained that such a link seemed natural from several points of view. The most direct one was that the security of all States, and not least of all European States, was directly affected by the armaments as well as by disarmament measures undertaken by the leading military Powers. Sweden itself continued to follow those talks with great attention. As they embarked upon issues of direct concern to the national security of Sweden, its Government expected to participate in a form found to be appropriate by the parties concerned (CCD/PV.793).

244. The United Kingdom emphasized that it attached great importance to the mutual and balanced forces reduction negotiations for the furthering of détente. In April 1978, the Western allies had tabled significant new proposals designed to meet concerns expressed by Eastern States. They had welcomed the Eastern response
to those proposals, tabled in June, as the most far-reaching move that the East had made since the talks began. The revised Eastern proposals were currently being examined and clarification was being sought on various aspects. But, the delegation noted, many areas of disagreement still remained, notably on the question of the numbers of forces currently stationed in the reductions area. The United Kingdom, together with its allies, would continue to do all it could to contribute to the conclusion of a mutually satisfactory agreement, the delegation added (CCD/PV.801).

245. The Federal Republic of Germany recalled the text of paragraph 82 of the final document adopted at the special session of the Assembly on disarmament which had been worked out by the Federal Republic together with other delegations. The paragraph stated that the achievement of a more stable situation in Europe at a lower level of military potential on the basis of approximate equality and parity, as well as on the basis of undiminished security of all States, with full respect for security interests and independence of States outside military alliances, by agreement on appropriate mutual reductions and limitations, would contribute to the strengthening of security in Europe and constitute a significant step towards enhancing international peace and security. It further stressed that current efforts to that end should be continued most energetically. For its part the Federal Republic of Germany would participate in all activities that could help achieve that goal (CCD/PV.802).

246. The delegation of Japan believed that effective confidence-building measures were of great importance to back up negotiations and treaties in the field of disarmament and, in this connexion, noted that paragraph 93 of the final document had referred to some measures in this category, including the prevention of attacks which would take place by accident, miscalculation or communications failure. The delegation also pointed out that there were other measures such as supplying military information and data, and the reduction of military budgets, etc. Moreover, in addition to the establishment of "hot lines" mentioned in paragraph 93, and which was already embodied in a treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union, the delegation pointed out that another possible measure could be the establishment of a buffer zone in areas of conflict. The delegation also noted with interest the Romanian proposal at the special session 22/ which had stated that each State should firmly undertake to give notification of troop movements and big military manoeuvres, in the vicinity of the frontiers of other States, and believed that the proposal should receive sufficient attention in the negotiating body (CCD/PV.801).

247. The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany held that confidence-building measures had a great impact on disarmament efforts and recalled that the Federal Chancellor, Mr. Schmidt, in his address to the special session on disarmament, 23/ had referred to the European experiences and stated that confidence-building measures contained in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe had proved to be successful. It was the view of the Federal Republic of Germany that confidence-building measures could now be further developed perhaps on a regional basis. If, at a given time, the experiences gained in different regions proved the effectiveness of confidence-building measures, it would be appropriate to start working out a world-wide agreement on such measures (CCD/PV.802).

22/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Plenary Meetings, 22nd meeting.
23/ Ibid., 5th meeting.
D. Question of general and complete disarmament

248. As in previous years, at the Committee's 1978 session, virtually all delegations continued to recognize general and complete disarmament as the ultimate goal of all disarmament efforts, and most of them referred to the question either directly or indirectly in discussions related to various aspects of disarmament, but more particularly in the context of the elaboration of a comprehensive disarmament programme and the discussions concerning the special session of the Assembly on disarmament, both before and after the holding of that session.

249. The delegation of Ethiopia thought that, on the whole, negotiations in certain of the most important fields were slow in coming. At the same time, far too many technical and financial resources which should have been devoted to combating poverty and promoting economic and social development for developing member countries were diverted to the arms race (CCD/PV.786).

250. At the Committee's meeting on 11 May 1978, the representative of Mexico quoted a statement made at the opening meeting of the Committee, on 15 March 1962, by the representative of the Secretary-General in which he had stressed the importance of both the work which was about to begin and the contribution which States Members of the United Nations, whether militarily powerful or not, could make to that work, as well as the need for concrete achievements. The representative of Mexico stated that the words "concrete achievements" should serve as the basis for the assessment of the situation to be made at the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. For that reason the delegation of Mexico, together with that of Sweden, had submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the special session a draft of an introduction to the final document, 24/ which began as follows:

"The Disarmament Decade solemnly declared in 1969 is coming to an end. Unfortunately the objectives established on that occasion by the General Assembly appear to be as far away today as they were then, or even further. No 'effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament' have materialized, and still less has there been any progress that might lead to the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Neither has it been possible to free, for the purposes of economic development, any amount, however modest, of the enormous resources and energy, both material and human, that are squandered on the unproductive and wasteful arms race, which 'places a great burden on both the developing and developed countries.'"

The representative of Mexico concluded by stating that the texts which he had quoted had to be kept very much in mind in order to obtain a balanced and objective idea of what the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament had achieved and what the special session should accomplish (CCD/PV.789).

Comprehensive programme of disarmament

251. Early at its 1978 spring session, the Committee decided to establish an ad hoc working group to elaborate a comprehensive programme of disarmament. The

group would use as its basic working texts all Committee documents on the subject, beginning with the 1961 Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for disarmament negotiations 25/ and taking into account other documents submitted to the Committee during the course of its work by members or non-members of the Committee.

252. During the discussions, the following new documents on the subject were submitted to the Committee: a working paper on the question of the drafting of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, submitted by Italy (CCD/548); a working paper on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the USSR (CCD/552), a working paper on the subject of a comprehensive programme of disarmament submitted by Romania (CCD/553); a working paper containing suggestions for inclusion in a comprehensive programme, submitted by Nigeria (CCD/555); and a study on the establishment of an international disarmament organization, submitted by the Netherlands (CCD/565).

253. In addition, a number of delegations submitted documents reproducing working papers or other views on the same general subject that they had already submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament. Among these were: a draft programme of action for the special session, submitted by the United Kingdom and also sponsored by Canada, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan and the Netherlands, (CCD/549); a paper submitted by Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Peru, Yugoslavia and Zaire, containing the text of document A/AC.187/55/Add.1 submitted by the non-aligned countries to the Preparatory Committee (CCD/550); a paper submitted by Sweden containing the text of Preparatory Committee document A/AC.187/95 CCD/554); a paper submitted by Mexico (CCD/560) containing the text of document A/AC.187/56, already approved by the Preparatory Committee; a paper submitted by Mexico (CCD/561 and Add.1) containing the text of documents A/AC.187/89 and Add.1 submitted to the Preparatory Committee; and a working paper submitted by Italy on international mechanisms for disarmament (CCD/568).

254. In submitting its document CCD/548, the delegation of Italy stated that it offered a realistic contribution to the framing of an orderly and articulated set of guidelines for future disarmament negotiations in appropriate forums, but stressed that it was not intended to counter any other formal working document already before the Committee. The first part, the delegation pointed out, dealt with basic principles for such negotiations such as the observance of a degree of flexibility, the maintenance of a balance between nuclear and conventional measures, the co-ordination of global and regional initiatives, the acceptance of a step-by-step approach to prevent destabilizing effects and facilitate agreement on effective verification measures; the second part offered a suggested set of priority measures, involving in the first instance nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, but including conventional weapons (CCD/767). The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany welcomed working paper CCD/548, which it believed contained good suggestions for a comprehensive disarmament programme to be drawn up by the Committee; such a programme, by its nature, had to be conceived as a long-term instrument (CCD/771).

255. In introducing its paper on international mechanisms for disarmament (CCD/568), the Italian delegation pointed out that the first part of the paper, dealing with the role of the United Nations in disarmament, suggested that the First Committee of the General Assembly should concentrate its future efforts in the main on

25/ Ibid., Sixteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 19, document A/4879.
problems of disarmament and international security; the paper also suggested that, in connexion with the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the role of the Security Council under Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations should be reviewed and that the Council itself consider creating, under Article 29, subsidiary organs charged with specific tasks in the field of arms control, particularly a committee divided into regional sub-committees, entrusted with control of international conventional arms transfers (CCD/PV.784).

256. In introducing document CCD/550 on behalf of seven non-aligned countries, the delegation of Yugoslavia pointed out that that important document, setting forth the positions and concrete proposals of the non-aligned countries, deserved the full attention of all Committee members (CCD/PV.772).

257. Introducing document CCD/549, the delegation of the United Kingdom stated that, while it did not wish to duplicate discussions taking place in the Preparatory Committee of the special session of the Assembly, it thought it would be useful to circulate in the Conference the document submitted to the Preparatory Committee, to be taken into account together with other relevant documentation such as the Mexican paper (CCD/545) 26/ and the Italian paper (CCD/548) (CCD/PV.768).

258. In introducing document CCD/552 on behalf of seven socialist States members, the Soviet Union confirmed the continued relevance to the problem of its 1977 memorandum on questions of ending the arms race and disarmament (CCD/522) 27/ and noted that the new working paper was based on proposals presented by the same sponsors to the Preparatory Committee, as well as proposals, particularly in the field of nuclear disarmament, that had recently been put forward. The sponsors of the paper, the delegation added, proceeded from the premise that a comprehensive disarmament programme should define fundamental purposes and principles, which should include such principles as that of not impairing the interests of any of the parties to an agreement, the abandonment of attempts to obtain unilateral advantages, the universal affirmation and development of the principle of the non-use of force in international relations, the principle that negotiations and agreements should involve the largest possible number of States, particularly the nuclear Powers and States possessing the most powerful weapons and armed forces, together with such other principles as should be used for guidance in matters of disarmament. The programme should then propose specific disarmament measures in all possible areas and, finally, put forward basic provisions dealing with forms of negotiations and the negotiating machinery to be used (CCD/PV.773). Mongolia (ibid.) and the German Democratic Republic (CCD/PV.775) made similar statements in explanation of the document. Mongolia stated that it proceeded from the premise that the programme of action on disarmament should include the main areas in which efforts must be made to achieve the elaboration of suitable international agreements. At the same time, it was extremely important to define the fundamental provisions and principles which should underlie negotiations on, and the solution to, questions relating to the curbing of the arms race and to disarmament.

259. Introducing document CCD/553, the delegation of Romania, holding that the need for a comprehensive disarmament programme arose from the growing anxiety of

26/ Ibid., Thirty-second Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/32/27), vol. II.
27/ Ibid.
the international community concerning the unprecedented accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, noted that the need had become more urgent as a result of the preparations for a special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. Arms control measures achieved so far, the delegation held, had had no perceptible impact on the dynamics of the arms race and, accordingly, one of the basic objectives of the special session was the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament capable of leading to general disarmament. Such a programme (a) must place disarmament negotiations in perspective once again, creating a real impetus to reverse the escalation of arms and gradually to reduce and eliminate the factors responsible for such escalation; (b) must consist of a systematically organized combination of measures leading up to major objectives and to the final goal of general and complete disarmament, with each specific measure opening the way for other measures in the framework of the general pattern; (c) must be comprehensive in order to mobilize the political will of States, with the various measures in the programme negotiated concurrently as organic parts of a single effort; (d) must meet the interests of all States and be carried out with the participation of all, with global, regional and bilateral measures all incorporated into a unitary concept; and (e) must not simply represent a plan of efforts to achieve the objective within a reasonable time period but also suggest ways and means of achieving the desired goal (CCD/PV.77).

260. Introducing document CCD/554, the delegation of Sweden noted that it contained some key elements of a programme of action for disarmament and the machinery for negotiations to that end. It was focused on subjects in which Sweden had long taken a special interest, such as nuclear disarmament, the prohibition of particularly inhumane weapons, the reduction of military budgets, the reorganization of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the strengthening of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament; it also proposed that a second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should be convened in 1982 (ibid.).

261. In introducing documents CCD/556 and 557, the delegation of Pakistan noted that they had already been submitted to the Preparatory Committee and that their submittal to the Conference was a formality. The papers represented an attempt to focus on issues which, in the view of Pakistan, deserved increasing attention and were of particular concern to developing countries (CCD/PV.77).

262. Introducing documents CCD/560 and CCD/561 and Add.1, the delegation of Mexico noted that the papers were self-explanatory supplements to its paper CCD/545 and gave the following principal reasons for presenting them to the Committee for consideration in its work on a comprehensive disarmament programme. Regarding document CCD/560, Mexico was convinced that the programme to be prepared by the Committee must, like the comprehensive programme of 1970, contain a section defining the fundamental principles for implementation of the programme, and the Mexican document set forth 25 such principles, including affirmations that the final objective should be general and complete disarmament, that the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons should have the highest priority and that the United Nations has a primordial role in disarmament. Regarding document CCD/561, the paragraph of most use to the Committee was undoubtedly the one to the effect that the Committee should undertake preparation of a comprehensive programme as soon as it had undergone the reforms envisaged in the draft final document of the special session of the Assembly and that the programme should contain procedures for facilitating the co-ordination of all disarmament negotiations and ensuring that
the General Assembly was kept fully informed. Lastly, document CCD/561/Add.1 contained an additional 15 illustrative measures which might be included in the Committee's comprehensive programme of disarmament if they were not included in the short-term programme of action that might be adopted by the General Assembly at its special session (CCD/PV.780).

263. Commenting on document CCD/550, the delegation of Egypt stressed the following three main aspects of the question of a disarmament programme: (a) such a programme was an urgent matter in light of the continuing accumulation of arms, particularly nuclear arms and weapons of mass destruction; (b) priority should be given to nuclear, chemical, incendiary weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, in that order, while regional conflicts should be ended by eliminating their causes, thus bringing about the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons on both the regional and global level; and (c) confidence-building measures should be completely observed by all States and the principles of the non-use of force or threat of force in any form against any State would constitute such a measure. The delegation also expressed satisfaction that an ad hoc working group had been set up to elaborate a comprehensive programme (CCD/PV.782).

264. In commenting on document A/AC.187/55 of the Preparatory Committee for the special session, 28/ India held that a comprehensive programme of disarmament should be elaborated by a United Nations deliberative body, as had been proposed in that document. The measures of a comprehensive programme of disarmament had been correctly defined as a middle road between the current step-by-step approach and the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament. India was of the view that although eight years of the Disarmament Decade had passed, very little progress in regard to the comprehensive programme has been achieved. Therefore, the time had come to consider specifically the setting up of a body entrusted with the task of elaborating such measures within a specified time frame.

265. The delegation of Iran, stating that consideration of a comprehensive disarmament programme was especially appropriate now to plan future disarmament measures, agreed that such a programme need in no way depend on or conflict with the action programme to be decided by the Assembly at its special session, as the latter would presumably focus on more immediately achievable goals while the former would fit those goals into the framework of a larger process to extend over a longer time period. The delegation commented, however, that discussion of a comprehensive programme could not be a substitute for the negotiation of disarmament measures (CCD/PV.778).

266. The United States also pointed out that there were limitations to what could be accomplished by a comprehensive programme, particularly since it was not possible to set binding deadlines for negotiations that were, by their very nature, consensual. The delegation also hoped that the working group would consider not only proposals now before the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, but those that might be submitted in the future (CCD/PV.767).

267. The Ad Hoc Working Group to Discuss and Elaborate a Comprehensive Programme for Disarmament met informally during the spring session with a view to elaborating such a programme. It had before it papers prepared by the Secretariat, including

28/ Ibid., Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/S-10/1) vol. IV.
a compilation of the documents and proposals submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament which were relevant to the consideration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament (CCD/556 and Add.1) and a tabulation of working papers and proposals on a comprehensive programme of disarmament submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD/567 and Add.1). On 10 May, the Ad Hoc Working Group submitted a report (CCD/571) to the Committee which, inter alia, took note of the documents prepared by the Secretariat. The Working Group also decided to recommend to the Committee that the tabulation paper should be annexed to the Committee's special report to the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. 29/

268. Following the special session of the Assembly on disarmament, the Ad Hoc Working Group was not reconvened in the course of the summer session, the General Assembly having recommended in paragraph 118 of the final document of the special session that the Disarmament Commission should consider the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament to be submitted as recommendations to the General Assembly and through it to the negotiating body.

269. At the opening of the summer session of the Conference, the United States recalled that the special session of the Assembly on disarmament had agreed that negotiations on general and complete disarmament should be conducted concurrently with negotiations on partial measures of disarmament. In this connexion, the final document included a recommendation that the Committee on Disarmament should undertake the elaboration of a comprehensive programme on disarmament "encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality". The Conference had already begun this task, the United States stressed, by compiling the necessary documentation to facilitate future work on the comprehensive programme (CCD/PV.790). Similarly, the Soviet Union noted that an important provision of the final document was the one which emphasized the link between nuclear disarmament and the parallel adoption of political and international legal measures to strengthen the security of States, as well as the link between nuclear disarmament and progress in the field of limiting and reducing armed forces and conventional armaments of the nuclear-weapon States and other States in the regions concerned (ibid.).

270. Referring specifically to the programme of action included in the final document of the special session of the Assembly on disarmament, Mexico said that the measures included therein could be grouped into various categories according to whether they dealt with nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons, the preparation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, the reduction of military budgets, verification procedures, measures to strengthen international security and to build confidence, the relationship between disarmament and development, the preparation of studies on disarmament by the United Nations or the mobilization of world public opinion in favour of disarmament. In the light of the agenda of the Conference, which had remained unchanged since 1968, Mexico added, it would seem that, of all these categories of measures, those which were at the moment most directly within its competence were those concerning nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction and the comprehensive programme of disarmament (ibid.).

29/ Ibid., Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 2A (A/S-10/2/Add.1).
271. On the same subject, the Soviet Union recalled that at its spring session the Conference had established an ad hoc working group for this purpose and added that the special session of the Assembly on disarmament had confirmed this task, noting that the Committee on Disarmament would undertake the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control would become a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevailed and in which the new international economic order was strengthened and consolidated. The Soviet side intended to make energetic efforts with a view to the fulfilment of this task (ibid.).

272. The delegation of the Soviet Union also stressed the importance of the proposals put forward by the Soviet Government at the special session on disarmament, the recent proposals made by the Soviet Union and a number of other socialist countries at the Vienna negotiations on the mutual limitation and reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, the proposals on confidence-building measures put forward at the Belgrade Conference on Co-operation and Security in Europe, as well as a number of other proposals on various specific questions of disarmament presented at bilateral and multilateral talks. Those proposals concerned all aspects of the disarmament problem, and encompassed measures relating to both nuclear disarmament and conventional types of armaments and armed forces, measures of a global and regional character, as well as specific considerations on the expansion of co-operation between States and the consolidation of principles of peaceful coexistence of States with different social and economic systems and for the elimination of the use or threat of force from the relations between States. The Soviet proposals on disarmament, the delegation noted, took into account present realities in the world, as well as the security interests of all States, both large and small, nuclear and non-nuclear. Those proposals envisaged that any further quantitative and qualitative expansion of the armaments and armed forces of States with a large military potential should come to an end. Specifically, the Soviet Union had in mind the following measures: cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons; cessation of the production and the banning of all other types of weapons of mass destruction; cessation of the development of new types of conventional weapons of great destructive force; renunciation of the build-up of armies and of conventional armaments by the Powers which were permanent members of the Security Council, as well as by countries that had concluded military agreements with them. In other words, the Soviet Union proposed the implementation of specific measures both in the field of nuclear disarmament and in the field of conventional armed forces and armaments. However, since the main danger stemmed from the accelerating nuclear arms race, priority among disarmament measures should be given to ending the production of nuclear weapons so that stockpiles of such weapons could be gradually reduced and ultimately completely liquidated. The process of achieving nuclear disarmament should be inseparably connected with the strengthening of international legal guarantees for the security of States, including the conclusion of a world-wide treaty on the non-use of force in international relations (CCD/PV.790 and 805). Czechoslovakia (CCD/PV.792) and the German Democratic Republic (CCD/PV.795) also referred to those proposals as being of great significance. The German Democratic Republic viewed them as a comprehensive programme on the complete cessation of the quantitative and qualitative arms race. Bulgaria suggested that the Ad Hoc Working Group to Discuss and Elaborate a Comprehensive Programme for Disarmament be kept active (CCD/PV.794).
273. Sweden, considering the possibility of making more purposeful efforts to control arms developments, said that the reorientation of military research and development to more arms control adapted projects could be pursued by the leading military Powers. Such a reorientation could become instrumental either in negotiated agreements, or as mutual examples, or in the adoption of unilateral decisions to observe restraint during periods when negotiated results remained out of reach. Arms control assessments of planned new weapons might be more closely related to the international disarmament process. They could in that case facilitate the introduction of relevant weapon issues in different negotiating contexts both at the stage of research, development, production and deployment (CCD/PV.793).

274. Sweden also recalled that the Swedish proposals at the special session of the Assembly on disarmament for a programme of action in the field of nuclear disarmament specifically mentioned research, adding that while control and verification by inspection of all research performed in national laboratories might appear a distant goal, there were a number of important research and development activities which lent themselves more easily to observations than others.

275. The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany referred to paragraph 109 of the final document of the special session of the Assembly on disarmament, which called for negotiations on general and complete disarmament to be conducted concurrently with negotiations on partial measures of disarmament. In this connexion, the Committee on Disarmament was called upon to elaborate a comprehensive programme of disarmament. On the basis of paragraph 118 of the final document, the Disarmament Commission would consider elements of such a disarmament programme, which were to be submitted as recommendations to the General Assembly and, through it, to the negotiating body. The Federal Republic would have liked to see the Ad Hoc Working Group, which had been established during the spring session, resume its work at the summer session in order to continue its exchange of views. That would have been useful in order to clear up some questions which, at a later stage, could speed up deliberations in the Disarmament Commission, in the General Assembly and in the Committee on Disarmament. Unfortunately, such an exchange of views had not taken place, which meant, in practice, that the future Committee on Disarmament would probably not be able to take up that task before the spring of 1980 (CCD/PV.802).

Special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament

276. Practically every delegation that spoke at the summer session of the Conference made reference to the achievements of the special session on disarmament held at the United Nations Headquarters from 23 May to 30 June 1978.

277. That representative forum, the Soviet Union stated, had confirmed the wide interest displayed by all the peoples of the world in putting an end to the arms race and in achieving real disarmament. The session had also demonstrated that serious obstacles still remained to be overcome on the way towards reaching agreements on genuine disarmament. The special session was but a stage along that road. Many sound and useful proposals, the delegation noted, among which proposals by the Soviet Union and by other socialist States occupied a prominent place, formed the basis of the final document. Now the main task was to bring about the implementation of those proposals. As the Soviet Union had already repeatedly stated, it had always proceeded and continued to proceed from the premise that the
problem of disarmament could and should be solved. That required efforts by all States, both large and small, as well as political will and the wisdom of statesmen and Governments of all countries, and their determination and willingness to solve the problem. As for the Soviet Union, the delegation added, it was prepared to make its worthy contribution to the solution of that problem which was so vitally important to the maintenance and strengthening of peace (CCD/PV.790).

278. The United States held that the recommendations of the session were especially significant for the Conference as they had recognized that there was an urgent need that existing international disarmament machinery be revitalized and forums appropriately constituted for disarmament deliberations and negotiations with a better representative character. The delegation further noted that in a few months, "not later than January 1979", the Committee on Disarmament would be meeting, along with France and five to eight additional members. Membership in that Committee would also be open to the People's Republic of China, the delegation pointed out. The delegation went on to note that the United States was particularly pleased with the helpful role played by France in the deliberations on disarmament machinery. The United States was also very pleased that a general understanding had been reached, as announced by the President of the special session of the General Assembly, Mr. Mojsov, that the Committee on Disarmament would be open to all the members of the current Conference of the Committee on Disarmament that wished to participate (ibid.).

279. Mexico referred to the final document adopted by the special session as unprecedented in the disarmament annals of the United Nations and reviewed the salient features of the decisions taken by the General Assembly at its special session on disarmament and as set out in the various sections of the final document. That final document contained many objectives and principles whose mandatory nature none could call into doubt, since it was a document which was approved by a consensus to which China and France subscribed. Furthermore, it was a document in which States had expressly declared that they "will respect the objectives and principles stated above' and "make every effort faithfully to carry out the Programme of Action". The introduction contained a description of the regrettable paucity of results achieved by the United Nations with regard to disarmament. Alarmed by the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race, the Member States had concluded, in the Declaration, that mankind was today confronted with the choice either of halting the arms race and proceeding to disarmament or facing annihilation. Within the Declaration, Member States had also proclaimed words to the effect that the pressing need now was to translate into practical terms the provisions of the final document and to proceed along the road of binding and effective international agreements in the field of disarmament. That, according to the delegation of Mexico, was the most important guideline transmitted by the special session on disarmament (ibid.).

280. Czechoslovakia viewed the special session as a positive outcome of the trend in international policy during recent years, leading to détente and to the strengthening of confidence among States, and contributing to the growth of international co-operation and prosperity. The very fact that the General Assembly, at its special session, had been able to work out a unanimously adopted final document relating to major issues of disarmament was, in its view, an undeniable success (CCD/PV.792). Poland expressed its awareness of the historic significance of the session for the current and future disarmament negotiations. What clearly

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stood out among its major effects, Poland said, was the forceful reaffirmation in the final document of the priorities in disarmament negotiations, that is: nuclear disarmament, the prohibition of other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, and the reduction of conventional weapons and of armed forces (CCD/PV.793). Bulgaria pointed out that, although a number of important elements of a disarmament programme had not been included into the final document, the importance and usefulness of that document, which was the result of an international consensus, could not be underestimated (CCD/PV.794). The German Democratic Republic stressed that the useful impetus provided by the session must be channelled towards negotiations without delay (CCD/PV.795). The Mongolian delegation, associating itself with the positive assessment of the results of the special session on disarmament, noted with satisfaction that the success of the work of the special session had been largely promoted by the constructive efforts of the countries of the socialist community and other peace-loving States, especially the Soviet Union. It emphasized that the document submitted at the special session by the Soviet delegation 30/ on practical measures for ending the arms race, containing a broad and realistic programme of specific measures, had served as a useful basis for agreement on and the preparation of the final document of the session (CCD/PV.802).

281. Sweden saw in the special session a fresh starting point from which the nations of the world must move on towards concrete disarmament on the basis of the Programme of Action outlined in the final document (CCD/PV.793). Egypt noted approvingly the high priority that nuclear disarmament had been given in the final document (CCD/PV.795).

282. Romania stated that its Government was convinced that the special session had created the premises for a new approach to disarmament and had opened up new avenues for future negotiations. The principles - more democratic and established with the participation and consent of all States - that were to govern the negotiations, the negotiating machinery with its global outlook, the rich heritage of ideas and proposals put forward at the session and inspired by the will to relaunch the negotiations on the way towards genuine results, all those were new conditions which, in its view, justified hopes for the future. The special session on disarmament, the delegation went on to note, had not succeeded in adopting a programme which was sufficiently detailed and which would compel States to adopt disarmament measures, particularly in the field of nuclear disarmament. However, only through the adoption of practical measures for ending the arms race and for disarmament was it possible to assess the effectiveness of international action in that regard. Accordingly, the attainment of such a goal must, in the future, constitute the main task of the new deliberative and negotiating structures (CCD/PV.796).

283. In undertaking an extensive review of the results of the special session on disarmament, the delegation of Iran stated that while some contribution to the principles of disarmament had been made, and the direction of further disarmament efforts had been clarified, in terms of practical results the special session had, regrettably, been unable to clear the obstacles which had thwarted all efforts to date to achieve real progress in disarmament. The session had been unable to make any serious inroads on the essential issues, or to offer any new solutions. The

real breakthrough towards the goal of stopping the arms race and scaling down nuclear stockpiles had still to come, and it depended on the policies and measures pursued by the super-Powers. Nevertheless, the delegation noted, while no specific disarmament measure was concluded at the meeting, the spotlight was thrown on the most crucial problems, and the Governments primarily concerned would, hopefully, feel the pressure to negotiate as rapidly and efficiently as possible (ibid.).

284. Hungary considered the tenth special session to be an important instance of new disarmament efforts and stated that the outcome had in many respects met the expectations of its Government. The session had helped to increase awareness of world public opinion to the risks and dangers inherent in the continuing arms race and to the necessity of meaningful disarmament. It had also contributed to a better understanding of a wide range of different disarmament issues (CCD/PV.797).

285. Enumerating a number of positive developments of the special session on disarmament, the delegation of Canada listed, among them, participation in the debate by many world leaders; active involvement in the work of the Conference by all nuclear-weapon States and the declared readiness of France to join international negotiations on disarmament; the solemn declaration by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union that they would not use nuclear weapons except for self-defence, and not against States that had renounced nuclear weapons; and awakening of public interest and the long-term educational effect of intensified studies and public information activities. While all that was laudable, so far as it went, the delegation stressed that what happened now would depend, as always, on the political will of the countries concerned (CCD/PV.799).”

286. The Netherlands welcomed the virtual consensus on the final document, which despite some regrettable ambiguous language, nevertheless provided a substantive outline for a somewhat safer future for the world. However, the delegation also felt it necessary to express some disappointment with respect to certain sections of the final document, where it believed more could and should have been achieved in order to meet the very strong feelings prevalent throughout all regions and all peoples of the world without exception. That comment referred particularly to the parts that dealt with the nuclear arms race, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the comprehensive test ban and the conventional weapons trade (ibid.).

287. Yugoslavia stated that the special session on disarmament had fully confirmed the justification of the initiative of the non-aligned countries concerning the need for a direct engagement of all members of the international community in the consideration of disarmament problems. The special session was an event of exceptional political importance, particularly for broadening the platform on which, in the future, adequate solutions should be looked for. It was of great importance for the identification of the roads leading to the established objectives, as well as for the reaffirmation and strengthening of the role of the United Nations in this decisive area of contemporary international relations. In this sense, it seemed true to state that the special session represented a mark of progress on the way to a new stage in the post-war efforts of the international community in the field of disarmament, the delegation added (ibid.).

288. The delegation of the United Kingdom, noting that most of the assessments of the special session on disarmament which had been heard in the Committee had been moderately positive, said that its Government shared that view. There could be no doubt of the success of the session in promoting general awareness - both among
Governments and among peoples... need for disarmament and appreciation of the difficult problems involved. It certainly generated pressure for progress. According to the delegation, the most tangible results of the session were with respect to the decisions taken regarding the restructuring of the deliberative and negotiating machinery. The Government of the United Kingdom particularly welcomed those decisions. Another achievement was the very fact that the final document had been adopted by consensus, the delegation noted. This was all the more remarkable when one considered that only one third of the disarmament resolutions adopted by the thirty-second General Assembly, had achieved consensus. It was also significant that the consensus had involved 144 States, almost the entire membership of the United Nations, and had included both France and China. However, in the delegation's opinion, when historians came to assess the special session, in the future, they would be wrong to consider only those aspects to which the delegation had referred. The true test would be whether the special session had given new impetus to the process of disarmament, and whether the new machinery assisted that process. The delegation also stressed that the judgement of those future historians would depend in large part upon the actions in the present Committee and its successor (CCD/PV.801).

289. The delegation of Japan stated that though the special session on disarmament had not produced any concrete disarmament measures, the delegation still considered it of great value that the final document had been adopted by consensus, after hard negotiations (ibid.).

290. The delegation of Nigeria was of the opinion that it seemed too early to make an assessment of the special session on disarmament. That the General Assembly was able at the session to adopt a consensus document could and must be applauded, the delegation stressed. However, one could not but adopt a wait-and-see attitude, for delegations had also witnessed and congratulated themselves on the consensus reached at the sixth and seventh special sessions of the General Assembly on the new international economic order. Since then, not much had happened, the delegation noted. Composing a declaration and negotiating a programme of action, as well as devising suitable machinery, were perhaps indispensable means to an end. But, the delegation emphasized, they should not be given the attribute of the end itself. Prospects for early implementation of the programme of action did not, at present, appear bright. Otherwise, delegations would not be spending their time in the Committee debating instead of negotiating (ibid.).

291. The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany shared the generally positive assessment on the results of the special session as expressed in the Conference by other delegations. Referring, in particular, to the final document adopted by the special session, it noted that the document recorded all the important objectives to be achieved on disarmament, defined their urgency and at the same time made their interdependence clear, emphasizing the close relationship between all the objectives which were to be integrated in the disarmament process. In this context, the document clearly showed the close link between nuclear and conventional disarmament. The delegation also recalled the specific areas (verification of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, verification of a ban on chemical weapons, and confidence-building measures) on which the Federal Republic had submitted working papers at the special session (CCD/PV.802).

292. The delegation of Italy declared that it considered the result of the special session on disarmament a reasonably positive outcome. Although the final document
adopted by the special session did not fully reflect the Italian Government's views on a number of issues, it embodied to the fullest possible extent the degree of unanimity which was within reach at that particular instance and which could have been expected from the first gathering of such an important magnitude. The delegation went on to state that the special session, in particular, had produced a programme of action which, in establishing an order for priority tasks, had put new pressure on States that were in a position to negotiate to pursue prompt initiatives and to realize fresh and substantive achievements in the field of arms limitation (CCD/PV.804).

293. Czechoslovakia urged that a world disarmament conference, as recommended in the final document, be convened as soon as possible (CCD/PV.792). Poland recalled the language of the final document to the effect that "at the earliest appropriate time, a world disarmament conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation" (CCD/PV.793). The German Democratic Republic believed that only a world disarmament conference could be a forum where, given appropriate powers, existing proposals could be translated into concrete and binding legal agreements and urged that still greater efforts be made to prepare such a conference (CCD/PV.795). Hungary declared that an important result of the special session was the support given in the final document to the idea of convening a world disarmament conference at the earliest appropriate time (CCD/PV.797). In the view of the Mongolian delegation, the special session on disarmament constituted an historical forum and had made an important contribution to the preparations for a world disarmament conference (CCD/PV.802).

Question of establishing an international disarmament organization

294. The question of establishing some type of international disarmament agency, which had been raised from time to time in the Conference in earlier years, continued to receive attention at the Committee's 1978 session.

295. At the 1978 spring session of the Committee, the delegation of Italy stated that the establishment of an international organization to supervise the implementation of disarmament agreements would be of great value (CCD/PV.778). Subsequently, the question was raised again by the Netherlands in concrete form, and the delegation submitted a document on the subject, entitled "Study on the establishment of an international disarmament agency" (CCD/565), proposing the creation of such an agency "to streamline" disarmament consultations and implementation measures and suggesting that the special session of the General Assembly, in its final document, include an invitation to all Member States to submit their views on such an agency.

296. In introducing the document to the Committee, the delegation of the Netherlands stressed that several countries, including Italy, had recently shown interest in a disarmament organization because a number of important disarmament agreements now approaching conclusion would require rather elaborate permanent machinery for consultations between parties and for substantial implementation and verification tasks. The only existing treaty of such a complicated nature was the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and it had used the existing International Atomic Energy Agency to carry out its verification requirements; but no such organization existed to carry out such needs for a chemical weapons ban or a nuclear test ban, for example. Such an organization could also be entrusted with organizing review conferences for various treaties and, as it gained experience, could be
given other appropriate functions. As more disarmament measures were achieved, it would be important, the delegation held, to have an impartial body, for example under United Nations auspices, which could contribute to the implementation of such agreements. In that connexion, the delegation expressed support for the premise of a recent French proposal to establish an international observation satellite agency, because internationalization of satellite information seemed essential in the long run; however, satellites could not perform all verification functions — as was clear from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and from the negotiations on a comprehensive test ban and a chemical weapons ban — and it therefore seemed better to combine the French proposal with the idea of the Netherlands for an international organization so as to make it possible to combine all sorts of implementation functions. The delegation realized that much more careful consideration would be required before any final decision in the matter could be taken and therefore proposed only that the views of States Members of the United Nations be sought on the matter. If further steps proved warranted by the responses received, the Conference or an ad hoc committee might be given the task of working out the modalities of such an agency and the General Assembly, at the second special session on disarmament, could take a decision on its establishment (CCD/PV.783).

297. The delegation of Italy also submitted a working paper (CCD/568) suggesting that the United Nations consider establishing machinery to verify multilateral disarmament agreements. In introducing the paper, the delegation expressed the view that the document of the Netherlands (CCD/565) contained ideas worthy of being discussed, studied in depth and elaborated. Italy felt that the problem of verification of compliance with disarmament measures as a whole should be reconsidered with a view to tackling it and, if possible, solving it by reference to uniform and coherent criteria in an appropriate international context. It was of the opinion that the international organ of verification suggested in working document CCD/568 should employ whatever technological and scientific means — such as sensing, sampling, recording, communicating and interpreting devices — might be usefully applied toward an effective verification of disarmament measures (CCD/PV.784).

298. The Romanian delegation stated that it was prepared to consider in a favourable light the proposal by the Netherlands for the establishment of an international disarmament agency (CCD/PV.785).

299. At the Committee's summer session, the Netherlands notified the Committee of its intention to continue the discussion on its proposal for an international disarmament organization. The delegation stated that, although of no direct urgency, that proposal was obviously of great relevance to the future and that it could have been dealt with somewhat more adequately at the special session on disarmament. But like several other valuable suggestions, it had received insufficient attention at the special session, due to the immense complexity and urgency of the central, major issues that were at stake. The delegation expressed its wish, nevertheless, to continue the dialogue on the international disarmament organization and its various aspects in the Committee on Disarmament until such time that it was ripe for implementation. It was confident that in due course there would be a consensus in the Committee to put the proposal before the General Assembly. In fact, the delegation emphasized, within a few years the absolute indispensability of an international disarmament organization, or some such equivalent organization, would be generally recognized (CCD/PV.799).
300. Elaborating, at the summer session, on the question of verification machinery for multilateral disarmament agreements, the delegation of Italy pointed out that the Assembly, at its special session, had authoritatively stated in paragraph 31 of the final document that disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they were being observed by all parties. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depended upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. Agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process. Where appropriate a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed. The delegation stressed that its Government, which had always taken a clear stand on that matter, entirely subscribed to such an approach. In that respect, it recalled the proposal introduced by the Italian Government both in the Conference and at the special session, regarding the establishment, within the framework of the United Nations, of an international verification organ to supervise, from the technical and from the legal standpoint, the implementation of disarmament treaties in force, so as to ensure full compliance with their provisions. The delegation noted that comprehensive proposals on the same question had been made, in connexion with the special session by France and the Netherlands. In the delegation's view they contained both valuable and constructive elements. It looked forward to a thorough debate on the whole matter with a view to finding effective and generally acceptable solutions to the problem of verification (CCD/PV.804).
E. Organization and procedures of the Committee

301. At the Committee's meetings during 1978, prior to and following the holding of the special session on disarmament, delegations commented on various facets pertaining to the organizational and procedural aspects of the Committee.

302. In the course of meetings preceding the special session, many delegations commenting on the question of specific modifications in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament organizational procedures, also commented in a general way on the performance of the Committee as a whole.

303. The United States emphasized that, if the Committee were to continue as an effective multilateral disarmament negotiating body, it was essential that the Committee continue to operate on the principle of consensus and that it maintain limited, but representative membership. The United States also stated that it was prepared to consider organizational changes, but cautioned against discarding methods proven to be effective just for the sake of change (CCD/PV.767).

304. The delegation of the Soviet Union stressed the significance of the Committee as an authoritative and effective international negotiating body and hoped other members would contribute to a solution of the common problems so that it could achieve further concrete results (ibid.). The delegation also stated that the Committee had become increasingly active, particularly in recent years and had been intensifying its work, going deeper into problems and concentrating its attention increasingly on the main areas of disarmament (CCD/PV.781).

305. The delegation of Mexico, stressing the view that there was widespread support for improving the structure and methods of work of the Committee and specifically for changing without delay the present system of co-chairmanship, urged the Committee to reconsider the proposal previously put forward by Mexico and others to set up a standing sub-committee of the whole and to abolish the co-chairmanship. Reminding the Committee that the Group of 15 had unanimously supported the proposal to establish a sub-committee contained in their working paper of 1977, 31/ the delegation quoted extensively from that document concerning the advantages of establishing the sub-committee and suggested that the document be used as a basis for further consideration of the matter. With regard to the co-chairmanship, the delegation proposed that the many previous suggestions of Mexico on the subject, the latest of which recommended a monthly rotation of the Chair among all non-nuclear-weapon States members of the Committee, might be used as a basis for a resumption of consideration of the matter. The delegation said that Mexico's reason for not including nuclear-weapon States in the suggested rotation was the same as that for excluding such States from the presidency of the General Assembly (CCD/PV.767).

306. The delegation of Romania stated that a change in the Committee's activities was urgently demanded by the large majority of States which would enable the Committee to become a real multilateral negotiating body (CCD/PV.768). The delegation of Hungary held that the Committee, as the sole organ for multilateral disarmament negotiations, had a well-defined place in the machinery

of such negotiations and that it was generally recognized that it would continue to be needed in the future (CCD/PV.770). The delegation of Bulgaria, stressing the significance of the five treaties and conventions worked out as a result of the Committee's efforts, expressed amazement at various negative assessments of the Committee's work, which it considered prejudicial and unwarranted (CCD/PV.772).

307. The delegation of India held that, with all its inadequacies, the Committee had been a useful forum. It would function even more effectively with some changes in its structure and working procedures, but India did not agree that it should be replaced by some other negotiating body (CCD/PV.771 and 786). The delegation added the view that effective mechanisms were important not only for making progress in negotiations but also to help generate political will (CCD/PV.786).

308. The delegation of Japan supported the idea that the Committee should modify parts of its organization and procedures so as to introduce measures for improvement, with a view to strengthening its function while reflecting the voices and opinions of the countries which were not members of the Committee, as well as strengthening its ties to the General Assembly. However, it was firmly convinced that the Committee had been effectively discharging its responsibility as a forum for negotiations, and that it was undoubtedly the most appropriate organ for further negotiations, and hence that it should continue to be an indispensable negotiating body in the future (CCD/PV.776).

309. The delegation of Italy, noting that the Committee had played a leading role in the elaboration of most of the treaties so far concluded, held that while it was not perfect, radical changes should not be made or existing bodies dismantled without any real necessity. The Committee had irreplaceable skills and experience and had recently adjusted its methods of work to meet the changing needs; it should continue to function as the main multilateral negotiating body (CCD/PV.778). The delegation of the United Kingdom considered the Committee to be one of the most important international bodies in the world, since it was the principal multilateral disarmament negotiating forum and disarmament was one of the most important world tasks (CCD/PV.779). The delegation of the United Kingdom also stressed that the Committee had not only achieved several treaties but had made a substantial contribution to the general improvement in the international atmosphere and had increased understanding of the problems of disarmament and the ways of overcoming them (CCD/PV.786).

310. The delegation of Sweden also continued to support the elimination of the co-chairmanship on the grounds that the world of 1978 was considerably different from that of 1962, when the institution was established. The delegation suggested that a Committee "bureau" be established consisting of four members, one Chairman and three Vice-Chairmen, two of which would be chosen from the States belonging to the military blocs and two from the group of neutral or non-aligned States; under that arrangement, the chairmanship of Committee meetings could rotate among all Committee members on a monthly or sessional basis. Sweden also recommended that the formal meetings of the Committee be made public unless decided otherwise and that all States Members of the United Nations who submitted proposals to the Committee should be entitled to address the Committee during the discussions of such proposals in the plenary meetings (CCD/PV.767).

311. The delegation of Nigeria observed that the Conference was often accused of being an irrelevant talking-shop which was incapable of making a real contribution
to the most pressing question of our time - how to save mankind from the nuclear
monster which he had created. The delegation believed that such criticisms
should not be dismissed as being ill-motivated; rather, members should undertake
a realistic examination of the Committee based on four factors: (a) an effective
negotiating forum should ensure the participation of all nuclear-weapon States;
(b) it should not be unduly restrictive; (c) it should have a democratic
structure; and (d) account should be taken of the many changes that had taken
place in the world since 1961 and the growing interest of all countries in
disarmament (CCD/PV.769).

312. The delegation of India noted that, as a result of recent discussions on
organization and procedures, the annual reports were now more substantive and
meaningful, the records of the Committee were now made available to all States
Member of the United Nations and to the public and the work programme followed an
agreed calendar ensuring the orderly conduct of business. A change should be
made, however, in the institution of the co-chairmanship, the delegation
believed, not because such a change would make it easier for China and France
to participate in the Committee, however desirable that might be, but because
all members of an international forum should have the same rights and
responsibilities. For the same reason, however, the delegation saw no reason
to deny the nuclear-weapon States the right to act as chairman and preferred a
procedure of monthly rotation among all members. The proposal to establish a
standing sub-committee should also be carefully studied. India also supported
the suggestion that non-members should have the right to submit proposals or
views on measures under negotiation and to attend meetings when such measures were
examined. It also believed that the plenary meeting should not, as a rule, be
closed to the press and public, particularly since the verbatim records of those
meetings were now being made available to the public. Lastly, the delegation
believed that, in addition to its annual report to the General Assembly, the
Committee should submit periodic reports (CCD/PV.771).

313. The delegation of Iran said it would consider changes in the Committee's
organization and procedures that would advance the ultimate goal of achieving
substantial measures of arms limitations, in particular any modifications that
would bring all the nuclear-weapon States into the negotiations. With reference
to the co-chairmanship, the delegation held that any remedy for the present
situation must also uphold the principle of the sovereign equality of States
and, therefore, the best solution would be to rotate the chairmanship among all
Committee members without excluding any State or group of States (CCD/PV.778).

314. The delegation of Italy believed that while a good negotiating structure
could not remedy a lack of political will, the latter could be stimulated by,
and gradually originated from, a better understanding through constructive
discussions in an appropriate body. With particular regard to suggestions that
the Committee should again be enlarged, Italy considered a limited forum to be
essential for the efficient conduct of business and, although it would consider
a small increase in the Committee's size, it believed that careful attention
should be given to the capability of new members to contribute to disarmament
negotiations. As an alternative, Committee meetings might be opened to other
States Members of the United Nations under appropriate conditions, possibly as
observers. Other States Members of the United Nations might also be allowed to
submit written proposals for consideration as official documents and participate
in the discussions of those proposals. With regard to strengthening the link with
the United Nations, the Committee should maintain the degree of autonomy essential for creativity and productiveness, as well as the principle of consensus so essential in a body where the security interests of all States were involved. The Committee should, however, prepare periodic reports to the General Assembly after its annual spring session, as well as special reports on particular topics. The Committee should, at the beginning of each annual session, also agree on the work to be accomplished and on a methodical programme of negotiations. It should also seek agreement on setting up without delay functional working groups to negotiate draft treaties or to give informal considerations to specific items, when necessary with the participation of experts. With regard to the argument that the abolition of the co-chairmanship would make the Committee more attractive to the nuclear-weapon Powers not now participating in it, Italy believed that, in a body taking decisions by consensus, elimination of the co-chairmanship would not affect the substance of the prerogatives of the Soviet Union and the United States, both of which played a crucial role in the disarmament process and had a special responsibility for its promotion: on the other hand, if renunciation of the co-chairmanship would result in the participation of China and France, such a renunciation would be a gesture of goodwill highly appreciated by the international community (ibid.).

315. The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany favoured improvements in the Committee's procedures and composition, provided such changes would improve the Committee's efficiency (CCD/PV.771). The delegation of Japan supported the idea of improving the Committee's organization and procedures with a view to enhancing its role, reflecting the views of non-members and strengthening the Committee's ties to the General Assembly (CCD/PV.776).

316. The delegations of Hungary (CCD/PV.770), Czechoslovakia (CCD/PV.771), Bulgaria (CCD/PV.772), Mongolia (CCD/PV.773) and the German Democratic Republic (CCD/PV.775) directly rebutted a number of the proposals outlined above for additional changes in the Committee's organization and procedures, in particular the proposal to eliminate the co-chairmanship. Speaking generally, the delegation of Czechoslovakia considered the recently revised organization and procedures of the Committee, including maintenance of co-chairmanship, to be well-suited to the needs of the Committee's work; while the delegation was willing to consider any further meaningful and justified changes on their merit, it did not believe changes should be made hastily without due consideration. The delegation of Hungary pointed out that the Committee had already taken a number of decisions to strengthen or modify its practices, and held that in view of the urgent problems of halting the arms race, the Committee should set secondary matters aside and concentrate all its energies on the main tasks before it. Similarly, the German Democratic Republic stressed that the Committee had discussed all procedural questions freely and regularly over the years, which had resulted in important changes in the Committee's composition, as well as the adoption of a number of procedural changes as recently as 1977. All States Members of the United Nations were now fully informed of the Committee's work and could participate in that work under various arrangements. Such flexibility should continue, the delegation held, on the basis of consensus and the equality of States, and no bureaucratic machinery should be established, for example in the form of a standing sub-committee. The delegation of Mongolia stated that it regarded the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament as an independent, multilateral negotiating body with solid working experience, and that the question which was now being raised repeatedly in the Committee with the clear aim of achieving a fundamental reorganization of its structure should be approached with all due seriousness.
317. On the particular question of the co-chairmanship, the delegation of Hungary, pointing out that all countries recognized the reality of the important role played by the Soviet Union and the United States in world problems and in the maintenance of peace and international security, held that it followed that the unity of views and common initiative of those two States was essential for any important and lasting arrangement on disarmament. That fact justified the institution of the co-chairmanship. The delegation added that it doubted that the abolition of the co-chairmanship would appreciably influence the attitude of those Powers that were so far not inclined to participate in disarmament negotiations. The key to the solution of major disarmament problems, the delegation concluded, lay neither in the continuous reorganization of the Committee nor in the abolition of the co-chairmanship, but in much deeper considerations.

318. The delegation of Bulgaria pointed out that there had never been a single instance of high-handedness in the Committee on the part of the Co-Chairmen and that all members were equal, each chairing the Committee meetings in alphabetical order. Each member could not only present documents and proposals, but also oppose Committee decisions, all of which must be taken by consensus. The efficiency of the Committee's procedures had been amply demonstrated, and the Committee should be grateful to the Co-Chairmen for their hard work both in the Committee and outside it; there could be few results in the disarmament field without their active bilateral efforts. For those reasons, the delegation urged the Committee to concentrate its entire attention mainly on the most pressing problems of disarmament instead of diverting it to non-substantive matters. The delegation of Mongolia also held that the institution of the co-chairmanship involved the very principles on which the Committee was based.

319. Similarly, the delegation of the German Democratic Republic held that the existence of the co-chairmanship had never prevented equality in reaching Committee decisions; on the contrary, the close collaboration of the two Co-Chairmen had saved the Committee from lengthy discussions of matters which were the special responsibility of those two Powers. The delegation added that attempts to transfer the structure of other international bodies to the Conference could only harm the Committee. Its failure to achieve a greater degree of success was not due to its procedures, and changing its procedures would not significantly accelerate its work. The German Democratic Republic also referred to the question of the Committee's composition, noting that it had grown dynamically over the 16 years of the Committee's existence and holding that the present composition met essential requirements and should be maintained in principle.

320. On 17 March 1978, the Group of 15 in the Committee submitted a working paper (CCD/563) on the organization and procedures of the Committee. The paper stated that the following five changes deserved the highest priority: (a) strengthening the existing link between the General Assembly and the Committee by permitting all States Members of the United Nations to submit disarmament proposals on questions under the Committee's consideration and to participate in the Committee and its working bodies when such proposals were examined and by enhancing the role in the Committee of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Centre for Disarmament of the United Nations; (b) replacement of the co-chairmanship by a new system to be agreed upon based on existing proposals; (c) adoption of rules of procedures for the Committee; (d) examination of other procedures to improve the Committee's effectiveness, including the establishment of a standing sub-committee of the whole; and (e) opening the Committee's plenary meetings to the public.
321. In introducing the document on behalf of the 15 sponsors, the delegation of Mexico stressed the additional points that renunciation of the co-chairmanship could not prejudice the powers or legitimate interests of the Soviet Union and the United States, since all decisions were taken by consensus and that, on the contrary, such a gesture of renunciation would considerably enhance the moral stature of the two Powers; and that the rules of procedure to be adopted would incorporate all the customs and usages that had been gradually developed over the 16 years of the Committee's existence (CCD/PV.781).

322. In supporting the document, the delegation of Egypt emphasized that the co-chairmanship should be altered to satisfy the need for a change felt by Committee members, perhaps by monthly rotation, and that an organic link should be established between the Committee and the General Assembly (CCD/PV.782).

323. The delegation of the Soviet Union again noted that the Committee was the basic multilateral disarmament negotiating body and that it had actively participated and contributed to the elaboration of five disarmament agreements which, together with bilateral arms control agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States, constituted the most essential part of international agreements in the disarmament field. The delegation also affirmed that the practical results achieved by the Committee could have been more significant if the Committee's efforts had had the political and practical support of all States, and in particular the nuclear-weapon Powers. Despite such objective difficulties, however, the Committee had proved itself to be a dynamic mechanism for conducting multilateral negotiations on disarmament, a mechanism which was constantly improving the forms of its organization and procedure. In that connexion the Soviet delegation made additional comments on various specific aspects of the Committee's work and organization. On the question of the Committee's composition, the delegation stressed that, over the years, the Committee had made dynamic changes in membership reflecting the changes that had taken place in the world since its establishment. The present ratio of membership, with one half divided in equal numbers between the socialist countries and the Western countries and the other half comprised of developing and non-aligned countries, reflected existing realities and took into account the interests of all States. The present Committee membership thus ensured the required representation while being reasonably limited to enable the Committee to act effectively and flexibly. On the question of the forms and methods of the Committee's work, the delegation pointed out (a) that the chairmanship of formal meetings was rotated in turn among all members in alphabetical order; (b) that informal meetings were regularly held on various questions to permit a more free exchange of views and the participation of technical experts if required; (c) that ad hoc working groups could be established for detailed scrutiny of draft agreements, for study of special questions and for seeking solutions to various problems; (d) that bilateral and multilateral negotiations and consultations were conducted for various purposes, including the preparation of specific proposals; (e) that all decisions were taken on the basis of consensus, thus putting all Committee members on an equal footing; and (f) that the Co-Chairmen were increasingly assuming difficult tasks and responsibilities for the preparation of initiatives to solve various topical questions, playing an important organizational role without hampering in any way, but rather encouraging initiative on the part of other members, and providing the specific knowledge of the subject-matter under discussion which, unlike the case in certain United Nations bodies, was of particular importance in a working body having the more narrow task of elaborating draft disarmament agreements. While the delegation proceeded from the
premise that improvements in the form and methods of work were both possible and desirable, as evidenced by the decisions in the matter taken at the 1976 and 1977 sessions of the Committee, reforms should not be an end in themselves nor be made merely for the sake of reform, but should actually result in greater effectiveness to achieve greater results (CCD/PV.781).

324. The delegation of the United States, while understanding the impatience and concern of some Committee members that important matters were being discussed on a bilateral or trilateral basis, urged the Committee to bear in mind that the Committee had played an important substantive role in elaborating five arms control treaties, all of which were time-consuming and required extensive bilateral or trilateral consultations. As examples, the delegation mentioned negotiations on the partial test ban from 1958 to 1963 - with promising negotiations continuing to the present day on a full test ban - and on the non-proliferation Treaty from 1962 to 1968. As a final word on the future of the Committee, which would be discussed at the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly, the delegation reiterated its view that the Committee was a useful negotiating forum and should be retained as such with a size commensurate to its tasks; it also believed that its organization and procedures were operating effectively, although the United States would be prepared to accept structural changes if it appeared that a positive advantage would be gained thereby (CCD/PV.781 and 789).

325. The delegation of Poland stressed the view that, with many formidable new and old tasks, the Committee should be careful that the ultimate interests of disarmament did not suffer through a desire to reform existing mechanisms. The delegation also emphasized that the two enlargements of the Committee's membership, in 1969 and 1975, had reflected the growing interest in disarmament negotiations and had resulted, among other things, in a better political and geographical representation without turning the Committee into a mere debating forum. With regard to the method of work, the last few years had shown that the annual reviews or organizational procedures had resulted in satisfactory procedural adjustments, such as the method of preparation of the Committee's annual reports, the new press release format and the variety of ways in which the Committee was now handling its work. Unacceptable additional demands, the delegation believed, might seriously strain the constructive spirit of accommodation now prevailing in the Committee and undermine its foundation as a viable and effective multilateral disarmament negotiating body, based on the essential principle of consensus. Specifically, the delegation was not persuaded that the institution of co-chairmanship should be replaced, particularly since it saw no tangible proof that the institution stood in the way of other nuclear-weapon Powers joining in the common endeavours. Sharing the view that the treaties and conventions that the Committee had already helped to conclude represented the most essential part of the international achievements in the field, the delegation held that the list was unsurpassed in the history of multilateral disarmament negotiations, even though the Committee should not be overly satisfied so long as the arms race had not been stopped or reversed (CCD/PV.783).

326. The delegation of the Netherlands, summarizing the situation with regard to the Committee's organization and procedures as the delegation saw it, held that it would be too easy to pretend that something was wrong with the Committee because of some understandable disappointments over the allegedly meagre results of its negotiations. Disarmament was a difficult and complex problem touching on the security of States and must be considered in various forums depending on the
subject-matter. The Conference had been created to meet the absolute necessity of
having a world-wide forum to conclude agreements that would find world-wide
acceptance; it had accomplished important work and had other important work before
it. There seemed to be a general feeling that such a body should have a restricted
membership to make possible effective negotiations on complicated disarmament
questions, and the delegation did not believe that suggestions for a rotating
membership were practical. On the other hand, countries not members of the
Committee should be permitted, even more than in the past, to circulate working
documents and participate in special working groups, such as had occurred in the
cases of the nuclear-weapon-free zone group and the seismological Group. It must
be kept in mind, however, that the detailed negotiation of a particular treaty was
a key Committee activity that did not require the participation of many countries.
The delegation also feared that making the Committee meetings public might
encourage propaganda exercises for the press. It suggested that the role of
non-members in achieving agreements might be enhanced by giving the First Committee
of the General Assembly ample time to consider the results of the Committee's work
each year and to refer matters back to the Committee for further consideration
if the First Committee did not consider the results satisfactory (ibid.).

327. With regard to the position of the Soviet Union and the United States in the
Committee, the delegation of the Netherlands held that it was obvious that no
disarmament agreement could be concluded without their consent and active
participation in its elaboration, but there was no need for the two Powers to
have the special status of Co-Chairmen to make that position clear. The main
objective should be to maintain the Committee as a serious and viable forum
attractive to all nuclear-weapon States, since the agreement of the two principal
nuclear-weapon States, while vital for any real disarmament measure, was not the
only factor in world relations. The delegation had no strong feeling with regard
to the establishment of a Committee "bureau" or steering committee, provided that
it would be a tool to accelerate Committee work efficiently and democratically
and not become a kind of "inner circle". In conclusion, the delegation again
stressed the importance it attached to the Committee, to its flexible procedures,
to its restricted membership with substantial know-how and to its rule of
consensus. The delegation considered the Committee basically sound and, while not
opposing useful adaptations, as already indicated, believed there was no need for
a fundamentally different forum. It hoped the Committee would make that position
clear in its special report to the special session of the General Assembly.

328. The delegation of Italy, in introducing its working paper CCD/568 on
international mechanisms for disarmament, confirmed its high regard for the work
of the Committee, despite some disappointments, and stressed that Italy still
considered it the most qualified body for the negotiation of international
disarmament measures at the multilateral level and on the basis of consensus.
The delegation pointed out, however, that its paper suggested that the Committee
might: (a) accept a limited increase in its present membership; (b) permit a
broader participation of interested non-member States as observers with the
right to present written proposals and to take part in the discussion of such
proposals; (c) maintain a closer liaison with the United Nations by submitting
progress reports after each spring session, as well as periodic reports on
particular topics; (d) establish a methodical schedule of negotiations for its
sessions at the beginning of each year's work; (e) establish functional working
groups to negotiate draft treaties or to study specific items in depth with the
assistance of experts; and (f) consider opening its plenary meetings to the
public. The delegation further noted that its Government had not deemed it
appropriate to formulate suggestions regarding the Committee co-chairmanship in a
general and tentative working document because of the delicate and complex nature of the question, but confirmed the views it had expressed earlier on the subject and said it was prepared to accept any solution conforming to generally recognized international practices (CCD/PV.784).

329. The delegation of Romania held that the attention being given at the spring session to the role of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in the framework of disarmament negotiations was justified by the unsatisfactory results achieved by the Committee so far and by the forthcoming special session on disarmament. Quoting from a number of documents on the subject submitted by Romania in the past to show its constant interest in the adoption of measures to improve and enhance the role of the United Nations and the Committee, the delegation stated that the views it was now presenting to the Committee on the subject of the Committee's organization and procedures were based on the recent Romanian document submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the special session, affirming that the United Nations should exercise direct authority in the disarmament field concerning negotiations, the elaboration of draft agreements and the verification of implementation of agreements. The basic reason for the Committee's inactivity was a lack of political will of States, in contradiction to commitments undertaken by them in the Charter of the United Nations, and the role of any disarmament mechanism should be that of mobilizing and harmonizing such political will. In carrying out such a role, the organization and procedures under which negotiations were carried out could be decisive, particularly in a multilateral negotiating body such as the Conference. Committee reform was therefore not a case of change for the sake of change, but a means of increasing the Committee's efficiency and output; the positions of the various members towards procedural reform reflected their attitude on the degree of authority and competence the Committee should be given. The delegation listed five considerations that it considered indispensable for efficient Committee work: (a) the extension of the authority of the United Nations over the Committee's work; (b) democratization of Committee work and procedures; (c) the taking into consideration of the proposals and views of all member States on an equal footing; (d) the creation of conditions for the direct participation of all members in all phases of discussions and negotiations, as well as for the free access to the Committee of all other interested States; and (e) the use of open diplomacy within the Committee and the provision of accurate information to the public concerning the consequences of the arms race and the progress of disarmament negotiations. In expressing Romania's support for document CCD/563 submitted by the Group of 15, as well as for other proposals concerning Committee organization and procedures, the delegation concluded that a substantial majority of Committee members now stood for such changes. On the specific point of the co-chairmanship, the delegation of Romania expressed its strong preference that the Committee should be presided over by all delegations in an alphabetical order. It also stated that no chairmanship formula based on the representation of military alliances would be acceptable. Changes in organization and procedures were a basic requirement for adjustment to the basic changes in international relations since the Committee's creation and not a matter to be directly linked with the question of participation of all nuclear-weapon Powers in the Committee's work (CCD/PV.785).

330. The delegation of the United Kingdom, reaffirming its view of the value of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament as an institution, called attention to


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the gradual expansion of disarmament committees over the years, which reflected a growth of interest in the subject of disarmament. There had been a conflict between the desire to keep the negotiating committee small enough to facilitate the progress of the negotiations and the desire to contain as many States and points of view as possible. Because of this, there could be no ideal size for a negotiating body but there was a strong case for bringing certain major Powers into the negotiating of disarmament treaties and there should be arrangements to allow non-members of the Committee to participate on issues in which they had a particular interest. Considerable improvements in the working procedures of the Committee had been made over the years, the delegation held, and the use of ad hoc working groups had proved valuable (CCD/PV.786).

331. The delegation of Ethiopia said it would support genuine measures which would enable the Committee to function more effectively and to continue as the main international negotiating forum on disarmament. It recognized the special responsibilities devolving upon the nuclear-weapon States and the need for maintaining the delicate balance in the Committee's membership, but measures should be sought to improve the working mechanism of that important negotiating machinery and at the same time to enable all nuclear-weapon States to participate in its work. It was with that understanding that the Ethiopian delegation supported working paper CCD/563 submitted by the Group of 15.

332. When the Committee resumed its work after the holding of the special session on disarmament, the United States delegation, in its opening statement on 11 July 1978, noted that the special session was especially significant for the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament because of the recommendations in the final document of the session which related to the international negotiating machinery. In its final document, the General Assembly at its special session had agreed that there was an urgent need that existing disarmament machinery be revitalized and forums appropriately constituted for disarmament deliberations and negotiations with a better representative character (CCD/PV.790).

333. The delegation pointed out that with regard to the convening of such a forum -- the Committee on Disarmament -- it had been agreed that membership in it would be open to the nuclear-weapon States, the 27 non-nuclear-weapon States members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, and five to eight additional members to be chosen in consultation with the President of the thirty-second session of the General Assembly. The United States was also very pleased that a general understanding had been reached, which had been announced by the President of the General Assembly, that the Committee on Disarmament would be open to all the members of the current Conference of the Committee on Disarmament that wished to participate. In that connexion, the Federal Republic of Germany, reaffirming that all members would, if they so wished, also belong to the Committee on Disarmament, stated that it would participate as a member of the Committee on Disarmament in the Committee's work (ibid.). The delegation of Zaire also expressed the desire of its country, currently a member, to continue to sit as a member in the Committee on Disarmament (CCD/PV.798).

334. The delegation of Mexico stated that, of all the sections of the final document, which were of concern to the Conference, the one entitled "Machinery" affected the members of the Committee the most because, according to it, its existence as a multilateral negotiating body would not be extended beyond December 1978. As indicated in paragraph 120 of the final document, the Committee on Disarmament, whose membership was defined in that same paragraph, together with
some basic procedural rules, was to meet not later than January 1979, and was thereafter to be the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum (CCD/PV.790).

335. Poland expressed confidence that the forthcoming limited expansion of the Committee as well as certain modifications of its mechanisms and modus operandi would make it not only a more representative organ but also one in which the responsibility for the negotiation of effective disarmament measures would, as was required, be shared by the international community more equitably. The delegation stressed, however, that the sheer number of participating countries would not by itself guarantee tangible and early progress in the disarmament effort. For that to be realistically possible, the delegation added, all States members of the Conference, and, in the future, of the Committee on Disarmament must display sufficient political will and determination to pursue constructively the common goals of peace and equal security for all in a disarming and disarmed world (CCD/PV.793).

336. The Bulgarian delegation hoped that the decisions and the recommendations concerning machinery which had emerged from the special session devoted to disarmament would contribute to further intensification of international political and diplomatic activity with a view to realization of the will of the peoples of the world for general and complete disarmament. Such organizational improvement, the delegation stated, would be applied as well to the Conference which was to be enlarged by the addition of several new members (CCD/PV.794).

337. Romania observed that the new Committee on Disarmament had been established on a more democratic basis, in accordance with the general development of international relations. Its procedures and working methods, too, would be such as to have a positive impact on the future negotiations. In the delegation's view, the specific provisions and the spirit of the final document adopted by the special session on disarmament had created more favourable conditions than had been obtained in the past for enabling the machinery designed by the Assembly at that session to contribute to the formation and mobilization of the political will of States, which should find practical expression in real disarmament agreements (CCD/PV.796).

338. The delegation of Egypt urged the members of the Committee to lay the groundwork and facilitate the task of the Committee on Disarmament in whose deliberations Egypt was looking forward to playing an active role (CCD/PV.795).

339. Iran expressed the view that the reorganization of the negotiating body had gone far towards meeting the criticisms expressed from many sides. The delegation recalled that during the spring session of the Conference it had come out in favour of changes tending to render the Committee more efficient and, especially, allowing for the participation of all the nuclear Powers in its work. It therefore expressed gratification with the establishment of the new Committee on Disarmament. Similarly, the delegation noted, the addition of a certain number of States would surely broaden the perspective of the discussions. The newly structured Committee represented a wise compromise between the need to expand participation in the negotiating body and the need to keep its size to manageable proportions. Finally, the delegation expressed approval of the new system for assuring the chairmanship of the Committee, which had resolved a ticklish problem and had removed a serious political block (CCD/PV.796).
340. The delegation of Yugoslavia pointed out that with an increased number of members, compared with the Conference, the Committee on Disarmament would become a more representative negotiating body, particularly regarding certain regions, which would be better represented than hitherto. The meetings of the Committee would be chaired, in turn, by all its members, on a monthly basis. The liaison between the Committee and the General Assembly would gain in strength and States Members of the United Nations would be in a position to participate more directly in the work of the Committee, whose plenary meetings would be held in public. The delegation observed that, compared with the actual state of affairs, those were important changes which should make it possible to provide a new base for the activities of the Committee and to establish equality and democratic relations among its members. That was obviously an important prerequisite for the successful and efficient work of the new negotiating body, the delegation added. The delegation of Yugoslavia stressed that it paid great attention to the method of work of the Committee on Disarmament which, compared to the present state of affairs, should also be substantially changed. It stated that the basic assumption for efficient work by the new Committee was to make of the latter, from the very beginning, a negotiating body in the real sense of the word. The Committee must not be a body which would wait for agreements among its individual members. It should be actively engaged in all stages of negotiations, starting and carrying out, to the very end, its own initiatives; it should not be simply a kind of intermediary for transmitting to the General Assembly the agreements reached outside its own framework. The delegation stated that the Committee should, itself, decide the pace and timing of negotiations regarding matters which were of direct concern to it and that it should not confine its activities to the consideration of a limited number of problems, even if they happened to be of exceptional importance; its programme of work should, rather, be much wider and diversified, and in line with numerous recommendations contained in the final document of the special session on disarmament and in the resolutions of the regular sessions of the General Assembly. The delegation stressed also that the Committee should not be an exclusive body of its participating members, but an organ allowing for co-operation among all countries which were ready to contribute to its activities (CCD/PV.799).

341. The United Kingdom noted that when the Committee on Disarmament would meet in January it would be, in many ways, a new body. It would have several new members and its organization and procedures would differ from those of the Conference in several important respects. The delegation was particularly pleased at the improved opportunities for non-members to participate in the work of the Committee on Disarmament, something for which it had long pressed. However in important ways it would remain the same body. First, among its members would be delegations from all the States represented in the Conference at present; the delegation trusted that would mean that the new body would enjoy the same spirit of friendly co-operation and workmanlike endeavour that had been the hallmark of the Conference. Secondly, its fundamental rule of procedure would be that the Committee on Disarmament would conduct its business by the rule of consensus, which the delegation considered to be the only one appropriate when fundamental security matters were at issue. Finally, the Committee on Disarmament would be facing the same task as that which the Conference had faced - to perform the function of the prime organ for the negotiation of multilateral treaties for arms control and disarmament (CCD/PV.601).

342. The Federal Republic of Germany welcomed the measures decided upon by the Assembly at its special session on disarmament and, in particular, referred to
paragraph 120 of the final document of the special session, in which it entrusted the Committee on Disarmament with the task of negotiating disarmament agreements. The delegation added that the Committee, a body with a limited membership, could and should use the expertise gained so far in the Conference (CCD/PV.802).

343. The Mongolian delegation was of the opinion that the main reason why the Committee had not yet achieved the desired results in reaching generally acceptable agreement on the problems under discussion should be sought above all in the degree of political will and willingness displayed by individual participants in the negotiations, and not in any need for the radical restructuring of the existing machinery (ibid.).

344. Italy welcomed the setting up of a new Committee on Disarmament which, according to the schedule indicated in the final document, was due to meet not later than January 1979. By that time, there would be a negotiating body which, thanks to its enlarged membership and to new arrangements offered to all the States Members of the United Nations, would allow for a wider participation and a closer commitment of the international community to disarmament negotiations. Italy, which had been a member of the Geneva body since its creation in 1962, for its part, stood ready to take its seat in the new forum and was willing to make an effective contribution to its activities. The delegation believed that, from the beginning of its first session, the Committee on Disarmament should give serious consideration to the adoption of methods of work, which, while respecting the essential rule of consensus, would inject a new spirit and more energy into disarmament negotiations. In that respect, the delegation was of the opinion that the Committee should seek to reach a broad agreement on the work to be accomplished, in the light, also, of the conclusions reached by the special session, and to establish a methodical schedule of negotiations to be conducted within a certain time-table. It also believed that, as soon as it was deemed appropriate, by a sufficient convergence of views among its members, the Committee on Disarmament should consider the establishment of functional working groups which would negotiate draft treaties or give consideration, informally and in depth, to specific items, with the assistance of experts. The delegation added that the experience of the Conference and the important documentation accumulated by the Committee should be fully taken into account in that connexion (CCD/PV.804).

345. A number of delegations, including the United States of America (CCD/PV.790), Poland (CCD/PV.793), Bulgaria (CCD/PV.794), Egypt (CCD/PV.795), Iran (CCD/PV.796), the Netherlands (CCD/PV.799), Yugoslavia (ibid.), Japan (CCD/PV.801), the Federal Republic of Germany (CCD/PV.802) and Italy (CCD/PV.804) expressed satisfaction at the prospect that France would be taking its seat in the Committee on Disarmament. Poland added that the involvement of yet another nuclear-weapon Power in the multilateral disarmament negotiations was a move in the right direction which would not fail to contribute to greater effectiveness and purpose of such endeavours. Similarly, Egypt noted that France's membership would give the Committee on Disarmament an added impetus and vitality. Iran hoped that in time all nuclear States would become members of the Committee on Disarmament. The delegation of Nigeria reaffirmed its support for the proposals to make the Committee on Disarmament more representative, especially through the participation of all nuclear-weapon States. Nigeria stressed its belief that all nuclear-weapon States owed a duty to humanity to participate in the Committee on Disarmament when it convened (CCD/PV.801). The delegation of Japan stated that it was particularly gratifying to note that, as a result of the reorganization of the machinery on
disarmament, a new negotiating body, namely, the Committee on Disarmament, was to start functioning in January of next year and that very probably France might participate in that body. Furthermore, it strongly hoped that China would participate in the Committee on Disarmament as early as possible in the future (ibid.). The Federal Republic of Germany said that, in addition to France, it would like to see China participate in the work of the Committee (CCD/PV.802). Mongolia stressed the special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States in achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament, referred to the "negative attitude" of China towards disarmament problems and said that the concern and hopes of those who would like to see China among the participants in future negotiations was quite understandable (ibid.). The delegation of Italy, noting that it looked forward to seeing France taking an active part in the deliberations of the Committee on Disarmament, expressed its sincere hope that China would not delay its participation in that body (CCD/PV.804).

* * *

346. On 29 August, Sweden raised the question of the adjournment of the summer session of the Conference and urged that every opportunity should be used during the autumn of 1978 to start the Conference's own negotiations on a draft comprehensive test-ban treaty. Therefore, Sweden proposed that the Committee decide that it was free to convene at any time during the remainder of the year upon the recommendation of the Co-Chairmen, after full consultations with Committee members, "in order to conduct negotiations on the highest priority item on its agenda" (ibid.).

347. At the last meeting of the session, the delegation of the United States called attention to certain aspects of the history of disarmament negotiations relating to the pace of negotiations which the multilateral negotiating body had undertaken in the past. Most of the negotiations which had been successfully completed had taken a long time, often several years, from their conception to their elaboration as international conventions. This fact was not surprising in view of their complexity and considering that they dealt with the vital security interests of nations. The most painstaking efforts were required to ensure that no nation's security would be impaired and that agreements reached would endure. In this connexion, the delegation of the United States noted that some members of the Committee were impatient with the pace of current negotiations and with the lack of action on those measures called for by the final document of the special session on disarmament. It was understandable, however, that in the brief period of time which had elapsed since the special session, it would have been unrealistic to expect measurable progress on the Programme of Action prescribed in the final document. Many of the recommendations of that document were under active consideration, including negotiations on strategic arms limitations, a comprehensive test ban and the prohibition of chemical and radiological weapons. The final document had also pointed out new areas for the negotiating body's concern. Many countries had made suggestions in the field of disarmament which had not been fully considered during the special session and which merited the scrutiny of the multilateral negotiating body. There were also many tasks other than those which the members of the Committee had been anticipating to which the negotiating body should turn its attention in the future and the United States looked forward to a busy and constructive role for the multilateral negotiating body in the future. Despite frustrations and disappointments, the United States would continue to search for mutually acceptable solutions (CCD/PV.805).
In a statement made on behalf of the Group of 15 at the Committee's last meeting of the summer session, the delegation of Mexico recalled that in inaugurating the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the negotiating body which had preceded the Conference, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General had stated, on 14 March 1962 that: "The recent General Assembly resolutions related to disarmament questions would seem to indicate that the Members of the United Nations intend to persist in this field until the world's deep and growing concern has been transmuted into concrete achievements". Furthermore, the General Assembly at its special session on disarmament had declared in paragraph 17 of the final document that: "The pressing need now is to translate into practical terms the provisions of this Final Document and to proceed along the road of binding and effective international agreements in the field of disarmament". Also in paragraph 113 of the same final document, the Assembly had stressed that: "In addition to the need to exercise political will, the international disarmament machinery should be utilized more effectively".

The Group of 15, the delegation noted, had considered it most appropriate to recall those three emphatic pronouncements. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, in effect, was nearing its end without having yet received, as the Group of 15 had underlined recently in its unanimous statements, the preliminary draft treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and the preliminary draft convention on the elimination of chemical weapons, in spite of the repeated and urgent appeals adopted in that regard by the General Assembly. The Group of 15 wished to join in the appeal of the most representative body of the international community and to call upon the three nuclear-weapon States which had been carrying out trilateral talks, in the case of the first preliminary draft, as well as the two which were taking part in the negotiations on the latter of those instruments, to undertake to make all the efforts required in the four months still remaining in 1978 in order that the Conference receive, before the end of the year, the preliminary drafts of those longed-for multilateral instruments. That would justify the immediate reconvening of the Committee, in accordance with what had been set out in the schedule adopted on 27 July, as contained in document CCD/574.

At that same meeting, the delegation of Mexico stated that it considered it necessary to read paragraphs 4 and 2 of the final document of the special session on disarmament, approved by consensus, since, in the opinion of the delegation, they described accurately both the lack of progress on disarmament that the existing situation implied and the serious dangers it involved for mankind. The texts of the two paragraphs which the delegation read were as follows:

"I. The Disarmament Decade solemnly declared in 1969 by the United Nations is coming to an end. Unfortunately, the objectives established on that occasion by the General Assembly appear to be as far away today as they were then, or even further because the arms race is not diminishing but increasing and outstrips by far the efforts to curb it. While it is true that some limited agreements have been reached, 'effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament' continue to elude man's grasp. Yet the implementation of such measures is urgently required. There has not been any real progress either that might lead to the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Furthermore, it has not
been possible to free any amount, however modest, of the enormous resources, both material and human, which are wasted on the unproductive and spiralling arms race and which should be made available for the purpose of economic and social development, especially since such a race 'places a great burden on both the developing and the developed countries'.

"2. Unless its avenues are closed, the continued arms race means a growing threat to international peace and security and even to the very survival of mankind. The nuclear and conventional arms build-up threatens to stall the efforts aimed at reaching the goals of development, to become an obstacle on the road of achieving the new international economic order and to hinder the solution of other vital problems facing mankind."

* * *

At its 805th meeting on 31 August 1978, the Committee confirmed its decision, as contained in document CCD/574, to the effect that "the Committee is free to convene at any time during the remainder of the year upon recommendation of the Co-Chairmen after full consultations with Committee members, in order to conduct negotiations on the priority items on its agenda".

The present report is transmitted by the Co-Chairmen on behalf of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

(Signed) V.I. LIKHACHEV
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

(Signed) Adrian S. FISHER
United States of America
ANNEX I

Documents issued by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament*

On 31 January 1978, the Secretary-General of the United Nations transmitted to the Co-Chairmen a letter containing the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on disarmament (CCD/547).

On 31 January 1978, the delegation of Italy submitted a working paper on the question of the drafting of a comprehensive programme of disarmament (CCD/548).

On 2 February 1978, the delegation of the United Kingdom submitted a draft programme of action for the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (CCD/549).

On 16 February 1978, the delegations of Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Peru, Yugoslavia and Zaire submitted a working document containing a draft declaration, a draft programme of action and a proposal for implementation machinery (CCD/550).

On 16 February 1978, a schedule of meetings of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament for the spring session was circulated (CCD/551).

On 21 February 1978, the delegations of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics submitted a working paper on a comprehensive programme of disarmament (CCD/552).

On 21 February 1978, the delegation of Romania submitted a working paper on a draft comprehensive programme of disarmament (CCD/553).

On 21 February 1978, the delegation of Sweden submitted elements for inclusion in the programme of action of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and in its documents relating to the machinery for disarmament negotiations (CCD/554).

On 24 February 1978, the delegation of Nigeria submitted suggestions for inclusion in a comprehensive programme of disarmament (CCD/555).

On 5 March 1978, the delegation of Pakistan presented a working paper previously submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament: declaration on disarmament (CCD/556).

* With the exception of document CCD/573, all the documents listed appear in annex II. For document CCD/573, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 2 (A/S-10/2) and Supplement No. 2A (A/S-10/2/Add.1). In 1978 the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament also issued document CCD/578 and Add.1 containing the report of the Conference.
On 6 March 1978, the delegation of Pakistan presented a working paper previously submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament: programme of action on disarmament (CCD/557).

On 9 March 1978, a letter dated 9 March 1978 from the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events addressed to the Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, transmitting the final report of the Ad Hoc Group, was circulated (CCD/558 and Add.1).

On 10 March 1978, the delegations of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics submitted a draft convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons (CCD/559).

On 10 March 1978, the delegation of Mexico submitted a paper concerning some fundamental principles and norms for inclusion in the "Declaration on Disarmament" envisaged in the draft agenda of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament approved by the Preparatory Committee on 18 May 1977 (CCD/560).

On 10 March 1978, the delegation of Mexico submitted an outline of a draft final document of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (CCD/561 and Add.1).

On 13 March 1978, the delegation of Sweden submitted the terms of reference for the continued work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events (CCD/562).

On 17 March 1978, a working paper on the organization and procedures of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, submitted by the members of its Group of 15, was circulated (CCD/563).

On 30 March 1978, the delegation of the Netherlands submitted a study on the establishment of an international disarmament agency (CCD/565).

On 4 April 1978, a compilation of documents and proposals submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament relevant to the consideration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament was circulated (CCD/566 and Add.1).

On 18 April 1978, a tabulation of working papers and proposals on a comprehensive programme of disarmament was circulated (CCD/567 and Add.1).

On 24 April 1978, the delegation of Italy submitted a working paper on international mechanisms for disarmament (CCD/568).

On 24 April 1978, the delegation of Sweden submitted a working paper on a methodological investigation for computerized scanning of chemical literature (CCD/569).

On 4 May 1978, the terms of reference for the continued work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events was circulated (CCD/570).
On 10 May 1978, the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group to Discuss and Elaborate a Comprehensive Programme for Disarmament was circulated (CCD/571).

On 10 May 1978, the terms of reference for the Ad Hoc working group on a comprehensive programme of disarmament was circulated (CCD/572).

On 11 May 1978, the special report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament was circulated (CCD/573).

On 27 July 1978, the schedule of meetings of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament for the 1978 summer session was circulated (CCD/574).

On 14 August 1978, the delegation of Hungary submitted a working paper on infrasound weapons (CCD/575).

On 15 August 1978, the sixth progress report by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events was circulated (CCD/576).

On 22 August 1978, a letter dated 14 August 1978 from the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Finland to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament concerning an analytical technique for the verification of chemical disarmament - trace analysis by glass capillary gas chromatography with specific detectors was circulated (CCD/577).
ANNEX III

List of the verbatim records of the meetings of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament

For the verbatim records of the meetings held by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in 1978, see documents CCD/PV.767 to 805.
ANNEX IV

Index by subject and country of the statements made in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in 1978

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