FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FORTY-FIFTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Thursday, 23 June 1960, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: MR. MOCH (France)
**Present at the Table**

**Bulgaria:**
- Mr. M. Tarabanov
- Mr. K. Christov
- Mr. G. Guklev

**Canada:**
- Mr. E. L. M. Burns
- Mr. A. G. Campbell
- Mr. R. M. Tait

**Czechoslovakia:**
- Mr. J. Nosek
- Mr. Z. Trhlik
- Lieut.-Gen. J. Hecko

**France:**
- Mr. J. Moch
- Mr. M. Legendre
- Col. L. Convert

**Italy:**
- Mr. G. Martino
- Mr. F. Cavalletti
- Maj.-Gen. D. Fanali

**Poland:**
- Mr. M. Naszkowski
- Mr. H. Biusztajn
- Maj.-Gen. J. Sliminski

**Romania:**
- Mr. B. Mezincescu
- Mr. G. Bogdan
- Col. C. Popa

**Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:**
- Mr. V. A. Zorin
- Col.-Gen. A. A. Gryzlov
- Mr. A. A. Roshchyn
PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Rt. Hon. D. ORMSEY-GORE
Miss B. SALT
Sir Michael WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. G. McURTRIE GODLEY
Col. T.W. WOLFE

Representative of the Secretary-General:

Dr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN
The CHAIRMAN (France) (translation from French): The forty-fifth meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament is called to order.

Mr. STEILÉ (United States of America): At our meeting on Friday, 17 June, Mr. Zorin made some observations to the general effect that the United States was not adopting a constructive attitude towards our negotiations here, and that the United States was not interested in disarmament but instead favoured an intensification of the armaments race. This theme has been repeated here by other Eastern delegations. Following yesterday's meeting, at which no delegation -- either allied or communist -- spoke, the communist delegations issued a statement to the Press along the lines of Mr. Zorin's observations last Friday. I should like to make some brief comments on these charges.

It does not serve the objective of successful negotiations in our Conference to have accusations made against the good faith or motives of other delegations. Indeed one of the tests of real interest in negotiation is, we believe, the extent to which a delegation seeks to avoid gratuitous charges against the motives of other countries. One cannot expect to achieve success in a field so vital to the security of nations unless the parties on both sides can develop arrangements that take into account the mutual interest and concerns of all; this cannot be achieved by abuse but only by patient negotiation to clarify positions and work out those arrangements which will be acceptable to all parties. It is, in part, for this reason that the United States delegation has not responded to insinuations about our motives with counter-charges. We seek to advance our work here and we see our task as one that can be achieved only by joint efforts on our part and also on the part of the Soviet Union. We believe that the Soviet Union and the Western countries have a mutual interest in working out together an acceptable alternative to the arms race.

The United States believes that our task here is to work out arrangements that will lead us as quickly as possible by balanced, safeguarded steps to our goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. It will not be a simple task for us to devise those steps which, at each stage, will protect the security of all parties by avoiding the giving of military advantage to some. Indeed the problems of how to get started and how to move progressively towards our common goal in a manner that protects the security of all parties is at the very
heart of our task. The United States delegation has expressed the view in our meetings that our task will be easier if we work out those measures on which we can initially move forward, not as partial measures but as the initial steps that we are agreeing to in a programme for general and complete disarmament. When we have worked out the first steps, we here can then agree on the subsequent measures.

Mr. Zorin complained in his statement last Friday that the United States had not responded constructively to the Soviet proposal of 2 June and said that this indicated a lack of interest in disarmament. In the joint Press statement issued by the communist delegations yesterday, it was charged that the allied delegations were evading businesslike discussions. These charges are of course inaccurate, and I should like to set the record straight.

During the first week of our post-recess discussions, most of the debate was centered on the Soviet proposals of 2 June. During that week, the United States representative, together with other Western representatives, made preliminary comments on the Soviet proposals, noting those aspects that seemed to indicate some positive movement and those aspects that gave us difficulties — difficulties that we hoped would be overcome by subsequent Soviet clarifications and by joint negotiation. In response to questions by Mr. Zorin, the United States representative elaborated, during the second week of post-recess meetings, on some of the concerns, the United States delegation had regarding certain elements of the Soviet proposals. In addition, the Western delegations have asked various questions concerning the Soviet proposals in order that we might understand more clearly the Soviet position. We have received answers to some of these questions; responsive answers to others are as yet outstanding.

Thus, the United States delegation and other Western delegations have sought through our discussions these past two weeks to obtain clarification and understanding of Soviet views in order to assist our Governments' assessments.

As the Soviet delegation knows, the United States representative is presently in Washington in order to participate in consultations on ways and means of moving our negotiations forward. The responsibilities which all nations at this table share to ensure the success of our work are too great to be dealt with lightly, overnight.

If the communist delegations truly desire progress, they should draw encouragement rather than demonstrate impatience at the evidence of the careful consideration which the United States and other Western Governments are giving to our negotiations.
It is our hope that subsequent meetings of our Conference will see us move forward to greater areas of understanding and agreement. We for our part will spare no effort in this attempt.

Mr. NASZKOWSKI (Poland) (translation from French): I must say to start with that we were rather astonished to hear the remarks made just now by the representative of the United States, who took exception to the communiqué given to the Press yesterday by the delegations of the socialist countries represented on the Ten Nation Committee.

It may be questioned whether there is really anything in that communiqué which is not in accordance with the facts. Is it not true that, for three weeks, the Western delegations have been refusing to state their position on the substance of the proposals put forward by the socialist countries? Is it not true that since the beginning of our second series of meetings the Western representatives have been unwilling to start businesslike negotiations on our proposals? Can it be denied that the Western delegations' main contribution to our negotiations has been the questions they have put to us -- which, moreover, are mostly of minor importance -- to which we have, however, at once given clear answers, exhausting the subject, in the majority of cases. My statement today will also contain replies to the questions put by Mr. Martino and Mr. Burns.

It may be said in passing that we too have put certain questions to the Western representatives, and that there are some to which we have still not received an answer.

What is the logical conclusion that must be drawn from such an attitude on the part of the Western Powers? Can the attitude of those Powers be interpreted otherwise than as an attempt to evade discussion of our proposals on general and complete disarmament, even when there are no new proposals on the part of the West? Does that attitude on the part of the Western Powers not also denote a tendency to mislead public opinion by a semblance of negotiation?

For our part, we think it our duty to draw attention to the possible consequences of prolonging the present state of affairs. That is precisely what we did in our communiqué. At the same time we are constantly and conscientiously giving proof of a constructive attitude, and we are ready to conduct a serious discussion of the problem put before our Committee. That does not depend only on us, however, it depends on both parties.
In the statements of the Western representatives at the last few meetings of our Committee -- and this applies particularly to the statements of the United States representative -- there has been increasingly open expression of a negative attitude to the new disarmament proposals put forward by the socialist States, especially the measures provided for in the first stage.

The main objections relate both to the abolition of vehicles for nuclear weapons and to the liquidation of bases on foreign territory and the withdrawal of foreign troops.

To justify those objections, the alleged danger of imbalance is invoked -- we have heard that argument used again today by the representative of the United States -- the alleged danger of disturbing what is called the "strategic balance", which is in fact nothing but alignment at higher and higher levels in the arms race. And it is on that -- it is affirmed -- that peace is to depend. In other words, it is considered that the arms race and perpetuation of the division of the world into opposing military blocks would constitute an effective guarantee against the outbreak of war.

As to the Western military alliances, a loosening of which is feared by Mr. Eaton, I do not wish to revert to an assessment of their nature. We have very definite views on the matter, and we have stated them. There is, however, no doubt that the object of these alliances, which are the result of a specific political situation, has been to establish the most favourable strategic positions against the socialist States.

Can peace be built on the foundation of such concepts? Can peace be ensured, for example, by establishing an arsenal of nuclear weapons and rockets in the centre of Europe? Is it possible to believe in the peaceful intentions of an alliance in which one of the leading positions is occupied by the Federal Republic of Germany, a State which openly aims at changing existing national frontiers? We, for our part, consider that the only means of guaranteeing peace is not alignment at higher and higher levels in the arms race, but balance in the conditions of disarmament. Our position is that the best means of guaranteeing peace is to carry out general and complete disarmament and to base international relations on the principles of peaceful co-existence.

While the Western delegations are adopting a more and more openly negative position with regard to our new plan, attempts are also being made -- I am thinking
mainly of the statements by the representatives of Italy and Canada -- to reintroduce the question of studies on the technical aspects of disarmament and to raise them to the status of a prior condition for agreement on general and complete disarmament.

One cannot help seeing a certain analogy between the present tactics of the Western Powers and those to which they resorted in former negotiations on disarmament.

It is difficult to escape the impression that there is a method in this constant return to the question of technical studies, while a negative attitude is in fact adopted to the substance of the Soviet plan.

I should like therefore, in my remarks today, to deal with the question of these studies, especially as Mr. Martino, the representative of Italy, thought fit to maintain on 14 June that it is only now that the socialist States recognize "the necessity for joint study of the technical aspects of the disarmament process". (TNCD/PV.38, page 13)

In reality, we have always considered that to accomplish disarmament, which by its very nature is a complicated process, it is necessary to agree on, and specify, a number of details.

On the other hand we have also considered, and still consider, that it would not be right to substitute technical studies for discussion on the very essence of disarmament or to let it be preceded by such studies, whose value would be all the more doubtful because they would relate to hypothetical disarmament measures not agreed on by the parties concerned.

Mr. Burns and Mr. Martino asked why we had proposed that joint studies on certain measures should be undertaken after, and not before, the beginning of the disarmament process, and why such studies were envisaged for some measures, but not for others equally important.

In its statements on 14 and 17 June, the delegation of the Soviet Union has, in fact, already answered that question. Wishing to make the matter absolutely clear, however, we will explain once more that the new Soviet proposals provide for the practical preparation of, and hence also for studies on, all the principal measures of disarmament and also appropriate means of control before the signing of the treaty on general and complete disarmament.

On the other hand, joint studies on certain measures have been specially mentioned for the following reasons:
(a) We propose that joint studies be undertaken in the first stage on the measures relating to the discontinuance of manufacture of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and to the destruction of stockpiles of such weapons -- measures to be implemented in the second stage.

Although all the principal questions relating to these measures must be worked out before the signing of the treaty, allowance must be made for the fact that control over nuclear disarmament is linked, to a large extent, with science and technology, which are developing rapidly. That is why it is planned to take advantage of the time between the entry into force of the treaty and the beginning of the second stage, during which nuclear weapons will be destroyed, to improve still further, taking scientific and technical progress into account, the methods of control over the discontinuance of manufacture of such weapons and the destruction of stockpiles of them.

(b) We propose studies, in the second stage, on measures to ensure observance of the treaty on general and complete disarmament after the implementation of all the measures provided for by that treaty.

These measures should, also, in principle, be formulated and embodied in the treaty before it is signed. That is why the Soviet programme of 18 September 1959 stipulated that:

"To anticipate possible attempts on the part of States to circumvent or violate the agreement on general and complete disarmament, the agreement shall contain a provision stipulating that any question of its violation shall be submitted for immediate consideration by the Security Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations, in accordance with their respective sphere of competence". (A/4219, page 16)

That provision still holds good.

But at the present time, it is difficult to specify in detail what kind of measures to ensure observance of the treaty will be needed in a completely disarmed world, when the situation will have changed radically and trust will prevail in relations between States. That is why we propose that joint studies on these measures, which will be applied when general and complete disarmament has been accomplished, should be undertaken in the second stage, that is to say after important measures leading towards general and complete disarmament had been put into effect. It is following these studies that it will be possible to draft such measures in final form.
(c) Finally, we also propose studies, in the second stage, on measures to maintain peace and security in accordance with the United Nations Charter, under conditions of general and complete disarmament.

Although all the essential questions relating to these measures should be settled before the treaty is signed, there is nevertheless no doubt that at the present time it is practically impossible to establish in advance, in every detail, the conditions which will obtain in a disarmed world. Consequently our attitude to this question is based on the same considerations as we mentioned in connexion with the studies on measures to ensure observance of the treaty once the process of disarmament has been completed.

These are our explanations concerning this question. Mr. Martino fears that technical progress may cause disarmament and control measures formulated now to lose their effectiveness while disarmament is being carried out. In the light of the explanations I have just given, Mr. Martino's fears are groundless. Apart from the studies envisaged in the first and second stages, I will also take the liberty of referring Mr. Martino to section III of the Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament, which explicitly mentions periodical conferences of the control organization to be set up as soon as the treaty comes into force -- conferences which would be devoted to the consideration of matters arising out of the implementation of effective control over disarmament.

Mr. Burns, the representative of Canada, observed in this connexion, at the forty-first meeting, that it was necessary to examine the details in order to arrive at realistic conclusions on disarmament; and yet I wonder what reasons could justify priority for the examination of details.

As long as there is no agreement on the whole, on the main provisions of the disarmament programme, there can be no agreement on the details.

The example given by Mr. Burns, namely, the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, is not such as to justify his argument. For the participants in those negotiations first of all declared that it was the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests which was to be agreed on. They then went on to the drafting of the treaty, while at the same time studying the details of its implementation and the verification of observance of the prohibition which is its object. What we are proposing is the acceptance of a similar procedure.
The difference between our view and that of the Western States is that the Western delegations wish studies to be undertaken as an end in themselves, whereas we hold that they should serve to settle the details of concrete and well-defined disarmament measures.

At the fortieth meeting, the Polish delegation showed, mainly by the example of the statements made by the United States representative, that the singular philosophy of disarmament preached by the Western States is, in fact, nothing but the very negation of disarmament. As for the procedure which it is proposed that we should follow, it seems to be only a means of dissimulating the real significance of that philosophy, by giving public opinion the misleading impression that something is being done about disarmament, that real negotiations have started — in short, that the West is giving proof of good will. If such is the significance of this procedure — and that at least is what clearly follows from the words of the Western representatives — we shall be obliged to disappoint them, for we are not prepared to assist in misleading public opinion.

I should also like to deal with another problem.

Mr. Martino, the representative of Italy, saw alleged contradictions in my statement of 16 June, particularly in the part concerning the maintenance of peace and security in a disarmed world, in which I said that the provisions of our new proposals are in conformity with the United Nations Charter and are based on it. That assertion by Mr. Martino was supposed to be based on Article 47 of the Charter, which provides that Member States shall place their military staffs at the disposal of the Security Council. (cf. TNCD/PV.41, page 19)

I see no need to give a detailed reply to a question put in such a manner, for it is based on a play on words and is really intended to justify the negative attitude of the Western Powers in regard to general and complete disarmament, and in particular in regard to the postulated total abolition of the military machine of States.

By a similar reasoning, it would be possible to conclude that the abolition of the trusteeship system as a result of the granting of independence to trust territories would be contrary to the provisions of the United Nations Charter, since it would, in fact, entail the abolition of the Trusteeship Council, which is recognized in the Charter as one of the principal organs of the United Nations.
It is quite clear to everyone, however, that only a supporter of the system of colonialism who has no wish to see that infamous system abolished could adopt such an attitude.

I would include among arguments of the same calibre, that put forward on 21 June, to the effect that dealing with the problem of general and complete disarmament means revising the United Nations Charter, because the Charter only mentions "disarmament" and the "regulation of armaments."

As early as the thirteenth meeting, that is to say on 31 March, I said it was quite understandable and natural that certain functions and institutions of the United Nations, which were designed for a world in which armed forces existed, would have to be adapted to the conditions of a disarmed world.

(Cf. TNCD/PV.13, page 8)

The abolition of military staffs and of all other military institutions would certainly not be prejudicial to the United Nations Charter in any way. On the contrary, the situation which would result from complete disarmament of the whole world would be much closer to that envisaged by the authors of the Charter, and thus much closer to the spirit of the Charter than is the existing state of affairs with its intensive arms race.

Mr. Martino also wished to know whether it was intended that the contingents of police (militia) which are to be placed at the disposal of the Security Council after general and complete disarmament has been carried out would be included in the police forces States would be allowed for the maintenance of internal order, or whether they would be additional to those forces.

Our answer is that this question should be settled by agreement during the drafting of the treaty on general and complete disarmament. The agreement reached should be expressed in the text of the treaty itself. Depending on the actual conditions obtaining in the world up to the time when general and complete disarmament has been accomplished, it will be possible, during the studies carried out in the second stage on measures to maintain peace and security in accordance with the United Nations Charter under conditions of general and complete disarmament, to introduce into the agreement any further particulars required by the actual situation. In any case, it is necessary to ensure that the units of police (militia) will be used solely for the purpose of maintaining peace among nations, not for the suppression of peoples who are struggling for their independence and social progress, and not for interference in the internal affairs of other States.
I must add that when examining the attitude of the representative of Italy to the problems I have just mentioned, I cannot escape the impression that it has little to do with concern to observe the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter, as is shown by the requirement stated by Mr. Martino that there should be established

"a true international police force ... in any case removed from the control of States and placed permanently at the disposal of a higher authority ..."

(Mr. Naczkowski, Poland)

I should therefore like to ask Mr. Martino, in return, how he manages to reconcile his position with the provisions of the Charter, which nowhere envisage the establishment of permanent, supra-national forces, but only the placing of specific contingents at the disposal of the Security Council, i.e. of the body responsible for maintaining peace and security.

In an attempt to challenge our argument that under present conditions, and in view of the existing ratio of forces in the world, the concept of permanent, supra-national police forces is entirely unrealistic, Mr. Martino mentioned the example of the United Nations police force formed in 1956. Now that example is particularly inopportune. Those forces, the creation of which, by the way, was not in conformity with the provisions of the Charter, do not constitute an international police force as conceived by Mr. Martino, because their task was not to apply sanctions against disturbers of the peace, in conformity with Chapter VII of the Charter, but to supervise the cease-fire in the Near East.

All negotiation calls for a serious attitude with regard to the position of the other party.

The socialist States drew conclusions from the first part of our Committee's work, and in their new expanded plan they adopted a whole series of suggestions made by the Western States which came within the framework of general and complete disarmament.

Have the Western States, too, drawn appropriate conclusions from the fact that their plan was rejected? Not at all. Their position merely amounts to the repetition of old and unchangeable arguments, which are now being put to us on a "take it or leave it" basis, and — what is more — we are asked to accept them as a prior condition for any further negotiation.

Do the Western Powers consider that it is possible, in such an atmosphere, to reach any agreement between equal partners?
Mr. Ormsby-Gore, the representative of the United Kingdom, went so far that he even thought he could attack our flexibility by endeavouring to see "the flexibility of quicksilver" in our position, whereas, for their part, the Western Powers remain constant to their ideas. I can agree with Mr. Ormsby-Gore on one point, namely, that the Western Powers immutably and constantly maintain their negation of disarmament. But any observer, even the least perspicacious, can see that whenever we accept the ideas of the Western countries they abandon them at once.

If the Western Powers gave proof of a desire as sincere as that of the socialist States to seek compromise solutions, and if they did not abandon their own proposals as soon as we accepted them, we could make much greater progress in the negotiations on disarmament. But, so far, we can see no sign of a change in the attitude of the Western Powers. That is why our Committee is not making any progress in its work.

We should like to believe that there will, finally, be a change in this attitude and that our Committee will consequently be able to set about accomplishing its task.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): The representative of Poland has referred to certain views put forward by the Canadian delegation. I would like to reply briefly to what he has said but I would reserve the right to study the verbatim record and, if necessary, reply in more detail.

Mr. Naszkowski argued against the suggestions the Canadian delegation made about the desirability of studies or detailed negotiations, and it seems to me that the principle that he would wish to follow is that this Conference must first of all accept certain general ideas and thereafter study whether they are good and practicable. We, I think, prefer the reverse procedure, that is to say that before accepting an idea in general terms we wish to see whether it is practicable and can be put into effect in advancing the process of disarmament.

I gathered that the suggestion was made that the intention of the Western delegations in asking for such studies or detailed negotiations to determine the practicability of general propositions that are put forward is to deceive the public into thinking that we seriously want disarmament whereas, as a matter of
fact, we wish to evade it. I think that this is the type of aspersion of which
the representative of the United States complained in his statement today and
which does not facilitate our proceedings here.

One might also say that to propose general principles without preliminary
investigation to see if they were practical and could be put into effect could
also be attacked as insincere and intended more to mislead uninformed public
opinion than to facilitate serious and effective discussions on the attainment
of disarmament.

Finally, I would say that, in spite of what has been said today, the
Canadian delegation believes that our Eastern colleagues in fact thoroughly
understand the need of studies of, or detailed negotiations on, these measures
which are proposed, some of them common to the Western and the Soviet proposals,
and that we shall in due course arrive at an agreement to undertake them at one
stage or another.

The CHAIRMAN (France) (translation from French): If no one wishes to
speak, I shall say a few words as representative of France.

I should like, first of all, to reply to Mr. Naszokowski, and to tell him
that the surprise he expressed at the initial American reaction surprises me.
I learned this morning, in the aircraft, of the communique published by the
Eastern delegations after yesterday's semblance of a meeting. I must say that
I much regret the publication of this communique. My first thought, somewhere
over the Morven, was to wonder whether it did not indicate a desire on the part
of our Eastern colleagues to bring the negotiations in Geneva to an end, and
saddle us with the blame for their failure. But in any event, it has taken
our discussions out of the realm of negotiation into that of propaganda and
polemics: for after reading the final sentence one cannot describe it otherwise.
The sentence is as follows:

"There is a growing impression that the United States of America
and its allies do not wish to make progress in the negotiations on
dismament, but to make them mark time indefinitely or, in general,
to bring about their failure." 1/

If that is not cheap public meeting propaganda, cheap polemics, then words
do not mean the same thing in our different languages.

1/ Translation from the Russian text of the communique.
In any case, I repeat what the United States representative said, that what we, the Western representatives, want on behalf of our Governments is businesslike negotiation with a view to concluding a serious agreement. That is why some of us have contacted our Governments again. In my opinion it is not seemly to take advantage of these absences to spoil the atmosphere in which our discussions must continue.

I am also astonished, like General Burns, at the rather over-emphatic position taken by the Polish Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs on the question of technical studies. Following General Burns, I repeat that none of us wishes to mislead public opinion. Mr. Naszkowski said it was wrong to substitute technical studies for the consideration of disarmament measures, or to make them precede such consideration. If that means that we must agree on our objective, his argument is tenable. But before agreeing on our objective it might perhaps be well to understand how it can be attained, and how it can be controlled. I could put Mr. Naszkowski's proposition the other way round by saying that he is asking us to sign an agreement on measures which have not been studied. And that, obviously, would lead to absurdity. I see that Mr. Naszkowski is protesting; but the truth, as always, lies between the two extremes. Hence my conclusion is as follows: the Eastern delegations are proposing studies during the stage preceding the execution of the measures concerned, on two matters which Mr. Naszkowski has just mentioned. In connexion with the discontinuance of the manufacture of fissionable materials for military purposes and the conversion of stocks, moreover, he emphasizes that, in this sector at least, disarmament is linked with scientific and technical progress. I fully agree with him. If we demonstrated here, as in other assemblies, I should have applauded that sentence. But is not the point equally applicable to matters other than the two mentioned by the Eastern delegations — for instance, to the elimination of vehicles, for which I showed the diversity of means needed, or to the setting down in black and white of the idea, so simple to express but so difficult to carry out, of establishing a proportion between the conventional armaments remaining and the forces temporarily retained?

Of course, it is very easy to say, as the Soviet proposal and the Western proposals say, that there must be a certain ratio, for instance, between the number of guns larger than a given calibre, or tanks above a given tonnage, etc., and the level of the forces retained; but when we come to take up the problem of
settling that ratio, we shall encounter very serious difficulties: first, because the large units in our respective countries are not of similar composition, and we shall have to arrive at a standard average composition so as to make specified quantities of armaments correspond to forces of a given strength, and secondly, because we shall have to discuss the exact nature of these armaments. All this is not easy, and will call for technical studies to determine how the problems can be solved.

Thus, while I approve the method suggested for two matters, I wonder why it has not been extended to two others, which are just as complicated.

I should like now to turn to another point.

On 20 June the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics put three questions to me. I replied at once that those questions did not raise any particular difficulties for us, and that I would answer them as soon as I had consulted my Western colleagues. I added, however, that I too would like to have answers to the specific questions I had asked several times, and which I had summed up in my statement of 16 June. For these questions do not concern secondary, peripheral or artificial matters, as certain delegations are sometimes inclined to say or to try to make out. They are fundamental questions which govern our negotiations.

To say that questions relating to the automatic application or the nature of the time-limits laid down in the treaty are secondary or artificial would be contrary to the argument of the Soviet delegation itself. Similarly, it is impossible to maintain that questions relating to the objects and the general role of control are secondary questions. Since my return this morning, therefore, I have most carefully read the statement made on 21 June by the representative of Romania. There I discovered, again with some surprise -- I am going from one surprise to another this morning -- the assertion that all our questions had been answered "in a positive and ... exhaustive manner". (TNCD/FV.43, page 12)

In fact, I have found nothing in the statement which answers my questions. What I have found, alas, are retreats, particularly as regards the establishment of the preparatory commission. For I thought I understood, I thought I could deduce from Mr. Zorin's statements, that that commission which is to be responsible for the detailed formulation of practical control measures, not laid down in sufficient detail in the draft treaty, would be set up before the treaty had been
signed. But now, according to Mr. Mocînceasu's statement, it appears that the commission would only be set up after the treaty had been signed. This is, in fact, the only "exhaustive" answer I have found, but it is a negative one.

The same applies to control over practical disarmament measures, with regard to which I also read the Romanian representative's statement very carefully this morning. I had asked two questions. I will repeat the first one exactly as I asked it:

"Will the control authorities be able to ascertain not only what equipment has been eliminated, but also the quantities remaining after such elimination, to the full extent necessary to verify their conformity with treaty obligations?"  (TNCD/FV.40, page 7)

The answer I received to this was as follows -- and I quote:

"[Control] must offer every possible guarantee that no State will be able to evade its responsibility for carrying out disarmament measures within the time-limit fixed or circumvent the treaty on general and complete disarmament in any way whatsoever."  (TNCD/FV.43, page 12)

My question was quite precise and concrete; but the reply is couched in terms so general that I am obliged to ask whether, to ensure that no State will be able to evade carrying out disarmament measures, the control authorities will, or will not, have the right to verify the equipment on hand as well as the equipment eliminated. I do not know at all. Quite frankly, after reading the reply, I am no wiser than before, and the question is so important that I must press for an equally precise answer.

The representative of Romania said in this connexion that I regarded verification of armed forces as unimportant, and verification of stocks of nuclear weapons as ineffective or even impossible. That is putting my argument rather inaccurately. We regard verification of armaments as far more important than that of armed forces, because it is possible overnight to call up reservists but not to re-make weapons that have been destroyed. Thus my question applies essentially to verification of armaments of all types. I may add that it will also become important as regards armed forces, when they have been reduced considerably below their present levels.

As to stockpiles of nuclear weapons, the difficulty of locating them, which I have always pointed out -- and which I was perhaps the first to point out to the United Nations about 1952 -- is no obstacle to carrying out checks when there are grounds for suspecting deceit.
This difficulty further increases the importance of control over the manufacture of fissionable materials and nuclear weapons, and over the conversion of stocks, and is a reason for taking action as quickly as possible in regard to vehicles for nuclear weapons, which can still be controlled.

I asked a second question, which was as follows:

"Will the control authorities be able to verify not only the accuracy of the declarations made by the governments accepting control, but also their honesty, by making certain, in accordance with procedures to be discussed, that there are no clandestine stocks?" (TNCD/PV.40, page 8)

The reply was as follows, and again I quote:

"To enable the international controllers and inspectors to carry out their duties, States must undertake: (i) to give them timely and unrestricted access within their territory to any place where disarmament measures subject to verification are being carried out, or to any area in which on-site inspection of such measures is to be made."

(TNCD/PV.43, page 13)

Here again the reply to a specific question is given in general terms and appears to be negative. What we want, in fact, is the right to verify the existence or non-existence of clandestine stocks, that is to say stocks which in the words of the reply -- I quote again -- are not situated in "any place where disarmament measures subject to verification are being carried out".

I therefore repeat my question: Will the control authorities, under conditions to be determined by us, have the right to visit places or areas other than those indicated by the government accepting control, or will they not? That is the essence of my question, and it has not been answered.

I will not insist further. I note with regret that there is a wide difference between our conceptions of verification of the implementation of the treaty -- a difference which it is sought to conceal by general formulas, but which still remains.

Further insistence on my part cannot compel the delegations of the Eastern countries to reply if they do not choose to do so. I can only take note of their silence.

I now come to the third part of this statement. For I have said that, for my part, I will answer all questions put to me, and will do so as quickly and clearly as possible.
Three questions were put to me on 20 June by the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. I answered the third of these questions at once. Today I confirm that answer which related, you will remember, to the two meanings attributed to the word "bases". I have nothing to add to my original answer and nothing to withdraw, so I will not revert to it.

There remain two other questions put by Mr. Zorin, the first of which was whether the observations I made in my statement of 15 June on the problem of eliminating means of delivering nuclear weapons

"reflect the general attitude of all the Western Powers represented on the Committee or merely that of France." (TNCD/PV.42, page 13)

In reply to Mr. Zorin, I can say that the statement made here on 15 June concerning the means of delivering nuclear weapons, a question to which the French Government attaches primo importance, was prepared in close consultation with the other Western delegations, and that they agreed to the general ideas I put forward.

The second question by the Soviet delegation concerned my statements on 22 October 1959, at the fourteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, and at the first meeting of our Committee on 15 March 1960, in which I said that "the prohibition and destruction of all means of delivering nuclear weapons was the chief and most urgent problem." (Ibid., page 14) Mr. Zorin asserted that my statement of 15 June was "mainly devoted to the establishment of control over the means of delivery and not to their early destruction", and said that the Soviet delegation "would like to know the reason for this change." (Ibid.)

My answer is that there is no change in the position of the French delegation. Mr. Zorin will look in vain for any differences or contradictions between my various statements on a matter regarding which the constancy of French policy has been established and it may perhaps be recognized that I contributed to framing that policy. I have had an opportunity of stating our policy several times, the last of which was on 15 June. I have tried to do so precisely and clearly. Mr. Zorin reproaches me for speaking mainly of the establishment of control over the means of delivery. I feel bound to repeat that here, as in other sectors of disarmament, it is quite certain that no useful result, acceptable to all, will be achieved, unless effective control measures are studied and put into effect at the same time as the first disarmament measures;
and that disarmament, in the sector under consideration, can only be continued in so far as control over those initial operations has proved fully satisfactory.

Once again, these are not secondary or artificial questions. The Soviet delegation will only delay any useful discussion on disarmament, if it rejects these obvious truths. So let it give us some answers — either confirming or invalidating those of the Romanian representative, but at least making them clearer — on the major preliminaries to disarmament, i.e., the questions I put to it again last week.

Let the Soviet delegation also tell us more precisely than it has in a mere three lines of the plan of 2 June, by what miracle or what stroke of the magic wand the Soviet Government hopes to be able to eliminate all the wide variety of nuclear weapon vehicles, under conditions that guarantee the security of all States, during a stage which on its own admission would be of only about twelve to eighteen months' duration, and without preliminary study of the question. Let the Soviet delegation tell us how it will provide for satisfactory control over operations of this magnitude. I need not repeat that the French delegation is prepared to study the answers given it on those fundamental points with the greatest care. As I said here on 15 June:

"To sum up, we believe that elimination of the vehicles for strategic nuclear weapons is still controllable, but that, to be acceptable to all, it must be carried out in a realistic manner — that is to say, gradually and methodically." (TNCD/FP.39, page 10)

If the Soviet delegation can propose more effective, safer and quicker methods than those we have studied with great care and described here, we shall be glad to know them and to give them the fullest consideration. But its silence on this point, as also on the general question of control and on the preliminaries of which I have spoken, is not calculated to facilitate our negotiation.

Mr. ORMSEY-GORE (United Kingdom): This morning I wish to say something on a topic about which the Chairman has just been speaking in his capacity as the representative of France, namely, the subject of the means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction.
Before I do so, however, I should like to make some comments on the statement we heard this morning from the representative of Poland. He tried to defend the publication of the rather unhelpful and ill-considered document which was released to the Press after our meeting yesterday. I say "ill-considered" because the contents of that document would of course be much more disturbing if the document had been carefully considered. I suppose it is quite natural that many of us round this table should become impatient from time to time. We wish to see progress, and sometimes progress seems to be a very long time in coming. But those of us who have taken part in negotiations on disarmament have learned that patience is a very considerable virtue. I can assure Mr. Naszkowski that it has not been unusual in the past to have to wait two or three weeks for a considered reply to important proposals. Indeed I am sure that Mr. Zorin will recollect that at previous negotiations on disarmament we sometimes had to wait not weeks, not months, but years for a reconsideration of the Soviet Union's position. Mr. Naszkowski himself will remember that for many years the Soviet Government's proposals on disarmament were an all-round cut of one third in conventional forces and a ban on the use of nuclear weapons from the start. That was the Soviet position. It had no support anywhere else in the world, but the Soviet Union maintained it for a considerable period of time -- not weeks, not months, but years.

We also recollect that, as recently as last September, Mr. Khrushchev did give us what I thought was some very good advice. I find myself in the curious position of continually having to refer to Mr. Khrushchev's statements in order that all of us should take account of them. After having put forward the Soviet plan of last September, he did say that these were serious and important matters, that nobody ought to be asked to hurry in giving a reply, and that they needed the most careful examination. I have said before that I thought those observations of Mr. Khrushchev were very wise, and I remind the representative of Poland of them because this morning he has shown certain signs of impatience.

We, for our part, believe that it is right for us to assume that all countries in this negotiation are acting in good faith, that the objective of the plans that they put forward in this Conference is the reaching of an agreement between the two sides which are represented here in this Committee. We are aware that this is not the view of certain people in the world. We are aware that some people think that the Soviet Government's proposals contain a certain amount of
propaganda. For instance, we were rather interested to read a speech by the Chinese Communist leader, Liu Cheng-sheng, to the World Federation of Trade Unions in Peking on 8 June. He said this about the Soviet plan:

"We support the proposal for disarmament put forward by the Soviet Union. It is, however, inconceivable that imperialism will accept a proposal for general and complete disarmament. The purpose of putting forward such a proposal is to arouse the people throughout the world to unite and oppose the imperialist schemes for an arms drive and war preparations, to unmask the aggressive and bellicose nature of imperialism before the people of the world in order to isolate as far as possible the imperialist bloc headed by the United States, so that they will not dare unleash a war lightly".

This apparently, in the view of that distinguished Chinese leader, is the objective sought by the Soviet Union in putting forward these new proposals. He does not consider them remotely acceptable to the Western side. I do not take so gloomy a view. I hope that Mr. Zorin will say that he does not agree with the kind of analysis of the Soviet proposals which has been put forward in Peking.

Mr. Naszkowski, in the course of his remarks, also made some criticism of one of my speeches in which he seemed to indicate that I disliked flexibility, that I was opposed to flexibility in the negotiations. That is not the case. I welcome flexibility, but the problem really is more complicated than that. The question is whether the flexibility shown brings us closer to an agreement or further away. For instance, when we have said previously that the postponement of the elimination of nuclear weapons and of foreign bases to the last stage of the disarmament process is an improvement -- which is what we did say about the Soviet proposals of last autumn -- it is no real concession for the Soviet Union then to put them in the first stage. That is a kind of flexibility which I find unwelcome, but it does not mean that I am against flexibility in negotiations -- and I hope this is now understood by the representative of Poland.

I turn now to the remarks which I wish to make this morning on the subject of the means of delivery. We have, particularly since this Conference reconvened at the beginning of this month, had some discussion about the possibility of approaching general and complete disarmament by way of the so-called means of delivery of weapons -- notably weapons of mass destruction.
It will be recalled that the Western plan for general and complete disarmament, submitted on 16 March, contained provisions designed to prevent the carriage of nuclear weapons by space vehicles and missiles, as a preliminary to the total destruction of all such weapons, including of course military missiles, the elimination of all stocks of weapons of mass destruction, and the devotion of nuclear energy exclusively to peaceful purposes. The Soviet disarmament plan of 1959 also contained certain provisions which, it was explained to us, were intended to cover amongst other things the controlled elimination of means of delivery. The means of delivery approach has, however, assumed a new impetus since the submission of the latest Soviet disarmament plan, which specifically proposes that:

"... agreement should be reached to begin the process of general and complete disarmament with the prohibition and destruction under international control, already during the first stage, of all means of delivering nuclear weapons to their targets ..." (TNCD/6/Rev.1, page 4)

It is important, therefore, that we should attempt to clear our minds on this issue and indicate our respective positions.

To begin with, I would recall Mr. Zorin's remarks at our thirty-seventh meeting. After claiming, inaccurately, that the latest Soviet proposals on means of delivery were a direct response to and in conformity with certain suggestions made by the French Government, and notably by the President of the French Republic, Mr. Zorin pressed for an indication of the French delegation's reactions to the Soviet proposal. Mr. Zorin's interest was of course understandable and legitimate, and I hope that he has been satisfied with the most lucid reply given by Mr. Moch at our thirty-ninth meeting and the further comments which he has made today, and also with the indications which Mr. Moch gave at the thirty-ninth meeting of the rather limited extent to which French ideas are in fact reflected in the Soviet proposals. We have not, incidentally, heard any more from the representative of the Soviet Union on this subject since Mr. Moch's statement, but I have noticed that certain unfavourable remarks about the French attitude in these negotiations have subsequently been made both within and outside this Conference by sources which presumably echo the sentiments of the Soviet Government.

On behalf of my delegation I should like to say that we welcome the initiative of the French Government which has led us to explore this new approach to general and complete disarmament. As early as 29 October last year, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, said in the House of Commons:
"I warmly support the emphasis which my old friend and colleague, Mr. Moch, the French representative, laid in his speech to the Political Committee upon the control of means of delivery of nuclear weapons. That may well be the answer to what we know to be one of the problems, that we cannot absolutely, 100 per cent, guarantee the discovery of all nuclear weapons."

The notion of coming to grips with armaments via the mechanical means which convey them to their targets, and which thereby make them effective weapons of war, seems to us, as Mr. Moch himself said, a healthy and fruitful idea. A new angle of approach to the problems confronting this Conference is always valuable, because it may suggest new and better means of solving them than those which we have tried already. A new approach had in fact been rendered necessary, as Mr. Selwyn Lloyd indicated, because the Soviet Union had refused to agree to eliminate nuclear weapons from the armours of all States at a time when this could have been controlled and when the United States, which had a complete monopoly of such weapons at that time, was prepared to enter into such an agreement. History will not lightly forgive that lost opportunity. But the opportunity was lost and large stocks of nuclear weapons were accumulated. By 1955, if not earlier, it had become apparent that science and human ingenuity could offer us no solution to the problem of verifying the elimination of existing stocks. Soviet leaders emphasized this to us in the clearest possible terms. That being so, and all of us being convinced of this undeniable fact, it was desirable to search for some other means of overcoming the threat posed by the existence of nuclear weapons. The possibility of eliminating under effective control the means of delivery of such weapons was one promising approach.

In addition, this approach lent itself to adaptation for the purpose of dealing with problems concerning possible measures to reduce the danger of surprise attack. Discussions on this topic led eventually to the special conference on surprise attack in the late months of 1958, when ideas on the subject were exchanged between experts from all the countries represented here except, I think, Bulgaria. The conference itself was not able, unfortunately, to produce an agreed report and a number of ideas put forward by the Western experts to protect States against surprise attack did not receive the consideration which, in our opinion, they deserved. However, a basic idea seemed to be shared on both sides: that international distrust

\[1/\] Hansard, 29 October 1959, Col. 393
and the accumulation of modern armaments were a direct cause of tension and a possible cause of war; and that, in consequence, measures to reassure States that they were not to become victims of sudden attack, and to put difficulties in the way of a "blitzkrieg" by a possible aggressor, had a positive value in reducing tension and thereby reducing the defensive military preparations which States felt obliged to make. As I have explained in previous speeches here, any step which has the effect of increasing international confidence is of direct value in the disarmament context, because it reduces one of the main obstacles to progress, which is lack of trust. I am glad to note from the intervention of the representative of Bulgaria at our forty-second meeting that the Soviet Union and its allies apparently share this view. Mr. Tarabanov said at that meeting:

"Other statements by representatives of Western countries can be quoted to show the interest they took in the problem of preventing surprise attack ..."

"There is no doubt that the interest taken in the problem is justified in the highest degree, at a time when exceptional factors -- of which the world is becoming increasingly aware -- make the threat more and more real.

"The first of these factors lies in the progress made with armaments, the rapidity of which is increasing and aggravating the danger of surprise attack". (TNCD/PV.42, page 5)

There seems to be agreement between us, therefore, that the nature of application of modern weapons of war, that is to say the rapidity with which they can strike at a victim, is, quite apart from the accumulation of the weapons themselves, a distinct factor in the armaments race, particularly that part of it which concerns the development of the most modern weapons. It is also a cause of doubt and apprehension about other States' intentions and hence a cause of international tension.

"We therefore hope that, in putting forward its proposals regarding means of delivery, the Soviet Government has also adopted the basic philosophy underlying the surprise-attack approach and has moved away from its previous insistence that measures to reduce the danger of attack by surprise and to restore international confidence have little value in themselves."
Leaving aside the question of foreign bases, which the Soviet Union has linked with the question of means of delivery, but which I have already rejected as irrelevant and tendentious in this context, it seems to me that the introduction into the Soviet Union's new proposals of measures to deal with the means of delivery of modern weapons -- and also, I hope, the adoption by the Soviet Union of the underlying philosophy already described -- could open up possibilities of fruitful negotiation in three main fields.

The first field is that of control. It is obvious that separating the striking power of modern military forces into two elements -- on the one hand, the armaments and explosive charges themselves and, on the other, the means by which they are conveyed to their targets -- and then trying to prevent the two from being joined together, inevitably involves a very thorough and detailed discussion of control measures. The whole object of adopting the means-of-delivery approach is to prevent, through satisfactory reciprocal control and inspection, these potential means of delivery from being actually put into use. It is also desirable to eliminate, progressively of course, the means of delivery themselves. But this again necessarily involves discussion of effective control. Intelligent consideration of any proposal relating to means of delivery must therefore include far-reaching and detailed discussion of possible controls over potential means of delivery. The new Soviet plan seems to recognize this in some, at least, of the control provisions attached to the first stage, notably the provision for on-site inspection of rocket launchings, but, as has already been pointed out both by Mr. Moch and by myself, the present formulation in the Soviet plan leaves serious loopholes.

Secondly, the Soviet proposals on means of delivery imply, in logic, a readiness to discuss and negotiate other possible proposals to reduce the danger of surprise attack, and not only those relating to means of delivery of nuclear weapons. On this point Mr. Tarabanov seems to have been in error when he stated at our forty-second meeting:

"Thus, with the destruction of the vehicles for nuclear weapons, the liquidation of military bases on foreign territory, the withdrawal of the forces stationed at those bases and the implementation of the other measures proposed in the first stage of the socialist countries' new plan for a treaty on general and complete disarmament, all the problems involved in the prevention of surprise attack would be solved".

((TNCD/PV.42, page 6))
This is surely untrue. A danger of surprise attack persists so long as military production continues, stocks of armaments exist, and there are men ready and able to use them against other countries. At our sixth meeting, speaking of the possible aggressive value of conventional armed forces, the representative of Czechoslovakia took precisely the opposite view to Mr. Tarabukin when he said:

"The idea of a war being only a duel of rockets and ballistic missiles, I venture to say, is quite unrealistic." (TONE/PV.6, page 13)

Then again at our fifth meeting, Mr. Zorin said:

"There can be no doubt that, without large armed forces, even if nuclear weapons are available, it is impossible to conduct an offensive war ...".

(TONE/PV.5, page 36)

The corollary is of course that offensive war by conventional forces, by surprise attack, and in the absence of nuclear weapons, is perfectly possible; we have had too many instances already in history for the point to need proving. There are also other possibilities of surprise attack which, it seems to us from studying the latest Soviet proposals and listening to the replies of the Soviet representative and his Eastern colleagues to questions put by our side, are by no means eliminated under the first stage of the Soviet plan.

However, it is at least welcome, as I have already suggested, that the Soviet Union has now attempted in its plan to deal with possible means of surprise attack, possible means of delivery, which have not yet been perfected but which could in the foreseeable future become a very real danger and a cause of fear. I refer, of course, to orbiting vehicles. The Soviet Union previously objected to the Western proposal about orbiting vehicles, on the rather formalistic ground that measures to prevent the armament of orbiting vehicles with nuclear weapons were not measures of disarmament because orbiting vehicles were not yet armed.

The third field of possible negotiation which has been opened up by the Soviet proposal of proposals on means of delivery is the whole field of measures designed to build up international confidence. If surprise-attack measures are useful in the disarmament context because they reduce the doubts and apprehensions of States, then so are other measures which have the same effect. Consideration can therefore logically be given also to proposals of this sort.
However, the Soviet proposals concerning means of delivery as put forward in the latest Soviet plan raise serious difficulties and are in some respects, we feel, unrealistic. We have already referred to the obvious military advantage which the Soviet Union would derive from the immediate liquidation of foreign bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops coupled with the elimination of means of delivery. In a previous intervention I also referred to the evident discrimination against States whose sovereign territories may be far-flung and widely scattered in the suggestion in section I.3 of the plan that warships of all sorts should be confined to their own territorial waters.

The unrealism of the Soviet proposal lies in the fact that it includes far too much for a first step. All the measures in the first stage of the Soviet plan ostensibly aimed at "eliminating all means of delivery of nuclear weapons from the armed forces of States" will take a very long time to implement — if their implementation takes place, as we all agree it must, under effective international control. Again, it is unrealistic to suppose that the very extensive measures of control required, for instance, in order to prevent the clandestine production of means of delivery — including aerial photography — will be acceptable to States at the very beginning of the disarmament process; at least that is the very strong impression we have gained from various statements by Eastern delegations.

I had thought that the concept of gradually expanding control, becoming complete only in the final stages of disarmament, was agreed between us. At our very first meeting, for example, the representative of Czechoslovakia said:

"General and complete disarmament rests on the assumption that disarmament measures would be consistently controlled by an international control organ whose competence and functions would be enlarged gradually hand in hand with the progress of general and complete disarmament so that, in the final stage, even the control and inspection would be general and complete." (TNCD/PV.1, page 14)

This same idea seems to have been in the mind of the representative of the Soviet Union when, at our eighth meeting, he said:

"The question was also asked whether the international control organ should use aerial photography at every stage of the Soviet plan, or will this control measure be used at the last stage only. If what is meant is a system of aerial observation and survey over the whole territory
of States such a measure can, in our opinion, be introduced, of course, on the completion of general and complete disarmament because before that ... such a measure could be utilized for gathering military intelligence data...". (TNCD/FV.8, page 14)

Clearly if there are to be definite restrictions on the degree of control there will be corresponding restrictions on the extent of any first-stage measures. If no aerial photography will be allowed, then we can have no effective guarantee that clandestine manufacture of weapons or the deployment of such weapons is, in fact, taking place. As they stand, therefore, the Soviet proposals would clearly create a military imbalance which might actually increase, rather than diminish, the danger of surprise attack. The importance of such a balance was referred to by the representative of Czechoslovakia at our sixth meeting, when he said:

"The Czechoslovak delegation believes that the basis for an equal and well-balanced security is the mutual balance of various disarmament measures." (TNCD/FV.6, page 12)

"Security", I assume, includes security from surprise attack.

It is therefore clear that measures concerning the control and progressive elimination of means of delivery will have to be carefully co-ordinated and synchronized with other disarmament measures. Their timing must be carefully phased because lack of phasing would lead to military imbalance. Their control must be carefully co-ordinated because the more intensive controls relating to means of delivery, such as those concerned with their industrial production, must be fitted in with the general expansion of the disarmament control until this finally becomes, as we all agree, complete. As Mr. Moch said at our thirty-ninth meeting:

"either we include in the first stage of a disarmament plan measures so complex that their preliminary study -- which is, however, necessary -- will delay for years any start on carrying out the plan; or, on the contrary, we agree to arrange the difficulties in series and grade them so as to introduce in the shortest possible time those measures which are the simplest and the easiest to put into effect and to control... By dividing up the difficulties, we can make out a solution ... politically acceptable to all ...". (TNCD/FV.39, page 7)
As a final observation on the Soviet proposals concerning means of delivery, I would point out that by extending the definition of "means of delivery" to include not only strategic means but also tactical means, including dual-purpose means such as artillery, and by bringing in all kinds of military aircraft and ships, the Soviet proposals inevitably involve consideration of the parallel "conventional" use of those armaments and of the whole associated problem of conventional disarmament. I am not complaining in any way about it on this score. It shows indeed very clearly the indissoluble link between nuclear and conventional disarmament and the need for careful phasing of disarmament measures as a whole. But the sweeping and unrealistic procedure proposed in the Soviet plan is liable to strangle this new approach at birth and render sterile the healthy and fruitful idea of the French Government to which I have already referred.

I conclude that, while the control and progressive elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons is no complete substitute for the process of disarmament as a whole, it can be a very useful adjunct to that process and a hopeful means of reducing the risk of war. As the disarmament process continues, it must be accompanied by the controlled reduction and eventual elimination of all sorts of armaments and armed forces. The latter, the armed forces, are themselves a very important means of delivery of the smaller conventional weapons. My delegation supports the French delegation's suggestions concerning the various methods of approach to the control and progressive elimination of nuclear means of delivery, and the way in which such measures might be timed in relation to other disarmament measures. To quote Mr. Moch once again:

"... to agree to eliminate the vehicles for nuclear weapons in a manner which is both realistic and practicable, that is to say, by basing their elimination on serious studies and effective controls." (TNOD/PV.39, page 11)

I would add a quotation from Mr. Moch's speech at our thirty-seventh meeting, when he said:

"For we have always maintained that, in order not to reduce the security of one of the parties to the advantage of that of the other, it was necessary to combine measures of both kinds -- that is, nuclear and conventional -- "at each stage, in proportions to be established." (TNOD/PV.37, page 5)
This is a fundamental principle to which my Government has always adhered. We have not changed or reversed our position on it, and in spite of lengthy accusations to the contrary I have still to hear a shred of evidence from any communist representative in support of this ill-directed charge.

Mr. MĂZINCESCU (Romania) (translation from French): I should like to reply very briefly, Mr. Chairman, to some of the questions you asked just now in your capacity as representative of France.

From what you said, I think I understood that you do not regard my answers to certain questions put by you last week as satisfactory.

First, however, I should like you to confirm that you raised the questions you described as fundamental, as governing our negotiations, or to repeat another expression you used, as "major preliminaries" — and I shall revert to this concept of "major preliminaries", which we do not accept — out of concern to prevent evasions of the provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, or to prevent clandestine activities. I think I heard you whisper "of course" to Mr. Legouët. I can therefore take it that you are replying in the affirmative to this "preliminary" question — to use your own terminology — which I have asked.

Accordingly, these questions which you regard as fundamental matters governing our negotiations, which you consider to be "major preliminaries", these questions which are preliminaries to any negotiation on disarmament, are prompted by concern to prevent evasions of the disarmament measures which States had decided jointly to adopt. They are to be taken as an expression of the French delegation's concern to prevent the clandestine manufacture of armaments prohibited by a treaty on general and complete disarmament, and to have a guarantee that the States signatories to the treaty on general and complete disarmament will not be able to circumvent particular provisions of that treaty.

If that is the position, I think you should be fully satisfied with the answer I gave on behalf of the socialist countries represented on the Committee and which you have quoted. I will quote it again:

"Control of practical disarmament measures must be realistic and effective. It must offer every possible guarantee that no State will be able to evade its responsibility for carrying out disarmament measures within the time-limit fixed or circumvent the treaty on general and complete disarmament in any way whatsoever." (TNCD/FV.43, page 12)
We are at the beginning, at the opening of negotiations on the basic provisions of a future treaty on general and complete disarmament, which still has to be drafted and which, at some future time which I cannot now determine, will have to be discussed article by article, with great care and in full knowledge of the responsibilities entailed. The answer given to your questions prompted by concern to prevent evasions, to proclude any clandestine action, to make it impossible for a State to circumvent the treaty on general and complete disarmament in any way, expresses our position of principle in a manner entirely appropriate to this stage of our negotiations and fully covers the problem you have raised.

If the questions you put have aspects which do not fall within the framework of the principles I have just stated, in order to obtain the required answer you would have to tell the Committee what they conceal. But if you are confining yourself to principles, that is, to concern to prevent evasion, to discover clandestine action and to prevent any attempt to circumvent the provisions of the treaty once it has been adopted, our reply, I repeat, fully covers the problem, provided of course that we are all acting in good faith and that we have a clear idea of the stage reached in our negotiations on disarmament. For we could not agree -- and neither, I think, could the representatives of the Western Powers agree -- to anyone claiming that we are far advanced in our negotiations and that we have reached the stage of discussing details. That is what I have to say on the question of principle.

I shall now go on to examine the real importance of the problems which you have raised. I will not tell you of my doubts on this matter, since they are obvious to the Committee and I have already had occasion to express them. But I will be more explicit and remind you of your own doubts, which you yourself expressed, as to the value of the measures which you now wish to raise to the status of principles or "major preliminaries". You thought you had identified the quotation I used in my statement at the forty-third meeting. I must tell you that you were wrong, or perhaps your experts misinformed you. The quotation I used was different from the one you referred to earlier in the meeting. To show the importance of the points of detail, of the particular aspects of control which you wish to raise to the status of principles, I quoted your statement at the fourth meeting of our Committee. Here is the text:

"For certain operations which are not of decisive importance (not of decisive importance) mark you! -- the strength of armed forces, for example -- the signatory Powers will probably be satisfied if each
signatory Power declares the initial figures and if the numbers taken out of service are verified; from this it will be possible to deduce the number remaining in service." (TNCD/Fv.4, page 11)

There are at least two points in this text which conflict with your present position. The first concerns the importance of verifying the strength of armed forces. You have just said:

"The representative of Romania said ... that I regarded verification of armed forces as unimportant...". (page 18, above)

But it was not I who said that, Mr. Moch; it was you yourself who said it, before the Committee; I merely quoted your own words as they appear in the verbatim records which the Secretariat so kindly places at our disposal.

There is another point which contradicts your thesis on these basic conditions. That is, that for such concrete measures -- in this case measures relating to the strength of armed forces -- "the signatory Powers will probably be satisfied" -- that is your opinion -- "if each signatory Power declares the initial figures and if the numbers taken out of services are verified; from this it will be possible to deduce the number remaining in service".

Consequently, the question which you regarded as fundamental does not arise, as far as the strength of armed forces are concerned. That is what I maintained in my statement the day before yesterday.

At the same meeting you affirmed that the question of verifying stocks "may not be very important in certain fields, such as personnel strength, but it is quite important in the case of material on which world mastery could, at a particular moment, depend". (TNCD/Fv.4, page 11)

Concerning this material, however, on which, in your own words, "world mastery could, at a particular moment, depend", you said at the sixth meeting of our Committee, when speaking on prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons -- and I quote your own words:

"I said this just now and I shall not go into it again -- we shall never know the exact amount of stocks not yet converted and consequently existing in weapon form." (TNCD/Fv.6, page 35)

You thus propose that we should accept as a basic question governing our negotiations and, in addition, as a "major preliminary", an idea, a particular aspect of control, concerning which you yourself have taken the trouble to tell the Committee that, in one particular case, it is unimportant and, in another, ineffective.
Well, we cannot accept that. You can arbitrarily raise some particular aspect of control or some particular detail to the status of a principle or fundamental condition; but we cannot join you in doing so, and if you continue on this course we shall be able to draw only one conclusion: that while there are some very strong factors making for progress in our negotiations on general and complete disarmament, you and other representatives, instead of showing goodwill and endeavouring to meet our proposals, are looking for pretexts and searching through the most detailed aspects of control of this or that disarmament measure to find something that might serve as an obstacle to progress in our negotiations. I say that is a conclusion we should be forced to draw. I do not say that we have already drawn it. That will naturally depend on the future course of our discussions.

For the sake of accuracy, I should like to make another comment; if we are to engage in a war of quotations, let us do so honestly, that is to say by quoting each other correctly. Mr. Moch stated a little while ago that in my statement the day before yesterday I had said that the socialist delegations had answered "all our questions". I must point out that the actual wording of this quotation is slightly different and that there is something missing from the words quoted -- something which gives a shade of meaning to my statement that day. This is what I said:

"The delegations of the socialist countries have replied, in a positive and I might say, exhaustive manner to all the important questions..." (TNCD/PV.43, page 12)

Mr. Moch omitted the word "important". In fact, we believe we have really answered all the important questions, and the representative of Poland added today further replies to some of the questions asked. That is what I wished to say on this subject.

In the communiqué we issued to the Press after yesterday's meeting, at which the Western delegations, if I may so put it, went on strike against stating their position, we made certain statements. Our discussions, our negotiations, cannot progress unless the basic aspects of the problem are examined and the Western delegations state their views on those fundamental aspects. I would add -- and this is a particularly important point which should not be forgotten -- that our negotiations cannot progress if the Western delegations do not make efforts commensurate with those made by the socialist countries to meet them halfway. We have already
had occasion to enlarge on that point. And what sort of response did we get, to use the words of Mr. Stello, the United States representative, as a proof of good faith on the part of the Western delegations? Statements to the effect that their position was to be accepted or rejected, a glorification of the rigidity of the Western countries' position and criticisms of the flexibility of the Eastern countries.

It is a fact that we took advantage of the five-week recess between our first and second series of meetings to draft new proposals, which embody certain ideas of the Western countries that we considered worth taking into consideration, and which take into account certain criticisms and comments regarding the plan we submitted earlier.

The good faith to which the United States representative referred a little while ago may be judged by the fact that so far we have not had any clear statement of position on the basic aspects of our proposals or any proof or indication that the Western delegations are endeavouring to meet our proposals, in response to the efforts we have made to come closer to their position. That is what constitutes proof of good faith -- not fino phrases, and not attempts to induce the Committee to carry out studies which are certainly premature, if not sterile, and to set up working parties to study problems which do not arise, or at least do not arise at the moment.

As to the questions that have been put to us, I wish to take up, for instance, those asked at our meeting of the day before yesterday by the representative of Italy. At this stage of our negotiations we know nothing about the position of the Italian Government on general and complete disarmament; we do not know whether the Italian Government agrees on general and complete disarmament, whether it understands general and complete disarmament to mean a world in which there will be no more armed forces or weapons of mass destruction and no more American military bases in Italy; we know nothing about this; we do not know the opinion of the Italian Government on a programme of general and complete disarmament by stages, in which the operations included in each stage are specified, together with the corresponding control measures.

Yet it is at this stage of our negotiations that the representative of Italy wishes to know what structure the international control organization is to have, to enable it to meet its responsibilities. But to judge by the progress made in the discussion of disarmament measures, there is no responsibility for the
control organization to assume, because we have not yet discussed any disarmament measures and have not yet reached agreement on a single disarmament measure; thus there is nothing for which we can make this control organization responsible.

What else does the representative of Italy wish to know? He wishes to know what organs will have to be set up with an inter-governmental structure, and which States will be represented on them. I wonder what the purpose of these questions is. Is it really a way of introducing the filibustering methods of the United States Congress into the deliberations of our Committee? Are we in a position to decide now which States will participate in the inter-governmental organs or the international control organization? Does the Committee consider that we can decide on their composition? Does it consider we can perhaps decide that only the States represented here will be admitted to the inter-governmental organs of the international control organization, or that we are competent to decide that representatives of other States may also participate in them? But have we got as far as discussing these questions? Or have we only reached the fundamental provisions on the basis of which, if we succeed in reaching agreement, we shall have to prepare a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament which will be discussed article by article?

In conclusion, while reserving the right to revert to certain aspects of the question after reading the verbatim record, I wish to emphasize that it is only by the manner in which the Western Powers reply from now on, and by the attitude the Western representatives adopt in the Committee to the serious matters we have submitted for its considerations, that we can be convinced that the Western countries really wish to negotiate seriously.

The CHAIRMAN (Franco) (translation from French): Before giving the floor to the representative of Bulgaria who has asked to speak, I should like to reply to the representative of Romania by making three points in considerably less than three minutes.

First point: I am glad that at least one thing is clear in the statement we have just heard — there are probably others too — that is the definition of an "important" question. An important question is one that has been answered, and a secondary or unimportant question is one which has not been answered.
Second point: I would ask Mr. Miezinescu to read my statement of today with attention. He will no doubt find in it the explanations he requires, in particular with regard to the strength of armed forces and nuclear stocks.

Third point: I would prefer him not to refer to my statements of position as pretexts, which is not a diplomatic expression. I assure him that they are sincere and at least they have the merit of being clear.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): I should like to make a few comments on a question which has been discussed here today, certainly most fortunately, and which has enabled us to take certain positions.

First, there is the fact that the socialist countries complained, or noted, that the Western countries neither wished nor intended to continue the discussion in a businesslike manner that would enable us to achieve the object of our work. We were justifiably concerned -- and we still are -- at the position taken by the Western Powers, who are dragging out the discussion of disarmament -- especially the discussion of important questions -- a position which inevitably suggests that it is desired to give public opinion the impression that discussions are taking place, that something is being done, whereas in reality the fundamental problems of disarmament are not being dealt with.

Next I must point out that the socialist countries have submitted new proposals to meet the Western Powers more than half-way on some very important questions. They simply tell us: We are going to study the proposals, and we are going to consult each other. But there is no discussion on the fundamental problems. Instead of discussing these fundamental problems, they ask so many questions on points of detail that one gains the impression that the discussion is being kept going in order to prolong our debates interminably.

It has been wondered -- and it was Mr. Moch who said so -- whether the communique issued yesterday was not drafted with the intention of putting an end to the work of the Conference and trying to make the Western Powers responsible for the consequences of the break. I must say that we shall be very pleased if yesterday's communique has had the effect of reviving our discussions as soon as this morning. If it enables the Committee to do some work, that in itself will be a very important result, for at the rate at which we have been going it would certainly not have been possible to achieve anything.
As regards the patience which is essential in such discussions, in international negotiations, we believe that we could have -- and that everyone should have -- the necessary patience, because we have come here to deal with serious matters, but that we must get down to discussing them in a serious way.

I should like to say a few words about the statement made by the United Kingdom representative, who referred to the adoption of certain positions and to some passages in the statement I made the other day. I certainly do not intend to go into everything he said; to do that, I should have to consult the verbatim record of the meeting in order to see whether there are any other points I ought to take up. But I should like to point out at once that we, the socialist countries, understand general and complete disarmament as a continuous process really leading to such disarmament. That is the basis of all the conclusions put forward in our statements.

Mr. Ormsby-Gore, referring to my statement at the forty-second meeting, asserted that what I had said did not cover the means -- or all the means -- of preventing surprise attack. What I said was:

"Thus, with the destruction of the vehicles for nuclear weapons, the liquidation of military bases on foreign territory, the withdrawal of the forces stationed at those bases and the implementation of the other measures proposed in the first stage of the socialist countries' new plan for a treaty on general and complete disarmament, all the problems involved in the prevention of surprise attack would be solved."

(TNCD/FV.42, page 6)

He also quoted another passage from my statement. But in order to draw his conclusion he omitted to quote the passage in which I emphasized that at the present time a surprise attack is an attack carried out mainly, and at the present stage of our development even solely, with nuclear weapons -- with powerful means. That was, precisely, the second factor I referred to in my statement as follows:

"The second factor is that at the present time a surprise attack means a nuclear attack -- an attack made with devices which strike like lightning and are capable of delivering nuclear charges and other weapons of mass destruction almost instantaneously to any point on the globe, and thus of unleashing a general devastating war."

(TNCD/FV.42, page 5)
We maintain that in the present state of military development a surprise attack would be an attack launched with weapons such as would surprise an enemy armed as he is today, not an attack by an army going to surprise another army. The fact is that even the greatest American and Western experts conceive of a surprise attack essentially in terms of the use of nuclear weapons, rockets and nearby military bases, with fast aircraft to carry out such an attack.

I assume that if I have anything further to add, I could speak at a later meeting.

The CHAIRMAN (France) (translation from French): Does anyone else wish to speak?

I will read out the draft communique:

"The forty-fifth meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament was held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 23 June 1960, under the chairmanship of the representative of France.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 24 June 1960, at 10.30 a.m."

Are there any objections?
The communique is adopted.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m."