FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE NINTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday, 25 March 1960, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)
PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Bulgaria:
Mr. M. TARABANOV
Col. K. SAVOV
Mr. K. CHRISTOV

Canada:
Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. A.G. CAMPBELL
W/C R.J. MITCHELL

Czechoslovakia:
Mr. J. NOSEK
Lieut.-Gen. J. HEČKO
Mr. Z. TRHLIK

France:
Mr. J. MOCH
Mr. M. LEGENDRE
Col. L. CONVERT

Italy:
Mr. G. MARTINO
Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. L. DAINELLI

Poland:
Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
Mr. M. LACHS
Brig.-Gen. J. SLIWINSKI

Romania:
Mr. E. MEZINCESCU
Mr. C. BOGDAN
Col. C. POPA

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
Mr. V.A. ZORIN
Col.-Gen. A.A. GRYZLOV
Mr. A.A. ROSECHIN
PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Rt. Hon. D. CRMSEY-GORE
Miss B. SALT
Maj.-Gen. RIDDELL

United States of America:

Mr. F.M. BATON
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Rear-Admiral P.L. DUDLEY

Secretariat:

Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Dr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN
The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I declare the ninth meeting of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament open. The first speaker on my list is Mr. Tarabanov, the representative of Bulgaria, and I now call on him to speak.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): A discussion began here on foreign military bases. It aroused very lively interest among the delegations, because the problem is important to all and itself constitutes an essential chapter in the disarmament problem. Some delegations are interested simply because military bases are installed on their national territory -- others because their countries have established bases on foreign territory and provided the military equipment, the personnel and the weapons of mass destruction accumulated in them. Yet other delegations are particularly interested in the problem because it is against their countries that the bases have been installed on the territory of their neighbours, or a little further away. The bases are directed against their territory and peoples, who are the targets for the weapons of mass destruction which have been assembled there.

The Bulgarian delegation has major reasons for being particularly sensitive on this score. I hope those reasons are well known; and when I mention here that my country is not far from a certain number of those military bases on foreign territory, I do so in order to indicate that we know what we are talking about.

In his statement of 22 March the representative of Italy, Mr. Martino, made out that the question of foreign military bases had been exploited for propaganda purposes, to feed a propaganda campaign. He also tried to prove that it was not related to a disarmament measure but was a political question. We shall not indulge here in controversy about whether the question of military bases has been used for propaganda purposes, nor about whether, like disarmament, it constitutes a political question. We leave that to the judgment of those whom the controversy concerns and, of course, to that of public opinion.

Nevertheless, the question of foreign military bases is not for us of purely academic or technical significance. It is a question of primary importance and fundamental urgency, which affects us closely. The existence of those bases, and current preparations to establish new bases on the territory of certain countries, have a particularly important effect on relations between States, more
especially between neighbouring States. The Balkan journey of the Minister of War for Western Germany, the speeches he made there, and in particular the so-called friendly visits which he promised to arrange for certain military units from Western Germany to make in the countries through which he travelled, and the training areas which he secured for the German air force near our frontier, are not such as to cause us to make any mistake about the nature of those preparations or the meaning of foreign military bases.

Because of the existence of such bases, relations between the countries in which they are established and the neighbouring countries, against whom they are directed cannot be or become good-neighbourly relations. On the contrary, the existence of the bases is the cause of the bad relations between such countries, in spite of the efforts made to reach an understanding.

What is there to say, when people have made a point of explaining to you, as frequently happens, with a plenitude of details and maps to support them, that some base or other "covers" the territory of your country, that aircraft taking-off from some other base can wipe out its towns and villages, and that the missile-launching installations are set up in such a manner that their murderous devices are already pointing at you?

It is thus entirely natural that the Bulgarian delegation should have followed with close attention the discussion on bases; and we cannot conceal our surprise at the way in which that question was treated in the speech made by the representative of Italy, Mr. Martino, who from what he said was also expressing the opinion of certain other delegations.

In a reply he gave to the representative of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Martino stated that foreign bases were not mentioned specially in the disarmament plan submitted by the five Western countries because they would disappear at the same time as national bases; and he also said:

"General disarmament will then have been completed" (TNCD/PV.5, page 15).

But when will general disarmament have been completed according to the plan submitted by the five Western countries? In an absolutely undefined period and in particularly indeterminate circumstances, because, according to that plan, there will always exist military forces and armaments, and it appears that nuclear weapons will never disappear from the armaments of States and that consequently it will not be possible to bring about disarmament. The inference is that foreign military bases, too, will remain for an indeterminate period."
However, in one of his speeches Mr. Martino said:
"... we shall not be able to speak about dismantling and abolishing these bases until disarmament is complete; that is to say, until not only foreign bases but also national bases have to disappear. That is why the programme -- or plan -- put forward by the Soviet Union provides for the abolition of foreign bases precisely at the end of the second stage, that is to say precisely when not only these bases but also national bases have to disappear. Does not the representative of Czechoslovakia agree with his Soviet Union colleague in accepting this principle that foreign bases will have to disappear at the end of the second stage?" (TNCD/FV.6, page 18)

Are we to understand from this expression of the Italian representative's attitude that he agrees that military bases should be abolished at a certain stage of implementation of the disarmament programme corresponding to the end of the second stage of disarmament proposed by the Soviet Union? If that is his opinion, why not specify it in the agreement on disarmament which is to be drafted after discussions have led to acceptance of the principles relating to the various measures which would bring about general and complete disarmament?

I should now like to pass to another question which by its very nature is bound up with the question of bases. It has been asserted in some statements that distrust is what has caused the arms race. I should not like to get involved here in a discussion which, for the moment, might appear to be of purely theoretical interest -- an explanation of the relationship between distrust and the arms race and vice versa. However that may be, it is necessary to face the facts, and to note once again that at the present time it is precisely the arms race which is the essential factor, the dominant factor, in the distrust between States, and the main cause of the worsening of the international climate.

The arms race in all its forms, and more particularly in certain of its aspects, as for example the accumulation of new weapons and their dissemination throughout the world, and the establishment of military bases and missile-launching installations on foreign territory -- that, in our delegation's opinion, is what is literally and figuratively poisoning the atmosphere.

We are in complete agreement with the United Kingdom representative, who said when introducing the Western plan on 16 March: "... disarmament is necessary to create confidence among the nations." (TNCD/FV.2, page 5)
Mr. Ormsby-Gore went on to say:

"It is above all towards this need to create confidence that the plan which I shall have the honour to present today is directed." (ibid)

I note in passing that this sentence is such as to prompt certain reflexions concerning the goal of the Western plan. It gives a very clear definition of that goal, falling far short of general and complete disarmament. I am not saying this in order to revive the discussion about the objective of the five Western countries' plan. I would rather take the sentence literally, and briefly examine how far that plan is likely to create an atmosphere of confidence.

Even a cursory examination of certain proposals in the Western plan will show us that it is not calculated to create an atmosphere of confidence among States. What sort of confidence could be said to result from the application of measures such as those specified in paragraph B of the first stage, which provides for "Prior notification to the International Disarmament Organization of proposed launchings of space vehicles"? (TNCD/3, page 1) The same question could be asked about point C of the first stage of the Western plan, concerning information on existing force levels and on armaments pertaining to land, sea and air forces possessed by the various Powers; or point E, which refers to the "submission by the various States to the International Disarmament Organization of data relating to: the operation of their financial system as it affects military expenditures, the amount of their military expenditures, and the percentage of their gross national product earmarked for military expenditures" (ibid, page 2).

All this is called for without the first stage of the Western plan providing for the slightest measure of disarmament, unless we are asked to believe that it is a measure of disarmament to fix the level of the armed forces of two great Powers, the Soviet Union and the United States of America, at two and a half million men, which is the present state of affairs.

The second stage of the Western countries' disarmament plan can easily be seen to contain no, or hardly any, real disarmament measures; whereas the information and notifications required continue to increase.

In this second stage it is desired to represent as a measure of disarmament the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, or the transfer of fissionable material from past production to non-weapons uses. But
can one speak of measures of disarmament in relation to cessation of production or to transfer of fissionable materials, when existing stock of nuclear weapons are sufficient to cause irreparable damage?

An attempt was, however, made to represent the Western plan as one which, compared with the Soviet plan, gave preference to nuclear disarmament. A mere glance at the proposed measures will convince us that those measures, far from representing any nuclear disarmament whatever, are merely a pretext for obtaining information about nuclear armaments and fissionable materials, and that there is no nuclear disarmament in the Western plan, even at the end of the third stage.

If it had been desired to take in the two first stages of the Western disarmament plan, a real step towards restoration of confidence among States, what could and should have been done was to accept the Soviet proposal as stated a few days ago by the representative of the Soviet Union, for that proposal aims at the total prohibition of atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons, at eliminating them from national armaments, and at destroying all stocks of nuclear weapons existing at the start of the disarmament programme.

However, in his statement of 22 March Mr. Jules Moch indicated that "... because we know that stocks may always remain in being in spite of all moral prohibitions of possession or use" (TNCD/PV.6, page 6), effective nuclear disarmament would be impossible. But, as has already been stressed repeatedly, in the Soviet Union's general and complete disarmament plan nuclear disarmament is accompanied by disarmament affecting space vehicles and other means of delivering nuclear weapons. If all that were combined with a system of control over nuclear weapons and missiles, launching installations and other means of transport, what difficulty would there be in tackling the problem of nuclear and total disarmament? Is it not clear that in a world where effective control was organized, and in which public opinion was mobilized for constant vigilance to ensure that means of transport for nuclear weapons were not prepared in order to launch a nuclear war, no States could possibly launch an attack?

In the Western plan, although nuclear disarmament is supposed to begin in the second stage, there is not really any nuclear disarmament, because the goal to be reached has no time-limit and is conditioned by "... scientific knowledge,
to achieve final elimination of these weapons" (TNCD/3, page 5). Whereas in
the Western plan there is, as we have just noted, no mention of total prohibition
of nuclear weapons, in Mr. Jules Moch's statement there is a reference to the
possibility of prohibition of use and possession when large stocks shall have
been converted with a view to their use for peaceful purposes.

If that is the intention of the sponsors of the Western disarmament plan,
why is there no reference to such prohibition in the plan itself? If the Western
States intend to arrive at a total prohibition of nuclear weapons, why not mention
it specifically in the plan itself at a specified stage? Is the omission
unintentional, or is there a definite intention not to proceed to a complete
prohibition of nuclear weapons?

As the subject of control has come up, I should like to deal with certain
observations made on it here a few days ago by the United Kingdom representative.

Mr. Ormsby-Gore's point was that the establishment of an international
disarmament organization, envisaged for the beginning of the first stage of the
Western countries' disarmament programme, would require time.

We think it natural that the establishment of an international control
organ should take a certain time. The preparatory work for the creation of
such a body could be carried out before the beginning of the first stage of
disarmament measures. That preparatory work could be done between the signature
and ratification of the treaty on general and complete disarmament. The
procedure would be the same as that adopted when the United Nations bodies
were set up: the preparatory work for their establishment was done between the
signature of the Charter and its ratification. Furthermore, as we know, a
similar procedure is now being contemplated in connexion with certain articles
of the treaty on the cessation of nuclear tests.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): The necessity of having international peace-keeping
machinery in a world in which nations have disarmed themselves has been questioned
by a number of delegations here. These statements seem to show a misunderstanding
of the position of the five Western nations in regard to the nature and function
of the peace-keeping machinery. In these remarks I shall try to clear up some
of these misconceptions.
On 22 March the representative of Czechoslovakia stated:
"... at the end of the second stage of general and complete disarmament the chance of launching aggression would, in comparison with the first stage, be further considerably diminished. The carrying out of aggression would become really very difficult. The conduct of war by small, numerically limited police forces, armed only with light firearms, is hard to imagine. Such numerically limited forces will not possess adequate material means necessary for launching an attack and to carry on offensive operations.

"Likewise, it is not probable that an aggressive war could be conducted only with missiles and nuclear weapons without using conventional armed forces. The goal aimed at by an aggressor would be not only to unchain aggression, but also to carry it on in order to occupy foreign territories, to seize economic resources and to exploit occupied territory for his own interest. This, however, cannot be achieved by using only nuclear weapons and missiles without employing the so-called classical armed forces and their armaments. The idea of a war being only a duel of rockets and ballistic missiles, I venture to say, is quite unrealistic" (TNCD/FV.6, page 13).

From the viewpoint of the five Western Powers it is unrealistic to pretend that when and if disarmament had reached the stage described by those who are proponents of the Soviet plan of complete disarmament there would be no possibility of aggression.

It is not impossible for lightly armed police to be used for warlike operations. Experience in the Middle East has been that on many occasions lightly armed men, who were described as police by their country of origin, carried out distinctly military actions, in some cases penetrating into and carrying out aggressive acts in the territory of neighbouring States; at other times occupying zones that were supposed to be entirely demilitarized. It was sometimes found that merely a change of uniform was enough to convert armed men from soldiers to policemen. The actions of these people were variously described as "police actions" or as "aggression", depending on the nationality of the spokesman.

It is therefore clear that disarmament to the point of leaving only what may be described as "police forces" will not prevent aggression even today. There is no reason to suppose that if the Soviet Union plan of disarmament is carried through to its final stage the millenium will simultaneously arrive and all humanity will forever lose any tendencies to aggressive action.
(Mr. Burns, Canada)

I think it has been mentioned that while the Soviet Union plan does not question the necessity of keeping police to maintain internal security, to protect the citizens within their own country against possible evil-doers, it ignores the need for some means of protecting individual nations against unjust acts or even armed aggression by their neighbours. I do not think a survey of human society shows that the dealings of one nation with another display any higher standard of morality than the dealings of the citizens of the same State with each other; in fact one would probably judge that the standard is lower. Therefore if there is need for police within the nations there is also need for some effective organization to enforce laws -- or equity -- between nations.

We have another recent example in the Middle East of what might happen in a disarmed world, and by that I mean a world in which all weapons had disappeared except those light armaments needed by police forces. In the Middle East nearly two years ago the borders of a certain State were crossed by very considerable bands of armed men, men armed with rifles, sub-machine guns and grenades. These armed men then joined in civil disorders that had broken out in that State and greatly aggravated them. To correct these conditions the United Nations sent a large force of observers who, after some difficulties, were able to establish themselves along the borders of this State. With certain supporting action by some great Powers, gradually the disturbances were calmed and without any bloodshed order was restored, and the differences between the quarrelling parties were settled peacefully.

This is an example of the kind of aggressive action which might have to be dealt with in a disarmed world, and this is why there should be linked with the United Nations some effective force to enable it to carry out its duty of keeping the peace. Unless there were such means at the disposal of the United Nations, disarmament down to rifles and machine guns would be no guarantee that aggressive groups would not cross the borders of neighbouring States and interfere in their affairs. That is, there might be attempts to settle political disputes by force and not by the rule of law in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, which the five Western Powers' plan has set down as its final objective.

The representative of Czechoslovakia, in part of the statement I have mentioned, seemed to think that ballistic missiles and national police forces, after the second stage of the Soviet Union plan had been achieved, could not possibly be used in an aggressive manner; he seemed to think that a large conventional army would be
necessary to occupy the territory of the State with which one of the parties might have a dispute. I think a moment's consideration will show that a great Power possessing missiles could use them to threaten a smaller State if it did not fall in with the desires of the great Power and act according to its interests. It would not be necessary to threaten the destruction of large cities and their population; a threat of exploding nuclear weapons in some part of the smaller State, perhaps in an area important to its economy, after due warning so that population could be evacuated, might be sufficient to break the will of the smaller nation.

I hope that no great nation possessing these engines of destruction would ever actually make such threats, but how could the small nations which do not possess nuclear weapons and rockets regard the world and themselves as secure while even after conventional weapons had largely disappeared there were great Powers possessing nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and their means of delivery? It is a fact that weapons of this kind create far more fear in the world today than any others, as many speakers in this Conference have said.

The representative of Romania -- and I refer to TNCD/FV.7 of 23 March, page 9, line 16 -- seemed to think that under the Western plan the international force would be equipped with nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery. In my view there would be no such necessity, and the international force intended for keeping the peace under the Western plan should never be given what is referred to as "nuclear capability". It would really only need to enter its peace-keeping functions when disarmament had progressed to such a state that there were few nuclear weapons in the world and those under strict control in the hands of the great Powers, eventually to disappear. I do not think that from the point of view of morality any international force linked to the United Nations should ever be organized to use nuclear weapons.

It may be useful to clear up some of the misunderstandings which are indicated by the questions of the representative of Romania on page 7 of TNCD/FV.7.

In the five Western Powers' plan the international organization for preserving world peace is first mentioned in stage I at para. F.7. This paragraph calls for a study of the means of preventing aggression and preserving world peace and security, as national armaments are reduced, by an international organization, to be an organ of, or linked to, the United Nations.
In stage II, para. 7, it is proposed that the international organization so studied -- the same organization -- shall be established, always, of course, as an organ of, or linked to, the United Nations.

In stage III, para. B.6, the international organizations -- note the use of the plural -- to preserve world peace are to be completed. The organizations meant here are the International Disarmament Organization and the international organ to preserve world peace, both of which are intended to be within the framework of the United Nations and might, perhaps, be parts of that organization. This, I hope, will dispose of the idea that the five Western powers intend in their proposals to supplant the United Nations.

The Romanian delegate says also:

"We all know very well that the United Nations organization is far from fulfilling the purposes for which it was set up; but we also know the reasons why" (TNOD/PV.7, page 7).

The five Western powers could agree pretty well with this statement though their assignment of reasons might be different from that of the Romanian delegate. However, our purpose in providing for a supplementary or adjunct organization to preserve the peace was precisely to remedy the defects of the United Nations in this respect. The new organization would, of course, have to be studied, negotiated over, and agreed upon between the ten nations in this Conference.

I hope I have been able to clear up misunderstandings regarding this matter. I think it is important that all delegations here should be quite clear as to what is intended, because the five Western Powers' plan has included provision for international peace-keeping machinery whereas the Soviet Union plan has not; and this constitutes the most significant difference between the ultimate objects of the two plans.

Mr. NOSEK (Czechoslovakia): First, I would like to say a few words in connexion with the statement just made by the distinguished representative of Canada, General Burns, who expressed some doubts about my assumption that it was hard to imagine the conduct of war with small, numerically limited forces, armed only with light firearms. In this connexion, he gave an example from one particular part of the world. I would like to draw the attention of the Committee to one aspect of the Soviet proposal. It is that:
"States should be allowed to retain only strictly limited police
(militia) contingents -- of a strength agreed upon for each country --
equipped with light firearms and intended solely for the maintenance of
internal order and the protection of the citizens' personal safety."

(A/FV.799, para. 76)

I should like to stress the words "agreed upon". It is very necessary to
keep this provision in mind because, when these small, strictly limited, forces
are agreed upon, they will be known to everyone: it will be very easy to control
the size of such police forces. I wanted to stress that following the inter-
vention made this morning by the representative of Canada.

In my own intervention I should like to deal with one of the significant
principles which, in our view, is an integral part of any real proposal on
general and complete disarmament. What I have in mind is a timing of the
proposal as a whole, as well as of its various stages. At the same time, I
will try to answer some questions raised during previous meetings concerning
the problem of time-limits.

We believe that every plan or proposal which claims to be realistic must
contain time-limits for the implementation of the determined tasks. The element
of time is inherent in any plan. A plan without time-limits cannot be called
a plan at all. If it does not fix time-limits both for its accomplishment as
a whole and for the accomplishment of its various parts it becomes non-concrete
and cannot serve as a useful basis for our work.

The Western representatives seemed to regard as an advantage the omission
of time-limits from their proposal. The United Kingdom representative,
Mr. Ormsby-Gore stated, for instance, on 16 March:

"Indeed it is because of our desire to be practical that we have
omitted any specific reference to the timing of various stages."

(TNCD/FV.2, pages 8-9)

The statements of some Western representatives would indicate that they do
not like the idea of setting down a time-limit for the accomplishment of the plan.
For instance, the representative of Italy called the precise timing of the
accomplishment of disarmament measures, "a forecast". At the meeting on
21 March he described the period of four years proposed for the achievement of
the Soviet programme of general and complete disarmament as follows:
"It is no more than a forecast, and only experience will tell us whether it is exact". At the same time, he pointed out, that: "On the other hand, the Western representatives refuse to make forecasts with regard to the period necessary for each disarmament operation".1/ However, such a conception would turn every disarmament proposal into a non-binding, incomplete and uncontrollable affair. In the view of the Czechoslovakian delegation such an approach to the timing of disarmament measures is contradictory to Resolution 1373 (XIV) of the General Assembly of the United Nations, which described the question of general and complete disarmament as the most important one facing the world today; one to be solved according to the unanimous desire of all member States of the United Nations, and of people all over the world, in the shortest possible time. These are the words of the Resolution -- "in the shortest possible time". Hence, it follows that our Committee has to determine in a concrete way, a time-limit for the achievement of the given task. The proposal of the socialist countries on general and complete disarmament does comply fully with this requirement. For its complete implementation a realistic term of four years is being proposed, comprising three stages.

In his additional explanatory notes to the programme on general and complete disarmament the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Zorin, made it clear on 16 March that from the organizational-technical as well as from the political point of view the reduction under appropriate control of armed forces by about 700,000 persons, as it is envisaged in the first stage of the Soviet proposal, was quite feasible during the course of one year or eighteen months. This time-limit is entirely realistic as it is based on experience gained by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries during the unilateral reductions of their armed forces.

As to the second and third stages of the disarmament programme of the Soviet Union, our Committee has already had the occasion to take notice of the fact that these two stages envisage reasonable and feasible time-limits of two years and of one year respectively. The implementation of measures envisaged in the second stage, especially the completion of the disbandment of armed forces and the complete liquidation of all military bases on the territories of foreign States, will, in our view, take two years. In this connexion we cannot overlook

1/ Quotations from the English provisional record of the fifth meeting.
the fact that the process of further reduction of armed forces and their final liquidation in the second stage will be considerably easier and quicker owing to the experience gained during the first stage.

The conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament would in itself favourably influence the international situation and would lead to a substantial increase of confidence among States. In this situation all measures proposed by the socialist countries could be realized with lesser difficulties and obstacles than at the present time. Moreover, there is no doubt that it is always easier and more advantageous for States and more beneficial for peoples to disband armies than to equip them and modernize them which under present conditions is very expensive. Therefore, we think that the achievement of the third and final stage of general and complete disarmament will not take more than one year.

The time-limitation of disarmament proposals and of their various stages is also indispensable from the point of view of safeguarding an effective control of proposed measures. It is very difficult to imagine how the international control organization or international control organ could work effectively if there should be no time-limits for the achievement of various disarmament measures. In such a case it would be almost impossible to observe the completion of various operations, so that their implementation could be protracted ad infinitum. Thus the whole disarmament process would become a very indefinite one. The determination of time-limits would at the same time make it possible for people all over the world to observe the implementation of various measures for the accomplishment of general and complete disarmament.

Here we see a contradiction in the attitude of the Western delegations which on the one hand have been stressing constantly the requirement of effective control but which, on the other hand, refuse to recognize the principle of time-limits for the implementation of proposed measures. This, as we see it, would in fact make effective control of the implementation of disarmament measures very difficult. The fixing of time-limits for the fulfilment of all disarmament measures and their control is of special importance for the small States. How can these small countries in good faith, and having in mind their own security, begin the implementation of their disarmament obligations without safeguards that the large States really reduce and finally disband their armed forces in the fixed time-limits and under effective control?
The delegations of the Western Powers, in referring to the alleged shortness of the time-limits in the Soviet proposal, qualify them as being unrealistic. We think that this is not a correct opinion. The allegedly short time-limits on the proposal of the Socialist countries on general and complete disarmament are by far more realistic and feasible for the attainment of our goal than the laying down of vague or no time-limits at all. A short but quite realistic time-limit for the implementation of the disarmament programme would lead to a maximum concentration on efforts for its rapid realization. On the contrary, any inaccurate determination or even the omission of any time-limits could only lead to undesirable delays in the accomplishment of general and complete disarmament.

It has already been recalled by other delegations of the Socialist countries that we consider the fact that the plan of the Western countries has no time-limits to be one of its fundamental deficiencies. It is true that this plan is formally divided into three stages, but in fact there are only two. This follows also from the statement of the representative of the United States, Mr. Eaton, who stated at our third meeting:

"... we look on Parts I and II as simply being scenes in a single act ..."

(TNCD/PV.3, page 10).

One can hardly understand why the delegations of the Western countries so strongly oppose the determination of time-limits, which would be agreed upon. Almost every State in the world has had experience regarding the mobilization and demobilization of its armed forces. The time-limits for the liquidation of armed forces can be determined with reasonable exactitude — by mutual agreement, of course. If we succeed in reaching an agreement, then necessarily we have to suppose that every State will fulfil its obligations. We assume that the agreement on general and complete disarmament would also include provisions on how to proceed in the case of any State not fulfilling its obligations.

In the course of our past meetings some representatives of Western countries have raised questions regarding the time-limits set out in the Soviet proposal. These questions were summarized by the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Ormsby-Gore, at our fifth meeting. With the consent of the other delegations of the Socialist countries I would now like to answer these questions.

In his statement on 21 March Mr. Ormsby-Gore inquired whether the representatives of Eastern European countries were willing to undertake a commitment to carry out the measures within the periods envisaged for each stage of the Soviet plan for
disarmament. Our answer is that we are ready to fulfil precisely all the disarmament measures envisaged for each stage of general and complete disarmament within the periods proposed for all three stages and for our programme as a whole, on the understanding, of course, that these periods would also be acceptable to the Western Powers and that they would be embodied in the agreement.

Further, there was a question as to whether the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries would be prepared to move automatically from one stage to another and whether or not it would prove practicable to complete the realization of all those measures envisaged for the previous stages in the time allowed. In our opinion, the transition from one stage of general and complete disarmament to another has to be fixed by agreement. In the declaration of the Soviet Government on general and complete disarmament we read:

"The programme of general and complete disarmament shall be carried out by States in strict conformity with the time-limit specified in the agreement, and its implementation may not be suspended or be made contingent upon the fulfilment of any conditions not provided for in the agreement."

(A/4219, page 16)

We think that this formulation more than clarifies our standpoint on the above-mentioned question.

Another question asked was whether we considered any time-table should be observed within each stage so that certain items were completed before others. Our answer is that in the course of preparation of the agreement, should it prove to be appropriate for certain stages, then we do not exclude the possibility of laying down such a time-table.

Mr. MARTINO (Italy) (translation from French): If I were to reply to all the comments made this morning regarding the statements I have had the honour to make during the last few days, I should have to make too long a speech, and one which, even if it were interesting as oratory, would not serve to further the object of our work and the task before us.

But there is one point on which I feel bound to say a few words. The Czechoslovak representative gave a wrong quotation from my statement, suggesting that I had said exactly the opposite to what I did say. Referring to the question of time-limits, I said:
"It is impossible therefore to say whether four years [the period provided for in the Soviet plan] is in fact the right period to allow for general and complete disarmament. It might be, but it might also be too long or too short. It is a forecast, and only experience can tell whether it is correct." and I added:

"Nor do the Western Powers, on the other hand, refuse to forecast the time required for each disarmament operation. For example, regarding the first stage of the Western plan Mr. Ormsby-Gore mentioned in his statement one year as in his view a reasonable period."²/

This means that we do not refuse to forecast the time required. The Czechoslovak representative made out that I said just the opposite. He made out that I said the Western Powers refuse to forecast the time required, and did so by quoting from my own statement.

I must protest against this way of debating. We are here to discuss matters in good faith; otherwise, our discussions will be completely fruitless.

Since I have the floor I will add that what I said -- namely, that the point to be emphasized is that the period envisaged can in any event be no more than a rough guide -- does not conflict with, but is confirmed by, Resolution 1378 (XIV), which has been quoted and which says "the shortest possible time". What does that mean? It means a period that can reasonably be expected to be the shortest possible; but it is still only a forecast. What data have we got for fixing a really precise period? Have we any experience of disarmament? The only experience mentioned by the Soviet Union representative is his country's experience in reducing forces. But I said very clearly in my statement that though that experience was obviously important it was not enough, because disarmament is not just a unilateral measure for the reduction of forces, it is something a great deal more complex which we may assume will take a great deal more time. Reduction of forces will necessarily have to be accompanied by the storage or destruction of corresponding questions of armaments, which owing to modern technique are of very varied types; and organizing the controls needed for this process will, naturally, also take time.

²/ cf. the final verbatim record of the fifth meeting (TNCD/FV.5, page 17)
Mr. NOSEK (Czechoslovakia): I would like to make it quite clear that I quoted from page 26 of the English text of TNCD/PV.5.\(^3\) In this document it states quite clearly — according to the English interpretation of course — what the Italian representative said:

"But it is obvious that the four years mentioned in this plan" — that is, the Soviet Union plan -- "are only a forecast of what would be reasonably necessary for the process of elimination."

That is my first quotation and the word used by Mr. Martino was "forecast".

As far as my second quotation is concerned, I would like to read again directly from the same document. According to the English interpretation, Mr. Martino stated:

"It is, therefore, impossible to say whether the four-year period is sufficient for general and complete disarmament. It may be sufficient; it may be too short; it may be too long. It is no more than a forecast, and only experience will tell us whether it is exact."

Then Mr. Martino used these words:

"On the other hand, the Western representatives refuse to make forecasts...".\(^4\)

Mr. MARTINO (Italy): "Nor ... do the Western representatives refuse ...", not "... the Western representatives refuse ..."

(continued in French) It is the exact opposite. The French text is the authentic, authoritative version.

(continued in English) If you read the English text you will see that I cited Mr. Ormsby-Gore also. Why do you not read all of it? You only read part of it.

Mr. NOSEK (Czechoslovakia): May I be allowed to finish my statement?

Mr. MARTINO (Italy): Yes, do.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): May I ask speakers not to get excited?

\(^3\) The reference is to the English provisional record of the fifth meeting, the final verbatim record having not yet been distributed.

\(^4\) The English provisional record of the fifth meeting does not correctly reflect the original statement in French.
Mr. NOcek (Czechoslovakia): "... refuse to make forecasts with regard to the period necessary for each disarmament operation", and following the request of Mr. Martino I shall read the next sentence:

"This is so much so that, for example, Mr. Ormsby-Gore, speaking of the first stage of the Western plan, mentioned the possibility of a one-year period which he considered as being reasonable."

That is the next sentence and I do not think that is wrong because I was quoting the English document.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): May I as Chairman draw the Secretariat's attention to the fact that there are apparently some inaccuracies in the interpretation here — at least in the English text — seeing that Mr. Martino claims that the English text does not agree with the French original. I would like the Secretariat to check this point and provide final and correct translations in English, French and Russian.

Mr. ORMSBY-GORE (United Kingdom): I wish only to make a very short intervention on this question of time limits and forecasts. I think it will be perfectly apparent from the last sentence which the representative of Czechoslovakia read out that quite clearly Mr. Martino could only have meant that we were prepared to make forecasts but that they were no more than forecasts. They were not rigid time-tables because we do not think that it is realistic to lay down rigid time-tables in those kinds of matters.

However, to clear up a misunderstanding which appeared in the statement of the representative of Czechoslovakia, of course there would have to be a time-table with regard to the reaching of an agreed force level. If there were agreement that certain countries should have a force level of 2.5 millions and other countries should have a force level to be agreed upon, then clearly those levels would have to be reached at a certain date. That would be discussed between us and we would say that on a certain date we would have reduced our force levels to a particular figure.

To that extent, of course, there must be a time limit when you have reached agreement, but what we say is that you cannot take a whole stage of the disarmament process and say that this can be completed in toto in a specific period of time.
That is not possible; indeed, I think anybody who read the first stage of the Soviet plan must see that it is not possible because that demands the calling of a world conference on general and complete disarmament, or a special session of the United Nations General Assembly.

I believe we can take it from certain statements made by the Czechoslovak representative that he himself envisages a world conference, because he has laid very special stress on the need for the Federal Republic of Germany to take part in the discussions, and as he knows very well that country is not a member of the United Nations; therefore, presumably he is thinking in terms of a world conference.

Is it seriously suggested that we sitting here can lay down a precise time limit when the 90 nations taking part in that conference have reached agreement on general and complete disarmament? Is that realistic? We do not think so. We have many examples which lead us to believe that that could not be the case. Let us take an example which is very much in our minds, the Conference of the Law of the Sea, which is now sitting. They met in 1958. No doubt all those who attended on that occasion wished to come to an agreement in the shortest possible time; that was their intention. However, there was not agreement between all the nations taking part, and so instead of there being a new law of the sea as regards territorial waters in 1958, they are meeting again in 1960.

Therefore, I do think we must make this very clear distinction: that you can forecast what you hope will happen but that it is not a rigid time limit. You can mention a specific date by which time certain countries must have carried out their obligations. That is quite understandable, and I agree that this would have to be part of any treaty we arrive at.

Then there is the question of a strict time limit applied to a whole plan of disarmament divided into three stages. We say that in this respect a strict time limit is quite unrealistic.

Mr. NOSEK (Czechoslovakia): I shall be very brief. I just wish to remind the Conference that yesterday the representative of Poland, Mr. Naszkowski, stated in his intervention that the convening of a special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, or a conference on disarmament, as is proposed in the Soviet Union disarmament plan, will precede the signing of a treaty. Even
now it is not appropriate to think that some States will oppose the idea and the programme of general and complete disarmament, because all Member States of the United Nations, as is well known — it has already been stated here many times — voted in favour of resolution 1378 (XIV). Therefore, I think it would not be too proper to begin consideration of this as if at some stage they will oppose this agreement; that they will oppose complete disarmament. If we start on such a basis we shall not achieve a good result.

Mr. MOCH (France) (translation from French): Just a few words in support of what Mr. Crmsby-Gore said a moment ago; they are prompted in particular, by the statement I have just heard.

The fact that all countries voted, in the United Nations, in favour of a resolution which, though generously conceived, was to say the least of it vague, does not mean that all those countries will agree about the force levels they are to be allowed in relation to those of their neighbours. I fancy that when a special session of the United Nations General Assembly meets, or an assembly of the members of the disarmament organization, there will be great debates about the regional balance of forces in the Middle East, in the Far East, in South America and so forth, and it is quite impossible to forecast how long they will take.

The other day a representative — I think it was our Polish colleague — sketched out the programme thus: first, there would have to be an agreement between the ten nations; secondly, a meeting of the world conference; thirdly, signature of a treaty on general and complete disarmament; and fourthly, implementation of the provisions of that treaty within the prescribed time limits. That is reasonable enough, but when we are told that four years will cover the whole of this programme I am obliged to say that is quite unrealistic.

I may add that, so long as one question still remains to be discussed, it is impossible to lay down time limits in advance. If I wanted an example I should not have to look very far for it: I should only need to go to a conference room to which France is not invited and where the Powers are engaged in a three-sided discussion — which is easier than one between ten nations or between eighty-two. I would gladly ask the three participants at that conference, which is being held next door whether any of them foresaw that more than two hundred meetings would be
required to draft the first fifteen articles of a treaty and still not reach agreement on a number of points. So, for heaven's sake, let us not make too many forecasts, but keep our feet on the ground.

Mr. Eaton (United States of America): Since it appears that we are about to adjourn until next week, I should like to ask the Chairman whether he would not agree that it would be well for the Conference to begin somewhat more specific discussions, to define somewhat more precisely various areas of the disarmament plans which are of such concern to us.

The Chairman (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Does anyone wish to comment? Perhaps the United States representative could give us some clearer idea of what he has in mind.

Mr. Eaton (United States of America): I shall be glad to do so. I feel that the general discussion we have had during the last two weeks has been very helpful. It was essential that we should have such a discussion before moving on to the specific problems facing us. I believe, however, that it would now be useful if -- at least for a certain period -- we were to begin a discussion of some of the more specific measures on which we must agree before we can arrive at anything that may be called a plan.

I have in mind particularly a measure which, it seems to me, all delegations here agree should be regarded as an essential first step. It seems to be agreed -- and this has been pointed out again this morning -- that immediately upon the signature of the treaty the international disarmament organization, as it is called in the Western plan, or the international control organ, as it is called in the Soviet plan, should be established, before the implementation of any of the contemplated measures. Both plans regard this as an essential step in connexion with the verification of levels of armed forces and armaments. In our plan we say that there should be general supervision under an international disarmament organization; in the Soviet plan the words "international control organ" are used.

Hence, since both plans regard that measure as essential, why should we not discuss it during the early days of next week?
I was impressed by the statements made by Mr. Zorin at previous meetings about his concern at the confusion which exists in the world regarding what is intended by control and investigation, what verification there will be that the commitments undertaken are carried out. Mr. Zorin went to some lengths to clarify this point, not by making any particularly new statement but by referring, in a very helpful way, to statements made by Mr. Khrushchev during the last year or so. As is known, my country shares that concern about what are the elements of control and what is the nature of the verification.

I would therefore suggest that, if the other delegations agree, we should turn our attention to this point next week, as a matter of first importance. We have devoted considerable time to a general discussion of it this week. As has been indicated, it is a matter about which the world is greatly concerned and on which there is considerable confusion.

I was particularly glad to note that Mr. Zorin agreed with the concept which was set forth by Mr. Moch last autumn in the United Nations General Assembly, and has been reaffirmed here, that there should be no disarmament without control and no control without disarmament. I think that we can heartily endorse that approach.

In his remarks (TNCD/FV.7, page 13) Mr. Zorin to Mr. Khrushchev's statement that certain spokesmen in the West had tended to distort the Soviet Government's position on control by maintaining that the Soviet Government was not prepared to accept strict international control over all disarmament measures. I might also say, parenthetically, that my Government's position on control has been distorted by certain spokesmen who have contended that we seek control without disarmament. That is not the case, as Mr. Zorin knows from remarks made by my colleagues and myself during our discussions so far. I am glad to note that the approach which we have been taking here now appears to have the support of the Soviet Government also.

Another important question on which we have received some degree of clarification from Mr. Zorin relates to the time when control over specific disarmament measures should begin to operate. Quoting Mr. Khrushchev's statement in his interview with Mr. Pierre Cot on 30 December 1959 Mr. Zorin said -- and I quote:

"... we intend that control will be maintained from the beginning to the end of the disarmament process and that the beginning of control will coincide with the beginning of the execution of appropriate measures of disarmament."

( ibid.)
This is precisely the position of my Government, and I believe of the other Western Governments represented at this table. We believe, as Mr. Ormsby-Gore stated several days ago, that if this principle is to be applied in practice adequate control machinery must be established and be ready to function when the disarmament measures to which it relates go into effect; and the representative of Bulgaria made this abundantly clear this morning that that is also the view of your own delegations.

On Wednesday Mr. Zorin reaffirmed the statement which he made to the Conference on 16 March:

"When the measures embodied in the first stage of disarmament begin to be put into effect, an international control organ will be established to which States will supply information about their armed forces and conventional armaments." (TNCD/FV.7, page 14)

He said, further, with reference to the specific measures of force level reductions:

"The control machinery will begin to operate simultaneously with the disbandment of the troops which are to be reduced in the first stage ..." (ibid.)

It appears, therefore, that the position of the Soviet Government is in consonance with the stress of the desirability of the early establishment of an international disarmament organization.

Mr. Zorin's remarks in connexion with his reference to statements on the subject by the Soviet Prime Minister have also helped in a measure to clarify for us the question of who would be responsible for inspection and control of specific disarmament measures. Mr. Zorin will, I am sure, understand why there has been some misgiving on our part as to precisely what the Soviet Government had in mind on this point. Soviet statements in past negotiations have left the impression with us that the Soviet Government contemplated control by national inspectors, i.e. a sort of self-inspection. This, of course, is totally unsatisfactory -- it is no inspection at all. I am very glad, therefore, that in his references on Wednesday to what he called the "distortion" of the Soviet position by Western newspapers Mr. Zorin stated clearly that his Government had in mind international and not national inspectors.
Finally, I would like to touch briefly on certain remarks made by Mr. Zorin concerning the fear of the Soviet Government that control measures might be exploited by certain Powers as instruments of intelligence, instruments of espionage. Lest there be any doubt in Mr. Zorin’s mind on this score, let me say unequivocally at this time that my Government has never for one moment contemplated that international control machinery would be exploited for these purposes. International control machinery, as I am sure Mr. Zorin will readily admit, will certainly result in the exchange of information, but only that degree of information necessary to confidence, without which there can be no disarmament in the true sense. Equal knowledge to both sides that commitments under a disarmament agreement are being carried out, is essential. This is the essence of international control. This, therefore, cannot be espionage. Such evidence will lead to a reduction of the fear of war, by chance, by miscalculation, since it will constitute assurance that each side is faithfully and reliably carrying out the commitments it has undertaken.

The foregoing, I believe, sums up where we stand at this moment in this Conference on what both sides agree is the important matter of effective inspection and control of disarmament measures.

How can we further advance the task which I have suggested to the Chairman that we take on next week, of clarifying these matters? Recalling Mr. Zorin’s insistence that there can be no fruitful discussion of controls except in conjunction with specific measures, let me make a suggestion. Let us focus our attention on some concrete measures in order to bring out more clearly what both sides have in mind with respect to the requirements for inspection and control. As an example, in both the Western plan and in Mr. Zorin’s statement to the Conference on 16 and 23 March it is indicated that the declaration of force levels to an international control organization is an essential condition precedent to what we both consider to be primary initial measures of disarmament, the reduction of force levels. The same is true with regard to conventional armaments, and we put equal stress on armaments. Let this, then, serve as an illustrative disarmament area in the context of which we can move to a concrete discussion of control arrangements, recognizing at the same time that we are dealing with only one example of the disarmament measures to which we must promptly address ourselves specifically and concretely.
It will be clear from the text of section I of the Western plan (TNCD/3) that there are other early-stage measures which must be considered and agreed, such as those concerning the cut-off of fissionable materials, materials produced for weapons purposes, and their transfer to peaceful uses, agreed measures on missiles and the prohibition against mass destruction weapons entering outer space. The control machinery developed in connexion with force levels and armaments will be an element in the international disarmament organization for the inspection and verification of these other measures which are an integral part of our first stage and must be a part of any measured, balanced, controlled, disarmament measure.

Addressing ourselves to the example that we have selected in the Allied plan and in the Soviet plan, there is provision for early reduction of force levels for the United States and the Soviet Union to substantially lower figures than each country now possesses. In the Allied plan the United States registers its willingness to set United States and Soviet force level ceilings at 2.5 million men immediately, and to reduce the ceilings to 2.1 million men when certain conditions are met. The Soviet plan proposes an additional reduction from present levels to 1.7 million men. Both plans also provide in their early phases for accompanying reductions of conventional armaments after agreed force levels have been fixed.

Rather than embark on a discussion at this juncture on what the figure for the United States and Soviet force levels and related conventional armaments should be, the United States delegation proposes an approach which can be used as a non-controversial basis for concrete discussion of control arrangements. Let us take as an example of a concrete disarmament measure the force level figure of 2.1 million men which represents a substantial reduction of presently declared Soviet force levels, as well as a considerable reduction of the already lower levels reached by the United States. Whatever eventual agreements may be reached, it seems reasonable to suppose that at some point in the process of reduction both the United States and the Soviet forces will be found in the vicinity of 2.1 million men and, therefore, it will be necessary to determine the type of organization which is necessary to verify this level, whether we go to lower levels or not.

We think that we should explore such questions as: Will there be a central authority which will direct these activities? What will be its composition? What
will be the composition of the inspection forces? What relation will nationals of the country subject to inspection bear to other nationals? Will they have free access to all depots? Will the inventories be prepared and attested to by the nation on whose territories the depots are stationed? What is the concept of the Soviet Union as to how many locations it will be necessary to have for ground force, air force and navy inspection and verification? After verification, will these armaments remain under the control of the international disarmament organization -- or what disposition will be made of them? Will they be destroyed? Will they be moved to a neutral nation? Will they remain in the country of origin? What will be the total number of inspectors which the Soviet Union will permit to verify these levels? What kind of armaments will be placed in these depots? Will the inspection personnel receive logistic support from the host country? What will be the nature of the communications system?

All these are questions which we must get down to, and I would suggest that we turn our attention to these in the coming week.

We believe that this manner of approaching the problem within the framework of a sample, specific disarmament measure, uncomplicated by abstract considerations, will serve to clarify the question of control as it will be applicable to the other measures contained in the initial stage of the Allied plan.

Mr. NASZKOWSKI (Poland) (translation from French): I should like to make two brief comments. First, I do not agree with our United States colleague that we have not yet discussed concrete questions. True, the discussion during the last fortnight has been of a general nature: delegations have explained their positions. But that does not mean, at least so far as the statements of the socialist countries are concerned, that the discussion or the statements have been abstract.

My second point is this. Of course we agree that we should press on with the discussion and get down to formulating concrete disarmament measures. But I do not see why we should begin by working out the control system. That is not in line with our basic viewpoint. We consider that the control system should be strictly linked with the disarmament measures themselves, as we have already frequently stressed in this Committee.
Mr. Eaton, the United States representative, proposes, for example, that we should work out the control system for the reduction of conventional forces before even agreeing on the reduction. In our view, that is not the proper procedure. We consider that before going into questions of detail such as the control system, we should agree on the principle of the disarmament programme.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): If no one else wishes to speak, I should like to say a few words as representative of the Soviet Union.

I have listened with great attention to the statements made by the representatives of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Italy, the United Kingdom and, finally, of the United States of America, not to mention the various remarks made by the representative of France and the representative of Poland, who spoke just before me.

The Soviet delegation has given particular attention to the considerations just put forward by Mr. Eaton, the representative of the United States. We share the desire of the United States representative that we should proceed to consider individual concrete problems of disarmament, and we think that the ground for this has now to some extent been cleared. We are also glad to note our agreement on the basic approaches, approaches involving points of principle, to the problem of control over disarmament, to which the United States representative has just referred. What he said concerning, more particularly, the statement made by the Soviet delegation on control problems shows that our respective positions have come substantially closer, and that, I think, will make it easier to consider specific control problems when we proceed to analyze them in connexion with specific disarmament measures.

As regards his remarks that we ought to concentrate our attention upon definite disarmament measures, we also feel that this would be useful -- always, of course, within the framework of the general objective on which we would appear to be agreed, apart from some individual departures from this line noted in the statements of some delegates. Our delegation has its own views as to what we should work on in order to move towards a more concrete examination of individual disarmament problems and I should like to put forward those views now.
We have come to the end of the second week of our work. We feel that the work done by the Committee during that time has been useful. In the course of the Committee's discussions the positions of delegations have been clarified on a number of questions. I fully agree with the representative of Poland, who spoke just before me, that we have already had a discussion of concrete disarmament problems. In its desire to facilitate the execution of the decision of the United Nations General Assembly which called on all Governments to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament in the shortest possible time, the Soviet delegation has given explanations of our programme of such disarmament which is now before the Committee. Various substantive problems involved in this programme have been given detailed analysis and justification by the representatives of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria.

The United Kingdom delegation in one of its statements put forward a number of considerations on the substance of our programme of general and complete disarmament. Other Western delegations, though they referred in general terms to the Soviet programme, did not, however, advance many specific views upon its substance. We hope, however, that, in the course of our further proceedings, they will do so.

We have begun to study the disarmament plan submitted by Mr. Ormsby-Gore, Head of the United Kingdom delegation, on behalf of the five Western members of the Committee. We are studying it from the angle of its consistency with the provisions of the United Nations General Assembly's resolution on general and complete disarmament. From this angle some delegations put questions to the authors of the Western plan, and we had an opportunity of hearing replies to these questions.

In their turn, the delegations of the Western countries, principally the French and United Kingdom delegations, asked us to clarify a number of aspects of our plan and we, accordingly, gave additional explanations which, as we gather, have served to bring the positions of the parties somewhat closer on certain important aspects of the problem of general and complete disarmament, including such questions as the order in which measures in the sphere of nuclear and conventional disarmament should be implemented and the principles governing the carrying out of control, which I have just mentioned.
We feel we are entitled to stress the desire of our delegation and of the
delégations of the other socialist countries to approach the discussion of the
question of general and complete disarmament in a constructive and concrete manner.
We wish to speed up our work in every way and for that reason deem it our duty to
clarify, one after the other, the most important aspects of our programme of general
and complete disarmament. In doing so we sometimes compare the way in which
particular problems of general and complete disarmament are dealt with in the Soviet
programme and in the plan of the five Western Powers. It is not our fault, of
course, if such comparison happens not to be in favour of the Western plan which,
as has, incidentally, been said by some Western representatives, is not a plan of
general and complete disarmament.

We think it necessary to draw attention also to the following fact. Although
the Soviet delegation does not see its way to accept many of the provisions of the
Western plan as a basis for agreement, this does not, in the least, mean that we do
not see points of contact between our position and the position of the Western
Powers. Quite a number of such points of contact have by now already emerged.
For instance, on questions like the necessity of starting general and complete
disarmament by reducing armed forces and conventional armaments, to which
Mr. Eaton referred more particularly this morning, or, more especially, the very
important significance of nuclear disarmament, which has repeatedly been referred
to these last few days in our Committee meetings and, lastly, on the point that,
when drafting measures for the control of disarmament, there should be neither
control without disarmament nor disarmament without control. This has been
confirmed again today by the United States representative.

In an endeavour to multiply the number of common points of contact between
our positions in order to expedite the negotiations for general and complete
disarmament, the Soviet delegation has in several cases moved towards the views of
the Western Powers. Surely this is shown, for instance, by our agreement to
examine the possibility of taking realistic measures in the sphere of nuclear
disarmament even before the third stage of general and complete disarmament?

It seems to us that the work of the Committee has now reached a definite
turning-point. Following a general exchange of views, approaches leading to the
solution of a number of problems have now emerged and a certain evaluation has been
made of each of those problems, so that it would now be possible to begin
implementing the principal task of our Committee, the drafting of an agreement for
general and complete disarmament or, at least, to begin framing the basic provisions
of such an agreement.
It must, of course, be noted that at one of the early meetings of the Committee the representative of France tried to turn our work in another direction -- one that is not at all in conformity with the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly on general and complete disarmament -- in the direction of discussing certain partial measures in the sphere of the limitation and reduction of armaments. I venture to remind the Committee that, in connexion with that speech of Mr. Moch, the Soviet delegation then asked the delegations of the other Western countries to make it clear whether they supported the view put forward by the French delegate or whether they intended to follow the course laid down for disarmament negotiations by the United Nations General Assembly resolution of 20 November 1959.

I can now say with great satisfaction that we got an answer to this question from the United Kingdom delegation. Mr. Ormsby-Gore, at our fifth meeting on 21 March, said, and I quote:

"I should like to say, on behalf of the United Kingdom delegation, that we voted for that resolution. We accept it in toto. All paragraphs of it represent the policy of the United Kingdom Government in this sphere."

(TNCD/PV.5, page 25)

We attach the importance it deserves to this plain reply by the head of the United Kingdom delegation.

So far, however, we have received no such reply from the other Western delegations about their attitude towards the General Assembly resolution on general and complete disarmament. Perhaps these delegations are not stating their position on this very important question because their reply would be different from that of the United Kingdom delegation. It may be that this is precisely why some delegations -- and in raising this point I am motivated by the wish to be quite clear how things stand in our Committee -- show no inclination to make a constructive contribution at our meetings towards the discussion of fundamental questions of principle underlying general and complete disarmament.

Nevertheless, we still hope that none of the delegations forming our Committee will deviate from the line of the United Nations General Assembly resolution, and that together we shall all be able to make progress towards drafting a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

From the first day of the Committee's work the Soviet delegation has called on it to set about fulfilling the task facing us. Now that we have had a whole series of meetings at which there has been a general exchange of views, we are more than ever convinced that it is essential not to procrastinate but to tackle the business of drafting this treaty.
It may be asked: What precisely is meant by drafting a treaty on general and complete disarmament?

There is only one possible answer to this question: To set about drafting this treaty means starting concrete, business-like negotiations on a programme of general and complete disarmament, from its beginning right through to the end, comparing the positions of both sides and finding mutually acceptable solutions to the problems that arise. Only such concrete discussion of the problem of general and complete disarmament will enable us to make progress towards the practical implementation of the General Assembly's unanimously adopted resolution on this question.

Where shall we begin?

The United States representative today explained at great length that, from his point of view, it would be useful to start by working out the whole system of control. In so doing, he confirmed that he agreed with the two positions advanced earlier by the Western representatives and which meet with no objections from the representatives of the socialist countries, that there must be no control without disarmament.

If this is so, if the United States representative agrees that there can be no control without disarmament, why must we begin with control? I entirely agree with the remarks made by the representative of Poland, Mr. Naszkowski, when he said that, if we have met here for the purpose of working out a treaty or agreement, or simply coming to an arrangement on a programme of general and complete disarmament, as the General Assembly resolution indicates, it at once becomes incomprehensible why we must start, not with concrete measures for disarmament, but a control system in all its details.

The United States representative said that we must agree on a number of concrete and detailed questions of control. He indicated, for example, that we must agree whether there will be a central control authority, on how it will be staffed, on inspection, on the relation within the inspection groups, on the various categories of inspectors from the different countries, on whether there will be free access to depots, and to what sort of depots, and so forth; that we must agree on aviation control points; on whether stocks will be transferred to peaceful uses or destroyed, on the total number of inspectors, on precisely which armaments will be subject to control, and so forth.
It seems quite understandable to me that all these questions can and must be discussed. We have no objections whatsoever to this, once we know what we need to control.

The United States representative says that we must come to an agreement as to which depots will be controlled. But, in order to settle this question, we must decide what armaments we are going to store in these depots, what specific types of armaments we shall reduce and by how much, and how many depots will be needed. Perhaps one depot will be sufficient, if almost nothing will be reduced. The question then arises why discuss now the question of how many inspectors will be needed in this depot.

The same point is made about aviation control points, but we have not yet agreed whether aviation will be reduced at all or by how much or within what time-limits. How, then, can we discuss now what depots or what aviation control points we are going to control, or how many inspectors will be needed in all?

Can we really settle these questions when we do not know what the total reduction of armaments and armed forces will amount to? If this reduction involves a million men, one number of inspectors will be necessary; if we reduce armed forces by three million men, another number of inspectors will be needed. Why then discuss the number of inspectors when we have not yet discussed the size of the reduction in armed forces on which we are going to agree?

The United States delegate appealed to us for a business-like approach; but is it really business-like to perform useless work? How can we discuss the number of inspectors when we do not know what these inspectors are going to inspect? That would be useless work.

I apologize for speaking so bluntly, but I cannot help wondering what is the point of discussing the details of control when we have still not discussed what has to be controlled.

I do not want to enter into a detailed examination of the views expressed today by Mr. Eaton nor to create the impression that the Soviet delegation will not agree to discuss also the detailed questions which Mr. Eaton mentioned. I only want to make it clear from the start that we do not wish to do useless work. Moreover, we want the world at large to know that we have started discussing questions about the concrete reduction of armed forces and armaments in various spheres, that we have begun the work on general and complete disarmament, that we
are moving forward in successive stages in a discussion of these concrete measures of disarmament and at the same time are examining the question of what concrete measures of control will have to be adopted in order to ensure that these disarmament measures are put into effect.

I think that, if we approach the question in this way, the world at large will be satisfied and will say that the Committee has indeed embarked upon serious work in accordance with the General Assembly resolution and with the aspirations of the peoples, who are expecting us to take definite steps in the matter of disarmament.

It seems to us that, in order to make progress, we must try to find common ground and reach agreement on the basic provisions of the future treaty on general and complete disarmament.

What does this mean? It would mean, first and foremost, that we must agree about the general scope of the measures which should be carried out in the process of general and complete disarmament. In the Soviet programme for general and complete disarmament provision is made for the implementation, under effective international control, of the following measures, which, taken together, would be bound to ensure that disarmament will be general and complete: the disbanding of all armed forces and the destruction of all forms of armaments; the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons, the cessation of the manufacture of all types of these weapons and their elimination from the armaments of States and the destruction of stockpiles; the complete cessation of manufacture and the destruction of all types of war missiles, irrespective of their range, including military space vehicles; the abolition of military bases of all kinds -- army, navy or air force -- and in the territories of foreign States and all missile-launching installations; the cessation of military production; the abolition of war ministries, general staffs, and military and paramilitary establishments and organizations of all kinds; the discontinuance of the appropriation of funds for military purposes.

Since all these measures, in combination, would, as we think, really ensure the complete abolition of the armed forces and armaments of States, the Soviet programme provides that, when these measures are implemented, States shall retain at their disposal only strictly limited contingents, of police or militia -- the size of which shall be agreed upon for each country and which shall be equipped with small arms and be used exclusively for the maintenance of internal order and the protection of the personal security of citizens.
We are prepared to listen with great attention to any remarks and views which our partners in the negotiations on these proposals may express concerning the scope of the measures which, taken together, would amount to general and complete disarmament. If any proposals are introduced which would add precision, or in any degree modify or amplify this programme of measures which should lead to general and complete disarmament, we are ready to look into such suggestions most carefully.

Unfortunately, the Soviet delegation is obliged to note that the scope of the measures in the Western disarmament plan put forward by the five Powers cannot, in our opinion, ensure general and complete disarmament. One need only point out, for example, that in the Western plan there is no provision either for the destruction of all nuclear weapon stocks, or even for renunciation of the use of such weapons; nor is there provision for the complete abolition of armed forces and armaments, or for the elimination of military bases on foreign territories, or for a number of other important measures without which disarmament cannot be general and complete.

The Soviet delegation considers it equally essential to reach agreement on the phasing of the various measures making up the programme of general and complete disarmament, and on the time-limits for the implementation of this programme and also on the scope and nature of the control arrangements applicable to concrete disarmament measures.

We are obviously not refusing to discuss the general problems of how control is to be organized as well: the creation of an international control organ, the general principles on which the control apparatus will function, and so forth. We are ready to discuss these matters too; that is to say, we are ready to discuss what Mr. Eaton was talking about earlier today. But we consider that all this must be examined in connexion with concrete stages in disarmament, which will in their entirety constitute a programme of general and complete disarmament. Nor do we exclude the possibility of discussing particular stages in greater detail at this moment since, if we proceed by stages, we shall have a better chance now of finding a concrete solution of the problems. We do not exclude this either.
The Soviet delegation has presented its explanations and clarifications with regard to the different stages of this programme. We see that there are stages in the Western plan, each with its own particular content. We are prepared to make a careful study in order to find out what part of the content of these concrete stages can be considered from the standpoint of possibly combining them in a single programme of general and complete disarmament.

Lastly, if we do not succeed in agreeing on all the concrete elements in a given stage, we shall try to indicate the main measures at each stage on which we can agree. We think it most important that we should now exchange views on all these concrete questions, and consider that, by spelling out each stage of disarmament and the time-limits it involves, we should be able to clarify the position of each delegation.

We might also try to reach mutual agreement on such a question as how to ensure peaceful relations between States after general and complete disarmament has been brought about. We have noted that the Western Powers show considerable interest in this question. We do not think that it should be solved by creating new armed forces in a world where there will be no weapons or military resources, even if such forces were to have international status. We are, however, prepared to discuss certain aspects of the question of international relations in the light of the requirements of the United Nations Charter.

These are some of the questions on which we should obviously reach agreement so as to begin drafting the basic provisions of the treaty on general and complete disarmament, and we consider that the Committee should start to tackle this problem next week.

That is all I wanted to say for the moment.

Mr. MOGH (France) (translation from French): I have asked for the floor, not in order to reply to the substance of the rather long and meaty statement you have just made, Mr. Chairman -- I shall do that, perhaps, next week -- but to say that I admire your cleverness. Sometimes it is almost diabolical! In the first part of your statement you tried to set the Western
Powers against each other. I warn you at once that you will not succeed in doing that. Then you tried to put all five of us, together, against the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly. You will not have much success there either. The text adopted by the General Assembly is sufficiently vague for us all to be able to support it. You are forgetting that the resolution expresses a hope, and merely a hope:

"... the hope that measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control ..." -- these words are invariably forgotten by people speaking of general and complete disarmament -- "... will be worked out in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time." (A/6578/378 XIV).

We too, want general and complete disarmament, under effective control -- which perhaps explains Mr. Eaton's statement just now -- but we are far from certain that the four-year method you are proposing is the one most certain to lead towards that goal.

I may add that, while admiring your cleverness, I also felt rejuvenated, because I have been familiar for years with the argument that we should begin by deciding on disarmament and then discuss control. I know very well where that argument leads. One gives the outside world the impression that there is agreement on certain disarmament measures. Then, little by little, the connexion between those disarmament measures and the corresponding control measures is whittled away, and so we end up with imperfectly controlled disarmament.

I tell you plainly and in all friendliness, on behalf of the French delegation, that we shall not let ourselves be driven into courses that lead to disarmament being separated from control, to disarmament being given priority and to pressure being then exerted by public opinion to secure disarmament without control.

Similarly, the French delegation -- and the other Western delegations too, I think -- wishes to draw attention to the idea you have just put forward, namely, that it is necessary to begin with the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments. No! I tell you plainly that the reduction of armed
forces and conventional armaments, in our view, forms part of a comprehensive plan including nuclear disarmament, which is now strategically, tactically and psychologically much more important than a reduction of armed forces. We shall not accept the course which, under the pressure of some campaign or other, would mean isolating one aspect of disarmament and saying we agree on a reduction of forces (the unilateral reductions made show clearly enough that this is meaningless from the point of view of disarmament) and then dropping the rest on the pretext that we are not agreed, so as to arrive at the reduction of forces without nuclear disarmament, which we do not want.

Such are, perhaps rather too forthrightly expressed, my first thoughts on Mr. Zorin's reply to Mr. Eaton. In conclusion I may observe that after the cold shower a tap was turned and the water became warm. The statement ended with hopes: we are prepared to alter our time-limits, said Mr. Zorin, we are willing to modify the nature of the states; we are willing to consider carefully what we can agree in the Western plan, and even to consider what international relations would be like in a world with only police forces; so let us get down to work on this.

Do not imagine for one moment that by pressing for the Soviet four-year plan for general and complete disarmament, without any mention of effective control, you will succeed in making us abandon our plan. We shall only amend our plan in so far as it is realistic to do so and if you, on your side, abandon much that is unrealistic in your own plan.

I am sorry I had to say this at once; but it is perhaps the best way of clarifying today's discussion after the turn it has taken.

Mr. Eaton (United States of America): As indicated this morning, I must now leave. However, before leaving I ask that this hasty refusal to consider the suggestion I have made be given the most solemn reconsideration over the weekend, because the alternate plan proposed has very unfortunate historical overtones which would not bode well for the outcome of our Conference.

Mr. Tarabanov (Bulgaria) (translation from French): The United States delegation has proposed, contrary to what the United Nations resolution enjoins us to do, that instead of getting to work on the problem of general and complete disarmament — defining the tasks and principles and going progressively ahead with concrete work on disarmament measures — we should simply turn our attention to certain points relating to control and only control, connected, as he said at the end of his statement, with certain disarmament measures supposed to be included in the first and second stages of the Western plan submitted to this conference.
We have repeatedly stressed that there are no disarmament measures, or practically none, either in the first or in the second stage of the Western plan. That was one point. Thus we are simply being urged to start work on the question of a control organization set up merely to begin controlling — what? We do not know. And there has been occasion to point this out as our Polish colleague has done.

Secondly, we have been told by the representative of France that they will not agree to begin discussing the Soviet plan or all the principles and positions necessary to define general and complete disarmament, because the text of the United Nations resolution is somewhat vague, and, if I understand correctly, the French delegation subscribed to it, precisely because it was vague.

Mr. MOCH (France) (translation from French): You might read it again.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): I shall certainly do so. We think that to take up such a position will certainly not help us to make more progress in defining the problem — for we believe that to define what we are going to do is a practical task. All we have been doing is simply discussing the various positions, but we have not managed to define what we are going to work at as a practical job in order to achieve general and complete disarmament. That, we believe, is precisely what would need to be done.

We have also heard, I regret to say, a statement by Mr. Eaton, the head of the United States delegation, purporting to note a hasty refusal by the Soviet delegation to begin work on certain points he had emphasized here — which amount to starting with the discussion of a programme of control only, not linked with disarmament measures. He said that that would be thought over during the week-end. I am not sure that proposals made here — and I would be sorry to think that was why they were made — were made just to provide an opportunity for reflection and to interpret the desire to discuss general and complete disarmament and the principle underlying it so that public opinion and certain sections of the Press will be able to say that the delegations of the socialist countries do not want to tackle the practical job. What else, though, is the definition of our future task if not a practical job?
The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): If no one else wishes to speak, I should like to make one remark in connexion with Mr. Moch's intervention. I have no intention to argue with him at present. I only wish to draw his attention to the fact that he said that we propose to consider the question of disarmament without mentioning effective control. That I consider is not an objective statement, because the whole of my today's speech and all previous statements made by the Soviet Union, its concrete proposals and the statements of other socialist countries, tell another story.

We are even now proposing to discuss questions of control, but only in connexion with specific disarmament measures, whereas you, Mr. Moch, are proposing to discuss control without disarmament, in spite of your own formula that there can be no control without disarmament.

That is all I had to say.

Mr. MOCH (France): I never said that.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): If no one else desires to speak, I shall read out the communique which we have drafted:

"The ninth meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament was held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 25 March 1960 under the chairmanship of the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Monday, 28 March 1960, at 10.30 a.m."

If there are no objections, I shall consider the communique adopted.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m."