FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE SIXTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Tuesday, 22 March 1960, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman

Mr. MARTINO (Italy)
Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV
Col. K. SAVOV
Mr. K. CHRISTOV

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. A.C. CAMPBELL
W/Cdr. R.J. MITCHELL

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. NOSEK
Lieut.-Gen. J. HEČKO
Mr. Z. TRHLÍK

France:

Mr. J. MOCH
Mr. M. LEGENDRE
Col. L. CONVERT

Italy:

Mr. G. MARTINO
Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. L. DINELLI

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
Mr. M. LACHS
Brig.-Gen. J. SLIWINSKI

Romania:

Mr. E. MEZINESCU
Col. C. ROPA
Mr. G. BOGDA

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V. A. ZORIN
Col.-Gen. A.A. GRZYLOV
Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
**PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)**

**United Kingdom:**
- Rt. Hon. D. Ormsby-Gore
- Miss B. Salt
- Maj-Gen. Riddell

**United States of America:**
- Mr. F.M. Eaton
- Mr. C.C. Stelle
- Rear-Admiral P.L. Dudley

**Secretariat:**
- Personal Representative of the Secretary-General: Dr. D. Protitch
- Deputy Personal Representative of the Secretary-General: Mr. W. Epstein
The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): I declare the sixth meeting of the Conference open and I call on the United Kingdom representative to speak.

Mr. ORMSBY-GORE (United Kingdom): I should just like to make a very short intervention as a result of something that the representative of the Soviet Union said in reply to some remarks I made yesterday. It concerned the question of the timing of nuclear disarmament, and in the course of his remarks Mr. Zorin suggested that there was some inconsistency in the position which had been taken up by the United Kingdom with regard to this question. But I do not believe, if he will look back over the record, that there has been any inconsistency. We have always stated that we believe that disarmament should be kept in balance, that nuclear disarmament and conventional disarmament should go hand in hand. If Mr. Zorin would refer to the Anglo-French plan of 1954 or to the plan of 1956, he would see that provision is made for measures of nuclear disarmament to take place at the same time as measures of conventional disarmament. We have always opposed the idea of a ban on nuclear weapons at the first stage. This was a proposal which had frequently been made by the Soviet Union in the past. Indeed we had always recognized that once nuclear weapons existed it would probably have to be left until the last stage to bring about their elimination. That is why I stated at the United Nations First Committee of the General Assembly:

"... I note that the Soviet proposals no longer contain a demand for an immediate ban on nuclear weapons before any start can be made with reductions in conventional forces. This is a major change, and is a move in the direction of balanced disarmament which we have consistently advocated."

In saying that it was a step in the right direction I indicated that it met our demand that the final elimination of nuclear weapons would have to be left until the last stage, but it in no way detracted from the position held consistently by the United Kingdom that disarmament should proceed by balanced stages and that provision for nuclear disarmament should be made at all stages pari passu with provisions for conventional disarmament.

Later in his remarks Mr. Zorin went on to say that it did not make any difference to them where the nuclear disarmament came. He said:
"... the Soviet Government has always been, and will continue to be, a determined advocate of the total prohibition of nuclear weapons at any stage of the disarmament programme." (TNCD/PV.5, page 43)

I am rather puzzled by this statement because only a few minutes earlier I had put a direct question to the Czechoslovak representative and asked if I was to understand from his remarks that he would be prepared to look at nuclear disarmament in one of the earlier stages, and he replied that this was not so. Therefore, I think there is some confusion as to whether it is now the proposal of the representatives from the Eastern countries that the prohibition of nuclear weapons should come in the last stage or at one of the earlier stages.

Mr. MOCH (France) (translation from French): Yesterday Mr. Martino replied to questions put by the representatives of Poland and Czechoslovakia, and Mr. Ormsby-Gore asked for particulars which we consider essential and which I would sum up as follows:

Does the Soviet delegation consider it necessary that, before any agreement is reached on the first stage, we should agree in detail on the measures included in that stage; and how does it envisage this work?

The world conference for countries not represented here ought to be carefully prepared, and will presumably continue for a long time before agreements are reached, in particular between neighbouring States in certain troubled areas of the world. Is the time needed to reach a general agreement at the conference included or not included in the period of four years suggested by the Soviet Government?

Should not the establishment of the international disarmament organization precede effective disarmament measures?

Will the time-limits proposed by Mr. Zorin for each stage be observed, even if some of the measures provided for are not put into effect? Must each stage be completed before we pass on to the next?

Lastly, do the fuller details given in former Soviet plans remain applicable or not?

Mr. Ormsby-Gore also asked a question about nuclear disarmament being left until the last stage, to which he referred again this morning and to which Mr. Zorin gave a preliminary reply; I shall revert to this matter shortly.
For my part, on 18 May I put three specific questions on control which have so far not been answered.

I, too, should like some explanations which, like those already referred to, are essential for assessing the realistic nature of the Soviet plan. They relate to nuclear disarmament and to the maintenance of peace in a disarmed world.

Replying to Mr. Ormsby-Gore yesterday morning, Mr. Zorin said he was willing to advance the nuclear disarmament stage if we so wished. But he immediately added that it consisted mainly of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons.

This is one of those moral prohibitions which are unnecessary when trust prevails, but mean very little in times of mistrust. What we need in the nuclear sectors, as in other sectors, is effective, controlled disarmament that will assure every State that the others are fulfilling their obligations properly. Now it is obviously impossible to control prohibition of use, just as it is today impossible to control prohibition of the possession of nuclear weapons. Hence this is not the way we should begin disarmament procedure.

Similarly, Mr. Zorin regards the prohibition of tests as a first step towards nuclear disarmament. That is not the view of the French delegation, which, as I have often said during the last three years, considers that prohibition of tests alone merely means maintaining a discrimination in favour of the Powers which have already carried out a sufficient number of experiments.

The only way of really delivering the world from the nuclear threat is closely to link the prohibition of tests, which is controllable, with cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes, which is also controllable, and with rapid conversion of stocks (not merely token conversion), which can also be verified. The surplus of stocks in existence as conversion proceeds will remain unknown; we shall only know that it is decreasing, since production will have been stopped and large quantities of stocks will have been converted to peaceful uses. At that point, to complete the work of nuclear disarmament, prohibitions of use and possession would be conceivable, but it is not realistic to begin with them, since they are impossible to verify. Does Mr. Zorin agree to this order of operations in the nuclear sector?

In addition, precisely because we know that stocks may always remain in being in spite of all moral prohibitions of possession or use, we have constantly proposed that all types of nuclear vehicles should be given priority. The Western plan takes account of this idea, on which I will not dwell further, as I have already gone into it at length on several occasions.
I now wish to draw attention to another aspect of the Soviet plan which is also causing us concern because we do not consider it realistic. Suppose — and I assure Mr. Zorin that this is only a supposition — that the plan were accepted as it stands and applied by all the countries of the world. After four years the world would be completely disarmed: there would no longer be any military or para-military institutions.

I shall ignore for the time being the difficulty of defining the para-military organizations to be abolished: it would be necessary to distinguish them from others intended for peaceful purposes, in particular youth organizations. Among such organizations there are some which give training needed by soldiers: discipline, various sports, piloting aircraft, orientation, the use of ground, games of skill as a preparation for shooting, etc. Suppose, once more, that there is full agreement, even on disputable definitions of this kind.

What would then be the world situation? Each State — and I quote Mr. Khrushchev speaking before the United Nations General Assembly — would have only "strictly limited police (militia) contingents — of a strength agreed upon for each country — equipped with light firearms and intended solely for the maintenance of internal order and the protection of the citizens' personal safety". (A/PV.799, paragraph 76).

This formula seems clear and definite, but it immediately introduces serious difficulties.

First of all, it calls for various amendments to the United Nations Charter. The Charter provides, in Article 43, that all Members of the United Nations "undertake to make available to the Security Council ... armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security". The Soviet plan calls for an amendment here since, having no forces, Member States would no longer be able to fulfill these obligations.

Moreover, in Article 47 the Charter establishes "a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament". It is specified that the Committee shall consist (I quote again) "of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives". This article
also would need amendment, for, as all officers would have disappeared with complete disarmament, none of the five permanent members would be able to delegate officers to the Committee.

These, however, may perhaps be regarded as secondary considerations in view of the objective before us; in that I agree with those who may oppose my views. Thus I merely touch on these considerations, and pass without delay to the principal difficulty, which is one of substance.

What will be the police forces assigned to each State in this completely disarmed world? I do not know whether the authors of the Soviet plan will give us an answer to this question.

We can, however, imagine an answer based on former Soviet documents. The proposal of 10 May 1955 which Mr. Khrushchev, on 19 September 1959, still considered likely to provide a satisfactory basis for discussion stated — in regard to arms — that these would be determined in the light (I quote) "of simple agreed criteria including demographic, geographic, economic and political factors". (DC/71, page 21).

Suppose, once more, that there is general agreement on this method and on the criteria to be adopted. Where does this lead us?

If demographic criteria are adopted, the population of the countries of the world varies from less than half a million to over 500 million inhabitants, that is to say, a ratio higher than 1:1,000.

If the geographical criterion is adopted, the differences are no less, for the areas of States vary between some tens of thousands of square kilometres and more than twenty million.

If economic criteria are chosen, similar discrepancies will be found.

In other words, the needs of the different States of the world for security forces will vary in considerable proportions. Certain countries will prove their need to have large forces.

Now, excluding the rural constables in its villages and the municipal police in its boroughs, France uses police and constabulary forces numbering roughly three per thousand of the population. Perhaps some countries will consider a higher proportion necessary. But, even admitting the proportion existing in France, the Soviet Union would be entitled to claim police forces of over 600,000 men, while other States with still larger populations could demand much larger forces. Inversely, very
small countries, some of which might be neighbours of the greatest Powers, would have their police or militia forces limited to some hundreds, or at most some thousands, of men.

It matters little in either case that those men would only have light weapons. In a totally disarmed world, a police force several hundred thousand strong, even if merely armed with revolvers and tear-gas grenades, could easily invade and occupy a small country, making its police forces helpless to oppose their advance.

You may perhaps object and say that I am painting a gloomy picture of the disarmed future of mankind, or that I have no trust in the peaceful spirit of peoples and their governments. I do not want to make my reflections more specific by recalling painful interventions in the internal life of States by foreign forces substituted for the national police.

How can such a risk be avoided? Only two means of doing so are apparent; they are not mutually exclusive, but are on the contrary complementary.

One method is to proceed by stages, adapting the process of disarmament to the progress of the spirit of peace and to the settlement of disputes.

That method obviously precludes the fixing in advance of an exact time-limit for implementation, and is explicitly rejected by our Soviet colleagues when they define three stages extending over four years.

Nevertheless, although it appears slower, that might be the surest way to total disarmament.

The other method is to strengthen and codify international law, and give it executory force. That is the idea embodied in the Western plan, indicated by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd at the last general debate in the United Nations Assembly, and reverted to here by Mr. Ormsby-Gore.

Our colleagues from the East have only seen in that suggestion the creation of an international police force, to which they appear to be strongly opposed. Only yesterday morning Mr. Zorin asked what would become of the United Nations if such a concept were adopted, and expressed pity for the fate of its Secretary-General, Mr. Hammarskjöld.

We have no intention of depriving the United Nations of its powers. Indeed, this organization for the maintenance of peace should be set up within the United Nations framework.
Its functions would be of three kinds: to enunciate international law, to apply it to specific cases, and to enforce decisions.

The first of these functions — the codification of international law — belongs to the United Nations, which would thus play not a lesser but a greater part.

Then there is the application of the law to specific cases.

This second task would need judges, not government delegates. Those judges, too, could be found within the framework of the United Nations, by resorting to the International Court of Justice.

I am well aware that, in order to empower the Court to enunciate the law in specific cases, its methods at least, if not its Statute, would have to be amended. Article 36 of the Statute specifies that — I am quoting, because I consider this very important —

"The States parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other State accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning..."

the matters listed in the article. It would be sufficient if the States parties to the disarmament treaty all made that Declaration for the whole duration of validity of the treaty.

Thus there exists actually within the framework of the United Nations the means of codifying international law and of applying it to all specific cases.

It then remains to invest the decisions with executory force. In most cases States would abide by them voluntarily.

If they did not, then the law must, like domestic law, prevail: that is to say an international constabulary must be able to oblige disarmed but recalcitrant States to comply with decisions of the Court. Such a force could be constituted by national units placed at the disposal of the Court pending the achievement of total disarmament.

Subsequently, however, in a disarmed world there could be no question of giving up the idea of an international police force. At that stage, and only then, does the idea which seems to have aroused such emotion in our Eastern colleagues come into the picture.
It is, however, only an adjunct to a general system essentially consisting of the strengthening of international law in proportion to the weakening of national arms, its application to specific cases, and lastly resort to compulsion if other means available to the United Nations are not sufficient to enforce international law.

I have perhaps dwelt too long on this second part of my theme. However, I shall not apologize, because I regard as essential, not the solutions which I have outlined and given only as examples, but the ideas which I have developed.

I ask the advocates of the Soviet plan kindly to reflect on the anarchy and peril of a totally disarmed world not at the same time governed by an international system of law with all its consequences.

We wish to succeed in the great work of disarmament. To do so, we must face the problems realistically. It is not realistic to uphold the possibility of passing from a dangerously over-armed to a totally disarmed world without at the same time endowing it with the organs necessary to establish, apply and enforce international law. That is all I wish to make clear, and I should be glad to have the views of our colleagues from the Eastern countries on these ideas.

Mr. NČŠEK (Czechoslovakia): In my intervention today I would like to deal with some aspects of a question which is of essential importance for the achievement of general and complete disarmament. I have in mind the question of safeguarding equal security for all States, which the Czechoslovak delegation considers to be one of the basic principles of general and complete disarmament.

In his intervention the other day the leader of the Italian delegation -- our distinguished Chairman today -- kindly answered the questions raised previously by the Czechoslovak delegation.

In the first of these questions we asked whether the plan of the Western countries included the liquidation of all military bases on foreign territories. In his answer the representative of Italy referred to the problem of military bases in general terms. As to the military bases on foreign territories he pointed out that -- and I quote from the verbatim record in English:

"..... this question will no longer arise when armed forces have been reduced to levels corresponding with the requirements of internal security and of obligations under the United Nations Charter". (TNOD/FV.5, page 15)
According to the reply of Mr. Martino military bases on foreign territories should disappear in some undetermined way and sometimes at the very end of the Western disarmament programme, which moreover does not contain, as has already been pointed out by various speakers, any at least approximate time limits or periods for the carrying out of all disarmament measures included in this programme.

In respect to this situation it is, in the view of my delegation necessary to clarify, before taking up other aspects of the problem under consideration, our standpoints on the requirement of safeguarding equal security of all States. It is not possible to admit that during the process of carrying out the disarmament measures the safeguarding of security would be ensured for one State or for one group of States only, without paying due attention to the interests of the security of other States.

In the view of my delegation a consistent assertion of the requirement of maximum security rests with the achievement of general and complete disarmament as well as with the achievement of a situation in which there would be no material basis for waging wars, that is, no military potentials, no military organizations and no military institutions. This requirement must, however, be fully respected also in the course of the carrying out of disarmament measures.

The Czechoslovak delegation believes that the basis for an equal and well-balanced security is the mutual balance of various disarmament measures. The proposal of the Soviet Union on general and complete disarmament does emanate from this principle and applies this principle in all three proposed stages. This is also one of the reasons for placing in the forefront of the disarmament programme the requirement of a gradual reduction of armed forces and their armaments down to their complete liquidation, as provided for in the proposal of the Soviet Union.

The first stage of the proposal of the Socialist countries recommends a reduction of the armed forces of the USSR, the People's Republic of China and the United States of America to the level of 1.7 million men, and of those of the United Kingdom and France to 650,000 men, as well as the corresponding reduction of conventional armaments. At the same time, other States would carry out the reduction of their armed forces to the agreed levels. This measure complies with the principle of the safeguarding of equal security because the possibility of aggression would be considerably decreased owing to such a substantial reduction of armed forces. It would further contribute to a significant improvement of the international atmosphere and to a significant limitation of the danger of a surprise attack.
The proposal of the Soviet Union also provides in the second stage for the complete liquidation of all armed forces and conventional armaments. It means that at the end of the second stage of general and complete disarmament the chance of launching aggression would, in comparison with the first stage, be further considerably diminished. The carrying out of aggression would become really very difficult. The conduct of war by small, numerically limited police forces, armed only with light firearms, is hard to imagine. Such numerically limited forces will not possess adequate material means necessary for launching an attack and to carry on offensive operations.

Likewise, it is not probable that an aggressive war could be conducted only with missiles and nuclear weapons without using conventional armed forces. The goal aimed at by an aggressor would be not only to unchain aggression, but also to carry it on in order to occupy foreign territories, to seize economic resources and to exploit occupied territory for his own interest. This, however, cannot be achieved by using only nuclear weapons and missiles without employing the so-called classical armed forces and their armaments. The idea of a war being only a duel of rockets and ballistic missiles, I venture to say, is quite unrealistic.

We can, therefore, conclude our deliberation by the following: with the decrease of the danger of aggression the security of all States will substantially grow. At the end of the third stage no single State will be able to start an aggressive war against another State.

I would like to refer very briefly to the question of military bases in connexion with the discussion of the other day.

The second stage of the proposal of the Soviet Union provides among other things also for the liquidation of all military bases on foreign territories. The establishment of military bases at the present time creates indisputably a serious threat to the States surrounded by these bases. But, at the same time, it creates also a danger for the States on whose territories these bases are established and constructed. Hence, the following, that the liquidation of military bases and the withdrawal of troops and military personnel from the territories of foreign States to within their own national frontiers, as provided for in the Soviet proposal, would contribute to the strengthening of the security of all States, including those on whose territories the bases and troops are displaced.

The representative of the Soviet Union has already stressed that we must not isolate the question of nuclear and rocket weapons from the question of military bases. In our view this mutual interdependence is not being sufficiently taken into account by the Western plan.
The third stage of the Soviet plan provides for the complete liquidation of all armed forces and of all armaments, without difference. This will be the best guarantee of peace and security for all the peoples of the entire world, without exception.

The equal level of security for all States is further safeguarded by the basic provision of the proposal put forward on 18 September 1959 by the Soviet Union which remains valid throughout all stages and which reads as follows:

"While the programme of general and complete disarmament is being carried into effect and until the final disbandment of all armed forces, States shall maintain the same ratio among the various services of their armed forces as existed at the time of the entry into force of the disarmament agreement."

(A/4219, page 15)

This fundamental provision safeguards the balanced security of all States.

The proposal of the Socialist countries therefore solves the question of equal security for all States without difference and in all stages not only by this fundamental provision, but also through an essential increase in the security of all States at every stage of general and complete disarmament by reducing radically the possibility of the outbreak of war. The substance of the disarmament measures eliminates the danger of a surprise attack, which is reduced in the first stage of disarmament and which vanishes gradually in the course of the second and third stages. Our study of the Western proposal, on the other hand, did not result in our finding any equivalent provision.

If a certain balance of security for all existed at the very start of disarmament it would be seriously violated in the first and second stages of the Western proposal. How would the situation appear in the course of these stages? The armed forces of the United States of America and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would be slightly reduced towards the end of the second stage by some 13 to 16 per cent. The armed forces of the other States would probably not be reduced at all, because it is only at the second stage that the proposed conference would take place at which certain reductions of their armed forces might be agreed upon. In this way a disproportion in the reduction of the armed forces of the various States would arise.

An essential factor of mutual equality and security for all States is a requirement which is fully recognized in the Soviet proposal under which disarmament measures should, from the very beginning, include all States. We consider the omission of this point to be a serious deficiency in the first stage, and even in the second stage, of the Western plan.
The measures proposed in the two first stages of the Western plan would not even affect the constantly growing armed forces of the German Federal Republic. These forces, it is known, are being equipped with the latest military techniques and represent a dangerous focus of the potential outbreak of a new world war in the very heart of Europe.

The people of Czechoslovakia, having in mind their historical experience with aggressive German militarism, watchfully follow the developments on the other side of the Western frontiers of their country. Events we are facing today in Western Germany are alarming. The Bundeswehr is being built up with increasing speed as a numerically strong, modern army equipped with rockets and nuclear weapons. It is no secret that the Government at Bonn regards the framework of NATO and even the questionable restrictions imposed by the Paris treaties as being too tight. Therefore, the Government of the German Federal Republic is conducting negotiations aimed at the establishment of military bases for the Bundeswehr in Spain and in other European countries.

We consider the fact that the proposed measures of the Western countries completely overlook the growth of the military potential of the German Federal Republic to be one of the fundamental shortcomings of the Western proposal. Likewise, we cannot refrain from comment upon the incessant increase in the levels of the armed forces of NATO as a whole, which are also being equipped with modern arms including nuclear weapons and, according to General Norstad, mobile forces of NATO charged with special missions have to be finished this year. It is generally known that the levels of the armed forces of NATO are still growing. This fact is in flagrant contradiction to the policy of the countries who are signatories of the Warsaw treaty. These countries continue to reduce the levels of their armed forces unilaterally and thus to create favourable conditions for successful negotiations on general and complete disarmament.

The necessity of safeguarding mutual equality and security has, therefore, also to be reflected in the requirement that the limitation and reduction of armed forces unconditionally include all countries from the very beginning. This requirement, however, is completely missing from the Western plan.

What are the methods for strengthening the security of States according to the plan of the Western countries? This plan does not answer that question in a satisfactory way. On the contrary, the urgently required security would be further weakened by the accomplishment of unlimited exchanges of information, and by the
control and inspection of all military installations still almost untouched by disarmament. Such an exchange of information and inspection would furnish the potential aggressor with better information than has ever been possessed by any country preparing to unleash an aggressive war. The possibilities of contemporary destructive war techniques increase the importance of such exact information for an aggressor.

According to the Western plan the whole first stage would, in reality, be only some sort of preparation, and this applies also even to the second stage which does not provide for any essential disarmament measures. On the other hand, the first and second stages include a whole series of actions which should lead to a preliminary exchange of important military information, data and characteristics. We may judge the real scope of the required information by the fact that there are provisions calling for such information as, for instance, declarations of the location of rocket weapons as well as places of manufacture of such weapons, the establishment of ground and aerial inspection, and so on, in the same phase of negotiations in which there has been hardly any other progress in the field of disarmament than academic negotiation and the study of questions.

In our view these requirements of the Western plan are contradictory to the principle set out by the French representative, Mr. Moch, during our fourth meeting, when he stressed in his speech that:

"there should be no control without disarmament just as there should be no disarmament without control."  

Where the requirement of unlimited control and gathering of information without the achievement of disarmament measures would lead was pointed out as early as 1957 by General Genevey, a member of the French delegation. In the Revue de Défense nationale, No. 11, 1957, he stated:

(continued in French)

"Two adversaries are facing each other, as in a duel. Each knows the forces of the other and is in a position to annihilate him by a surprise attack, the preparation of which would take no longer than the time necessary to notify a very limited number of executive officers. It is undoubtedly the aggressor who will profit from such a situation because, by taking the initiative, he can be sure of reducing the effectiveness of the counter-attack in advance to a very low level. In the war of tomorrow, for a nation which has no aggressive intentions, a prior exchange of information will be a factor not of security but of insecurity."
So much for the opinion of General Genevey. How is it possible, therefore, to speak in connexion with the Western plan of security for all States if the potential aggressor would be provided with all the information necessary for launching an attack?

The Czechoslovak delegation expects that our negotiations will pass on to the concrete discussion of individual measures of general and complete disarmament. If this work is to be successful it is necessary to reach an agreement on the fundamental principles on which our work will be based. One of the most essential principles is embodied in the requirement that in the whole course of the realization of disarmament measures the principle of safeguarding the security of all States should be observed. In our view the proposal of the Western countries not only fails to guarantee equal security for all States, without distinction, in the course of disarmament but, on the contrary, violates this principle in all stages.

If, on the other hand, we analyze the proposal of the Socialist countries from the standpoint of equal safeguarding and strengthening of security, we necessarily arrive at the conclusion that it fully meets this requirement as regards the whole operation as well as during the realization of particular stages of general and complete disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): Before giving the floor to the representative of Romania, who has asked to speak, I should like to say something about what the representative of Czechoslovakia has just told us in reply to the speech I made yesterday on what are called foreign bases.

The representative of Czechoslovakia developed a very interesting concept of disarmament as a function of security. I agree with his view. It is not really possible to think of disarmament without the guarantee that security will be maintained for one and all. That is why a constant balance of disarmament must be maintained, and security must be guaranteed, throughout the entire disarmament process. But this means that we cannot accept the concept which the representative of Czechoslovakia has just expounded to us, namely that what are known as foreign bases should be abolished as soon as possible, because this would upset the situation at a preliminary stage, and the security which exists at present, and which will exist for everybody when disarmament begins, would be disturbed to the detriment of some countries and, in favour of others. That is why we cannot accept this idea.
Why do foreign bases exist? They exist as a form of security for certain countries. If you want to abolish these bases before a good deal of progress has been made in disarmament, you will disturb the security of the very countries which established these foreign bases. I shall not enter into the discussion about what these foreign bases are. Mr. Nosek was clearly alluding in his speech to the bases in the NATO countries, and one might question whether it is admissible to speak of foreign bases in this connexion. But I tell you that, for precisely the reasons which have been set forth by the representative of Czechoslovakia, we shall not be able to speak about dismantling and abolishing these bases until disarmament is complete; that is to say, until not only foreign bases but also national bases have to disappear. That is why the programme -- or plan -- put forward by the Soviet Union provides for the abolition of foreign bases precisely at the end of the second stage, that is to say precisely when not only these bases but also national bases have to disappear. Does not the representative of Czechoslovakia agree with his Soviet Union colleague in accepting this principle that foreign bases will have to disappear at the end of the second stage?

I said in my speech that we were not mentioning the abolition of foreign bases because it was clear that, once such a major step had been taken in disarmament, and once all weapons had been abolished, then not only foreign bases but all military bases, including national bases, would have to disappear.

That is why these bases were not mentioned in the Five-Power Plan.

Yesterday Mr. Zorin, though admitting that my observation was correct, told us that the question of foreign bases is a political one, concerning not a disarmament measure but propaganda and politics. We cannot follow him on to that ground. We cannot turn the Disarmament Conference into a conference designed for political propaganda; these considerations are alien to us here and do not concern us. Besides, Mr. Nosek himself supports the political line of thought taken by Mr. Zorin when he tells us, as he did a few minutes ago, that the dismantling and abolition of foreign bases would help to improve the climate of affairs. The abolition of foreign bases would, according to Mr. Nosek, be a very useful measure because these bases are a danger to everybody, including the countries in which they are situated.

It is clear that all armaments constitute a danger, and that is precisely why we want disarmament. We agree; but at what moment should foreign bases be abolished? According to the Soviet plan they should be abolished at the end of
the second stage. I note that the issue at that moment must be the abolition not only of foreign bases but of all bases. No bases, whether on foreign territory or on national territory, will have any further right to exist.

Mr. MEZINGESCU (Romania) (translation from French): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for letting me speak and for making me realize that, in accordance with the Christian principle, charity properly begins at home.

Commenting on my speech at the fourth meeting of our Committee, my French colleague made a few remarks about the place that nuclear disarmament should occupy in a disarmament plan. He said, in particular, that "since nuclear disarmament is the most important factor it must have a privileged place in disarmament operations and not be inserted at the end". (TNCD/PV.4, page 8).

At the fifth meeting of our Committee the United Kingdom representative made a similar remark. Mr. Ormsby-Gore, like Mr. Moch the other day, thinks he sees a contradiction between the fact that the representatives of the socialist countries, including Romania, are pleading the vital importance of nuclear disarmament, and their support of a plan which, in Mr. Ormsby-Gore's words, "gives this measure the lowest priority as regards timing" (TNCD/PV.5, page 30).

In order to help the representatives of the Western countries who have raised these objections to understand better the position of my country and that of the other socialist countries with regard to nuclear disarmament, I should like to make it clear once again that my country, like the other socialist countries, has from the beginning advocated the banning and abolition of nuclear weapons. The Government of the Soviet Union, as Mr. Zorin reminded us yesterday, had during the last ten or twelve years put forward numerous proposals to this end. If one takes the trouble to look again at the proposals made by the Soviet Union at different stages in the discussions on disarmament, one can readily see that the place assigned to measures for nuclear disarmament in the various plans which have been put forward has changed several times. But every time this has happened it has been precisely because the representatives of the Western countries have always, whenever new disarmament plans have been put forward by the Soviet Union, asked that measures for nuclear disarmament should be given a different place from that proposed.
I have already mentioned, in my speech at the fourth meeting, that the socialist countries' plan for nuclear disarmament has included certain ideas which the Western countries have put forward in earlier discussions.

I should like to remind the Committee and the representative of France of one of these ideas:

"Our original intention was that the prohibition of nuclear weapons should not begin until all conventional disarmament operations had been completed. The French delegation attempted, inter alia, to co-ordinate ... the measures relating to each of the two classes of weapons, and eventually put forward the proposal that prohibition should be instituted when 75 per cent of the reduction of conventional armaments had been completed."

(DC/SC.1/PV.30, page 21).

I have quoted the third point in Mr. Moch's speech made on 21 March 1957 at the meeting of the Disarmament Sub-committee in London. In that speech he enumerated the points at which the Western countries thought that they had made concessions so as to approach the position of the socialist countries. My Soviet colleague has already quoted what Mr. Ormsby-Gore said during the discussion on general and complete disarmament in the First Committee at the Fourteenth Session of the General Assembly. I believe that this quotation is fresh in the memory of the members of this Committee, and that I therefore need not repeat it.

According to Mr. Moch and Mr. Ormsby-Gore, the proposal in the Soviet plan to start general and complete disarmament by a reduction of conventional armaments seemed likely to make agreement easier on the problem as a whole.

We should like to know whether matters still stand as they were, or have changed; whether the opinion of the representatives of the Western countries on the place that nuclear disarmament must occupy in an overall plan has altered. We must obviously pay the greatest attention to what Mr. Zorin said yesterday:

"If, however, the Western Powers express their readiness to accept a complete ban on nuclear and hydrogen weapons — to eliminate those from national armaments and destroy the stocks of such weapons — right at the beginning of the disarmament programme, there will be no obstacle on our
part to an agreement on this question; for the Soviet Government has always been, and will continue to be, a determined advocate of the total prohibition of nuclear weapons at any stage of the disarmament programme."

(TNOD/FV.5, page 43)

No one could call inconsistent a change of opinion about the priority to be given to measures for nuclear disarmament if the Western Powers declared that they were ready to accept the prohibition and abolition of nuclear weapons at the beginning of the programme for general and complete disarmament which the eighty-two Member States of the United Nations have instructed us to negotiate.

If I understood Mr. Ormsby-Gore correctly just now, he was rejecting the idea that the first place in a series of measures, in an overall plan for disarmament, should be assigned to measures for nuclear disarmament.

I therefore find it difficult to understand for what we representatives of the socialist countries are being reproached. Why are there objections to our proposal and to the plan we are supporting, which provides for the final abolition and prohibition of nuclear weapons at the third stage if the prohibition and abolition of nuclear weapons are not acceptable to the Western countries at the first stage of an overall plan for general and complete disarmament. If, on the other hand, the prohibition and abolition of nuclear weapons are not acceptable to the Western countries at the first stage of that plan, perhaps they will be acceptable at the second stage of the plan. If that were so, I think everybody would welcome a declaration to that effect by the Western Powers.

But to reject out of hand the idea of abolishing and banning nuclear weapons seems to me quite contrary to the aim which ought to be pursued in our negotiations here.

My delegation has no difficulty in accepting the idea that some measures for nuclear disarmament, some effective and real measures, must occupy a privileged place in any disarmament plan, provided they are real measures for nuclear disarmament and not, as I have already said, half-measures, quarter-measures, or pseudo-measures.
We have a very sure test of the value of measures for nuclear disarmament. We must agree to examine what would happen to the nuclear military power of the different States after the given measure had been put into effect. The socialist countries' plan proposes to ban nuclear weapons and their use; it proposes that the production of all types of nuclear weapons should cease, that they should be eliminated from the armaments of States, and that existing stockpiles should be destroyed. Once these measures had been put into effect under the widest possible international control, the military nuclear power of States would quite simply cease to exist.

The plan proposed by the socialist countries thus envisages effective general and total nuclear disarmament. The same cannot be said of the plan advocated by the representatives of France, the United Kingdom, Italy and certainly by our other Western colleagues.

The first step in the Western plan provides only for some more or less theoretical studies, which are very interesting but are only studies. Document TNCD/3, paragraph F.3 reads:

"3. Measures to assure compliance with an agreement to discontinue the manufacture of fissionable materials for weapons purposes.

4. Arrangements required to carry out an agreement to transfer, under international supervision and control, fissionable material from past production to non-weapons uses, including stock-piling."

It is quite clear that even joint theoretical studies, however interesting their subject, could in no way reduce the nuclear military power of any State.

The second stage of the Western plan provides that the production of fissionable material for military purposes shall cease. It further provides, in paragraph II D, for the transfer of

"agreed quantities of fissionable material ... to non-weapons uses..."

To implement these two measures would not in the slightest degree affect the military nuclear power of States: first, because the stocks of nuclear weapons would not be affected; and, secondly, because nothing is so like fissionable material for military purposes as fissionable material which may be used for non-military purposes. Powers which have possessed the nuclear weapon for some time have accumulated, according to the experts, nuclear weapons and quantities of fissionable material amply sufficient to make modern warfare monstrously destructive.
The second stage, therefore, would consist rather of pseudo-measures designed to build up false hopes and false feelings of security among the people, since the military nuclear power of States would remain unchanged and the risks of an aggressive nuclear war would not be in any way diminished as a result of those measures, no matter how faithfully they were adopted and implemented.

The third stage of the Western plan provides in paragraph III B 1 for the "prohibition of production of nuclear, chemical, biological and other weapons of mass destruction", and for a further reduction of stocks of nuclear weapons (paragraph III B 2). "Further reduction" is mentioned. I emphasize the "further", although in analysing the Western plan I have not been able to discover when or in what form any reduction of nuclear weapon stocks at all would take place; but perhaps I have not analysed the plan enough.

Paragraph III B 2, which continues the point I have just cited, again refers to "further transfer of fissile materials to peaceful use, and further steps in the light of the latest scientific knowledge, to achieve the final elimination of these weapons", an aim which will still be remote at the end of the period of implementation of the Western Powers' plan.

The goal which we must reach, and which I thought we had all set ourselves, namely general and complete nuclear disarmament, will still have to be reached after the measures provided for in the third and final stage of the Western plan have been put into effect.

To ban the production of atomic weapons without prohibiting their use and totally destroying stocks would produce no sort of nuclear disarmament but only dangerous illusions; nor would the reduction -- I underline the word reduction -- of stocks. If there is to be a reduction of nuclear weapon stocks, we must ask ourselves -- and Mr. Jules Moch himself has accustomed us to this kind of algebraical exercise -- what equation is to govern that reduction. If, for example, the quantities of arms remaining in the stockpiles after reduction no longer had any strategic importance, there would be no reason to keep them; it would therefore be better to go the whole way and destroy the stocks completely. If after reduction the quantities of nuclear weapons remaining in stock were still sufficient for us to destroy one another, the measure would clearly not help in the least to diminish the danger of a nuclear war. Its only possible result would be to mislead the
peoples about its nature and give them the false sense of security which I spoke of when I was examining the measures laid down for the second stage. But our task -- at least as my delegation, and also the delegations from the other socialist countries, understand it -- is to adopt measures which would once and for all avert the danger of a nuclear war and end the nuclear armaments race and the risk of a nuclear war.

The plan put forward by the socialist countries proposes radical measures appropriate to this end. The Western Powers' plan offers no such measures. At the end of the third stage the nuclear military potential of States would remain intact or substantially unaltered in terms of nuclear military power and of the risk of nuclear war.

These are some of the additional reasons why the Romanian delegation supports the plan for general and complete disarmament submitted by the Soviet Union delegation, and the nuclear disarmament measures it contains.

Before concluding I should like to make one brief remark on the work of our interpreters. I should first like to express my great gratitude to the highly-qualified interpreters whom the United Nations Secretariat has placed at our disposal to facilitate our work here, and my appreciation of the high standard of their work. At the same time, I should like to indicate that the best way to translate my thoughts from French into English is not to put into my mouth ideas completely contrary to those I have expressed. I have felt obliged to say this at a plenary meeting of the Committee in order to clear up the following point. I refer to TNCD/FV.4. I was quoting the ideas expressed by our colleague from Canada with regard to the arms race, and I said -- I will quote it again -- :

"... There are just two alternatives: a continuation of the race, whose only end can be nuclear war, with unimaginable death and destruction; or its cessation, a resolve to control..."

and I added my own opinion of this opinion which my Canadian colleague had expressed -- "a view which I cannot share" --

"... and then to abolish weapons of this kind and return to a peace-loving world."

In the provisional English text which I have before me the reservation which I made, indicating that I could not share the point of view of the Canadian representative, was completely reversed in meaning, and the text referring to
my reservation reads as follows:

"...I must say that I agree with this..."

I felt obliged to clear up this point before the Committee, because I did not follow the interpretation at the meeting, and perhaps my colleagues who use the English text will have been slightly surprised to find such views attributed to me.

The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): I feel certain that the secretariat will bear in mind the remarks made by the Romanian delegate. I would, if I may, point out to him that delegations have a three-day limit for submitting corrections to the texts which are supplied to us after the meetings.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): I should like to begin my remarks by saying a few words about some general ideas concerning effective international control.

We have heard the phrase "general and complete disarmament" reiterated a great many times, and I have to point out to you that in the two out of three times this phrase occurs in the United Nations resolution of 20 November, which has been quoted many times, it is qualified by the phrase "under effective international control". Now "effective international control" in itself is just a phrase as is "general and complete disarmament" until it is broken down into specific and detailed information as to the control measures intended, and their relation in time to the measures of disarmament proposed. The Canadian delegation believes that in this Ten Nation Conference when any nation proposes or agrees to undertake a measure of disarmament it should be understood that that nation thereby also offers freely and without restriction or after-thought the means for other parties to the agreement to assure themselves that the agreed disarmament measures are actually carried out.

This does not in any way imply that the good faith of the Governments signing treaties or agreements is in question. However, experience has shown that all too often what is agreed by the heads of governments or foreign offices is not carried out faithfully by those who are lower down in the scale of military or related organizations. Many means of evasion of agreements and concealment of armaments can be found, and so it is necessary to guard against this.
Thus it is not enough to say, "we will disarm". Nations which are sincere in their intentions will say, "we will disarm and prove to you that we have disarmed, and we expect you to afford us the same kind of proof". In view of the above it seems essential that each measure of disarmament and each step in disarmament proposed should be accompanied by a proposal and explanation of the verification offered and required. Admittedly the final working out of verification or control measures will be required to be done by experts, which could be sub-committees of our Ten Nation Committee.

At the meeting of 16 March, Mr. Zorin, the chief representative of the Soviet Union delegation, had the following to say in regard to control:

"With regard to controlling the reduction of the armed forces of States in the first stage of the programme of general and complete disarmament, we believe that such control must guarantee the execution by all States of the commitments respectively undertaken. How is such control to be organized? We can envisage such control as taking the following form. When the measures embodied in the first stage of disarmament begin to be put into effect, an international control organ will be established to which States will supply information about their armed forces and conventional armaments. The control machinery will begin to operate simultaneously with the disbandment of the troops which are to be reduced in the first stage, so that the international controllers can be sure that States are complying exactly and strictly with the agreed measures for such reduction." (TNCD/FV.2, page 17)

This is an encouraging statement and so far as it goes it agrees with the Western view of what is necessary in regard to control. I note particularly that in the first stage of disarmament in the Soviet Union plan, the international control organization would receive information from States regarding armed forces levels and conventional armaments, the control machinery to begin operation at the same time as the reductions begin. This is not inconsistent with the function of the International Disarmament Organization as given in Phase I, Clauses A and C of the five-Power disarmament plan.

I might remark that in the five-nation disarmament plan we have mentioned "effective international control" frequently but have not given any elaboration of the methods proposed. Of course we will be prepared to do so at the proper time.
The next point in the Soviet Union plan on which I should like to be enlightened is what is meant by:

"The reduction of the armaments and military equipment at the disposal of the armed forces of States to the extent necessary to ensure that the remaining quantity of armaments corresponds to the level fixed for the armed forces."  (A/4219, page 14)

What does the passage that I have quoted mean exactly? Does it mean that when the armed forces of a certain State are to be reduced by a certain percentage, to take an example, then the number of tanks in the possession of that State would be reduced by the same percentage? I use tanks as an example; I might have used heavy artillery or attack aircraft or any class of naval vessel.

Or could the intention of the framers of the Soviet Union plan be more extensive? Might the reduction in the types of armament necessary for offensive action be in a higher percentage than the reduction of effective, the reduction of manpower, because obviously a reduction in the number of rifles or sub-machine guns would not be so significant as a reduction in tanks or attack aircraft. It would be very useful to learn how under the Soviet Union plan for "general and complete disarmament" it is proposed to work out in detail the principles on which the "corresponding reduction of armaments" would be related to the reduction of levels of manpower proposed. Would all arms surplus to the agreed levels be destroyed at once? If not, when would they be destroyed? What measures of inspection and verification of this "corresponding" reduction — and destruction — would the Soviet plan offer to and require of other nations?

Another aspect of the Soviet Union plan for "general and complete disarmament" which it would seem requires clarification is the following: In the plan of the Soviet Union (A/4219) there is a paragraph providing for:

"The reduction of ... armed forces of other States to levels to be agreed upon at a special session of the United Nations General Assembly or at a world conference on general and complete disarmament;".  (Ibid., page 14)

Would the great Powers reduce their forces to the levels indicated in the paragraph which precedes the one I have quoted, before this world conference is held? Supposing that the world conference did not reach any agreement, would the reduction of the forces and armaments of the great Powers go on nevertheless?
Would all States attending this Conference be required to agree to the total disbandment of armed forces which is supposed to take place in stage two of the Soviet Union plan? If such an agreement is not proposed for the conference to be held, would the great Powers be expected to disarm completely while some secondary powers remained armed?

Perhaps there is an answer to these questions in an extract from a statement made by the representative of Czechoslovakia on 17 March, 1960. Mr. Nosek said:

"The term general disarmament means that disarmament measures include all States. General disarmament means that it is impossible to approach disarmament measures which involve only certain States or a group of States while other States stand aside. In such a way a dangerous disproportion would necessarily arise and thereby cause a threat to peace. Only the Soviet proposals for disarmament include in all stages such measures relating to all States in an appropriate manner." (TNOD/FV.3, page 14)

In his remarks today I took it that he said -- subject to his correction -- that the Soviet proposals provide that there should be disarmament by all States from the very beginning of the plan. Mr. Nosek was contrasting that with what is provided in the proposals of the Five Western Powers. Later he said that the proposals include unconditionally all countries from the very beginning. This was in relation to the threat that the armaments of certain States, other than those represented here, were supposed to represent. I take it from what was said by the representative of Czechoslovakia that the reduction of the forces of the great Powers would not take place at all until a conference of all the countries in the world had taken place and reductions agreed. Perhaps I am wrong but that was the way I understood it. I should like to be told authoritatively what was the meaning, because it seems to me that in the present state of the world it would not be at all easy for some nations who have serious disputes with neighbours to disarm themselves. I cite as examples the Arab States and Israel. There are other cases. It might take a very long time for them to reach agreement on disarmament.

It may be that the answers to the questions I have put will bring out some hopeful factors which are not readily apparent in the Soviet Union plan as it now stands, otherwise it would seem that its third stage of total disbandment of
forces and the destruction and abolition of all means of atomic, biological and chemical warfare, and many other things, will not be reached for a long time and not until a period much longer than the three years has elapsed.

Before closing, I should like to refer to a quotation cited by the representative of Poland in his statement on 18 March, 1960. This appears in Document TNCD/PV.4, pages 23 and 25. He quoted from a speech of Mr. Green, Secretary of State for External Affairs in Canada, made in the United Nations on 24 September, 1959. However, the quotation is not quite accurate, doubtless owing to variations which have crept in through translation from English to French and then re-translation. The omission of the sentences in Mr. Green’s speech which immediately preceded and followed the statement quoted may give a mistaken impression of the viewpoint which Mr. Green intended to convey at that time. Therefore, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I should like to quote what he actually did say, which was as follows:

"I listened with much interest to the disarmament plans outlined last week by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd for the United Kingdom and by Mr. Khrushchev for the Soviet Union. We shall of course want to study these plans carefully and shall reserve detailed comments on them for a later occasion. For the moment, let me say that I am entirely sympathetic with the general objective stated by Mr. Khrushchev’s proposal — namely, a world without arms. We would all like to see general and complete disarmament. However, I am looking forward to more detailed proposals designed to this end, particularly with respect to control." (A/PV.827, paragraph 56)

I think it is clear from reading the fuller extracts that Mr. Greene was referring to an idea and not to a specific disarmament plan.

Mr. ZOPIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Mr. Chairman, fellow delegates, I do not intend at this time to dwell in detail on the statements which have been made here today. They are, in our view, of some importance for our future work. We shall study carefully the verbatim record of those statements and in due course express our views on them.

Today I should like to mention only two points, with which I want to deal straightaway.
Both Mr. Ormsby-Gore and Mr. Moch have enlarged on the question of nuclear disarmament and have asked us for some explanations about when we propose to have nuclear disarmament measures carried out and what form we thought the actual process of nuclear disarmament would take. I shall revert to this question again, obviously, in our further discussions, but I want to point out straightaway that Mr. Moch, when he referred to our position on this matter did not, I feel, put it quite correctly; he said that we were agreeable to move forward nuclear disarmament to the first stage of the whole programme only as regards such a measure as the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. I do not quite understand what led Mr. Moch to draw such a conclusion because, as far as I can remember, this is not to be found in any of my statements or documents.

We said quite clearly yesterday, and Mr. Mezinoescu, Head of the Romanian delegation, has already quoted this, that the point at issue is not merely to agree to ban the use of nuclear weapons. We would, of course, welcome that also, if we were all agreed that all the nuclear powers should declare their renunciation of the use of atomic weapons. We are prepared to accept this immediately, provided the other nuclear powers are agreeable. We have repeatedly proposed this. That was not, however, what the Soviet delegate said yesterday. He said:

"If, however, the Western Powers express their readiness to accept a complete ban on atomic and hydrogen weapons - to eliminate these from national armaments and destroy the stocks of such weapons ..." and, of course, provided this is all properly controlled,

"there will be no obstacle on our part to an agreement on this question; for the Soviet Government has always been, and will continue to be, a determined advocate of the total prohibition of nuclear weapons at any stage of the disarmament programme." (TNCD/PV.5, page 43)

It follows, therefore, that what Mr. Moch said does not correctly represent our position. Our position, as you see, is quite clear. It amounts to a complete prohibition of nuclear weapons and their elimination under appropriate control from the arsenals of States. This is precisely what we are prepared to move forward to the first stage, if all the members of our Committee will agree to it.
We shall, in due course and after studying the verbatim records, give our replies to the other questions mentioned as they arise in the course of our discussion of specific matters relating to the plan of general and complete disarmament put forward by the Soviet Union.

The second point upon which I should like to comment is connected with the remarks of Mr. Martino, the representative of Italy, on the question of foreign bases.

I said yesterday already that the question of foreign bases was extremely important because of the part which these bases play under modern conditions and because of the purpose which they serve. Today Mr. Martino alleged that in my speech yesterday I expressed in some connexion or other agreement with his view on the question of bases. Today — as I understood from the interpretation — he said that I had apparently agreed that this was a political question and that it was, so to speak, more of a propaganda matter than a question of actual disarmament. I must say that, if that is how Mr. Martino understood my statement, then he is mistaken. I do not want Mr. Martino to be left in any doubt whatever about our position.

We are talking here about bases not in the least for propaganda purposes but in the interests of genuine disarmament. We believe that foreign bases are not only a political factor which aggravates the international situation and constitutes an important element in the tense international relations of our time. That is unquestionably true: foreign bases are an important political factor. They are, too, a political factor, not only in the relations between States with differing political orientations and belonging to particular military and political groupings; the question of bases has a political character, even from the angle of relations within particular political and military groupings. For it is perfectly clear that the presence of foreign troops on alien soil cannot fail to influence political events or the policy of the governments on whose territory these foreign troops are stationed. In my view, there can be no doubt whatsoever about this and I hardly think that anyone will deny that the presence of foreign troops on alien territory does to a certain extent affect the course of events in any such country. It seems to me that there can hardly be any room for doubt on this score, all the more so because, as we know from the history of recent years, many of the States in which foreign military bases are located are making efforts to get rid in some way or other of these bases.
I could, by way of example, and simply for the purpose of illustration, mention the case of such a State, that of Morocco, which has been making great efforts to free its territory somehow from foreign military bases, French as well as American. I shall not go deeper into this question because Mr. Martino will blame me for making propaganda, and I would not like to provide him with a pretext for doing so. I merely mention this in passing. Foreign bases on alien soil are, however, not only politically important; they also have a purely military importance because, according to all available data, they constitute an essential element in preparing a theatre of military operations for modern warfare. They are the preparatory links, intended not so much for the defence of a particular State but for offensive action, for it is impossible to imagine that, say, the United States is preparing to defend its own country when it has bases at its disposal, say, in Italy. I do not think that the United States can defend itself against an attack on the United States in Italy which is tens of thousands of kilometres away from the United States itself.

It is obvious that such bases do not serve defence purposes. They are basically a preparatory link, intended solely for offensive operations.

That is precisely why we consider that the liquidation of foreign military bases is an important element in disarmament. It is a very substantial element in disarmament. And it is not simply automatically linked only with reduction of the armed forces concerned, but is an independent operation that is of very great military importance for every country in which such bases are located and for all the surrounding countries against which these bases are directed. Therefore we are not inclined to think that a simple reference in a particular plan to the fact that armed forces are being reduced will automatically lead to the liquidation of military bases on foreign territories.

No, we consider it appropriate and essential in the interests of disarmament that there should be a specific indication of when and within what time-limits foreign bases on alien soil will be reduced because it is an important military factor and not only a political one.

I think that our task is to go very carefully into this question of foreign bases.

The remarks made this morning by Mr. Martino to the effect that, strictly speaking, foreign military bases do not differ in any way from national bases and so there is no need to mention them specially, strike me as rather odd. It is
like saying that a particular military installation or a particular military establishment located on national territory and set up exclusively for the defence of that territory are absolutely identical in their significance with military establishments and military installations manned by foreign personnel, which often carry out not national tasks but foreign tasks. Surely, that is not one and the same thing. I do not know; perhaps in Italy people are by now so accustomed to foreign military personnel that they consider them to be almost identical with national military personnel; but I do not think that that is the real situation. And so far as I can gather from all the literature on the subject or from the controversies raging in the parliaments of various countries, there is no such unanimity at all on the question of whether the national and foreign bases throughout the world are one and the same thing, as Mr. Martino tried to tell us. There is no such unanimity of opinion in Italy either. This I can definitely assert, and I think Mr. Martino will be unable to prove the contrary, because we are all aware of the keen controversy and conflict that are going on regarding the question of the presence of foreign troops and foreign bases on Italian soil. And the same thing is happening in a country like Japan, where people are not at all inclined to consider that foreign military bases are one and the same thing as national armed forces. This, to my mind, is unquestionable and I feel that Mr. Martino will hardly find it profitable to pursue the argument on that level.

I think we had better stop arguing and reflect on those measures of disarmament which should really affect all the elements of the armed forces, including such an important element as foreign military bases. If Mr. Martino agrees that this is in general one of the basic elements in national armaments, not only those of certain countries, but entire blocks of countries, I think he should not refuse to give concrete consideration to the question of when and how these foreign military bases should be reduced and liquidated. I think we shall find a common language when we get down to a concrete discussion of all the elements of disarmament at every stage of disarmament.

These are the explanations which I wanted to present today in connexion with the remarks made by Mr. Martino. On other points we shall still have an opportunity of expressing our views in the course of our further discussions.
In conclusion, I should like to say that, as I see it, the discussion this morning, like the discussion yesterday, has been quite businesslike and to the point, and I think we should go on working on these lines. This will make it easier for us to reach a constructive solution of the questions now before us.

The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): I apologize for speaking again to give an explanation I consider essential. The elimination of foreign bases is provided for in the Soviet plan at a time when armed forces and their respective armaments have been eliminated. Is this a real measure of disarmament? At that time there could no longer be any bases, either on foreign or on national territory. This is just a political issue. It is not a disarmament measure. Mr. Zorin has told us that national bases are defensive and foreign bases offensive. I do not want to start a discussion which would only be of theoretical interest, but I ask this: if all bases are to disappear, of whatever nature and whatever size, what is the purpose of this distinction from the standpoint of measures of disarmament?

Mr. Zorin spoke about American bases in Italy, bases established on that country's territory for offensive operations. Mr. Zorin is sadly misinformed. There are no American bases in Italy. I agree with him that it would be much better to drop this controversy.

MR. MOCH (France) (translation from French): I have not the least intention of reviving a controversy of any kind. In particular, I shall not say anything about bases, a delicate and complicated question which we must all think over in the light of the previous discussions. But I should like to revert to Mr. Zorin's reply to me about nuclear disarmament, for I believe we are getting a bit nearer to the heart of the matter -- which is what we are really here for.

First of all, I shall make a small correction. I did not say -- this is the result of interpretations from French into Russian and Russian into French -- that Mr. Zorin had immediately added that this disarmament would consist "only" of the prohibition of use. In the text, which I still have before me, I said that it would consist "mainly" of the prohibition of use. And here I should like to explain our position clearly.
The problem of nuclear disarmament has, in fact, six different aspects, and of these six, four are controllable, while two are not. The prohibition of tests is controllable, subject to the reservations we all know. The prohibition of manufacture of fissionable materials for military purposes is controllable: you only have to inspect the rods removed from reactors and to keep a check on what is produced by isotope separation plants. Here, it is possible to exercise control which, considering its importance, does not require an excessive number of technicians and inspectors. The prohibition of manufacture of weapons from stocks of fissionable materials can be controlled. And, lastly, there is the rapid reconversion of stocks.

One speaker asked just now what the basis of this reconversion would be. That is exactly one of the things we have to discuss. We must say that for every 100 kg or 1,000 kg of fissionable material delivered for reconversion by the United States, so many kilograms must be delivered by the United Kingdom, so many kilograms by the Soviet Union and so many by France.

Those are the four operations which can serve as a basis for nuclear disarmament, because they are controllable.

Then there are two others which are only hopes, because they are absolutely uncontrollable, at least as far as I know. These are prohibition of use of the weapon, and prohibition of possession of weapons, for -- I said this just now and I shall not go into it again -- we shall never know the exact amount of stocks not yet reconverted and consequently existing in weapon form.

Thus -- and I hope with all my heart that the Soviet delegation will be willing to think over what I am going to say -- to propose introducing on the same footing measures which can inspire no confidence because, since they are not controllable, it would always be suspected that they were being evaded by the other side, and other measures which lead us securely and genuinely towards our goal because we can verify them, is to do a disservice to the cause of nuclear disarmament. Of course, if tomorrow an Eastern representative could suggest methods of controlling prohibition of use or prohibition of possession, and if those methods were effective, we should be delighted. But we are well aware that prohibition of use can never be controlled. It will be found that use is taking place in violation of the prohibition; that is all. We know very well, or we
think we know, that, failing scientific advances now unimaginable, we can never control existing stocks that have not yet been reconverted, because there will be no means of finding them. Consequently, to suggest that disarmament begin with these two points really means nothing in the present political state of the world and the present state of science as regards control. We must begin with the four other operations, and it is when their execution has reduced the danger potential and, what is still more important, has re-established some confidence in the world, that we shall be able to decide bans on the use or possession of -- which comes to the same thing -- the total destruction of weapons, all of which are things that can only be discussed at the end, because at the beginning we should have no certainty that they were being carried out by both sides.

That -- I apologize for pressing the point -- is perhaps a genuine, honest and sound approach to the question of nuclear disarmament. I ask you all to think it over.

Mr. Eaton (United States of America): I have no intention of entering into this discussion on foreign bases. I think the discussions that we have had here this morning have indicated that we shall run into political problems at the very earliest stage, problems on which earlier conferences have foundered. I would only say that the forces of my Government are only employed outside my own country and within my own country for the purpose of defending both ourselves and those of our allies who wish to be associated with us, who welcome our troops as a part of theirs and as a part of the allied defences, and for no other reason. Whenever the time comes when these troops need not be employed, for defensive purposes only, there need be no doubt in the mind of anyone here that those forces will be withdrawn. I think that if we go on with this discussion questions of a very serious political nature will arise which will involve the deployment of Soviet troops in areas which, by some, might be deemed foreign to them.

I would suggest that, rather than embark on this particular sea which has been treacherous for so long, we should try to get down to those measures which can perhaps be resolved at this early time.
I would like to make one comment in respect to the remarks made by the representative of Romania. He indicated that under paragraph III of the allied plan there was a reference to further reductions of nuclear stocks, and he asked where there had been an earlier reduction. I would call his attention to paragraph II.D of the allied proposal which states that in the very early phase — and I would interrupt parenthetically here to say that our phase one and our phase two merge into a single phase — "Agreed quantities of fissionable material from past production to be transferred under international supervision and control to non-weapons uses, including stockpiling". (TNCD/3, page 3) This was the earlier transfer to which the word "further" applied when used in paragraph III of the plan.

I think the problem of the total destruction of stocks is one which we all share. This is one of the reasons why we feel that common studies undertaken by all of us are essential before we can move into certain of these areas. You will recall that Mr. Bulganin, I believe, in 1955 stated that scientific means were not then available to determine whether fissionable weapons had been destroyed. Perhaps by these studies, and by the rapid advance in scientific techniques, we shall be able jointly to find means to destroy these weapons. It is to this end that I think we should address ourselves.

I have just one final comment. The Soviet proposal, which envisages the disappearance of all weapons other than small arms, would seem to us to ensure at least the possibility — assuming there is the intention — that the small nations of the world would for ever be the victims of their larger, more powerful and more highly organized neighbours, and there has been no evidence to establish that those who fell at the hands of the Spartans died any more happily than those who fell at Hiroshima. We therefore feel that when the time comes when arms are materially reduced — arms which so far as we in the West are concerned are used solely for defensive purposes — there must come into being some force that will give security to smaller peoples that they will not be overrun by their more powerful neighbours.

Mr. NASZKOWSKI (Poland) (translation from French): I should like to comment briefly on the part of the Canadian representative's statement in which he questioned the quotation I made from the speech of the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs at a plenary meeting of the General Assembly. I do
not see any inaccuracy in the quotation from Mr. Green's statement I made on 18 March, to which the Canadian representative referred today. The passage I quoted concerned Canada's attitude to the general idea of the Soviet plan, to which Mr. Green gave his support. The French text I read out was interpreted into English as follows:

"For the time being I can say that I fully subscribe to the general aim enunciated in Mr. Khrushchev's draft resolution—... a world without arms. We would all like to see general and complete disarmament realized."

(TNCD/PV.4, page 14)

I did not quote the following sentence, which reads:

"However, I am looking forward to more detailed proposals designed to this end, particularly with respect to control." (A/PV.807, paragraph 56)

It does not seem to me that this conflicts with the passage I quoted.

Mr. MESINGESCU (Romania) (translation from French): In reply to the question I raised in my statement the United States representative said that the "further reduction of existing stocks of nuclear weapons" was a sequel to paragraph D of section II, the second stage of the Western plan. I must explain to the United States representative that I have not studied these proposals in English. I had understood that the French text was the original. However, section III, paragraph B 2 of these proposals reads:

"2. Further reduction of existing stocks of nuclear ... weapons ..."

And section II, paragraph D, to which the United States representative referred, reads:

"D. Agreed quantities of fissionable material from past production to be transferred under international supervision and control to non-weapons uses, including stockpiling ..." (TNCD/3)

I understand that to mean stockpiling of fissionable materials for weapons purposes.

Lastly, to give me a clearer idea of the work I must assign to our delegation's experts, I should like to know whether, in the terminology of the Western plan, the expression "fissionable materials for weapons purposes" means the same thing as stocks of nuclear weapons. I believe it means something quite different.
Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I do not want to hold up our already lengthy meeting, but I should just like to make a brief remark in connexion with Mr. Eaton's statement. He spoke about foreign bases and the stationing of troops on foreign territory and said that, if we start discussing this question, the question of discussing the stationing of Soviet troops in various territories might arise.

I want to say that we do not refuse to discuss this question either here. We have repeatedly stated that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from certain States is a question we are perfectly prepared to discuss, and we are ready to withdraw our troops from foreign territories at the same time as foreign forces, are withdrawn from other territories, in particular the foreign troops of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and other countries.

Thus, this question does not present any great difficulty for us; I gathered from Mr. Eaton's remarks only that the difference between us lies in the fact that Mr. Eaton apparently does not want to discuss this matter because it might give rise to difficulty. But for us it does not present difficulties. Evidently, it does create a difficulty for the United States. But I cannot help that. We would like to discuss this question too from the standpoint of disarmament, from the standpoint of the elimination of all danger of military conflict.

So, in the further course of our work we can clarify these matters too. They do not present difficulties for us.

Mr. MOCH (France) (translation from French): I should just like to point out to our Romanian colleague that, in the French text, it does in fact say, at the second stage, that agreed quantities of fissionable material from past production would be transferred under control to non-weapons uses. For it is obvious that stockpiles of fissionable material are now of considerable size and part of them is probably being kept elsewhere than in nuclear warheads. But as reconversion of stockpiles proceeds we shall, instead of stockpiling nuclear weapons, since that would be pointless, have to reconvert the fissionable material already contained in nuclear warheads -- reconvert it too for peaceful purposes.

I do not know whether the English text makes the same distinction. But it does say: "Further reduction of existing stocks of nuclear ... and other weapons ...", whereas in the preceding section, section II, it speaks of "Agreed quantities of fissionable material". Thus, the two ideas are conveyed in the English text, as they are in the French text. The translation is accurate.
It is obvious, though, that we shall begin by reducing stocks not yet put in nuclear warheads, and that after that we shall remove the fissionable material from the nuclear warheads to reconvert it in its turn, as reconversion extends to larger quantities.

Mr. NEZINCĂSCU (Romania) (translation from French): I thank the French representative for the explanation he has kindly given me. I had understood it first that there was a difference between the two points, and that one related to fissionable material not yet in nuclear warheads and the other to material in nuclear warheads. The Western plan -- and it is this which I pointed out in my statement today -- did not provide for any measure in regard to fissionable material actually in nuclear warheads. I am not exactly an expert and there are people in this hall better qualified in the subject than I am, but from what the experts say the fissionable material already in nuclear warheads is amply sufficient to have catastrophic results if it was ever used.

The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): I shall now read the communique:

"The sixth meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament was held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 22 March 1960 under the chairmanship of the representative of Italy.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Wednesday, 23 March, at 10.30 a.m."

If there are no comments, the communique is approved.

The meeting rose at 1:15 p.m.