United Nations

Report of the Disarmament Commission

General Assembly
Official Records · Fiftieth Session
Supplement No.42 (A/50/42)
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United Nations · New York, 1995
NOTE

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its forty-ninth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 49/77 A of 15 December 1994, entitled "Report of the Disarmament Commission", which reads as follows:

"Having considered the annual report of the Disarmament Commission, 1/

"Recalling its resolutions 47/54 A of 9 December 1992, 47/54 G of 8 April 1993 and 48/77 A of 16 December 1993,

"Considering the role that the Disarmament Commission has been called upon to play and the contribution that it should make in examining and submitting recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament and in the promotion of the implementation of the relevant decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session,

"Noting the various suggestions for possible consideration by the Disarmament Commission, at an appropriate future date, including in particular the one for reconsideration of the subject 'The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields',

1. Takes note of the annual report of the Disarmament Commission;

2. Notes with regret that the Disarmament Commission was unable to achieve agreement on guidelines and recommendations under its agenda item entitled 'The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields', consideration of which was concluded in 1994;

3. Notes the continuing consideration by the Disarmament Commission of its agenda item entitled 'Process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons', which is to be concluded in 1995;

4. Notes also that the Disarmament Commission held a preliminary exchange of views on its agenda item entitled 'International arms transfers, with particular reference to General Assembly resolution 46/36 H of 6 December 1991';

5. Reaffirms the importance of further enhancing the dialogue and cooperation among the First Committee, the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament;

6. Reaffirms also the role of the Disarmament Commission as the specialized, deliberative body within the United Nations multilateral disarmament machinery that allows for in-depth deliberations on specific disarmament issues, leading to the submission of concrete recommendations on those issues;

7. Encourages the Disarmament Commission to continue to make every effort to enhance its working methods so as to enable it to give focused consideration to a limited number of priority issues in the field of disarmament, bearing in mind the decision it has taken to move its agenda towards a three-item phased approach;
8. Requests the Disarmament Commission to continue its work in accordance with its mandate, as set forth in paragraph 118 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 2/ and with paragraph 3 of resolution 37/78 H of 9 December 1982, and to that end to make every effort to achieve specific recommendations on the items of its agenda, taking into account the adopted 'Ways and means to enhance the functioning of the Disarmament Commission’ (A/CN.10/137);

9. Recommends that the Disarmament Commission, at its 1994 organizational session, adopt the following items for consideration at its 1995 substantive session:

(a) Process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons;

(b) International arms transfers, with particular reference to General Assembly resolution 46/36 H of 6 December 1991;

10. Also recommends that, pursuant to the adopted three-item phased approach, the Disarmament Commission, at its 1994 organizational session, consider including in the agenda of its 1995 substantive session a new third item, and in this context notes, inter alia, the following proposals: 'General guidelines for non-proliferation, with special emphasis on weapons of mass destruction' and 'Review of the Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade’;

11. Requests the Disarmament Commission to meet for a period not exceeding four weeks during 1995 and to submit a substantive report to the General Assembly at its fiftieth session;

12. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Disarmament Commission the annual report of the Conference on Disarmament, 3/ together with all the official records of the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly relating to disarmament matters, and to render all assistance that the Commission may require for implementing the present resolution;

13. Also requests the Secretary-General to ensure full provision to the Commission and its subsidiary bodies of interpretation and translation facilities in the official languages and to assign, as a matter of priority, all the necessary resources and services, including verbatim records, to that end;

14. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fiftieth session the item entitled 'Report of the Disarmament Commission’.

2. The Disarmament Commission met at United Nations Headquarters and held two meetings on 1 December 1994 and 13 April 1995 (A/CN.10/PV.191 and 192), for its organizational session. During that session, the Commission considered questions related to the organization of work for its 1995 substantive session in accordance with the adopted "Ways and means to enhance the functioning of the Disarmament Commission” (A/CN.10/137) and in the light of General Assembly resolution 49/77 A. The Commission took up the question of the election of its officers, taking into account the principle of rotation of the chairmanship among the geographic regions, and elected its Chairman and eight Vice-Chairmen as well as its Rapporteur (see para. 5 below). The Commission considered and agreed on the provisional agenda for the 1995 substantive session (see para. 6).
The Commission decided to establish a committee of the whole and three working groups to deal with the three substantive items on the agenda and appointed the chairmen of the working groups. The Commission further decided that its next substantive session would be held from 15 to 30 May 1995.

3. At its organizational session, the Commission also decided that the items entitled "Process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons" and "Review of the Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade" would be concluded at its 1995 substantive session.
II. ORGANIZATION AND WORK OF THE 1995 SUBSTANTIVE SESSION

4. The Disarmament Commission met at United Nations Headquarters from 15 to 30 May 1995. In the course of its session, the Commission held four plenary meetings (A/CN.10/PV.193-196) under the chairmanship of Ambassador Luvsangiin Erdenechuluun (Mongolia). Mr. Lin Kuo-Chung, Senior Political Affairs Officer of the Centre for Disarmament Affairs, Department of Political Affairs, served as Secretary of the Disarmament Commission.

5. During the 1995 session, the Bureau of the Commission was constituted as follows:

   Chairman: Mr. Luvsangiin Erdenechuluun (Mongolia)

   Vice-Chairmen: Representatives of the following States: Belarus, Colombia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Netherlands, Poland, South Africa, Sweden and Uruguay

   Rapporteur: Mr. Alaa Issa (Egypt)

6. At its 193rd plenary meeting, on 15 May 1995, the Commission adopted its agenda, contained in document A/CN.10/L.36, as follows:

   1. Opening of the session.

   2. Adoption of the agenda.

   3. Organization of work.

   4. Process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons.


   6. Review of the Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade.


   8. Other business.

7. At the same meeting, the Commission approved its general programme of work for the session (A/CN.10/1995/CRP.1) and decided to allocate two meetings to a general exchange of views.

8. On 15 May, the Disarmament Commission held a general exchange of views on all agenda items (see A/CN.10/PV.193 and 194).

9. In accordance with the decision taken at its organizational session, the Disarmament Commission entrusted Working Group I with the mandate of dealing with agenda item 4, entitled "Process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons". Working Group I met under the chairmanship of
Ambassador Luis Valencia Rodríguez (Ecuador) and held 10 meetings between 16 and 26 May.

10. The Commission entrusted Working Group II with the mandate of dealing with agenda item 5, entitled "International arms transfers, with particular reference to General Assembly resolution 46/36 H of 6 December 1991". Working Group II met under the chairmanship of Ambassador Wolfgang Hoffmann (Germany) and held 10 meetings between 16 and 26 May.

11. The Commission entrusted Working Group III with the mandate of dealing with agenda item 6, entitled "Review of the Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade". Working Group III met under the chairmanship of Ambassador Ibrahim A. Gambari (Nigeria) and held 9 meetings between 16 and 26 May.

12. At its 196th plenary meeting, on 30 May, the Disarmament Commission considered the reports of Working Groups I, II and III on agenda items 4, 5 and 6, respectively. The reports of the subsidiary bodies of the Commission and the conclusions and recommendations contained therein are included in section IV of the present report.

13. In accordance with past practice of the Disarmament Commission, some non-governmental organizations attended the plenary meetings.
III. DOCUMENTATION

A. Documents submitted by the Secretary-General

14. Pursuant to paragraph 12 of General Assembly resolution 49/77 A, the Secretary-General, by a note dated 15 March 1995, transmitted to the Disarmament Commission the annual report of the Conference on Disarmament together with all the official records of the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly relating to disarmament (A/CN.10/186).

B. Other documents, including documents submitted by Member States

15. In the course of the Commission’s work, the documents listed below, dealing with substantive questions, were submitted.

16. A note verbale dated 16 May 1995 was submitted by the Permanent Mission of Argentina to the United Nations addressed to the Centre for Disarmament Affairs of the Secretariat, containing a working paper outlining the sensitive and military equipment control regime of the Argentine Republic (A/CN.10/187).

17. A working paper entitled "International arms transfers, with particular reference to resolution 46/36 H of 6 December 1991" was submitted by Argentina (A/CN.10/188).

18. A working paper entitled "Proposed elements for the report of review of the Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade" was submitted by China (A/CN.10/189).


20. A working paper entitled "Review of the Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade" was submitted by India (A/CN.10/191).

21. A number of other working papers dealing with substantive questions were also submitted by Member States to the working groups and are referred to in the reports.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

22. At its 196th plenary meeting, on 30 May, the Disarmament Commission adopted by consensus the reports of its subsidiary bodies and the conclusions and recommendations contained therein regarding agenda items 4, 5 and 6. The Commission agreed to submit the texts of those reports, reproduced below, to the General Assembly.

23. At the same meeting, the Commission adopted, as a whole, its report to the General Assembly at its fiftieth session.

24. The report of Working Group I on agenda item 4 reads as follows:

"Report of Working Group I on agenda item 4"

"1. The Disarmament Commission, at its 192nd meeting, on 13 April 1995, decided to establish Working Group I to deal with agenda item 4, entitled 'Process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons'."

"2. In connection with its work, the following documents were before Working Group I for consideration:

(a) Working paper submitted by Argentina (A/CN.10/148);
(b) Working paper submitted by Australia (A/CN.10/157);
(c) Working paper submitted by Pakistan (A/CN.10/158);
(d) Working paper submitted by China (A/CN.10/166);
(e) Letter dated 16 April 1992 from the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary of the Disarmament Commission (A/CN.10/167);
(f) Working paper submitted by Portugal on behalf of the European Community and its member States (A/CN.10/172);
(g) Working paper submitted by Ireland (A/CN.10/173);
(h) Working paper submitted by Australia (A/CN.10/178);
(i) Working paper submitted by South Africa (A/CN.10/179);
(j) Working paper submitted by the Russian Federation (A/CN.10/180);
(k) Working paper submitted by the Chairman (A/CN.10/185);
(l) Working paper submitted by Cuba (A/CN.10/1992/WG.II/WP.1);
(m) Working paper submitted by India (A/CN.10/1992/WG.II/WP.2);
(n) Working paper submitted by Egypt (A/CN.10/1992/WG.II/WP.3);
3. The Working Group met under the chairmanship of Ambassador Luis Valencia Rodríguez of Ecuador and held 10 meetings between 15 and 26 May 1995. Mr. Timur Alasaniya of the Centre for Disarmament Affairs, Department of Political Affairs, served as Secretary of the Working Group.

4. At the 1st meeting, on 16 May, the Chairman made an introductory statement and submitted the working paper contained in document A/CN.10/1994/WG.I/CRP.6.

5. At the same meeting, the Working Group decided to take up the Chairman’s paper (A/CN.10/1994/WG.I/CRP.6) as a basis for discussion.

6. Also at the same meeting, the delegations of Germany, Canada, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark (also on behalf of Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden), the United States of America, Brazil, Mexico, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, Argentina, Austria, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Korea, expressed regret on the nuclear test explosion by China on Monday, 15 May 1995. The Chinese delegation reiterated China’s consistent position on the matter.

7. In the course of the deliberation, the Chairman conducted informal consultations on the various elements contained in his working paper. The representatives of Canada, France and Germany acted as the Friends of the Chair and assisted him in those consultations.
8. The discussions on the Chairman’s paper were substantive. Despite its efforts, the Working Group was unable to achieve a consensus document on the subject.

9. At its 10th meeting, on 26 May 1995, the Working Group, in accordance with the earlier decision of the Disarmament Commission, concluded the deliberation on the item entitled ‘Process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons’.

10. At the same meeting, the Working Group adopted by consensus the present report to the Disarmament Commission.

25. The report of Working Group II on agenda item 5 reads as follows:

"Report of Working Group II on agenda item 5

1. The Disarmament Commission, at its 192nd meeting, on 13 April 1995, decided to establish Working Group II to deal with agenda item 5, entitled ‘International arms transfers, with particular reference to General Assembly resolution 46/36 H of 6 December 1991’.

2. In connection with its work, the following documents were presented to Working Group II:

   (a) Working paper on international arms transfers, with particular reference to resolution 46/36 H, submitted by Colombia (A/CN.10/184);

   (b) Working paper outlining the sensitive and military equipment control regime of the Argentine Republic, submitted by Argentina (A/CN.10/187);

   (c) Working paper on international arms transfers, with particular reference to resolution 46/36 H, submitted by Argentina (A/CN.10/188);

   (d) Conference room paper on guidelines for international arms transfers (a compilation of possible elements) (A/CN.10/1994/WG.III/CRP.1);

   (e) Chairman’s working paper on guidelines for international arms transfers in the context of resolution 46/36 H (A/CN.10/1994/WG.III/CRP.2);

   (f) Chairman’s working paper on guidelines for international arms transfers in the context of resolution 46/36 H (A/CN.10/1994/WG.III/CRP.3);

   (g) Chairman’s working paper annexed to the report of the Disarmament Commission to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session (A/49/42), on guidelines for international arms transfers in the context of resolution 46/36 H (A/CN.10/1995/WG.II/CRP.1);

   (h) Chairman’s working paper on guidelines for international arms transfers in the context of resolution 46/36 H (A/CN.10/1995/WG.II/CRP.1/Rev.1 and 2);

   (i) Non-paper on responsibility and restraint in conventional arms transfers, submitted by Ireland (A/CN.10/1995/WG.II/CRP.2);
(j) Informal working paper No. 1, submitted by Ireland;

(k) Informal working paper No. 2, submitted by Canada;

(l) Informal working paper No. 3, submitted by China;

(m) Informal working paper No. 4, submitted by Greece (on behalf of member States of the European Union);

(n) Informal working paper No. 5, submitted by India;

(o) Chairman’s non-paper on guidelines for international arms transfers.

3. The Working Group met under the chairmanship of Ambassador Wolfgang Hoffmann (Germany), and held 10 meetings between 16 and 26 May 1995. Mr. Lin Kuo-Chung of the Centre for Disarmament Affairs, Department of Political Affairs, served as Secretary of the Working Group and Ms. Carolyn Cooper of the same Centre acted as Deputy Secretary.

4. Working Group II held a preliminary exchange of views with respect to the scope of the guidelines to be elaborated. It was agreed that the guidelines would pertain to international arms transfers in general, but that the focus would be on the illicit arms trade. The Chairman proposed a structure for the guidelines, contained in his non-paper referred to in paragraph 2 (o) above.

5. The Working Group decided to use document A/CN.10/1995/WG.II/CRP.1 as a basis for work and completed a first reading of the guidelines, in the process of which many delegations put forward their views and proposals. Subsequently, the Chairman issued a revision, as contained in document A/CN.10/1995/WG.II/CRP.1/Rev.1, which the Group further revised and which was then issued as document A/CN.10/1995/WG.II/CRP.1/Rev.2.

6. At its 10th meeting, on 26 May, the Working Group decided to annex to its present report the Chairman’s working paper, document A/CN.10/1995/WG.II/CRP.1/Rev.2, as a basis for work on the item at the 1996 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission, without prejudice to the position of any delegation (annex).

7. At the same meeting, the Working Group adopted by consensus its report on agenda item 5.

26. The report of Working Group III on agenda item 6 reads as follows:

"Report of Working Group III on agenda item 6"

"1. At its forty-ninth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 49/75 B of 15 December 1994, in which, inter alia, it decided to undertake, at its fiftieth session, the middle of the Third Disarmament Decade, a review and appraisal of the implementation of the Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade and requested the Disarmament Commission, at its 1995 session, to make a preliminary assessment of the implementation of the Declaration as well as suggestions that might be put forward to ensure appropriate progress and to submit a report to the Assembly at its fiftieth session."
2. At its 192nd meeting, on 13 April 1995, the Disarmament Commission decided to establish Working Group III to deal with agenda item 6, entitled 'Review of the Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade', pursuant to General Assembly resolution 49/75 B.

3. At the beginning of its work, the Working Group had before it the following documents:

   (a) Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade, annexed to General Assembly resolution 45/62 A of 4 December 1990 (A/CN.10/1995/WG.III/CRP.1);

   (b) Working non-paper entitled 'Review of the Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade', proposed by the Chairman in consultation with the Friends of the Chair (A/CN.10/1995/WG.III/CRP.2);

   (c) Working paper entitled 'Review of the Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade', submitted by India (A/CN.10/1995/WG.III/CRP.3);


4. The Working Group met under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Ibrahim A. Gambari (Nigeria) and held nine meetings between 18 and 26 May 1995. Mr. Mohammed K. Sattar of the Centre for Disarmament Affairs served as Secretary of the Working Group and Ms. Lucy Webster of the same Centre acted as Deputy Secretary. The Chairman of the Working Group also conducted informal consultations during the session.

5. At the 1st meeting, on 18 May, the Chairman of the Working Group made a substantive introductory statement. The Working Group decided to devote two meetings to a general exchange of views on the subject, in which a large number of delegations participated.

6. At its 2nd meeting, on 19 May, the Working Group decided that the Chairman's working non-paper (A/CN.10/1995/WG.III/CRP.2), which had been prepared in consultation with the Friends of the Chair, should serve as a basic document for consideration of the subject.

7. The Working Group began its consideration of the above-mentioned working non-paper, and a number of delegations made substantive suggestions on the text. Based on these suggestions, the Chairman of the Working Group circulated, at the 3rd meeting, on 22 May, a revised text of his working non-paper (A/CN.10/1995/WG.III/CRP.2/Rev.1), which took into account the views and comments expressed by delegations during the consideration of the Chairman's original non-paper.

8. At the 4th meeting, on 23 May, further to the consideration of the revised non-paper, the Chairman requested delegations wishing to present written proposals for amendments to do so. Based on those proposals and proposals made at the meetings, a second revision (A/CN.10/1995/WG.III/CRP.2/Rev.2) was prepared and considered by the Working Group.
"9. During its 5th to 7th meetings, on 24 and 25 May, the Working Group engaged in substantive deliberations on the various draft non-papers which were prepared by the Chairman at the request of the members of the Working Group, including A/CN.10/1995/WG.III/CRP.2/Rev.3-Rev.5 and a new, brief Chairman’s non-paper, entitled ‘Review of the Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade’ (A/CN.10/1995/WG.III/CRP.5). At the end of the deliberations, in spite of extensive efforts made to agree on consensus language, owing to the divergence of views expressed, it was agreed that it was not possible to reach consensus on the text. At its 8th meeting, on 26 May, the Working Group decided to consider its report to the Disarmament Commission at its next meeting.

"10. At its 9th meeting, on 26 May, the Working Group, in accordance with the earlier decision of the Disarmament Commission, concluded the deliberations on the item entitled ‘Review of the Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade’.

"11. At the same meeting, the Working Group adopted, by consensus, its report to the Disarmament Commission on agenda item 6, entitled: ‘Review of the Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade’.

Notes


2/ Resolution S-10/2.

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Arms transfers are a deeply entrenched phenomenon of contemporary international relations. This situation flows from [a variety of factors, including, inter alia,] the sovereign right of States to acquire arms for their defence, including arms from outside sources. Arms transfers [therefore cannot be considered as] [are not] necessarily destabilizing. [However, the international transfer of conventional arms as well as the increasing illicit and covert arms trafficking have, in recent decades, acquired a dimension and qualitative characteristics that give rise to serious and urgent concerns.] [In recent decades international transfers of conventional arms as well as increasing illicit and covert arms trafficking have acquired a dimension and qualitative characteristics that give rise to serious and urgent concerns.]

2. Arms transfers should be addressed in conjunction with the question of maintaining international peace and security, reducing international tension, [preventing and] [resolving regional [armed] conflicts,] enhancing confidence, and promoting disarmament as well as social and economic development. Restraint and greater openness [including various transparency measures] [and control] can help in this respect and contribute to the promotion of international peace and security. [However, illicit arms traffic, by its clandestine nature, defies transparency.]

3. The problem of the illicit traffic in arms has a social and humanitarian component in addition to the technical, economic and political dimensions. [The suffering of entire populations which are condemned by [political and] [commercial interests] to bear the devastating consequences of [wars] [and destabilizing violence and conflicts] cannot be ignored.] [The victims are generally the civilian population from all classes and conditions.] The humanitarian component of this trafficking should be taken into account. The consequences of the illicit arms trade can often be disproportionately large, particularly for the internal security and socio-economic development of affected States. [This is not an isolated phenomenon particular to a region of the world.] [On the contrary,] the illicit traffic in arms increasingly takes on more universal connotations, more diverse and dangerous to the welfare of the international community.

4. The problem of illicit traffic in arms is common to many countries. Wherever there is violence, terrorism, mercenary activities, subversion, drug trafficking, common and organized crime and other criminal actions, their link
to [illegal acquisition of arms] [clandestine and illicit arms supply] [has been often demonstrated] [has been highlighted]. [It is evident that] the relation of illicit arms trafficking with, inter alia, [the above-mentioned phenomena] [all forms of recourse to violence] puts to a test the capacity of States to [combat them] [confront and stop both of them] [find a solution to it].

5. Legal, political and technical differences in internal control of armaments and their transfer and, in some cases, inadequacy or absence of such controls, can contribute to the growing illicit traffic in arms. [Accordingly, the [harmonization] [acceptance of more rigorous norms] [enactment] of legislation and administrative procedures so as to permit the application, in all countries, of [uniform] [commonly high] standards of internal arms control and the regulating of exports and imports is essential to the prevention of the illicit arms trade.] [Accordingly, common national standards and procedures regulating exports and imports are essential to the prevention of the illicit arms trade.]

6. International cooperation in curbing the practice of illicit arms transfer and in unequivocally condemning it will assist in focusing the opinion of the international community on the pernicious ramifications of this phenomenon and will be an important factor in eliminating it.

II. UNITED NATIONS BACKGROUND

7. [The United Nations, in keeping with its overall purposes and principles, has a [special] responsibility [and important role to play] in the field of international arms transfers. Articles 11 and 26 of the Charter refer specifically to the role of the United Nations in the regulation of armaments.] [The United Nations, in keeping with its overall purposes and principles, has a legitimate interest in the field of arms transfers, recognized by Articles 11 and 26 of the Charter, which refer specifically to the importance of the regulation of armaments for the maintenance of international peace and security.] By its resolution 43/75 I of 7 December 1988, the General Assembly expressed its conviction that arms transfers in all their aspects deserve serious consideration by the international community, inter alia, because of: (a) their potential effects in areas where tension and regional conflict threaten international peace and security and national security; (b) their known and potential negative effects on the process of the peaceful social and economic development of all peoples; and (c) increasing illicit and covert arms trafficking.

8. Subsequently, pursuant to that resolution, the Secretary-General submitted a study, prepared with the assistance of governmental experts, on ways and means of promoting transparency in international transfers of conventional arms on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, taking into consideration the views of Member States and other relevant information, including information on the problem of the illicit arms trade (A/46/301, annex). A number of the recommendations made in the study were taken up subsequently in General Assembly resolutions 46/36 H and 46/36 L, of 6 December 1991.

9. By its resolution 46/36 L, entitled "Transparency in armaments", the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to establish and maintain a universal and non-discriminatory Register of Conventional Arms, to include data on international arms transfers as well as information provided by Member States on military holdings, procurement through national production and relevant policies.]
[10. As stated in paragraphs 142 and 144 of the study, "For obvious reasons the promotion of transparency in illicit arms transfers is a contradiction in terms." However, "those measures of national and international control over armaments which are a requirement for transparency in licit arms transfers are also of central importance to the objective of eradicating the illicit arms trade".]

[Conceptually, the illicit arms trade is a distinct phenomenon and merits separate study, especially as its inherently clandestine nature does not lend itself to the promotion of transparency.]

11. The adoption by consensus of resolution 46/36 H reflects the concern of the international community over the increasing illicit trafficking in arms. [Either because of constitutional reasons or other limitations of a legal nature, or because of scarce resources available to combat the magnitude and operations of this trafficking, or because of the activities of arms merchants, or because of involvement of other States, Governments are unable to deal effectively with these problems on their own.] [This kind of trafficking represents one of the major problems for the authorities of many countries which attempt to free their territories from the criminal use of arms and the consequences it has upon peace and stability.]

12. By its resolution 46/36 H, entitled "International arms transfers", the General Assembly, inter alia, called upon all States to give high priority to eradicating the illicit trade in all kinds of weapons and military equipment, a most disturbing and dangerous phenomenon often associated with terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime and mercenary and other destabilizing activities, and to take urgent action towards that end, as recommended in the study submitted by the Secretary-General.

13. By its resolution 48/75 F of 16 December 1993, the General Assembly recognized that the illicit arms traffic is a disturbing, dangerous and increasingly common phenomenon, and that, with the technical sophistication and destructive capability of conventional weapons, the destabilizing effects of the illicit arms traffic increase. The Assembly also called upon all Member States to give priority to eradicating the illicit arms traffic associated with destabilizing activities such as terrorism, drug trafficking and common criminal acts, and to take immediate action towards that end.

14. In this context, the Disarmament Commission included in the agenda of its 1994 substantive session the item entitled "International arms transfers, with particular reference to resolution 46/36 H of 6 December 1991".

III. SCOPE

15. According to paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 43/75 I, transfers of conventional weapons - whether licit or illicit - should be considered by the international community. In view of the priority given to the illicit aspect of this issue, the Assembly, in paragraph 4 of its resolution 48/75 F, entitled "International arms transfers", noted that the Disarmament Commission had included the question of international arms transfers, with particular reference to resolution 46/36 H, in the agenda of its substantive session in 1994.

16. In its resolution 46/36 H, the General Assembly called upon all States to give high priority to eradicating the illicit trade in all kinds of weapons and military equipment; urged Member States to exercise effective control over their
weapons and military equipment and their arms imports and exports to prevent them from getting into the hands of parties engaged in the illicit arms trade; and also urged Member States to ensure that they have in place an adequate body of laws and administrative machinery for regulating and monitoring effectively their transfer of arms, to strengthen or adopt strict measures for their enforcement, and to cooperate at the international, regional and subregional levels to harmonize, where appropriate, relevant laws, regulations and administrative procedures as well as their enforcement measures, with the goal of eradicating the illicit arms trade.

[17. In contrast to licit or Government-to-Government arms transfers, which could be addressed through an international code of conduct for conventional arms transfers, the objective in the case of illicit arms trafficking must be eradication through tighter controls.]

While licit or Government-to-Government transfers are being addressed, inter alia through increasing transparency measures, the objective in the case of illicit arms transfers should be their eradication] [through close cooperation by the international community including, inter alia, tighter controls, exchange of information and unequivocal condemnation.]

[18. There are [three] stages in the illicit arms trade that should be the focus of controls: [inter alia] the acquisition of arms by unauthorized persons, their export, and their delivery.]

19. An essential factor in the strategy for the prevention and eradication of the illicit arms trade [in its entirety] is the effective control of such arms. [Specific] measures designed to achieve that end must therefore be devised and implemented. From that standpoint, [two] priority lines of action must be promoted:

(a) [National measures ensure effective control of the transfer, possession and carrying of [arms];] [Control of the arms trade, in all its aspects in order to prevent illicit manufacture, acquisition and transfer;]
[Measures to ensure effective control of [arms] in the national territory, their manufacture, acquisition and transfer;]

(b) Measures of cooperation and coordination at the bilateral and multilateral levels which would help to reduce the opportunities for illegal arms transfers;

[(c) Unequivocal international condemnation of the phenomenon of illicit arms traffic by whomsoever practised;]

[(d) Measures to prevent [arms] transfers to non-governmental bodies other than transfers effected in accordance with bilateral agreements between Governments of importing and exporting countries.]

20. Since national legislation varies from country to country and, in practice, the borderline between licit and illicit arms transfers may not always be apparent, measures conducive to [harmonizing] [achieving common] laws and/or regulations and procedures, [as well as the means of enforcing them,] should be developed at the international level to ensure effective control over the acquisition and transfer of weapons.

[21. Measures should be developed to prevent illicit arms transfers to non-governmental bodies, [to any area of another country] rather than the issue
of Government-to-Government transfers which must have the specific agreement of both supplier and recipient Governments.

[Measures should be developed to ensure that international arms transfers are effected only with the consent or authorization of the Governments of the importing and exporting countries. Measures should also be developed to prevent illicit arms transfers to unauthorized persons and groups such as terrorists, drug traffickers, criminals and mercenaries.]

IV. DEFINITION

22. In view of the complexities of the subject, the report of the Secretary-General on this subject did not produce an all-encompassing definition of international arms transfers, which would, in practice, include transfers of military hardware, technical knowledge and services and foreign technical support.

23. The illicit arms trade is understood to cover that international trade in conventional arms which is contrary to the laws of States and/or international law. Under international law, arms trade can be circumscribed, inter alia, by the prohibition of interference in the internal affairs of a State, by international treaties, or by binding decisions adopted by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

[24. The term "illicit arms trade" can be defined as that which evades the control of or violates the decision of the authorities of either the supplier or recipient State or of competent regional and international organizations.]

V. PRINCIPLES

25. In their efforts to control their international arms transfers and prevent, combat and eradicate illicit arms trafficking, States should bear in mind the following principles:

(a) Every State has the inherent right of self-defence as provided for by the Charter. The possession and use of arms must be solely in the exercise of this right, in fulfilment of the obligation enshrined in the Charter [and in [strict] observance of [the five principles of peaceful coexistence and other] universally recognized [international] norms]. [However, Article 51 of the Charter shall not be interpreted as legitimizing illicit arms traffic.] In this connection, it must also be borne in mind that, in subscribing to the Charter, States commit themselves to refrain from the threat or use of force in international relations and to settle their disputes by peaceful means;

[(aa) The struggle of peoples under colonial or alien domination and foreign occupation for self-determination does not constitute terrorism. Furthermore, the struggle of peoples for liberation from colonial and foreign domination and foreign occupation by all available means, particularly armed struggle, is legitimate as reaffirmed in General Assembly resolution 33/24 of 29 November 1978;]

[(aaa) All States must recognize the need for transparency in arms transfers and for participation in the Register of Conventional Arms;]
(b) There is a responsibility for all States[, whether producer or importer,] to seek to ensure that they limit themselves to the strict minimum level of armaments necessary for their legitimate self-defence requirements, including their ability to participate in United Nations peace-keeping operations;

(b c) Each State has special responsibilities to prevent excessive or destabilizing build-ups of conventional arms, taking into account international and regional stability and security, their legitimate security needs and the principle of undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments, including their ability to participate in United Nations peace-keeping operations. In this context, Governments should exercise restraint in their arms [production and] procurement as well as their transfers;

(c) Both supplier and recipient States have [special] responsibilities to avoid excessive or destabilizing arms build-ups in the context of international stability and security. In this context, Governments should exercise responsibility and restraint in their arms [production and procurement] as well as their transfers;

(d) States should exercise effective control over their armaments, their production, possession, exports and imports. Strict monitoring and control should be exercised over [military equipment] [lethal weapons and other equipment] used by military and police forces as well as over licensed arms for civilian use, in order to prevent them from being sold or transferred illegally. State control over armaments must also include the process of destruction of armaments and military equipment [declared obsolete] [or subject to arms reduction and disarmament agreements] in order to prevent their criminal use or illegal export to other countries;

(e) (chapeau for combined (e) and (g)) For the purpose of combating illicit arms trade, the following additional measures should be taken in accordance with established national legal practice:

(e) The arms permitted for civilian use, whether imported or of domestic manufacture, should be subject to controls at all points in the chain, from production and/or acquisition up to the time they are sold to an individual. From then on they should remain subject to monitoring and control by an administrative entity which in carrying out its functions would prevent arms from being used in criminal activities or from being exported illegally to other nations;

(ee) Arms permitted for civilian use, whether imported or of domestic manufacture, should be subject to adequate legislative and administrative controls which could contribute to the curbing of their use in criminal activities and to the prevention of their illegal export to other nations;

(eee) All States must recognize the responsibility to prohibit and curb illicit trade in arms;

(eeee) States in the territory through which arms are transiting should exercise special responsibility in monitoring arms transfers and in detecting and curbing illicit arms transfers;

(ff) International arms transfers should not be driven [solely] by economic or commercial considerations. [Arms transfers should be compatible with the economic and technical capacity of the recipient State, taking into account the
need for States to provide for their legitimate security and defence needs with the least diversion for armaments of human and economic resources.} Arms should be exported or imported only after careful evaluation of the [political situation] both within and outside the area in question. The transfer of arms and military equipment should not give rise to [political, ethnic or] social disturbances [or violation of human rights or fundamental freedoms] in any State, nor should they cause, lead to the escalation of or prolong conflicts within or between States;]

(g) [In continuation of the principle outlined in (f) and] recognizing the negative effects of illicit arms transfers on the security and stability of many States, steps should be taken towards effective control measures aimed at preventing illicit arms transfers. International cooperation, at the global, regional and subregional levels, [in order to identify, apprehend and bring to justice all those involved in illicit arms trafficking.] [is essential in this respect.] [The transfer of arms and military equipment should not give rise to [political, ethnic or] social disturbances [or violation of human rights or fundamental freedoms] in any State, nor should they cause, lead to the escalation of or prolong conflicts within or between States;]

(h) All States must recognize the need to preserve regional peace and security, and to avoid introducing or exacerbating destabilizing factors in any nation. Arms-producing or supplier States have a responsibility to seek to ensure that the quantity and [quality] [level of sophistication] of their [arms exports] [military equipment exported] do not contribute to instability and conflict in other countries or regions or to the illicit trade in arms. [In this respect, States with the most advanced [defence industries] [arms production] and largest exports of arms have special responsibilities;]

[(hh) States receiving arms have an equivalent [special] responsibility to seek to ensure that the quantity and level of sophistication of their arms imports are commensurate with their legitimate self-defence requirements and that they do not contribute to instability and conflict in other countries or regions or to the illicit trade in arms. In this respect, States importing large amounts of arms have special responsibilities.]

(i) Account should be taken of transfers of military equipment, components and parts for the production and assembly of arms, as well as of technology, services and equipment modified for military use. [Such transfers should comply with the same principles as those governing international arms transfers.] [The supplying and receiving States should keep in view, wherever applicable, whether in the past such military equipment, components and parts for the production and assembly of arms, as well as of technology, services and equipment modified for military use, have been used only for legitimate self-defence needs. The supplying and receiving States should also keep in view whether such military equipment has not been diverted, in the past, to other uses or destinations different from those agreed between the receiving and the supplier States.] The supplying State should* also take steps to seek to ensure that the equipment will not be diverted to other uses or destinations, different to that agreed upon by the receiving State;

(j) States should exercise the necessary administrative controls to prevent the export of [arms] [military equipment] whose end use or end user does not have the explicit and verified authorization of the governmental authorities of the recipient country. [The exporting State should seek to obtain an import

* Some delegations expressed reservations regarding the term "should".
certificate from the receiving State covering the exported arms.) The receiving State should seek to ensure that imported arms are covered by a certified licence of the authorities in the supplying State. In both cases, the involvement of agents or intermediaries over whom the authorities cannot exercise absolute control should be avoided;

(k) International arms transfers should not be used as a means to interfere in the internal affairs of other States. [No State should transfer arms to any area, organization or individual of another sovereign State [or who is operating in that sovereign State] without the agreement of the exporting and receiving States as well as of those States through which the arms transit];

(l) The issue of international arms transfers and illicit arms trafficking should be dealt with in conjunction with the maintenance of international peace and security and efforts aimed at easing international tensions, promoting social and economic development, peacefully resolving regional conflicts, preventing arms races and achieving disarmament under effective international control.

VI. WAYS AND MEANS

A. National

26. States should ensure that they have an adequate body of national laws and/or regulations and administrative procedures to ensure effective control of armaments and of the exports and imports of arms [and [it is fundamentally a question of] maintaining] effective, comprehensive and continuous control over weapons [and explosives] to prevent their falling into the hands of unauthorized persons or parties engaged in illicit arms trade.

[27. States should take a close look at their national [arms] control legislation and procedures and, if necessary, strengthen them in order to ensure their effectiveness and practicability in preventing the illegal possession and carrying of [arms] in their territory that might be conducive to arms smuggling to other nations. [In States where no such legislation exists, those States are encouraged to put appropriate arms control legislation in place.]]

[States should scrutinize their national [arms] control legislation and procedures and, where necessary, strengthen them in order to increase their effectiveness in preventing the illegal production, trade in and possession and carrying of [arms] in their territory that can lead to arms smuggling to other nations.]

28. Whenever appropriate, efforts should be intensified to avoid corruption and bribery in connection with the transfer of arms. States should make all efforts to identify, apprehend and bring to justice all those involved in illicit arms trafficking.

29. States should maintain an effective system of export and import licences for international arms transfers and delivery and end-use/end-user certificates or equivalent mechanisms.

30. States should provide for adequate numbers of customs officials adequately trained to enforce the necessary controls over the export and import of [arms].

* Some delegations expressed reservations regarding the term "should".
31. The State should define which arms are permitted by law for civilian use and which may be used or possessed by the military and police forces.

32. In developing practical measures at the national level, States should take into account and apply, as appropriate, the recommendations that emanated from the International Symposium on Firearms and Explosives, held at Lyons, France, in September 1992 under the auspices of Interpol. (See appendix.)

33. The receiving State involved in an arms transfer [must] [should] [accept responsibility in cases of lapses leading to illicit arms traffic] [and avoid such arms being re-exported illicitly].

34. States [must exercise] [should seek to ensure that they have an adequate body of national laws and/or regulations and administrative procedures to ensure] effective control over the trade in and transport, security, [storage] and use of weapons and explosives [increasingly used by criminals and terrorists].

35. With [a view] [respect] to reducing surplus capacity in armaments, States should [rationalize] and convert to peaceful purposes the arms sector as an essential measure conducive to the elimination of [for diminishing] the economic need for arms exports [in order to avoid excessive or destabilizing exports].

[States with surplus capacity in armaments should reduce and convert to peaceful purposes the arms sector.]

B. International

36. The [harmonization] of legislation and administrative procedures so as to permit the application in all countries of uniform standards for internal arms control and regulating the export and import of arms is an essential measure for the prevention of the illicit arms trade.

[Taking note of General Assembly resolution 49/75 G of 15 December 1994, practical procedures should be devised to deal with the circulation and gathering of small arms acquired illegally.]

[In order to help combat the illicit arms trade, States should make efforts to develop and enhance the application of similar standards in their legislative and administrative procedures for internal arms control and regulating the export and import of arms.]

[[States should pursue and develop international cooperation in the enactment of legislative ...] [International cooperation relating to establishing a commonality ...] A commonality in legislative and administrative procedures to permit the application in all countries of similar standards for internal arms control and regulating the export and import of arms is important for the prevention of the illicit arms trade.]

37. Government-to-government agreements covering arms transfers can help to reduce the possibility of diversion of arms to unauthorized destinations. A requirement by the exporter for import licences or end-use/end-user certificates for international arms transfers is an important measure to prevent diversion.]
All arms transfers agreements and arrangements, in particular agreements and arrangements between Governments, should be designed so as to reduce the possibility of diversion of arms to unauthorized destinations and persons. In this context, a requirement by the exporter for import licences or end-use/end-user certificates for international arms transfers is an important measure to prevent diversion.

38. States should cooperate [at the bilateral and multilateral levels] [as appropriate] to [provide] [share] [relevant] customs information on trafficking in and detection of illicit arms[,] and coordinate intelligence efforts [as] [where] and when possible and necessary. In this context, States should endeavour to ensure effective control of borders with a view to preventing illicit arms trafficking.

[States should intensify international cooperation in the relevant field of criminal law. They should assist each other in the [field of] development and enforcement of effective national controls, with a view to curbing the evasion of justice by illicit arms traders.]

39. All States should comply strictly with sanctions and arms embargoes imposed by the Security Council under the authority of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

[40. States should report each transaction in their annual reports to the Register of Conventional Arms as an important confidence-building measure. States should also consider developing additional transparency measures at the regional, subregional and national levels as well as unilateral transparency measures. Those States which do not yet provide annual reports to the Register are strongly encouraged to do so.]

[41. States should cooperate to impose strict regulations on the activities of private international arms dealers, including arms bazaars, to prevent such dealers from engaging in illicit arms trafficking. International cooperation should also be aimed at identifying, apprehending and bringing to justice all those involved in illicit arms transfers.]

[42. States should oppose private sales of military goods except where sellers are authorized agents for a Government or are purchasing solely for resale to a Government.]

VII. INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

A. Role of the United Nations

43. The United Nations has a [special] [important role and] responsibility in the field of international arms transfers and the eradication of illicit arms trafficking in accordance with its overall purposes and principles. [No country can, by itself, eradicate the problem of the illicit arms trade or effectively control its own armaments without regard for the impact of the growing supply of arms on the black market and the internal and external factors that determine demand (see para. 11 above).] The cooperation of the international community and the United Nations is therefore necessary.

[44. The Secretary-General was given, under paragraph 8 of General Assembly resolution 46/36 H, the mandate for assisting in the holding of meetings and seminars at the national, regional and international levels, for promoting]
efforts to eradicate the illicit traffic in arms, and for providing advisory assistance to Member States, when so requested, on the recommended measures for enforcement of relevant rules and administrative procedures, including the training of customs and other officials, so that States could coordinate their efforts and thereby benefit on a continuing basis from the knowledge and experience of other States.]

[45. The Secretary-General was given, under paragraph 8 of General Assembly resolution 46/36 H, the responsibility for assisting, upon request, in the holding of meetings and seminars at the national, regional and international levels, as pertinent, with a view to, inter alia, increasing the awareness of the destructive and destabilizing effects of the illicit traffic in arms and to exploring ways and means for its eradication; promoting the development of internationally harmonized laws and administrative procedures relating to official arms procurement and arms transfer policies; and promoting regional and international efforts to eradicate the illicit traffic in arms and providing assistance to Member States, when so requested, on measures for enforcement of relevant rules and administrative procedures as recommended in the study, with a view to, inter alia, facilitating cooperation between Member States in the training of their customs and other appropriate officials.]

46. Transparency measures concerning arms transfers are not in themselves measures of limitation or restriction, but they can in several ways promote and facilitate the introduction of unilateral or multilateral measures of restraint as well as help in the detection of arms transferred illegally. The United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament and other appropriate international forums should continue to play an important part in the elaboration and adoption of transparency measures in the field of arms transfers [including the possible expansion of the Register].

B. Other institutional arrangements

47. All States should continue to use and further develop mechanisms for the exchange of information at the global, regional and subregional levels in order to assist institutions engaged in the control, tracking and seizure of arms in making full-scale efforts to eradicate the illicit arms trade.

[48. At the global level, a computerized system should be established to record those arms which have disappeared or been stolen so that if any attempt is made to register or sell them the system would immediately identify them and the persons involved could be tracked down and penalized and a more serious criminal act could perhaps be prevented.]
Recommendations emanating from the International Symposium on Firearms and Explosives, held at Lyons, France, in September 1992

Adoption of recommendations

The President submits the draft recommendations formulated by the working group on the basis of the recommendations made at the Paipa, Colombia, meeting for approval by the participants:

1. It is recommended that the member countries of the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) monitor more closely the manufacture and sale of authorized weapons, munitions and explosives so as to facilitate verification of their destination.

2. (a) It is recommended that each country in which firearms are manufactured establish a national firearms identification office to enable the police authorities to track such weapons from their date of manufacture to their purchase from a retail dealer. Measures should be taken to make arms manufacturers’ records available to national firearms identification offices whenever an arms factory ceases operations for any reason.

   (b) Pending the establishment in each country of national firearms identification offices, all Interpol National Central Bureaus (NCBs) are encouraged to contact the general secretariat for assistance in determining in which country particular firearms were manufactured. In this way communications concerning the identification of firearms may be addressed to the appropriate NCB, which will avoid any loss of time as a result of their being sent to the wrong address. The general secretariat’s General Crime Group now has information on firearms manufacturers recorded in the Interpol arms trafficking system (ITAR).

3. It is recommended that Interpol strongly encourage member countries to utilize ITAR and the Interpol bombing incidents system (IXXIS). These systems offer the general secretariat the best means of helping Interpol member countries to combat terrorism, organized crime and all other forms of international violent crime in which firearms and explosives are used.

4. It is recommended that Interpol organize more frequent regional meetings on firearms and explosives, such as that held at Paipa, as well as international conferences such as this one, so that everyone’s knowledge and experience may continue to serve all countries in their joint efforts to combat acts of violence involving the use of firearms and explosives.

5. It is recommended that Interpol strongly encourage all member countries to appoint an official with special responsibility for ensuring that all incidents involving weapons and explosives are reported to Interpol in good time in appropriate detail for dissemination to other member countries. The incidents should be reported on the weapons and explosives incident form.
6. It is recommended that the member countries of Interpol take the following measures with regard to incidents involving explosives:

   (a) Designate a service where information can be centralized, as well as an official to whom information can be transmitted and from whom it can be requested;

   (b) When a country is aware of the method used to conceal explosives being illicitly transported, it should so inform the general secretariat, giving sufficient detail to enable the information to be then transmitted to all member countries of Interpol by means of the Interpol modus operandi sheets;

   (c) When an improvised explosive device is seized, details of the device should be transmitted to the general secretariat, such as its appearance, method of concealment and firing mechanism, together with a sketch. If the device has already exploded, all information gathered during the investigation into the bombing should be transmitted.