FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FIFTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Monday, 21 March 1960, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. MOCH (France)
PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Bulgaria: Mr. M. TARABANOV
Col. K. SAVOV
Mr. K. CHRISTOV

Canada: Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. A.G. CAMPHILL
W/Cdr. R.J. MITCHELL

Czechoslovakia: Mr. J. NOSEK
Lieut.-Gen. J. KÍCKO
Mr. Z. TRELIK

France: Mr. J. MOCH
Mr. M. LEGENDRE
Mr. A. CUNY

Italy: Mr. G. MARTINO
Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. L. DAINELLI

Poland: Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
Mr. M. LACHS
Brig.-Gen. J. SLIWINSKI

Romania: Mr. E. MEZINCESCUC
Mr. C. BOGDAN
Col. C. POPA

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mr. V. A. ZORIN
Col.-Gen. A.A. GRYZLOV
Mr. A.A. ROSHOCHIN
PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:
Rt. Hon. D. ORMEBY-GORE
Miss B. SALT
Maj.-Gen. RIDDLE

United States of America:
Mr. F.M. EATON
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Rear-Admiral P.L. DUDLEY

Secretariat:
Personal Representative of the Secretary-General:
Dr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Personal Representative of the Secretary-General:
Mr. W. EPSTEIN
The CHAIRMAN (France) (translation from French): I declare the fifth meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament open. The first speaker on the list is the representative of Bulgaria, and I now call on him to speak.

Mr. TARABANOY (Bulgaria) (translation from French): Since I shall today have to use frequently the term "general and complete disarmament", I should like at the outset to clear up certain misunderstandings which might arise. It is my impression that, at our last meeting, the representative of the United States of America in his speech expressed his dissatisfaction with the fact that this term had, as he said, been used too often in our discussions in the Committee, and that, as a result, it would end up by having no meaning at all.

Do I have to make the point once again that we have agreed not to quarrel over adjectives, or even letters, much less complete expressions, particularly when such adjectives and expressions have a precise meaning and help us to express our thoughts better and to understand each other? It must not be forgotten that this term, as well as words like "control", "comprehensive", etc. will occur very frequently in our future discussions. We should not let this embarrass us, always provided such expressions allow us to clarify our respective positions and understand each other better.

Besides, all delegations have made their contribution to the use of this terminology and of these expressions, since they have had to give their views on the proposals made either by the Soviet Union or by the United Kingdom — proposals which each bear the title, in French at any rate, of "désarmement général et complet."

In this connexion, I shall, if I may, try to clear up certain points in our last week's discussion about the mission, as it is termed in some speeches, or the task — in others — of our Committee.

Documents have been quoted here in support of the theory expounded by some delegates that there should be no insistence laid on the discussion and adoption of a plan of general and complete disarmament. They claim that the task of the Ten Nation Committee is merely that mentioned in the letter sent to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by the four Foreign Ministers of the Great Powers, namely, the task of "exploring through mutual consultations avenues of possible progress toward such agreements and recommendations on the limitation and reduction of all types of armaments and armed forces". (DC/144, page 2)
There was, however, a further development, with which the Western Powers taking part in the present Conference were closely associated. In the discussion on disarmament held in the Political Committee and in the resolution which was later voted, Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States, among others, "considering that the question of general and complete disarmament is the most important one facing the world today", unanimously called upon Governments — that is to say, the Governments on the Ten Nation Committee — "to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of this problem".

(A/RES/1378 (XIV))

It should be emphasized that this resolution, like the letter already quoted from the four Foreign Ministers, of 7 September 1959, is not the basis or origin of the need for resuming negotiations on this problem. That would be the same as saying that it was those two documents which created the problem of disarmament. It was, of course, the existence of the problem which, needless to say, led to the creation of the Ten Nation Committee and to the unanimous adoption of the resolution.

It would thus be quite wrong to try to use those two documents as an argument and to give them a restrictive meaning which they do not and cannot possess, seeing that they reflect a de facto situation which is very much more distressing than it appears at first sight.

Attention has, however, been drawn in Mr. Jules Moch's statement and in the very brief statement by Mr. Ormsby-Gore to the fact that there was certainly a first paragraph in the resolution, but that since certain Western delegations thought — as indeed they are entitled to do — that the third paragraph covered the first, it was preferable to take as a starting point and working basis the third paragraph only. What, then, do we do with the first? Does it not come first precisely because those who drafted it and voted for the resolution thought that it was necessary to start precisely with the first paragraph and to use the next paragraphs to complete our work? Our Western colleagues think that paragraph 3 might restrict the task of the Conference, and that is the reason why they refer to it.

That, however, is not the case, because paragraph 3 cannot be separated from the resolution as a whole.
(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

But what is still more important for our work, and what I would like to stress, is the actual atmosphere in which the disarmament discussions were conducted in the First Committee at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly. I do not wish to dwell at length on the views expressed by almost all the delegations which took part in the debate. I only wish to refer to a few aspects of certain statements which should have a considerable bearing on our discussions, because at that time they expressed the views and opinions of delegations who are present here.

It was recalled the other day that, during the discussion in the First Committee, the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Ormsby-Gore, sought to show that the purpose of the United Kingdom plan put forward on 17 September 1959 was, like that of the Soviet plan, to achieve general and complete disarmament.

I do not propose to quote here the remarks made then by the United Kingdom representative in order to show that not only the purpose, but the words used, were the same and should have the same meaning as those used in the Soviet plan. I cannot, however, refrain from quoting the opinion of another supporter of the United Kingdom plan, a representative who is qualified from the standpoint of the Western Powers, Mr. Lodge, the representative of the United States, who, in his speech on 28 October 1959, said the following:

"The goal has been called 'real disarmament'; others refer to it as 'comprehensive disarmament'; a phrase which in the English language is particularly descriptive. The draft resolution which will be before us uses the words 'general and complete disarmament'. All these phrases mean disarmament right across the board, involving all types of weapons, covering every means of warfare."

And, later, Mr. Lodge went on to say:

"Indeed, the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Ormsby-Gore, made precisely this point in his speech here the other day when, after using the phrase 'comprehensive disarmament', he said: '... I assure you that this single adjective 'comprehensive' has the same meaning for us as the two adjectives 'general and complete' which have been preferred by some speakers in this debate.'"
Having received these particularly weighty explanations, the Political Committee and the General Assembly unanimously adopted the resolution on disarmament which expresses the wishes and the firm decision of all States and of all peoples to reach an agreement which will make it possible to achieve general and complete disarmament, a disarmament which will abolish all ways of waging war.

That mission and that goal were laid down for our Committee not only in the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly; they have been reiterated here, at the beginning of our discussion and in the official documents issued by the various delegations. Thus, in his statement introducing the Western plan for disarmament, the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Ormsby-Gore, emphasized that the "sincere intention" of the Western Powers had "always been ... to achieve real and comprehensive disarmament". (TNOD/PV.2, page 5) In fact, the plan submitted by the Western Powers is called "A Plan for General and Comprehensive Disarmament".

The reason why our delegation has dwelt at such length on this matter, is because we desired, as Mr. Ormsby-Gore put it in his statement introducing the plan of the five Western Powers, to have "a definite and openly declared final goal". (Ibid. page 6)

That having been said, let us now try to study more closely the actual core of the problem of general and complete disarmament by taking as a starting point an essential feature in the proposals of the Western countries, which consists in giving first place to the nuclear problem. That view was expounded more especially by Mr. Moch. In stressing the predominance of nuclear weapons over all other forms of armaments Mr. Moch said:

"What the world expects of us, what it hopes for above all, is nuclear disarmament. Conventional weapons and the strength of armed forces are secondary considerations." (TNOD/PV.1, page 16)

Our problem is not to discuss whether that is true or not, nor to point out gaps or even contradictions in the Western plan. Let us confine ourselves now to examining more closely what nuclear disarmament represents at the present time. In this field, one fact is universally admitted by all atomic experts and scientists: namely, that, owing to their nature and destructive power, nuclear weapons constitute a terrifying threat, whatever their number or quantity. If the intention is to bring about a nuclear disarmament which really is nuclear disarmament, it is quite impossible to claim that it can be achieved merely by
reducing the number or quantity of nuclear weapons. Consequently, nuclear disarmament cannot be really effective unless it is general and complete — that is to say, it must be accepted by all countries in the world, it must apply to all existing nuclear weapons, and it must lead to the abolition and total liquidation of all nuclear weapons.

The United Kingdom representative, in introducing the plan of the five Western countries, insisted on what he called the three essential elements of disarmament:

"Firstly," said Mr. Ormsby-Gore, "the plan must not at any stage give a significant military advantage to one country or group of countries over others. From this it follows that disarmament must be comprehensive, world-wide, and must embrace all kinds of forces and weapons, the so-called conventional forces and weapons as well as modern nuclear forces and weapons. No one who has considered the horrors which would result from nuclear war — and which of us has not? — can fail to sympathize with the feeling that it is above all nuclear weapons which we must succeed in eliminating. But nuclear disarmament by itself would merely leave certain countries with an overwhelming superiority in conventional forces and weapons ..." (TNCD/PV.2, pages 5 and 6)

That quotation leads us directly to a pertinent conclusion: nuclear disarmament can be nothing other than general and complete disarmament, and it presupposes conventional disarmament of the same kind. Thus, disarmament can only be general and complete. That is a conclusion which stems from the considerations quoted, conclusions which weigh heavily with all those who have dealt with these problems. I need only quote Mr. Krishna Menon who, during the discussion in the Political Committee, in supporting on his Government's behalf the idea of general and complete disarmament put forward by the Soviet Union, stressed that his Government considered that it was the only correct approach at the present time.

Consequently, it is not at all because we are fond of using adjectives or get carried away by the words we use, but out of a conviction as profound as it is sincere that we support the programme of general and complete disarmament proposed by the Soviet Union — the only one which accords with the vital requirements of all mankind, because it is the most realistic way of tackling and solving the problem.
We have not yet heard what strictures are being voiced against the Soviet Government's plan. For the moment, all the objections raised can be summed up more or less as accusing it of an eloged lack of realism. An attempt is thus being made to create and maintain confusion by asserting that the Soviet plan requires that there should be an immediate switch, without any transition, from one day to the next, from an armed world to a disarmed world. There is, of course, no truth in such an assertion.

To speak of a lack of realism in relation to proposals of such scope and such weight, put forward by a country like the Soviet Union, proposals which have evoked a tremendous echo everywhere, is, as one of our eminent colleagues said here a few days ago, to take a very poor view of human intelligence.

If the two plans before us are compared, from the sole point of view of realism, it will easily be seen that it is the Soviet plan which is realistic. In his statement of 15 March, the United Kingdom representative said:

"It is above all towards this need to create confidence that the plan which I shall have the honour to present today is directed. As we see it, any disarmament plan which is to provide a solid foundation for the process of building up confidence must be based on three essentials. Firstly, the plan must not at any stage give a significant military advantage to one country or group of countries over others." (TNCD/PV.2, page 5)

In the statement by the Government of the Soviet Union on general and complete disarmament, made at the Fourteenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, on 19 September 1959, we find the same principle expressed even more clearly:

"The proposal for complete and general disarmament is to be distinguished from all other disarmament proposals, since its realization would completely exclude any inequality and would rule out the possibility that military advantages of any kind would be created for any State." (A/4219, page 8).

In all the provisions of the Soviet disarmament programme which follow, that principle is strictly observed. The same cannot be said of the Western plan. Suffice it to say that in that plan not one word is said of the abolition of military bases on foreign territory. Does that not show a desire to gain military advantage? Is it being realistic to ask one of the parties to abolish "vehicles" and to want to keep bases which, according to a term used at the
United Nations, are only another form of such vehicles and a particularly important form from the military point of view? The Western plan, as we know, gives an important place to outer space. That is, doubtless, a very important problem, and one which deserves to be taken into consideration. The plan for general and complete disarmament accordingly gives it the place it merits by providing for the complete cessation of production and for the destruction of all types of rockets, of all ranges, including space vehicles for military purposes. In these circumstances, it would be extremely interesting to specify which countries are insisting on gaining a military advantage by proposing that we should deal with outer space but omit the very much nearer, more topical and more real problem of bases established on foreign territory.

The second of the elements defined by Mr. Ormsby-Gore is that of effective control. On that point the Soviet plan is both clear, definite and realistic. In his speech on 16 March, Mr. Zorin, the representative of the Soviet Union, supplied important details. Furthermore, the fact of the agreement on control achieved at Geneva during negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests proves that the problem of control cannot be such an unsurmountable obstacle as it was made out to be.

In the Soviet Union representative's statement on 16 March, it was explicitly emphasized that the Soviet proposals were based on the hypothesis

"that such control must guarantee the execution by all States of the commitments respectively undertaken. How is such control to be organized? We can envisage such control as taking the following form. When the measures embodied in the first stage of disarmament begin to be put into effect, an international control organ will be established to which States will supply information about their armed forces and conventional armaments. The control machinery will begin to operate simultaneously with the disbandment of the troops which are to be reduced in the first stage, so that the international controllers can be sure that States are complying exactly and strictly with the agreed measures for such reduction." (TNOD/FV.2, page 17)
If, as the Western countries say, control without corresponding measures of disarmament is not their objective, in what way do the Soviet proposals, which provide, at each phase and for each measure of disarmament, the corresponding measures of control, not suit them? We personally are sure that, if we do not wish to make the question of control a further obstacle on the road to disarmament, we can and we must, if we are making an honest effort, succeed in making control effective and commensurate with the disarmament measures implemented in the course of a given phase.

The third essential element needed for the creation of this atmosphere of confidence is, according to the statement by the United Kingdom representative, "steady progress towards a definite and openly declared final goal". (TNOD/PV.2, page 6).

The principle, in its essence, is unobjectionable but, as soon as one starts to analyze the Western plan, it becomes clear that "steady progress" and "a definite and openly declared final goal" are just what is lacking.

It should be noted that the very notion of steady progress cannot be separated from that of a time-limit or period. If there is to be steady progress, there should be, in the case before us, a fixed period of time within which such progress is to be made. Steady progress can only be measured in relation to an existing situation and after the lapse of a period of time. Now, advance and forward movement occur in time; and it is those very two elements, without which no progress is conceivable, which are missing in the plan of the five Western countries. Any examination made of the Western plan evokes the question: "Yes, but by when?" And what will be going on during this period of which no one knows the limits -- the period between the time when the objective is, as it were, definitely and openly declared, and the time when it is attained? Whereas the Western plan is mute on that question, the Soviet plan gives it a most definite answer. Not only does it define the objective -- general and complete disarmament -- but it fixes the time-limits for carrying out the measures for general and complete disarmament. Contrary to what has been alleged concerning the four-year period, it should be stressed that that is precisely one of the most distinguishing features of the profound realism which characterizes the plan from the first to the last of its proposals. That time-limit is what is required by the dangerous situation created by the arms race, and by the need to act quickly while there is yet time to turn off the road leading inevitably to war.

We hope that those realistic features of the Soviet plan will not fail to receive due attention from the Western countries.
Mr. MARTINO (Italy) (translation from French): I have already, in my short statement at the opening meeting, spoken of the hopes and aspirations of the Italian Government and people regarding disarmament. I have also briefly expressed the views of the Italian Government on the proposals of the five Western countries contained in the plan presented and explained by Mr. Ormsby-Gore, entitled: "A Plan for General and Comprehensive Disarmament in a Free and Peaceful World submitted by Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America on 16 March 1960".

I said then that I am thoroughly convinced that this plan is based on a realistic attitude which can restore the mutual trust indispensable for any measure of disarmament. The plan is progressive and balanced, it provides the necessary safeguards, and the speed of its execution is only limited by its scope. I therefore do not think I need say anything further on the subject. The noteworthy statements made by my Western colleagues during these discussions are already amply sufficient to demonstrate the merits of our scheme. I shall confine myself, then, to a few remarks which I think are required after what the representatives of the socialist countries have said at previous meetings about the Western plan.

Allow me first to observe that although the discussion on the tasks and aims of this Conference which has taken place here at earlier meetings, and has been taken up again in the Bulgarian representative's statement just now, has obvious procedural interest, it must not lead us to put form before substance. I come from a country of ancient and august legal traditions, yet I am peculiarly sensitive to procedural questions and not apt to underestimate their importance. But in my opinion the substance should come before everything else, otherwise our discussions would be no more than vain dialectical exercises.

As a matter of fact, in its substance the disagreement that has arisen does not seem to me really serious when its importance is compared with that of the work each of us is required to do and of the goal we set before us. If you read the Western plan carefully you must see that its measures as a whole aim at a total disarmament of all States; likewise, according to the Soviet statements, the measures in the Soviet plan aim at a similar disarmament.

What, then, are the factors which divide us? Wherein do the points of view and the intentions of the West differ from those of the Soviet Union?
The five Western countries here assembled are convinced that every possible effort must be made to achieve total disarmament. But, being realists, they do not exclude the possibility that this may be attained by stages. The Eastern countries, on the other hand, seem now to be excluding this possibility and taking an all-or-nothing stand. The correctness of this impression seems to be borne out by what the Soviet representative is reported to have said at a press conference in Geneva. According to statements in the press which have not yet been denied, the Soviet representative stated that his plan must be accepted or rejected as a whole and was not open to discussion. It was a take-it-or-leave-it plan. I am willing to believe that that expression was not used, or at any rate that it was not used in that way and that the impression it gives is incorrect. But even if it were so used, I frankly do not understand why there should be this insistence that the tasks of this Conference should be formally discussed and why so much importance should be attached to a prior solution of that problem.

Let us concentrate our attention on measures of disarmament. We, for our part, believe that this discussion must always have general disarmament as its final objective. It is precisely for that reason that the five-Power plan is so conceived that the two initial phases of an important and decisive stage are followed by measures aimed at the elimination of forces and armaments in a world governed by international statutes and guarantees.

Nevertheless, we believe that this discussion can be really decisive if we bend all our efforts to a search for speedy agreement on the specific measures without which a disarmament programme could not be achieved. This agreement, which would establish a basis for joint work and a fruitful initial understanding, could be followed by other discussions and other agreements aimed at the ultimate goal.

The last world war and the problems it left unsolved have sown distrust among the nations. That is why so much effort has had to be devoted since the war to search for an international agreement for the limitation of armaments. That is why we are assembled here once again, all of us assuredly moved by the same faith and the same hope, to discuss disarmament plans. If that distrust did not exist, we should not have engaged, and should not now be engaged, in an
arms race as spectacular as it is alarming. If that distrust did not exist, disarmament would not be the most important and most urgent problem of the day, upon the solution of which depends that of so many other problems. But trust cannot be restored by a mere demonstration of good faith. We cannot enjoin it on ourselves. Distrust is the product of concrete facts; and the return of trust, similarly, can only be the product of concrete facts.

This shows very clearly that no positive agreement to prohibit States' dangerous armaments is conceivable unless it provides means for restoring confidence to one and all. If such means were not provided, disarmament would not be accepted by anyone, at any rate not in good faith. Those means are control.

If control is to serve its purpose, it must be real and effective. That is why my Government cannot be satisfied with general statements unaccompanied by specific proposals. That, too, is why my Government cannot very well agree to the association of the idea of control with the idea of espionage. Once a concrete plan for general disarmament has been sincerely accepted by all, at no phase and at no moment of its implementation can the international inspectors commissioned to verify the faithful application of the agreements be compared with spies.

The implementation of disarmament agreements requires good faith. A mere show of suspicion that international inspectors could be used for intelligence purposes, as the Soviet Union representative suggested on 16 March, would suffice to destroy confidence and to justify distrust.

In his statement of 17 March the Czechoslovak representative explained to us his delegation's concept of the steps which should be taken to secure general and complete disarmament. At the same time he mentioned certain points in the Western plan which he described as vague. Allow me, Mr. Chairman, on behalf of my four colleagues to comply with the Czechoslovak representative's request and clear up any misunderstanding and misapprehension. I shall reply without more ado to the four questions he asked. They are as follows: (TNCD/PV.3, pages 17 and 18):

The Soviet Union programme for general and complete disarmament proposes as one of the important measures the liquidation of all military bases on foreign territories. Does the proposal of the five delegations envisage the same kind of measures?
Does the plan of the Western delegations provide for the termination of military training, the abolition of war ministries, general staffs and other military and para-military institutions, and organizations? Does it provide for the prohibition of the re-establishment of armed forces in any form?

Have the Western Powers any intention of making a declaration concerning the banning of the use of nuclear weapons and, if so, at which stage?

In the view of the five authors of the plan, when will the complete liquidation of nuclear weapon stockpiles deposited in custody under international control take place?

These four problems will only arise when the forces and armaments of States have been reduced to levels corresponding with the requirements of international security and of obligations under the United Nations Charter. General disarmament will then have been completed.

Regarding the first question, under the five Powers' proposal military bases -- wherever they may be -- will all disappear when the forces and armaments required for their garrisons and equipment cease to be available as a result of the reductions laid down in the plan.

We regard disarmament as basically a problem of the general and progressive limitation of forces and armaments. We consider that each State, within the limits agreed at each phase, is free to use its remaining forces and armaments in whatever manner it deems necessary for its security. Furthermore, it follows logically, and is implied by the plan, that this question will no longer arise when armed forces have been reduced to levels corresponding with the requirements of international security and of obligations under the United Nations Charter.

I would add a remark on my own account. In the statements of our Eastern colleagues this expression "foreign bases" or "bases in foreign territory" crops up again and again, with great emphasis. It appears once more, with the same emphasis, in the statement just made by the Bulgarian representative. At the end of the second stage of the Soviet plan, when all forces are to be eliminated, the liquidation of foreign bases is nevertheless explicitly provided for -- as though liquidation of bases would not have been obligatory at the same time on national territory. That is surprising.

Regarding the second question of the Czechoslovak representative, I must point out that implementation of the five Powers' plan would mean progressive reduction of military training, general staffs etc., corresponding with each level of limitation of forces. When general disarmament has taken place, the
limits of military training will be determined by the requirements of internal security and by the obligations arising from the United Nations Charter. Obligations under the Charter may in their turn be modified as a result of the enforcement of the agreements required for the maintenance of peace.

My reply to the third question is this: when the prohibition of manufacture of nuclear weapons has taken place and stockpiles for those weapons have been converted to peaceful purposes, further measures -- in the light of up-to-date scientific knowledge -- would be taken to secure the final elimination of those weapons. At that time, no nuclear weapon could be available.

Regarding the last question, about destruction of fissionable materials transferred from military stocks to peaceful purposes, there seems to have been a misunderstanding.

In point of fact this fissionable material would have been available for peaceful purposes from the time of the first transfer to the last. Since there would undoubtedly be a big demand for this material from all over the world we envisage, not its destruction, but its preservation for peaceful purposes.

One of the criticisms of the Western plan made in earlier meetings and repeated here today concerns the absence of a time-limit for carrying out the measures laid down at the various stages. The chief virtue of the Soviet plan, it is said, is its specific time-limit. This plan comports, as we know, a period of four years for its implementation; the Soviet Union representative has told us that it is technically and politically impossible to eliminate forces, armaments and stockpiles all at once. He is quite right. But the four-year period is clearly only a forecast of the time reasonably required for carrying out the measures laid down in the agreement.

Mr. Zorin has declared that this forecast is warranted by the experience the Soviet Government has had in applying its own unilateral disarmament measures. The estimate could not easily be disputed, but neither could it be accepted out of hand.

It is true that the Soviet Union has already had experience of reducing its forces, as incidentally have other countries. Disarmament is not, however, a unilateral measure for the reduction of forces, but something a great deal more complex which we may assume will take a great deal more time. Reduction of forces will necessarily have to be accompanied by the laying-up or destruction of the corresponding armaments, which owing to modern technique are of very varied types; and to organize the controls provided for this purpose will also, naturally, require time.
It is impossible therefore to say whether four years is in fact the right period to allow for general and complete disarmament. It might be, but it might also be too long or too short. It is a forecast, and only experience can tell whether it is correct. Nor do the Western Powers, on the other hand, refuse to forecast the time required for each disarmament operation. For example, regarding the first stage of the Western plan Mr. Ormsby-Gore mentioned in his statement one year as in his view a reasonable period. The point that must be emphasized, I think, is that the period envisaged at this moment can in any event only be a guide. For what would happen if the combined disarmament operations were not fully completed in the period laid down, owing to circumstances over which the contracting States have no control? Would the agreements become void? That is a very complex problem for which a solution has to be found.

Certain speakers complained during earlier discussion that the first stage of the Western plan provides for a whole series of joint studies. The point was also made that studies ought not to be stipulated at any stage because someone might use them as an excuse for deliberately prolonging the discussions and so scuttling disarmament.

Allow me to remark in this connexion that it stands to reason that each problem must receive thorough study.

Can such far-reaching and serious problems be solved without previous study among us? If these problems are not studied during the first stage, then they must be studied before that stage. This would mean that disarmament would indeed be put through more quickly, but on the other hand the disarmament agreement would be reached much later. The upshot is the same.

The Polish representative asked three questions about the Western plan (TNCD/FV.3, page 7). On behalf of my colleagues the representatives of Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, I should like to reply to Mr. Naszkowski.

The first question was this: The Western plan provides for the establishment of an international disarmament organization; what are the functions of this organization in regard to concrete disarmament intended to be during the first stage, which is almost wholly given over to negotiations?
The idea regarding the international disarmament organization in the Western plan is that it will develop gradually, but will prepare itself from the outset for the various tasks it will be required to perform during the implementation of the plan. Its initial functions and responsibilities will naturally be limited. Their gradual and systematic extension will eventually reach its maximum, and the organization's structure will be complete, when general disarmament is completed.

During the first phase the organization will, it is true, have comparatively limited control functions, but the administrative problems connected with the progressive expansion of its activities will, from the beginning, be one of the main responsibilities of the organization itself and of its leaders.

It will be necessary, for instance, to recruit technically-qualified staff in large numbers. The heads of the organization will also have to establish relations and contacts with the various national authorities and with the United Nations, while they are getting ready to start the organization's various activities.

Once the organization has been set up, its activities during the first stage will mainly consist of collating and analyzing the notices sent in by the various States under paragraphs B and C of the plan. This work of analysis represents the first element of control, although at this stage the scope of verification will be limited. The first phase of the Western plan is planned in such a way as to be applicable without extensive measures of inspection; this was arranged from a desire to come nearer to the principles of the Soviet Union and its allies in the matter.

Nevertheless the organization will, as soon as it is established, have one important responsibility, namely control of the depots to which armaments are to be transferred under paragraph D.2 of the Western plan.

To sum up, the functions of the disarmament organization under the Western plan will consist at first mainly of preparatory work corresponding with a phase we all expect to be very short. But we mean that the organization should gradually extend, and that its control responsibilities should increase pari passu with the actual progress of the various stages of disarmament.

The United States representative explained last week that sections I and II of the Western plan are so to speak two steps in the same stage. The disarmament organization must be ready to shoulder its new responsibilities as soon as each study required by paragraph F of section I is completed.
I now come to the second question asked by our Polish colleague.

Mr. Naszkowski observed that the Western plan provides in its first stage for the storage, under the supervision of the international disarmament organization, of certain quantities of conventional armaments, bearing a relationship to the agreed force levels.

He then asked:

Since the level of the armed forces of the two greatest Powers is not to undergo any change, and the reduction in the forces of other States has not been specified, what armaments are to be placed in the storage depots?

The answer to this question is as follows:

Even if there were no reduction of armed forces during the first stage, the storage under the international organization's control of certain agreed types and quantities of conventional armaments bearing a relationship to the agreed force levels is important.

In fact, if during the first stage armaments were not placed in storage depots, it would be possible considerably to strengthen armed forces within a few days by calling up trained reservists. If, on the other hand, the lists of armaments to be placed in storage depots were so drawn up that the remaining armaments corresponded to the authorized force levels, the call-up of reservists would serve no military purpose, since the men recalled could not be equipped.

It is therefore important to place certain agreed types and quantities of armaments, bearing a relationship to the agreed force levels, under international guard.

The third question raised by our distinguished Polish colleague was:

Since any discussion of military budgets can only be justified if it concerns their reduction, what is the purpose of collecting information on military budgets during a stage which does not provide for their reduction?

The answer to this question is as follows:

(a) The Western Powers do not consider that budgetary control of disarmament can be separated from other measures of control; it is, on the contrary, an integral part of control. Since a department of budgetary control is a necessary part of the international disarmament organization, it must be created and start functioning at the same time as the organization.
(b) The five-Power plan provides — at least with regard to armed forces and conventional armaments — for certain measures of reduction and limitation that must enter into force during the first phase. It would therefore be desirable to know and to be able to follow any budgetary implications from the moment they are introduced.

(c) In order to be able to follow effectively the financial and economic implications of the reductions agreed for the second phase, it is essential for the international disarmament organization, as in the case of the armed forces and armaments, to have as early as possible a starting-point based on the information submitted by the various States.

(d) It is impossible as yet to assess the effect on national defence expenditure of the agreed reductions of armaments; but in any case the submission of the required budgetary information will contribute effectively to control over those reductions.

Since this information will be submitted in accordance with previously-settled criteria, the control will be all the more effective.

May I make one more comment? I have the impression that the delegations of the communist countries would strongly oppose the setting-up of an international organization possessing the means necessary to maintain peace. If I have understood them correctly, our colleagues seem to be convinced that, once general and complete disarmament has been carried out, aggression will become impossible on the face of the earth and war will be banished forever.

This does not seem to me to be quite a realistic view. Wars between peoples have taken place from the earliest times and in the most primitive conditions, before the invention of the horrible modern weapons of mass destruction, before that of gunpowder, and even before that of bronze axes. Wars have existed as long as man. Only a capable international organization possessing the necessary means could prevent them. I know it may seem strange to devise measures for the disarmament of all, and at the same time to devise others for the creation of an armed force.

But it is for States that disarmament is to be enacted, while this armed force will be vested in an international organization placed above all States and obliged to enforce international law and order.

In all civilized countries individuals are unarmed. Such is the law. But the community, on the contrary, is armed. This is essential in order to ensure that every citizen obeys the law. How could peace be maintained if such an armed force did not exist? Indeed, notwithstanding total abolition of all armaments, there will always be armed police forces. And these armed forces, as even the Soviet representative has told us, would have to be related to the needs of each country for maintaining internal order.
Obviously the maintenance of internal order in a large country must require a much larger police force than in a small one. Thus, if there were no international organization bound to enforce the law and maintain peace, what would prevent a larger State with a more powerful police force from being tempted to use it to attack a weaker State?

Should we not be ignoring the lessons of history if we thought that things could or should work out differently, that temptation could or should be expelled from the human soul by the agreements we are going to conclude?

I should like for the time being to stop here and, in conclusion, express the hope that the explanations I have had the honour to submit to the Conference today on behalf of my Western colleagues will be accepted in the spirit in which I have given them — a spirit of sincere co-operation in order to achieve the great purpose assigned to us. This purpose, which is common to us all and should inspire us to spare no patience or effort in carrying out our task, has been for centuries the noblest aspiration of humanity, namely, the abolition of war as a means of settling differences between peoples, and the establishment of peace on earth.

Mr. NOSEK (Czechoslovakia): On behalf of the Czechoslovak delegation I would like to express my thanks to the representative of Italy, Mr. Martino, for having answered the questions raised by our delegation at the third meeting of our Committee on 17 March. We will carefully examine the answers we have just heard and will come back to them at a later meeting. We will, of course, study the precise wording of the replies and we therefore have to wait until the verbatim record of this meeting is available.

The general impression of the answers contained in Mr. Martino's intervention this morning convinces us again of the necessity of clearing the common approach to the task of our Committee. In this connexion I would like to stress right away that we put forward our questions in connexion with the whole problem of general and complete disarmament and that we must therefore approach and examine these replies from the same angle. As the members of this Committee will recall, our four questions were raised at the conclusion of an intervention which dealt with general and complete disarmament. Starting from this point in our intervention on 17 March we proceeded further to the substance of the matter and raised our clear questions. In the view of the
Czechoslovak delegation it would be incorrect to discuss the laying down of the tasks of our Committee in an abstract way. On the other hand, as we see it, it would not be proper, as the Western delegations seem to hint and as the representative of Italy put it again this morning, to go into details without making quite clear the framework of this task and the final goal to be attained by our work.

I would also like to stress this approach because of the fact that during our meeting on 17 March a serious difference of opinion appeared as to what was the fundamental task facing our Committee. During our meeting last Friday the representative of the United States, Mr. Eaton, even went so far as to declare that if there should be frequent use of the words "general and complete disarmament" this "may inevitably lead to chaos" (TNCD/FV.4, page 15). Well, what is the real cause of the dissension which has been mentioned as facing us in this Committee? After my delegation had explained in our intervention at the meeting on 17 March how we understood, and how we understand, the principles of general and complete disarmament, the representative of France, Mr. Moch, expressed his disapproval of our view that the main task of our Committee was to draw up measures for general and complete disarmament. Mr. Moch, in his intervention on 17 March, expressed his astonishment at the fact that in our negotiations "I am constantly hearing talk of 'general and complete disarmament'" (TNCD/FV.3, page 18), and in concluding his intervention Mr. Moch, quoting from document DC/144, proclaimed quite unequivocally that the goal of the work of our Committee was only to attain "agreements and recommendations on the limitation and reduction of all types of armaments and armed forces ..." (Ibid., page 21.)

During our meeting on 18 March the leader of the United States delegation, Mr. Eaton, also expressed with astonishing disdain his opinion on the main task of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament. Mr. Eaton, in spite of having declared at our meeting on 17 March: "I, for one, am willing to assume that we are all desirous of achieving the goal of general and complete disarmament ..." (Ibid., page 8), only one day later referred with a certain amount of criticism to the many times during our Conference the term "general and complete disarmament" had been mouthed, and he added that these words had become "hollow words -- words shorn of all meaning" (TNCD/FV.4, page 15).
I do not intend to waste time enumerating how often, on the other hand, the words "general and comprehensive disarmament" have been used in our present negotiations. I would like to assure the representative of the United States that for our delegation the words "general and complete disarmament" are not and never will be hollow words or, to use Mr. Ormsby-Gore's expression "a debate on the adjectives". We approach our work in accordance with resolution 1378 (XIV) of the General Assembly of the United Nations, and I believe that it is our duty, the duty of all of us, to strive for the accomplishment of the provisions of resolution 1378 in the shortest possible time.

We fully agree with the point of view put before the Committee this morning by the representative of Bulgaria, Mr. Tarabanov, that the fundamental task of our Committee rests on the clear wording of the first operative paragraph of resolution 1378 adopted unanimously on 20 November 1959 by the delegations of all Member States of the United Nations during the fourteenth session of the General Assembly. In this paragraph the General Assembly of the United Nations "Calls upon Governments to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of this problem;" -- that is, the problem of general and complete disarmament. As has already been stressed here, the representatives of the governments of all countries participating in this Conference voted for this paragraph.

Thus the obligation which has been assumed is clear, and we can hardly imagine any delegation abandoning it. Should that be the case, however, we must be told so quite clearly and publicly. Then world public opinion will be able to judge who is in favour of and who is against an accelerated working out of proposals on general and complete disarmament -- the early achievement of which is being awaited with great hope by peoples all over the world.

The representatives of France and the United Kingdom, it seems to me, have attempted to misinterpret resolution 1378 (XIV) of the General Assembly. But I hope that all the jurists who are present here will agree with me that in the interpretation of a text the most essential point is the definition of the main task -- and in the case of resolution 1378 that is the General Assembly's appeal to governments to "make every effort to achieve a constructive solution" of the problem of general and complete disarmament.
The obvious principal meaning of paragraph 3 of the operative part of resolution 1378 (XIV) is the expression of the hope that measures — that is, the practical working out of procedures to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control — will be elaborated in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time. It is hard to imagine that the text of paragraph 3 of the operative part of the resolution could mean anything else than that measures to achieve general and complete disarmament should be worked out. Any other interpretation of the paragraph would obviously contradict the whole spirit of this resolution. Our viewpoint is confirmed by the very title of the resolution: "General and complete disarmament", as well as by the fact that the resolution contains the words "Considering that the question of general and complete disarmament is the most important one facing the world today".

In conclusion, I should like to say that the Czechoslovak delegation understands the fundamental task of this Committee in the following way. We must devote our best endeavours to working out in detail in the shortest possible time measures for a constructive solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. That is the aim of the USSR proposal on general and complete disarmament, which represents a joint proposal of the socialist countries.

I fully agree with the United States representative, Mr. Eaton, that it would be desirable to proceed without delay to a discussion of the substance of the problem. As is very well known, the USSR proposal on general and complete disarmament was submitted more than six months ago. We feel that it is therefore high time that the delegations of the five Western countries should approach a concrete discussion of the proposal.

The CHAIRMAN (France) (translation from French): Before asking whether other members of the Committee wish to speak, I should like to point out to the representative of Czechoslovakia, in the most friendly way, that he attributed to me, as far as I could understand from the English, words to the effect that I wished only "to explore through mutual consultations" etc. I must point out that the word "only" does not appear in the text before me and that the phrase read out as being mine was taken from the letter of the four Foreign Ministers; thus, I only used this phrase in quoting the basic document.
Mr. NASZKOWSKI (Poland) (translation from French): In the first place, I wish to thank Mr. Martino, the representative of Italy, for the explanations he has been good enough to give us concerning the questions we put a few days ago to the authors of the five-Power plan. We have listened carefully to these explanations and shall study them thoroughly.

For the present, I shall confine myself to a few preliminary remarks of an entirely general nature. In the statements made so far in this hall, much attention has been devoted to the problem of control of disarmament. For our part, we stress the necessity of establishing effective control from the beginning of the disarmament process. According to the French representative, our chairman today, the West holds the same opinion on this point. But what is our understanding of the main point, namely, the concrete measures constituting the beginning of the disarmament process? It seems to me that we have not yet had sufficiently clear explanations on this point. I cannot understand how maintaining the forces of the two greatest Powers at the same general level can be considered a disarmament measure.

What is essential for us, is to know what the duties and functions of the control organization will be during the first stage of the five-Power plan. Would they not in fact be reduced to control without disarmament? Another point which strikes us in the five-Power plan is that the matter of placing conventional armaments in storage depots, and also budgetary problems, are treated as disarmament measures, whereas in reality they are only secondary problems or, at least, matters subordinate to the achievement of a reduction in conventional armaments.

Mr. ORMSEY-GORE (United Kingdom): Before our Polish colleague spoke, the representative of Czechoslovakia intervened to refer once more to the question of the United Nations resolution on disarmament. He emphasized, in particular, one paragraph of that resolution to which his Government attached particular importance. I should like to say, on behalf of the United Kingdom delegation, that we voted for that resolution. We accept it in toto. All paragraphs of it represent the policy of the United Kingdom Government in this sphere.
Our Czechoslovakian colleague also said, in the course of his remarks, that he recognized that mere abstract discussion of disarmament was not perhaps of very much use; that substantial discussion, especially on the measures outlined in the Soviet draft plan, would be helpful in forwarding our work. This morning I should like to touch in some detail on the plan put forward last September by the Soviet Union, and now supported by four other countries round this table.

The Soviet representative and his Eastern colleagues have, in their preliminary observations on the Western plan, criticized the attention that we have paid to the preparatory stage of disarmament. They have said, and our Polish colleague has just repeated the assertion, that the first stage of the Western plan does not in fact contain much in the way of disarmament measures; they have criticized the provision made therein for studies on a number of subjects.

When I compare the Western plan with the Soviet plan, I wonder whether some of these criticisms from the Soviet representative are not, perhaps, based on a misunderstanding. If one looks at the two plans side by side one finds that a number of features in the first stage of the Soviet plan can reasonably be compared with measures in the second stage of the Western plan. However, as I and other of my Western colleagues have pointed out, the second stage of the Western plan is closely linked with the first stage, although it goes in many cases well beyond the ground covered by the first stage of the Soviet plan.

It seems to me, therefore, that, generally speaking, the difference in approach as between the Western and Soviet plans is that the Soviet plan makes no mention of the preliminary work and action which must precede the implementation of the measures contained in their first stage. I should like to ask, therefore, whether the Soviet representative could agree that much preliminary discussion is necessary before agreement can be reached upon the measures contained the first stage of the Soviet plan; and would also ask him how he envisages that the preliminary work should be carried out.

Coming now to examine the measures contained in the first stage of the Soviet plan, I observe that provision is made for the calling of a special session of the United Nations General Assembly, or a world conference which would agree on reduction of the strengths of armed forces of States other than those taking part in this Ten Nation Conference. In the Western plan provision has been made, in the first stage, for the preparation of such a conference. It is not clear
how the Soviet representative, or his Eastern colleagues, consider such a world conference should be prepared. If there were not careful preparation the work of the world conference might well be extremely prolonged, and could even last for years. Has the Soviet representative any idea when such a conference might take place, and what, precisely, it will be asked to consider? As the Czechoslovakian and Polish representatives pointed out at our third meeting, earlier discussions on disarmament on a world scale took a very long time and were ultimately overtaken by the preparations for a new war.

I think that it would be fair to interject at this point that those disarmament negotiations were a failure not because they took so long but because political developments at that time, and in particular the development of national socialism in Germany, prevented their coming to fruition. Indeed, it would be fair to say that, at the time Hitler came to power, they were very near to success. But it is quite natural in itself that disarmament, which has such far reaching implications for the security of nations, should be examined very carefully.

To return to the question of the world conference on disarmament envisaged in the Soviet plan, I should like to know whether I and my Western colleagues would be right in thinking that the duration of this Conference is not taken into account by the Soviet delegation when it states that the whole plan could be completed in four years. Would we, indeed, be right in thinking that it was the Soviet intention that the period of four years should begin from the end of the world conference on disarmament, when agreement between the States concerned had been reached? In this connexion I was very much interested in a part of the speech made by our Czechoslovakian colleague on 17 March:

"The term general disarmament means that disarmament measures include all States. General disarmament means that it is impossible to approach disarmament measures which involve only certain States or a group of States while other States stand aside. In such a way a dangerous disproportion would necessarily arise and thereby cause a threat to peace. Only the Soviet proposals for disarmament includes in all stages such measures relating to all States in an appropriate manner."

(TNCD/FV.3, page 14)
From that, one can only gather that the disarmament process would begin only when all States, as a result of this world conference, had agreed with the obligations that were being undertaken by the ten countries that are now sitting round this table.

A feature of both the Western and Soviet plans is the attention paid by each to the development of what the Soviet representative calls an international control organization and what we call an international disarmament organization. The tasks which the Soviet and Western plans propose for this organization may differ in some respects, but the same basic responsibilities must be catered for.

My Italian colleague has this morning given you some idea of what we regard as the preliminary functions of the international disarmament organization. It is our conviction that the establishment of this organization is fundamental to the process of disarmament, and on this I do not think that there is much disagreement between the two sides. The organization is not one which can be created overnight, and this is why we have placed the establishment of the international disarmament organization at the beginning of stage 1 of the Western plan. Would not the Soviet representative and his Eastern colleagues agree that the establishment of this organization, and its preparation for performing the tasks allotted to it by any disarmament agreement, would indeed take time? In fact, is this not what one might call a preliminary measure which would be necessary before any actual disarmament measures came into effect?

In discussing this question of timing, I recall that the Soviet representative the other day claimed that Stage I of the Soviet plan could be completed in one to one and a half years, that the second stage would require a further two years, while for the final stage a one-year period would be sufficient. I should like to enquire whether the Soviet representative regards the timing for each stage as fixed, that is to say, would they undertake a commitment to carry out the measures in each stage within the periods indicated by the Soviet representative, and be prepared to move automatically on to the next stage whether or not it would prove practicable to complete the previous stage in the time allowed?

Secondly, do they regard each stage as self-contained or do they consider that progress on certain items of later stages could be made even before the whole of the earliest stage had been implemented? And finally, do they consider that there is any time-table to be observed within each stage so that certain items are completed before others?
It is necessary for us to be clear why the Soviet plan now contains a rigid
time-table in spite of the vast amount of practical work which would have to be
done in completing the very elaborate process of disarmament, whereas in the
previous Soviet comprehensive proposals of 1955, no final time-limit was laid down. Perhaps here I should read the exact words which appeared at the end of the 1955
Soviet plan and which might be regarded as the third stage of that plan. Here I
quote from the Soviet plan:

"On the completion of all the measures enumerated above, it would
be desirable that the Powers should further reduce their armaments and
armed forces to the levels strictly necessary for the maintenance of
internal security and the fulfilment of the obligations of signatory States
under the terms of the Charter of the United Nations." (Disarmament Commission
Official Records, supplement for April to December 1955, page 23)

And there was no time-limit set down on that occasion for the carrying out of that
particular task. I should also like to draw the attention of my colleagues to the
phrasing of that particular disarmament measure, as they will see it corresponds
very closely with the relevant paragraph in the third stage of the Western
disarmament plan.

To say that the process of disarmament must be rapidly completed in order
to avoid backsliding on the part of certain nations is understandable and
reasonable, but it does not follow that we should lay down a rigid time-table when
none of us can foresee just how the problems which will arise are all to be resolved.

I now turn to the references in the Soviet plan to the destruction of all
types of nuclear and rocket weapons. It seems to us a very curious feature of
the Soviet proposals that, although all the speakers from Communist countries have
emphasized the vital importance of nuclear disarmament, and the intense feelings
held throughout the world in this regard, they nevertheless make no provision for
any such measures until the last stage. The Romanian representative pointed out
at the fourth meeting of this Conference that:

"One of the most salient features of the general and complete disarmament
plan proposed by the Soviet Union and supported by all socialist countries
is that it envisages the prohibition and complete elimination of nuclear
weapons in a reasonably short period of time." (TNCD/PV.5, page 5)
But the plan which he supports in fact gives this measure the lowest priority as regards timing, and no preparations for dealing with the problem are made until the last stage. Nor is it clear what consideration the Soviet and Eastern European delegations have given to the problems of the cut-off of the production of fissionable material and of their reconversion for peaceful uses. Nor how the elimination of stocks is to be verified.

In the Western plan provision is already made in Stage I for preparation of an agreement to discontinue the manufacture of fissionable materials for weapon purposes, and to transfer existing stocks to peaceful uses, and action to implement these measures is already taken in Stage II. In the Soviet Plan, there appears to be no provision for preparation of the measures envisaged by them in Stage III. Perhaps the Soviet representative has proposals to make for preparing the necessary measures before we reach Stage III. I should be interested to learn what methods of control they have in mind for arriving at this total measure in Stage III and in what sort of time period they envisage the negotiation of agreement and establishment of these controls. I ask this question bearing in mind that in earlier Soviet proposals there was provision for nuclear disarmament at an earlier stage than is apparently now contemplated, and it has often appeared from the speeches of the representatives of the other Eastern European countries that they would evidently wish to see a greater urgency attached to the nuclear problem. In this connexion I thought very interesting what our Czechoslovak colleagues had to say on this subject on 17 March:

"In order to achieve complete disarmament it is necessary to destroy successively in all stages all weapons so that they are eliminated from the armaments of armed forces." (TNCD/PV.3, page 15)

I do not know whether we should take it as meaning that the representative of Czechoslovakia rather agrees with us that all armaments should be dealt with, conventional and nuclear, in all stages of any disarmament plan.

These are some preliminary remarks which I have wished to make regarding the Soviet proposals, but I feel I should tell Mr. Zorin that one of the reasons why I have refrained from comment until now is because we were confidently expecting the presentation of a very much more detailed plan. Previous Russian proposals have been far more explicit. Mr. Litvinov’s proposals, which were called to mind with admiration by Mr. Khrushchev in New York last year, were contained in no less than sixty-three articles. The Soviet proposals of 1955, 1956 and 1957 were presented in far more detail although they were less far reaching.
For instance, the 1956 plan set out at some length the provisions for control. Do those provisions apply to this plan or have there been modifications?

A general reference is now made to aerial photography, but there is no indication whether the Control Organ is to make use of this extremely valuable aid to its work of verification at all stages of the Soviet plan or only in the last stage.

Then again the plan does not make clear what is meant by "armed forces". Reductions of armed forces are proposed for stages I and II, with corresponding reductions of armaments and material, but stage III suddenly speaks of "liquidation of the material of the air force". Does this mean that no control of air forces is envisaged before stage III, or does it mean that certain air force components would still be in existence at the end of stage II?

Similarly all armed forces are supposed to have been disbanded in Stage II, but nuclear weapons are not to be touched until stage III. It is difficult to understand who will be in control of these weapons at this stage if all armed forces have ceased to exist. Perhaps what we need is a clearer definition of armed forces.

To sum up what I have to say this morning, there appears to me to be a considerable lack of precision in the Soviet proposals so far presented to us. In their present form they hardly merit the title of a plan -- certainly not if we compare them with the previous Soviet proposals -- and therefore, before we can give them the careful consideration we wish we shall need more detailed clarification than we have at the present time.

Mr. NOSEK (Czechoslovakia): Mr. Chairman, in your brief intervention as representative of France you expressed some dissatisfaction with the word "only" which I used in my intervention this morning. I have before me document TNCD/PV.3 according to which in your statement, on page 19, you quoted a paragraph from the letter dated 7 September 1959 from the four Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and then you said as follows:

"The aim is to prepare agreement and recommendations on the limitation and reduction of all types of armaments and armed forces of particular relevance to the countries participating in these deliberations; that is to say to the ten nations meeting here -- and that under effective international control."
You then said:

"This is our task and, I would almost say, that is our only task." (Ibid.)

To conclude my intervention, I would just like to comment very briefly on the statement made just now by the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Ormsby-Gore. He quoted one sentence from my statement on 17 March where I said:

"In order to achieve complete disarmament it is necessary to destroy successively in all stages all weapons so that they are eliminated from the armaments of armed forces." (TNCD/FV.3, page 15)

I would like to stress the words "successively in all stages"; this does mean according to the provisions set out in the Soviet plan for the various stages.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): We have listened with great interest to the considerations put forward by the representatives of both the Western Powers and the socialist countries.

We are gratified to find that the Conference is now beginning to give more detailed consideration to the Soviet proposal for general and complete disarmament. Only by following this path shall we be able to make progress in solving the problem set before us. We are also glad that the United Kingdom representative plainly stated today that for his delegation the General Assembly resolution adopted on 20 November last year is the resolution on the implementation of which we must work.

The representative of Italy also said today that, in his view, the differences of opinion on the tasks facing the Committee are not so very serious. In this connexion he somewhat clarified the position of his delegation in regard to the problem of general and complete disarmament and referred to the approach to that problem of the Soviet Union and of other delegations. I gather from this that the views expressed by Mr. Moch at one of our recent meetings are apparently not shared by some of the Western delegations. At any rate, this is what they are now saying. The course taken by further proceedings will, of course, show clearly whether this is the case.

As regards Mr. Ormsby-Gore's remark that he had up to now found it difficult to comment on the Soviet proposal in so far as that proposal, in his view, was not elaborated in such full detail as had been done previously. In this connexion
he even cited the proposal put forward at one time by Mr. Litvinov, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and referred also to the proposals submitted by Soviet representatives at various stages of the discussions held on disarmament since the war. I am sorry to have to point out that the proposals put forward at the time by Mr. Litvinov, detailed though they were, were not any more acceptable on that account to the United Kingdom representative. On the contrary, these detailed proposals, which were submitted to the League of Nations Preparatory Commission, were at that time sharply opposed by Great Britain. So, it does not apparently much matter whether the Soviet proposals are drafted in greater or less detail; what matters is the actual approach to the ideas embodied in those proposals. In addition to this, I wish to say that, if the proposals are basically acceptable, we are prepared to elaborate them in greater detail. I hope that we shall join together here in doing this job.

In any case, Mr. Ormesby-Gore's remarks today enable us, at least, to see where the United Kingdom representative finds our proposals insufficiently detailed and we shall try to help him, and also the other Western representatives, to make progress in the constructive examination of our proposals.

In the light of the views expressed at our last meeting that it was time to proceed to consider specific disarmament problems, the Soviet delegation would like today to give additional explanations of certain specific measures in the Soviet programme of general and complete disarmament. This we intend to do to supplement what we did at one of the early meetings of our Committee. On that occasion we explained in greater detail the content of the basic stages in the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament; we talked of approximate time-limits for the solution of that problem and we explained certain elements of control at each of the stages precisely in order to give concrete form to our basic proposals submitted to the United Nations General Assembly six months ago.

Both the representatives of the Western Powers and the representatives of the socialist countries pointed out in their statements that nuclear disarmament measures must be given special prominence in any disarmament plan. Incidentally, the United Kingdom representative today also reminded us of this once again.

It is a fact that, in view of the contemporary development of military technology and the appearance in national arsenals of the latest devices for delivering missiles, the greatest menace to peoples is that represented by the
atomic and hydrogen weapons which possess colossal destructive power and can inflict unheard-of calamities upon millions of people. The Soviet government has always maintained, and continues to maintain, that any disarmament agreement should embody a ban on all types of atomic and hydrogen weapons. Ever since the United Nations began considering the disarmament problem, the Soviet Union has persistently striven for the earliest possible prohibition of weapons of this kind and for their elimination from national armaments, so that mankind should, once and for all, be freed from the threat of a destructive nuclear war. The Soviet Union stoutly maintained this position both when it had no atomic or hydrogen weapons and later when it came to possess such weapons. At the discussions also for the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapon tests now being conducted in Geneva we have demonstrated our desire to put an end to the nuclear armaments race, because we consider this measure as one of the important steps towards the complete banning of atomic weapons.

The new proposals, which the Soviet representative submitted on 19 March 1960 to the Geneva Three Power Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests designed to end the deadlock in those negotiations, constitute further clear evidence of the Soviet Government's desire to remove all obstacles to the immediate conclusion of an agreement for the discontinuance of all nuclear weapon tests. There can surely be no doubt left in anyone's mind that it depends solely upon the attitude taken by the United States of America and Great Britain whether an agreement for the discontinuance of such tests will shortly be concluded.

It is not our fault either that so far no agreement has been concluded for the banning of nuclear weapons and that these weapons continue to form part of the armaments of a number of States, which implies a threat that these weapons may be used in any future war.

In this connexion, I cannot forbear recalling that, over the many years of discussions held on the question of disarmament -- Mr. Moch must remember this well, for he has been a perennial participant in those protracted discussions -- the representatives of the Western Powers invariably put forward the argument that they cannot give up nuclear weapons on the ground that the Soviet Union possesses superior armed forces and conventional armaments. On the strength of this argument the Western Powers, in the course of the disarmament discussions, made a point of relegating nuclear disarmament measures to the very end of the disarmament
programme and demanded priority for the implementation of measures for the reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons. The Western Powers pointed out in this connexion that, if nuclear disarmament measures were transferred to the initial stage of disarmament, it would fail to ensure the drawing up of a well-balanced programme which at every stage of disarmament would not, as they saw it, change the existing balance of power between States and at the same time increase the security of States as each new step was taken on the way to disarmament.

The Soviet Government carefully considered these views put forward by the Western Powers and, in drawing up its programme of general and complete disarmament, it arranged the measures embodied in its plan in such a way as to make the fullest allowance for the desiderata of our partners in the discussions. We think that we have done this. In any case Mr. Ormsby-Gore, the United Kingdom representative, when he gave his views on the disarmament programme submitted by the Soviet Union, said in a speech he made in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on 19 October 1959, and I quote:

"I note that the Soviet Union no longer insists upon an immediate ban on nuclear weapons before any start can be made on reductions in conventional forces, or on the abolition of foreign bases before disarmament in conventional weapons becomes complete."

I did not quite understand, therefore, why Mr. Ormsby-Gore in his speech today seemed to reproach us with having taken the very step which last October he considered as a step towards balanced disarmament. It may, of course, be that the United Kingdom's position has now changed -- that is a different matter -- but I feel only that Mr. Ormsby-Gore should in that case explain to us what is exactly how the matter stands.

It is precisely in consideration of the views put forward by the Western Powers that the Soviet Union has now proposed that the first two stages of our programme of general and complete disarmament should comprehend, in the first instance, measures relating to a substantial reduction of armed forces and armaments, to a complete disbandment of armies and the abolition of conventional armaments and only after this, at the next stage, measures for the complete banning of nuclear weapons. A reduction of armed forces and armaments would substantially help to diminish the threat of war, because, quite clearly, it is unthinkable to conduct an offensive war without having large armed forces and conventional armaments capable of speedily seizing enemy territory. How indeed can anyone commit
aggression or occupy enemy territory without possessing large military assault
units equipped with modern armour, powerful artillery, aircraft and other
conventional armaments?

There can be no doubt that, without large armed forces, even if nuclear
weapons are available, it is impossible to conduct an offensive war because, if
nuclear weapons only are used, nothing can be achieved as regards occupation of
territory; the only consequence will be the extermination of the peaceful
population and the destruction of material and cultural treasures on enemy territory.

When it included the reduction of armaments and armed forces in the first stage
of the disarmament programme, the Soviet Union was guided by the fact also that
these measures, including the establishment of control, would be comparatively
easier to implement from the organizational point of view. Furthermore, if
States carried out a reduction of armies and armaments, it would undoubtedly
have an important significance for the cause of peace as a step which would help
to diminish the threat of war, improve the whole international atmosphere and
strengthen confidence between States. These measures would show that States had
made a start on practical measures of disarmament. Their implementation would clear
the way for carrying out further measures in the programme of general and complete
disarmament.

In this way the measures proposed in the Soviet disarmament plan for
substantially reducing armed forces and armaments until they are completely
liquidated have the important advantage that, on the one hand, they are relatively
easier to implement and, on the other hand, they constitute a most vital
contribution to the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament.

To what I have just said I would like to add the following. The representatives
of the Western Powers have, in the course of disarmament negotiations, repeatedly
alleged that the large armed forces of the Soviet Union are a threat to the security
of those Powers; they have said that, so long as the armed forces of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics are not reduced, the Western Powers cannot give up
nuclear weapons which they need as what they call a "deterrent". Needless to say,
this argument has never had any foundation, inasmuch as the Soviet Union never had,
nor has it now, any intention to attack anybody. The best proof of this is
constituted by the systematic measures taken by the Soviet Union for the unilateral
reduction of its own armed forces and armaments. A State which, of its own free
will and without waiting for an international agreement, sets out to do this
cannot be harbouring any aggressive intentions.
But, should the Western Powers continue to think that the possession by States of large armed forces constitutes a threat to security, why do these States not then agree to carry out a substantial reduction of armed forces and armaments, which is precisely the measure envisaged for the first stage of the Soviet programme of general and complete disarmament and, later, to the entire abolition of all armed forces and armaments of States, as is proposed in the second stage of our disarmament programme?

Nowadays, when the armaments race has been so enormously accentuated and when national forces and stocks of arms are continuing to build up, it is essential at the earliest possible moment to arrest this dangerous development and to take bold and decisive action to reduce substantially the present levels of armed forces and armaments. This is the very path which the Soviet Union urges should be followed.

As you are aware, the Soviet Union proposes that, in the first stage of the programme of general and complete disarmament, the strength of the armed forces of the USSR, the USA and the Chinese People's Republic should be reduced, under appropriate control, to 1,700,000 men and those of the United Kingdom and of France to 650,000 men respectively.

As regards the strength of other States' armed forces, it is proposed to reduce them to levels which will be agreed at a special session of the United Nations General Assembly or at a world conference on general and complete disarmament.

We shall carefully read over the verbatim record of the statements which Mr. Ormsby-Gore made today on this question of convening a conference, and, when we have done so, we shall do our best to clarify for him — and, of course, for other colleagues — any points which are still not clear in this connexion.

Simultaneously with this, in the first stage, it is proposed that armaments and military equipment at the disposal of national armed forces should be reduced to the extent necessary to ensure that the remaining quantity of armaments corresponds to the level fixed for the armed forces.

In the second stage of the Soviet programme it is proposed to complete the disbandment of national armed forces and also to eliminate all military bases on the territories of foreign States. Troops and military personnel will be withdrawn from the territories of foreign States to within their own national frontiers and disbanded.
In this connexion, I should like to make just one minor remark about the statement made today by Mr. Martino, the representative of Italy, when he said that he could not quite understand why military bases and foreign troops on the territories of other countries are specially mentioned in the Soviet programme. We, for example, cannot understand why they are not mentioned in the Western plan, for it is common knowledge that they constitute a rather large category of the military forces which are stationed near certain States, and which, of course, represent a certain danger to the security of those States. If, indeed, the representative of Italy regards it as self-evident that, when armed forces are reduced, military bases will be abolished — well then, let us include this self-evident point in our general and complete disarmament plan, so as to make it clear what is intended, and let us state at which stage of general and complete disarmament we shall carry out this operation. This is vitally important to us, and I think it is vitally important to the Western Powers too. But I make this remark only in passing; I shall still read through the verbatim record of Mr. Martino's statement carefully, and perhaps say something more on this point later.

The measures proposed by the Soviet Union for the first and second stages of disarmament would be a very substantial contribution towards bringing about general and complete disarmament. They would go a very long way towards strengthening international peace and security and would create favourable conditions for implementing the further measures provided for in the third stage, which would result in the destruction of the whole military apparatus of States and deprive them all of the material possibility of waging war. In this connexion, I should also like to make a remark on Mr. Martino's statement, in which he tried to convince us that it would be essential also to have a special organization for the maintenance of the peace and security of States, even after the entire military apparatus of States has been abolished.

Everything else apart, I could not help asking myself the following question: Whatever has happened to the existing organization, which was specially set up for the maintenance of peace and international security — I mean the United Nations? — Would it, under the Western plan, be completely abolished by that time, or would it nevertheless remain in existence? If it remains in existence, then why set up a new organization? This is something that is not at all clear to me. I am even afraid that Mr. Hammarskjold may find himself unemployed after such an international organization is set up. I hardly think that that would be to our common advantage.
What are the disarmament measures which the Western Powers suggest in the first section of their plan?

In the first section it is proposed that, for the United States and the USSR, the force levels should be fixed at two and a half million men. Can this measure have any real significance in terms of the practical business of disarmament? If it is borne in mind that the present strength of the United States armed forces stands just around this figure, while the strength of the Soviet armed forces will shortly be brought down to a still lower level, everyone will realize that this proposal has no real meaning. It can easily be seen that, in actual fact, the proposal is to maintain the armed forces of these Powers at existing levels. Nor can we pass over the absence in the Western plan of any proposals at all about establishing any kind of ceilings for the armed forces of other Great Powers. The intention presumably is that the other Great Powers will maintain their armed forces at present levels or will perhaps even be able to increase them.

It is true that in the second section of the Western plan there is a reference to fixing somewhat lower ceilings. The figure of 2,100,000 men is mentioned for the armed forces of the USSR and the United States: that is to say, it is proposed to reduce the armed forces of the United States by, let us say, 400,000 men. But, is it not clear that this is a quite negligible reduction, which cannot have any important significance at all, in present circumstances, for the cause of disarmament? In addition, we do not know how many years the Western Powers are allotting for carrying out this measure — three, five, ten or more. On this point I want to make it clear to Mr. Ormsby-Gore that it is nevertheless very important to lay down a time-limit for the implementation of every measure included in the disarmament programme. With regard to the levels of the armed forces of other Great Powers, once again, at stage two, in the second part of the Western plan, there are no definite figures or time-limits whatsoever.

Again, the second measure mentioned in the first section of the Western plan — namely, that certain types and quantities of conventional armaments should be placed in storage depots under international control — can hardly have any practical meaning at all. This measure will not, in practice, lead to a reduction of armaments. This is clear; if only from the fact that the Western plan contains no proposal for the physical destruction of conventional armaments but only for storing them, — and they would be stored on the territory of the
States to which the armaments belong. Furthermore, it is stated in the Western Powers' proposals that these armaments must bear a relationship to the force levels; but what sort of reduction of conventional armaments can then be meant if the force levels are going to remain as before? States obviously regard those quantities of armaments which are now in their arsenals as corresponding to their present force levels.

The remarks which Mr. Ormsby-Gore made today in connexion with reserves call for special consideration. I do not want to say anything definite at the moment, until I have consulted my military colleagues.

Here I should also like to call attention to the fact that, in the Western Powers' proposals of 29 August 1957 on partial measures of disarmament, it was proposed that the levels of the armed forces should be fixed at 1,700,000 men for the USSR and the United States, and at 650,000 men for the United Kingdom and France. Now, however, in presenting their plan for "General and comprehensive disarmament" for the consideration of our Committee, the Western Powers suggest levels of 2,100,000 men for the armed forces of the USSR and the United States and do not fix any levels at all for the United Kingdom and France; so the levels suggested by the Western Powers for the armed forces of the USSR and the United States are even higher than those they suggested previously for a programme of partial disarmament measures.

Here again we shall, obviously, have to make it clear exactly which programme we are talking about and what precisely the representative of Italy was referring to today when he spoke on behalf of all the Western delegations. In fact, it will be necessary to state precisely what are the differences between us in the approach to a programme of general and complete disarmament. In this connexion, I remember the resolute way in which Mr. Eaton, the United States representative, expressed himself at our recent meeting, when he advocated that the Committee should, first of all, discuss initial steps in the sphere of disarmament. The Soviet delegation considers that raising the question of initial steps could, in itself, be proper, but this can be done in different ways and in different directions. It is possible to consider initial steps as an integral part of a programme of general and complete disarmament. It is also possible to speak of these or similar steps quite apart from general and complete disarmament.
The Soviet programme for general and complete disarmament starts precisely from the proposition that such disarmament must be brought about gradually, by stages, and provides, in the first stage, for such initial measures as a substantial reduction in the armed forces of the Great Powers, as well as of all other Powers, and a corresponding reduction in conventional types of armaments. But in our programme those initial measures are an integral part — the beginning — of general and complete disarmament and not separate measures on the completion of which disarmament might well be discontinued. Mr. Ormsby-Gore said today that, after each stage of disarmament, it would be necessary to discuss the direction in which and the extent to which any further reduction in armaments could be made; this immediately makes us suspect that here there is apparently a difference of approach, and that the initial measures proposed by the Western Powers are separate, isolated measures which might not be followed by any other measures.

The Soviet Union takes the view that, following the initial steps in disarmament proposed for the first stage, there must be subsequent steps at the second stage, and that these must be determined in advance; as well as, subsequently, the final measures of general and complete disarmament, to be implemented at the third stage. And these have now to be agreed upon. This is why the basic measures for general and complete disarmament stage by stage are clearly set out in our programme.

An impression has been created in our minds, however, that when Mr. Eaton and, apparently, Mr. Ormsby-Gore, talk about initial steps in disarmament, they have in mind measures which would not necessarily be connected with general and complete disarmament, and which would not serve as a beginning of such disarmament. If this is precisely what the United States and United Kingdom representatives have in mind — and I can apparently associate the representative of Italy with them — then it is absolutely impossible to regard this way of putting the question as designed to solve the basic problem of drafting an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

We cannot avoid drawing the conclusion either that, in suggesting 2,100,000 men as a measure for reducing the armed forces of the USSR and of the United States, the Western Powers are patently departing even from their own earlier proposals for a programme of partial disarmament measures. This is all the more odd since, as their own statements, particularly that made by Mr. Ormsby-Gore this morning,
indicate, the United Kingdom Government, and obviously the other Governments as well, are taking the resolution of the General Assembly as the basis for their programme of work in the Committee, yet the General Assembly resolution refers not to partial measures but to general and complete disarmament.

From what I have said it is clear that with regard to the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments, the Western plan does not contain proposals which could form a basis for a reduction of armed forces and armaments substantial enough to indicate a real intention to work for general and complete disarmament.

The Soviet Government considers that any disarmament programme must begin with the implementation of substantial measures which would lead to real, and not imaginary disarmament. We think it advisable to begin the business of disarmament by reducing the armed forces and armaments of States so as to achieve with the least possible delay the complete disbandment of armies and complete abolition of armaments. In submitting for the consideration of our partners a proposal for concrete measures of disarmament at each stage of a programme of general and complete disarmament, we are acting on the conviction that these are precisely the measures which, to the greatest extent, meet the requirements of the speediest possible completion of this task. But this does not in the least mean that we refuse to consider any amendments, additions or proposals which would make for the achievement of general and complete disarmament. In this connexion, I certainly must express my surprise at the question put to us by the representative of Italy as to whether our programme is one to which no amendments or changes can be made.

Of course, in submitting our programme we reckoned with the fact that any reasonable suggestions and amendments could be included and we have met together in order to have a concrete discussion about this programme, at which due weight will be given to all possible views which may be expressed by the representatives of all States taking part in our Conference. If the Western Powers have any other views about the order proposed by the Soviet Union for carrying out disarmament measures — namely that armed forces should first be disbanded and conventional armaments destroyed, and that nuclear weapons should next be destroyed — we should like to hear concrete proposals on this matter and we are prepared to examine such proposals most attentively.
I indicated at the beginning of my speech the reasons why the Soviet Union thought it advisable to propose the particular order for carrying out disarmament measures which is set out in our programme. If, however, the Western Powers express their readiness to accept a complete ban on atomic and hydrogen weapons — to eliminate these from national armaments and destroy the stocks of such weapons — right at the beginning of the disarmament programme, there will be no obstacle on our part to an agreement on this question; for the Soviet Government has always been, and will continue to be, a determined advocate of the total prohibition of nuclear weapons at any stage of the disarmament programme.

Mr. Martino (Italy) (translation from French): I shall make only a brief statement now because those of our colleagues who spoke this morning and referred to my speech said they would study the verbatim record before making any comments. I shall, therefore, reply to them later should the need arise.

Nevertheless, I think I should clarify certain points now so that there may be no misunderstandings between us.

The representative of Poland said he was surprised to find that, in the view of the Western Powers, the storage of surplus arms and budgetary control constituted disarmament measures.

There is a misunderstanding here. In our view, these are concrete measures of control. It is for control purposes that we want the surplus stocks of armaments to be placed under international supervision and military budgets to be published.

Mr. Zorin, the representative of the Soviet Union, spoke just now about bases on foreign soil and said he could not understand why the question of bases on foreign soil was not mentioned in the Western plan.

I have said — and I say again — that it is incomprehensible that this question should be explicitly mentioned in the Soviet plan. As a matter of fact Mr. Zorin has just confirmed to us that, in the second stage of the Soviet plan, after the elimination of all conventional arms, it would be necessary to envisage the abolition of bases on foreign soil. What we say is that at that time all bases — whether situated on national or on foreign soil — should be abolished. There is therefore, no need to mention bases on foreign soil. You cannot have
it both ways: either, the reference is solely to bases on foreign soil, in
which case the elimination of conventional arms will not be complete at that time,
or the elimination of conventional arms will be complete, national bases too will
have been dealt with and there will be no need to mention only those established
on foreign soil.

I have one other comment to make. Mr. Zorin seems to think that, in our
view, the United Nations would have to disappear after the organization for the
maintenance of peace is set up. But it is clear that, while it is certainly the
task of the United Nations to safeguard the maintenance of peace, we must also
realize that it has not the means to do this. Has the United Nations got the
armaments needed to make anyone respect the law? That is why we are considering
the creation of machinery for this purpose. As regards the question whether this
machinery should be set up within the framework of the United Nations or outside
it, that is a separate question and will have to be discussed at the appropriate
time.

The CHAIRMAN (France) (translation from French): Mr. Zorin, you have
just dubbed me a perennial, but you too are a regular participant in our marathons;
that is why I call on you, even though the hour is late.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from
Russian): I am most grateful to Mr. Moch for his kindness in allowing me to
make a further brief comment. I do not intend to speak at any great length.
I must make only one small clarification regarding foreign bases in connexion with
Mr. Martino's statement. As he put the matter you cannot have it both ways --
either we are referring to the abolition of all armies and all armaments, including
the abolition of all bases on foreign soil and then there is no sense in mentioning
foreign bases or else we are referring only to bases and say nothing about armed
forces at all.

I want to explain to Mr. Martino that we have placed the abolition of bases
on foreign territory -- foreign bases -- in the second stage of our disarmament
plan. At the same time also we put the abolition of all armies and armaments in
the second stage. We have, however, always assumed that, in discussing the
disarmament problem there may be widely-differing alternatives for dealing with
particular problems in one stage or another. You probably know, from studying
the documents on disarmament, that the Soviet Union at one time proposed to start
the elimination of bases in the first stage of disarmament. I do not exclude
the possibility that in our discussion there may be various alternative ways of
abolishing bases, either in the first stage or the second. In view of the possible
combinations of such measures, Mr. Martino will, obviously not object to a
reference being made to foreign bases so that they should not somehow be overlooked
in settling the question of the gradual elimination of all types of armaments and
all types of armed forces, for his main argument was only that, since the abolition
of all armies and the abolition of all bases are mentioned in one and the same
stage, the two concepts are, so to speak, identical. But what if they are
mentioned at different stages? Do you think it possible to make a special
reference to foreign bases?

I feel that this explanation will help to clear up the position of Mr. Martino
and everyone else with regard to the abolition of bases on foreign territory. We
consider this an important, a very important, element of disarmament. Therefore,
we mentioned it specially, although the abolition of foreign bases falls in the
stage of disarmament in which it is proposed that the armies will be disbanded and
all armaments abolished. Moreover, it was felt that this was a major self-
contained measure and hence of no small importance to all our countries represented
here. Some of them have bases, others can see such bases across their frontiers.
One way or another, bases on foreign territory are of vital importance.

We thought it necessary, therefore, to deal with such bases separately.

I hope that, after this explanation, Mr. Martino will not object to foreign
bases being mentioned separately, since we still do not know in what stage of
dismament we shall agree to eliminate them. In general, we would be in favour
of abolishing them in the first stage but, in view of the position taken by some
Western Powers, we have now put them in the second stage. However, we can also
move them up to the first stage; that will not create any difficulty.

The CHAIRMAN (France) (translation from French): If no one wishes to
speak, I shall now close this meeting — which started on time and finished late
and which has been most instructive — with this rather meagre communiqué:
"The fifth meeting of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament was held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 21 March 1960 under the chairmanship of the representative of France.

"The next meeting will be held on Tuesday, 22 March 1960, at 10.30 a.m."

I take it that the communique is acceptable.

The meeting rose at 1.25 p.m.