The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in Thailand

Prepared by Thailand

1. The Convention on Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BTWC) or the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was opened for signature on April 10, 1972 and entered into force on March 26, 1975. Thailand signed the BWC on January 17, 1973 and submitted its ratification instrument to become 38th Party to the Convention on May 28, 1975.

2. The 3rd Review Conference in 1991 appointed an Open Ended Ad Hoc Working Group consisting of government experts to identify and determine potential verification measures for a protocol resulting in Ad Hoc Group (AHG) in 1995 to develop a verification measures protocol which should have been ready for adoption at the 5th Review Conference originally scheduled in November 2001 but postponed to November 2002. However, at the 25th session during July-August 2001, the AHG was not able to conclude the negotiations on the draft protocol.

3. Thailand has participated in some of the AHG sessions and the Review Committees either by a representative from its Permanent Mission to the United Nations and other international organizations in Geneva or by a representative from the BWC Working Group established by the Royal Thai Government under the National Science and Technology Development Agency (NSTDA), Ministry of Science and Technology in which the National Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (BIOTEC) serves as Thailand BWC Secretariat and the National Focal Point.

4. At present, Thailand by the BWC Working Group under the National Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (BIOTEC) is undertaking a task in compiling information within the country to be used for an annual declaration on a voluntary basis. The information being collected and inventorized includes facilities, personnel and activities related to microbiological research in government research agencies, universities and private organizations.

5. As far as the export/import/in transit processes of biological weapons goods are concerned, there are no case studies in Thailand yet. Information, however, has been obtained about goods of dual purpose being shipped in transit in the country. In case that these goods may get misused in biological weapon programs, defensive or offensive, Thailand is prepared to deal with them.
by existing import-export laws as well as new measures to be put in place. One example of the latter is the attempt of the Royal Thai Government to install the Container Security Initiative (CSI) in collaboration with the U.S. Government and its trading partners, which will become effective probably in 2004.