FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE SEVENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Wednesday, 23 March 1960, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI (Poland)
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PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:
Rt. Hon. D. ORMSBY-GORE
Miss B. SALT
Maj-Gen. RIDDLE

United States of America:
Mr. F.M. EATON
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Rear Admiral P.L. DUDLEY

Secretariat:

Personal Representative of the Secretary-General:
Dr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Personal Representative of the Secretary-General:
Mr. W. EPSTEIN
The CHAIRMAN (Poland) (translation from French): I declare open the seventh meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament.

I call first upon the representative of Romania, who is the first speaker on the list.

Mr. MEZLIESCU (Romania) (translation from French): At the present stage of our discussions, my delegation considers it necessary to state its views on a very far-reaching problem, namely, the effects of general and complete disarmament on the future conduct of international relations -- a problem to which various representatives of Western countries have already referred.

As long as States retain a military organization, armed forces and armaments, military rivalries and balance-of-power considerations -- which amount to more or less the same thing -- will continue to influence their policy and act as a stimulus to the arms race, with all its dangers and hazards.

The arms race has become a major political problem in itself. It is now the main source of international tension and danger of war. It poisons the lives of all the nations, and is one of the main obstacles to their economic and cultural progress.

The arms race and its corollary, the militarization of the life of States, restrict the fundamental freedoms of men, distort their private lives and their ideas of the future, and create a psychosis which, in itself, becomes a danger to the security of the international community, because it seems to make some people more afraid of the prospect of a world without arms or conflicts than of a nuclear war.

General and complete disarmament, by putting an end to the arms race, creates new and radically different conditions, both for the development of international relations and for the life of each nation.

What would international life be like in this new world -- the disarmed world? Obviously, it would be rash to attempt a detailed picture of it. But some of its characteristic features can already be pointed out.

First of all, there would no longer be any material means of making war. The elimination of armed forces and armaments -- both nuclear and conventional -- and of general staffs and commands, the conversion of war industry into peace industry,
the cessation of war propaganda, the abolition of military training, the liquidation of military alliances, etc., are all factors which would prevent not only the outbreak of war, but preparation for it.

Even on the absurd assumption that in some countries power would be monopolized by political forces which would not reject the idea of a war conducted with sporting guns and kitchen knives or with the light arms of the internal police force, the necessary preparations for setting up a general staff, the drawing-up of a plan of attack, the preparation of public opinion, the concentration of troops, the organization of lines of communication, transport, supplies, etc., could not escape detection by international controls.

As we have often pointed out, when general and complete disarmament is achieved, international control will be practically unlimited.

Apart from the abolition of the material means of waging war and the widest international control, there is another factor, at least equally important, which should be taken into account when considering what the future disarmed world will be like: that is the moral factor -- public opinion -- which will play an increasingly large part in a disarmed world. The nations will exercise increasingly effective control over their own governments, obliging them, when necessary, to conform to the universally adopted standards of peaceful coexistence. In the last few years it has been possible to observe the increase in the weight of world public opinion and its influence. Armed conflicts have been prevented, others, already begun, have been stopped, and the pressure of public opinion has played an effective part in all cases.

In this connexion it is worth quoting a passage from an editorial in that influential American newspaper the "New York Herald Tribune", which wrote on 21 March this year:

"Furthermore, for perhaps the first time in Western history, the brandishing of powerful weapons tends to alienate opinion rather than to intimidate it. And although those weapons are developed in utmost secrecy, they must be tried out before all the eyes and ears of the globe".

If public opinion is now beginning to refuse to let itself be intimidated by the military machine of a State, it is easy to imagine what authority it will have when the nations no longer have anything to fear from weapons of mass destruction or large armed forces.
The positive influence of the will of the peoples who demand a world without arms made itself felt, whether we like it or not, in the very act of setting up our Committee, and will, I hope, make itself felt in our work as a spur to progress.

Of the evils which beset mankind, one of the most terrible is want. A large proportion of the world's population is in the grip of hunger. There are many under-developed countries which cannot provide minimum standards of human life for their people. General and complete disarmament will help to solve that problem too.

The existing lack of balance between the highly developed countries and those which are under-developed could be corrected in a short time. One of the main sources of conflict and disequilibrium from which our world now suffers would thus be removed.

The inability of States to use threats and military pressure against other States is sure to have very far-reaching consequences in a world without arms or armed forces.

Safe from the threat of war, each nation would enjoy better conditions in which to develop freely according to its interests and aspirations.

There will certainly be a radical change in human psychology. Once the world is delivered from the spectre of annihilation and is enjoying conditions of unimpeded material and spiritual development, relations of peaceful co-operation and mutual assistance will most certainly be established and will develop progressively between the individuals and between nations.

In a world without weapons there could, of course, still be misunderstandings between States. We do not regard general and complete disarmament as a panacea, or a means of solving all international problems. But in the new international situation brought about by general and complete disarmament it will be impossible, for the reasons I have already explained, for disputes to result in war.

Certain Western delegates, including Mr. Ormsby-Gore, have raised the problem of the means available to the international community to ensure respect for international law and order in a disarmed world.

The Western plan, as presented to us, includes in its second stage measures for the "initial establishment of the international organization to preserve world peace". (TNCD/3, section II, 1)
The third stage calls for "completion of the establishment of international organizations and arrangements to preserve world peace". (ibid., section III, B, 6)

I should like to say a few words on this subject. Section II, J refers to "the international organization to preserve world peace" -- in the singular. In section III B, 6 we find "completion of the establishment of international organizations ... to preserve world peace" -- this time in the plural.

It thus appears that the intention is to have not just one new international organization to preserve peace, but several -- and this in circumstances in which the establishment of a single organization would be superfluous, since there is already an international organization whose purpose is, precisely, to ensure peace, security and the international rule of law. This organization, we all know, is the United Nations, which I hope nobody is thinking of abolishing. If it is otherwise -- if any government contemplates abolishing the United Nations in the future -- it would be better to say so openly.

We all know very well that the United Nations is far from fulfilling the purposes for which it was set up; but we also know the reasons why.

In a world without arms, where there would be no more military alliances or blocs, there would likewise be no possibility of using the United Nations as an instrument to further the policy of certain Powers. The United Nations would really become a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The machinery provided by the Charter for the maintenance of the international rule of law would be amply sufficient, in our view, to ensure respect for international law in a disarmed world.

I wish to make myself quite clear. I spoke of machinery to ensure respect for international law, for I exclude the possibility of violations of the peace and of the security of States in a world where general and complete disarmament has been effected. In this connexion I feel bound to point out that the Western plan provides, in the third stage, not only for the establishment of international organizations, but also -- and I quote from the same document -- for "completion of ... arrangements to preserve world peace" (TNCD/3, section III, B, 6). This seems to me to show a certain lack of confidence on the part of the authors themselves in the virtues of the plan they have put forward.
Let me explain. For example, every time the question of concluding a pact of non-aggression and co-operation between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries has been raised -- and I think this would be very useful for the maintenance of peace -- the Western Powers have replied that it was unnecessary because of the existence of the United Nations Charter, which contains the necessary provisions to guard against aggression.

Do the authors of the Western plan imagine that the problem of maintaining peace and international security would be so much less easy to solve under conditions of general and complete disarmament than when the world is divided into two military blocs armed to the teeth? It is because they believe this that they think the machinery of the Charter ought to be strengthened by new agreements.

The machinery provided by the Charter to ensure respect for the international rule of law seems to us amply sufficient to call to order any violators of international law in a disarmed world.

I will pass on to another problem: that of maintaining international peace and security during the period in which general and complete disarmament is carried out. During this period all the machinery of coercion provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter will no doubt be applicable.

Because the socialist countries have confidence in the United Nations and in the machinery of the Charter for the maintenance of international peace, security and the rule of law, both during the period when an agreement on general and complete disarmament is being put into effect and in a world in which States would be without the material means of waging war, certain Western representatives have thought fit to conclude that the socialist countries are lacking in realism. In their view, it would not be possible to make the transition from a dangerously over-armed world to one completely disarmed, without setting up international gendarmes or police forces.

My delegation considers that it would be just as mistaken to regard disarmament as a means by which States could continue to make war with other weapons, as to apply the dangerously out-of-date idea of an international police force to the disarmed world and to the new relations that would be established between States. The world has seen enough of international police forces, and it seems that aspirants to this rôle are still not lacking.
But I do not wish to deal with this aspect of the matter today; I do not think that it would help to advance our work. I would like to stress another aspect of the problem, which may enable us to see things more clearly. If an international gendarmerie or police force were to be established during the period in which the Western plan was being put into effect or thereafter, it would, of course, be necessary to make certain assumptions about the possible role of this force.

We should be careful to note that at the time when the Western plan provides for the establishment of international organizations -- allegedly to preserve peace -- i.e. the second and third stages of the Western plan, nuclear weapons would still form part of the armaments of States. Hence the international police force or gendarmerie would have to be provided with the men and weapons it would need in the event of violations of international peace and security by Powers possessing nuclear weapons.

It would therefore be necessary to provide, for this international gendarmerie or police force, quantities of fissionable material and nuclear weapons, together with the means of delivering them anywhere in the world in such quantities that the organization could face any of the existing nuclear Powers or the combined forces of several of them. Moreover, so long as nuclear weapons remain in the arsenals of States, research to perfect them and develop new weapons of mass destruction will necessarily continue, so that the international police force or gendarmerie would also have to be provided with research institutes and with a nuclear industry capable of meeting the need to perfect its nuclear weapons.

Thus we shall have the former nuclear Powers continuing the nuclear arms race, for the stoppage of which the Western plan makes no provision, and, in addition, a new competitor in the race -- the world police force or gendarmerie itself.

Is this what is called realism in regard to the means of ending the arms race in general and the nuclear arms race in particular? It is obvious that the creation of a world police force or gendarmerie could only stimulate the race and give it a most dangerous speed and direction.

In conclusion, I must point out that the concept of an international police force or gendarmerie is based on the idea that peace can be assured by the means used to make war; this, in our view, is absolutely false.
The proposals of the socialist countries for general and complete disarmament and for the future conduct of international relations are based on an entirely different idea. They are based on confidence in human reason, in the ability of the nations to eliminate war and violence from international life and in the ability of the international community, freed from the threat of nuclear war and from war psychosis, to call violators of international law to order by the means provided in the United Nations Charter.

Mr. ORMSBY-GORE (United Kingdom): I have nothing of any consequence to say this morning, but I should like to remind the Committee that last week Mr. Moch put, I think, three or more questions to the Eastern delegations, to which we have not yet had any answer. On Monday I put a dozen or more questions to the Eastern delegations, to which we have so far had no answer. Yesterday, both General Burns and Mr. Moch put further questions, to which we await an answer. Naturally, we do not wish to hurry the answers; but it does make it a little bit difficult for us to continue the debate until at least we have had some answers to some of the questions that have been put.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): In the last few days our Committee has had an exchange of views on a number of questions relating to the Soviet plan for general and complete disarmament and the proposals put forward by our Western colleagues. We have exchanged views on the general problems involved in our work and also on individual concrete proposals which figures in the Soviet plan and the plan of the Western Powers. This exchange of views and the questions which were put on both sides in order to clarify positions require, of course, to be studied, and our last two meetings have been rather full. As Mr. Ormsby-Gore said, he alone put about a dozen questions, so that, naturally, each of our delegations must make a careful analysis both of the substance of the questions and the point to which they were directed. I consider that we need not be at a loss because answers to some of these questions are lacking, particularly since the subject matter of our discussion — the programme of general and complete disarmament submitted by the Soviet Union — has many aspects which can, and must, in our view, be discussed from every angle.
As you are aware, the Soviet Union delegation, and also the delegations of a number of other countries which are members of our Committee, have been considering some of the individual problems touched on or set forth in the Soviet Union plan, and they have at the same time made a number of remarks on questions connected with the Western Powers' plan. We intend to continue to follow this line of action, irrespective of whether we receive answers to some of the questions put by us or not.

It must also be borne in mind that quite a number of questions which may arise will be settled in the course of discussions of specific problems and that they may be settled on the basis precisely of an examination of concrete problems, not in the abstract, because, when a problem is put in an abstract way, there is a danger of the discussion becoming divorced from the concrete problems facing us and from the specific documents in which are set out proposals directed to solving the problem of general and complete disarmament.

As, however, Mr. Crmstby-Gore expressed the view today that he himself, and apparently other Western delegations, are finding it rather difficult, because no answers have been given to some of their questions, I shall venture today to clarify somewhat our position on some of the questions raised at earlier meetings of our Committee. This does not mean, however, that all the questions that have been put even require an answer because, on some of them as I said before, answers will emerge of themselves when we pass on to the practical examination of the concrete problems and questions already adumbrated in the documents that we know.

As regards the theses and questions advanced by Mr. Moch, particularly on questions of disarmament control, I want, first of all, to note with satisfaction that the French delegate has apparently gone to some trouble to study our position on that question and has, on the whole, taken a favourable view of that position -- as I understood from his remarks -- because, in his view, our position has come closer to the position of the Western Powers and conforms to the principle according to which there must be neither control without disarmament nor disarmament without control.
At the same time, Mr. Moch asked some questions in connexion with the problem of control. I must say I cannot refrain from feeling surprised by certain of his statements.

Mr. Moch asks us: does the Soviet programme of general and complete disarmament provide for the establishment of such control as would be capable of verifying the execution of the commitments undertaken, which would be exercised from the very beginning and up to the end of each measure in the sphere of disarmament and which would be embodied in an international agreement concluded not later, as Mr. Moch said "than the date on which the agreement providing for the material execution of the operation to be controlled is signed." (TNCD/PV.4, p.12).

The French delegate claimed further that he did not find the answers to these questions in the documents he was studying, more particularly, in the speeches of N.S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, nor in the latter's replies to the questions of Mr. Pierre Cot, political editor of the newspaper 'Horizon', nor in the statement made by the Soviet delegation on 16 March in the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament.

We have carefully looked through the documents referred to by Mr. Moch and have satisfied ourselves that these documents, not to mention other documents, contain sufficiently full answers to the questions asked by Mr. Moch.

I shall permit myself to quote some extracts from these documents. For instance, N.S. Khrushchev, in his report to the Third Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on 31 October 1959, said, and I quote his statement:

"One need only make a careful study of our proposals to be convinced that the Soviet Government proposes the establishment of strict international control over all disarmament measures."

I stress the words "over all disarmament measures."

"For each stage of disarmament," continued N.S. Khrushchev, "we propose to establish a corresponding stage of control. It is also our intention that the inspectors should be on the territory of States from the very beginning of the disarmament process until its final completion" --
I stress the words "from the beginning of the disarmament process until its final completion," --
"and also after disarmament has been carried out, so that no State can make clandestine war preparations."

It seems to me that this is clearly enough said and we do not quite understand why Mr. Moch asks us whether we intend to control disarmament from the very beginning to the very end. Yes, we do want -- from the very beginning and to the very end -- to have international inspectors control all the disarmament measures which will be carried out.

In his replies to Mr. Pierre Cot on 30 December 1959, N.S. Khrushchev dwelt on this question in even greater detail. He said, and I quote:

"We intend to have control begin simultaneously with the beginning of the implementation of the relevant disarmament measures."

and further, in reply to the same question, he said:

"In the West" N.S. Khrushchev said, "people often misrepresent the position of the Soviet Union in this matter in attempting to show that the Soviet Union, as they make out, proposes to carry out control only after complete disarmament has been effected. This has nothing whatever to do with our position. Such methods can only be resorted to by people who wish to evade a solution of the disarmament problem and who invent a pretext to shift the responsibility for it on to others."

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union has thus given a clear answer in his statement to the question, namely, that we intend that control will be maintained from the beginning to the end of the disarmament process and that the beginning of control will coincide with the beginning of the execution of appropriate measures of disarmament.

True, this is not exactly what the Western Powers are proposing in their plan, for they would like to fix the beginning of control before the beginning of actual disarmament measures. But that does not fit in then with Mr. Moch's formula of no control without disarmament.

We maintain the view that control should go along with disarmament; that is to say that, simultaneously with the process of disarmament, control should apply to that process and to all measures connected with it.
N.S. Khrushchev said on 14 January 1960 at the fourth session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR:

"If our Western partners are concerned really to ensure effective control of disarmament, we welcome this, for that is our position also. The Soviet Union is in favour of strict international control of disarmament. The Soviet Union is in favour of an agreement on general and complete disarmament that will offer a firm assurance that no party will violate its obligations with regard to disarmament. Our proposals provide for the establishment of effective international control over disarmament which, naturally, must correspond to definite stages of disarmament."

This seems to be clear enough. If you want to ensure effective control over disarmament, we are all in favour of it— that is our position.

Acting on instructions from the Soviet Government our delegation gave, in a statement made at the Committee's meeting on 16 March, specific examples of how in our opinion, control can and should be carried out over the implementation of such a measure as, for instance, the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments of States in the first stage of general and complete disarmament.

We said:

"When the measures embodied in the first stage of disarmament begin to be put into effect, an international control organ will be established to which States will supply information about their armed forces and conventional armaments."  (TNCD/Pv.2, page 17).

This is, I believe, what Mr. Moch termed "X - A". We will supply the X, and then verify what is to be deducted (the A).

We will supply data concerning our armed forces and conventional armaments, since this task will form part of the first stage of our plan.

We went on:

"The control machinery will begin to operate simultaneously with the disbandment of the troops which are to be reduced in the first stage, so that the international controllers can be sure that States are complying exactly and strictly with the agreed measures for such reduction..." (ibid.).
In this connexion it should be mentioned that some Western, particularly German, papers, and even so respectable a newspaper as "Die Welt", have tried to misrepresent our position, alleging that we want the inspectors to be national and not international. A quite baseless reference was made in this connexion to a reply given by me at a press conference. The Soviet delegation was obliged to issue a special bulletin, a press release, in which my reply to the question was given verbatim and from which it was absolutely clear that that newspaper and also the "Neue Zürcher Zeitung" had misrepresented our position. Even then we quite clearly stated, and all the members of the Committee heard it, that what we were talking about was international and not national inspectors.

I should draw attention, incidentally, to the dishonest tricks of some foreign newspapers, more especially "Die Welt", which, on learning that we had issued a denial of the statement in the "Neue Zürcher Zeitung", apparently became apprehensive lest we should later announce publicly somewhere that it too had been just as unobjective in its attitude. In one of its subsequent issues it wrote alleging that "the Soviet delegation a few days later explained that it was incorrect to interpret its position as meaning that it was in favour of having national inspectors, and that it favoured international inspectors". Apparently this had not been realized by "Die Welt" from the very outset, when we clearly said we were in favour of international inspectors. In order to cover up their incorrect statements these newspapers attempted to shift the onus to us by alleging that we had corrected ourselves on this matter.

I am giving this example simply in order to show how people try to misrepresent our position, though it has been perfectly clear ever since we first stated it. I think that all my colleagues in the Committee can confirm that in my statement on 16 March I very clearly said:

"The control machinery will begin to operate simultaneously with the disbandment of the troops which are to be reduced in the first stage, so that the international controllers can be sure that States are complying exactly and strictly with the agreed measures for such reduction." (Ibid. page 17).

In the same statement we gave another example also, when referring to control over the liquidation of foreign military bases on alien soil in the second stage of general and complete disarmament. We stressed, and I quote, that —
"In order to ensure that States fulfil their obligation to destroy their military bases on foreign territories, international inspectors will have to be sent to such bases..." (ibid., page 18).

--- in the same way as international inspectors would be sent to check the reduction of conventional armed forces,

"and given the opportunity of supervising all measures taken for the liquidation or destruction of these bases" (ibid.).

On this point, incidentally, when we spoke of foreign bases, neither "Die Welt" nor any other Western newspaper questioned our intention to send international controllers. When it came to the reduction of conventional armed forces, however, they for some reason expressed doubts of our intention to send out international inspectors.

Lastly, on 16 March we said:

"Another factor of immense importance is a realistic approach to the question of control over the implementation of the general and complete disarmament programme. Our view is that realism must here take the form of control which is, on the one hand, effective and, on the other hand, appropriate to the disarmament measures which are being taken at any particular stage". (ibid., page 20),

we further pointed out that ---

"it would be ... unrealistic, while the disarmament programme is being implemented, to endow the control organ with powers for controlling armaments which still remain at the disposal of States under the terms of the treaty, for these powers could be used for intelligence purposes and could, naturally, not be accepted by States jealous of their own security" (ibid.).

I should like in this connexion to give an explanation to Mr. Martino, the representative of Italy, who seemed displeased, it would appear, at our mentioning the possibility of spying. We are realists. We understand that, if inspectors are sent to verify armed forces and armaments which are not subject to reduction or abolition, this can only be attributed to a desire to learn what those armed forces are, and that cannot be regarded as other than military intelligence or, to use a coarser word, spying. That cannot be helped. There is no need to propose forms of control which could, in fact, be qualified as military intelligence operations. Let us agree on forms of control which cannot be qualified as espionage. These
would be precisely those forms of control which will ensure observation and verification of the execution of disarmament measures, i.e. control of the types of troops and armaments which are to be reduced or, in the case of armaments, destroyed. Go ahead and verify it. Then it will not be represented as a form of espionage or military intelligence activity and there will be no need to take offence. We must propose forms of control which cannot be qualified as forms of military intelligence activity or espionage.

I apologize to my colleagues for the rather lengthy quotations I have given, but Mr. Moch and some of the other speakers obliged me to do this because they said that our statements and those of N.S. Khrushchev do not, allegedly, contain any reply to the questions they asked. I think any unprejudiced person will gather from the passages I have just quoted and the explanations I have provided that those statements contain sufficiently full replies to the questions which interest my colleagues.

However, with regard to the questions asked by Mr. Moch and some of the other Western representatives concerning control, I should like to make one further remark about something I have already mentioned in passing at the beginning of my speech today.

Many of these questions were asked in the abstract, unconnected with specific measures of disarmament. I must say that this was also the typical approach adopted previously, during our many discussions on disarmament, more particularly at those held in the Sub-Committee of the United Nations Disarmament Committee in London. But I believe that Mr. Moch, who was a participant at our protracted talks in London and also at the previous talks, came to realize that, when this is how the matter is approached, discussions on control are sterile, for it is impossible to conduct discussions on control in the abstract. Experience shows that fruitful discussions on control have to be quite concrete and relate to specific measures of disarmament. The Soviet delegation will, of course, do all it can to help solve the problems which will arise during such talks.

This attitude is a matter of principle for the Soviet Union and it has frequently found expression in practice, for example, during the talks on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, with which the honourable Mr. Ormsby-Gore and his colleague Sir Michael Wright are well acquainted. I think they too will confirm that, at those talks in Geneva with Mr. Tsarapkin, we have never refused to discuss the quite specific control questions which have arisen, and are
arising, during the drafting of the treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests and all its annexes. I believe that Mr. Ormsby-Gore can confirm that at the moment the conclusion of an agreement on this important question is not in the least being held up because the Soviet Union somehow does not want to formulate control provisions. That is not the reason at all. The main obstacle at the moment is that certain Powers, unfortunately, do not want to renounce explosions -- tests of nuclear weapons, as they now say, below a certain threshold. Thus the point at issue is not control at all, or objections by the Soviet Union on points of control, it is, essentially, the question whether tests are or are not to stop. That is the crux of the matter. And it seems to me that the eighteen months' work of the three-Power Conference at Geneva is a most convincing example of how problems regarding disarmament measures are essentially solved.

The Soviet Union has shown in these talks its sincere desire to elaborate a fairly detailed control system involving the presence of international inspectors on the territory of the Soviet Union and of the other nuclear Powers.

It has given its full agreement to the control system which was prepared by these three nuclear Powers' technical experts, and any delay in concluding the treaty on the discontinuance of tests during all this time has not been, and is not now, in any way due to the existence of disagreement on control matters. Nothing of the kind. The delay is occurring because some of the Powers do not want to discontinue nuclear weapon tests.

It seems to me that this experience suggests the approach we should also adopt to control questions in connexion with general and complete disarmament. The point at issue will not be what forms of control will be proposed by particular countries in our Committee.

As we see it, the main question will be whether the various States do or do not wish to carry out measures which would lead, stage by stage, to general and complete disarmament. That will be the crux of the matter. That is where there are bound to be and inevitably will be serious arguments between us on this subject, but I believe we shall succeed in solving control problems if we agree on the substance of the actual measures of general and complete disarmament.
These are the remarks I felt were required by way of explaining our position on the questions which were put here by my colleagues Mr. Kooeh and Mr. Ormsby-Gore, and I think also to some extent by the Canadian representative.

Regarding the other points which interest our Western colleagues, I think that during the meetings immediately ahead we shall be able to answer other questions as well and thereby help them to examine the real purport of the specific measures of disarmament set forth in the Soviet disarmament plan which is before our Committee.

Mr. MOCH (France) (translation from French): I hasten to thank Mr. Zorin for his reply to our questions and for having given it, whether intentionally or otherwise, at the very moment when the Heads of our two Governments are meeting at Orly Airport and driving through the suburbs of Paris.

It is precisely because we do not want to sidestep the disarmament problem or to throw the responsibility for and ultimate failures on others that we are trying to get matters clarified.

Since Mr. Zorin has spent a few days studying the questions I ventured to ask him, he will find it quite natural if I confine myself today to thanking him and say that I want to have a correct and full text of the important statement he has just made to us — before drawing our conclusions or perhaps asking further questions.

So, since I do not want to reply now on points of substance and do not want to let myself be influenced by my first impressions — it is always risky in meetings like these to say things which remain on the record and are the result of what has been heard in an interpretation or in the original language without having had time to think it over — I shall confine myself for the moment to thanking Mr. Zorin.

The CHAIRMAN (Poland) (translation from French): As no other member of the Committee desires to speak, I shall now read the communiqué:

"The seventh meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament was held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 23 March, under the Chairmanship of the representative of the People's Republic of Poland."
"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 24 March 1950, at 10.30 a.m."

If there are no objections I take it the communiqué is approved.

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.