



# PAKISTAN

PERMANENT MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

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**STATEMENT**

**BY**

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PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF PAKISTAN  
TO THE UNITED NATIONS**

**AT**

**THE 2016 SUBSTANTIVE SESSION OF THE  
UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT COMMISSION  
(UNDC)**

New York,  
4 April 2016

**Mr. Chairman,**

Let me begin by congratulating you on your election as Chairman of the Commission. I assure you and the Bureau of our full support and cooperation.

We thank the Acting High Representative for his important statement.

**Mr. Chairman,**

The international security situation today is in a state of flux, marked by multiplying conflicts and tensions among and within States.

Even as old disputes remain unresolved and at best, frozen, there are worrying indications of new cold wars in Europe and Asia and growing turmoil in the Middle East.

Meanwhile, in my region, South Asia, real progress towards peace and prosperity is being impeded by hegemonic impulses often fanned and encouraged by powerful states from beyond the region to advance their own geo-political objectives.

**Mr. Chairman,**

These larger trends are impacting the disarmament regime and structures. The global consensus the General Assembly evolved thirty-eight years ago to promote the disarmament agenda has eroded. There are continuing differences in approaches to pursue an agreed disarmament agenda.

The challenges facing the disarmament machinery are not exclusive to this Commission or the First Committee. Other parts of the arms control machinery are also not immune from these problems. The failure of last year's NPT Review Conference and the continuing deadlock in the CD on all its core issues are indicative of this gloomy picture.

There are new dangers on the global security horizon in areas such as the hostile use of Outer Space, offensive cyber capabilities, development and use of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS) and armed drones, as well as the development of advanced conventional hypersonic systems of global reach.

**Mr. Chairman,**

Efforts to regulate nuclear weapons through legal, normative and political means have not matched our expectations. Despite reductions in the number of nuclear weapons since the end of the cold war, the pace has been slow and the scale modest.

Advancement towards multilateral nuclear disarmament is being resisted by a handful of Nuclear Weapon States. These States are neither willing to give up their large inventories of nuclear weapons nor their modernization programmes yet they continue to advocate this for others. This doublespeak has only aggravated the sense of insecurity among other states.

Instead of fulfilling their legal disarmament obligations, these States have almost exclusively pursued non-proliferation with messianic zeal. This gap between legality and reality has eroded the global faith in the mutually reinforcing nature of these processes.

**Mr. Chairman,**

Close to 30 NPT States, which are members of nuclear-armed alliances, continue to rely robustly on nuclear weapons, some of them even housing tactical nuclear weapons on their territories.

As such these states indirectly and implicitly encourage the possession or even use of nuclear weapons as part of the strategic doctrines of their alliances. Even as these States enjoy a nuclear umbrella, they call on others to eschew the means to defend themselves in the face of real and often growing security threats.

Some of these States have also concluded discriminatory nuclear cooperation agreements and helped grant waivers in an unfortunate departure from long-held non-proliferation principles.

Double standards are also evident in the area of conventional arms. While professing strict adherence to responsible arms transfers, some of these States continue to supply increasing number of conventional weapons in our region, thereby aggravating instability in South Asia. These policies and actions are obviously driven by self-serving strategic, political and commercial considerations.

It remains a grim irony that weapons, which propel and sustain conflicts, come from areas or regions that enjoy peace. Only four countries account for two thirds of global arms exports, while major importers are developing countries, mainly in the Middle East, Asia and Africa.

Not surprisingly, these dual standards have engendered a wide sense of dismay in the international community as well as in my country. Many therefore see advocacy by these States for a world free of nuclear weapons and for high standards in arms transfers as hollow rhetoric.

**Mr. Chairman,**

Progress towards nuclear disarmament is also being delayed and hindered by some who wish to divert the Conference on Disarmament's focus to partial non-proliferation measures such as a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty. A treaty that is discriminatory in nature and does not address the existing stockpiles of fissile material would impinge on the security of some states while being cost free for those with the largest amounts of fissile stocks.

Claims by some delegations that an FMCT would put a quantitative cap on nuclear weapons are false. The reasons are self-evident; because the vast stockpiles of fissile material, coupled with the continued unsafeguarded production for civilian and non-explosive military purposes, provide a ready reserve of fissile material that can be weaponized at will.

There is no provision in the treaty favoured by these states that would constrain a quantitative or qualitative increase in nuclear weapons. Pakistan therefore cannot support an unequal treaty that has direct implications for our national security.

**Mr. Chairman,**

Pakistan is a responsible nuclear State. Our nuclear policy is shaped by the evolving security dynamics in South Asia. Our nuclear capability is geared towards assuring our security and self-defence, based on credible minimum deterrence.

As my Prime Minister told the General Assembly last year and I quote "Pakistan neither wants to, nor is it engaged in, an arms race in South Asia. We cannot however remain oblivious to the evolving security dynamics and arms build-up in our region, which obliges us to take essential steps to maintain our security".

The Prime Minister further underscored, "South Asia needs strategic stability and this requires serious dialogue to achieve nuclear restraint, conventional balance and conflict resolution".

Pakistan has consistently supported the goals of nuclear disarmament and a nuclear weapon free world. These objectives need to be pursued through the conclusion of a universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable nuclear weapons convention in the CD.

**Mr. Chairman,**

Pakistan shares the concerns and anxieties associated with the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. We have therefore participated and

contributed to this discourse during all three Conferences on this subject. We also understand and share the sense of frustration among non-nuclear weapons states over the slow pace of nuclear disarmament obligations by nuclear weapons states.

At the same time, Pakistan believes that the subject of nuclear weapons, while relevant and important, cannot be exclusively reduced to a humanitarian paradigm. It is important to recognize the context and motivation of each State, which possess such weapons. In the case of Pakistan, our security was seriously challenged by the induction of nuclear weapons in our region. We were left with no option but to acquire a credible nuclear deterrent capability to respond to this and defend ourselves.

**Mr. Chairman,**

Several regions of the world have benefitted from the application of principles, guidelines and confidence building measures in the area of conventional arms.

Confidence building measures have proved their efficacy over the years at regional and sub-regional levels. CBMs are significant in that they can lead to the creation of favourable conditions for peaceful settlement of international disputes and facilitate the solution of any situation, which might lead to international friction.

Confidence-building measures have a special significance in the South Asian context. Without progress towards eliminating underlying disputes and causes of mistrust between states, the utility of confidence-building measures will diminish. Confidence-building measures can neither act as a substitute nor a precondition for steps towards the political settlement of disputes.

Pakistan supports the development of confidence-building measures in the area of conventional arms. This has remained one of the traditional items on UNDC's agenda. The Pakistan delegation has contributed constructively to deliberations on this in the last decade and will continue to do so.

**Mr. Chairman,**

The challenges presented to the global security architecture as well as the disarmament agenda and machinery require a cooperative approach aimed at rebuilding the consensus agreed by all States at SSOD-1.

For over a decade, Pakistan has elaborated elements to revive such an international consensus. Even as we recognize that such an undertaking would neither be quick nor easy, this Commission, as a deliberative body with universal membership, can play an important role to evolve such a consensus.

An important beginning to revive such a consensus has been made last week when the Open-Ended Working Group met to consider the objectives and agenda of Fourth Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD-IV).

Early convening of (SSOD-IV) holds the promise of overcoming the present impasse in the field of disarmament, revitalizing the role of the UN to promote global security, and respond to the aspirations of a world without nuclear weapons, other non-conventional and advanced conventional weapons.

**I thank you, Mr. Chairman.**