Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

The present volume contains the report of the Conference and annexes I, III and IV. Annex II appears in volume II.
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INTRODUCTION

1. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament submits to the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Disarmament Commission a progress report on the Committee's deliberations on all questions before it for the period 15 February to 30 August 1977, together with the pertinent documents and records.

2. This report includes an account of the organization of the Conference (part I) and of the Committee's work during 1977 based on its agenda, as well as on the recommendations contained in the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly (part II).

I. ORGANIZATION OF THE CONFERENCE

A. Procedural arrangements

3. The Conference was in session from 15 February to 29 April and from 5 July to 30 August 1977. During this period, the Committee held 39 formal plenary meetings at which members set forth their Government's views and recommendations for progress on the questions before the Committee.

4. The Committee also held 35 informal meetings without records on various subjects, including its schedule of work, committee procedures, a comprehensive negotiating programme, cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, prohibition of chemical weapons, and prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

5. In addition, members of the Committee met frequently for informal multilateral consultations on disarmament questions of common interest.

6. In accordance with its schedule of work adopted on 1 March (see part II below), the Committee held four informal meetings on procedures from 1 to 4 March, with a fifth meeting on 24 March. It also discussed some general aspects of the subject in plenary meetings, during the same period (see paras. 286 to 313 below);

7. As a result of these discussions, the Committee, at its 746th meeting on 21 April 1977, took the following decision:

"I. Organization of Work of the Conference

"The work of the Committee will continue to be conducted in plenary meetings and through any additional arrangements agreed by the Committee, such as special plenary meetings, informal meetings, or informal meetings with experts.

"The Committee agrees to the following provisional guidelines for the establishment of ad hoc working groups to facilitate the negotiations of texts of agreements (or any other document)."
1. When it appears that there is a basis to negotiate a draft treaty or other draft texts, the Conference should establish an ad hoc working group for this purpose open to all members.

2. The Conference should define the mandate for each working group including a target date for submitting its final report to the Conference and should provide the group with such working documents as may form an appropriate starting point for the group's work.

3. In connexion with the establishment of a working group, the Conference may take a decision to send, through the representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to all States Members of the United Nations, but not members of the Conference, appropriate working documents which have not previously been made available to them.

4. In accordance with the established procedure of the Conference, the working groups shall work on the basis of consensus. The chairmanship of the working groups should rotate in the same manner as in the Conference. The meetings of the working groups should be on an informal basis and should be so scheduled as to avoid conflicting or otherwise interfering with the regular or informal meetings of the Conference. The level of representation in the working groups should be determined by each delegation. The working groups, on a periodic basis, should issue whatever reports to the Conference are deemed necessary. The Committee requests that the Secretariat provide assistance to the working groups as necessary, including the preparation of unofficial summaries of the working groups' proceedings.

5. The Conference will take any other decisions that may be necessary regarding the organization and procedures of the working groups.

II. Preparation of the annual report of the Conference to the United Nations General Assembly

1. The draft report should be prepared by the Secretariat.

2. The draft should be made available to all members of the Conference at least two weeks before the scheduled date for the closure of the summer session. (It should be updated at the end of the succeeding week.)

3. The draft should contain:

   (a) The provisional agenda as adopted on 15 August 1968;

   (b) Summary of specific requests addressed to the Conference by the United Nations General Assembly at its preceding regular session;

   (c) Sectional headings in accordance with items comprised in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above and other matters raised in the Committee during the year;

   (d) Significant views expressed by delegations under each item including their analysis, if any, of the issues discussed. (If more than one delegation has made the same point the fact should be clearly stated.)
(e) Conclusions and decisions, if any, adopted by consensus;

(f) A table of contents and an index, along the lines of the index which was included in the 1976 report, as well as a subject index of both the basic report and annexes. (The subject headings may need to be changed from time to time.);

(g) Working papers and proposals submitted during the year;

(h) Verbatim records of the meetings held during the year should also be distributed as a separate annex of the report.

The Committee will consider the draft report during the final week of its summer session. Delegations wishing to make statements on matters of substance during that week, and wishing reference to the statements to be included in the report, should provide brief summaries for this purpose.

5. The report should be circulated in New York to all delegations of States Members of the United Nations by 1 October.

III. Distribution of verbatim records of plenary meetings and working documents of the Conference

Verbatim records of the plenary meetings of the Conference held during the year and the working documents should be distributed in New York to delegations of States Members of the United Nations as soon as received from Geneva.

IV. Communique of plenary meetings of the Conference

The communiqué should be drawn up in such a way as to reflect adequately the substance of the proceedings of the plenary meetings of the Conference.

It should contain information in respect to the consecutive number of the plenary meeting held, and the chairmanship of the day.

The communiqué should enumerate the names of the representatives of the countries who made statements, the topics covered by them as well as proposals or working papers submitted to the Committee.

It should also contain information in respect to the Committee's decisions concerning its schedule of work, convening of formal, informal, or other meetings."

B. Participants in the Conference

8. Representatives of the following States continued their participation in the work of the Committee: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Hungary, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Yugoslavia, Zaire.
II. WORK OF THE CONFERENCE DURING 1977

9. Pursuant to the decision taken by the Committee in 1975 that in the future it would discuss the organization of its work each year at the beginning of the session and thereafter as the need arose, the Committee held on 24 February two informal meetings on its agenda and schedule of meetings for the spring session. Based on recommendations of the two Co-Chairmen, it took the following decision at its 732nd meeting on 1 March 1977 (CCD/527):

"Plenary meetings"

"Plenary meetings will continue to be held on Tuesday and Thursday at 10.30 a.m., unless decided otherwise. The agenda for the plenary meetings, adopted on 15 August 1968 reads as follows:

"1. Further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.

"Under this heading members may wish to discuss measures dealing with the cessation of testing, the non-use of nuclear weapons, the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons use, the cessation of manufacture of weapons and reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear stockpiles, nuclear-free zones, etc.

"2. Non-nuclear measures.

"Under this heading, members may wish to discuss chemical and bacteriological warfare, regional arms limitations, etc.

"3. Other collateral measures.

"Under this heading, members may wish to discuss prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, etc.

"4. General and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

"The Co-Chairmen note the recognized right of any delegation to raise and discuss any disarmament question in any meeting of the Committee.

"Informal meetings"

1 - 4 March Informal meetings of the Conference on procedures.

7 - 11 March Informal meetings on a comprehensive negotiating programme. (Further meetings on the subject may be arranged later.)
14 - 18 March
Informal meetings, with the participation of experts, on new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.

21 - 25 March
Open.

28 March - 1 April
Informal meetings, with the participation of experts, on chemical weapons.

4 - 7 April
Continuation of informal meetings on chemical weapons, with the participation of experts, as necessary.

11 - 15 April
Open.

18 - 22 April
Informal meetings on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

25 - 29 April
Open. (It was noted that, during this period, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events would hold its third session.)

"Recess"

"The Conference will go into recess on 29 April 1977. The Committee will reconvene for its summer session at a date to be determined at a later stage."

10. After resumption of the session on the date subsequently decided, 5 July 1977, the Committee discussed its schedule for the summer period in five informal meetings, held from 6 to 19 July, taking a decision at its 755th meeting on 21 July (CCD/535) that the plenary meetings of the Committee would continue to meet at the same time as previously and under the same agenda, and that informal and other meetings would be scheduled as follows, based on recommendations of the Co-Chairmen:

"Further, pursuant to the decision of 29 April 1977, as well as the relevant discussions of this decision in the Committee, the Co-Chairmen note that the Committee can establish an ad hoc working group whenever it deems it appropriate to do so under the procedural decision of 21 April. The Committee can consider the question of setting up such a group later in the summer session.

"Informal meetings"

5 - 15 July
Informal meetings on the Conference as required to discuss the summer session programme.

18 - 22 July
Informal meetings on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban.
11. The Committee also had before it a letter dated 28 January 1977 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations (CCD/521), transmitting the resolutions on disarmament adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-first session in 1976, in particular those entrusting specific responsibilities to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, namely: resolution 31/65, "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons"; resolution 31/66, "Urgent need for cessation of nuclear end thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban"; resolution 31/68, "Effective measures to implement the purposes and objections of the Disarmament Decade"; resolution 31/72, "Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques"; and resolution 31/74, "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons".

12. In the same letter the Secretary-General drew attention, in particular, to the following provisions of those resolutions:

"(a) In resolution 31/65, paragraph 3 requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue negotiations as a matter of high priority, taking into account the existing proposals, with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and for their destruction; and paragraph 6 requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to report on the results of its negotiations to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session."
"(b) In resolution 31/66, paragraph 6 urges the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue to give the highest priority to the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban agreement and to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session on the progress achieved.

"(c) In resolution 31/68, paragraph 7 urges the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to adopt, during its 1977 session, a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV) proclaiming the Disarmament Decade.

"(d) In resolution 31/72, paragraph 4 calls upon the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, without prejudice to the priorities established in its programme of work, to keep under review the problem of effectively averting the dangers of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques.

"(e) In resolution 31/74, paragraph 1 requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue the negotiations, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, aimed at working out the text of an agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons and to submit a report on the results achieved to the General Assembly for consideration at its thirty-second session.

Furthermore, the General Assembly in paragraph 6 of resolution 31/70, entitled "Comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects", decided to convey the comprehensive study and the report of the Secretary-General related thereto, inter alia, to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament for the further consideration and measures that it might deem appropriate within its field of competence."

13. All the matters dealt with in the above-mentioned resolutions of the General Assembly were considered by the Committee and are covered in this report, as follows:

Resolution 31/65 (considered in both plenary and informal meetings with experts): part II, section B
Resolution 31/66 (considered in plenary and informal meetings): part II, section A
Resolution 31/68 (considered in plenary and informal meetings): part II, section D
Resolution 31/72 (considered in plenary): part II, section B
Resolution 31/74 (considered in both plenary and informal meetings with experts): part II, section B

14. At the opening plenary meeting of the 1977 session, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations conveyed to the Conference a message from the Secretary-General. In his message, the Secretary-General stressed that
the continuing arms race was a hazard to international security and that changes in world conditions had increased the need for the release of resources through disarmament for economic and social development. In this connexion he pointed out that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament had negotiated three agreements that were real achievements - the non-proliferation Treaty, 1/ the sea-bed Treaty 2/ and the biological weapons Convention 3/ - and that it had recently elaborated the text of a draft convention to prohibit the military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques, which the General Assembly had decided to refer to all States for their consideration, signature and ratification. 4/ The latter convention, he noted, was the first disarmament agreement to designate the Secretary-General as depositary; it also empowered the Secretary-General to convene a consultative committee of experts appointed by interested States parties for the purpose of considering and reporting on any problem. The Secretary-General interpreted that as an indication of the intention of the world community to have the United Nations play a more central role in the disarmament field, and hoped that the innovation of the consultative committee would serve as a precedent for creative solutions of the ever-recurring problem of verification of compliance with international agreements, which some had considered to be the major obstacle to the conclusion of a number of important agreements.

15. Despite the achievements of the Conference, the Secretary-General continued, there had been no significant breakthrough to halt the ever-accelerating arms accumulation that was now consuming some $350 billion annually while resources were lacking for the world struggle against hunger, poverty and disease. Unfortunately, he added, the greatest increase in arms spending had been registered in areas of the world where the arms race had as yet been relatively unknown, and some satisfactory means must be found to curb the dangerous trend.

16. In the field of nuclear arms, the Secretary-General stated, there was general agreement that the most urgent attention should be directed towards bringing an early halt to the nuclear-arms race, followed by the reduction and ultimate elimination of these awesome weapons. He noted in this connexion that, over the years, he had repeatedly stressed the vital importance of a general and complete test ban as a necessary first step towards the goal of nuclear disarmament, and reiterated his view that the risks of continuing such tests far outweighed the risks involved in any tests that might still conceivably go unverified. Expressing satisfaction that the two major nuclear Powers had, during the past year, agreed to limit the scope of nuclear-weapon tests, including tests of peaceful nuclear devices, and that both Powers had also indicated a willingness to overcome the impasse with regard to on-site verification, the Secretary-General hoped the Committee would make a determined effort at the 1977 session to achieve a comprehensive test ban, which he was confident would have a major positive impact on the international situation and accelerate progress towards nuclear disarmament.

1/ General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex.
2/ Treaty on the Prohibition of the Implantation of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (General Assembly resolution 2660 (XXV), annex).
3/ Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (General Assembly resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex).
4/ General Assembly resolution 31/72.
17. The Secretary-General also noted that the General Assembly had stressed the urgency of international co-operative efforts to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices, while recognizing the right of all States to the benefits of peaceful uses of atomic energy under appropriate safeguards. Also noting the renewed call of the General Assembly for the early creation of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones, the Secretary-General called special attention to the 10th anniversary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, 5/ which created such a zone in Latin America and thereby demonstrated that progress towards disarmament could be achieved if the political will to do so existed.

18. With regard to the prohibition of chemical warfare, the Secretary-General stressed the continuing importance attached to the problem by the General Assembly and, believing that the situation in that regard seemed to be more encouraging than at any time in the past because of fresh approaches to the problem, hoped that substantial progress in the matter could be made at the 1977 session of the Committee.

19. Stressing the view that the constructive international dialogue on political and economic matters that now seemed possible should also include the subject of disarmament, the Secretary-General concluded by welcoming the spirit of compromise that had characterized recent disarmament discussions and the consensus reached on strengthening the role of the United Nations on disarmament and on the convening, in 1978, of a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

A. Further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament

20. Members of the Committee continued their work in 1977 on questions related to the halting of the nuclear-arms race and to nuclear disarmament, which virtually all members considered to be the priority goal of any disarmament effort, beginning with a ban on all nuclear-weapon testing.

21. The delegation of the United States cited passages from the inaugural address of President Carter to the effect that, while the massive arms race was designed to ensure the continuing equivalent strength of the two major nuclear Powers, armaments should be limited to those necessary for domestic safety and that the ultimate goal of the United States was the elimination of all nuclear weapons. The delegation also assured the Committee that the United States was reviewing its position on a number of arms control issues (CCD/PV.728).

22. In a special address to the Committee early in the summer session, Mr. Paul Warnke, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Head of the United States delegation to the bilateral strategic arms limitation talks, again reminded the Committee of President Carter's commitment to the control and reduction of armaments, including the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons. He added that the arms control policy of the United States was based on the considerations that the current world-wide level of arms could be reduced without impairing the security of any nation; sound measures of arms

control were an integral part of over-all security policy and should contribute to the security of all parties; obligations undertaken in arms control must be balanced and equitable; and arms control agreements must be adequately verifiable. The United States Administration, Mr. Warnke continued, had set ambitious goals in the disarmament field but had at the same time made concrete proposals for achieving these goals on a realistic step-by-step basis in the fields of reduction of strategic arms, arms limitation in the Indian Ocean, control of United States arms exports, reducing the risks of nuclear proliferation, strengthening the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America, and new initiatives towards a comprehensive test ban and a chemical weapons ban. Disarmament was a complex issue, he said, but the benefits inherent in achieving it compelled all States to make every possible effort to surmount the difficulties, since it was apparent to all that weapons had reached a level of destruction almost beyond rationality (CCD/PV.75).

23. The delegation of Mexico stressed the encouraging effects that the unequivocal statements of the President of the United States, Mr. Carter, calling for the elimination of all nuclear weapons, as well as certain pronouncements of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. Brezhnev, which were similar to the former in some respects, might have for disarmament negotiations. It also mentioned the words of President López Portillo of Mexico who, in his inaugural address, had called for an end to all genocidal weapons which threatened the survival of mankind. More specifically, it stressed the necessity that the Committee concentrate its 1977 endeavours on the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban agreement (CCD/PV.728).

24. The delegation of Romania reaffirmed its support for a number of nuclear disarmament measures, including a pledge by the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, a ban on the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of other States, the withdrawal of nuclear arms from the territory of other States; a halt to the testing, refinement and production of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, a cut-off of production of fissionable materials for military purposes and the transfer of existing stocks to peaceful uses under a co-operative arrangement and the reduction and destruction of existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery (CCD/PV.731).

25. The delegation of India held that concepts of a nuclear "balance of terror" and "arms control" were incorrect as they implied a legitimization of the existence of nuclear weapons and that lasting world peace could be based on fear of them. Peace, it maintained, could be built only on arms limitation and disarmament and a just economic order (CCD/PV.734).

26. The delegation of the Soviet Union emphasized that the previous year the Soviet Union had directed its efforts towards putting into practice the programme of further struggle for peace and international co-operation which had been drawn up at the Twenty-fifth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. One of the cornerstone items on that programme was to devise and apply international measures designed to halt the accelerating arms race, which was a danger to peace, and to pass on to the reduction of the accumulated stockpiles of weapons, to disarmament. Mr. L. I. Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, speaking of the Soviet Union's aspiration to achieve a breakthrough in the struggle for an end to the arms race and for disarmament, had emphasized that: "Not a course towards superiority in armaments, but a course
towards reducing them, towards lessening military confrontation - such is our policy". The foreign policy programme of the Twenty-fifth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union included a global measure: a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations, the idea of whose conclusion had been approved at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly. The USSR delegation introduced for examination by the Committee a "Memorandum of the Soviet Union on questions of ending the arms race and disarmament" (CCD/522), which had previously been submitted for examination to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session. The memorandum singled out the main areas for co-ordinated action by States in the field of disarmament; it set out the specific views of the Soviet Union as to how it might be possible at the practical level to solve or begin solving the most important problems in the disarmament field, such as cessation of the nuclear arms race, reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear weapons, prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, consolidation of the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, prohibition of the development of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction, reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments, the establishment of zones of peace in the Indian Ocean and other regions, and reduction of the military budgets of States. The Soviet delegation further stated that the USSR and the other Socialist States parties to the Warsaw pact desiring to take an effective new step to remove the threat of nuclear war, had proposed to all States participating in the all-European Conference that they should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against one another, and the Socialist countries had worked out and proposed a draft treaty on the subject. Noting that some States members of NATO had found that peace-loving proposal inappropriate for themselves, the USSR delegation nevertheless quoted a statement by Mr. L. I. Brezhnev: "We hope that those who ultimately determine the policy of States will display a reasonable approach to our proposal" (CCD/PV.728).

27. The delegation of the German Democratic Republic stressed the importance of the nuclear measures envisaged in the memorandum, as well as in the 1976 declaration of the Warsaw Pact States, beginning with the prohibition of use of nuclear weapons in the framework of a world treaty on the non-use of force leading to the elimination of all nuclear weapons (CCD/PV.736). The delegations of the USSR (CCD/PV.728), Bulgaria (CCD/PV.731), Hungary (CCD/PV.732), Mongolia (CCD/PV.733), Poland (CCD/PV.735) and Czechoslovakia (CCD/PV.747) also called attention to the Warsaw Pact proposal that all European States that had participated in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against one another, as well as to the draft world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations put forward by the Soviet Union in 1976. 6/ The delegation of Bulgaria drew a close link between the two proposals, and regretted the rejection of the non-first-use proposal by NATO. The delegation of Hungary considered both proposals to be constructive initiatives. The delegation of Mongolia maintained that implementation of the proposal for the non-use of force would constitute an important step towards strengthening confidence and mutual understanding between States and would promote the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and disarmament, reducing the threat of a new war. It also stressed that the non-first-use proposal met the interests of strengthening the spirit and principles of the Helsinki Conference and extending détente to other

parts of the world. The delegation of Czechoslovakia held that the Committee should give its full attention to the question of non-use of force.

28. At the summer session, Bulgaria also expressed regret that efforts to acquire increasingly sophisticated arms continued unabated despite the favourable conditions for disarmament negotiations created by détente and the achievement of a series of international agreements. Stressing that there was no more urgent task than that of controlling the arms race, the delegation noted that the socialist States were tireless in their efforts to that end and pointed out that a recent Soviet-Bulgarian communiqué had stressed the need for intensifying efforts to halt the arms race and achieve disarmament, including a general and complete nuclear-test ban, the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction and a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations (CCD/PV.755).

29. The delegation of Yugoslavia expressed concern that the arms race, both nuclear and conventional, continued unchecked on the ground, on the sea, in the air and in outer space and that particular attention was currently being paid to armament research and development. The delegation therefore hoped that the Committee would be able to make definite progress during 1977 towards the preparation of international agreements on some long-standing questions that had been on its agenda for many years (CCD/PV.742). The delegation also pointed out that development in the application of nuclear energy for military purposes, like the advancement of military technology as a whole, had by far outpaced the tempo of negotiations in the Committee and that old unsettled problems were being compounded by new ones, even more complex and dangerous from the standpoint of maintaining international peace and security (CCD/PV.757).

30. The delegation of the United Kingdom again stressed the pressing need to end the nuclear-arms race and to begin to reduce such arms as a first step towards their abolition in the framework of a comprehensive disarmament programme, noting that three of the nuclear Powers had assumed that obligation under Article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty (ibid.).

31. With particular regard to the bilateral strategic arms limitation talks, the delegation of Mexico held that the new spirit reflected in the recent statements of the leaders of the two major nuclear Powers should be demonstrated by further achievements at the talks (CCD/PV.728). Later in the spring session, the delegation regretted the outcome of the recent negotiations in Moscow and expressed the hope that at the planned Geneva meeting both sides would concentrate on negotiating reductions and thus move towards achieving "important qualitative limitations and substantial reductions of their strategic nuclear-weapon systems", as urged by the United Nations General Assembly (CCD/PV.748). The delegation of Sweden expressed concern over the slow pace of the negotiations while the qualitative arms race threatened to undermine their very basis, and urged additional measures of quantitative and qualitative disarmament by the two major military Powers (CCD/PV.729). Similarly, the delegation of Iran hoped for some concrete results at the talks (CCD/PV.731). The delegation of the Netherlands considered the limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear arms to be the starting point of the necessary process of nuclear disarmament (CCD/PV.741). The Italian delegation expressed the view that the strategic arms limitation talks represented a unique opportunity to develop sound progress towards the goal of the complete cessation of the nuclear-arms race (CCD/PV.760). The delegation of Pakistan held that the two major nuclear-weapon Powers, which already enjoyed a preponderant position in
military arms, could make a beginning by making progress at these talks (CCD/PV.765).

32. The delegation of the Soviet Union stressed that the two Powers must continue the negotiations, perhaps to be joined later by other States (CCD/PV.730). The delegation of Czechoslovakia welcomed the partial steps already achieved and hoped for progress during 1977 (CCD/PV.742). In his special statement to the Committee, Mr. Warnke of the United States stressed that, pending realization of its long-term goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons, the United States sought substantial reductions in strategic armaments, plus a series of measures that would stabilize the strategic balance. He stated that there was an agreed approach at the second round of the strategic arms limitation talks and slow but steady progress was being made, but that a number of differences remained to be worked out (CCD/PV.754). The delegation of the United Kingdom noted that, while progress at the talks was not easy, it was important because it could have a beneficial impact on the non-proliferation régime and on other arms control negotiations (CCD/PV.757).

Question of a comprehensive test ban agreement

33. In its resolution 31/66, the General Assembly had urged the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue to give the highest priority to the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-weapon test-ban agreement and to report to the General Assembly at the thirty-second session on the progress achieved. With this request in mind, the members of the Committee continued to express their views on the general question and to consider specific proposals for such an agreement.

34. In these discussions many members of the Committee, including Mexico (CCD/PV.728), Italy (ibid. and 760), Sweden (CCD/PV.729 and 750), the USSR (CCD/PV.730), Canada (CCD/PV.731), Mongolia (CCD/PV.733), the Netherlands (CCD/PV.734) and Poland (CCD/PV.735), specifically attached highest priority to the achievement of an agreement to ban all nuclear-weapon tests. Others, including Hungary (CCD/PV.732), Japan (CCD/PV.733), the German Democratic Republic (CCD/PV.736), Iran (CCD/PV.758) and Mongolia (CCD/PV.761) stressed that such a ban would be a decisive step towards the achievement of nuclear disarmament, while Hungary (CCD/PV.754) and Bulgaria (CCD/PV.755) believed such a ban would bring a halt to the arms race. The delegation of Czechoslovakia stressed the fundamental importance his Government attached to the question (CCD/PV.759). The delegation of the United States also noted that the question was at the top of the foreign affairs agenda of the new President of the United States (CCD/PV.728). The delegation of Mexico recalled that the General Assembly had adopted 36 resolutions on the subject, having on seven occasions "condemned" all nuclear-weapon tests and repeatedly stressed that the continuance of such tests would intensify the arms race. It emphasized that the General Assembly had also reiterated its conviction that "whatever may be the differences on the question of verification, there is no valid reason for delaying the conclusion" of a comprehensive test ban. Citing the President of the United States, the delegation thought conditions were right for achieving such a ban (ibid. and 748). The delegation of Egypt believed it should not and could not be impossible for the Soviet Union and the United States to begin negotiations to halt all nuclear-weapon tests for all time (CCD/PV.737). It also held that a comprehensive ban would improve the present non-proliferation régime (CCD/PV.746), as did the delegations of Hungary (CCD/PV.754), Bulgaria (CCD/PV.755), Iran (CCD/PV.758 and Italy (CCD/PV.760). The delegation of the Soviet Union stressed that such a ban should be achieved without waiting for the start of negotiations on the whole range of nuclear disarmament (CCD/PV.730). In a
communication submitted to the Committee (CCD/536) the Government of New Zealand also strongly urged early conclusion of a comprehensive test ban. The delegation of Pakistan considered it imperative to reach agreement on the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests in the immediate future and held that the two major nuclear-weapon Powers should agree to an immediate suspension of such tests (CCD/PV.756). The delegation of Sweden (CCD/PV.729) and Romania (CCD/PV.731) believed that a comprehensive test ban could have full significance only in combination with a limitation on strategic nuclear weapons or measures banning the sophistication of nuclear weapons by other means. The delegation of Poland held that the bilateral Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (threshold test-ban Treaty) constituted an important step towards the objective of a full test ban (CCD/PV.758).

35. At the beginning of the session, the delegation of the Soviet Union stressed the significance of the General Assembly resolution it had proposed in 1975 (3478 (XXX)), calling for a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests, to be negotiated by a special body composed of all nuclear-weapon States and some non-nuclear-weapon States, and including a draft treaty as an annex. Since some Western States had considered the verification system proposed in that draft treaty to be inadequate, the delegation continued, the Soviet Union declared its readiness to participate in the search for a mutually acceptable understanding on such a basis as would ensure a voluntary framework for taking decisions relating to on-site inspection to ascertain the relevant circumstances and would, at the same time, give all parties to the treaty an assurance that obligations were being discharged. The Soviet delegation pointed out that the appropriate additions had been made to the draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests submitted by the Soviet Union, and that that opened the way for a generally acceptable understanding on the problem of control and for the speedy conclusion of a treaty (CCD/PV.728).

36. On 22 February the Soviet delegation introduced into the Committee a new draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests (CCD/523). The addition to the original text read as follows:

"In case a State Party to this Treaty has doubts regarding the nature of a seismic event that occurred in the territory of another State Party to this Treaty, it has the right to raise the question of carrying out an on-site inspection in order to ascertain the true nature of that event. The State Party to the Treaty that raised this question must cite appropriate grounds in support of the necessity of carrying out the inspection. The State Party to the Treaty which is the object of doubts regarding its compliance with the Treaty, recognizing the importance of this question, may take a favourable position regarding the carrying out of an inspection in its territory, provided it finds the grounds convincing, or it may take another decision. Such an inspection shall be carried out according to rules established by the inviting State Party."

37. The Soviet delegation stated that that important provision on the question of control, included as a new paragraph 3 in article II of the draft treaty, opened the way to a generally acceptable understanding on the question of control. The delegation emphasized that the task of imposing a complete and general prohibition of nuclear tests could be performed only with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States, and that the draft treaty was based on that necessary condition. A solution to the problem adopted on a more limited basis than that one would be at
variance with the principle of not impairing the security of any of the parties; it would merely increase suspicion in mutual relations between States, and would lead to the unleashing of an arms race in non-nuclear areas. The delegation stated further that, inasmuch as the beginning of negotiations between all nuclear-weapon States was being delayed, the Committee could play a useful role in the preparation of a treaty. Referring to the basic provisions of the draft treaty, which consisted of eight articles, the Soviet delegation stated that, since the objective of a complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests could be achieved only with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States, the draft provided that the treaty was to enter into force only after it had been ratified by a specific number of States, including all nuclear-weapon States. Under the draft treaty, control over compliance by parties with their obligations under the terms of the treaty would be based on the use of national technical means in conjunction with international co-operation in the exchange of seismic data between the States parties to the treaty, supplemented by the clause already mentioned concerning the possibility of on-site inspection to ascertain the actual circumstances on a voluntary basis. The draft provided for consultations between the parties to the treaty and for the lodging of complaints with the Security Council, which would undertake an investigation when it received a complaint from a State to the effect that any party to the treaty had acted in violation of the obligations it had assumed (CCD/PV.730).

38. The Soviet delegation also emphasized that the draft treaty afforded broad opportunities for peaceful use of the energy from nuclear explosions for the benefit of all States, and that peaceful nuclear explosions must be conducted in conformity with the objective of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Thus the draft treaty provided that, in the case of non-nuclear-weapon States, peaceful nuclear explosions would be conducted in conformity with the provisions of article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, while in the case of nuclear-weapon States the procedure for conducting them would be established by a special agreement which should be concluded as speedily as possible. In establishing that procedure it would be necessary to take into account the recommendations of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which was the most competent and best qualified international organ in that field. The delegation further stated that the proposal put forward by the Soviet Union with regard to the on-site verification of seismic events on a voluntary basis opened the way to a generally acceptable understanding on the problem of control and to the early conclusion of a treaty, given good will on the part of other States (ibid.).

39. In summing up its position with regard to peaceful nuclear explosions at the closing meeting of the 1977 session, the Soviet delegation emphasized that, in calling for the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests, the USSR attached great significance to extensive peaceful use of atomic energy, including nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes as an integral part of that general problem. Article III of the Soviet draft treaty provided for the conduct of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, the delegation pointed out. The Soviet Union was fully aware that the use of such explosions must in no way be allowed to promote the proliferation or improvement of nuclear weapons or the development of new types of such weapons and, while acknowledging the importance of the peaceful use of nuclear energy to an ever-increasing number of countries, considered it necessary that co-operation in that field should be accompanied by guarantees precluding such proliferation. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was the basis of the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the
40. The delegation of Hungary held that the complexity of negotiating a full test ban required the efforts of three negotiating forums - that proposed by the Soviet Union, the Committee on Disarmament, and the bilateral strategic arms limitation talks, all assisted by the International Atomic Energy Agency in solving certain problems (CCD/PV.732).

41. The delegation of Sweden hoped that such a ban could be achieved before the opening of the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament in early 1978. The delegation further suggested that a possible approach to facilitate an early agreement on an early signing of such a treaty could be to make its entry into force dependent upon the final cessation by the United States and the Soviet Union of their nuclear weapon tests. In case transitional arrangements were needed, they could be laid down in a protocol that should be negotiated under the auspices of the Committee and that would enter into force upon signature by the two nuclear States. Another solution would be to include provisions for transitional arrangements in the treaty itself. It would be possible under both these formulas for Committee members and other States to sign and ratify the treaty before the United States and the Soviet Union had actually terminated their tests. The treaty should also contain provisions for an international exchange of seismological data and for a verification procedure involving on-site inspections on a voluntary basis. For clarification of events pertaining to the subject matter of the treaty, the treaty could also include provisions for the services of a consultative committee set up for that purpose. The treaty should ban nuclear-weapon tests or explosions of other nuclear devices in all environments, thus constituting an independent and comprehensive treaty not complementary to the partial test ban treaty. It was not only desirable but, in the long term, fundamental that all nuclear-weapon States become parties to the agreement, but if the situation required, the Committee could envisage the inclusion of a provision which would make it possible for a party to withdraw from the treaty if all nuclear Powers had not adhered to it within a specified period of time (CCD/PV.729).

42. On 1 March, the delegation of Sweden submitted the text of a draft treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in all environments, containing the general aspects already outlined by the delegation (CCD/526). In presenting the draft to the Committee, the delegation stressed that it was comprehensive in scope, but with suggested transitional arrangements, if considered necessary, for the two major nuclear-weapon Powers and special arrangements for the conduct of peaceful nuclear explosions under international supervision, the details of which could be worked out later to be included in protocols to the treaty. With particular regard to peaceful explosions, however, the delegation held that they should be allowed, even under international control, only when they were of overriding national or international importance. Assurance of compliance with the treaty, the delegation further pointed out, was based on the concept of verification by challenge, i.e. involving the voluntary agreement of the party to be inspected. Special provisions concerning co-operation of all parties in a world-wide seismic data exchange should be included, possibly in an additional protocol to the treaty. The draft treaty also proposed the creation of a consultative committee of parties to the treaty, the functions and activities of which could also be elaborated in a protocol. An appeal to the United Nations Security Council could be the last step in the verification procedure. The delegation also pointed out that the draft provided for the immediate withdrawal of any party at a given time if all nuclear-weapon...
States had not adhered to the treaty by that time. The delegation formally proposed that a working group be set up as soon as possible to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban agreement (CCD/PV.733).

43. The Soviet draft treaty was specifically supported as a good basis for agreement on the subject by the delegations of Bulgaria (CCD/PV.731 and 755), Hungary (CCD/PV.732), Poland (CCD/PV.735 and 758), the German Democratic Republic (CCD/PV.736), Czechoslovakia (CCD/PV.742 and 759) and Mongolia (CCD/PV.733 and 746). The delegation of India, recalling its expressed interest in a comprehensive test-ban dating back to the 1950s, held that an interesting stage had been reached with the simultaneous tabling of the Swedish and Soviet draft treaties (CCD/PV.738). The delegations of Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic called particular attention to the fact that the draft provided a solution to the problem of conducting peaceful nuclear explosions in the framework of article V of the non-proliferation Treaty, thereby strengthening the latter Treaty. The delegation of Czechoslovakia also stressed the importance of the new approach to on-site inspection on a voluntary basis embodied in the draft. The delegation of Sweden, however, expressed specific reservations on article III of the Soviet draft providing for the conduct of peaceful explosions by the non-nuclear-weapon States in conformity with the non-proliferation Treaty but, by the nuclear-weapon States, in conformity with a special agreement. The delegation held that restrictions on such explosions should apply equally to all States, as in the Swedish draft treaty (CCD/PV.733). In that connexion, the delegation also noted that interest in conducting peaceful explosions seemed to have decreased, and held that the future conduct of such explosions must yield to the urgency of achieving a comprehensive test ban (CCD/PV.729).

44. The Swedish draft treaty was welcomed by the delegation of the Netherlands as an excellent basis for discussion in the Committee (CCD/PV.734 and 739). The delegation of Egypt also welcomed the draft (CCD/PV.737), while those of Poland (CCD/PV.735) and India (CCD/PV.738) welcomed both the Swedish and the Soviet drafts. The delegation of Czechoslovakia said the Swedish draft would be studied with due attention (CCD/PV.759), while the delegation of Iran welcomed it as a clear effort to meet the various concerns on the subject (CCD/PV.758).

45. The delegation of the Netherlands held that the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty 7/ should remain in force after entry into force of the treaty, even though the treaty banned all tests in all environments. The delegation also feared that article II of the Swedish draft, concerning the conduct of peaceful nuclear explosions, might leave open the possibility of conducting such explosions in the atmosphere and other environments as well as underground. In addition, while not objecting to the verification procedures in article III in principle, the delegation noted that the partial test-ban Treaty was based on the view that no such procedures were needed for tests in environments other than underground. Supporting the concept of a consultative committee to ensure a verification role for small countries, the delegation of the Netherlands believed such countries should also be permitted to play a role in the assessment of seismic data; the seismic system should not be such that it could only be used by large countries having large national data-handling systems. The delegation also considered it unwise to seek to negotiate a special protocol for the carrying out of peaceful

explosions under the treaty, because it was more important that the weapons test ban be concluded speedily and the treaty should begin by banning peaceful explosions. It also considered the proposed transitional arrangements unclear and perhaps unnecessary, but thought the United States and the Soviet Union should, pending the entry into force of the treaty, commit themselves by reducing and phasing out their weapons testing. Finally, the delegation suggested that nuclear States planning to withdraw because other nuclear States had not adhered to the treaty by a predetermined date should announce their intentions well in advance (CCD/PV.734 and 739).

46. The delegation of Egypt noted, in particular, that the Swedish draft made no distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear States with regard to the conduct of peaceful nuclear explosions under the weapons ban (CCD/PV.737). The delegation of Hungary, commenting on the proposed consultative committee, thought such a Committee should be considered in connexion with the organization of international exchange of seismic data (CCD/PV.732), while the delegation of the German Democratic Republic opposed the proposed moratorium on tests as a stimulus to other nuclear-weapon States to continue their tests, which would lead to difficulties and withdrawals from the treaty (CCD/PV.736).

47. The delegation of Japan, in making preliminary remarks on the Swedish draft treaty, stated that it concurred fully with the comprehensiveness of the Swedish approach on the scope of prohibition in draft article I, paragraph 1, since this was exactly the position it had been taking throughout the deliberations on this question in the Committee. In its view, the partial test-ban Treaty would not necessarily and automatically lose effect upon the coming into force of the comprehensive treaty; it was necessary and useful for the partial Treaty to remain in force because, if a State party to the comprehensive treaty withdrew from it, that State would still be bound by the partial Treaty obligation. With regard to the transitional measures proposed in article I, paragraph 4, and article VII, paragraph 4, the delegation held that if the United States and the Soviet Union reached the point where they were prepared to sign the comprehensive test-ban treaty, that would indicate that a political condition had been attained in which the two Powers had already decided not to carry out any nuclear weapon tests; they would thus be in a position to assume the obligations imposed by the comprehensive treaty, and hence the delegation could see no need for a transitional arrangement (CCD/PV.746).

48. With regard to draft article II of the Swedish draft concerning the carrying out of peaceful nuclear explosions, the delegation of Japan shared the view that none should be conducted unless an international agreement was reached on an international supervision and control system which would ensure that no weapon testing could be carried out in the name of peaceful nuclear explosions. It interpreted article II as providing for equality between nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States, in that both might possess a nuclear explosive device for peaceful nuclear explosion projects under strict international supervision and control. On the other hand, article IX of the draft presupposed the distinction between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, a distinction upon which the entire concept of the non-proliferation Treaty régime rested. Under the present non-proliferation Treaty régime, any single State other than the nuclear-weapon States was prohibited from receiving or manufacturing nuclear explosive devices, and hence could not in practice carry out peaceful nuclear explosions by itself. Therefore, if a non-nuclear-weapon State was granted the right to carry out peaceful nuclear explosions according to a comprehensive test ban treaty under
international supervision and control, that would contradict the related provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty. The delegation of Japan considered that article II would lead to inequality among non-nuclear-weapon States in that non-nuclear-weapon States parties to both the non-proliferation Treaty and a comprehensive test ban would be banned from conducting peaceful nuclear explosions, while non-nuclear-weapon States parties only to the comprehensive ban would be allowed to conduct them under international supervision and control. The delegation suggested that, in order to be compatible with the non-proliferation Treaty, article II should be modified to the effect that peaceful nuclear explosions should be conducted in accordance with article V of the Treaty. Referring to proposed protocol II annexed to the draft treaty concerning international supervision and control, the delegation feared that considering the fact that the technical difficulties involved in establishing international control were immensely complex and difficult to overcome, such a provision might delay negotiations on the comprehensive test ban treaty.

49. The delegation of Japan suggested that the two main subjects of draft article III, namely, exchange of international seismological data and verification procedures, might better be dealt with in two separate articles. With regard to the former, it urged that, though the details might be provided for in a protocol, the basic principle should be explicitly included in the treaty itself, namely, that the data should be automatically gathered at a few assessment centres for analysis and, when the results at any centre indicated the possibility that a nuclear explosion had taken place, the case should be referred to the consultative committee. The delegation also held that an article concerning verification should provide that on-site inspection should be obligatory if the consultative committee, through majority vote, thought it necessary and that the detailed procedure of such on-site inspection should be provided for in a protocol. The Japanese delegation felt that draft article IX was unnecessary, as withdrawal was adequately provided for by article VIII. With regard to the political pressure which that article might have intended to exercise upon nuclear-weapon States not members of the Committee, the delegation believed it could be counter-productive.

50. In replying to a number of the questions raised with regard to the draft treaty, the delegation of Sweden, at the first meeting of the summer session, stressed that the draft was one of several contributions aimed at removing obstacles that had so far prevented agreement on a comprehensive test ban (CCD/PV.750).

51. With regard to the scope of the draft treaty, the delegation noted that it was comprehensive because it covered any nuclear-weapon-test explosion or any explosion of other nuclear devices in any environment. While Sweden had concluded that wide adherence to a test-ban agreement might be encouraged by such a single, independent, and comprehensive instrument, it considered it self-evident that the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty would still remain in force after the entry into force of the proposed convention. The draft article I prohibition also covered nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes because any possible interest in carrying out such explosions must yield to the urgency of achieving a full test ban; in any case, the possibility that peaceful nuclear explosions might some day prove useful should not be used as an excuse for preventing a total ban on all nuclear tests.

52. Draft article II, the Swedish delegation commented, offered the possibility of carrying out peaceful nuclear explosions under certain conditions and had been included, among other reasons, in view of existing international obligations in
this regard adhered to by many, including the three nuclear-weapon States members of the Committee. However, Sweden believed peaceful nuclear explosion projects should be allowed only when they were of overriding national or international importance, and a country requesting a peaceful nuclear explosion, whether a nuclear or non-nuclear State, would be obliged to submit the project to strict international supervision and control according to procedures agreed upon by the parties to the treaty. Moreover, the delegation added, no such project should be carried out if no satisfactory procedures could be devised to ensure that it would yield no information of real significance for nuclear-weapon maintenance and development, either for nuclear or for non-nuclear States. The delegation of Sweden also wished to confirm that draft article II, although worded generally, was intended to cover only peaceful nuclear explosions carried out underground, and Sweden was prepared to modify the article to make that explicit. It would be taken for granted, it noted, that such underground explosions would be carried out under special arrangements by a nuclear-weapon State. With regard to the suggested protocol to cover the details of procedures concerning possible exceptions to the peaceful nuclear explosion ban, there was no particular urgency in terminating its negotiation; if considered necessary, the text of the article could be modified to make it clear that a total prohibition against all nuclear explosions would be in force as long as no special procedures relating to peaceful nuclear explosions had been agreed upon.

53. With regard to the draft articles on verification (III and IV), the Swedish delegation, noting that the proposed verification procedure in article III related only to underground explosions, as stated in paragraph 3 of the article, expressed willingness to clarify the point in other paragraphs as well. The proposed international exchange of data served both to deter a potential violator of the agreement and to counteract unfounded suspicions. The final assessment of all data relevant to monitoring the proposed agreement would be made by individual States parties, but the international data system would facilitate such national assessment. Several data centres would be needed to facilitate interpretation, the delegation held, particularly for small countries. The proposed formula for verification by challenge would require further negotiation, possibly leading to more precise language. In Sweden's view, the methods of seismological identification had long been sufficient to deter a possible violator and to avoid false claims about earthquakes, thus making on-site inspections unnecessary except in the rare cases where the earthquake seemed unusually similar to an explosion. In such a case, the inquiring party might wish to avoid making unfounded accusations and the party on whose territory the event occurred might feel the need to free itself from becoming the target of such accusations; thus, both might welcome the possibility of inspections by invitation. Inspection procedures would have to be established, but they should be directed more towards inspecting earthquakes than towards inspecting explosions. In this connexion, the delegation maintained, it would be of great value to receive further clarification soon with regard to the statement of the Soviet Union in its disarmament memorandum (CCD/522) indicating a willingness to discuss methods of ascertaining on-site the relevant circumstances of a seismic event, as well as clarification with regard to the exact meaning of the term "adequate verification", so often used by the United States.

54. In the light of comments made with regard to the proposed consultative committee, the Swedish delegation continued, it might be better to make the mandate of the committee broad enough to cover all questions relevant to the treaty by inserting a new article III in the draft, consisting of the present
paragraph 1, concerning an undertaking to co-operate in good faith to ensure full observance of the treaty, and the present paragraph 4 concerning the consultative committee. The remaining paragraphs of the present article would then become new article IV, and other articles and references would be renumbered accordingly. A revised text was being issued to reflect these changes (CCD/526/Rev.l). As to the Committee's mandate, the Swedish delegation planned to consult informally with interested delegations with the aim of putting forward a concrete proposal during the summer session. For its part, the delegation had in mind an advisory body that would be the main instrument for consultation among parties in all matters relating to the operation and interpretation of the treaty. The Committee's main purpose should be to inspire confidence in the treaty, and it should meet periodically to consider compliance with treaty obligations and proposals for increasing the treaty's viability, including the preparation of the proposed review conference. The Committee could also be given a consultative function with respect to the desirability of carrying out peaceful nuclear explosions. The Committee should be open to all parties, the delegation held; the depositary, that is, the Secretary-General of the United Nations or his representative, would be its chairman; it would also seem appropriate that the Secretary of the Committee be an official of the United Nations Secretariat; it should also be convened either on the initiative of the depositary or at the request of any party; its decisions should be on a consensus basis, but all points of view should be recorded in its reports distributed to parties after each meeting; finally, close liaison between the Committee and the seismic data system should be established, with details embodied in the proposed protocol concerning the technical supervision of treaty compliance (protocol II), while the right of each party to receive information as a result of inquiries concerning seismic events abroad should be set forth in the proposed protocol on the Committee's "functions and rules of procedures" (protocol IV). The question of giving the Committee a role with regard to possible on-site inspections should be left for further negotiations, the delegation added.

55. With regard to the transitional arrangements proposed in draft articles I and VII, the Swedish delegation pointed out that such arrangements would not be necessary if the two major nuclear Powers decided to refrain from nuclear testing immediately, but since this did not appear possible, the draft treaty suggested two alternative bases for agreement: one (article VII) based on the acceptance by the two Powers of certain restraints in testing from the time of signing the treaty until its entry into force, and another (article I) based on such acceptance for a fixed period after signature, which might hasten the entry into force of the treaty. Sweden was confident that, if a transitional period was needed, an acceptable solution could be found rather quickly through two-Power negotiation under the auspices of the Committee. The delegation stressed that the purpose of the proposed transitional arrangements would be to achieve the quickest possible termination of test activities and not to open the door to further rounds of testing by the major nuclear Powers.

56. With regard to the provision for the special withdrawal of parties from the proposed treaty (draft article X), the Swedish delegation held that, since it was fundamental, in the long term, that all nuclear-weapon States become parties to a comprehensive test ban treaty, draft article X provided for the withdrawal of any party from the treaty if all nuclear-weapon States had not adhered to it within a certain specified period of time, which would have to be negotiated but which should not be too short.

57. The Soviet delegation observed that the Soviet Union remained convinced - and
the arguments of specialists substantiated that view - that national means of
detection were entirely adequate for monitoring the prohibition of nuclear-weapon
tests. Nevertheless, in order to clear the way for an agreement, it had taken a
major step towards meeting the views of the Western Powers and had introduced into
the draft treaty a provision for the possibility, on a voluntary basis, of on-site
inspection, if any doubts should arise regarding one or another country's fulfilment
of its treaty obligations. The delegation added that it had noted that the Soviet
Union's readiness to take part in the search for a generally acceptable
understanding on questions of control had met with a wide positive response among
the members of the Committee, particularly the delegations of the United States of
America, the United Kingdom, Japan, Italy, Canada, Sweden, Iran and other countries
(ibid.).

58. The delegation of the United Kingdom stated that the draft treaty and comments
of the Swedish delegation would be studied with great interest by its Government
(CCD/PV.757).

59. The delegation of Iran made extensive comments on the draft and the Swedish
explanation of it. With regard to draft article I, it shared the view that the
1963 partial test-ban Treaty should remain valid, at least until the comprehensive
ban had acquired universal adherence, particularly if withdrawal from the
comprehensive treaty was facilitated, as proposed in the Swedish draft. The two
alternatives proposed in the article for phasing out the testing of the nuclear
Powers, the delegation continued, raised the questions whether treaty commitments
could become binding upon signature of an agreement but before its ratification,
whether other States would be willing to ratify before the nuclear States had done
so and whether a treaty coming into force while nuclear testing was still taking
place might not contradict the agreement's very essence. The delegation suggested,
however, that a bilaterally negotiated schedule for a gradual cessation might be
contained in a separate agreement (CCD/PV.758).

60. With regard to draft article II, the delegation of Iran believed that it would
be difficult to determine the conditions for peaceful nuclear explosions under a
comprehensive test ban and that the question had become a new obstacle to agreement.
It pointed out that on the one hand, many believed it was necessary to implement
article V of the non-proliferation Treaty as soon as possible and, on the other, it
was evident that the technology of peaceful explosions was identical to that used
for nuclear weapons purposes; a moratorium on peaceful nuclear explosions which
postponed the implementation of article V might discourage adherence to the
non-proliferation Treaty, and it would require broad support for its acceptance.
However, even though hopes that the provisions of the Treaty on peaceful nuclear
explosions associated with the threshold test-ban Treaty might apply to a
comprehensive ban had not been realized, a solution to the problem should not be
beyond the capabilities of the Committee, the delegation concluded (ibid.).

61. With regard to draft articles III and IV, the delegation welcomed the concept
of a consultative committee with responsibilities for treaty implementation,
particularly as a device for the participation of all parties in the operation of
the agreement. It further believed that the draft provisions on the difficult
verification problem seemed to reflect many ideas expressed in recent discussions,
to facilitate co-operation and consultations among States parties, and to offer
equal opportunity for all parties to participate in the verification procedure,
including particularly the exchange of seismic data. Such exchange, together with
other existing technical methods, could provide good assurance of compliance with
the treaty, the delegation thought. The provision in both the Swedish and the Soviet draft for on-site inspection under certain conditions indicated that this long-standing obstacle to agreement might perhaps now be negotiable. Since the value of on-site inspections had come increasingly under question and they would primarily serve the purposes of building confidence among the parties, it was to be hoped that the Committee might be approaching a convergence of views on the issue.

62. Concerning draft article X, the delegation of Iran valued the attempt to permit the entry into force of the treaty while recognizing the need for universal adherence to it; however, the article raised many questions and it was not yet clear whether such a compromise would be realistic.

63. At the first meeting of the summer session on 5 July, the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union informed the Committee that they had held useful preliminary consultations on the subject of a test ban in June and that, in early July, the two delegations would be joined by the United Kingdom delegation to begin negotiations that would result, it was hoped, in agreement on such a ban. If such an agreement was reached, the delegation of the United States noted, the Committee could then play an important role in the elaboration of an appropriate international treaty. The delegation added the view that although the achievement of such an agreement had eluded negotiators in the past, the matter was now on the right track. In a message to the Conference read by the delegation, the President of the United States noted that the United States had recently completed an extensive review of its position on a comprehensive test ban on nuclear explosions and that it supported the priority given the subject by the Committee and recognized the central role to be played by it in reaching a final agreement. The United States delegation stressed that a comprehensive test ban that was genuinely non-discriminatory and adequately verified would slow the pace of the nuclear-arms race, would contribute significantly to preventing the spread of nuclear explosives and would strengthen the non-proliferation Treaty (CCD/PV.750).

64. The delegation of the Soviet Union believed that the bilateral and trilateral consultations should contribute to a successful solution to the test-ban problem (ibid.).

65. The delegation of the United Kingdom, noting the world-wide support for a comprehensive test ban and its own long support for such a ban provided it was adequately verified and could ensure that peaceful nuclear explosions were not used to obtain military benefits, welcomed the renewed efforts towards that goal recently announced by the President of the United States and confirmed its participation in trilateral discussions on the subject (CCD/PV.752).

66. The delegation of the United States later assured the Committee that it hoped to begin elaboration of a comprehensive test ban in the Committee at the earliest practical date, but believed that broad agreement would be easier if the nuclear Powers members of the Committee first found a way to bridge their differences on the subject. The three delegations concerned had begun serious work on that task and would make every effort to prepare the way for early and fruitful negotiations in the Committee. It added the view that informal discussions in the Committee could be useful in regard to such negotiations (CCD/PV.754).

67. The delegations of Hungary (CCD/PV.754), the German Democratic Republic (CCD/PV.753) and Bulgaria (CCD/PV.755) welcomed the new efforts being made to achieve a breakthrough on the issue. Hungary noted, however, that all nuclear
Powers were responsible for achieving such a ban, which could not be comprehensive without the participation of all of them, while Bulgaria held that a full ban would not be possible without the co-operation of all nuclear Powers. The delegation of the German Democratic Republic (CCD/PV.753) and Bulgaria (CCD/PV.755) stressed the need for early political decisions by the nuclear Powers to bring about such an agreement. Bulgaria maintained, in that connexion, that the Committee should play its full role in elaborating the desired agreement and that further delay would imperil international security, while its achievement would strengthen the non-proliferation régime and open the door to more substantial measures of nuclear disarmament. The delegation of Mongolia maintained that most members of the Committee were united in their belief that, at present, when obstacles were being placed in the way of beginning negotiations between all nuclear Powers with the participation of States not possessing nuclear weapons, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 31/89, the Committee could play a useful part in preparing the text of an international agreement in the test-ban field (CCD/PV.733).

68. The delegation of Sweden, again stressing that a comprehensive test ban would be beneficial to all mankind while its continued absence would be deleterious, took the position that, while there was a need for bilateral or trilateral talks on the subject among the nuclear Powers, such talks must be transformed into concrete multilateral negotiations to begin early in the summer of 1977, and it would be reasonable to expect a negotiated treaty text in time for the 1978 special session of the General Assembly. It stressed, in that connexion, that members of the Committee had solemnly pledged to strive for a full test ban as parties to the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty and the 1968 non-proliferation Treaty. With sufficient political will, it would not be difficult to find the appropriate structure for a treaty, it maintained; and the two major nuclear Powers must take the lead in mobilizing the political will to begin long overdue multilateral negotiations on such a ban soon. There had been an improved atmosphere at the spring session of the Committee, the delegation believed, and there was a real basis to hope for the results so eagerly expected by the international community. If results were not achieved soon, the credibility of the partial test-ban Treaty and the non-proliferation Treaty would be undermined, the risk of horizontal nuclear proliferation would increase and the massive nuclear-arms race would continue unabated (CCD/PV.750).

69. The delegation of Mexico stressed that it was necessary and urgent that the Committee learn the results of the bilateral conversations between the super-Powers with regard to both a comprehensive test ban and the prohibition of chemical weapons; in the light of the conclusion drawn from these results, the Committee should, as already decided at its spring session, consider and decide whether to set up a working group on the test ban, as proposed by Sweden and Mexico, and one on chemical weapons, as proposed by Italy (ibid.).

70. On 28 July, the delegation of the Soviet Union, again noting that it favoured the earliest possible solution of the problem of a general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and was exerting specific and constructive efforts in that direction, informed the Committee that the first round of tripartite consultations on the subject, held in Geneva from 13 to 27 July, had terminated and that the three participants had agreed to resume negotiations in Geneva on 3 October 1977. The delegation also noted, in that connexion, that the question of peaceful nuclear explosions and verification of such a ban had been discussed in detail in the course of these initial consultations (CCD/PV.757). The delegation of the United States confirmed that the first series of tripartite
consultations on the subject had been concluded, noting that its Government looked forward to resumption of the negotiations in the fall and hoped they would prepare the way for fruitful negotiations in the Committee toward the desired objective (ibid.). The delegation of the United Kingdom also confirmed the conclusion of the first round of tripartite negotiations, which it said had led to a better understanding of the position of the three Governments. It further stressed that while it was right that the nuclear-weapon States should first seek to establish agreement among themselves, as they were now doing, it was also right, once the broad principles of such agreement had been achieved, that the details should be communicated to the Committee for it to play its indispensable role (ibid.).

71. The delegation of Yugoslavia, regretting that the programme for 1977 adopted by the Committee made the Committee's negotiating activities dependent on the outcome of bilateral or trilateral consultations (see sect. E below), stressed that the Committee must make the greatest possible effort to complete the negotiations on a full test ban before the opening of the special session of the General Assembly in 1978 (ibid.). The delegation of Sweden also emphasized that something must be done soon to enable the Committee to start multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test ban and hoped that such negotiations could begin by the end of 1977 and be pursued with the utmost efficiency in order to achieve such a ban before the opening of the special session of the General Assembly (ibid.).

72. The delegation of Iran said that it approached the question with greater optimism than last year because of the positive signals on the subject that had recently emanated from both the United States and the Soviet Union, the draft treaty of the Soviet Union, with the welcome amendment to its verification procedure, which now included on-site inspection on a voluntary basis, the carefully elaborated draft treaty submitted by Sweden, which had stimulated comments in the Committee and helped crystallize thinking on the subject, the additional reports of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, and, above all, the trilateral consultations that had recently taken place and would resume in October. The delegation also stressed the importance of reporting progress on the test-ban issue to the special session of the General Assembly, holding that continued stalemate on the matter was no longer possible and that a treaty might be within the Committee's reach. Despite signs of some flexibility in the position of the major Powers on the long-standing verification issue, however, other issues had arisen to create new controversies, the delegation noted; but new deadlocks must be prevented and other issues must remain susceptible to compromise. The Committee must seize this apparently propitious moment to concentrate on the goal of a full test ban. In view of the large number of nuclear tests still taking place, an immediate cessation was imperative and, if negotiations for a permanent treaty threatened to drag on, an interim cessation advocated by many might become a minimum objective. The delegation also welcomed the trilateral talks that had taken place preparatory to multilateral negotiations on the subject of a full test ban and hoped tangible results could be achieved when the talks resumed in October. It added, however, that although such consultations were necessary because the major nuclear Powers must seek preliminary agreement on a given matter, a clear channel of communication must be maintained between the talks and the work of the Committee on the test-ban issue; the participants in the consultations should take the Committee's contributions into account (CCD/PV.758).

73. The delegation of Poland believed the Soviet draft treaty would receive careful consideration in the tripartite consultations and would later become the basis for an agreement in the matter (ibid.).
The delegation of Czechoslovakia welcomed recent indications that important new steps had been taken towards achieving a solution to the problem (CCD/PV.759).

The delegation of Canada regretted that no substantive negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty would take place in the Committee during the 1977 session and hoped the period of pause could be turned into a useful contribution to the negotiating process. Canada was anxiously awaiting fruitful results from the trilateral consultations to enable the Committee to play its indispensable part in the elaboration of a long overdue multilateral agreement in the matter. At the same time, the delegation added, while the nuclear Powers sometimes deserved criticism, it was only fair to note with appreciation that they were all working in a common effort to make as rapid progress as possible on many arms control problems of great importance to all countries; and Canada was confident that, with their essential commitment, the Committee could eventually produce a valuable test-ban treaty (CCD/PV.760).

The delegation of Italy believed that a large part of the scientific aspects of the problem had been sufficiently explored and that the time had now come to take the political decisions required for final agreement; negotiations on the subject were long overdue. Decisions must, however, be based on a mutually satisfactory solution of the essential pre-conditions for a viable treaty, such as verification, the delegation added. With regard to the trilateral consultations the delegation welcomed them as a necessary and positive step but shared the view that the Committee should start negotiations in order to identify points of convergence in the different drafts before it and to find a broad acceptable treaty language (ibid.).

The delegation of Nigeria also welcomed the trilateral discussions on a comprehensive test ban and hoped they would be successful, that the Committee would be informed of their progress at the earliest possible time, and that ongoing negotiations would facilitate the solution of other disarmament problems and encourage members of the Committee to draw up a comprehensive negotiating programme (CCD/PV.763).

At the last meeting of the session, the delegation of the United States, noting that the trilateral talks on the subject would reconvene on 3 October 1977, stressed the view that the Swedish draft treaty had stimulated thinking on several important questions related to the ban and also recognized the potential contribution of the Ad Hoc Group of scientific experts (see paras. 80 to 86 below) in that regard (CCD/PV.766).

Without direct reference to either draft treaty, many delegations continued to give views on the principal obstacles to early agreement on a complete test ban — the issues of verification, the participation of nuclear-weapon Powers in the treaty and the conduct of peaceful nuclear explosions.

On the verification issue, the delegations of the Soviet Union (CCD/PV.728) and other socialist States members of the Committee continued to hold that any nuclear explosion could be detected and identified by national technical means supplemented by the international exchange of seismic data. They stressed, however, as noted above, that they would participate in the search for a mutually acceptable
understanding on such a basis of compromise as would ensure a voluntary framework for taking decisions relating to on-site inspection to ascertain the relevant circumstances and would, at the same time, give all parties to the treaty an assurance that obligations were being discharged; that the text of the Soviet draft treaty had been modified accordingly; and that they would now participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. The delegation of the Soviet Union also commented that the question of a comprehensive test ban had been artificially complicated by exaggeration of the problems involved in verification (CCD/PV.730).

81. The new Soviet position on verification was widely welcomed, with specific comment to that effect by the delegations of Sweden (CCD/PV.729), Mexico (CCD/PV.730), Iran (CCD/PV.731), Japan (CCD/PV.733), the Netherlands (CCD/PV.734), Egypt (CCD/PV.737), Pakistan (CCD/PV.748) and Canada (CCD/PV.760). The delegation of Mexico urged the Committee to act in accordance with the General Assembly's reiterated conviction that there was no valid reason for delaying conclusion of a comprehensive test ban, either by achieving a permanent agreement or through a unilateral or agreed moratorium (CCD/PV.736). In a letter submitted to the Committee (CCD/536) the Government of New Zealand also held that the level of confidence in compliance with a full test ban was already adequate for a treaty to be concluded. The delegation of the Netherlands noted, however, that even if the Soviet concept, which resembled verification by challenge, were to be accepted, many problems of detail would remain, such as the required basis for requesting on-site inspections and the modalities for carrying them out (CCD/PV.734).

82. The delegations of the United States (CCD/PV.748 and 750) and the United Kingdom (CCD/PV.752 and 757) continued to stress that verification of a full test ban must be adequate. The delegation of Italy also stated that ways must be found to combine the exchange of teleseismic data with on-site inspection whenever the former was not likely to provide adequate assurance of compliance with a test ban (CCD/PV.760).

83. The delegation of Japan, holding that on-site inspections were generally considered indispensable, proposed the establishment of a verification committee, consisting of experts from both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, which would be empowered to request additional data regarding a seismic event, if required, and to decide whether or not an on-site inspection should be carried out. The delegation also noted that its working paper CCD/524 indicated that existing seismic array stations could locate events above a magnitude of 4.7 and held that, with some expansion, the magnitude could be lowered to 4.25 in most of the northern hemisphere; it stressed the possibility of verifying even smaller yields through full exchange of data and proposed that the Committee should suggest that the main seismic array stations be connected to the existing data exchange system of the World Meteorological Organization and that the Committee should request the Ad Hoc Group to carry out its experimental exercises stage by stage (CCD/PV.733). The same delegation further elaborated, in particular, a technical aspect of the proposed system and presented another working paper (CCD/540) during the summer session (CCD/PV.760).

84. The delegation of Canada hoped that the precedents on verification contained in the USSR/United States Treaty on peaceful nuclear explosions, which included both national means and, in some cases, on-site inspections, would assist in solving the verification problem in a full test ban (CCD/PV.746). Subsequently,
the same delegation expressed the belief that there had been encouraging progress in recent years with regard to the crucial verification problem such as (a) the successful negotiation of the bilateral threshold test-ban Treaty and the related agreement on peaceful explosions, (b) the work of the seismic experts on a report to be issued soon that might help solve the problem, and (c) the recent modification in the traditional position of the Soviet Union with regard to verification, as now reflected in its draft treaty. The problem would be further eased, the delegation held, if the concept of a joint consultative committee advanced in the Swedish draft treaty could be generally accepted (CCD/PV.760).

85. From 18 to 22 April 1977, informal meetings were held on the general question of a comprehensive test ban. The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, established in 1976, also met in three sessions - from 21 to 25 February, from 25 to 29 April, and from 25 July to 5 August 1977 - and submitted to the Committee the second, third and fourth progress reports (CCD/528, 534 and 542). Scientific experts and representatives from the following Committee members attended the second session of the Group of experts: Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, the German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Mongolia, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Sweden, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. These members, as well as Pakistan, participated in the third session and were joined by Peru at the fourth session. In addition, scientific experts invited from Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland and Norway participated in all three sessions, while an expert invited from New Zealand also participated in the third and fourth.

86. The Soviet Union, as noted above, called particular attention to the fact that it was participating in the work of the Ad Hoc Group during 1977; Italy (CCD/PV.728) and the United States (CCD/PV.748) specifically welcomed the participation of additional countries. In commenting on the second and third sessions of the Ad Hoc Group of experts, the delegation of Sweden hoped that the Group would facilitate the achievement of a generally acceptable global monitoring system for a comprehensive test ban (CCD/PV.729 and 733). The delegations of Egypt (CCD/PV.737) and Czechoslovakia (CCD/PV.742) also hoped the Group would work out the concrete co-operative measures required for achieving a test ban at an early date. Similarly, the delegation of India hoped the Group would clarify the technical issues central to a comprehensive test ban (CCD/PV.749). The delegations of Poland (CCD/PV.735) and the German Democratic Republic (CCD/PV.736) held that the Group should confirm the fact that national means of verification, supplemented by seismic data exchange, would suffice for verifying a full test ban. The delegation of Poland added the view that the Group would soon achieve a broadly acceptable draft proposal (CCD/PV.758). With particular regard to the Group's second progress report, the delegation of Sweden drew the attention of the Committee to the conclusion that some important geographical areas were not sufficiently covered by the existing seismic network and urged all member States to offer their seismic facilities to meet the Group's purposes (CCD/PV.733). The delegation of the Netherlands (CCD/PV.734) expressed the view that the Group was making good progress. The delegation of the United Kingdom felt that the Committee had made a valuable contribution to the important verification problem, particularly through the studies of the expert group, and asserted that it would therefore look to the Committee for practical advice in establishing the broad principles of an acceptable comprehensive test ban (CCD/PV.757). The delegation of Czechoslovakia held that the Group had made encouraging progress and was likely to provide an analysis of international verification capabilities that would permit States to judge the
adequacy of such a system and might help to solve the test-ban problem (CCD/PV.759). As noted above, the delegation of Canada listed the work of the Group as one of the encouraging signs of progress towards a test ban in recent years (CCD/PV.760). The delegation of Italy commented that the Group had done good work on a problem which required careful study (ibid.). In requesting the Committee to note the Group's fourth progress report on 9 August, the delegation of Sweden called attention to the fact that it would meet again in Geneva from 27 February to 10 March 1978 and also expressed satisfaction that Peru had participated in the fourth session as a representative of the important area of the southern hemisphere (ibid.). The delegation of the United States, as noted above, recognized the potential contribution of the Group to a solution of the test-ban problem (CCD/PV.766).
87. On the question of the participation of nuclear-weapon States in the treaty and its negotiation, the delegation of the Soviet Union (CCD/PV.730), supported by those of Bulgaria (CCD/PV.731), Mongolia (CCD/PV.733 and 761), Poland (CCD/PV.735), the German Democratic Republic (CCD/PV.736), India (CCD/PV.738), and Czechoslovakia (CCD/PV.742 and 759), continued to hold that the participation of all nuclear-weapon Powers in a comprehensive treaty was a primary condition for a solution of the problem; similarly, the delegation of Egypt believed that the effectiveness of a comprehensive ban required the adherence of all potential nuclear-weapon States, as well as those already possessing such weapons (CCD/PV.748). Several of these members pointed out, however, that if some nuclear Powers continued to refuse to negotiate, the Committee could and should play a useful role by assuming the task of drafting the text of an agreement on the basis of the Soviet draft.

88. The delegation of Sweden held that, while the ultimate goal of such an agreement must obviously be universal adherence, the participation of all nuclear-weapon States should not be made a precondition and that the two major nuclear Powers, which were overwhelmingly superior in nuclear arms and which had committed themselves to a comprehensive test ban in both the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty and in the non-proliferation Treaty, must start the process towards achievement of the desired goal (CCD/PV.729 and 733). The delegations of Iran (CCD/PV.731), the Netherlands (CCD/PV.734), Mexico (CCD/PV.736), Pakistan (CCD/PV.748 and 765) and Canada (CCD/PV.760) expressed similar views. The delegation of Japan stressed the need for early political decisions by the two major nuclear Powers on the issues of participation, verification and the conduct of peaceful explosions (CCD/PV.733). With specific reference to participation, it shared the view that the halting of all military tests by the major nuclear Powers would not jeopardize their military security, and suggested that the Committee should work out either a draft treaty or basic principles for such a treaty and present them to the General Assembly with a request for comment, thus giving non-participants in the Committee the opportunity to express their views; that it should negotiate the final text of the treaty and have it endorsed by the General Assembly or, if that was not possible, referred back to the Committee with relevant comments; and complete the draft treaty, taking those comments into consideration, for submission at the next session of the General Assembly (CCD/PV.746). The delegation of Canada stressed that a credible agreement involving the three nuclear Powers members of the Committee would be an impressive step towards wider multilateralism; it must be persuasive, however, to non-participating nuclear States and, to that end, should have an initial duration period long enough to encourage those States to recognize that their own interests and the cause of world peace would be served by their early adherence (CCD/PV.760). The delegation of Iran, noting that the question of universality of the treaty was threatening to become an intractable obstacle to agreement, urged that positions remain fluid (ibid.).

89. In a communication submitted to the Committee (CCD/536) the Government of New Zealand also maintained that there would be advantages in the adherence of the major nuclear-weapon Powers to a full test ban before China and France adhered. The delegation of the United Kingdom, as noted above, favoured a full test ban with the participation of as many States as possible, both nuclear and non-nuclear (CCD/PV.757).

90. On the related question of a limitation of the duration of a treaty, or moratorium, the delegations of the Soviet Union (CCD/PV.730) and other Socialist
States opposed setting any time-limit, while those of Mexico (CCD/PV.728 and 736), Japan (CCD/PV.733) and Egypt (CCD/PV.737) favoured a bilateral moratorium of several years on such tests, such as that recently suggested by President Carter of the United States. Japan added the view that, during a two- to four-year moratorium, the Committee on Disarmament should begin concrete negotiations on a comprehensive ban with an effective verification system; and if such a moratorium was not achievable, the two major Powers should then reduce substantially the threshold of their bilateral threshold test-ban Treaty and seek to transform it into a multilateral agreement.

91. With further regard to the problem of carrying out peaceful nuclear explosions under a nuclear-weapon-test ban, the delegation of the Soviet Union and other Socialist States continued to support the solution proposed under the Soviet draft treaty, as described above. The delegation of Poland stressed that peaceful explosions should be dealt with in a treaty separate from that on the nuclear-weapon-test ban and separately negotiated (CCD/PV.735). The delegation of Mongolia, stressing that all States should be able to enjoy the benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions, held that any solution of the problem must be based clearly on article V of the non-proliferation Treaty, on the implementation of which negotiations should be held concurrently with negotiations on the full test ban (CCD/PV.746). The delegation of Bulgaria stressed the view that the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions could not be solved under such a ban because they were provided for under the non-proliferation Treaty and should be regulated by agreements to be worked out under article V of that Treaty (CCD/PV.755).

92. The delegation of Japan, on the other hand, held that the present technology could not distinguish between nuclear explosive devices for weapon uses and those for peaceful uses, and that if peaceful nuclear explosions were permitted under a comprehensive test ban treaty, it might lead to the danger of non-nuclear-weapon States acquiring nuclear explosive capability in the name of peaceful purposes and nuclear-weapon States finding a loophole in the treaty. It accordingly firmly believed that peaceful explosions should be conducted only under an international control system that could prevent such a danger; but until such a system was established, the nuclear-weapon States should voluntarily refrain from carrying out peaceful nuclear explosions (CCD/PV.733 and 761). The delegation of the Netherlands considered the problem of peaceful tests to be a major obstacle to agreement (CCD/PV.734) and thought that such tests should be initially renounced if the complex problem delayed the conclusion of a comprehensive ban (CCD/PV.741). The delegation of Sweden expressed similar views, as noted above (CCD/PV.729 and 733). The delegation of Pakistan, noting again that military and peaceful nuclear explosions were indistinguishable, held that the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions must be regulated in the context of a comprehensive test ban and that matters would be simplified by a moratorium on all peaceful nuclear explosions until agreement had been reached on that question (CCD/PV.748). In a communication submitted to the Committee (CCD/536), the Government of New Zealand also concluded that peaceful nuclear explosions should be generally proscribed until it was established that they could be carried out without danger of providing military advantages. The delegation of the United Kingdom stressed that any agreement must ensure that peaceful nuclear explosions could not be used for military purposes (CCD/PV.757). The delegation of Canada held that, unless some effective means could be found to make absolutely sure that there would be no weapons-related benefits from peaceful nuclear explosions, no such explosions should be contemplated under a comprehensive ban, as envisaged in the Swedish draft treaty (CCD/PV.760).
93. The delegation of the German Democratic Republic hoped the bilateral US/USSR Treaty on peaceful nuclear explosions would lead to a solution of the problem (CCD/PV.736). The delegation of Iran commented that its hopes that this USSR/United States treaty would lead to a solution of the problem had foundered, but urged that positions with regard to that new obstacle to agreement should remain flexible (CCD/PV.758).

94. The delegation of India held that it would be a basic error to seek to regulate peaceful explosions in the framework of a comprehensive weapons test ban, since the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was the proper forum for consideration of that matter and had already been seized of various aspects of the question (CCD/PV.738). In reply, the delegation of the United States again stressed the view that nuclear-weapon tests and peaceful nuclear explosions were indistinguishable and that it should be acknowledged that both questions should be covered under a comprehensive ban (ibid.). The delegation of India, however, reiterated the view that the question of peaceful explosions was outside the scope of disarmament problems and hence beyond the competence of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD/PV.739). The delegation of the Netherlands reminded the Committee that the General Assembly had adopted by an overwhelming majority a resolution requesting the Committee to study the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions and that the Committee had prepared a special report on the matter (ibid.).

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95. During the discussions on a comprehensive ban, the delegations of Sweden (CCD/PV.729) and Hungary (CCD/PV.732) expressed regret that there had been three weapons tests in the atmosphere during 1976 and also urged universal adherence to the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty, as did the delegation of Mongolia (CCD/PV.746). The delegation of India (CCD/PV.738) noted that the 1963 Treaty had remained doubly partial, as it prohibited testing in only three of four environments and had been adhered to by only three of five nuclear-weapon States. Other members made indirect comments on the partial test-ban Treaty, as noted above.

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

96. Many members, including Iran (CCD/PV.731), Hungary (CCD/PV.732), Japan (CCD/PV.733), Mongolia (ibid.), the United States (CCD/PV.735), the USSR (ibid.), the United Kingdom (ibid.), Poland (ibid.) and Czechoslovakia (CCD/PV.742 and 747), made statements specifically supporting the non-proliferation Treaty and calling for universal adherence to it. The delegation of Poland expressed particular concern that the non-proliferation regime was being threatened. The delegation of Yugoslavia called for consistent implementation of all the objectives and provisions of the Treaty (CCD/PV.742). The delegation of Egypt also expressed support for the principles underlying the Treaty and called for universal adherence to it, while again noting that it could not ratify the Treaty for obvious reasons (CCD/PV.737 and 748). The delegation of the United Kingdom, maintaining that the international community must remove the incentive to acquire nuclear weapons if it was to control the greatest risk to mankind, nuclear proliferation, noted with regret that two nuclear-weapon States and some 30 non-nuclear-weapon States had not adhered to the non-proliferation Treaty (CCD/PV.757).
With regard to recent adherences to the Treaty, the delegations of the United States (CCD/PV.735), the USSR (ibid.), the United Kingdom (ibid.), Poland (ibid.), Czechoslovakia (CCD/PV.742) and Mongolia (CCD/PV.746) welcomed the ratification by Switzerland.

The delegations of Iran (CCD/PV.731), Hungary (CCD/PV.732) and Czechoslovakia (CCD/PV.747) supported the strengthening of the role of IAEA in non-proliferation issues, particularly in the application of its safeguards against the diversion of peaceful nuclear materials to military purposes.

The delegation of India, recalling that it had inscribed the subject of non-proliferation in the agenda of the General Assembly in 1964, stressed the view that horizontal and vertical proliferation were both parts of the same problem and had to be tackled together if a satisfactory solution to the non-proliferation problem was to be found (CCD/PV.734). It emphasized in that connexion the recent statement of the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Desai, that India did not intend to possess nuclear weapons (CCD/PV.749). The delegation of Iran expressed similar views on the close relationship between horizontal and vertical proliferation (CCD/PV.758).

The delegation of Pakistan stated that the objective of strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States was of critical importance not only for the vulnerable non-nuclear-weapon States, but also for the international community as a whole in its non-proliferation and disarmament efforts; the concept was, in the long run, in the interest of the nuclear-weapon States themselves (CCD/PV.748). The same delegation maintained that an essential step towards preventing nuclear proliferation was to reassure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the threat of use, or use of nuclear weapons and to give them credible security assurances (CCD/PV.765).

With regard to the peaceful use of nuclear energy by non-nuclear-weapon States, the delegation of Romania held that measures had recently been initiated to hamper such use by adherents to the Treaty, which was contrary to the spirit of the agreement and could endanger its very future. It stressed the view that it was not the peaceful uses programme that was causing a threat of proliferation, but the refusal of the nuclear-weapon States to slow down the arms race and provide adequate security guarantees to the non-nuclear States (CCD/PV.731). The delegation of India stressed that the developing countries had made the unhampered transfer of nuclear science and technology the cornerstone of their fight for a just economic order and that the true solution of the non-proliferation problem lay in halting the production of nuclear weapons and fissile material for weapons purposes, with verification procedures applied to all States equally (CCD/PV.734).

A number of other members, however, welcomed efforts to establish stronger controls over the export of fissile materials and nuclear technology to non-nuclear-weapon States. The delegation of Hungary supported IAEA's efforts in that connexion (CCD/PV.732); that of Poland attached great importance to the agreements being elaborated among the major exporters of nuclear materials and equipment (CCD/PV.735) and that of Czechoslovakia, noting that some States had not yet adhered to the non-proliferation Treaty, believed that stricter conditions should be applied to the export of nuclear materials and technology, including re-exports to third countries, without however, slowing down the development of peaceful nuclear power (CCD/PV.747).
103. The delegation of the Netherlands agreed that technical means, such as strong safeguards, would not suffice to combat the danger of horizontal proliferation unless the nuclear arms race between the great Powers was brought under control. At the same time it was impossible to focus attention exclusively on the question of vertical proliferation when thousands of kilograms of plutonium were being accumulated all over the world. After mentioning several necessary measures to halt the nuclear arms race, such as strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, the delegation introduced the concept of an inherently safe nuclear fuel cycle, that is a fuel cycle that did not contain significant quantities of highly enriched uranium or plutonium in a readily accessible form. The problem of building such fuel cycles were extremely complex, both from a technical, an economic and a political point of view, but an attempt to tackle this problem was not only worth while but essential, the delegation held. Many ideas had been put forward, such as to minimize or even abandon the reprocessing of spent fuel, to build enrichment plants which could produce only slightly enriched uranium, to postpone the introduction of fast-breeder reactors, to develop the thorium-uranium breeding cycle instead of the uranium-plutonium one, and to stop the development of certain types of high-temperature gas-cooled reactors which use highly enriched uranium. With regard to dangerous materials in the fuel cycle, one could minimize the risks by, for example, the creation of multinational fuel-cycle centres, by blending the materials so as to make misuse more difficult, by storing dangerous materials in international storage vaults, etc. The delegation called for a thorough international dialogue on the subject of how to develop the peaceful use of nuclear energy without the risk of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and hoped that the IAEA Conference on the nuclear fuel cycle, to be held in Salzburg in May 1977, would contribute to a solution of the problem. It stressed, however, that since the realization of the new ideas for a safer fuel cycle would take considerable time, international safeguards should be strengthened within the framework of IAEA to improve the existing safeguards systems and to further develop all forms of additional safeguards. Pointing out that the suppliers of nuclear materials, equipment or technology had special responsibility to make sure that such exports would not undermine international security, the delegation stressed that it was not the intention of the participants in the consultations of nuclear exporting countries at London to seek economic advantage by creating some kind of monopoly of the technologically advanced countries. Rather, the London consultations should be seen as a transitory stage, pending the development of a dialogue that would involve both supplier and recipient countries (CCD/PV.741).

104. The delegation of the United States recalled, in this general connexion, the comments of President Carter concerning the continued support of the United States for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy (CCD/PV.745).

105. The delegation of Bulgaria, noting that the recent joint communiqué of the Soviet Union and France had reaffirmed their interest in preventing the proliferation of nuclear arms and in taking care that their assistance to third countries in the field of nuclear industry was covered by the necessary safeguards against such proliferation, particularly welcomed the statement of the two Governments favouring limitations on the transfer of nuclear materials from which nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices could be manufactured, since the non-proliferation of nuclear arms was, now more than ever, an indispensable condition for international security (CCD/PV.755).

106. The delegation of the United Kingdom agreed that the commitment in the non-proliferation Treaty to promote the development of nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes was important, but held that the central dilemma was how to reconcile this objective with the equally important objective of curbing the spread of nuclear weapons. Therefore, the delegation maintained, the most stringent control must be placed on access to the technology and fissile materials required for weapons production, and the international safeguards system must be made as water-tight as possible. Accordingly, the United Kingdom advocated the general application of the full fuel cycle safeguards developed by IAEA. Concurrently with safeguards, the delegation continued, the nuclear suppliers group had been concentrating on the harmonization of nuclear export policies, as requested by the 1975 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It was untrue that the group was monopolistic, and the purpose of the discussions was to ensure that safeguards and the non-proliferation aspects of sales of nuclear materials and equipment took precedence over commercial considerations. The group had established beneficial guidelines in this regard, but it should now be opened to a wider membership in order to establish an international dialogue based on the recognition that all countries required assurance that all their future nuclear energy needs would be met. A decision would also have to be taken on what fuel cycle would most effectively contribute to non-proliferation objectives, which would be the starting point for the international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation programme proposed by the United States. Since all countries had an interest in curtailing nuclear proliferation, a long-term process of continuous negotiations must be carried out (CCD/PV.757).

107. Many delegations addressed themselves to the question of implementing article V of the non-proliferation Treaty concerning peaceful nuclear explosions, but they did so largely within the framework of the discussion on the comprehensive test ban.

108. Several delegations, including the United Kingdom, referred to the commitment of the nuclear Powers to halt the arms race and to achieve disarmament contained in article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty.

109. The delegation of Japan made a comprehensive statement setting forth Japan's basic policy on nuclear non-proliferation. The delegation maintained that the obligation of the nuclear-weapon States to adopt concrete measures of nuclear disarmament and the inalienable right of non-nuclear-weapon States to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy without discrimination were the two elements making up the very fabric of the non-proliferation Treaty régime; if the obligation was not fulfilled and the right guaranteed, the credibility of the non-proliferation Treaty would be jeopardized and the achievement of its universality made more difficult. Trying to freeze the legitimate rights and activities of parties to the non-proliferation Treaty even partially, out of the fear of nuclear proliferation, was not the right way to solve the problem; and in fact, it might be described as a case of the remedy being worse than the disease. The delegation added that, after reviewing the non-proliferation Treaty system and examining the central dilemma in the Treaty between the commitment to curb the spread of nuclear weapons and the equally important commitment to promote the further development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, it had concluded that it was not reasonable for the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to be unilaterally forbidden, for the purpose of nuclear non-proliferation, to operate reprocessing plants, and that their operation should be allowed under certain objective conditions, for example, upon the entry into force of both the non-proliferation Treaty and a comprehensive test ban treaty, the implementation of the proposed international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation programme and extracting plutonium in a
form inappropriate for the production of nuclear weapons. The delegation also proposed a variety of measures, some to be taken within the framework of the non-proliferation Treaty and others outside. Among the former were (a) positive measures to guarantee the right of the non-nuclear-weapon States to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, specifically access to a supply of natural uranium, as well as enrichment and reprocessing services, reactors and other facilities, as well as related technologies; (b) stricter safeguards requirements on peaceful nuclear activities of States not parties to the non-proliferation Treaty; and (c) submission by all nuclear-weapon States of their civil nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards and strengthening of the IAEA role. Among measures to be taken outside the non-proliferation Treaty framework were (a) steps to prevent the accidental uses of nuclear weapons, such as the United States/USSR agreement on notification of missile launching tests and military exercises; (b) early conclusion of the second round and the beginning of the third round of the strategic arms limitation talks; (c) conclusion of a comprehensive test ban, towards which negotiations in the Committee should start at the earliest possible date; (d) cut-off of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; (e) strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States on the basis of solutions reflecting the prevailing political and military conditions in each region; (f) international arrangements for physical protection of nuclear materials during storage and transportation; and (g) measures in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy to control effectively sensitive technologies and materials that could lead to nuclear-weapons capability. The delegation emphasized that the latter measures should be implemented taking into account the economic and other relevant facts and held that Japan could not do without reprocessing and recycling of spent uranium fuel to secure stable energy supplies. It added that Japan was ready to support the international fuel-cycle evaluation programme provided it did not hamper Japan's nuclear energy programme and urged participation in it of the greatest number of interested countries, including the so-called nuclear-threshold countries. The delegation concluded that the present task of the international community could not be accomplished by freezing the legitimate right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy of those States which has developed atomic energy solely for peaceful purposes, and that what was now required was not to establish a "philosophy of denial" but to implement the existing nuclear non-proliferation regime in a constructive manner so that the initial ideal of a programme of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, advocated by President Eisenhower as "Atoms for Peace", would be attained (CCD/PV.761).

110. The delegation of Pakistan stated that Pakistan fully shared the renewed concern about the danger of nuclear proliferation and had taken several initiatives to avert this danger. However, the approach being advocated by the so-called "London Club", i.e. to place trust in the non-proliferation Treaty and in unilateral controls and restraints on the transfer of nuclear technology, even under the strictest international safeguards, was not likely to succeed. Pakistan had always felt that the non-proliferation Treaty could not be effective unless it was subscribed to by the major threshold Powers and unless the security of the non-nuclear States was effectively safeguarded. The policy of restraints and embargoes on the transfer of nuclear technology could not be successful for several reasons, the delegation held, and the best course was to ensure that nuclear technology was acquired under the necessary controls and safeguards. Sooner or later, the developing countries were bound to adopt a common position on the issue, thereby leading to further difficulties in North-South relations. The only durable solution to the problem of nuclear proliferation, the delegation believed,
lay in building an international climate of trust and confidence in which nations would not feel the need to acquire nuclear weapons and towards that end, the world must focus its attention on the more basic tasks in the field of disarmament, i.e. preventing the further development and sophistication of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, immediately reducing the existing level of armaments, especially nuclear armaments, and initiating methods towards their eventual destruction and complete elimination. The delegation concluded by stating that, realizing the need for a new consensus, Pakistan would propose, at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly, principles for promoting peaceful nuclear co-operation within the framework of the restraints against the proliferation of nuclear weapons (CCD/PV.765).

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

111. A number of members also commented on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones, with particular reference to the various resolutions adopted on the subject by the General Assembly at its thirty-first session.

112. The delegation of Romania, considering itself in the forefront of those supporting measures of military disengagement and the limitation of development of nuclear weapons, noted General Assembly resolution 31/70 on the subject of nuclear-weapon-free zones and favoured maintaining the question on the agenda of the Committee as a means of encouraging the creation of such zones. In that general connexion, the delegation reaffirmed its interest in establishing new co-operative relations among Balkan countries so that the area might be transformed into a zone of peace (CCD/PV.731). The delegation of Poland (CCD/PV.735) and Czechoslovakia (CCD/PV.742) hoped the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof would stimulate new interest in nuclear-free zones in other areas. The delegation of India again stressed the importance of the voluntary participation of the concerned regional States in such zones, which could only be developed and maintained from within the region concerned (CCD/PV.749).

113. With regard to the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone, the delegation of Mexico submitted a letter concerning the tenth anniversary of the opening for signature of the Treaty of Tlatelolco (CCD/525) and referred to the scope and significance of the Treaty (CCD/PV.728). The delegation of the United States, recalling that the United States had ratified Additional Protocol II of the Tlatelolco Treaty in 1971, called attention to the recent announcement of President Carter that the United States would sign and seek ratification of Protocol I, providing for the application of the Treaty to the territories in Latin America of countries located outside the area. The delegation also stressed the desire of the United States to contribute towards bringing the Latin American nuclear-free-zone fully into effect throughout the region and to avert the dangers of nuclear proliferation (CCD/PV.745). The delegation of Mexico welcomed the announcement of the United States and called on France, the only country concerned by Protocol I that had not acceded to it, to make the Protocol complete. It recalled the 1967 interpretation of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America concerning the absence in the Treaty of provisions relating to the question of the transit of nuclear weapons through Latin American territory. The delegation of Mexico also called on the Soviet Union to accede to Additional Protocol II of the Treaty, by which nuclear-weapon States
agreed to respect the objectives of the Treaty. At the first meeting of the summer session, the delegation referred to the importance it attached to the signature by the President of the United States, on 26 May, of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty (CCD/PV.745 and 750).

114. The delegation of Iran again stressed the need to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the area of the Middle East to avoid the dangerous introduction of nuclear weapons into the area. On the related subject of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean, the delegation of Iran hoped that progress could be made towards a conference on that subject (CCD/PV.731).

115. The delegation of Pakistan again stressed the belief that a nuclear-free-zone in South Asia would be in the common interest of all countries of the region and that the international community should continue to encourage all regional initiatives to create such zones (CCD/PV.748). The delegation of India held that South Asia was a subregion of Asia and the Pacific and could not be treated in isolation, and that the security environment of the region as a whole must be considered; it believed that a genuine nuclear-weapon-free zone could only follow from the total absence of nuclear weapons in that region (CCD/PV.749). The delegation of Pakistan noted that the General Assembly had responded to the wishes of a majority of States in various regions by adopting resolutions urging the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, notably in South Asia, the Middle East and Africa; it held that non-nuclear-weapon States must take initiatives towards regional security against the nuclear threat from within or without their regions by establishing such zones and that, instead of retarding progress by setting preconditions, the nuclear-weapon States should take an active part in their establishment (CCD/PV.765).

116. With reference to nuclear-weapon-free zones and the proposed peace zone of the Indian Ocean, the delegation of Japan maintained that a concrete and realistic way to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States of their security was to explore a solution based upon the prevailing political and military conditions in each region (CCD/PV.761).
B. Non-nuclear measures

Question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons

117. Having in mind the recommendations of General Assembly resolution 31/65, the Committee continued and intensified its efforts to make progress towards a prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction. Virtually all members again stressed the importance and urgency they attached to the matter as a priority issue before the Committee, equal to or second only to that of a comprehensive test ban.

118. In response to a request of the Committee at its 1976 session, the Secretariat submitted, at the outset of the 1977 session, a compilation of material from working papers and statements presented to the Committee in recent years on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. Among a number of delegations commenting favourably on the compilation, the delegation of the Netherlands expressed the view that it indicated the existence of a possible consensus on some substantial issues involved (CCD/PV.741).

119. Many members made general comments on the subject of a convention to ban chemical weapons, and a considerable number addressed themselves directly to the draft convention on the subject submitted to the Committee by the United Kingdom in August 1976 (CCD/512). 8/

120. With regard to the general prospects for the achievement of a broadly acceptable ban, the delegation of Mexico noted the many proposals already before the Committee that might help to overcome the obstacles to agreement (CCD/PV.728). The delegation of Italy believed that significant progress could be made in 1977 if the Committee adopted a pragmatic method of work, making maximum use of its previous experience, in particular the draft conventions and the many working papers that had already been submitted to it. Accordingly, the delegation proposed the creation of a working group assisted by experts, in which interested United Nations members outside the Committee could be invited to participate and which would be given the specific task of seeking a concrete agreement in the matter. The delegation further suggested that the proposed group use the United Kingdom draft convention as the basis of its deliberations (ibid.). The delegation subsequently expressed the hope that the group could be convened during the 1977 summer session (CCD/PV.741).

121. The delegation of the United States believed that progress made in the matter at the 1976 session had set the stage for resolving some complicated issues and hoped that the 1976 pace could be accelerated or at least maintained. In that general connexion, the delegation also reminded the Committee that, in addition to its contribution to work on the matter in the Committee, the United States also intended to continue consultations with the Soviet Union in an effort to reach agreement on principles (CCD/PV.728). The delegation of the Soviet Union stressed the urgent need for a ban on chemical warfare and expressed the belief that bilateral efforts under way since August 1976 to achieve a ban on the most dangerous, lethal chemical means of warfare could make a substantial contribution to that goal (CCD/PV.740).

122. The delegation of Iran believed that the prospects were encouraging for the negotiations of a chemical weapons ban during 1977 (CCD/PV.731). The delegations of Bulgaria (ibid.) and Mongolia (CCD/PV.733) also felt that progress was possible, since the step-by-step approach, beginning with a prohibition of the most dangerous chemical agents, now enjoyed wide support in the Committee, and since the Soviet Union was now willing to consider additional verification procedures. The delegation of Hungary noted, in particular, the progress already made in identifying the criteria for banning the most lethal chemical agents and in proving the effectiveness of national means of control (CCD/PV.732). The delegation of Poland believed that efforts of the Committee need not slacken in the expectation of a joint Soviet-United States initiative; on the other hand, such an initiative would add an important momentum to the Committee's efforts if a political convergence of views could be arrived at bilaterally (CCD/PV.735). The delegation of Mongolia also expressed the belief that the 1976 discussions had narrowed the differences somewhat, particularly in the matter of definition of the agents to be banned on the basis of the primary criterion of general purpose of the agent, as well as the toxicity criterion; but the delegation held that the technical aspects of the question had been more than amply considered and that more time should have been given to its political aspects (CCD/PV.744). The delegation of Czechoslovakia, recalling that the Socialist States had proposed a draft international convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons (CCD/361) as early as 1972, held that the meetings on the subject held during the Committee's spring session with participation of experts including an expert from Czechoslovakia, had helped to create a broader understanding of a practical approach to a solution of the problem (CCD/PV.759).

123. The delegation of the United Kingdom made the general comment that, since the international community had supported a ban on the use of chemical weapons in the 1925 Geneva Protocol, it should not be beyond its collective intelligence to devise a ban on the production and retention of such weapons (CCD/PV.757). The delegation also noted that, since all States were interested in such a ban, any agreement in the matter must satisfy the security needs of each State, as the draft convention of the United Kingdom would do (CCD/PV.752).

124. The delegation of Canada recalled that it had renounced the first use of chemical weapons and had completed, during 1976, the lengthy process of destroying its stocks of Second World War mustard gas (CCD/PV.740).

125. The delegation of Yugoslavia, pointing out that it possessed no chemical weapons and had none on its territory, stressed the possibility that some of the differences in attitudes towards certain questions concerning the banning of such weapons arose precisely from the fact that not all States were in the same position regarding their possession. The delegation believed that chemical weapons represented a danger for smaller countries perhaps even greater than for bigger ones, because the former did not usually possess an arsenal of various kinds of highly powerful weapons and most of them did not possess the appropriate capacity.

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for chemical and medical defence against such weapons. Past experience seemed to confirm that view, the delegation maintained, since chemical warfare agents had been used since World War II only against armies that did not possess them. Accordingly, in future discussions on chemical weapons, the Committee should pay due attention to the security problems of all States and not, as had been the case so far, consider the problem primarily from the standpoint of the security and mutual relationships of countries possessing chemical weapons (CCD/PV.742).

126. The Italian proposal for the creation of a working group to seek concrete agreement was directly supported by the delegations of Canada (CCD/PV.731), the Netherlands (CCD/PV.734), Sweden (CCD/PV.735), Japan (CCD/PV.739), Romania (CCD/PV.743), and Egypt (CCD/PV.744). The delegation of the Netherlands thought that there could perhaps be a prior discussion of such a group's programme and priorities in the informal meetings on the subject of a chemical weapons ban that the Committee had decided to hold in late March. Subsequently, the Netherlands delegation supported the idea of forming such a working group early in the summer session to formulate a number of agreed principles for the desired agreement, while the United States and the Soviet Union were seeking a bilateral solution of certain outstanding problems, preferably also in the form of principles that could be brought into the discussions of the working group. The delegation believed that the Committee could thus present to the thirty-second session of the General Assembly as many agreed principles as possible, together with an outline of the issues still outstanding, perhaps in the form of alternative solutions. The delegation hoped that, in that manner, the Committee on Disarmament would be in a position to elaborate during 1978 a draft convention on the basis of the agreed principles and the comments received (CCD/PV.741). The delegation of Egypt also thought the working group should prepare a set of principles to be subsequently agreed upon by the Committee and submitted to all States for their comments at the next session of the General Assembly (CCD/PV.744).

127. The delegation of Japan suggested that, for concrete negotiations, alternative solutions should be drawn up with regard to the two important problems of the scope of the treaty and the verification of compliance with it; then, one solution for each problem should be chosen or, if that proved impossible, the major trends of the discussion should be summarized; finally, a draft treaty could be negotiated by the proposed working group (CCD/PV.739).

128. The delegation of Poland shared the view that such an ad hoc group might be established by the Committee if and when it appeared warranted, that is to say when there was both political will and sufficient evidence of converging views to justify negotiation of a specific draft agreement; at such a stage the Italian proposal might prove to be both valuable and practical (CCD/PV.735). The delegation of Czechoslovakia held that the establishment of a working group could under certain circumstances facilitate achievement of the desired agreement, but believed the group should consider all proposals submitted to it (CCD/PV.747). The delegation of the German Democratic Republic held that a working group to negotiate an agreement might begin its work after the initiative of the United States and the Soviet Union had been announced (ibid.).

129. In late April, the delegation of the United States stated (CCD/PV.748) and the delegation of the Soviet Union confirmed (ibid.) that the two Powers had recently held further bilateral discussions in Geneva to consider a joint initiative with respect to a convention and that both countries had considered the consultations useful and had agreed to continue them. The delegation of the United
States also noted that it had suggested that a convention on the subject could usefully prohibit training and related programmes for the use of chemical weapons and hoped that these and other confidence-building measures would contribute to an effective ban. It also stressed that any convention on the subject should not weaken the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of chemical weapons, but supplement it. The delegation of Pakistan, holding that the achievement of a chemical weapons ban was really a question of establishing mutual confidence and that a solution would be found through a political decision, welcomed the continuing bilateral consultations and looked forward to further progress in the matter (ibid.). The delegation of India also hoped that the bilateral consultations would soon bring about concrete results (CCD/PV.749). The delegation of the German Democratic Republic noted the importance it attached to the bilateral consultations on banning the most dangerous, lethal chemical weapons, as a first step towards a comprehensive ban, but stressed that the provisions of the agreement should make it clear that it was only a first step (CCD/PV.747).

130. At the beginning of the summer session, on 5 July, the delegation of the United States informed the Committee that the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in consultations aimed at reaching early agreement on a joint initiative in this field and that a new round of consultations would take place during the month of July. The delegation hoped to be able to report on the results of the consultations in the latter part of the summer session; if they were successful, it envisaged the establishment of an ad hoc working group of the Committee to elaborate the text of an international convention. The delegation recommended that the Committee plan an informal discussion on the subject in the latter part of the 1977 session to discuss how best to proceed. Achievement of an international agreement on the subject would not be easy, but the United States was convinced the matter was now on the right track. In a message to the Conference read by the delegation, the President of the United States noted that his Government had recently completed an extensive review of the question of a chemical weapons ban, that it supported the priority given the subject and recognized the essential role to be played by the Committee in achieving a final agreement in the matter (CCD/PV.750). The delegation also stated that, in formulating its new position on the question of chemical weapons, the United States had drawn heavily on the experience gained in informal discussions in the Committee over the past several years. The United States delegation now had a clear idea of the specific measures it would like to see in a chemical weapons agreement and was working with the Soviet delegation to develop a joint initiative which could be made in the Committee with regard to a treaty on the subject, hopefully in the near future (CCD/PV.754).

131. At the meeting on 5 July the delegation of the Soviet Union confirmed that bilateral Soviet-American consultations had been held to give further consideration to a possible joint initiative in the Committee for the conclusion of an international convention concerning the most dangerous and lethal chemical weapons, as a first step towards the complete and effective prohibition of chemical weapons. The delegation added that discussions had also been held on the question of banning other highly toxic chemical weapons and that both sides had agreed to meet to elaborate an appropriate document, thereby implementing the joint initiative announced in 1974. The Soviet Union hoped the Committee would be able to move to the practical plane of elaborating an international agreement on the subject and intended to present, at a later stage, additional considerations on some aspects of the problem, taking into account the Committee's decisions as well as the bilateral consultations (CCD/PV.750).
132. The delegation of Mexico commented that the Committee should be kept informed of the results of these bilateral consultations and that, on the basis of those results, the Committee should decide to set up a working group on the subject, as proposed by Italy (ibid.).

133. The delegation of the United Kingdom welcomed the continuation of the bilateral discussions on the subject and hoped they would proceed rapidly. With regard to the proposed working group, the delegation suggested that it might be well to wait until the United States and the Soviet Union were in a position to play their part in such a group, perhaps towards the end of the 1977 session, if all went well. In the meantime, the Committee could usefully arrange for technical experts to meet to discuss the definition of agents and technical difficulties with regard to the destruction of stockpiles (CCD/PV.752). The delegation later stated that it confidently expected that solid progress would be achieved in the bilateral consultations (CCD/PV.757).

134. The German Democratic Republic hoped the bilateral consultations would have a positive impact on the negotiations on the subject in the Committee by creating pre-conditions for the establishment of a working group to elaborate a draft treaty (CCD/PV.753). The delegation of Hungary welcomed the new round of bilateral consultations and hoped they would result in a joint initiative of the two Powers involved, thus greatly facilitating the Committee’s work on the subject. It shared the view of those who felt the Committee could and should make its greatest contribution at the summer session in the area of a chemical weapons ban, even though it was clear that differences of view continued to exist (CCD/PV.754). The delegation of Bulgaria believed the consultations would contribute significantly to the achievement of the desired goal of a chemical weapons ban. In the meantime, it held, the Committee should cease its technical consideration of the subject and initiate authentic negotiations; later, at a very advanced stage of the negotiations, a special working group could be set up to prepare a draft text of an agreement (CCD/PV.755). The delegation of Yugoslavia stressed the importance of achieving a ban on chemical weapons, as well as on a comprehensive test ban, before the opening of the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament (CCD/PV.757). The delegations of Czechoslovakia (CCD/PV.759) and Mongolia (CCD/PV.766) hoped the new round of bilateral consultations would result in a joint initiative that would facilitate the Committee’s work. The delegation of Canada also believed that the consultations should very soon reach the point where the Committee would be able to take up the important problem of a chemical weapons ban in a more meaningful way (CCD/PV.760).

135. On 21 July, the Committee decided to schedule informal meetings on the subject of a chemical weapons ban during the last week of its 1977 session and to hold open the possibility of establishing a working group on the subject at any time.

136. Subsequently, the delegation of the Netherlands held that, although a number of difficult problems were still waiting for solution, the differences with regard to a prohibition of chemical weapons had decreased considerably in recent years and that differences on certain points need not impede more concrete progress on other aspects. The Netherlands had therefore favoured the setting up of a working group to elaborate consensus views on a significant part of the problems for presentation to the next session of the General Assembly. It was not convinced that the way to make progress on a chemical weapons ban was to wait for the main Powers to solve their differences, because interest in the problem was not confined to those Powers. It also preferred the elaboration of principles for a treaty,
some of which could be rather detailed, to the elaboration of detailed treaty language, and believed that consensus existed in the Committee on a number of such key elements. The submission of such a consensus to the General Assembly would give States Members of the United Nations a better opportunity to acquaint themselves with the problems involved in reaching agreement. However, since it was now clear that the Committee would not have the opportunity to present results on the problem to the regular session of the General Assembly, ways must be found to accelerate negotiations on it before the special session, either by scheduling an extraordinary session of the Committee in the fall or by starting the 1978 spring session in early January. The delegation noted, in passing, that the reservations made by many countries to the 1925 Geneva Protocol concerning the right of retaliatory use of chemical weapons would have to be abandoned if the goal of strengthening the Protocol by a full prohibition of chemical weapons was to be achieved (CCD/PV.758).

137. The delegation of Italy noted that, as a result of the Committee's deliberations, a considerable amount of data was now available on the problem and that the data had been accurately and usefully compiled by the Secretariat. While divergent views still existed on the two key elements of a convention, its scope and its system of verification, the delegation believed that they could be overcome by common efforts. The delegation accordingly awaited with impatience a positive outcome to the United States/USSR bilateral consultations on the subject and regretted that the Committee had not been called upon to contribute to the common endeavour at the present point. Italy had proposed the setting up of a working group on the subject but some delegations had held that such a procedure might unduly complicate the problem; however, Italy still shared the view that such a group could have performed valuable work if it had been requested to concentrate on some specific issues or on the basic principles of a convention, and believed that such action would have given less room for the mounting criticism with regard to the Committee's ability to perform its negotiating functions. At the present stage, the delegation hoped no efforts would be spared to give the Committee another chance before the end of 1977 (CCD/PV.760).

138. The delegation of Poland held that the intensified consideration of the chemical weapons problem by the Committee in recent years had resulted in a better understanding of the problem involved and the identification of various practical approaches to a comprehensive ban, despite the failure to live up to the full expectations of the General Assembly in the matter. It agreed with the Netherlands delegation that the goal of the Committee's deliberations on the chemical weapons problem was to strengthen the ban on the use of such weapons contained in the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and believed that the only ban on such weapons that would be effective and credible would be a ban on their development and production (CCD/PV.764).

139. The delegation of Sweden, regretting the continued absence of a bilateral joint initiative but encouraged by information that new efforts to that end were being undertaken by the two Powers concerned, presented views on the scope of a chemical weapons ban and on its verification as of possible use to the two Powers in considering problems that other Committee members found urgent (ibid.).

140. At the closing meeting of the 1977 session, the delegation of the United States reported that the United States and the Soviet Union had just completed the fifth series of negotiations on a joint initiative for the Committee with respect to chemical weapons, that progress had been made and that there was definite
momentum towards the desired goal. It added that, if a joint initiative was completed on either of the high priority issues before the beginning of the next regular session, the Committee might appropriately be reconvened to consider it (CCD/PV.766).

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141. With more particular regard to the scope of a possible agreement, the delegations of the Soviet Union and other Socialist States, as indicated in the draft convention submitted by the Socialist countries in 1972 and in the general comments above, held that any prohibition of chemical means of warfare should be comprehensive in scope, banning the development, production and stockpiling of all such weapons, even though the comprehensive goal might be achieved in phased stages. The delegation of Romania, for example, held that a comprehensive approach would satisfy the criteria for a genuine disarmament measure and would create the necessary confidence among its parties to stimulate the achievement of other disarmament measures, while a partial approach might actually be more complicated to achieve than a comprehensive one. Accordingly, the delegation suggested that the scope of the ban should be as broad as possible, that its objectives should be precisely defined, that the convention should increase confidence among the States parties to it, that it should not hamper in any way chemical research for peaceful purposes, and that, if partial at the outset, it should provide for the continuation of efforts to achieve further measures leading towards the comprehensive goal (CCD/PV.743). The delegation of the German Democratic Republic, noting that the development of binary chemical weapons had already complicated efforts to achieve a total ban of chemical weapons, held that anyone who was prepared to accept the elimination of the most dangerous and lethal of these weapons should logically see no difficulty in also accepting a ban on less dangerous and non-lethal ones (CCD/PV.747). The delegation of Czechoslovakia welcomed working paper CCD/531, in which the United States stated its readiness to include incapacitating agents, as well as lethal agents, in a chemical weapons ban (CCD/PV.742). The delegation of the Soviet Union, recalling that the position of the USSR on the question of a chemical weapons ban was reflected in the draft convention on the subject introduced by the Socialist countries in 1972 and in a working paper presented by those countries in 1973 (CCD/403), stressed that the Soviet Union stood for a comprehensive prohibition of such weapons and that, in solving the problem, it was prepared to go as far as other participants in the negotiations were prepared to go (CCD/PV.759). The delegations of Poland (CCD/PV.764) and Mongolia (CCD/PV.766) expressed similar views.

142. Most of the members favouring a comprehensive prohibition seemed prepared to accept— as a first step towards a comprehensive ban— a ban on the most dangerous, lethal means of chemical warfare; and several, including Bulgaria (CCD/PV.731), Hungary (CCD/PV.732 and 754), Mongolia (CCD/PV.744 and 766), the German Democratic Republic (CCD/PV.747), and Poland (CCD/PV.764) expressed the hope that the Soviet Union and the United States would soon take the joint initiative they had announced in 1974 with regard to chemical weapons.

143. The delegation of the Netherlands held that in practice the approach of a phased destruction of existing stockpiles and that of a simultaneous prohibition of production and possession were not so far apart, since the destruction of existing stockpiles would take a long time in any case (CCD/PV.741).

144. The delegation of Yugoslavia believed a comprehensive ban would be the only lasting solution, but did not oppose a phased approach to such a ban if each step in the process towards the desired goal was strictly defined and linked to a time-limit; otherwise, a partial solution could in fact help to preserve the present situation and postpone the solution of the problem ad infinitum (CCD/FV.1).

145. The delegation of Egypt supported the approach recommended in the working paper of the non-aligned States (CCD/400) 12/ because (a) it was comprehensive in scope; (b) it measured the danger of a chemical agent not only by its toxicity but by the availability of protection against it; (c) while favouring use of the general purpose criterion for defining the scope of the prohibition, it also envisaged the elaboration of more detailed provisions in appropriate annexes to an agreement; and (d) it proposed a combination of national and international verification measures. The delegation of Egypt considered it particularly important that support and assistance be provided to a country which was a victim of an attack by chemical weapons. The delegation also suggested that any agreement reached should precisely define only highly lethal chemical agents, that a ban on production of chemical agents should not apply to such agents used as protection against chemical weapons, that, while provisions for destroying stockpiles could become effective upon signature of an agreement provided that details of such destruction were embodied in an annex to it, the obligations of parties under the agreement should, in principle, be assumed only upon ratification, and that a great number of countries should be involved in the negotiation of such an agreement from the beginning, since many produced chemical weapons (CCD/PV.744).

146. The delegation of Japan maintained that the prevailing view was that such a ban should cover not only super-toxic compounds, but also other lethal agents and that the ban should be based on the general purpose criterion supplemented by a toxicity criterion, such as the LD spectrum criterion suggested by Japan in 1976 (CCD/PV.739).

147. The delegation of Hungary, in introducing a working paper (CCD/537) suggesting a possible method of defining toxic chemical agents, held that while the majority of States continued to favour a comprehensive prohibition, the deliberations in the Committee had shown that the final aim could be achieved only through successive steps or phases; it stressed, however, that the delegation conceived those steps as an organic part of the negotiating process leading to the ultimate goal. The delegation also noted that the view was widely shared in the Committee that, in addition to the general purpose criterion, some other specific characteristics should be used for the definition of chemical agents to be covered by a partial prohibition. It held, however, that, while offering some advantages, the suggested lists of chemical agents to be included in the prohibition had serious shortcomings and that the method according to which chemical structures or formulas could be used was possible with identical groups of agents only (CCD/PV.758).

12/ Ibid., sect. 8.
148. The delegation of the Netherlands welcomed the general feeling in the Committee that a chemical weapon convention should be fairly comprehensive in scope, both with respect to the agents and to the activities to be banned. The former should range from lethal agents up to, and including, incapacitants, the delegation held, because a ban on lethal agents alone might lead to the development and stockpiling of non-lethal agents and would make verification of the treaty more difficult. With regard to the activities to be banned, there seemed to be a consensus that these should include the development, the production, the stockpiling and the transfer and acquisition of the banned weapons as well as training for offensive chemical warfare. The delegation further held that existing stockpiles of chemical weapons must be phased out over a period of time because of the technical difficulties of destruction, and technical discussions in the Committee on that subject, as proposed by the United Kingdom, would appear useful. It also believed that more technical work must be carried out on the question of definitions, in particular how to distinguish between single-purpose (i.e. military only) super-toxic agents and dual-purpose agents, between lethal and non-lethal and between incapacitants and irritants. The Committee must also discuss whether to include a list of examples of banned agents or a more complete list of all agents to be banned, the delegation continued. The proposal of the Federal Republic of Germany that criteria other than toxicity might be used to assess a chemical agent was also a useful one in the delegation's view, despite the difficulty of putting such criteria into treaty language. There appeared to be no difference of opinion that binary weapons should be prohibited, even if the precursors of such weapons might not be lethal; there also seemed to be a consensus on banning chemical munitions. With regard to irritants, the Netherlands believed their complete elimination would be impossible because of the need to retain their use for non-military purposes, e.g. riot control; but it might be possible to explore in the Committee the possibility of banning their use for military purposes. The use of herbicides and defoliants on the battlefield should also be banned in a new convention, even though certain restrictions on their use had recently been laid down in agreements such as the Convention on environmental warfare 13/ and the new Protocols to the Geneva Conventions on humanitarian law in armed conflicts. 14/

With regard to the use of protective measures against chemical attack, the delegation held that a consensus existed in the Committee that such use should not be prohibited because it could constitute a deterrent against chemical warfare and also strengthen security against possible hidden stockpiles; in fact, it seemed worth-while to stimulate international co-operation in the improvement of such protective measures (CCD/PV.758).

149. The delegation of Poland held that since 1972, when the Socialist countries had proposed a total elimination of chemical weapons in their draft convention, supported by 10 non-aligned members of the Committee, there had been a slow evolution of the prevailing view of the Committee in that direction. The 1974 Japanese draft convention (CCD/420) 15/ had proposed a ban limited at first to

13/ Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (General Assembly resolution 31/72, annex).

14/ Adopted at the fourth session of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, held in Geneva from 17 March to 10 June 1977; see document A/32/144.

super-toxic chemical warfare agents; in 1976, the United Kingdom draft convention (CCD/512) \(^{16/}\) went a significant step further by including not only lethal agents but also the so-called incapacitating agents; and at the current session, the delegation of the Netherlands had expressed the view that any ban should also cover herbicides and defoliants. The Polish delegation saw no reason why the so-called irritants should not be added to the list of banned agents, making it comprehensive, since both the draft of the Socialist countries and that of the United Kingdom called for banning all agents not having justification for peaceful purposes. Any successful negotiations on the subject, it maintained, must recognize the fundamental point that support for a comprehensive ban was constantly increasing (CCD/PV.764).

150. The delegation of Sweden appreciated the United States' declaration that a chemical weapons ban should also cover incapacitating agents, as well as working paper CCD/531, but requested further elaboration regarding a delimitation between incapacitating agents and riot control, or crowd control, weapons. The need for use of the latter agents in peacetime was indisputed as long as the use of other means of control increased the danger to human beings, the delegation held, and it should also be recognized that some uses of tear gases must be assured even in wartime. Rather than adopting a delimitation based on the persistence of the effects of the agent, Sweden has suggested possible exemptions from a comprehensive prohibition, to be spelled out in a protocol. Such an exemption procedure under a general ban would strengthen the purpose criterion, the delegation maintained, particularly if the explicit exemption for crowd control agents were designed to serve as an example of the meaning of the purpose criterion. Herbicides, which Sweden believed should be covered by the ban, could probably be treated in a similar way (ibid.).

151. The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, maintaining that the scope of a chemical weapons ban appeared to be the least problematical aspect, held that the view that a convention should from the outset embrace not only super-toxic but also other lethal and highly toxic chemicals, as well as incapacitants and binary weapons, has gained general support. Over and above the general purpose criterion, the objective criterion of toxicity was now generally accepted for the definition, the delegation stated. Additional criteria should make the distinction between warfare agents and substances not suitable for military purposes as clear as possible, the delegation added; with the inclusion of incapacitants, the number of substances in respect of which criteria other than toxicity were of growing significance would also probably increase (CCD/PV.765).

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152. On the question of verification of compliance with a prohibition of chemical weapons, the Soviet delegation continued to stress that, in exercising control, it was necessary to maintain conditions in which the control would not infringe the sovereign rights of States parties to the convention and would not lead to the disclosure of State or military secrets. Those requirements would be satisfied by control based on national means of verification combined with some international

\(^{16/}\) Ibid., Thirty-first Session, Supplement No. 27, (A/31/27), vol. II.
procedures. At the same time such control would be a sufficient guarantee of compliance with the convention by all parties thereto. At the present level of development of science and technology, the possibilities inherent in national means of control were enormous; if they were used to the full, those means were sufficient to provide a certainty that other parties to the agreement were complying with it. At the same time, in an endeavour to ensure that agreement was reached as quickly as possible, the USSR had expressed its readiness to examine the possibility of using additional supervision procedures and, in particular, "to discuss methods of verifying the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons which are to be excluded from the arsenals of States" (CCD/PV.759).

153. Enlarging on those views, the Soviet delegation submitted for the Committee's consideration two working papers on the above-mentioned aspects of the question of control. One of the papers, entitled "Some methods of monitoring compliance with an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons" (CCD/538), was designed to explore the potentialities of national means of control, and in particular of extraterritorial monitoring, which could be carried out by remote and indirect methods; such control could be used to verify the different aspects of the prohibition of chemical weapons - development, production and stockpiling, as well as the destruction of stockpiles. The paper pointed out that the results of monitoring would be more reliable in the case of remote appraisal by artificial earth satellite, and that that method was accordingly of special interest in organizing remote extraterritorial monitoring. Noting that the method in question had already been discussed, in particular, in working paper CCD/371 17/ submitted by the United Kingdom, the Soviet delegation emphasized that, at the present level of science and technology, the photoconductive detector referred to in the United Kingdom paper could be replaced by far more sophisticated detectors and systems which could provide considerably greater sensitivity. The Soviet working paper showed that, by improving technical means for the remote detection of chemical agents and using a system of artificial earth satellites, it was possible to increase the effectiveness of the method considerably, to record with a high degree of reliability the presence in the atmosphere of very low concentrations of chemical agents, and consequently to detect the production of chemical weapons and field tests of such weapons. The paper also examined the great possibilities held out by indirect monitoring (through the analysis of statistics and other information) of practically all types of activity connected with chemical weapons, and concluded that the sum total of remote and indirect methods of monitoring was adequate for exercising extraterritorial control by national means.

154. The second paper, entitled "Verification of the destruction of declared stocks of chemical weapons" (CCD/539), set forth the ideas of the Soviet Union regarding one method of monitoring the destruction of declared stocks of chemical weapons. It noted that the main purpose of monitoring the destruction of declared stocks of chemical weapons should be to establish not only the type and quantity of the agents destroyed but also - a most important point - their quality, i.e. the percentage content of the basic substance in the agent destroyed. It was pointed out that the use of such an additional method would contribute to more effective monitoring of the destruction of declared stocks of chemical weapons. The delegation observed that, in elaborating methods of verifying the destruction

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of declared stocks of chemical weapons, the Soviet Union had proceeded from the premise that those stocks would be declared in quantity by weight of the agents expressed in terms of the basic substance, and that such an approach would make it possible to propose a method of assessing the completeness of destruction. The method was based on recording the quantities of chemical agents destroyed by incineration or detoxication and determining how far the stocks declared for destruction tallied with those actually destroyed. The proposed approach would also make it possible to assess objectively the comparability of the quantities of chemical agents destroyed by different States. Thus the working paper on verification of the destruction of declared stocks of chemical weapons was a concrete expression of the readiness of the Soviet Union to discuss methods of such verification. The Soviet delegation expressed the hope that the working papers it had submitted would contribute to the speedy achievement of agreement on the question of control and thus on the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons as a whole (CCD/PV.759).

155. The delegation of the German Democratic Republic specifically opposed the establishment of international control organs with excessive powers as a legitimization of interference in the internal affairs of a State (CCD/PV.747) while that of Mongolia, holding that negotiations should not be protracted by exaggerating the significance of international control measures, specifically opposed on-site inspections (CCD/PV.744). The delegation of Poland, holding that an eventual compromise on the verification of chemical weapons stockpiles would have to reflect the close similarity in production characteristics of chemical weapons and biological weapons, suggested that consideration must be given to general acceptance of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which banned the use of both chemical and biological weapons, the degree of uncertainty regarding the size and character of existing chemical weapons stockpiles and the relationship between the chemical industry and national economies (CCD/PV.735). Subsequently, the same delegation stated that national means of control, combined with certain supplementary control procedures with regard to the destruction of stockpiles, would be quite adequate. The delegation also believed that all chemical weapons manufacturing facilities must be either dismantled or converted to peaceful uses rather than being "moth-balled", as had been suggested, because the latter course would tend to breed suspicions as to the credibility of the chemical weapons ban and inevitably suggest that the ban was provisional and tentative (CCD/PV.764). The delegation of Mongolia, holding that a chemical weapons ban could be effectively monitored by national means combined with certain procedures of an international nature, stressed that a generally acceptable solution of the control problem with regard to such a ban would contribute significantly to the progress of other disarmament problems. The delegation added its appreciation for the working papers on the subject submitted to the Committee by the Soviet Union (CCD/538) and Hungary (CCD/537/Rev.1) (CCD/PV.766).

156. The delegation of the United States, on the other hand, continued to express reservations with regard to reliance on national measures for verification of a chemical weapons ban, welcomed what it considered to be international awareness of the importance of the role of verification in such an agreement and again suggested that technical exchange might facilitate work in the area (CCD/PV.728). The delegation of Sweden welcomed the latter suggestion as a means of enhancing mutual confidence among future parties to a convention, as well as to advance work towards agreement (CCD/PV.738).
157. The delegation of Japan also held that the prevailing view was that international verification, including on-site inspection, was necessary, and that such inspections could supplement national means without unjustifiable intrusion (CCD/PV.739).

158. The delegation of the Netherlands held that a certain amount of international verification was necessary and that an effective verification system should be based on various mutually reinforcing measures (CCD/PV.741). Later, in introducing its working paper CCD/533, the same delegation stressed that the methods described in the paper permitted the detection of very small quantities of nerve gas downstream from a suspected plant and that the methods were non-intrusive (CCD/PV.748).

159. The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, held that, although there was no doubt that the evaluation of statistics and a centralized information exchange system would be useful, in the final analysis verification of a chemical weapons ban would not be sufficiently effective without international on-site inspection. It was convinced that a system could be developed that would ensure the protection of commercial and military secrets, at least to the extent that they were legitimate within the meaning of the convention. Inspections on challenge, which would have to be based on suspicion, should play only a supplementary role. The regularity of inspections would be a key factor in confidence-building. In this general context the delegation made reference to the IAEA safeguards system (CCD/PV.765).

160. The delegation further held that destruction of existing stocks of chemical agents would, for technical reasons, take quite some time; that period could be used to strengthen confidence among States. The importance of the convention and the considerable difficulty of ensuring effective verification would justify a review of its effectiveness after several years, but before the destruction process had been completed (ibid.).

161. The delegation of Yugoslavia considered that a unified system of national and international control measures could be one of the possible ways of organizing the verification process with particular emphasis on the prevention of proliferation. The delegation held that countries not possessing chemical weapons should have no particular difficulty in accepting on-site inspection in certain cases provided all States parties were equally liable to such inspections. The delegation also stressed that verification should ensure controlled destruction of existing stockpiles of chemical weapons, efficient supervision to ensure that the ban on development and production was respected, and prevention of the proliferation of chemical weapons and technology (CCD/PV.742).

162. The delegation of Romania expressed the view that, whether the control measures were national or international, the problem of controls would be difficult to solve if it was separated from the concept of international co-operation and that it was therefore essential that the system be based on principles such as respect for the equality and sovereignty of States parties, non-interference in the internal affairs of parties and sincere co-operation towards the goal of disarmament (CCD/PV.743).

163. The new flexibility indicated by the Soviet Union with regard to the verification of the destruction of stockpiles was welcomed by the delegations of the United States (CCL/PV.728), Iran (CCD/PV.731), Bulgaria (ibid.), the Netherlands (CCD/PV.734), Poland (CCD/PV.735), Sweden (CCD/PV.738), Japan (CCD/PV.739), Italy (CCD/PV.741), the United Kingdom (ibid.), and Mongolia (CCD/PV.744). Iran, Italy and the United Kingdom, as well as Sweden (CCD/PV.738)
stressed, however, the importance of further elaboration of the Soviet position. The Netherlands thought that the basic positions on the verification of the destruction of chemical stockpiles now seemed close. Poland thought that a satisfactory agreement could be worked out if the flexible position of the Soviet Union was matched by other Committee members, and Mongolia also urged other Members to respond flexibly to the Soviet position. The delegation of the Soviet Union stressed that the purpose of control over the destruction of stockpiles should consist in determining the facts concerning such destruction (CCD/PV.748).

164. The delegation of the Netherlands considered a declaration by all parties of their chemical weapons stocks an important confidence-building measure. It suggested that all States should be obliged to declare all stocks on becoming a party to the convention but might make a unilateral declaration, or several declarations in stages, containing as much information as possible. That would also help the planning of the destruction of the stockpiles. The delegation subsequently gave such a unilateral declaration, pointing out, among other things, that the Netherlands did not possess lethal chemical weapons or incapacitants. With regard to verification, the delegation noted that it would be practically impossible to establish the amount of stockpiled weapons and that it would be very difficult to detect the development of new chemicals; limited possibilities existed for verifying training activities and the presence of chemical munitions and perhaps munition-filling plants, etc.; on the other hand, destruction of known stockpiles, a very important confidence-building measure, could be verified without many problems, and it now seemed possible, in the light of the Soviet position on the matter contained in document CCD/522, that such measures might be generally accepted. Verification of the production was just as important, however, the delegation held, and while such verification with regard to single-purpose agents appeared possible in principle, as indicated in the Netherlands's working paper CCD/533, the verification of dual-purpose agents was a difficult problem; however, since the highly toxic, single-purpose agents constituted a considerably greater military threat than most of the dual-purpose agents, international verification measures might be concentrated on nerve agents and comparable chemicals, including the precursors for binary weapons, with less stringent attention given to other agents. The Committee must try to develop verification methods that were as non-intrusive as possible, the Netherlands believed, but it was convinced that national means of verification alone would not be sufficient and, without an international leg, such as that agreed upon in the non-proliferation Treaty, would become mere self-control. The convention might usefully provide that parties declare their chemical weapons production facilities, and verification of the dismantling of such facilities would not be intrusive and would constitute another important confidence-building measure, the delegation continued; however, the problem of undeclared production plants was almost as difficult as that of undeclared stocks, and required thorough discussion in the Committee. The Netherlands did not believe, for example, that the method of economic monitoring would work in a country with a large chemical industry, but it had contributed to a solution of a part of the problem in its working paper suggesting a non-intrusive method of analysing waste water for traces of nerve agents. It believed that possibilities existed for adequate deterrence of production of such agents if States were willing to accept a certain amount of non-intrusive on-site verification, which would be a small price to pay for a viable treaty strengthening international security. Pending further developments on the matter the delegation would not comment on the necessary institutional arrangements; it reminded the Committee, however, that the Netherlands had proposed in the past the establishment of an international disarmament agency whose initial task would be to supervise such a treaty (CCD/PV.758).
The delegation of the United Kingdom introduced document CCD/541, "Working paper on prophylaxis against nerve agent poisons", which referred particularly to the problem of treating poisoning by the nerve agent "soman" and described experiments which show that the prophylactic use of carbamates, together with supporting treatment, could raise the lethal dose LD50 of soman by a factor of about 8. The delegation noted that the paper was being submitted in the spirit of article XII of the United Kingdom's draft convention (CCD/PV.761).

The delegation of Sweden believed the concept of a consultative committee, first used in the Convention on environmental warfare and now also being considered for a comprehensive test ban treaty, was gaining support, but noted that a chemical weapons ban was more complex than most others and that the tasks and procedures of such a committee would not be the same for every disarmament convention. Stressing the importance of effective verification measures, the delegation held that, since no effective non-intrusive methods had been devised, additional ideas must be explored, such as the identification of planning for chemical warfare and the preparation and training of forces for such warfare, as previously suggested by Sweden, the Netherlands, the United States and Yugoslavia. Since such ideas had regrettably not been extensively discussed, the delegation solicited the views of other delegations on the subject. The delegation also welcomed the two working papers of the Soviet Union on the subject of verification (CCD/538 and 539) (CCD/PV.764).

In accordance with the procedural decisions taken by the Committee on 1 March (see CCD/527), a series of four informal meetings on the general question of chemical weapons was held, with the participation of experts, from 20 to 31 March 1977. Prior to the meetings, the delegation of the United Kingdom suggested that, in addition to consideration of working papers submitted to the Committee by delegations and the Secretariat's compilation of all views expressed on the general subject during recent years, the discussions at the meetings should include the means of defining the weapons to be banned in an agreement, the verification problems involved and the next stage of negotiations in the Committee (CCD/PV.737).

After the informal meetings, several delegations commented on the results. The delegation of Romania held that the meetings had clarified the problems involved in a chemical weapons ban and that the Committee on Disarmament now had enough technical information to prepare a draft convention on a priority basis (CCD/PV.743). The delegation of Mongolia believed that the meetings had once again confirmed the positive aspects of the Committee's work (CCD/PV.744). The delegation of Iran held that the meetings, together with other welcome developments, such as the submission of a draft convention by the United Kingdom and the Soviet willingness to consider additional control procedures, had reinforced the opinion that forward movement towards achieving a chemical weapons ban was possible. The delegation also noted, however, that despite the many ideas put forward on the subject of verification, the Committee was still far from agreement on a coherent control plan (CCD/PV.745). The delegation of the Soviet Union held that the informal meetings had resulted in a broader understanding of practical approaches to the subject (CCD/PV.750).
169. Three additional informal meetings were held on the subject with the participation of experts, during the last week of the session from 23 to 25 August 1977. The delegation of Mongolia noted that all the informal meetings with experts had been useful in gradually broadening understanding and in determining practical approaches to the problem (CCD/PV.766).

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170. With direct regard to the draft convention submitted by the delegation of the United Kingdom in late 1976 (CCD/512), most members made general comments and several discussed various articles of the draft. The general comments are summarized below, followed by particular views on each article discussed.

171. The draft convention was welcomed or favourably noted by the delegations of the United States (CCD/PV.728), Canada (CCD/PV.731, 740 and 760), the Netherlands (CCD/PV.734 and 758), Sweden (CCD/PV.738), Japan (CCD/PV.739), Italy (CCD/PV.741), Yugoslavia (CCD/PV.742) and Iran (CCD/PV.745). Yugoslavia held that it was a positive contribution towards a generally acceptable solution of the problem; Canada and Italy believed the draft could serve as a basis for the Committee's further deliberations on the problem.

172. With regard to the phased approach proposed in the draft convention, Sweden, noting that the draft called, first, for the submission of information by all signatories on their chemical weapons potential and the introduction of a moratorium on production before the entry into force of the convention and, second, the destruction or conversion of all production facilities and weapon stockpiles, questioned whether countries possessing chemical weapons would accept far-reaching obligations before the entry into force of an agreement (CCD/PV.738). Expressing similar views, Iran wondered whether such a procedure would not disadvantage States acting in good faith (CCD/PV.758). Canada favoured such a phased but comprehensive approach, holding that it should lead, in agreed and verified stages, to an eventual total ban on all lethal chemical agents and munitions that could be used for hostile purposes. The delegation also recalled, in this general connexion, its 1974 suggestion that the phasing should not be on the basis of excluded agents but on the basis of excluded activities (CCD/PV.740). The Federal Republic of Germany also favoured the proposed introduction of a ban on production, followed by the destruction of stockpiles (ibid.).

173. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, rejected the proposed idea of accepting obligations before an agreement even entered into force, and held that the prohibition of production while stocks were preserved would put States not possessing stocks in an unacceptable position (ibid.). Similarly the delegation of the German Democratic Republic rejected both articles of the draft convention proposing obligations prior to its entry into force (articles II and III) on the grounds that the arrangements proposed therein would jeopardize the principle of equal security for all States (CCD/PV.747). Mongolia supported the opinion that the prohibition of production before the destruction of stocks would be unfair, stressing that the process of prohibition must be comprehensive and run concurrently with regard to the development, production and destruction of stockpiles (CCD/PV.784).
174. Referring directly to the provision of the draft concerning the submission of information by signatories on their chemical weapon capabilities prior to the entry into force of the agreement (article II), the delegation of the United States, while supporting such confidence-building measures, suggested that agreements to take certain action before the convention entered into force should be included in a document separate from, but closely linked to, the convention (CCD/PV.740).

175. The delegation of the United Kingdom, stressing the many years required for the safe destruction of stockpiles, held that an immediate ban on production was essential in order to prevent replenishment of stocks in parallel with their destruction. Accordingly, the delegation explained, the United Kingdom draft proposed a phased approach in recognition of the realities of the present situation; it would freeze from the outset the existing situation where some countries had stocks and some did not, and in the long term, it would lead positively to a situation of real equality following the destruction of stocks (CCD/PV.741). Later, the delegation of the United Kingdom, referring to legal precedents for the acceptance of some obligations upon the signature of an agreement, pointed out that article 25 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, as well as several commodity agreements, such as the International Wheat Agreement of 1971, had used such an approach (CCD/PV.741). The delegation of Mongolia replied that such a provision could not, however, be applied to a disarmament problem, which was directly related to national security interests (CCD/PV.744).

176. At the beginning of the summer session, the United Kingdom delegation expressed satisfaction with the response to its draft convention and gratitude to those who had spent time studying it and providing constructive comments on it; such observations would make clear the extent of agreement and disagreement in the matter and reveal where particular efforts had to be made to increase understanding (CCD/PV.752). The delegation stressed, in that general connexion, its readiness to consider alternative solutions to the various problems involved in such a complex agreement (CCD/PV.757).

177. With particular regard to article I of the proposed convention, defining the general scope of the ban, Sweden held that such words as "lethal", "long-term", "harm" and "physiological" must be clearly defined and that toxins should also be included in the ban, even though already covered by the Convention prohibiting biological weapons. Noting that the draft also did not mention agents causing harm to plants or animals, the delegation suggested consideration of the concept of banning agents that caused damage to the environment that might lead to harm or destruction of human beings, as set forth in the Soviet draft convention on weapons of mass destruction, contained in CCD/511 18/ (CCD/PV.738). The delegation of Czechoslovakia also held that defoliants and herbicides should be covered in the ban (CCD/PV.742).

178. The delegation of Japan, considering the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (as amended) 19/ useful as a model for defining the scope of the ban, suggested that banned agents be listed in three annexed lists rather than attempting to ban a category of weapon. The first list, the delegation explained, would

19/ See United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.XI.3.
cover single-purpose super-toxic agents, the second would cover dual-purpose agents and the third would be for other chemical substances that had the dangerous characteristics of chemical weapon agents or that were precursors of binary weapons. Parties to the agreement should give notification of their activities with regard to the substances on the third list but, if it was felt necessary to control them strictly, they could be transferred either to the first or second lists following a periodic review. The delegation also suggested a procedure for determining the agents to be included on the lists, as well as time-tables for the destruction of stocks on the two primary lists. Finally, the delegation suggested that paragraph (b) of article I of the United Kingdom draft, concerning a ban on munitions, equipment or systems designed to deliver chemical agents for hostile purposes, be modified to read: "munitions, equipment or systems designed to fill up, install or deliver such agents specified in the preceding paragraph (a), or chemical substances which are to show the same effect as those agents specified in paragraph (a) when the fired munitions reach their targets" (CCD/PV.739). In this connexion, the delegation presented a working paper (CCD/PV.529) entitled "Some thoughts on the international control of chemical weapons".

179. The delegation of Canada stated that, in view of the difficulty of defining chemical weapon agents precisely, it favoured, as an interim solution, a ban on the basis of the general purpose criterion, together with negotiations to define the precise agents to be banned based on further study (CCD/PV.740).

180. The delegation of the United States suggested elimination of the proposed ban on the use of chemical agents, since the 1925 Geneva Protocol already included a ban on such use. On the other hand, the United States delegation suggested a ban on all training in the use of chemical munitions, except for the use of small quantities for protective purposes, and believed that the ban should also include incapacitating agents as well as lethal weapons. It also suggested consideration of practical methods for deciding which agents were being produced in "types and in quantities that have no justification for protective or other peaceful purposes". With regard to paragraph (b) of article I, while supporting the proposed text and understanding that the term "munitions" was intended to cover binary and other possible multicomponent weapons, the delegation held that the article did not deal adequately with the precursors of the prohibited agents, which should also be banned (ibid.). Italy also addressed the question of the relationship between a chemical weapons convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol, expressing the view that the question should be examined and resolved when clearer indications on the overall chemical weapons project emerged in the Committee (CCD/PV.741).

181. The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany welcomed the idea of supplementing the proposed definition of agents to be banned by a protocol specifying the agents in greater detail, and supported the ban on "munitions, equipment or systems" as a means of dealing with the problem of dual-purpose agents, including binary weapons. It suggested, however, that the military suitability of a given agent should also be considered as a criterion for including an agent in the ban (CCD/PV.740).

182. The delegation of the United Kingdom confirmed that the second part of article I, referring to munitions, equipment and delivery systems, was specifically designed to cover the means of delivery of banned agents and the special system required for binary weapons. The delegation expected that the supplementary protocol containing detailed definitions of the agents to be banned would include
single-purpose supertoxic agents, i.e. nerve agents and highly toxic carbamates, binary nerve agent components, particularly the single-purpose precursors, dual-purpose chemicals, i.e. First World War agents, such as mustard gas, hydrogen cyanide, chlorine and phosgene, and, finally, incapacitating agents falling within the scope of article I, e.g. substances that were long-lasting in their effect, such as BZ and LSD (CCD/PV.7).

183. The delegation of Yugoslavia, holding that draft article I did not adequately cover the precursors of binary weapons, suggested the following formulation of the article:

'Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never and under any circumstances to develop, produce or otherwise acquire chemical warfare agents in quantities that have no justification for protective and peaceful purposes, and munitions, equipment or systems designed to deliver them for hostile purposes or in armed conflicts. All chemical compounds intentionally used in quantities and in a manner which directly or indirectly, immediately or after some time can produce physiological harm or cessation of physiological functions in man, animals and plants should be considered as chemical warfare agents' (CCD/PV.7).

184. The delegation of Iran believed that the proposed phrase in draft article I referring to banning agents 'of a nature and intended primarily to cause long-term physiological harm to human beings' gave rise to doubts as to whether the ban was comprehensive and would lead to differences of interpretation, it might accordingly be less controversial to make the prohibition in the text as general as possible, perhaps based only on the general purpose criterion. The delegation discussed the idea of listing the agents to be banned as a method of supplementing the purpose criterion. It also stressed the view that dual-purpose agents and the components of binary weapons must be clearly defined through specific listing or in some other acceptable manner (CCD/PV.7).

185. The delegation of Mongolia also opposed the inclusion of a ban on use on the grounds that such a ban might cast doubt on the ban on use in the 1925 Geneva Protocol or even detract from its effectiveness (CCD/PV.7). The delegation of the German Democratic Republic held that neither the United Kingdom draft convention nor the draft submitted by Japan (CCD/4) provided a solution for the prohibition of binary agents, which was a requirement for any effective comprehensive ban and which was provided by the 1972 draft convention of the Socialist States (CCD/361) (CCD/PV.7).

186. In replying to these comments, the delegation of the United Kingdom stated that while the ban on chemical weapons should be as broad as possible, it was clear that the overlap with chemicals produced for peaceful purposes became increasingly greater, and the prohibition less absolute, as the scope was broadened. For example, defoliant chemicals, which had important uses in agriculture, could not be banned as easily as single-purpose agents, lethal or otherwise, could be; and riot control agents should not be banned outright, as such a ban might lead countries to resort to much more harmful methods of crowd control. Accordingly, draft article I referred to agents which caused long-term physiological harm to man. With regard to the request of many delegations for a clear definition of the expression "long-term", it was to be expected that a supplementary protocol to the convention giving detailed definitions would show a clear dividing line between riot control agents, which had effects lasting little longer than the period of exposure, and
incapacitants, which had much longer-lasting effects. The delegation fully agreed
that binary weapons should be covered by the ban and believed that the draft it
proposed accomplished this by banning munitions, equipment or systems designed to
deliver agents for hostile purposes (para. (b) of article I). That point
could also be emphasized in a protocol and the detailed definitions might be
expanded to cover the chemical precursors of binary munitions. Other formulas
could also be developed. The use of criteria, such as shelf-life and volatility,
as suggested by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, might
substantially reduce the overlap between chemical weapons and chemicals used for
peaceful purposes; and such criteria could be incorporated in a protocol to draft
article I in a manner such as that suggested by the Japanese delegation (CCD/PV.752).

187. The delegation of Hungary subsequently commented that technical difficulties,
such as that of overlap with chemicals produced for peaceful purposes should not
lead to a limitation in the scope of a chemical weapons ban or to the granting of
substantial exceptions to its provisions (CCD/PV.754).

188. With particular regard to the provision of information on production facilities
under draft article II, the delegation of the United States considered it sufficient
to report only on facilities producing or designed to produce single-purpose agents
or their precursors and those capable of producing toxic agents; if facilities
producing less toxic agents were to be included, they should be tied to a list of
specific chemicals (CCD/PV.740). The delegation of Italy stressed the need for a
clear distinction between facilities producing agents of warfare, those producing
for peaceful purposes and those producing for both purposes (CCD/PV.741). The
delegation of Yugoslavia suggested that, if details of the article caused
difficulties, most of them could be transferred to an annex. The delegation also
thought that the obligations contained in draft article II, as well as in
articles III, V, VII and IX should be more precisely defined for those countries
that might not possess the banned weapons but might have them on their territory;
draft articles II, III and VII should specifically contain not only the term
"possession" but also the term "located on its territory" (CCD/PV.742). (Aspects
of article II dealing with the entry into force of obligations upon signature have
been noted above among the general comments.)

189. Commenting on the various provisions of the draft convention concerned with
confidence-building (articles II, III and IV), the delegation of the United Kingdom
stated that, while it did not share the legalistic doubts expressed by some
concerning such measures, it would be willing to have them brought into play in
some other way, such as by including them in a protocol that would come into force
before the rest of the convention or by phasing the entire convention and providing
that parties could be released from their obligations if sufficient confidence
was not established. The delegation would consider any other proposals designed
to build the confidence necessary to allow chemical disarmament to proceed
(CCD/PV.752).

190. The delegation of Hungary replied that the explanations of the United Kingdom
delegation had not diminished Hungary's difficulties with provisions of the
convention that amounted to an obligation to be assumed before its entry into force;
such provisions could decrease the convention's attractiveness, and prohibition of
production before destruction of stocks would discriminate against States not
possessing chemical weapons (CCD/PV.754).
191. On draft article III, providing for the closing down or conversion to peaceful purposes of chemical production plants, the delegation of the United States thought it might be better to require the closing down or dismantling of all such plants, since verification of such action would be simpler than verifying a conversion to peaceful uses. The delegation added the view that any destabilizing suspicions concerning the activities of plants producing the protective chemical agents still to be permitted might be minimized through the exchange of information on such plants and international co-operation in improving means of protection (CCD/PV.740). The delegation of Italy, while supporting the article as a confidence-building measure, stressed the need for unambiguous clarification of the closing-down of facilities producing munitions, equipment or delivery systems (CCD/PV.741). As noted in the comments on article I, Yugoslavia thought article II should also be more precise concerning States having banned items on their territory, if not in their possession (CCD/PV.742). (Aspects of article III dealing with the entry into force of obligations upon signature have been noted under general comments.)

192. On draft article IV, concerning the setting of a time-limit for the entry into force of the convention, Sweden thought such a provision might complicate verification of the prohibition (CCD/PV.738), while Iran believed it might jeopardize the convention unnecessarily, since ratification by some States might be delayed for legitimate reasons (CCD/PV.745).

193. There was no comment on draft article V, pertaining to internal legislation of the prohibition, other than the comment of Yugoslavia, already noted above, that the article should also apply to States with banned items located on their territory (CCD/PV.742).

194. The delegation of the United States strongly supported draft article VI, concerning the prohibition of assistance to a third country in acquiring banned items (CCD/PV.740).

195. With regard to draft article VII, concerning the destruction of stockpiles, Japan held that all single-purpose supertoxic agents (to be included in suggested list one) should be destroyed within five years, for example, with on-site verification, and that dual-purpose agents (to be included in the second list) should also be controlled to ascertain that their amounts did not exceed a State party's requirements for peaceful purposes (CCD/PV.739). The delegation of the United States expected that some States would be reluctant to become a party to an agreement which did not include a precise plan for the destruction of stocks but which deferred the matter to the subsequent consideration of a consultative committee (see comments on draft article VIII below); it believed a phased programme of destruction of stocks could be specified in a protocol to the convention (CCD/PV.740). The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany favoured the destruction of absolute quantities of stocks, rather than percentages of total stocks (ibid.). The delegation of Canada stressed, in the context of the article, that the Committee on Disarmament must work realistically to build up confidence and achieve a total ban on chemical agents and munitions (ibid.). The delegation of Italy held that the destruction of stocks should be verified through appropriate and effective international procedures (CCD/PV.741). The delegation of Iran, expressing concern over the possibility of long delays in initiating the proposed destruction of stocks, stressed that such action should take place within the shortest possible time (CCD/PV.745). As noted above, Yugoslavia advocated the inclusion of a reference to countries on whose territory banned items were located (CCD/PV.742).
196. With specific regard to draft article VIII, pertaining to the establishment and functions of a consultative committee of parties "to oversee the working" of the convention, the delegation of the United States believed that, in addition to outlining the committee's functions in the agreement, it would be necessary to specify its composition, decision-making procedures and methods. The delegation hoped, however, that the creation of an elaborate international mechanism for the implementation of the convention could be avoided (CCD/PV.740). The delegation of Canada expressed similar views in the context of article IX, below. The delegation of Italy pointed out that the main requirement for the proposed committee should be effectiveness and impartiality (CCD/PV.741). The delegation of Yugoslavia suggested that subparagraph (f), referring to national control measures, be given prominence (CCD/PV.742). The delegation of Iran, while favouring the establishment of a consultative committee, doubted that a system of safeguards similar to those applied by IAEA for the transfer of nuclear materials and equipment could be applied to the chemical area, as suggested by the United Kingdom at the previous session (CCD/PV.745). The delegation of Romania indicated support for the proposal that the control system should include a certain institutional framework that would give the less advanced countries a chance for direct participation (CCD/PV.743).

197. With regard to draft article IX, concerning verification of the proposed agreement, the delegation of Sweden expressed general support for the proposed control system, but noted the need to solve questions concerning the mandate and procedures of the proposed consultative committee. The delegation also stressed the need to monitor military training activities, as well as chemical production plants. It also suggested that a system of verification by challenge might be used instead of the on-site inspection proposed in draft article IX. As noted above, the delegation also thought that verification might be rendered more difficult by setting a time-limit for the entry into force of the convention (CCD/PV.738).

198. Canada welcomed both draft articles VIII and IX and agreed that, as provided in article VIII, the effective operation of a treaty should be the responsibility of the parties to it rather than being delegated to a separate international body. Reiterating the view that some international verification would be necessary even to implement the first phase of a phased agreement, the delegation specifically supported the procedures for on-site inspection by persons appointed by the consultative committee, although it thought it might be desirable to specify the committee's composition, procedures and terms of reference in an annex. Referring to the new Soviet position on supervision procedures, it hoped that concrete and effective verification measures could be agreed upon (CCD/PV.740).

199. The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany maintained that the fact that no fully satisfactory verification system for a chemical weapons ban had as yet been found did not justify the conclusion that no effective system was possible. It also stressed the view that on-site inspection would be necessary for more than the destruction of stocks but that such inspection could be devised in such a way as not to impair the inspected State's legitimate interests (ibid.).

200. The delegation of the United States believed that detailed arrangements for on-site inspection would have to be elaborated in an annex to the convention (ibid.).

201. The delegation of the United Kingdom, noting that the destruction of stockpiles was a true disarmament measure having long-range implications, stressed the need for a high level of assurance of such destruction and held that there was
no alternative to the presence, on site, of internationally acceptable supervisory personnel. The delegation also looked forward to further explanation of the Soviet Union's position on the destruction of stocks (CCD/PV.741). The delegation of Italy also stressed the importance of verification of the agreement (ibid.). The delegation of Yugoslavia held that the obligation of States on whose territories banned items were located should be more precisely determined (CCD/PV.742).

202. The delegation of the Soviet Union maintained that the proposed measures of control were mainly international in nature and disagreed with that concept on the grounds that it was tantamount to the legalization of interference in the internal affairs of States and would lead inevitably to the disclosure of military, industrial and commercial secrets. More specifically, the delegation held that it was hardly justifiable that an international consultative organ should be granted supernational powers (CCD/PV.740). The delegation of Czechoslovakia, holding that the United Kingdom draft separated control measures from disarmament measures, expressed difficulty in agreeing to such a separation (CCD/PV.742).

203. On draft article X, concerning consultation and co-operation prior to a decision to implement an on-site inspection, the delegation of the United States suggested that the proposed consultative committee be given more responsibility for solving complaints of violation (CCD/PV.740), while the delegation of Italy (CCD/PV.741) endorsed the principle involved in the article.

204. In commenting on the various questions raised with regard to the proposed verification provisions, the delegation of the United Kingdom stated that it considered the fears expressed to be unjustified; while the possible disclosure of commercial secrets through inspections was an understandable concern, similar fears had been expressed with regard to the inspection of nuclear power plants under the safeguards system of IAEA, but these fears had not proved justified, even with extensive application of such safeguards. Because of the difficulty of monitoring the many chemical plants in industrialized countries, however, it might be better, as suggested by the Netherlands, to confine reporting and inspections in such countries to factories producing chemicals closely analogous to the most toxic nerve agents, with only random checks of those producing less toxic chemicals. In any case, the delegation added, commercial considerations should not be allowed to prevent progress towards a ban so widely supported. As for possible disclosure of military secrets, the United Kingdom had sought to avoid giving the proposed consultative committee any control over weapons and armed forces that were not relevant to the draft convention. With regard to possible verification of the agreement by the use of space satellites, it had concluded that, while technically feasible, such verification would not be adequate and would be too costly even for those few States to which satellites were available. National control committees, set up to monitor statistics on peaceful chemical production for peaceful purposes, could play their part, the delegation held, but would not by themselves be sufficient to ensure compliance. With regard to suggestions that factories formerly producing chemical agents should be dismantled or converted rather than simply closed down, the delegation believed, in principle, that any measures adopted should be as far-reaching as possible. With regard to the phased destruction of stockpiles (article VII) the delegation hoped that further discussion would lead to agreement on the crucial question of timing and on the techniques involved based in part on the views of technical experts (CCD/PV.752).
205. The delegation of Hungary continued to believe that, apart from the destruction of stocks, national means of verification combined with international procedures would provide adequate assurance of compliance with treaty obligations. The delegation favoured a constructive discussion on the issue with a view to narrowing the area of disagreement but shared the view of those who proposed to set up a working group at a later stage, since no common ground for immediate success existed as yet and early discussions could unfavourably affect the ongoing bilateral discussions (CCD/PV.754).

206. In the only comment on other draft articles, Yugoslavia expressed its support for article XII, concerning international co-operation in the peaceful uses of chemical agents (CCD/PV.742).

Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction

207. The delegations of the Soviet Union and other Socialist States, reaffirming reasons advanced at previous sessions, continued to urge early efforts to reach agreement on the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction as a matter of priority. They also continued to support the draft convention submitted to the Committee in 1976 by the Soviet Union (CCD/511) 20/ as a good basis for consideration of the question. In that connexion, they urged that the informal expert meetings on the subject with the participation of experts, which the Committee had decided to hold during its 1977 session, should be held early in the session and that participation in the meetings be broad.

208. The delegation of Hungary noted that the meetings of that type held during the 1976 session had helped clarify the general approach to the problem, had provided the Committee with useful scientific information on new weapons and had more clearly defined the distinction between the convention proposed by the Soviet Union and the already existing agreements on arms limitation (CCD/PV.732).

209. The Romanian delegation favoured the conclusion of an agreement on the subject, which in its opinion would be both possible and useful. The negotiation of such an agreement should take into account that its consideration must not divert the attention of the Committee from working for the adoption of effective measures relating to already existing weapons, first and foremost nuclear weapons, that it must occupy a clearly defined place in the context of disarmament negotiations and stimulate further efforts in that direction, that it must not hamper technological and scientific research for peaceful purposes, and that its coverage must be subject to periodic review in the light of advances in science and technology (CCD/PV.745).

210. The delegation of India also supported the Soviet proposal, disagreeing with previous criticism that it was amorphous, that new weapons of mass destruction were difficult to define, that verification would also be difficult and that the proposal diverted the Committee's attention from more pressing problems. The delegation added the view that already existing disarmament agreements did not contain precise definitions of the prohibited weapons and that the verification problem was a perennial one in all agreements (CCD/PV.739).

211. The delegation of Egypt stressed the need for early agreement in the matter (CCD/PV.714). At the same time, however, Egypt, as well as the Netherlands (CCD/PV.734), and Italy (CCD/PV.760) held that the subject must not divert the Committee's attention from the responsibility to adopt effective measures relating to already existing weapons, particularly nuclear weapons.

212. The delegation of Italy said that it was still studying the particularly delicate and largely unexplored question of such new weapons and hoped the series of informal meetings to be held early in the session would help to dispel the legitimate concerns that had been expressed on the subject (CCD/PV.728). The delegation of Iran (CCD/PV.731) also hoped the informal meetings would enable the Committee to deal with the problem effectively, while that of the Netherlands (CCD/PV.734) hoped the Committee could reach a more common ground.

213. With particular regard to the scope of the agreement, the delegation of the Soviet Union, noting that it had earlier suggested the inclusion in the prohibition of any types of weapons of mass destruction that were based on qualitatively new principles - according to their mode of use and the targets to be destroyed or the nature of their effects - stated that the ban should also cover those types of weapons based on scientific principles already in use but whose characteristics could be made even more dangerous through the introduction of new technical elements. While sharing the view that the proposed agreement should not cover weapons of mass destruction already banned by other agreements, particularly by the Convention on biological weapons, the delegation thought it might be useful to examine the possibility of including new types and systems of chemical weapons, particularly since the exact scope of a prohibition of such weapons had not yet been decided. The delegation recognized that the first step in the negotiating process must be to reach an understanding on the scope of the prohibition, but suggested that the Committee focus, at the present stage, on the identification of possible directions for the development of new types and systems of weapons (CCD/PV.736).

214. The delegation of Hungary, noting that there was fairly general agreement that the proposed convention should not deal with weapons already prohibited by existing agreements or due to be prohibited in the near future, held that there were four alternatives for defining the scope of the convention: a precise general definition, a less precise definition supplemented by examples that would be illustrative only, a definition indicating the objective and orientation of the agreement, but which would not be precise from the technical and legal standpoints, and a definition by the enumeration of examples. The delegation preferred the third alternative, because a practical approach was necessary at the present stage and because difficulties in elaborating a definition must not hinder further constructive negotiations on the subject. In passing, the delegation specified that a new generation of air-cosmic delivery vehicles should be considered a new weapon of mass destruction (CCD/PV.739).

215. The delegation of Egypt believed the Committee should not be rigid in trying to maintain the 1948 United Nations definition on weapons of mass destruction (ibid.). The delegation of Mongolia considered the definitions in the Soviet working paper CCD/514 21/ to be entirely acceptable (CCD/PV.714). The delegation of the German Democratic Republic also supported the general proposals for defining the weapons to be banned, while also supporting an earlier proposal of Pakistan for listing specific banned weapons and keeping the list up to date (CCD/PV.747).

21/ Ibid.
216. The delegation of Hungary also stressed that any agreements must not hamper peaceful research on and use of the technologies involved in the new weapons (CCD/PV.739). The delegation of the German Democratic Republic held that scientific research was assured under draft article IV of the Soviet draft convention (CCD/PV.747). The delegation of Italy held that the resolution adopted in 1948 by the Commission for Conventional Armaments, established by the Security Council, defining weapons of mass destruction should be kept in mind when considering the problem of prohibiting new weapons of mass destruction (CCD/PV.760).

217. A series of four informal meetings on the subject was held from 14 to 17 March with the participation of experts.

218. In commenting on the informal meetings, Bulgaria held that they had shown that the task of banning new weapons of mass destruction was as urgent as other priority tasks assigned to the Committee, and that documents CCD/511 and CCD/514 submitted by the Soviet Union provided a basis for constructive consideration of the question. The delegation also held that the meetings had made clear that an agreement on the subject would not affect agreements already in force or in the process of being negotiated and would not impede the general progress of science and technology on the uses of new discoveries for peaceful purposes (CCD/PV.741). The delegation of the German Democratic Republic, holding that the meetings had identified the fields in which new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction might come into existence in the foreseeable future, expressed regret that Western experts had not submitted helpful proposals (CCD/PV.747). The delegation of the Soviet Union, while holding that the meetings had enhanced understanding of the substance of the problem stressed that progress on the matter required not only a scientific and technical approach, but also the demonstration of political will (CCD/PV.746). The delegation of the United States held that progress had been made at the meetings towards a better understanding of the complex issues involved, but recalled that the United States had urged acceptance of the 1948 definition of weapons of mass destruction as a comparability standard for future discussions and as a basis for identifying new candidate weapon types as weapons of mass destruction (ibid.). The delegation of Pakistan believed that the difficulties were not insurmountable and looked forward to further discussions to evolve a generally acceptable approach and to formulate solutions (ibid.).

219. The delegation of the Soviet Union held that the discussions during the spring session had been more active than those in 1976 and welcomed the fact that representatives of non-aligned countries had, for the first time, taken part in the discussions and that the Western States, also for the first time, had made constructive contributions to them. In the view of the delegation, the Committee should now proceed to a more concrete examination of the question. The delegation also informed the Committee that bilateral discussions between the Soviet Union and the United States had taken place in Geneva in 1976 and in early May 1977, particularly with regard to radiological weapons, and that the two participants had agreed to continue their work in the near future (CCD/PV.750). The delegation of Bulgaria expressed similar views in comparing the 1976 and 1977 discussions, noting that it had been particularly stressed that a ban on new weapons of mass destruction would have no effect on disarmament agreements already in force or in the course of negotiation and that it would not hamper scientific progress or the peaceful uses of new discoveries. The delegation expected a more concrete and constructive study of the question at the summer session on the basis of the Soviet draft convention (CCD/PV.755). The delegation of Hungary shared the latter view (CCD/PV.754). The
delegations of the German Democratic Republic (CCD/PV.753), Hungary (CCD/PV.754) and Czechoslovakia (CCD/PV.759) stressed that recent news reports on the development of new and more dangerous types of weapons had underlined the significance and urgency of prohibiting such development. The delegation of Czechoslovakia, maintaining that such reports would create additional difficulties for arms negotiations, welcomed the fact that understanding of the urgency of the problem of new weapons was gradually increasing, partly as a result of the informal meetings of experts on the subject, and expressed its conviction that the Committee would shift from a general exchange of views to a concrete examination of the question and make progress towards the elaboration of a convention (ibid.).

220. The delegation of the United Kingdom, while supporting the aim of preventing the development of new weapons of mass destruction, believed that a single treaty on the subject would have to be so general in its scope and so vague in its definitions that it would not be effective. A more fruitful approach, it held, would be a firm condemnation by the world community, perhaps by means of a resolution of the next General Assembly, of the development of such weapons, coupled with a request to the Committee to keep the matter under review; the Committee might then decide to negotiate specific agreements from time to time to preclude the development of particular new types of weapons of mass destruction which were based on new applications of scientific principles. The delegation believed the current discussions on radiological weapons between the Soviet Union and the United States might lead to such a requirement (CCD/PV.757). The delegation of Italy (CCD/PV.760) supported the United Kingdom suggestion concerning the condemnation of such weapons, as did the delegations of the United States (CCD/PV.761), Sweden (CCD/PV.764) and Canada (CCD/PV.760), as noted below.

221. The delegation of Canada said that it had consistently supported efforts to ban weapons of mass destruction and that it recognized the appeal of the notion that the development and production of such weapons could be inhibited even before they threatened to appear in the world's arsenals. At the same time, the delegation held, lengthy discussion of the Soviet proposal to ban such weapons had failed to show that weapons based on new applications or new principles of science threatened to appear in the foreseeable future; and there was nothing in the record that suggested to the Canadian authorities that an "umbrella" agreement could be of any practical value, since each type of weapon had its own characteristics and special set of problems. Until something more tangible appeared, Canada would therefore support the common-sense approach of the United Kingdom in favour of a condemnation by the world community of the development of such new weapons; a United Nations resolution on the subject, embodying a firm undertaking by all participating States to be vigilant in and outside the Committee against the possible development of new weapons of mass destruction, would bring the welcome result that the fears that had been generated in respect of weapons of mass destruction - fears that were sometimes justified, but often not really warranted - would be seen in a more reasonable perspective.

222. At the 760th meeting on 9 August, the Soviet Union submitted a revised version of its draft treaty (CCD/511/Rev.1) reflecting a number of changes in the draft provisions relating to the scope of the proposed agreement. In introducing the revised draft, the delegation noted that the delegations of a number of States had advanced many constructive ideas and considerations with respect to its proposal, which made it possible to come closer even at the present stage to agreeing on some basic provisions of a draft agreement on a generally acceptable basis. The
Soviet Union had taken into account the comments and proposals made in particular by the representatives of Poland, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, India, Pakistan, Sweden, Egypt, the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Canada, Italy and other States. The main attention had been focused on the question which had to be solved first of all - namely, the question of the scope of the prohibition - in order to outline the precise subject of the prohibition, without touching upon the sphere of existing types of weapons of mass destruction, including those among them which were being modernized, or the areas covered by existing agreements or by agreements which were being negotiated. The delegation emphasized that, although the definition which it had proposed earlier for new types of weapons of mass destruction (CCD/514) was in harmony with the 1948 formulation of the Commission for Conventional Armaments, now, taking into account the wishes of a number of members of the Committee, it was using that formulation as a basis for elaborating a definition, stating it in greater detail in the light of present requirements and tasks in the field of disarmament. The desirability of that approach was borne out, in particular, by the fact that the definition of the novelty of weapons contained in the 1948 formulation did not, in the view of the Soviet delegation, make the necessary distinction between known types of weapons of mass destruction, including those that had been modernized, and new types of weapons of mass destruction which might be developed. The Soviet delegation also proposed that the 1948 formulation be supplemented in the sense that it was possible to develop even more effective weapons than existing ones, which would be more effective not only from the point of view of destruction but also from the point of view of their damaging effect on human beings.

223. The Soviet Union accordingly suggested that the definition of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction to be included in article I of the agreement should be worded as follows:

"For the purposes of this Agreement, the expression 'new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction' includes weapons which may be developed in the future, either on the basis of scientific and technological principles that are known now but that have not yet been applied severally or jointly to the development of weapons of mass destruction or on the basis of scientific and technological principles that may be discovered in the future, and which will have properties similar to or more powerful than those of known types of weapons of mass destruction in destructive and/or injuring effect."

224. The delegation pointed out that the draft agreement also included a clause providing that, parallel to a general agreement on the prohibition of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, special agreements could be concluded on the prohibition of particular types of weapons of mass destruction. The draft also contained a statement to the effect that a specific list of types and systems of weapons of mass destruction to be prohibited would be annexed to the agreement, and that that list could be supplemented if new areas of development and manufacture of weapons of mass destruction emerged after the entry into force of the agreement; and an approximate list of types and systems of weapons of mass destruction covered by the agreement was annexed to the draft. It included the following types of weapons: radiological means of the non-explosive type acting with the aid of radio-active materials, technical means of inflicting radiation injury based on the use of charged and neutral particles to affect biological targets, infrasonic means using acoustic radiation to affect biological targets, and means using electromagnetic radiation.
to affect biological targets. The delegation emphasized that, in the opinion of specialists, there existed a sufficient material basis for the application in practice of those scientific and technological principles with a view to the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction.

225. The Soviet delegation stated that, in summary, the USSR position on the question of the scope of the prohibition provided for: (a) the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction containing a specific list of the types to be prohibited; (b) the possibility of supplementing, in the future, the list of new types of weapons of mass destruction to be prohibited; (c) the possibility of concluding special agreements on individual specific new types of weapons of mass destruction. The delegation further stated that its position represented a composite approach to the solution of the question of the scope of the prohibition, if one took into account the proposals presented in the Committee both by countries which were in favour of a general formulation of the prohibition and by countries which preferred to conclude special agreements on various new types of weapons of mass destruction. The Soviet delegation, in submitting the expanded draft agreement for the Committee's consideration, stressed that the solution proposed by the Soviet Union made it possible not only to achieve the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction in the potentially dangerous areas which had been already identified, but also in principle to bar the road to the future development and manufacture of new types and systems of such weapons (CCD/PV.760).

226. The delegation of the United States held that the best way to prevent the development and deployment of new types of weapons of mass destruction would be to keep the question under review, developing specific agreements dealing with particular new types of such weapons when they had been clearly identified; such a procedure would permit the formulation of verification measures specifically tailored to the weapons in question. With particular reference to the Soviet draft agreement, the delegation doubted that attempts to reach agreements on specific types of weapons would be helped by linking such agreements to an over-all treaty dealing with technological fields not clearly understood or with areas of scientific development of whose military potential there was no general agreement. The United States shared the objective of curbing weapons of mass destruction, but considered the 1948 United Nations definition of such weapons to be adequate and saw no justification for amending it on grounds of new technological development since no such developments existed. The delegation acknowledged, however, that "radioactive material weapons" should be subject to appropriate agreement (CCD/PV.761).

227. The delegation of Mongolia, supporting the draft convention of the USSR, held that a number of useful ideas of other delegations had been crystallized in that document and noted, in particular, that an important aspect of the new Soviet proposal was its more detailed and specific definition of such weapons, accompanied by a suggested specific list of types to be prohibited as well as a provision for supplementing the list in the future. The delegation further held that such provisions constituted evidence of the trend towards minimizing the differences in the positions of the various participants in the negotiations of the question. It also expressed gratitude for the flexible approach shown by the Soviet delegation on the question of the possibility of concluding special agreements on particular new types of weapons of mass destruction, maintaining that agreement on a partial measure of that kind in this area should not hamper the conclusion of a general agreement in the matter (ibid.).

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228. From 9 to 12 August the Committee held, as scheduled, a series of four informal meetings, with the participation of experts, on the general subject of the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction. Experts from some 15 member States participated in the meetings.

229. Recalling that its Government had made every effort to contribute to an early agreement on the prohibition of new weapons of mass destruction, the delegation of the German Democratic Republic referred to the recently increased activities of the communist and workers parties of Europe, as well as of important international organizations and of leading scientists, which had increasingly drawn the attention of mankind to the dangers which might arise from the possible development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. The delegation also stressed the importance of the new initiative of the USSR in submitting an amended text of its draft agreement as a sign of its goodwill and readiness to contribute seriously towards solving even the most complicated aspects of such an agreement. The delegation expressed gratitude that the amended text took into consideration a proposal made by the German Democratic Republic to include in the ban any new types of weapons of mass destruction which might emerge through a combination of different principles of action. It held that the negative attitude of some delegations to the examples presented by the experts of the Socialist countries, which were scientifically substantiated as to the fields in which there was already a possibility of development of new types of weapons of mass destruction, could only contribute to playing down the possible dangers and to hampering efforts to prohibit the development of such weapons. The delegation also expressed its opposition to the suggestion to achieve the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction only through specific agreements, maintaining that the development of new types and systems of such weapons must be generally prohibited as had been proposed by the USSR and supported by the overwhelming majority of States. In conclusion, the delegation stressed that the Committee should continue its examination of the amended Soviet draft agreement with a view to achieving the desired prohibition (CCD/PV.763).

230. The delegation of Bulgaria held that the conclusion of an agreement banning all new types of such weapons, as requested by the United Nations General Assembly, was essential as a preventive measure inseparable from other efforts to halt the arms race. In his opinion, to renounce the conclusion of an agreement banning all new types of weapons of mass destruction in favour of possible specific agreements when a given new type of weapon of mass destruction could be better identified, as suggested by some delegations, would amount to ignoring the will of the General Assembly, would compromise the solution of the problem as a whole and would open the possibility of the future appearance of one or another new type of weapon of mass destruction. The Bulgarian delegation did not oppose the conclusion of specific agreements, but that should not be envisaged as an alternative solution to a general prohibition. In addition, the delegation stressed that the revised Soviet draft agreement, in its present version, offered a flexible and constructive approach to the problem and provided a good basis for reaching agreement on the important problem (ibid.).

231. The delegation of Poland held that the series of informal meetings with experts had been useful and instructive. It also welcomed the revised text of the Soviet draft convention on the subject, particularly its flexible combination of the principle of a total ban on all such weapons with a realistic provision for special agreements as meaningful steps complementing the goal of a comprehensive ban. It added the view that progress in the area was vital in light of the frequent
reports of the development of new weapons of mass destruction and the perfection of existing ones; and the price of failure might be not only an unprecedented arms race but also a serious undermining of disarmament efforts in general. With particular regard to the definition of weapons of mass destruction, the delegation suggested that the 1948 definition might well be outdated and that a more suitable definition should be found for inclusion in an agreement on the subject, as contained in the revised Soviet draft. With regard to claims that warnings of the development of certain new weapons, such as those using acoustics or electromagnetic waves, were unrealistic, the delegation recalled that many scientists had considered the possible development of nuclear weapons to be sheer fantasy (CCD/PV.764).

232. The delegation of Sweden also believed that the most recent informal meeting as well as the previous, had served to clarify the problem. The delegation added that Sweden had welcomed the Soviet initiative to try to put a definite obstacle to potentially disastrous new arms developments, but had concluded that it was unfortunately not possible to achieve an omnibus agreement to ban new weapons once and for all time. In the delegation's view, the most appropriate way to prevent the development of such weapons would be to engage the Committee on Disarmament in a procedural review of the pertinent areas to detect future dangerous signs and, if such were detected, to conclude rapidly agreements on the particular new types of weapons involved. Accordingly, it supported the United Kingdom proposal for a firm general condemnation by the world community, coupled with a request to the Committee to keep the matter under review (ibid.).

233. At the closing meeting of the 1977 session, the delegation of the United States, reporting on the results of United States/Soviet Union consultations on radiological weapons and other new weapons of mass destruction, stated that considerable progress had been made on a joint initiative dealing with radiological weapons (CCD/PV.766).

234. At the same meeting, the delegation of the Soviet Union noted with satisfaction that many delegations had taken a duly understanding attitude towards the additions proposed by the USSR in the draft agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction and had expressed their readiness to examine them carefully. A number of delegations had expressed support for that proposal, calling it flexible and constructive. At the same time, the USSR delegation noted the absence of well-conceived arguments on the part of those delegations which were opposed to a comprehensive agreement and were trying to cast doubt on the possibility that new types of weapons of mass destruction might make their appearance on the lines indicated, in particular, in the list proposed by the USSR. It observed that such an approach did not further the search for solutions satisfactory to all, and expressed the hope that, after careful study of the Soviet proposals, those delegations would also show a constructive approach and make their contribution to the attainment of an understanding (ibid.).

Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques

235. Several delegations commented on the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, which the General Assembly, in its resolution 31/72, had requested the Secretary-General, as depositary of the Convention, to refer to all States for their consideration, signature and ratification.
236. The delegation of the Soviet Union expressed satisfaction that an important arms limitation measure resulting from the Committee's collective efforts would soon become a reality and believed that it should provide a stimulus to the further work of the Committee (CCD/PV.728). The delegation also noted that the successful conclusion of the agreement showed once again that progress was possible in resolving complex problems if there was a collective will to succeed (CCD/PV.750). The delegations of Bulgaria (CCD/PV.731 and 755), Mongolia (CCD/PV.733), Czechoslovakia (CCD/PV.742), the German Democratic Republic (CCD/PV.753), Hungary (CCD/PV.754) and the United Kingdom (CCD/PV.757) also noted the Committee's success in elaborating the Convention and called for its early entry into force, as well as universal adherence to it. The delegation of Italy also held that the Convention had been drafted in a constructive spirit of co-operation and compromise by the Committee and looked forward to its early entry into force (CCD/PV.760).

237. The delegation of Mexico, on the other hand, held that the Convention represented the kind of product that the Committee should not duplicate, since, in Mexico's view, it amounted to a legitimization of undesirable military activities in an international instrument, provided only that such action did not have "widespread, long-lasting or severe effects" (CCD/PV.728).

238. The delegation of Iran held that the Convention had been endorsed by the General Assembly because it was not the most urgent arms limitation measure and because enough time had already been spent on a secondary issue. It further held, however, that the General Assembly's endorsement of the Convention had bolstered the confidence of Committee members in the Committee's ability to achieve arms limitation agreements (CCD/PV.731).

239. The delegation of Pakistan stated that its Government was giving sympathetic consideration to becoming a party to the Convention (CCD/PV.748).

Further measures for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed

240. The delegation of the Soviet Union held that the Review Conference of the parties to the sea-bed treaty, held in Geneva in June 1977, had clearly affirmed that the Treaty was an important link in the chain of the international restrictions limiting the nuclear arms race. The Soviet Union considered the Conference's position in favour of further measures for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed to be a positive one in keeping with the objectives of disarmament (CCD/PV.750). The delegations of the German Democratic Republic (CCD/PV.753), Hungary (CCD/PV.754), Bulgaria (CCD/PV.755), Poland (CCD/PV.758) and Mongolia (CCD/PV.741) expressed similar views. The delegation of Hungary held that, after formal submission to the Committee of the Final Declaration of the sea-bed Review Conference, the Committee should prepare to consider the question of further measures for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, as requested by the Conference. The matter would require further study, the delegation conceded, but it looked forward to hearing the views of other delegations with regard to further action. Similarly, Bulgaria noted that the Committee must decide later on its response to the request of the Review Conference. The delegation of Poland expressed confidence that the Conference's recommendations would not only facilitate future agreements in the sea-bed area, but would also contribute to the negotiation of broader measures. The delegation further noted that the Final Declaration of the Conference had left no doubt as to the strong and continued interest of the international community in expanding the scope of the agreement by seeking further
measures for the prevention of an arms race in the vast sea-bed environment and expressed the belief that it was appropriate that the Conference had requested the Committee to pursue that objective (CCD/PV.758). The delegation of the Soviet Union also pointed out that the Review Conference had requested the Committee to proceed promptly with consideration of further measures which would completely exclude the sea-bed from the arms race. It added that the Committee, having worked out the sea-bed Treaty and possessing as it did a significant potential for reaching mutually acceptable agreements on the various problems of disarmament, should conduct negotiations on practical steps leading to that goal (CCD/PV.766).

241. The delegation of the United Kingdom, holding that the Final Declaration of the Review Conference reflected a substantial measure of agreement, believed that the Treaty had worked well and that adherence to it by those who had not yet adhered would be a useful contribution to international security. The delegation hoped that, at an appropriate time, it would be possible to consider establishing under the Treaty an ad hoc expert group to keep technological developments under review, thereby allaying fears that possible new developments might be affecting the Treaty (CCD/PV.757). The delegation of Italy also noted that the Review Conference had shown that the Treaty had achieved its primary purpose (CCD/PV.760).
C. Other collateral measures

242. A number of members also commented on various collateral questions, such as the reduction of military budgets, European security and reduction of forces in Europe and limitations on conventional arms and on the arms trade.

243. On the question of reductions of military budgets, the delegation of the USSR held that its unilateral budget reduction for 1977 was further evidence of its desire to make a breakthrough in halting the arms race and achieving disarmament (CCD/PV.728). The delegation of the United Kingdom hoped that the United Nations Secretary-General's Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets, meeting in Geneva to prepare an analysis of the comments received from Governments on the subject and to make recommendations for further action, would be able to provide an agreed basis for measuring and comparing the military expenditures of States, so that proposals for the reduction of such expenditures could be considered on the basis of dependable facts. The delegation also pointed out that the reduction of military budgets must be universal if such action was to be an effective stimulant to the economic and social progress of all countries (CCD/PV.757).

244. With regard to limitations on conventional weapons and the arms trade, the delegation of the United States stated that its new Administration, both in its executive and legislative branches, ascribed great importance to achieving effective control over the transfer of conventional arms to other countries and to the reduction of the international arms traffic. Once the review of the United States policies now under way was completed, the delegation added, the United States would consult with other arms suppliers, as well as with arms importers, to encourage co-operation in achieving a reduction in the world arms trade (CCD/PV.728). The United Kingdom noted that at the last session of the General Assembly the Japanese delegation had put forward a proposal that the Secretary-General should ascertain the views of Member States on that problem and conduct a factual study of arms transfers with the assistance of qualified government experts and that it had transpired that many States preferred to avoid discussion of the trade in conventional weapons. The delegation suggested the need to remember that arms control and disarmament must concern itself not only with weapons of mass destruction but also with conventional weapons. The United Kingdom, it said, would continue to urge international discussions of possible arrangements for multilateral restraint in conventional arms transfers, and hoped the recent proposals of the United States to achieve broader agreements in the field between supplier and recipient nations and to encourage regional agreements among the latter would lead to constructive results (CCD/PV.757). The delegation of Italy, noting the growing concern in Italy with regard to the escalation of military expenditures for conventional weapons and their uncontrolled transfer, held that restraints on such weapons should be adopted parallel with the progressive reduction of nuclear arms. In that connexion, the delegation also noted that the Italian Government was formally proposing that the United Nations Security Council establish a Committee, divided into regional sub-committees with the participation of major arms suppliers and buyers from each region and entrusted with the task of maintaining conventional weaponry at the lowest possible level (CCD/PV.760). More specifically, the delegation suggested a pilot study aimed at the formulation of an effective system of international measurement of military expenditures with a view to their reduction, preparatory studies on the reconversion of military industries, the periodic publication by the United Nations of data on arms production and transfers and the creation, on the basis of
Article 29 of the United Nations Charter, of a Committee composed of regional sub-committees, as described above (CCD/PV.763).

245. The delegation of Pakistan, while noting that the primary responsibility for disarmament lay with the nuclear-weapon States, held that the non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly those of the third world, must lend strong impetus to the disarmament process by their own collective and regional initiatives (CCD/PV.748).

246. The delegation of India, however, stressed that developing countries needed conventional weapons to preserve their hard-won independence from various threats, including new threats of destabilization (CCD/PV.739).

247. The delegation of Romania, referring to the military situation in Europe, where practical measures for disarmament and nuclear disengagement were being increasingly felt, held that the Committee, as a multilateral disarmament negotiating body, must devote special attention to the continent of Europe (CCD/PV.731).

D. Question of general and complete disarmament

248. All delegations continued to recognize general and complete disarmament under effective international control as the ultimate goal of all disarmament efforts, and most referred to the question either directly or indirectly in discussing the proposed comprehensive programme, the Disarmament Decade of the 1970s, the related questions of disarmament and development and the economic and social consequences of the arms race, or the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament scheduled for early 1978 and the possibility of a world disarmament conference.

249. Among the more direct comments, the delegation of the Soviet Union, recalling the foreign policy programme formulated by the Twenty-fifth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, "Programme of further struggle for peace and international co-operation and for the freedom and independence of peoples", stressed that the memorandum of the Soviet Union on questions of ending the arms race and disarmament submitted to the Committee (CCD/522) called for a number of disarmament measures up to and including general and complete disarmament. The delegation added that the Soviet Union was willing to proceed towards the realization of the final goal on a step-by-step basis, and held, therefore, that the memorandum could serve as one of the basic documents for the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament (CCD/PV.728, 730 and 748). It also maintained that favourable conditions for successful disarmament negotiations had been created and that the agreements reached in recent years were proof that the disarmament problem could be solved (CCD/PV.750). The delegation of the German Democratic Republic expressed similar views (CCD/PV.736).

250. The delegation of the United States, noting its Government's resolve to press for its stated arms control goals while maintaining a stable balance at every stage in the process, stressed that all arms agreements must enhance the security of the United States and other countries and include adequate verification arrangements (CCD/PV.728). At the beginning of the summer session, the delegation read a message from President Carter in which he pledged his efforts to halting the nuclear arms race and to achieving practical limitations on the world's conventional arms (CCD/PV.750).
251. The delegation of Italy reaffirmed its long-standing dedication to general and complete disarmament, despite the many difficulties involved in achieving it, and stressed the need for a systematic programme of disarmament with both short and long-term objectives (CCD/PV.728). In that connexion, it welcomed the fact that an item on the subject of such a programme had been placed on the provisional agenda of the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament (CCD/PV.760).

252. The delegation of Bulgaria, expressing concern over the continuing arms race, held that the recent improvement in the international climate should prompt States to take concerted action in favour of disarmament (CCD/PV.731). The delegation of Mongolia expressed similar views (CCD/PV.733). (See also sect. A on nuclear disarmament above.)

253. The delegation of India stressed the need for efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament and the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, on a step-by-step basis within the framework of the ultimate goal. The delegation held, however, that the Committee must base that process on the correct premise, namely that of arms limitation, and not on the incorrect premise of arms control, which merely maintained a balance of terror (CCD/PV.732 and 734). (See also sect. A on nuclear disarmament above.)

254. The delegation of Egypt also stressed the importance of efforts towards the goal of general and complete disarmament and the establishment of a new economic order (CCD/PV.737).

255. The delegation of Yugoslavia held that, in order to make real progress toward fundamental disarmament agreements, simultaneous action should be taken in the following three directions: (a) the acceleration of negotiations and the conclusion of international agreements on problems that had been discussed in the Committee for several years; (b) the undertaking of the most serious efforts and urgent measures aimed at halting at its source the unabated arms race, which was now one of the basic obstacles to achieving progress on disarmament; and (c) the consistent and full implementation of all the objectives and provisions of international disarmament agreements, not only those selected by individual preferences. In the absence of a broad agreed programme of action and simultaneous progress in these three fields, the delegation further held, the treaties concluded so far had failed to provide an important contribution to the solution of the substantial problems of disarmament; and if those treaties were not followed very soon by new agreements and by positive development with regard to halting the arms race, they would lose their validity, if only because of the rapid technological development in the field of armaments (CCD/PV.742).

Comprehensive programme of disarmament

256. With more direct reference to the elaboration of a disarmament programme in the framework of the Disarmament Decade, Mexico held that the third priority task of the Committee was that entrusted to it by the General Assembly in its resolution 31/68, urging the Committee to adopt during 1977 a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of the arms race and general and complete disarmament, in accordance with resolution 2602 E (XXIV) proclaiming the Disarmament Decade of the 1970s. In fulfilling this task, the delegation maintained, the "Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament" contained in United
257. The delegation of Romania, stressing what it considered to be the meagre disarmament results achieved by the Committee and the need for practical working negotiations on all problems in the field and a coherent general approach, urged adoption during 1977 of a detailed programme of negotiations, as the Committee had decided in 1976 at the initiative of Nigeria. It also asked the secretariat of the Committee to prepare a compilation of all the proposals made and views expressed in the Committee concerning the programme of disarmament (CCD/PV.731).

258. The delegation of Iran also held that a comprehensive programme would help guide the Committee's discussions and shared the view that the questions of a comprehensive test ban and a chemical weapon ban should receive priority attention, as suggested in working paper CCD/510 24/ submitted by Nigeria (ibid).

259. The delegation of Egypt, stressing the importance of responding to the General Assembly's request to adopt a comprehensive programme during the 1977 session, supported working paper CCD/313, 25/ submitted in 1970 by Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia, as well as the proposal of Mexico to establish a working group for the preparation of the programme (CCD/PV.737).

260. The delegation of India considered that the adoption of a comprehensive programme involved the ultimate goal to be achieved; the establishment of priorities; the sequence to be followed in respect of stages, steps or measures; the adoption of principles of disarmament negotiations; the method of implementation of the specific measures; the creation of necessary institutional arrangements; and verification or controls to ensure that the programme was being implemented. The delegation noted that, during negotiations which had preceded the establishment of the Committee in 1961, all the main elements of a comprehensive programme had been identified and established in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations 26/ by the Soviet Union and the United States and that resolution 1722 (XVI) had endorsed all these main elements. Recalling India's suggestion to develop and elaborate the Joint Statement into a comprehensive programme, the delegation held that there could be no other agreed basis on which the Committee could work for developing such a programme. Moreover, in view of the fact that the agenda of work of the Committee adopted in 1968 27/
was based on the Joint Statement, it would be a serious error to change the agreed basis of work, and the goal and priorities should not be tampered with, nor should the fundamental world-wide approach to disarmament questions be whittled down by the so-called regional approach. The delegation concluded that if it proved impossible to draw up an agreed comprehensive programme, it would be best to transmit the complete records of discussions on this subject to the General Assembly and to report that the Committee was continuing to adhere to the main elements of the programme, as recommended by the Assembly in 1961 in its decision to establish the Committee (CCD/PV.737).

261. In accordance with a decision taken by the Committee at the end of the 1976 session "to consider, during its 1977 session, the question of a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under strict international control, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV) proclaiming the Disarmament Decade", 28/ a series of five informal meetings were held on the subject from 8 to 11 March and on 29 March.

262. In comments near the end of the spring session, the delegation of Pakistan said it shared the general sense of disappointment expressed in the Committee with regard to the Disarmament Decade and regretted that no comprehensive programme had been worked out (CCD/PV.748).

263. The delegation of the United States held that the Committee's approach to disarmament should be flexible and not forced into rigid and static guidelines (ibid). Similarly, the delegation of the United Kingdom commented that the desire of many delegations to establish a comprehensive disarmament programme had been reflected in a decision of the Preparatory Committee for the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament to place an item entitled "Adoption of a programme of action on disarmament" on the provisional agenda of the session. The delegation considered it useful to have an outline of the total task in all its major aspects, but did not believe that disarmament could follow a rigid and limited pattern; also, experience had shown that agreement in the field depended primarily on political conditions and that while the international community should be vigilant to seize the opportunity for progress when conditions were right, it should avoid setting rigid timetables and deadlines that could only result in frustration and perhaps sour the very political climate which the community sought to improve (CCD/PV.757 and 763).

264. The delegation of the Soviet Union noted that there was so far no common view either on the content of the proposed programme or on the approach towards its elaboration. It stated that that was understandable because the implementation of a comprehensive disarmament programme must involve in the process of disarmament all States, each of which had its specific interests that must be carefully taken into account in elaborating any documents of a comprehensive nature, including a disarmament programme. When in 1970, in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV), the Committee had considered the question of elaborating a comprehensive programme, many different opinions and been expressed; and that had made it impossible to come to a decision. The Committee's 1970 report had pointed out the complexity of the question raised and the necessity of a "broad and thorough study" of the proposals and considerations put forward. 29/ As the


discussions at the present session of the Committee had shown, the complexity of that problem had not decreased. The question of the document or documents which should constitute the basis for the establishment of a comprehensive programme had occupied no small place in the discussion. A number of members of the Committee had expressed themselves in favour of document A/8191, in which the views of six States on this matter had been set forth in 1970. However, in that connexion a discussion had arisen on the question whether it was possible to take as a basis a document which had not been approved by the General Assembly and which reflected the views of some States only. On the other hand, it had been suggested that the Joint Principles for negotiations on disarmament agreed between the United States and the USSR, which had been approved by the General Assembly in 1961, should be taken as the starting point for further work. Noting that the considerations expressed in the Committee deserved careful examination in the search for a mutually acceptable solution, the delegation expressed the view that the Soviet Union's memorandum on questions of ending the arms race and disarmament might be taken as the basic document, or as one of the basic documents, for the elaboration of a concrete comprehensive disarmament programme. It stressed that the memorandum was an extensive and comprehensive document containing a programme of disarmament measures which were most urgent at present and in the immediately foreseeable period. The memorandum set forth the specific ideas of the Soviet Union as to the directions in which the struggle against the arms race should be concentrated as a matter of high priority, how the most important problems in the field of disarmament could be solved or how their solution could be started in practical terms, and what should be done to that end bearing in mind the objective of general and complete disarmament (CCD/PV.748).

265. The delegation of the United Kingdom supported the attention being given to the subject of a comprehensive negotiating programme in accordance with General Assembly resolution 31/68, holding that that item had assumed greater importance in the context of preparations for the special session on disarmament. It also supported the flexible approach reflected in General Assembly document A/8191, put forward in 1970 by Ireland, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia, and agreed with Mexico that this document would be a suitable basis for discussion of a new negotiating programme (CCD/PV.763).

266. Stressing Italy's long-standing interest in a comprehensive disarmament programme as demonstrated by its 1970 suggestions on the subject in working paper CCD/309 30/, the delegation of Italy welcomed the new series of informal meetings on such a programme, as well as the fact that the matter had been included as a separate item in the agenda of the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. The special session, it held, should set disarmament goals as an integral part of a potential structure designed to eliminate the causes of international instability and based on considerations of disarmament, international security, respect for the principles of world détente, the application of peaceful means for the resolution of conflicts and even the gradual elimination of economic, social and technological disparities. The delegation further held that a global disarmament programme should be based on the following principles: (a) that disarmament negotiations are essential to world peace; (b) that the majority of States favoured the pursuit of disarmament along the parallel paths of general and complete disarmament and the negotiation of specific measures; (c) that the United Nations and the Committee on Disarmament had made some progress in the field, either by achieving specific agreements or by adopting principles, such as

30/ Ibid., document DC/233, annex C, sect. 38.
the joint principles of 1961; (d) that the disarmament process must avoid the
creation of imbalance and privilege by including measures of collective security
and the strictest possible verification measures; and (e) that any disarmament
programme should be coherent, global and carefully designed to provide clear
guidelines leading logically from urgent initial steps to the ultimate goal of
general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The
delegation added that such a programme should be achieved by successive steps
without any rigid deadlines, that it should include a balance of nuclear and
conventional disarmament and the greatest possible measure of co-ordination
between global and regional disarmament and that it should give priority to
nuclear disarmament, including a nuclear weapons test ban, to the prohibition of
chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and to the reduction of
conventional arms (CCD/PV.763).

267. The delegation of Nigeria, recalling the General Assembly's urgent request,
in its resolution 31/68, that the 1977 session of the Committee submit a
comprehensive negotiating programme in accordance with resolution 2602 E (XXIV),
stressed the special interest of several delegations, including Nigeria, in that
subject and hoped that that assignment would be completed by the Committee during
1977 or at the latest before the special session of the General Assembly.
Appealing in particular to the nuclear-weapon States members of the Committee, the
delegation maintained that the fact that the Committee had not been able to tackle
substantial issues of disarmament in a systematic and comprehensive manner called
for a review of the method of approach to the complex problem. Holding further
that the 1961 Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for disarmament negotiations
and the provisional agenda of 1968 required up-dating in view of subsequent
developments and the growing demand of world public opinion for an increase in the
pace of disarmament, it opposed the view that the matter should be regarded as the
responsibility of the United States and the Soviet Union only, and stressed the
direct relationship between the arms race and the new international economic order.
In conclusion, the delegation proposed the setting up of an informal working group
to prepare a draft programme for the Committee's consideration and adoption by
consensus not later than the 1978 spring session and definitely before the special
session of the General Assembly (ibid.).

268. On 18 August, an additional informal meeting was held to discuss the Nigerian
proposal, among other aspects of the problem.

269. After the informal meeting, the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany
referring to the contributions made at the previous plenary meeting by the
delegations of Nigeria, the United Kingdom and Italy, and to the Nigerian proposal
to set up an informal working group to examine all available proposals on a
comprehensive negotiating programme, suggested a possible middle way which it
believed would lead the Committee to the 1978 spring session with a firm plan of
action in this respect. To this end, the delegation read out the text of a draft
decision to the effect that such a working group should be established at the
beginning of the next session of the Committee; the delegation noted that, before
such a group began actual operations, it would of course be necessary for the
Committee to define its mandate (CCD/PV.764).

270. The delegation of Italy supported the proposal of establishing a working group
for the purpose of elaborating a comprehensive negotiating programme on
disarmament, recalling that Italy had contributed positively to the elaboration of
such a programme by submitting working paper CCD/309 on the subject in 1970 and
adding that, in elaborating the mandate of the working group, the Committee should
bear in mind all relevant proposals and take into consideration the discussions
taking place on the same subject at the Preparatory Committee for the special
session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (ibid.). The delegations
of the United States and the United Kingdom also supported the proposal of the
Federal Republic of Germany (ibid.).

271. The delegation of Hungary, noting that his delegation did not share the view
that a detailed negotiating programme of disarmament should have a high priority
in the Committee's work but viewed it as one of the possible organizational
methods to give some direction to the work of the Committee without exercising
considerable influence on the progress of disarmament negotiations, nevertheless
considered that the proposal of Nigeria deserved the attention of the Committee
and that the establishment of an ad hoc working group could facilitate the
consideration of the question. The delegation added, however, that due to the
lack of time and of previous consultations, the Committee would not be in a
position to take an immediate decision on the question of the establishment of a
working group, but might decide now that at the beginning of the 1978 spring
session it would consider the setting up of an ad hoc working group when deciding
upon the organization of work (ibid.).

272. The delegation of Nigeria supported the proposal of the Federal Republic of
Germany in principle and expressed satisfaction with the apparent consensus for
the establishment of the proposed working group; it held, however, that the work
of the group would be greatly facilitated if it were appointed and given a mandate
at the current session of the Committee (ibid.).

273. Referring to General Assembly resolution 31/68 urging the Conference to
adopt during its 1977 session a comprehensive programme of disarmament, the
delegation of Mexico recalled its proposal at the spring session that the
Committee take as a basis for its discussion document A/8191, which should be
revised in the light of developments since its submission to the General
Assembly in 1970. Noting that it now appeared that the Committee would begin
consideration of the question of such a programme at the outset of its 1978
session, the delegation introduced, as a contribution to that task, a preliminary
draft comprehensive programme (CCD/545) which, the delegation said, largely
reproduced the contents of document A/8191, with certain changes, including one
serving to draw attention to the degree of responsibility to be borne by the
principal nuclear-weapon States in implementing various measures (CCD/PV.765).

274. The delegation of Pakistan stated that it would join in the presentation
of the Mexican working paper (CCD/545), if a phrase were added to the text to
include the question of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States among
the measures for whose implementation the political will of the principal
nuclear-weapon States was essential (ibid.).

275. At the same meeting, on 25 August, the Committee took note of the consensus
reached among the member States of the Committee that, at the beginning of its
spring session of 1978, an ad hoc working group would be established, in accordance
with the procedural decision adopted at the 746th meeting of the Conference on
21 April 1977 (CCD/532), to discuss and elaborate a draft comprehensive programme
of disarmament to be submitted to the Committee for consideration (CCD/PV.765).

276. At the closing meeting of the 1977 session, the delegation of the United
States welcomed the decision of the Committee to establish a working group on a
comprehensive negotiating programme at the beginning of the 1978 spring session and stressed the opportunity thus provided for the Committee to up-date its agenda and look to its future work programme. The delegation again noted, however, that a number of important changes had already been made in the Committee's procedures and expressed the view that the Committee should retain a flexible attitude towards its procedures and organization (CCD/PV.766).

277. At the same final meeting, the delegation of the Soviet Union, after emphasizing the priority of solving the important problems of ending the arms race and of disarmament, also drew attention to the need to work on a comprehensive programme of disarmament (ibid.).

Economic and social consequences of the arms race

278. With particular reference to economic and social aspects of the arms race, the delegation of the Soviet Union held that it was a matter of universal concern that resources that could be used for eradicating poverty, illiteracy, disease and hunger were being used by some for arms production and the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race (CCD/PV.728). The delegation of Italy held that the trend towards the diversion of resources to military ends was threatening détente by depriving mankind of capital that should be devoted to the development of economic and social well-being (ibid.). The delegation of Mongolia, stressing the organic relationship between détente, disarmament and development, hoped the enormous resources being absorbed by the arms race would be diverted to peaceful uses (CCD/PV.733). The delegation of Romania, referring to the meagre results of the Committee, stressed that the arms race had continued unchanged, proving an obstacle to the social progress and development of mankind and jeopardizing the possibilities of correcting the international structures and relations which for centuries had given rise to inequalities, suffering and disaster (CCD/PV.731).

Special session of the General Assembly on disarmament

279. A number of delegations made special comments on the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament scheduled for early 1978. The delegation of Sweden considered the General Assembly resolution 31/189 B calling for the special session to be the most significant of the 21 resolutions on disarmament adopted by the General Assembly at its last session (CCD/PV.729). The delegation of Iran thought the session should provide an opportunity to examine the fullest range of disarmament proposals, but stressed that it must be carefully prepared with the assistance of the new United Nations Centre for Disarmament (CCD/PV.731). The delegation of Romania, stressing the vital interest of disarmament to all States, thought that the decision to hold the special session was proof of the determination of small and medium-sized countries to put an end to the arms race (ibid.). The delegation of India held that the agenda of the session should be broad-based, as recommended by the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries held at Colombo in 1976 (CCD/PV.732). The delegation of Egypt hoped the session would establish new guidelines for disarmament and also consider new forms for the negotiating process (CCD/PV.737).

280. The delegation of Yugoslavia, pointed out that one of the most important recommendations of the Colombo Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries was the initiative for calling a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It held that the convening of the session was the result of growing awareness on the part of the international community of
the tremendous dangers of the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race, and reflected the need for resolute and immediate action to work out a programme of measures aimed at and ensuring concrete disarmament, as well as the need for all members of the United Nations to be engaged in such efforts on an equal and democratic basis. The delegation believed that the special session should constitute a broad forum for a constructive working dialogue among equal and sovereign partners for establishing ways and means of resolving disarmament problems and could, among other things, make an authoritative appraisal of the current disarmament situation and of the results achieved so far in determining certain priorities and adopting decisions contributing to the achievement of mutually agreed goals. The session could provide a powerful impetus to the achievement of more rapid solutions to disarmament problems and could mark a turning point in the process of tackling questions concerning disarmament and generate new hopes and prospects for attaining the final goal - namely general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. The success of the special session depended above all on the readiness of all members of the international community to do their utmost to achieve generally acceptable solutions, and the Committee on Disarmament should participate actively in such efforts as the best way to strengthen its prestige and prove its capacity as an important negotiating body in the field of disarmament (CCD/PV.742).

281. The delegation of Bulgaria stressed that the special session could not be a substitute for existing disarmament negotiating bodies, such as the Committee on Disarmament, and that the future of the Committee could not depend on the views of the session. The delegation hoped, however, that the Committee would be in a position to report new achievements to the session (CCD/PV.736). The delegations of Sweden (CCD/PV.729 and 750), the Netherlands (CCD/PV.741), Yugoslavia (CCD/PV.742) and the United States (CCD/PV.750) also stressed the importance of making significant progress in the Committee in 1977 as a contribution to the success of the special session. Sweden held that it was imperative that the Committee make such progress if it was to be maintained as a credible negotiating body (ibid.). Mexico noted that the Preparatory Committee for the special session had already manifested its impatience with the lack of action in the disarmament field (ibid.); it also held that the Committee should not only achieve tangible results with regard to genuine disarmament before the special session, but also changes in its structure (CCD/PV.762).

282. The delegation of Czechoslovakia thought that the question of convening a world disarmament conference should be constructively discussed at the special session (CCD/PV.747). The delegation of Hungary, noting that the special session and the Committee shared, each in its own way, the objective of limiting the arms race and promoting disarmament, also believed that the session, as a stage in the preparation of a world disarmament conference, could create favourable conditions for such a world conference. The delegation expected the session to outline the results and tasks of disarmament negotiations and a programme of actions aimed at the final goal of general and complete disarmament, thereby favourably influencing the activity of existing disarmament forums and mobilizing political will. It further believed that all Committee members should share a sense of urgency with regard to achieving progress before the opening of the session, but should not consider that date as an absolute deadline for solving all disarmament problems (CCD/PV.754). The delegation of Bulgaria also thought the special session should not only contribute to a solution of the disarmament question, but also constitute an intermediary step on the road to a world disarmament conference (CCD/PV.755).
283. The delegation of the United Kingdom, noting that the special session would provide the first occasion in recent years for focusing international public attention on disarmament in all its aspects, hoped it could be widely attended, particularly by all militarily significant Powers. With a co-operative spirit, the session could be a landmark of progress towards general and complete disarmament, the delegation held, but ill-considered proposals resulting in confrontation could lead to public disillusionment. The objective of the session should be to reach agreement on the general principles for effective disarmament, which would also indicate the priorities for negotiation; that would encourage productive negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament and elsewhere (CCD/PV.757).

284. The delegation of Italy, noting the businesslike atmosphere of the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the special session, expressed satisfaction that it had elaborated a balanced and factual draft agenda. The delegation also believed that the session would offer an important opportunity for a broad and profound appraisal of the numerous disarmament problems, and favoured the adoption of a declaration of basic principles, with broad support, as a useful guideline for all endeavours in the disarmament field (CCD/PV.760).

285. The delegation of Poland believed that the thirty-third session of the General Assembly, the 1978 session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament must all generate new momentum towards disarmament negotiations. The special session, in particular, would address many important and urgent problems, including the cessation of the arms race and nuclear disarmament, further consolidation of the non-proliferation régime and the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments; it could be confidently expected that the session would help make such a review successful, thereby contributing to the adoption of a programme of action on disarmament reflecting the Committee's efforts with respect to elaborating a comprehensive negotiating programme (CCD/PV.764).

E. Organization and procedures of the Committee

286. In accordance with a decision taken at the end of the Committee's 1976 session to hold, at the very outset of the 1977 session, further informal meetings on the question of a comprehensive review of its procedures, a series of four informal meetings were held on the subject from 1 to 4 March 1977. A number of members also commented on the question in plenary meetings, both before and after the informal meetings.

287. At the beginning of the session, the delegation of the United States expressed the view that the Committee had demonstrated renewed vitality at the 1976 session through the use of informal meetings, expert groups and an ad hoc working group to elaborate an agreement on environmental warfare. The delegation conceded that the Committee, which was a voluntary grouping of dedicated professionals and experts, was not perfect, but maintained that the Committee's task would be difficult, regardless of the procedural arrangements it followed (CCD/PV.728). The delegation of the Soviet Union shared the view that the Committee, in its present form, was capable of negotiating agreements and held that the real requirements for achieving such agreements were effort and the will to agree, particularly on the part of the nuclear Powers (ibid.). Italy noted that the Committee could claim some achievements and expressed concern over the great number of proposals for structural and procedural changes, which it thought might
impair the Committee's negotiating ability. The delegation agreed, however, that all substantive proposals for improvements in the Committee's work should be reviewed, with the aim of identifying problem areas and thereby dispelling misunderstanding (ibid.).

288. The delegation of Mexico noted its previous recommendations in favour of a calendar of work, preparation of the annual report by the Secretariat, replacement of the co-chairmanship and establishment of a permanent sub-committee. With more specific regard to the co-chairmanship, the delegation proposed (a) that nuclear-weapon States not be permitted to hold the chairmanship; (b) that beginning in 1978, the three groups represented in the Committee each designate one of the group for a three-year term as members of the Committee's "bureau", with each member holding the chairmanship for one of the years 1978-1980 while the other two would serve as vice-chairmen; (c) that the same procedure be repeated at the 1981 session and every three years thereafter; (d) that the present rotation of the chairmanship be abolished (CCD/PV.728).

289. The delegation of the United Kingdom held that the Committee should use, as a model for further discussions on specific subjects, the ad hoc group established to discuss the convention on environmental warfare, rather than creating a permanent negotiating sub-committee. In order to reduce the problem that many Members of the United Nations not members of the Committee had not been able to provide any input to the negotiating process and had had insufficient time to consider a treaty text before being asked to give their approval at the General Assembly, the delegation suggested that, when the Committee decided to set up an ad hoc working group for the negotiation of a treaty, a period of notice of not less than one month might be given to all States Members of the United Nations not members of the Committee. Such States might be invited to contribute to the negotiating process by submitting either written or oral statements, according to their preference, and they might also be offered an invitation to participate more fully in the Committee's negotiations: when the Committee completed its work on a treaty, notification might be sent, together with the treaty text, to all States Members of the United Nations which had not participated in the working group, preferably at least three weeks in advance of discussion of the text in the General Assembly (CCD/PV.729).

290. The delegations of Canada (CCD/PV.731) and Iran (ibid.), later joined by those of Hungary (CCD/PV.732 and 739), the Netherlands (CCD/PV.734), Poland (CCD/PV.735), the German Democratic Republic (CCD/PV.736), India (ibid.), Mongolia (CCD/PV.733 and 741) and Czechoslovakia (CCD/PV.742), also favoured a decision to use ad hoc working groups, on the model of that used for elaborating the convention on environmental warfare, for negotiating future agreements as the situation required.

291. The delegation of Canada, stressing that a review of procedural details should begin with the recognition that a number of useful innovations had been agreed upon in 1976, disagreed with the proposal of Mexico concerning a future rotational system for the chairmanship of the Committee based on groupings, holding that such a system did not do justice to the fact that Committee members participated as individual States, as in United Nations bodies such as the Security Council, where all members took the Chair in equal turn by alphabetic rotation. The delegation noted, however, that it had not as yet made up its mind as to the desirability of modifications in the co-chairmanship, pending exploration of the possibility of at least one of the two non-participating nuclear Powers joining
the Committee if the co-chairmanship were not an issue (CCD/PV.731). The
delegation of Mexico noted, with regard to the opinion of Canada, that its
proposal in no way violated the principle of the sovereign equality of States
and that it was similar to the procedure followed by the Review Conference of the
Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1975 and to
the practice followed for over a decade by the General Assembly in nominating its
President (ibid.).

292. The delegation of Romania, supporting constant improvement in the functioning
of the Committee, welcomed the suggestions already put forward by Mexico, Italy
and the United Kingdom and hoped that further ideas would be forthcoming (ibid.).

293. On the specific issue of the co-chairmanship, the Netherlands directly
supported the Canadian position, noting that the Committee was not a temporary
conference but a negotiating body of a permanent character and that there were
many ways to solve the problem of steering discussion in the Committee without
resorting to a "bureau" of three selected countries which, among other things,
strengthened the criticized bloc-structure (CCD/PV.734).

294. A number of members opposed any change in the system of co-chairmanship. The
delegation of India stressed the fact that the Soviet Union and the United States
had been unanimously chosen as Co-Chairmen of the Committee in 1962 in order to
help organize the Committee's work and that they acted as ordinary representatives
on substantive matters. With regard to France and China, the delegation noted that
the entire international community would welcome their participation in disarmament
negotiations (CCD/PV.736).

295. The delegation of Bulgaria, sharing the opinion that the present
coc-chairmanship met undeniable political needs, stressed that it derived from the
special role incumbent on the two great Powers and that its value derived from
the responsibilities assumed by the two Powers in the United Nations as permanent
members of the Security Council. The delegation disagreed with the view that the
abolition of the co-chairmanship would make possible the participation in the
Committee of France and China, stressing that the attitude of these Powers to
negotiations on nuclear disarmament matters and, in particular to the Committee,
was prompted by quite different considerations (ibid.).

296. The delegation of Hungary stressed that the co-chairmanship system had
facilitated rather than hampered the work of the Committee and noted that so-called
privileges of the Co-Chairmen had never restricted the sovereignty of other members
of the Committee and that an understanding between the two great Powers was a
prerequisite if a disarmament treaty was to be concluded and its provisions
implemented. Maintaining further that there was no indication that the
coc-chairmanship was really the reason why China and France were holding aloof
from the Committee, the delegation opposed the elimination of the institution for
an uncertain possibility that those two Powers might join (CCD/PV.739).

297. The delegation of the Soviet Union also maintained that the co-chairmanship
was based on the political reality of the present world and had actually
facilitated negotiations in the Committee (CCD/PV.748). The delegation of
Czechoslovakia considered the existing system suitable and practical (CCD/PV.747),
while the delegation of Mongolia opposed the replacement of the institution
(CCD/PV.741).
298. The delegation of Egypt commented that the Committee should function in such a way as to encourage others to take part in disarmament negotiations but that, if such participation was not possible, the Committee should get the best results through the existing machinery (CCD/PV.737).

299. The delegation of Mexico reiterated its view that replacement of the institution of the co-chairmanship would be indispensable to create conditions favourable for the participation of France and China in the Committee (CCD/PV.746).

300. Several members made more general comments on the Committee's work. The delegation of India, holding that the Committee's procedures were based on the principle of consensus and flexibility, that its records and documents were appropriately private but still available to all United Nations Members and that it enjoyed a special link with the United Nations, stressed the view that serious work on substantive disarmament measures could only be conducted on the basis of such traditions and that the Committee should therefore be preserved and further strengthened (CCD/PV.732 and 739). The delegation of Bulgaria expressed similar views, specifically supporting the view that Committee documents should be distributed to non-member States in New York as soon as issued (CCD/PV.736). The delegation of Egypt expressed support for any improvement in the Committee's methods of work, such as those adopted in 1976 (CCD/PV.737).

301. The delegation of Yugoslavia held that the Committee, in order to fulfil its mandate, should endeavour to improve and promote the substance and methods of its work and not be satisfied with the status of a quasi-negotiating body without taking initiatives and actions of its own. The only organ of its kind in the field of disarmament negotiations, the Committee should not simply wait for ready-made solutions to be presented from outside and only then start acting as a negotiating body: in particular, it should not be a body to which final solutions were offered, as that was no way for an international forum to perform its tasks and rise to its challenges. The Committee, the delegation emphasized, should initiate appropriate actions, actively participate in all phases of negotiations, influence decisions being taken in the disarmament field and orient its negotiations in accordance with scientific and technological developments in the field of armaments, bearing in mind the real needs of the international community in that field. If that was not done, the delegation held, the Committee would remain ineffective and would not be able to adjust to the requirements and the conditions of the present-day world. The delegation supported changes in the methods of the Committee's work in order to strengthen its capacity to negotiate on a basis of democracy and equality. The Committee, established nearly 16 years ago and outside the United Nations framework, reflected the circumstances and conditions of that time, the delegation held, but since that time many things had changed in the international community: now, a large number of member countries were supporting appropriate changes in the methods and character of the work of the Committee, or the way it was managed, and doing so in the best interests of the Committee itself, deeply convinced that it must reflect the needs of its time, rather than to be overcome by them, and must promote its efficiency as a negotiating body (CCD/PV.742).

302. A number of members, including the delegations of Iran (CCD/PV.731), Canada (ibid.), the German Democratic Republic (CCD/PV.736) and Hungary (CCD/PV.739), stressed that the consideration of procedural and organizational matters should not be unduly time-consuming and should not hamper the Committee's more substantive priority work, while the delegation of Poland (CCD/PV.735) warned
that insistence on the reform of Committee procedures, without consensus of the Committee, might prove to be self-defeating. Several members, including the delegations of Mongolia (CCD/PV.733), Bulgaria (CCD/PV.736) and Czechoslovakia (CCD/PV.747) also stressed the importance of the political will of the nuclear Powers in achieving agreement on disarmament.

303. On 15 March 1977, the delegation of the United States delivered a message from President Carter extending congratulations to the Committee on its fifteenth anniversary. Recalling the achievements of the Committee and the fact that it had proved itself to be an effective negotiating forum, President Carter stated that even more challenging opportunities for the Committee lay ahead (CCD/PV.736).

304. On 24 March 1977, a group of 12 non-aligned countries, Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Egypt, Iran, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, Sweden, Yugoslavia and Zaire, submitted a working paper on Conference procedures (CCD/530) containing suggestions for the establishment of a standing sub-committee, with an alphabetically rotating chairmanship, for the preparation of the Committee's annual report by the Secretariat on a permanent basis, and for the continuation of substantive communiqués of the meetings. In introducing the paper, the delegation of Mexico pointed out that the organization of work and procedures of the proposed sub-committee would be determined by the Committee and would not impair in any manner the right of the Committee to adopt any other procedural measures it might deem advisable. The delegation also stressed that the sub-committee would not be able to negotiate texts, whether of draft conventions, treaties, agreements or any other documents, unless they related to items on the Committee's agenda or unless the plenary Committee had referred them to it (CCD/PV.739).

305. At the same time, the Co-Chairmen circulated a draft proposal recommending the use of ad hoc working groups instead of a sub-committee, but recommending procedures with regard to the Committee's report and communiqués similar to those in CCD/530. The delegation of Mexico, while reiterating its preference for the recommendations contained in CCD/530, expressed no objection to the Co-Chairmen's proposal, which was adopted and issued as document CCD/532 (CCD/PV.746).

306. At the end of the spring session, the delegation of the Soviet Union again praised the present flexible and democratic procedures and organization of work in the Committee (CCD/PV.748), while the delegation of the United States noted with satisfaction that the Committee had adopted a useful set of principles with regard to ad hoc working groups, the preparation of its report and communiqués and the distribution of the documents upon issue to Missions at Headquarters (ibid.).

307. At the summer session, the delegation of the United States read a message of the President of the United States in which he assured the Committee that the United States would work tirelessly to contribute to the Committee's success (CCD/PV.750). The delegation also held that the Committee had the attributes of detailed knowledge, combined with skill and flexibility, that were required to achieve effective arms control and disarmament and that the Committee had a pivotal role to play in many arms control issues. The United States accordingly believed it essential to maintain and, where possible, improve the Committee as a key institution of multilateral agreements in the field. In particular, it must play a significant role in elaborating a comprehensive weapons test ban and the prohibition of chemical warfare (CCD/PV.754).
308. The delegations of the Soviet Union (CCD/PV.750), the German Democratic Republic (CCD/PV.753) and Poland (CCD/PV.758) also stressed the importance of the Committee as a competent and effective international body for negotiating multilateral disarmament agreements. The delegation of Poland held that criticism of the Committee over alleged defects in its procedure or the pace of its negotiations all too frequently tended to ignore or underestimate its past record and continued relevance, recalling in that connexion that the Polish Foreign Minister had recently referred to the speedy elaboration of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques as the latest proof of the usefulness, effectiveness and sustained vitality of the Committee (CCD/PV.758). The delegation of Czechoslovakia stressed that his country highly appreciated the work of the Committee as the central organ for co-ordinating the joint efforts of States in working out concrete measures for the reduction of armaments and for disarmament (CCD/PV.759).

309. The delegation of the United Kingdom suggested that the Committee should appraise its success in adapting to present realities, particularly in light of the item on the provisional agenda of the special session of the General Assembly on the international machinery for negotiations on disarmament. The United Kingdom welcomed the compromise achieved at the spring session enabling the Committee to reform its working procedures to the particular benefit of States not members of the Committee, but was disappointed that non-members could not have been associated even more closely in the discussion of treaty texts. The Committee was a highly effective piece of international machinery that must be kept in good running order, the delegation believed, so as to be ready to take on important work on short notice. The delegation of the United Kingdom hoped that the issues of a comprehensive test ban and chemical weapons would soon be ready for the Committee's full attention (CCD/PV.757).

310. The delegation of Yugoslavia held that as long as the results of the Committee's negotiations failed to keep abreast of technological developments, the Committee would continue to revolve in a vicious circle. The fact that disarmament problems were exceedingly complicated, and that the political will of all members of the international community was needed if they were to be solved, should not be used to justify the meagre results being achieved or the lagging tempo of negotiations, the delegation maintained. It further held that in the 15 years of its existence, the Committee had still not become a negotiating body in the full sense of the word, as it should be, but in the view of Yugoslavia, became such a body only when its two Co-Chairmen submitted for its consideration the agreed text of an international agreement. The Committee as a whole would at this moment have much material for negotiation but, regrettably that possibility had been reduced to a minimum by the Committee's engagement in the direct negotiating process being made dependent on the outcome of bilateral and trilateral consultations, a procedure which did not help it to achieve the best results. The delegation also expressed regret at cases of circumvention of the Committee, the conduct of negotiations outside its framework, and failure to inform it of the course and results of bilateral and trilateral talks. It stressed that the Committee as a whole should take an active part in all stages of the negotiation of the international agreements that it was supposed to prepare and held that, instead of constantly striving to create conditions enabling other States that were not members of the Committee to make a useful contribution to its work, the Committee continued to narrow its own framework and to curtail its own abilities. The delegation of Yugoslavia further maintained...
that all States, regardless of their size or military power, were equally interested in disarmament questions, which had the most direct bearing on the security of each State. For that very reason, it held, the international agreements in the field of disarmament rested on respect for the basic interests of all members of the world community, and they should be the product of the joint efforts of States for, only if they were, could they win general support; this was still not always the case with existing treaties and that fact in itself should act as a warning (ibid.). The delegation of Canada agreed with Yugoslavia that the Committee seemed at this juncture to be marking time with regard to its main work on a comprehensive test ban and chemical weapons ban and that there was a danger of its becoming a mere forum for exchanging views (CCD/PV.760).

311. The delegation of Italy, stressing the great importance Italy had always attached to the Committee and its confidence in it, held that the current session had offered a challenging opportunity to reaffirm the Committee's vitality and credibility to the international community through concrete achievements, which it was still essential to do if the Committee was to deter a search for another negotiating body; unfortunately, however, the Committee seemed once again to be sinking into a long and frustrating general debate to the detriment of its main task (ibid.).

312. The delegation of Mexico held that the failure to establish an ad hoc working group on a comprehensive test ban or a chemical weapons ban had rendered virtually impossible any substantive contribution by the non-nuclear-weapon States members of the Committee to negotiations on those items during 1977. It added, in that connexion, that the contribution of the 15 non-aligned members could prove to be most useful precisely in a situation where there were no "identical drafts" of the United States and the Soviet Union. With more particular reference to the question of organization and procedures of the Committee, the delegation quoted from the opinions of a number of Member States of the United Nations regarding the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament; in the delegation's view, the majority of those opinions reflected an impatience with the paucity of the results of the Committee's endeavours, which in large measure derived from its inadequate organization and procedures and which should not be ignored. The delegation then referred to two previous proposals aimed at improving the Committee's organization and procedures: the establishment of a standing subcommittee of the whole to negotiate specific drafts and the substitution of the co-chairmanship by a system more in keeping with United Nations practice and with the principle of the sovereign equality of States. The decisive argument for carrying out the latter, the delegation held, was the indisputable need for the participation of the other two nuclear-weapon States in the Committee's work, which the present system understandably precluded; in that connexion, the delegation also pointed out that a number of opinions he had quoted had emphasized the need to associate all nuclear-weapon States with disarmament negotiations and that several had referred specifically to the prerequisite of changing the system of co-chairmanship. As an alternative to the co-chairmanship, the delegation recalled his delegation's proposal for a monthly rotating chairmanship among the non-nuclear-weapon States members of the Committee, holding that such a system would in no way detract from the role played by the present Co-Chairmen of the Committee. In conclusion, the delegation hoped that it would prove possible for the Committee to achieve tangible negotiating results, as well as changes in its structure, before the special session of the United Nations General Assembly (CCD/PV.762).
At the closing meeting of the 1977 session, the delegation of the United States concluded that the Committee had had a productive year and had laid the foundation for future progress. The delegation looked forward to increasing the pace of the Committee's work in the year ahead and indicated that the United States intended to work in the interim so that multilateral negotiations on one or both of the Committee's high priority items could begin in the near future. The delegation also stated that, if a joint initiative was completed on either of those issues prior to the start of the next regular session of the Committee, it would be appropriate for the Co-Chairmen to reconvene it after consultation with the other members (CCD/PV.766).

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At its closing meeting on 30 August, the Committee took the following decision:

"The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament decides to convene its next regular session on 31 January 1978. The Committee also decides that, if the need arises, it will resume its work at an earlier date in order to conduct negotiations on the priority items on its agenda. To this effect the Co-Chairmen will consult with the other members of the Committee regarding the possibility and usefulness of such a resumed session of the Committee and after such consultations shall convene the Committee at an earlier date, if it would be useful to do so."

The present report is transmitted by the Co-Chairmen on behalf of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

(Signed) V. I. LIKHATCHEV (Signed) Adrian S. FISHER
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics United States of America
ANNEX I

Documents issued by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament

On 15 February 1977, the Secretary-General of the United Nations transmitted to the Co-Chairmen a letter containing the resolutions of the General Assembly on disarmament (CCD/521).

On 15 February 1977, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics submitted a memorandum on questions of ending the arms race and disarmament (CCD/522).

On 22 February 1977, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics submitted a draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests (CCD/523).

On 24 February 1977, the representative of Japan submitted a working paper on location capability of a multi-array stations system (CCD/524).

On 25 February 1977, the representative of Mexico to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament submitted two declarations relating to the commemorative meeting on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Treaty of Tlateloloco held in Mexico City on 14 February 1977 (CCD/525).

On 1 March 1977, the representative of Sweden submitted a draft treaty banning nuclear-weapon-test explosions in all environments (CCD/526).

On 1 March 1977, the Schedule of Conference Meetings for the spring session (adopted at the 732nd meeting on 1 March 1977) was circulated (CCD/527).

On 1 March 1977, the second progress report to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events was circulated (CCD/528).

On 22 March 1977, the representative of Japan submitted some thoughts on the international control of chemical weapons (CCD/529).

On 23 March 1977, the representatives of Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Egypt, Iran, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, Sweden, Yugoslavia and Zaire submitted a working paper on Conference procedures (CCD/530 and Add.1).

On 28 March 1977, the representatives of the United States of America

* With the exception of document CCD/537, all the documents listed appear in annex II. In 1977 the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament also issued document CCD/546 and Add.1, containing the report of the Conference.
submitted a working paper concerning incapacitating chemical warfare agents (CCD/531).

On 21 April 1977, a decision on certain procedural aspects of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (adopted at the 746th meeting on 21 April 1977) was circulated (CCD/532).

On 22 April 1977, the representative of the Netherlands submitted a working paper concerning the verification of the presence of nerve agents, their decomposition products or starting materials downstream of chemical production plants (CCD/533).

On 28 April 1977, the third progress report to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events was circulated (CCD/534).

On 5 July 1977, the representative of Sweden submitted a revised draft treaty banning nuclear-weapon-test explosions in all environments (CCD/526/Rev.1).

On 21 July 1977, the schedule of Conference Meetings for the summer session (adopted at the 755th meeting on 21 July 1977) was circulated (CCD/535).

On 22 July 1977, a letter dated 20 July 1977 from the Chargé d’Affaires of the Permanent Mission of New Zealand to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, transmitting the views of the Government of New Zealand on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, was circulated (CCD/536).

On 28 July 1977, the representative of Hungary submitted a working paper on a possible method of defining a partial ban on chemical weapons (CCD/537).

On 3 August 1977, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics submitted a document outlining some methods of monitoring compliance with an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons (CCD/538).

On 3 August 1977, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics submitted a paper concerning the verification of the destruction of declared stocks of chemical weapons (CCD/539).

On 3 August 1977, the representative of Japan submitted a working paper on focal depth resolvability of a multi-array stations system (CCD/540).

On 4 August 1977, the representative of Hungary submitted a working paper on a possible method of defining toxic chemical agents (CCD/537/Rev.1)

On 5 August 1977, the representative of the United Kingdom submitted a document on prophylaxis against nerve agent poisoning (CCD/541).

On 8 August 1977, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics submitted a revised draft agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons (CCD/511/Rev.1).
On 11 August 1977, the fourth progress report to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events was circulated (CCD/542).

On 17 August 1977, the final document of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof was circulated (CCD/543).

On 19 August 1977, a letter dated 19 August 1977 from the Counsellor of the Permanent Mission of Finland to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament was circulated together with a publication entitled "Chemical and Instrumental Verification of Organophosphorus Warfare Agents" prepared for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland by the Advisory Board of Disarmament (CCD/544).

On 23 August 1977, the representative of Mexico submitted a working paper containing a preliminary draft comprehensive programme of disarmament (CCD/545).
ANNEX III

List of the verbatim records of the meetings of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament

For the verbatim records of the meetings held by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in 1977, see documents CCD/PV.728 to 766.
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