FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE EIGHTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Thursday, 24 March 1960, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. E. MEZINOESCU (Romania)
PRESENT AT THE TABLE

**Bulgaria:**
Mr. M. TARABANOV  
Col. K. SAVOV  
Mr. K. CHRISTOV

**Canada:**
Mr. E.I.M. BURNS  
Mr. A.C. CAMPBELL  
W/Cdr. R.J. MITCHELL

**Czechoslovakia:**
Mr. J. NOSEK  
Gen. J. HAJKO  
Mr. Z. TRHLIK

**France:**
Mr. J. MOCH  
Mr. M. LECENDRE  
Col. L. CONVRIJT

**Italy:**
Mr. G. MARTINO  
Mr. F. CAVALLETI  
Mr. L. DIANELLI

**Poland:**
Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI  
Mr. M. LACHS  
Brig.-Gen. J. SLIWINKI

**Romania:**
Mr. E. MIZINOSCU  
Col. C. POPA  
Mr. C. BOGDAN

**Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:**
Mr. V.A. ZORIN  
Col.-Gen. A.A. GRYZLOV  
Mr. A.A. RÖSHCHIN
Present at the Table (cont'd)

United Kingdom:
Rt. Hon. D. Ormsby-Gore
Miss B. Salt
Maj.-Gen. Riddle

United States of America:
Mr. F.M. Eaton
Mr. C.C. Stille
Rear-Admiral P.L. Dudley

Secretariat:
Personal Representative of the Secretary-General:
Dr. D. Protitch
Deputy Personal Representative of the Secretary-General:
Mr. W. Epstein
The CHAIRMAN (Romania) (translation from French): I declare the eighth meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament open.

The first speaker on the list is the representative of Poland, on whom I now call.

Mr. N. BŁSZKOWSKI (Poland) (translation from French): I should like today to make some remarks on a problem which has been mentioned by several speakers at earlier meetings. It is the problem known as the "balance of forces". It was dealt with in particular by Mr. Ormsby-Gore, the United Kingdom representative, when he introduced the plan of the five Western Powers at the meeting on 16 March. Speaking of the foundations on which any disarmament plan must rest, the United Kingdom representative pointed out that the plan must not at any stage give a significant military advantage to one country or group of countries over others.

Similarly, in the statement made by the United States representative, Mr. Eaton, on 17 March, we noted a certain tone of mistrust regarding alleged tendencies to weaken the West unilaterally.

What are the real facts? After a closer study of the problem, it must be agreed that the Western States are probably the last which can have any cause for such anxiety.

The plan put forward by the Soviet Union and agreed with all the socialist countries provides for the complete disbandment of armed forces, the total destruction of all kinds of armaments and elimination of military techniques, and the absolute prohibition of the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons -- that is to say the cessation of manufacture of these weapons, their elimination from the armaments of States, and the destruction of stocks.

It is, precisely, this plan which provides for the complete cessation of production, and for the destruction, of all ballistic weapons irrespective of their range, including military space vehicles. In addition, it provides for the abolition of foreign bases in the territories of other States, and the evacuation and disbandment of armed forces stationed abroad. That would apply to all troops of any State stationed outside their own country.

The Soviet programme provides, at the same time, for a series of measures which would make the revival of armed forces impossible in any form whatsoever. That is an effective system of control. The benefits of the plan would be
enjoyed equally by all countries of the world. What, then, would be the alleged advantage given to certain States, or the alleged injury to the position of others? Would it lie in the fact that all States would be disarmed? Would not that be the common privilege of all?

The gradual implementation of this disarmament plan would preserve the proportions of all the armed forces. That would apply at each stage of the plan, so that there would be no injury to the interests of any State, great or small.

Such a concept really governs the conditions for starting on an equal footing, with the object of arriving in the final stage at a synthesis of general and complete disarmament.

The idea of balance should clearly not be used as an obstacle or a pretext against speedy and effective disarmament: that idea, in fact, belongs to a bygone day. However, if it is desired to take the term as denoting recognition of the principle of equal treatment for all partners during the various stages of disarmament, then it must be admitted -- and this also follows from what I have just said -- that the Soviet plan embodies that principle. On the other hand, it would be difficult to find it in the Western plan, which gives first place to the problem of abolishing ballistic weapons, and is silent regarding that of the abolition of bases. Even if we accepted the explanations furnished by our Italian colleague, Mr. Martino, according to which the bases would disappear automatically as disarmament proceeded, it would still be necessary to bow to facts and to recognize that their disappearance would be in a distant and unspecified future, whereas the ballistic weapons would be abolished during the first and second stages of the Western plan. But it is clear that nuclear warheads would in no way cease to be dangerous solely because they were not delivered by intercontinental missiles or other space vehicles, as Mr. Jules Moch put it, but by aircraft or by smaller rockets which could take off or be fired from bases situated near certain countries. Now, according to the Western plan, only the former would be prohibited, whereas the latter would be retained during the stages mentioned.

That is the core of the problem of equal treatment and simultaneous disarmament. It is also the reason why the problem of bases is so crucial.

The discussion on foreign bases has developed from the fact that the Soviet plan laid particular emphasis on the need for complete abolition of military bases on foreign territory, and for the simultaneous evacuation of troops and military personnel to their respective countries and the disbandment of these armies. The Polish delegation considers that this problem requires further clarification.
As you are well aware, in both Europe and Asia there are military bases of various countries on foreign territory. They are bases with launching ramps for missiles of various ranges, bases for long- and short-range aircraft, or bases at which are stationed land forces equipped with conventional weapons and atomic weapons; there are also naval bases. I can hardly say that Mr. Martino's arguments concerning the almost complete identity of foreign bases and national forces convinced me.

In his remarks on 21 March, the representative of Italy actually expressed his surprise at the fact that the socialist countries' plan, while stressing the problem of foreign bases, was not, so to say, sufficiently explicit as to whether the abolition of bases should take place simultaneously in the home country.

It is obvious that foreign bases and units stationed in the home country have a common denominator: they form part of the armed forces and are equipped with arms. That is precisely why, in our plan, we do not separate the question of bases from that of disarmament as a whole. The Soviet Union plan is very clear in that respect: its second stage provides for completion of the disbandment of the armed forces retained and elimination of all military bases in foreign territory. The armed forces and military personnel would be withdrawn from foreign territory to within the national frontiers, where they would be disbanded.

But to speak of the relationship between the abolition of bases and disarmament as a whole in no way lessens the importance of the fact that foreign bases constitute a special and acute problem, on both the military and the political levels. That is precisely why the question of bases must be clearly stated in the disarmament plan.

That is what has been lacking hitherto in the Western plan. It may be that, consequent on discussion, and the Western representatives' statement that they envisage the disappearance of the bases in the course of the disarmament process, we shall reach an agreement on the subject.

In talking of the special character of the problem of the various bases, what we have in mind is this: the existence of bases thousands of kilometres away from the countries concerned, equipped with a large number of aircraft and missile-launching installations directed towards other countries, cannot possibly help to promote an easing of the international situation or dispel mistrust. On the contrary, it renders necessary preparations in connexion with additional precautionary measures and counter-attacks.
Such are the considerations which require us to concern ourselves more particularly with this problem in the process of disarmament as a whole. The problem is inseparably bound up with that of equal treatment and simultaneous disarmament, and thus with the aspects mentioned by the United Kingdom representative in his statement which I quoted at the outset, namely with the exclusion of the possibility of giving, in the course of the various stages of disarmament, a military advantage to any particular country or group of countries in relation to others.

Before concluding my remarks I should like to refer to one further problem. In his speech on 21 March Mr. Ormsby-Gore noted that it would be necessary to devote much time to preliminary discussion before an agreement could be concluded on the measures envisaged in the first stage of the Soviet plan. He also asked how it was anticipated that the preliminary work could be carried out.

In agreement with other delegations of the socialist countries represented on the Ten Nation Committee, I should like to clarify certain matters. Our delegations are of the opinion that preliminary talks will be necessary in order to prepare an international treaty on general and complete disarmament. In the course of those talks it should be possible to arrive at an agreement on the contents of the disarmament plan, procedure, the order to be followed and the time-limits for the implementation of the various measures of disarmament, and the scope and character of the control measures. Agreement of that kind should apply to all stages of the plan for general and complete disarmament.

Those talks should take place, according to the Soviet disarmament plan, before a start is made with the implementation of the plan for general and complete disarmament.

It is envisaged that there would be a special session of the General Assembly or a disarmament conference as proposed in the Soviet plan before the signature of the treaty on general and complete disarmament. Once agreement with regard to the treaty had been reached among the ten Powers represented in this Committee, there would be no difficulty with regard to such a conference or session of the General Assembly. All questions concerning other States would, of course, have to be settled with their agreement and participation.
Mr. MOCH (France) (translation from French): I should like to come back to the question with which we dealt yesterday. During yesterday morning's meeting I thanked Mr. Zorin for answering my questions. I did not go any further, because I wanted first to read carefully the text of his statement, which I did yesterday afternoon.

I note with satisfaction that we agree on a number of points, which I should like to recall:

1. We all accept the establishment of an international disarmament organization to control the operations.

2. We agree on the need to control every operation of disarmament from its inception to its completion.

3. We agree that, once a given measure of disarmament has been carried out, the control relating to this measure must be maintained in such a way as to prevent any secret retrogressive move.

4. We agree to demand that all States should submit to the international disarmament organization, at the start of operations, declarations of their level of forces and their conventional armaments.

5. We agree to control the quantities of equipment or the total number of men to be eliminated in each army -- in other words, what I termed on 18 March the difference "X - A", the difference between the initial figure and the corresponding final figure. I shall have to come back to this point.

6. We agree that the necessary verifications should be carried out by international inspectors.

Thus, of the three questions raised on 18 March, one has received a precise and satisfactory answer. It was the one worded as follows:

"Must the control of a particular operation be ready to function as soon as that measure begins to be implemented, in order that, first, the implementation of the measure and, secondly, its results, may be observed?" (TNCD/FV.4, page 11)

But to one of the other two questions I have had no reply, and I believe I have had a negative reply to the other. Those are the two points on which I should now like to enlarge.
As regards the third clarification I requested, the wording I used was the following: "... The agreement between the two parties on the methods of control, on the organization responsible for it and so forth must be concluded not later than the date on which the agreement providing for the material execution of the operation to be controlled is signed". I added: "Do we agree to this?" (TNCD/PV.4, page 12). Today I have to say that I am no wiser than before. Yet the question is important. We ourselves think that it is essential to carry out simultaneously the necessary studies concerning on the one hand the methods of controlling a particular disarmament operation, and on the other that operation itself, since only this simultaneity of studies will permit of simultaneity in executing both disarmament and its control, which the Soviet delegation, like ourselves, seems to desire.

The first question I raised -- perhaps the most important -- relates to the actual effectiveness of control.

Mr. Zorin told us yesterday that a large number of questions had been put to him in the abstract, without any link with concrete disarmament measures. He added that I had been able to see for myself during our years of discussion that under such conditions negotiations on control proved to be sterile; "for," he said, "it is impossible to conduct discussions on control in the abstract" (TNCD/PV.7, page 17). This argument seems to carry some weight, but I should like to examine it a little more closely, taking as an example any given reduction of armed forces or conventional material and founding myself on the question I put to Mr. Zorin on 18 March and the comments he made yesterday.

I said on 18 March (TNCD/PV.4, page 10) that for control to be effective, we must verify not only the amounts removed but also one of the other two figures linked to each other: namely either the figure existing before the reduction, which I called $X$, or that remaining after the reduction, which I called $A$. So far as I understand, Mr. Zorin stated that only the quantities $X - A$, by which we have to reduce the unknown initial total figure $X$, would be subject to verification.

To explain my thought and show the obscurity in which my mind is still plunged, let me quote two sentences from Mr. Zorin's reply.

He first told us -- (I am quoting textually from the French translation): "... an international control organ will be established to which States will supply information about their armed forces and conventional armaments" (TNCD/PV.7, page 14). He then recalled my algebraic definition and added: "... We will supply
the X, and then verify what is to be deducted (the A). We will supply data concerning our armed forces and conventional armaments, since this problem will form part of the first stage of our plan." (Ibid.) How should this first sentence be interpreted? I can only see one explanation for it, which I admit hardly satisfies me. That is, that we shall be entitled to verify the amounts removed, but that we shall have to rely on simple declarations of the amounts existing before the removal. That being so, we should never be sure about the final amounts and could not verify whether the requirements of the treaty had or had not been fulfilled.

My doubts are further intensified by the second quotation from Mr. Zorin, reading as follows: "... It would be ... unrealistic ... to endow the control organ with powers for controlling armaments which still remain at the disposal of States under the terms of the treaty, for these powers could be used for intelligence purposes and could, naturally, not be accepted by States jealous of their own security." (Ibid., page 16). If I compare this quotation with the first one, I arrive at the pessimistic conclusion that if the USSR agrees, for instance, to reduce by ten per cent the number of its heavy guns, Mr. Zorin would authorize us to verify that 100 guns had been eliminated but not that there had been 1,000 such guns to begin with, nor that only 900 of them would then remain, because this, he says, would be espionage. In these circumstances it would profit us little to know that 100 guns had been eliminated, since we should not know whether the number left was 900 or more, or whether the total bore a relationship to the authorized force level.

But I must say that the second quotation from Mr. Zorin’s statement, which I have just read out, may lend itself to an entirely different interpretation. According to this second version there would be espionage only if control were exercised over equipment not subject to reduction at the material time; if, for example, during a stage in which guns were to be eliminated a claim were made to control submarines, these vessels not yet being due for reduction.

I must apologize for explaining these implications, but you are all aware that it is essential for us to understand them clearly and to lay down precise general principles before entering into detailed discussion of the various disarmament measures and the corresponding controls.

I am therefore compelled not only to recall my third question on the parallelism needed in the discussions on disarmament operations and on the corresponding controls, but also to press my first question, in the hope that
the pessimistic hypothesis I have advanced is false and the optimistic one correct. I would summarize this question as follows: Every disarmament operation involves passing from a given level to another level by reduction. A control over such reduction only is not enough. It is also necessary, at least in the case of important material, to check either the initial level or the final level. When I say "check", I mean "control". Is this, or is it not espionage? This is the question on which I am still unable to take a position.

If the replies to the foregoing questions permit us to do so, we shall proceed with the study of each of the elements of the first stage of a disarmament plan and shall propose that each measure and the corresponding control be discussed at the same time. This will be the kind of concrete action Mr. Zorin desires and for which, once the general principles have been fixed, we shall be able to set up groups of experts. For the time being, therefore, I shall not raise any other questions relating to control. But I emphasize that for each disarmament measure we shall have to study parallel control measures.

Furthermore, we shall have to decide, in broad outline, on the initial structure of the international disarmament organization, how it is to develop, its functions, its powers, its relationship with Member States and with the United Nations, the resources to be placed at its disposal etc. For in order to reach agreement on the means that will be needed, on the percentages of national forces and on many other matters, it is not sufficient to state that the control system must be adequate for a given task, or even that it must be international. But these are subjects which we shall take up later. For the moment, it seems to me more important for the success of our work that we should understand one another clearly at this resumption of our negotiations.

I would like to add, in conclusion, that the examples which have been quoted and the discussion now in progress relate to conventional armament factors, which are neither the only, nor the most important, factors in a disarmament plan. Similar questions arise with regard to nuclear disarmament which we think it impossible to defer until the end of the conventional disarmament operations.

In any case, I hope that the clarification resulting from this exchange of views will enable us usefully to continue our efforts to find a common solution.
Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):

I do not propose to dwell in detail on any of the questions which have been raised this morning. I should only like to draw the attention of Mr. Moch, and of our other colleagues, to one part of his statement this morning, particularly that part of it which referred to a similar question that was discussed at our meeting of 18 March.

Today Mr. Moch spoke about control questions and in particular about the answers which I gave him at our meeting yesterday. He did not seem to be fully satisfied with some parts of our reply and wished apparently to receive some further clarifications.

I must draw Mr. Moch's attention to his statements on 18 March when he said:

"... For certain operations which are not of decisive importance -- the strength of armed forces, for example -- the signatory Powers will probably be satisfied if each signatory Power declares the initial figures and if the numbers taken out of service are verified; from this it will be possible to deduce the number remaining in service." (TNOD/PV.4, page 11)

And he added:

"I repeat, therefore, this point may not be very important in certain fields, such as personnel strength, but it is quite important in the case of material ..." (Ibid.)

This refers to the same subtraction formula X - A. Mr. Moch thus admits that for a number of matters it is not vitally important. He mentioned this, in particular, in connexion with the problem of the figures for the armed forces, and said, that it would suffice if a State would declare a particular total quantity and then a check would be made of the quantity which would be deducted. This would be sufficient. I have no doubt that, in connexion with other matters also, not only matters relating to the total numbers of armed forces, this would have no vital significance, even from Mr. Moch's point of view. It follows that there may, apparently, not even be a common approach to this question. It depends on what specific measures will be accepted by us for implementation and what particular measures will be verified. In other words, I understand that Mr. Moch seemingly does not object to what I said at the last meeting, namely, that in this matter -- the matter of control -- a concrete approach is necessary, not an abstract approach.

Today he has, it is true, departed somewhat from this line of approach apparently; he said that, before talking of details, it was necessary to
establish clear principles. If it is a matter of general principles of control, these have we think, been sufficiently clearly defined by us.

They are set out in detail in the pronouncements of the Head of the Soviet Government to which I referred at the last meeting and were set out here in detail in our speeches of 16 March, and at yesterday's meeting. It seems to me that our basic positions in this matter do not evoke objections from Mr. Moch either. In any case, today he confirmed his agreement on six basic points. We think this is sufficient to enable us to pass on to the examination of control questions in conjunction with specific disarmament measures on which there must be agreement. For us too, it is of great importance, I should say of prime importance to know, what agreement we will come to on questions directly affecting disarmament.

If we come to an agreement about what is to be carried out by way of disarmament at the first stage, at the second stage and at the third stage, I think that we shall also agree on how to control those specific measures at each of the stages of disarmament. That is why we consider that further discussion of an abstract nature on this question would be unprofitable. We have to pass on to the examination of concrete disarmament measures and come to an agreement about them. If we agree on concrete measures we shall work out in detail control measures also to correspond to them. The basic positions in the matter of control are, to my mind, clear and they do not seem to arouse any objections on the part of Mr. Moch or, apparently, of the other Western delegations. That is what I wanted to say additionally on this point.

I shall take this opportunity also to answer some questions asked by Mr. Ormsby-Gore and to clarify our position on the problems which interested him and, obviously other Western delegations.

Mr. Ormsby-Gore asked why the Soviet plan now contains precisely fixed time-limits, whereas the previous comprehensive Soviet proposals of 1955 which, as he said, "might be regarded as the third stage of that plan", did not contain definite time-limits.

I should explain that in 1955 the Soviet Union put forward a broad disarmament programme, but it was a programme not for general and complete disarmament. Still it did provide specific time-limits for both stages of that programme; years were specified in it in which each stage of the programme had to be carried out. No final time-limit was fixed for the fulfilment of the desideratum contained at the end of the programme to the effect that States should go still further in reducing their armed forces down to the lowest levels, since this was merely a desideratum.
Now we propose a concrete programme of general and complete disarmament — a programme, a whole combination of measures — which will ensure the complete and final elimination of all armed forces and armaments of States without exception. The ultimate objective of this programme, as distinct from the 1955 programme, has a wholly concrete and definite character, and consequently a final time-limit can, and must, be fixed for it. We propose fixing this final time-limit at four years. That is the clarification which I wanted to give in connexion with Mr. Ormsby-Gore's question.

Mr. Ormsby-Gore also desired to know whether the provisions on control contained in the 1956 Soviet plan will apply to the present Soviet plan or whether they have undergone some modification.

I can say that, in the main, the Soviet provisions on control in the plan referred to by Mr. Ormsby-Gore, of course, retain their importance. In regard to the practical application of the concrete measures and forms of control provided for in those proposals and of other possible measures and forms of control which could be found necessary, these should be the subject of negotiation during the preparation of a treaty applicable to the concrete measures and stages of general and complete disarmament. In other words, we have the same approach in this case as, in general, to the concrete questions of control relating to individual disarmament measures. We are prepared to discuss these concrete problems in their application to the concrete disarmament measures upon which we shall reach agreement.

The question was also asked whether the international control organ should use aerial photography at every stage of the Soviet plan or will this control measure be used at the last stage only.

If what is meant is a system of aerial observation and survey over the whole territory of States such a measure can, in our opinion, be introduced, of course, on the completion of general and complete disarmament because, before that, at earlier stages, such a measure could be utilized for gathering military intelligence data and the possibility of doing this would disappear only on the complete liquidation of all armed forces and armaments.

Obviously, I am not referring here to the various forms of aerial observation which are being negotiated at the Three Power Conference in Geneva on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, where, as you know, a certain measure of agreement has now been reached on certain flying lanes for aerial inspection, a question connected with the taking of air samples when a nuclear explosion is suspected, etc. This is a special question which, as Mr. Ormsby-Gore knows, is being, on the whole, satisfactorily solved in the Three Power negotiations.
If, on the other hand, the possibility is meant of utilizing the aerial photography method as a means of forestalling sudden aggression then, as you are aware, the Soviet Union has already put forward specific proposals in this connexion which, however, to our regret, were not accepted by the Western Powers.

Those are the additional explanations which I wanted to give in connexion with Mr. Ormsby-Gore's questions.

In conclusion, I should like to add that, as I see it, we need to continue the substantive discussion of the problems involved in general and complete disarmament, try to reach agreement on basic principles and on the basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, come to agreement on the basic stages of that treaty or, rather, of this process of general and complete disarmament and, having reached agreement on all these basic problems, proceed to a more detailed elaboration of the contents of the treaty on the various basic stages of general and complete disarmament.

When examining the specific stages and the disarmament measures appropriate to each stage we shall, of course, examine also all the questions connected with control over these measures.

These are the additional general considerations which I wanted to put forward at today's meeting.

Mr. MOCH (France) (translation from French): I intervene again to comment on the reply Mr. Zorin has just made me. First, I should like to convince him that there is no contradiction between what I said on 18 March and what I said just now. He quoted a sentence about operations which are not of decisive importance, from my statement on 18 March. If he looks at my statement today he will find the following sentence:

"It is also necessary, at least in the case of important material, to check either the initial level or the final level." (page 11 above)

Thus we must know, in the case of operations we consider important, such as the elimination of surplus heavy artillery, which, if retained would make it possible immediately to reconstitute an army larger than is authorized by calling up reservists, or the stoppage of manufacture of fissionable materials for military purposes -- those are very important operations -- whether we are going to rest content with declarations or whether we shall have the right to carry out checks on the spot. That is, basically, the whole problem.
On this point Mr. Zorin, whom I have long known to be a fine fencer -- a skilful negotiator -- tried to draw me onto the ground of concessions and to avoid mentioning anything but unimportant operations. But the most vital operations are, by definition, important operations and it is with regard to these that we wish to be certain that not only the quantities eliminated, but also the quantities retained will be verified, since for all the reasons I have explained, and to which I will not revert, mere knowledge of the quantities eliminated does not give us any certainty.

I venture to hope that I shall have a further reply from Mr. Zorin on this point.

I will add one final remark which has no connexion with what I have been saying. Mr. Zorin has just referred to the Soviet plan of 1955. He said it was not one of "general and complete disarmament". Nevertheless, a few sentences later, at the conclusion of that passage, he said: "Now we propose a concrete programme of general and complete disarmament", i.e. a programme different from that of 1955 which, he had just told us, was not general and complete.

Now in Mr. Krushchev's statement on the 1955 plan to the United Nations General Assembly, I find the following sentence:

"It (the Soviet Government) is convinced that these proposals (i.e. the 1955 proposals) constitute a sound basis for agreement on this vitally important issue". (General Assembly, Official Records, Fourteenth Session, 799th plenary meeting, paragraph 92)

This shows that undue importance must not be attached to the words "general and complete", since Mr. Krushchev considers a plan that Mr. Zorin has just told us was not general and complete as being, nevertheless -- I quote -- "a sound basis for agreement on this vitally important issue".

Mr. GRIMSBY-GoBE (United Kingdom): First of all, I should like to thank Mr. Zorin for the replies he has given to some of the questions I raised in my speech on Monday of this week. I listened to them with interest, but naturally I shall wish to study them in greater detail when we have the verbatim record.

As I understand it, he really confirmed what I said about the 1955 plan, that although there were time-limits attached to the first two stages, when we came to the final paragraph -- which I read out on a previous occasion and which I shall not read out again -- he confirmed that there was no time-limit attached to that
particular paragraph, which looked forward to the day when the armed forces of States were reduced to those necessary for internal security purposes and for the obligations of nations under the United Nations Charter.

As regards the provisions for control, I may have misled Mr. Zorin — although he is such an expert on these matters that I do not expect that was the case — when, speaking on Monday, I referred to rather detailed provisions in the 1956 plan — they really appeared, I think, first of all, in the 1955 plan -- but I was glad to hear him say that he still thought that those provisions for control were significant because if we look at the 1955 plan, particularly to one or two of the measures with regard to control, I think they answer one of the doubts that was clearly in the mind of our Polish colleague at this table because on one occasion I remember that he wondered why we made reference to declarations about force levels; and on one occasion he wondered what the use was of obtaining budgetary information. If he will turn to the Soviet Union plan of 1955, he will find in the first stage, where only a standstill of forces was envisaged:

"The above-mentioned measures shall be carried out within two months of the entry into force of the corresponding agreement.

"The United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and France shall furnish the Disarmament Commission, within one month after the entry into force of the convention (treaty), with complete official figures of their armed forces, conventional armaments and expenditures for military requirements." (Disarmament Commission, Official records, Supplement for April to December 1955, annex 15, page 21).

He will also see in the rather detailed provisions for control which were attached to that plan that during the first stage:

"l.(c) The control organ shall have unimpeached access to records relating to the budgetary appropriations of States for military needs, including all decisions of their legislative and executive organs on the subject".

(Ibid. page 24)

I think these declarations in the 1955 plan are extremely relevant to our discussions round this table and I was glad to hear Mr. Zorin say this morning that he considered that these proposals still had some force when applied to any plan we should agree upon at this Conference.
I repeat, I would like to study in greater detail the replies that have been made to some of my questions by Mr. Zorin. I thank him for them because I believe this additional clarification will enable us to carry forward our work.

The CHAIRMAN (Romania) (translation from French): If no other member of the Committee wishes to speak, I will read the communique; it is as follows:

"The eighth meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament was held on 24 March, at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of the representative of the People's Republic of Romania.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 25 March, at 10.30 a.m."

If there are no objections, I take it that the communique is acceptable.

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.