FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FORTY-SIXTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Friday, 24 June 1960, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy)
Present at the Table

Bulgaria:
Mr. M. TARABANOV
Mr. K. CHRISTOV
Mr. G. GUELEV

Canada:
Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
W/Cdr. R.J. MITCHELL
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:
Mr. J. NOSEK
Mr. Z. TRHLIK
Lieut.-Gen. J. HEČKO

France:
Mr. J. MOCH
Mr. M. LEGENDE
Col. L. CONVERT

Italy:
Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. L. DAINELLI
Maj.-Gen. D. FANALI

Poland:
Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Maj.-Gen. J. SILWINSKI

Romania:
Mr. E. MEZINESCU
Mr. C. BOGDAN
Col. C. POPA

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
Mr. V.A. ZORIN
Col.-Gen. A.A. GRYZLOV
Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:
Rt. Hon. D. ORMSBY-GORE
Miss B. SALT
Maj.-Gen. RIDDILL

United States of America:
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. G. McMURTRIE GODLEY
Col. T.W. WOLFE

Representative of the
Secretary-General:
Dr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Representative of the
Secretary-General:
Mr. W. EPSTEIN
The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): The forty-sixth meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament is called to order. There are two speakers on my list: the representative of Czechoslovakia and the representative of Canada. I call upon the representative of Czechoslovakia.

Mr. NOSEK (Czechoslovakia): In its statement yesterday, the United States delegation again expressed its principal standpoint on the aim of our work. It only confirmed what the socialist countries had several times observed, namely that the representatives of the United States and the other Western countries here continue to refuse to hold businesslike discussions of general and complete disarmament. The United States representative, Mr. Stelle, repeated yesterday, in effect, the standpoint taken by Mr. Eaton at our thirty-ninth meeting on 15 June 1960.

What did Mr. Eaton propose? He proposed the introduction of control measures which would deny to outer space weapons of mass destruction and would increase protection against surprise attack through advance reports of missile launchings and through on-site inspection of missile launching sites. It is clear at first glance that we are faced exclusively with measures of control, that is with the old and well-known requirement of the United States — the introduction of control over armaments.

Apparently, with a view to misleading world public opinion, which requires a concrete discussion of general and complete disarmament, the United States representatives are beginning to prefer — for tactical reasons — to call these measures not "partial measures", but "initial steps" on the road to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. But no matter what the United States calls these proposals, "you cannot conceal an awl in a sack", as we say in our country. In any case the substance of these proposals remains the same: these measures are partial measures of the character of control which have nothing in common with the task before our Committee, which is to work out a programme of general and complete disarmament.

The delegations of the socialist countries have made clear on many occasions what they understand to be the task of our Committee. Under United Nations General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) on general and complete disarmament, the task of our Committee is to work out a programme of general and complete disarmament. A clear and realistic basis for the achievement of this goal has once again been furnished in the new proposals of the Soviet Union of 2 June 1960 on the basic
provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, in which the Government of the Soviet Union, consistently guided by the United Nations General Assembly resolution on general and complete disarmament, has taken into account to a large extent the views of the Western Powers on a number of questions. That fact has been acknowledged several times by the Western delegations during this second part of our Conference.

If we are to fulfil the task assigned to the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament, that is to work out measures for the implementation of United Nations General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV), then our Committee cannot discuss any subject other than general and complete disarmament.

No discussion of partial measures — whether they are called "initial" or "specific" — can lead to the fulfilment of the task entrusted to us.

Only the accomplishment of general and complete disarmament could radically solve the question of disarmament, because it would completely liquidate material means for waging war and, consequently, remove war from the life of nations for all time.

In our opinion, the adoption of United Nations General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) means not only the approval of the scope of disarmament measures, but also that a new method has been devised for the solution of the whole problem of disarmament. By adopting this resolution unanimously the General Assembly unequivocally expressed itself as being in favour of a radical solution of the question of disarmament by way of general and complete disarmament and not by way of partial measures, since it has been proved during the past fifteen years that no progress whatsoever can be made along the latter road.

In the whole course of the negotiations so far conducted in our Committee the Western delegations have demonstrated that they are deliberately overlooking this important aspect of the United Nations General Assembly resolution. The delegations of the Western countries do not pursue the same objective as the General Assembly, which expressed itself as being in favour not of the road of partial measures, but of the method of general and complete disarmament. In contradiction with General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) the Western delegations want to proceed along the old road of partial measures, which have never in the past led to the attainment of the aforementioned goal. Not only are the delegations of the Western countries against general and complete disarmament, but in their proposals on partial measures they have been avoiding any real disarmament measures
whateuver. No matter how eloquent the Western delegations try to be, and no matter how they manoeuvre words, they cannot disprove this fact. All the proposals for partial measures so far submitted in our Committee by the delegations of the Western Powers have been, in substance, equivalent to measures having primarily the character of control, which attests to the fact that the Western Powers continue to maintain their old positions and do not wish disarmament but control over armaments.

As a matter of fact, the United States Government has openly declared that its aim is not disarmament, but -- as President Eisenhower stated in his broadcast on 25 May 1960 -- "achieving verifiable arms control". A similar attitude was taken by the United States Government in its Note to the Government of the Soviet Union of 7 June 1960, to which the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Zorin, already referred at our meeting on 17 June. In this Note the United States Government said that

"... efforts must be redoubled to find ways to make a start on the control and balanced reduction of armaments..." and added "the United States representative in Geneva will participate in the negotiations in this spirit". (TCND/FV.41, page 32)

This quite openly proclaimed standpoint of the Government of the United States is clearly in contradiction with the resolution 1378 (XIV) in favour of which the United States delegation voted at the fourteenth session of the General Assembly. This standpoint also shows the two-faced attitude of the United States delegation in our Committee, which -- apparently with an eye on world public opinion -- does not yet consider it advisable openly to abandon the idea of general and complete disarmament but, acting upon the instructions of its Government, is trying its utmost to frustrate constructive discussion of this question in our Committee.

This line of policy of the United States Government on the disarmament question and the course of action of the United States delegation in our Committee are in conformity with the overall direction of United States foreign policy which sees its goal not as disarmament, the removal of the threat of war and the safeguarding of lasting peace, but as a continuous feverish armaments race and systematic provocations against the socialist countries.

The delegations of the Western Powers are now creating further obstacles. Thus, for instance, the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, expressed the requirement at our meeting yesterday that before accepting an idea in general terms we should:

"...see whether it is practicable and can be put into effect in advancing the process of disarmament". (TCND/FV.45, page 14)
As has been made abundantly clear by the delegations of the socialist countries, such studies can serve no purpose until agreement is reached on the basic questions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. To propose preliminary studies before the beginning of a discussion of general and complete disarmament is further evidence of the unwillingness of the Western Powers to proceed to concrete discussion of general and complete disarmament.

The Western delegations, in an attempt to discredit the very idea of general and complete disarmament, went so far as to invoke the United Nations Charter in support of their negative approach to general and complete disarmament. At our forty-third meeting the representative of Italy, Mr. Martino, stated that:

"... the resolution ... on general and complete disarmament ... in a certain sense itself went beyond the provisions of the Charter, which does not speak of general and complete disarmament..." (TNCD/FV.43, page 10)

This is really a curious argument. It is precisely the proposal on general and complete disarmament which, as was stated the other day by the representative of Romania, serves, in the best and most radical fashion, the main idea and purpose of the United Nations -- that is, the safeguarding of peace and the removal of war from the life of mankind. If we were to subscribe to the interpretation of the United Nations Charter presented by Mr. Martino, the representative of Italy, it would not be possible to speak, for instance, about control, which is not mentioned in the Charter, in connexion with disarmament.

The delegations of the socialist countries have repeatedly pointed out that in the new proposals of the Government of the Soviet Union, the socialist countries -- guided by a desire to achieve agreement -- have shown maximum understanding and goodwill in taking into account the position of the Western countries. However, we have not as yet seen any evidence of a similar attitude on the part of our Western partners. Whereas the delegations of the socialist countries are trying to create most suitable conditions for fruitful negotiations and the achievement of a mutually acceptable agreement, the delegations of the Western countries have not as yet moved an inch forward to meet the position of the socialist countries and have in no way tried to facilitate progress in our negotiations.

Listening to the statements by the representatives of the Western countries, we cannot help feeling that the Western delegations think that in our negotiations only the delegations of the socialist countries should make concessions and take the position of the other side into consideration.
It was with true astonishment that we listened to the statement made by Mr. Martino at our forty-first meeting in which, in connexion with one of the many questions on which the socialist countries have met the Western Powers half way, he said that the socialist countries would be mistaken to expect that their concessions would, in turn, call for concessions on the part of the West.

This is a really strange approach to negotiation. Such an attitude is in sharp contradiction with the very notion of negotiation and naturally cannot lead to positive results in the work of our Committee. Such an attitude is also contrary to the statement made by the Canadian Minister of External Affairs, Mr. Green, in the Canadian House of Commons on 15 June, to which the representative of Canada, General Burns, has already referred. In this statement Mr. Green said that the Soviet proposals were undoubtedly a step forward, and that "the time has come ... to begin a process of negotiation of balanced concessions".

At the end of the third week of our negotiations it is really high time for the Western delegations to begin, with all responsibility, to discuss general and complete disarmament, and to express their views on the whole of the proposals of the Government of the Soviet Union of 2 June 1960. We think that these proposals provide the best basis for a solution of the question of general and complete disarmament. In our opinion the time which has passed since the submission of these proposals has been sufficient for the Western Powers to study the proposals in detail and proceed to a businesslike consideration of them, all the more since they take into account, to a great extent, the views of the Western Powers.

However, we cannot agree to the approach of the Western Powers, which apparently visualize such consideration in the form of advancing various preliminary conditions, calling for abstract technical studies, and systematically raising questions the majority of which concern non-essential or technical points. Discussion of these questions will be justified only after agreement has been reached on the main aspects and basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The delegations of the socialist countries are, of course, willing -- as they have pointed out many times -- seriously to consider any observations on and amendments to the proposals of the Government of the Soviet Union, so long as they are aimed at general and complete disarmament. However, we deem it necessary in this connexion to make it sufficiently clear again that the delegations of the
socialist countries cannot discuss any proposals which would not lead to general and complete disarmament and which would pertain to the introduction of control over armaments -- as was the case, for instance, with the Western proposal of 16 March 1960 and other partial measures proposed by the Western delegations.

In some interventions of the delegations of the Western countries attempts have been made to misrepresent the positions of the delegations of the socialist countries. Striking examples of this attitude were the interventions of the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Ormsby-Gore, at our forty-first and forty-fifth meetings. At the forty-first meeting on 17 June the representative of the United Kingdom tried to lay blame on the Czechoslovak delegation for having, allegedly, on 15 June misrepresented the position of the Western Powers on the question of the mutual relationship of measures in the field of nuclear and conventional armaments during the process of general and complete disarmament.

In its statement of 15 June the Czechoslovak delegation stated that, prior to the submission of the proposals of the Soviet Union of 18 September 1959, the delegations of the Western countries, under the pretext of maintaining a balance of power, had required that, because of the alleged superiority of the Soviet Union in armed forces and conventional armaments, the process of disarmament should start with measures in the field of armed forces and conventional armaments and end with nuclear disarmament. This position is fully reflected in the documents of the disarmament negotiations over the past years, and this fact is surely very well known to Mr. Ormsby-Gore also.

I would like to take the liberty of mentioning a few facts which prove the correctness of the conclusions drawn by the Czechoslovak delegation. Following the submission of the proposals of the Soviet Union of 18 September 1959, which took into account the aforesaid position of the Western Powers, the delegations of the Western countries -- and this is shown in the verbatim records of the first phase of our negotiations here in Geneva -- began to require under the pretext of a balanced disarmament process, that nuclear weapons and the means of delivery of such weapons should be given priority in the disarmament process because they are the most important means of waging war.

From among a number of statements on this question it is sufficient to quote the representative of France, Mr. Moch, who, at our first meeting on 15 March, said:
"That is why my delegation is stressing here, as in New York, the predominance of nuclear weapons over all other kinds of armament. What the world expects of us, what it hopes for above all, is nuclear disarmament." (TNCD/FV.1, page 16)

This was confirmed by Mr. Moch again at our fourth meeting, when he said:

"... since nuclear disarmament is the most important measure ... it must have a privileged place in disarmament measures and not be inserted at the end." (TNCD/FV.4, page 8)

At our meeting yesterday, the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Ormsby-Gore, like Mr. Moch at our previous meetings, categorically reaffirmed the unity of the positions of the Western countries on disarmament. Therefore, it clearly follows that, whereas the delegations of the socialist countries proposed to begin the process of general and complete disarmament with measures in the field of armed forces and conventional armaments, the Western Powers required a privileged place for nuclear disarmament.

In its proposals of 2 June 1960 the Government of the Soviet Union has again taken into consideration these requirements of the Western Powers and has put the question of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons at the top of the disarmament process, while the question of complete nuclear disarmament and a substantial reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments has been included in the second stage. However, as soon as these new proposals had been submitted by the Government of the Soviet Union the delegations of the Western Powers again changed their position. This was made clear also by the statement of the representative of Italy, Mr. Martino, at our thirty-eighth meeting when he said:

"... we should endeavour to make nuclear disarmament and conventional disarmament go hand in hand ..." (TNCD/FV.38, page 16)

That means that in the second part of the negotiations in our Committee the Western Powers are requiring, again under the pretext of ensuring a balanced process of disarmament, that measures relating to armed forces and conventional armaments should also be included in the first stage of disarmament.

From these quotations it is apparent that the Western Powers have again changed their position. At the beginning of our negotiations they required a privileged place for nuclear disarmament. Now that the Soviet Union has taken account of this requirement they call for a combination of nuclear and
conventional disarmament. During our present negotiations the delegations of the socialist countries have gone even further beyond the Soviet proposals and have stated that they are willing to consider the suggestions of the Western Powers as regards the combination of the two measures, and that they expect concrete proposals in this respect. We cannot forbear saying that the attitude of the delegations of the Western Powers is hypocritical, in view of the fact that, despite repeated invitations by the socialist countries to submit concrete proposals on this matter, the representatives of the Western countries have not yet done so, and this includes Mr. Ormsby-Gore. From these facts it follows that the Czechoslovak delegation was justified in concluding, at our thirty-ninth meeting, that the Western Powers are continuing to manoeuvre on the question of disarmament and that this makes impossible any progress in negotiation and is typical of the attitude of the Western Powers to such important questions.

I would like to deal with another statement of Mr. Ormsby-Gore. He described the endeavours of the delegations of the socialist countries to reach agreement and to take into account to a maximum degree the position of the Western Powers as:

"... the flexibility of quicksilver", which Mr. Ormsby-Gore stated,
"one can never catch hold of ... long enough to be able to examine it".

(TNCD/PV.41, page 8)

The logic of Mr. Ormsby-Gore's statement is completely incomprehensible. Have not the Western Powers had enough time to examine in detail both the proposals of the Soviet Union of 18 September 1959 and 2 June 1960 and other proposals submitted by the socialist countries in the course of our Conference? What was the attitude of the Western Powers towards those proposals which, I would like to remind them again, remain valid? It is well known that, in the past, the proposals of the Soviet Union have always been rejected by the Western Powers. As regards the latest proposals, of 2 June 1960, the Western delegations have as yet refused to express their views on the substance of those proposals as a whole.

If there is anything on which the policy of the Western Powers has been constant and unchanging, to use Mr. Ormsby-Gore's words at our forty-first meeting, it is only in the unwillingness and the basically negative attitude of the Western Powers to proceed without unnecessary delay to the working out of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.
Finally, I would touch upon the method of argument used by Mr. Ormsby-Gore at our meeting yesterday when he quoted from statements made by the Czechoslovak delegation. For instance, a passage from our statement at the sixth meeting, in which we discussed the principle of safeguarding equal security for all States, was used by Mr. Ormsby-Gore as an argument for his unfounded contention that the proposal on the prohibition and liquidation of means of delivery of nuclear weapons at the first stage of general and complete disarmament, embodied in the Soviet Union proposals of 2 June 1960, created military unbalance. Likewise, when discussing the question of surprise attack, Mr. Ormsby-Gore took out of context another passage in which the Czechoslovak delegation had noted:

"The idea of a war being only a duel of rockets and ballistic missiles... is quite unrealistic." (TNOD/PV.45, page 28)

It is sufficient to look at the verbatim record of the sixth meeting to find out that the Czechoslovak delegation did not speak about the question of surprise attack at all in this connexion. (Cf. TNOD/PV.6, page 13). It is our opinion that such quoting out of context, leading to distortion of meaning, is not conducive to serious negotiation.

In the view of the Czechoslovak delegation it is high time for the delegations of the Western countries to abandon their present negative attitude towards the discussion of the proposal on the basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. It is essential that, in conformity with United Nations General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV), they should together with the delegations of the socialist countries proceed to constructive consideration of this question.

The entire public opinion of the world is waiting for our Committee to proceed to concrete discussion aimed at a constructive solution of the question of general and complete disarmament in accordance with resolution 1378 (XIV). Therefore the Western delegations should be aware of the great responsibility resting upon them for the fulfilment of the task assigned to our Committee.

The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): Before calling on Mr. Burns, I should like, as representative of Italy, to give the representative of Czechoslovakia a very brief explanation of some points concerning the position of my delegation, which he has not interpreted correctly. The Italian delegation has never said that general and complete disarmament is contrary to
the Charter. We have only pointed out that in order to accomplish general and complete disarmament, it might be necessary to make some amendments to the Charter, which was drafted for a world still possessing armaments.

Nor has the Italian delegation said that concessions by the Eastern delegations should not call for concessions by the Western delegations. We have only said that changes introduced by the Eastern delegations solely in order to make their positions more realistic and logical should not be presented to us as concessions to our views.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): In the speech he has just made the representative of Czechoslovakia said, I believe, that the socialist countries were trying to create favourable conditions for fruitful negotiation. I do not think, however, that his speech could be said to facilitate this endeavour — especially his attack on not only the position in the disarmament negotiations here but also on the world policy of one of the members of this Committee.

What I have to say today seems quite apposite in view of some of the statements of the representative of Czechoslovakia, especially as regards the attitude of the Western delegations here. The allegations which he has made are not at all new, they have been repeated many times, but they do not become true because they are repeated. They are not new and they are not true.

Mr. Nosek referred to a statement made by Mr. Howard Green, Minister of External Affairs of Canada. I shall be referring to that statement and explaining in greater detail the ideas behind it and how they apply to what the Canadian delegation hopes may be the course of our discussions here.

The Canadian delegation has for some time been concerned that the working methods of our Committee have not resulted in concrete negotiations designed to reconcile opposing views on problems which are admittedly of common concern. Accordingly, it is my intention in this intervention to explain how this problem presents itself to the Government of Canada, and I shall put forward suggestions the acceptance of which we believe could go far towards moving our discussions into the phase of effective negotiations.

I think it is hardly necessary to reaffirm the attachment of the Canadian Government to the concept of general and complete disarmament. The repeated charges in this connexion by Eastern European representatives may arise from a
misunderstanding of the reasons why the present Western proposals do not envisage our reaching this goal by means of one all-inclusive agreement embracing every detail of the complete programme to which all countries of the world must adhere before any disarmament can begin. Rather -- as I and my colleagues have pointed out on a number of occasions -- we foresee a comprehensive disarmament programme coming about by stages beginning with engagements which would not require the adherence of any State which is not a member of this Committee before it was sought to secure the agreement of all or even the majority of States not represented here to further measures.

At the same time, the Canadian delegation also conceives of the duties of this Committee as including the drafting of more far-reaching measures of disarmament, the implementation of which would require the adherence of all militarily significant States and ultimately of most if not all States in the world. Furthermore, it has never been proposed that the working out of the various measures of general and complete disarmament should be broken down into separate compartments. That is to say, the process of negotiation should be continuous, moving from measures which can be given effect by agreement within this Committee through measures requiring wider participation and finally to our ultimate goal.

Let me make it very plain, before I go any further, that it would be completely fallacious for my colleagues from the Eastern delegations to interpret the remarks I have just made as implying that the Western nations wish to bring about agreement on isolated measures only. That is far from being the case. We are in search of a balanced programme of nuclear and conventional disarmament which would benefit all and give advantage to none. We also seek to start the process as soon as possible.

The expression of our sense of urgency may have contributed to the evident misunderstanding. Our proposals of 16 March state at the head of section II: "The following measures will be undertaken as rapidly as possible upon successful completion of relevant preparatory studies outlined in I".

(TNCD/3, page 3)

It does not follow from this that we envisage separate agreements on each of the items contained in section II of our plan. We do not exclude the possibility -- as I have said -- that certain matters might by mutual agreement be regarded as suited to a separate instrument. However, our basic concept is one of balance.
It may be appropriate for me to submit to the Committee in this connexion an extract from a statement made in the House of Commons on 15 June by the Secretary of State for External Affairs -- the statement to which the representative of Czechoslovakia has just referred and from which I quoted at our forty-first meeting on 17 June. The additional passage I wish to bring to the Committee's attention is as follows:

"It is my view that the time has come, perhaps through an examination of equivalent features of new Soviet proposals and the Western proposals, to begin a process of negotiation of balanced concessions. This was the sort of 'package' approach to which I referred earlier in the House ... I should like to emphasize, however, that by 'package' I do not mean that the one side or the other should hold out for its present proposals on an all-or-nothing basis; the packages I have in mind, as I have tried to explain, are smaller and would contain immediately negotiable provisions of equivalent significance to both sides. The goal would remain general and complete disarmament under effective international control, but it would be accomplished by a stage-by-stage process, throughout which concessions would be balanced in such a way that neither side would obtain a temporary military superiority."

The previous statement to which Mr. Green referred in the passage I have quoted was a report on disarmament matters which he made to the House of Commons on 9 May while this Committee was in recess. He then spoke, in part, as follows:

"We suggested that an attempt might very well be made to work out package deals, that is, take one measure of disarmament in which the West was interested and one of equivalent importance in which the East was interested and try to make a package deal with regard to these two particular aspects of disarmament. For example, the West might offer to negotiate a controlled limitation on force levels and related conventional armaments if the USSR side would agree to negotiate on the nuclear disarmament measures in stages one and two of the Western plan. We believe this is a practical way to get this moving, and if package deals of that kind could be made in several instances the first thing we would know there would be a worthwhile disarmament agreement."
As will be obvious, the example of an area for negotiations was selected before the Soviet Union submitted its proposals of 2 June 1960, and is therefore not precisely apposite. However, what is important and relevant in this latter quotation is the last sentence. It indicates clearly that the suggestion of "package deals" is addressed to the problem of getting negotiations going and is not intended to affect the nature of the agreement negotiated. Mr. Green has plainly indicated that several "deals" would be put together to comprise a worthwhile agreement.

One point on which I am sure we will all agree in seeking a solution to this problem is that our method of work -- as well as the results it achieves -- should satisfy in so far as possible the guiding principles which are basic to any disarmament programme. Three such principles which I believe we have all endorsed are the following:

(i) That disarmament should proceed by stages;
(ii) That at no stage of disarmament should any State or group of States achieve a military advantage over other States;
(iii) That disarmament measures should be balanced as, for example, between measures of nuclear disarmament and measures of conventional disarmament.

In a consideration of the method suggested in the statement of 15 June which I have just quoted, two of the ideas put forward in it are worthy of special emphasis. The first is that in devising a series of measures on which the positions of the two sides could be set up against one another, it will not be satisfactory for "one side or the other to hold out for its present proposals on an all-or-nothing basis", that is to say, we must seek common ground between our two sides through patient and detailed negotiations. The second is that concessions on each side should be accomplished in the course of a stage-by-stage process and should "be balanced in such a way that neither side would obtain a temporary military superiority".

I think that if my colleagues can agree in principle that it will be worthwhile to adopt the method of work suggested, we could then select those measures of disarmament which are best suited for immediate examination. That is to say, we should both try to discover proposals from each side which could be taken together to preserve a balance between our two ways of approaching disarmament. At the same time we should pick out proposals which disclose a fundamental similarity of view on both sides, regardless of superficial differences of detail.
Mr. Green's speech of 9 May referred to one example of a possible area of negotiation where the proposals of each side ought to be balanced. I think it will be obvious to members of the Committee that others can be cited on which there is already some measure of agreement between our two views. In my first brief statement after the resumption of our meetings I referred to apparent advances in the Soviet plan in measures to deal with the prohibition of placing weapons of mass destruction in outer space, measures for a joint study of the cessation of production and destruction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons, and measures to set up international machinery to keep the peace in a disarmed world. These are, I believe, other features in the Soviet plan which have enough in common with proposals in the Western plan to make it possible to devise a series of negotiating "packages" such as I have already referred to.

With respect to other, less easily removed differences between the positions of our two sides, I would suggest that we will have to make a greater effort to find common features which could serve as the basis for further development of proposals which could be balanced against one another. If we should maintain rigidly defined or inflexible positions, it would, of course, be difficult if not impossible to arrive at a balanced and graduated series of measures which would meet the interests of both sides. I have already suggested with respect to areas in which we appear to have reached some measure of agreement that one way of going about this task is to put immediately into effect joint studies which would assist us in working out the details of measures on which we could agree. I think that this approach will also be most useful in areas where we do not as yet see eye to eye. It would enable us to understand each other's point of view more clearly, and in so doing to seek those common elements in both of them which would lead to further progress towards a comprehensive series of disarmament measures.

My colleagues from Eastern Europe may now charge that the Canadian delegation has gone further than any others in advocating an approach through partial measures, and that we are suggesting dealing with parts of parts. I trust that they will interpret my observations today in a more constructive sense. I should recall the efforts which my Western colleagues and I were making before the recess to bring about discussions upon specific measures of disarmament. The suggestions I have put forward -- that is to say, the suggestions contained in the passages I have quoted from the two statements to the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for External Affairs -- represent a constructive attempt to find the means for serious negotiations on specific measures.
The objections of our Eastern European colleagues to any discussion of specific measures appear to be connected to their assertions that the Western Powers are seeking agreement only on isolated measures. Perhaps the adoption of the method I have suggested would go some way to reassure them as to our intentions. In this way we could jointly concentrate on proposals from each side which would be juxtaposed to preserve balance in the process of negotiations as well as in the result.

If we were to set our hands vigorously and without delay to our task in the manner I have indicated, that is, by seeking to agree upon packages of proposals drawn from both sides, there would be no real reason why we could not be in a position to make progress towards agreement.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Today the Soviet delegation intends to make a number of observations prompted by the statements of the representatives of certain Western Powers, and by the general line taken by the delegations of those Powers in the Committee at the present stage of our negotiations.

As you know, the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons and the simultaneous elimination of military bases on foreign territories, together with the withdrawal of foreign troops from such territories, hold an important place in the new Soviet proposals regarding the basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, and are indeed assigned to the first stage of the plan for general and complete disarmament.

The reason we attach great importance to the carrying-out of these measures in the first stage is that, as everyone can see, this would be a big help towards general and complete disarmament and would provide a good beginning for a disarmament that would immediately reduce the threat of war, and particularly of surprise attack. At the same time, we thought that the inclusion in our new plan of a proposal that meets the wishes repeatedly expressed by one of the most influential of the Western Powers, France — the proposal that the means of delivering nuclear weapons should be abolished in the very first stage of general and complete disarmament — would enable us to move forward more rapidly towards the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament.
In this connexion, it is natural that France's attitude towards the new Soviet proposals should now have assumed great importance. It was that which made us ask the French representative, at the very first meetings held after the Ten Nation Committee had resumed its work, to elucidate his country's position with regard to the new Soviet plan, and in particular, to the measures we now propose for the first stage.

Mr. Moch spoke on this subject at the meeting held on 15 June, and in his replies to our questions on 20 June and 23 June. Speaking on 15 June, the representative of France assured the members of this Committee that he intended to give a clear answer to the question we put to him concerning the position of France. We were all, indeed, entitled to expect a clear answer from the French delegation on this question, since France was, in fact, the first Power to advocate priority in the disarmament programme for the abolition of the means of delivering nuclear weapons. Mr. Moch himself spoke quite definitely on this point on 22 October 1959 at the fourteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, and again on 15 March 1960 at the first meeting of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament. In both these statements Mr. Moch clearly and unequivocally stressed the need for giving priority to — I quote — "the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear materials", the prohibition and destruction of satellites, missiles, aircraft, aircraft carriers, submarines, launching ramps, etc..

It was clear from a series of public statements by General de Gaulle, President of the French Republic, as well as from his observations in the course of conversations with N.S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, that France's position was, in fact, that the abolition of the means of delivering nuclear weapons should be given priority in the disarmament programme. Mr. Moch quoted here a statement made on 31 May 1960 at the Elysée Palace in which the President of the French Republic, advocating the adoption of decisive measures of controlled disarmament, urged that priority of attention be given in this connexion to the means of delivering nuclear weapons. We therefore regarded our proposals, and we still do regard them, as a possible common basis on which to bring the positions of the socialist countries and the Western States, especially France, closer together.
And now we have heard the explanations given by Mr. Moch as to the position of France on the abolition, in the first stage, of the means of delivering nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, these explanations have not proved to be as clear as Mr. Moch promised us they would be. There are some points in them that are not clear, they contain a number of inconsistencies, some aspects of them — I do not want to conceal this — are surprising to us and even put us on our guard. Despite all this, we should like to hope that we can still find a basis for bringing our positions closer together, provided, of course, that this falls within the intentions of the Government of France. In order to see what justification we have for this hope, we should like to have some additional explanations from the French delegation on those matters which have given rise, on our part, to bewilderment and doubt.

First of all, we are bound to observe in this connexion that whereas formerly the French point of view, as expounded by Mr. Moch among others, was that priority should be given to the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, he now insists, or so we understand, that priority be given, not to the destruction of these means of delivery but to the establishment of control over them. It is true that on 23 June Mr. Moch said that the position of France had not changed in any way; but this assertion has made the question of France's position even more confused.

What in fact are the proposals which Mr. Moch actually places before us in expounding his views on the substance of the question of the abolition of the means of delivery? He proposes that the solution of the question be divided into two stages, of which the first would be devoted almost exclusively to the implementation of control measures — the establishment of control over the launching of satellites so as to make it impossible for any State to place satellites with nuclear charges in orbit; control over the launching sites for certain categories of rockets; control over the places where they are manufactured. Mr. Moch also spoke of a reduction, during this stage, in the number of certain types of surface vessels, submarines and aircraft. Nevertheless, the impression given is that the establishment of various types of control is still the main purpose in the first stage. At any rate, these are the measures proposed as a start.

As regards the second stage, although, as we understood Mr. Moch to say, the manufacture of certain types of military rockets would be prohibited and both the existing stocks of such rockets and the means of delivering them destroyed,
there would apparently be no provision, even at this second stage, for the complete destruction of such means of delivering nuclear weapons as, for example, surface vessels, submarines and military aircraft.

Obviously, however, such an approach to the question cannot provide a solution to the problem of prohibiting and destroying the means of delivering nuclear weapons, a problem to which — as I have already recalled here — Mr. Moch has spoken on behalf of the French Government on a number of previous occasions.

Yet another question comes to mind. In nearly all his statements Mr. Moch has stressed the formula that there should be no control with disarmament nor disarmament without control. However, when it comes to the point, it would seem that the French delegation has in mind the establishment of what would amount to a practically all-embracing control, in effect completely divorced from any measure of disarmament. We see in this a definite contradiction, and Mr. Moch's explanations have failed to make it clear how the French delegation, while expressing itself in favour of having no control without disarmament, can, at the same time, propose the establishment of extensive control in the first stage of dealing with the problem of the means of delivery when the destruction of these means of delivery is not envisaged.

Now have Mr. Moch's statements elucidated the French position with regard to the time-limits within which his proposals regarding the means of delivering nuclear weapons should be carried out. His statements do not show how long the first and second stages are to last. Are they to go on for months, years or decades? In this connexion, we cannot but recall that in his statement in the Committee on 15 March 1960 Mr. Moch spoke of the great urgency of finding a solution to the problem of eliminating the means of delivering nuclear weapons. He emphasized that this had to be done "while there is still time". We agree with these views, and we took them into account in preparing our own proposals. Has not the representative of France himself now forgotten, however, his own statements regarding the urgency of finding a solution to the problem of eliminating the means of delivering nuclear weapons? The fact is that the absence of any mention of time-limits in the French proposals means that the first stage — that is, the stage of control without disarmament — might continue indefinitely, and that might be as far as things would go. That, after all, is quite possible.

Mr. Moch seemed to be trying here to prove that it would be quite unrealistic to attempt, in present-day conditions, to secure the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons. If that is, in fact, Mr. Moch's opinion, we cannot
agree with him. He himself was unable to adduce any serious arguments in
support of this, to say the least, strange point of view; all he could do was to
make the most general assertions as to the complexity of the matter under dis-
cussion and the difficulties likely to arise in finding a practical solution for
the problem of destroying the means of delivery. In several of his statements
he alleged, inter alia, that we propose to solve the problem of destroying the
means of delivery without first studying the matter seriously. This does not
accord with our position. If that is the only obstacle, we are prepared to make
a serious study here, in the Committee, of all the aspects of the problem. It is,
after all, quite obvious that, if States really want to solve the problem of
disarmament instead of continuing the armaments race, any difficulties which
might arise in connexion with individual measures in the field of disarmament
can, and must, be overcome.

The new Soviet proposals afford a direct and most reliable way of finding
a radical solution to the problem of eliminating the means of delivering nuclear
weapons. These proposals envisage that States shall reach an agreement con-
cerning the elimination from their armed forces, the discontinuance of the
manufacture, and the destruction, in the first stage of general and complete
disarmament, of all means of delivering nuclear weapons.

How can this be done in practice? We consider that the treaty on general
and complete disarmament must on this subject contain precise and concrete
provisions -- and it is to draft these provisions that we are meeting here --
describing how, in what way and in what order, all nuclear weapon vehicles
must be eliminated from the armed forces of States, and destroyed.

The agreement must also contain clear and definite provisions regarding the
obligation placed on States to discontinue the manufacture of the means of
delivery. Naturally, since in so important a matter no one can be expected to
act on trust, effective international control must be established over all these
measures, which we believe can be carried out within a year or eighteen months.

What specific measures of control will have to be carried out? That, too,
is provided for in the Soviet proposals. We have in mind the establishment
of on-site international control over the destruction of all means of
delivering nuclear weapons; over the destruction of rocket-launching sites,
with the exception of those which are to be retained for launching rockets for
peaceful purposes; over airfields and ports, so as to preclude their use for military purposes; over the carrying-out by States of their obligation to discontinue the manufacture of the means of delivering nuclear weapons — and for this purpose the control organization would of course have the right to inspect without hindrance the enterprises concerned, i.e. plants, factories and shipyards, and permanent control teams might be established at some enterprises of this type — and, lastly, over the launching of rocket devices so as to prevent any State from making use of them for other than peaceful purposes.

In the treaty on general and complete disarmament, all these control measures must, of course, be appropriately described in detail. But in this context control would, of course, mean control over the elimination of the means of delivery, and not control per se, carried out in conditions wherein the means of delivery remained at the disposal of States.

Thus, we are not talking about a miracle or the magic wand which for some reason Mr. Moch has mentioned in connexion with the problem of eliminating the means of delivering nuclear weapons; we are talking about perfectly real and concrete measures on which States can, of course, reach agreement provided all the participants in the negotiations evince an interest in seeking a solution to this important problem.

The French position, as described by Mr. Moch, on the question of eliminating the means of delivering nuclear weapons prompts yet another question. It would appear that Mr. Moch is against the abolition of military bases on foreign territories. But it is widely known that these bases are being used precisely for the purpose of setting up therein, in close proximity to the frontiers of the socialist States, various means of delivering nuclear weapons. How, then, could Mr. Moch, in his statement of 20 June, assert that the question of means of delivery is not necessarily connected with that of foreign military bases; and how could he support the views on foreign military bases expressed by Mr. Ormsby-Gore, the United Kingdom representative, at the meeting held on 16 June. We all know that Mr. Ormsby-Gore was trying to prove, using what we have shown to be, in truth, an utterly inconsistent argument, that the question of foreign military bases should not really be raised at all.

What, in practice, would be implied in an attempt to solve the problem of eliminating the means of delivering nuclear weapons, while retaining military bases on foreign territory? It is hardly necessary to demonstrate in detail that
such a course would constitute a typical example of an unbalanced approach to the solution of the disarmament problem, such as would give the Western Powers unilateral military advantages. It is just this, of course, that the United States is trying to achieve. If military bases on territories adjacent to the frontiers of socialist countries were to remain at the disposal of certain States, that alone would of course give those States obvious military advantages. Moreover, if that were the case, the socialist States would have cause to suspect that, in keeping military bases on foreign territories at their disposal, the Western Powers were actuated, not by interest in those bases as such, but by the intention of using them for aggressive purposes, and that they were concealing certain quantities of the means of delivering nuclear weapons with a view to setting them up on those bases at the appropriate moment.

In the light of this we would like to receive some clarification from the French delegation on the following question: why, when speaking of the need for a balanced approach to the solution of the disarmament problem, does the French delegation refuse at the same time to recognize that the question of the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons and the question of the abolition of military bases in the territories of other States must be solved simultaneously?

In Mr. Moch's statement of 15 June, in which he expounded the present position of the French Government in regard to means of delivery, and in his answers to our questions, there are some more points which are not entirely clear, and on which we should like to ask some questions. Why, for instance, did the French representative speak only of strategic means of delivering nuclear weapons, apparently ignoring all other means of delivering this type of weapon? Does this mean that what the French Government has in mind is that those means of delivering nuclear weapons which are conventionally classified as tactical should be retained at the disposal of States, even after the entire programme has been carried out? In that case, we regard this formulation of the question as illegitimate. It is widely known that the so-called "tactical" means of delivering nuclear weapons, including certain types of rockets and military aircraft, have a range of some hundreds and even thousands of kilometres, and can be used for delivering nuclear blows at a considerable distance within the territories of States, and consequently for mass extermination of the population. Is it not with an eye to the possibility of using these so-called "tactical" means of delivering nuclear weapons that certain Western Powers wish to retain
their military bases near the frontiers of the socialist States? Further, when the French representative formulates the question as though, even at some future date, only strategic, and not all, means of delivering nuclear weapons are to be abolished, does not this suggest that, in consequence, the equipment of the armed forces of States with nuclear weapons will merely be perpetuated?

In this connexion it would be important to receive some clarification from the French delegation on the following question as well: Mr. Moch has expounded to us the French position on the question of the means of delivering nuclear weapons. It is still not clear, however, what place the French Government assigns to this question within the general programme of disarmament or how, in fact, the French Government regards this general programme at all. The representative of France has still not expressed the views of the French Government on the whole of the contents of the new Soviet programme of general and complete disarmament, although it has now been under discussion for three weeks. We should like to hear the views of France on this question, in order to assess the possibilities of bringing our positions closer together, and indeed the prospects for our negotiations in general.

These are the points we feel it necessary to mention in connexion with the French representative's remarks on the question of the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons.

There is one more remark I should like to make. In one of his first statements in this Committee after the resumption of its work, Mr. Moch gave us to understand that on this question he would try to bring the positions of the other Western Powers closer to the French position. We are now wondering whether the opposite has not occurred, and whether France's allies, and the United States in particular, have not induced the French Government to depart from its original position, which was that priority in the disarmament programme should be given to measures for destroying the means of delivering nuclear weapons. For it is the United States delegation which has strongly opposed, and still strongly opposes, the abolition of the means of delivering nuclear weapons. Perhaps we are mistaken. We should like the representative of France to clarify the position.

We are prompted to ask this question in view of the fact that we have not received a definite and precise explanation from the representative of France on the following point: Do his statements of 15 June, on the
problem of eliminating the means of delivering nuclear weapons, reflect the common attitude of all the Western Powers represented on the Committee, or the views of France alone? To our simple question, whether they reflect the attitude of all the Western Powers, Mr. Moch has not replied with a definite "Yes, they do" or "No, they do not". Mr. Moch said at yesterday's meeting that his statement of 15 June

"... was prepared in close consultation with the other Western delegations", and he added that these delegations

"... agreed to the general ideas I expounded in my statement."

(TNCD/PV.45, page 20)

Every word in this answer seems to have been weighed on a chemist's scales. How are we to understand these words? What is meant by "agreed to the general ideas"? This is all very vague and unlike Mr. Moch, who usually tries to make both his questions and his answers really precise. This wording does not give us any idea of the real state of affairs with regard to the position of the Western Powers on a question to which, as Mr. Moch said himself on 23 June, the French Government attaches "prime importance" and which is, in fact, of very great significance.

The confusion on this matter was still further increased after yesterday's statement by Mr. Ormsby-Gore. The United Kingdom representative assured us at the beginning of his statement that, since the Committee had resumed its work, the United Kingdom delegation had

"had some discussion about the possibility of approaching general and complete disarmament by way of the so-called means of delivery of weapons -- notably weapons of mass destruction." (TNCD/PV.45, page 23)

And to what conclusions has the United Kingdom delegation arrived on this matter?

We listened carefully to Mr. Ormsby-Gore's statement and studied the verbatim record of it, but we must frankly confess that in this extensive statement we have not managed to discover any definite reply to the question what the position of the United Kingdom Government is with regard to the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, as a priority measure in the programme of general and complete disarmament. One is involuntarily forced to the conclusion that Mr. Ormsby-Gore was trying not so much to give a precise formulation of the United Kingdom position on this highly important question, as to avoid the need for saying
what the real position of the United Kingdom Government is with regard to the Soviet proposal for the destruction of nuclear weapon vehicles in the first stage of general and complete disarmament. In this, it seems, the United Kingdom representative has displayed the maximum of flexibility.

What is going on here? Why, for three weeks since the Committee resumed its work, has the United Kingdom representative persistently refrained from taking a clear stand on this question? Is it not because the United Kingdom Government has adopted a negative attitude to the Soviet Union's proposal for the destruction of all means of delivery in the first stage, but does not venture to say so openly? Perhaps the United Kingdom Government is more concerned with equipping its army with United States military rockets as quickly as possible, and not with helping to reach agreement on the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons. If this is so, such a policy is not realistic. It does not take into account the present situation, which imperatively requires that decisive measures be taken without delay to put an end to the threat of a devastating nuclear rocket war. If this is the policy of the United Kingdom Government, then I must say it displays a lack of the necessary flexibility a reluctance to face the facts and make a sober appraisal of the real situation, which, for the United Kingdom, with its limited territory and dense population, contains as many dangers as for certain other countries -- and perhaps more.

In Mr. Ormsby-Gore's statement there was one other point which we cannot overlook. He spoke of the three fields in which, in his view, it would be possible and useful to have detailed negotiations now. Now what are these fields? I have here the record of yesterday's meeting. "The first field," said Mr. Ormsby-Gore on page 27, "is that of control", and he went on to say what should be understood by this field. (TNCD/PV.45)

"Secondly," he said, "the Soviet proposals on means of delivery imply, in logic, a readiness to discuss and negotiate other possible proposals to reduce the danger of surprise attack..." (ibid, page 27)

That is the second field.

"The third field of possible negotiation," Mr. Ormsby-Gore said, "which has been opened up by the Soviet espousal of proposals on means of delivery is the whole field of measures designed to build up international confidence." (Ibid, page 28)
These are the three fields in which the United Kingdom delegation believes that detailed negotiations would be useful at the present time. The field of concrete disarmament measures is, however, conspicuously absent from all the fields which Mr. Crmsey-Gore proposes for the conduct of detailed negotiations. This is strange; but it seems to reflect the entire approach of the United Kingdom delegation — and of some other Western delegations as well — to our negotiations.

What we want is detailed negotiations on the concrete disarmament programme which we have on our desks, but the Western delegations are trying to induce us to study fields which have nothing whatsoever to do with the concrete programme of disarmament measures, and they are side-tracking us from the drafting and discussion of these concrete measures. We feel bound to express our regrets, and to connect this with the general approach displayed by the Western delegations during our negotiations.

What point have we reached, now that three weeks have passed since the Soviet Union submitted for the Committee's consideration new proposals on the basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament?

So far, the representatives of the Western Powers have not definitely made known their attitude to these proposals as a whole. Moreover, they have resorted to every device to avoid replying to important questions of principle put to them by the delegations of the socialist States in connexion with the new Soviet proposals. So far, we have not even received a reply to the questions whether the Western Powers are ready to accept the general purport of the measures for general and complete disarmament envisaged in the new Soviet proposals, and what their attitude is to the measures proposed by the Soviet Union for each stage, and for the first stage in particular.

Of all the provisions mentioned in the new Soviet proposals, the United Kingdom delegation has expressed its view with some degree of precision on one question only — the question of the elimination of military bases on the territories of other States: and in this case its view was negative. Even less has been said by the Canadian delegation, which merely referred to the procedure envisaged in the Soviet proposals for studying certain problems. The French delegation, as I have already said today, has not expressed itself with sufficient clarity even on a question which was brought up on the initiative of France itself, the question of the abolition of the means of delivering nuclear weapons. Since the resumption of
the Committee's work, the Italian delegation has spoken more often than certain other Western delegations; but it is no secret that the Italian delegation either merely repeats the views of the United States of America on the main questions, or refers to curious questions such as whether the abolition of the general staffs of States is at variance with the Charter of the United Nations.

The United States delegation has dealt in its statements with a number of provisions in the new Soviet proposals — the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, the abolition of military bases on the territories of other States, the withdrawal of foreign troops from those territories, control measures, time-limits and certain other questions. But what of it? Whatever points in the new Soviet programme the United States delegation refers to, it says that its attitude to those points is negative. The United States delegation does not accept anything, it does not like anything, and nothing suits it.

And in these conditions the United States representative is still trying to convince us that the United States Government is interested in a positive solution to the disarmament problem! Unfortunately, the whole course of action which the United States Government has pursued suggests the contrary.

If the United States Government really wanted disarmament, if it was interested in businesslike negotiations on this question, it would have taken the appropriate constructive steps long ago. Since the end of our first series of meetings on 29 April, nearly two months have passed, and there has consequently been quite enough time in which to prepare and submit constructive proposals on disarmament questions. (Apart from this, the United States delegation would have adopted a very different attitude even in our first series of meetings, if the United States Government had really been anxious to solve the disarmament problem.) But nothing of the kind has happened. The United States Government neither prepared any new proposals on disarmament in time for the Summit Conference, nor has it any such proposals now.

Yesterday, Mr. Erskine-Gore produced for our edification some statements by N.S. Krushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. May I, too, for his edification, read the latest statement by N.S. Khrushchev on questions which are of direct concern to us? Addressing the Third Congress of the Romanian Workers' Party, N.S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, spoke as follows:
"If the Western Powers had also had any positive plans, they could have made them public at once, just as the Soviet Union published its new proposals on disarmament questions, and they could thereby have shown the whole world that they really had something to call their own when they went to Paris. But from the Western shores," including the shores of the United Kingdom — the reference to the United Kingdom, Mr. Ormsby-Gore, is my own insertion, and not Mr. Khrushchev's —

"we do not seem to hear any reasonable proposals. From the Western shores we hear the same old tune which everyone is bored with, namely that the Soviet Union's proposals on disarmament are propaganda."

This is what Mr. Khrushchev said only the other day. Since Mr. Ormsby-Gore reads Mr. Khrushchev's statements very carefully and even quotes them to us here, I would ask him to make a note of this latest quotation also.

It is now clear to everyone that while the United States Government was getting ready to torpedo the Summit Conference and was busy taking fresh steps to intensify the armaments race, the Soviet Government, which is sincerely striving to find ways and means of solving the most important international problems, was seriously engaged in working out a new plan of general and complete disarmament.

The Government of the Soviet Union thoroughly studied the results of the first series of meetings of the Ten Nation Committee and of the Committee's discussion of the Soviet programme for general and complete disarmament submitted at the fourteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly in September 1959. The Soviet Government prepared a new plan of general and complete disarmament which takes the views of the Western Powers into account on a number of important points. This new plan was prepared for consideration at the Summit Conference, to which the Soviet delegation went not with empty brief-cases but supplied with concrete proposals. But when, as it turned out, the Summit Conference was wrecked, through the fault of the United States, and the new Soviet proposals could not therefore be discussed there, the Soviet Government sent its new plan for general and complete disarmament to all the governments of the world and submitted it for the consideration of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament. In order to create the most favourable conditions for achieving agreement in this Committee as soon as possible on general and complete disarmament, the Soviet delegation explained in detail the basic features of the new Soviet plan and called upon the Western delegations to join it in the task of working out agreed basic provisions for a treaty on general and complete disarmament.
And what were the reactions to that? Endless questions on matters of secondary or even of third-rate importance. And what sort of questions were they? We were asked, for instance, whether we had in mind the regular procedure for ratification of the treaty on general and complete disarmament — as though we had a treaty ready for ratification — or some special procedure, what would be the procedure for placing national police contingents at the disposal of the Security Council to ensure the maintenance of peace after the completion of the programme of general and complete disarmament — a programme we have not yet agreed on even in principle — and questions on many other things that have just as little to do with the real substance of measures of general and complete disarmament and with the kind of problems that this Committee should have been discussing now.

Who can fail to see that all these questions have been put to us by the Western delegations with the sole purpose of creating the appearance of serious discussion of the Soviet proposals without actually engaging in such discussion, thus disguising the negative attitude of the United States and some of its allies to the question of general and complete disarmament?

Nevertheless, the delegations of the socialist States, displaying the utmost patience, have so far provided answers even to the Western delegations' specious questions of the type to which I have just referred. We have answered over a score of such questions and I believe that now there is not a single question left to which the socialist delegations have not given an answer.

But we must face facts. The work of the Committee is not progressing and the responsibility for this lies with the United States and the other Western Powers. It was this that was clearly stated in the joint Press communiqué of the five socialist delegations, issued on 22 June, and of course, not one of the Western delegations was able to refute these facts — to deny what was stated in the communiqué.

Nevertheless this marking time by our Committee cannot go on for ever, especially since it is growing increasingly obvious that certain circles in the United States simply intend to make use of the negotiations in our Committee as a cover for their own policy, which has nothing to do with the task of reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament. That is why we must again repeat our question to the United States delegation: does the United States delegation intend to give up its negative stand in this Committee and to turn to constructive discussion of the new Soviet proposals on the basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament?
To this question we have not so far had an intelligent reply, but we must have a reply, and it cannot be delayed much longer. It is awaited not only by the delegations of the socialist States in this Committee but by the peoples of the whole world, who have a vital interest in the speediest possible solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament, the absolute removal of the threat of war, and the creation of a world without weapons, a world without war.

Mr. ORMSBY-GORE (United Kingdom): We have just listened to an important statement by Mr. Zorin, and we shall naturally examine it in great detail. I am grateful to him for adding a quotation from Mr. Khrushchev to the dossier which I already keep — although I am bound to tell Mr. Zorin that I cannot guarantee to find all Mr. Khrushchev's statements equally valuable.

There were two points in Mr. Zorin's statement -- which, as I say, will need careful study -- which I would like to answer at once.

First of all, with regard to the question of foreign bases, I did not say that I thought foreign bases had no significance; what I did say was that it seemed to me that foreign bases had the same significance as bases on national territory. Certainly in the context of military strategy and in the context of disarmament that is the case.

Mr. Zorin also charged me with not giving a clear answer about the Soviet proposals on means of delivery. He said he could not understand from my statement whether or not I accepted that all the means of delivery should be eliminated in the first stage. I thought I had made it clear that I did not think it was realistic to suppose that all the means of delivery of nuclear weapons could be eliminated in the first stage. That is my clear answer.

In that connexion, I would point out that in the Soviet plan of September 1959 all the means of delivery of nuclear weapons are not in fact eliminated until the last stage — and we have been told only this morning by the representative of Czechoslovakia that the plan of September 1959 put forward by the Soviet Union is still valid. Therefore the elimination of means of delivery in the final stage is not wholly unacceptable to the Soviet Union either. But of course we can discuss these matters in greater detail after we have examined the verbatim record.

Finally, I would just like to say a few words about the speech we heard earlier this morning from the representative of Czechoslovakia. It was an example of his not very skilful mental gymnastics which we have come to know rather well
in this Committee. It is a speech which I personally will always treasure as an example of its kind. But I really think it is not helpful to have words like "hypocrite" used by representatives in this Committee. I do not suppose that Mr. Nosek is very familiar with our procedure in a free parliament, but such a word would not be allowed in Parliament in the United Kingdom and he would have been asked to withdraw it. I do not think that charging the other side with hypocrisy is going to help us make progress in this Committee.

As regards the main burden of Mr. Nosek's speech, it was more or less a repetition of what we have heard earlier.

I would just like to say once more that our idea of balanced stages of disarmament has been maintained now for a number of years. Mr. Nosek will find that there was both nuclear and conventional disarmament at each of the different stages of disarmament proposed in the Anglo-French plan of 1954. He will find the same thing in the Anglo-French plan of 1956. He will find the same thing in the Western proposals put forward in the Disarmament Sub-Committee in 1957, proposals which he will recollect were overwhelmingly supported at the General Assembly of the United Nations but which he and his colleagues voted against. He will find precisely the same balance in all stages of the proposals put forward by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd at the United Nations last year. He will find the same balance in the proposals put forward by the five Western Powers on 16 March this year. Therefore a study of these documents, if he cared to make it, would indicate to him what I mean by a balance of nuclear and conventional disarmament at each stage.

Now let us look for just one moment at the various positions which have been taken up by the Soviet Union and therefore by the Czechoslovak delegation. Originally we had the proposal for the banning of all nuclear weapons, at a time when of course the Soviet Union did not possess nuclear weapons. That was put in the first stage. Then later on -- last year, 1959 -- we had the elimination of nuclear weapons in the last stage. In the proposals put forward in June of this year the elimination of all the means of delivery of nuclear weapons appears in the first stage. I pointed out yesterday that when we have indicated that it is some advance for the Soviet Union to suggest the final elimination of nuclear weapons in the last stage of a disarmament process, it is not really a concession for the Soviet Union then to put that provision in the first stage. I would have thought that was quite clear.
The attitude of the Government of Czechoslovakia on this is revealed to us through the speeches of Mr. Nosek here, but I think it would be fair to say that these changes of position have been readily acceptable to the Czechoslovak Government. After all, we know that the proposals submitted last September at the United Nations General Assembly were proposals of the Soviet Union alone, and we were told that the countries of the Warsaw Pact had met together to give a very careful study to those proposals before they were submitted to this Committee in March. I am sure the Czechoslovak Government gave them very careful study and no doubt made suggestions for their improvement, and so on, but it is nevertheless a fact that when the proposals were presented to us here every single comma and every single word were precisely the same as in the proposals put forward by the Soviet Union in September 1959.

On 2 June the Soviet Union put forward some new proposals, and, as I understand it, these proposals also are totally acceptable to the Czechoslovak delegation. As they do indicate a substantial shift in position, moving all conventional disarmament from the first stage to the second stage and all nuclear disarmament from the last stage to the first stage, I do think this indicates a certain lack of consistency on the part of the Czechoslovak Government.

I do not intend to examine in detail Mr. Nosek's speech of this morning. I thought that the insults in it were particularly unhelpful and the further unsubstantiated charges were also simply a repetition of what he had said before. I think it would really be best, if we are to make progress in this Committee, to ignore in future the kind of speech to which we have had to listen this morning.

Mr. MOCH (France) (translation from French): Mr. Ormsby-Gore's reactions are the same as mine -- so much so that I nearly refrained from speaking. First of all, I will ignore the polemics in the last part of Mr. Zorin's statement this morning. It was polemical, but quite proper as to form. I will ignore it. I merely assume that it foreshadows a rather virulent Press conference by the spokesman of the Soviet delegation; but that matters little to us and is outside our subject.

Like Mr. Ormsby-Gore, I think that Mr. Zorin's long statement this morning, about three-quarters of which was directed against France, merits a thorough examination. I shall study it with my staff, so as to be able to make a lucid reply. But when Mr. Zorin puts questions to me and says I must answer "yes" or
"no", I am justified in reminding him that never, since I have been asking him questions, has he answered me "yes" or "no". Never at any time! When has he answered "yes" or "no" to a question as specific as whether an adverse vote by the Security Council would interrupt the running of the time-limits in the treaty; or to the question whether the Soviet delegation agrees to control of remaining equipment; or to the question whether the control authorities can verify not only the accuracy of declarations by governments, but also their honesty? We have generally had interposed replies by spokesmen, which, when re-read, increased rather than dissipated the obscurity, but never "yes" or "no" for an answer.

There is one point in the questions put by Mr. Zorin, on which Mr. Ormsby-Gore replied just now, and which I also noted that I must revert to at once in order to shorten the statement I shall make next week in reply to the questions asked. It is the problem of the link with foreign bases. That the Soviet Government should seek political or military advantages in a negotiation of this kind, I can understand, though I do not share its point of view. That is its own affair. But that it should try to prove to us that the question of foreign bases is linked with that of the abolition of vehicles for nuclear weapons is something which our logic cannot accept. Suppose, for instance, that there are three bases near the Soviet-Turkish frontier — so as not to take any other country represented here. One of these bases is an American base on Turkish territory; it threatens Soviet Russia, Mr. Zorin tells us. The other is a Turkish base on Turkish territory; does it not offer a similar threat to Soviet Russia if it is equipped with the same weapons? The third is a Soviet base on Soviet territory; does it not threaten Turkish territory, just as the two preceding bases threaten Soviet territory?

Well then, what is the difference between these three bases as regards destruction of the vehicles for nuclear weapons? Why does the American base on Turkish territory merit special treatment, which would not be applied to the Turkish base on Turkish territory, or to the Soviet base on Soviet territory? That is what my mind, which is perhaps too logical, absolutely refuses to accept. And when the President of the French Republic spoke of launching bases which must be brought under control to reduce the danger, he envisaged all bases without any exception, whether national bases or foreign bases on national territory.

That is the answer I can give to that question by Mr. Zorin. We do not see what reasons of military technique make him isolate "foreign" bases.
We can very well see the ulterior motives of a political or strategic nature which may be influencing him. He will excuse us for not having them.

I now come to the third point. At one stage in his statement, if I understood him correctly, Mr. Zorin told us that he was prepared to give serious study to the problem of the destruction of vehicles and of means of control -- to my mind that is the most encouraging part of the statement I have just heard -- and I answer him that we too are prepared to do so. We are prepared to join you in a serious study of the problem of the destruction of vehicles and means of controlling such destruction. We are prepared to show you that it is not realistic to carry this out in some twelve to eighteen months. We are prepared to show you that there are gaps in your text, and to ask you how, apart from the launching-ramps declared by each of the governments accepting control, we shall be able, all together and by agreement, to discover the clandestine ramps that could be built as and when the original ones are declared. Similarly, we are prepared to study with you -- and I say this in all sincerity -- the means of verifying stocks, and not only those declared by each government, but also any clandestine stocks which might be constituted. We are ready to study with you all that part of your plan which relates to factories and depots, but we are obliged to widen the problem and to say that our study must deal not only with the factories declared to us by the government accepting control as being those in which rockets and other devices have been manufactured hitherto, but also with factories in which it would be possible to start manufacture of new devices to replace those that had been declared and rendered useless. That is the kind of useful work which we should all do here together, perhaps with the help of experts. And if you are resolved to take that course, I shall be glad of this debate, because it will have contributed something new.

I should like to turn now to the remarks made earlier by our Czechoslovak colleague.

I wished you, Mr. Chairman -- but we did not understand each other -- to allow me to exercise my right to put a point of order during our colleague's statement. I was not given an opportunity to speak, and Mr. Ormsby-Gore has just said what was most important. But I wish to confirm that if, on the communist side, the Czechoslovak delegation has been put up to make insinuations and use disagreeable or wounding expressions, I shall not lend myself to this practice, for I think we can, and should, conduct our discussions with good manners.
I cannot accept that it should be said of any government on the Western side — in this case it was the Government of the United States — that its attitude is two-faced.

I cannot accept that it should be said that the policy of any Government on the Western side — again that of the United States — is a policy of provocation; that it should be said that the Western Powers are lacking in goodwill with regard to general and complete disarmament; that they wish to discredit the idea of general and complete disarmament, as has been said; that the attitude of the Western delegations is hypocritical — the word has been used; that they are indulging in manoeuvres — that word has also been used; that this is typical of their attitude — as has also been said; or, finally, that one of us "alleges", when he says something.

For my part, I will not accept such behaviour.

I repeat: we are here to do useful work and not to throw insults at each other. I have never insulted anybody on the Eastern side. I ask the Czechoslovak representative to maintain towards us the restraint which, quite naturally, his other colleagues maintain towards us and which we ourselves maintain towards them.

Mr. Mezingescu (Romania) (translation from French): I wish to make a very brief comment or, rather, I wish to try to obtain from you, Mr. Chairman, in your capacity as representative of Italy, an explanation which I think would be useful for our discussion.

Just now, speaking of the statement made by the representative of Czechoslovakia — a statement which I made myself, as did other representatives of the socialist countries — concerning the efforts at rapprochement made by the socialist countries in an attempt to come closer to the position of the Western countries, you told the Committee that the concessions made by the socialist countries were not concessions to the Western position, but concessions to logic and good sense.

The point I should like you to explain, in your capacity as representative of Italy, is whether you consider that the position of the Western countries is really totally irreconcilable with logic and good sense and whether that, in your opinion, explains the fact that the Western countries do not budge from their position.
The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): I only wish to tell the representative of Romania that I think this constant distortion of our words is really a very bad method of discussion. What I just said was simply this: the Eastern delegations have often presented their new proposals to us as being concessions to our views, whereas, on the contrary, they were only a recognition of certain undoubted truths — of certain logical truths. That was all my words meant.

Mr. NOSEK (Czechoslovakia): I shall, of course, study the statements made here this morning by the representative of the United Kingdom and the representative of France and I shall reply to them in due course. At the moment I would just like to say that I did not insult anybody. It is surely the right of all members of any international body to express their opinion and to make speeches in the way they think best.

I would add only one remark with regard to the statement made by Mr. Ormsby-Gore concerning the lack of consistency in the attitude of my Government. I really do not understand what he wished to imply because everyone in this Committee will recall that the socialist States were requested during the earlier part of the negotiations of our Committee to meet the attitude of the Western countries and to come forward with some new proposals. Now new proposals have been submitted by the socialist States — proposals which attempt to meet the points of view and desires of the Western delegations, as has been pointed out many times in this Committee. But Mr. Ormsby-Gore says that this shows a lack of consistency in our attitude. I really cannot understand this.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): We have heard again today, particularly from the Soviet representative, expressions of impatience at the rate of progress of our work. These expressions have been interlarded with charges against the motives and intentions of the United States Government and of the United States delegation. They have been mixed with the introduction into our Conference here of essentially extraneous matters, such as responsibility for the failure of the Summit Conference. These charges and other matters are debated, and may properly be debated, outside our Conference, but a debate on them here is not calculated to assist us in making progress or to provide an atmosphere which is necessary for serious negotiation.
We have heard an argument of curious logic, that because the Soviet Government had its 2 June proposals ready for the Summit Conference the United States Government should have responded immediately after the submission of these proposals here with what it had prepared for the Summit Conference. This argument seems to indicate that in the view of the Soviet Government and the Soviet delegation the Soviet disarmament proposals of 2 June should have been considered to have so little meaning that they would not in any way affect the proposals that the United States Government may have had in mind. We have not regarded the Soviet proposals of 2 June in this light. We have given them serious attention; our Government has given them serious attention.

We have heard the repetition today of an essentially meaningless question by the representative of the Soviet Union. He asked again, as I understood the simultaneous interpretation: when will the United States renounce its negative attitude in this Conference? It is obvious that the United States cannot renounce a negative attitude since it does not have a negative attitude. The attitude of the United States Government and of the United States delegation has been serious and constructive in these negotiations. We believe that we have amply demonstrated this in the past meetings of our Conference; we shall demonstrate it in the future.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): I do not intend to dwell on certain statements made today by the Western representatives, the only purpose of which was apparently to attenuate the effect of various interventions. I do not, for example, propose to deal with the statement that certain interventions were made solely to pave the way for press conferences. Nor do I intend to comment on the manner in which the Western delegations evade questions. I shall, however, make one comment -- a first comment, since there are many to be made -- on a question raised this morning by Mr. Moch, namely, the difference between bases belonging to the country on whose territory they are situated and foreign bases.

At least one difference could be found -- for there are many others of which we have already spoken. We have been asked, for example, what is the difference between a Turkish base on Turkish territory and an American base on Turkish territory. To that question it could be replied that if a base belonged to a country that was master in its own territory and could exercise command over it, there would not be incidents such as those which have been called the American over-flights of the Soviet Union's air-space, and the Summit Conference would not have been torpedoed.
That is one consequence of establishing foreign bases on the territory of other countries.

The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): If no other member of the Committee wishes to speak, I will read out the draft communique, which is as follows:

"The forty-sixth meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament was held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 24 June 1960 under the chairmanship of the representative of Italy. The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Monday, 27 June 1960, at 10.30 a.m."

Are there any comments?
The communique is approved.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.