FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FORTY-THIRD MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva on Tuesday, 21 June 1960, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. BURNS (Canada)
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<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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United Kingdom:  
Sir Michael WRIGHT  
Miss B. SALT  
Maj.-Gen. RIDDELL

United States of America:  
Mr. C.C. STELLE  
Mr. G. McMURTRIE GODLEY  
Col. T.W. WOLFE

Representative of the Secretary-General:  
Dr. D. PROFITICH

Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General:  
Mr. W. EPSTEIN
The CHAIRMAN (Canada): I call to order the forty-third meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. MARTINO (Italy) (translation from French): I propose, today, to take up again and develop some of the themes of my previous statements, in order to help towards a more constructive examination of some of the problems with which we are dealing.

Mr. Zorin, in his reply to Mr. Moch at the meeting on 14 June, appears to have at last admitted that the study of the international control body must not be put off until the end of the agreement on disarmament. But apparently the representative of the Soviet Union is still continuing to resist any effort to develop without further delay the notion of control, even as regards those aspects where development is possible from now on. According to Mr. Zorin, it would first of all be necessary to determine the new measures of disarmament. But that does not take sufficiently into account a fact of great psychological importance, namely, that a State might be prepared to embark on a measure of disarmament on condition that it were established that adequate means of control would ensure the effective and complete attainment by all, of the desired aim.

The Italian delegation considers that our Committee would be taking a step forward if we start as soon as possible to study and prepare a draft for at least the general organization of the control system. I must emphasize the psychological importance of such a step. It is certainly possible to obtain results in that field right away, so that we should spare no effort to achieve that aim, if we really wish to be constructive.

More particularly, what we have to try to do is to show clearly to world opinion that the Ten Nation Committee envisages a control system which, by its very structure -- its central and peripheral organs, the facilities which the contracting parties will be prepared to grant it, and particularly, the importance and value attached to its verifications, inspections, reports and findings in law and in practice -- genuinely represents an effective and sufficient guarantee for each and all.

I am the first to admit that it is not easy to settle straight away all the details of control. I admit that certain control measures could only be decided or settled in relation to the nature and scope of the concrete measures of
disarmament. But I also believe that Mr. Zorin has not paid sufficient attention to the reasons explained in this connexion by the Western delegations. For instance, only a few days ago, on 14 June, he affirmed — as a matter of fact somewhat in contradiction to the Soviet delegation's insistence on its flexibility — that

"We must of course agree on disarmament measures; otherwise there is no sense in talking about control". *(TNCD/FV.38, page 29)*

The Italian delegation has participated, and is participating, in the work of the Ten Nation Committee in the most sincere spirit of co-operation, imbued with the keen desire to find, along with the other delegations, the necessary and appropriate methods and procedures for the achievement of the aims set out in the United Nations General Assembly resolution. That is precisely the task we have been set: together to try to find and work out "measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control". *(A/RES/1278(XIV))*

Now, among the practical measures immediately possible and likely to create an atmosphere favourable to complete agreement on disarmament, of obvious importance is the joint study of the principles on which the organization of control should be based. To continue to maintain that there must first be agreement on measures of disarmament, failing which any discussion on control becomes pointless, would only be to indulge in idle, time-consuming controversy.

Nor would it be the slightest help towards reaching our goal merely to reply: there must be agreement on control measures before agreement can be reached on disarmament measures. On the contrary, we must try to lay the foundations for simultaneous discussion, useful and constructive, both progressive disarmament measures and control measures.

But there are some questions of a general nature concerning the organization of control which we should in any case explore and take joint decisions on, whatever the nature and extent of disarmament may turn out to be. For example: what structure is to be given to the international body in order that it may discharge the responsibilities to be entrusted to it? What organs will have to be established with an inter-governmental structure, and what States will have to be represented on them? What links will there have to be between the control organization and the United Nations? Will the organization have to be fitted in
as an integral part of the United Nations? Or will it have to be granted a
large measure of functional independence, while observing the spirit of the Charter
and establishing close relations with those United Nations organs already
endowed by the Charter with powers and functions in the field of disarmament?

These problems, and others too, are of a general nature. Some problems of a
similar kind are also mentioned in the Soviet Government's plan of 2 June 1960.
Now these are, to a large extent, technical and not political problems. Would it
not be desirable to adopt the suggestion I made on 14 June on this subject, that
the study of these questions be entrusted to a working party, with instructions to
report to the Committee as soon as possible? The primary duty of the latter is
to determine the general principles which should govern an international control
organization. In the light of the findings of the report, it would then be
possible to decide whether, in setting up the proposed organization, it would be
advisable to adopt the Soviet proposal for a preparatory commission, or whether
it would not be preferable to follow a different course and, for instance, ask
the Secretary-General of the United Nations to prepare the necessary measures.
I hope my suggestion, which I feel is constructive, will be accepted without delay.

May I once more draw the attention of members of the Committee to another
problem of great importance, which has an obvious connexion with the control
problem. However efficacious the precautions and controls, carrying through a
vast disarmament programme could lead, in certain conditions, to a disturbance
of the balance of the forces still remaining at any given moment. If a State
did not carry out its undertakings in good faith, it might try to follow a
policy of concealing armaments, and perhaps escape all control, however carefully
planned. That is an eventuality which it would be unrealistic not to take into
account.

Several other eventualities might arise. Suppose, for instance, that the
internal police forces, which under the Soviet plan would be the only forces at
the disposal of States once the disarmament process was completed, could be
turned into forces of aggression and, from an instrument of internal policy,
could be converted into an instrument of international policy. For every
organized society tends spontaneously, not to exclude the use of force, but to
turn it into a social instrument for the maintenance of peace, law, and justice.
The absolute need to link the process of disarmament, at least from a certain
stage, with a process of strengthening international organization by the progressive establishment of a joint system of security, thus appears quite obvious. Disarmament is a function of peace, on condition, however, that it is not regarded as in itself a means of security. In full conformity with the Charter, which is based on the twin concepts of peace and international security, we must be realistic and adopt the notion that disarmament must be not only controlled but also guaranteed, that is to say, that a form of joint security must replace the individual security of the present day. Agreement of principle on that notion is truly of the utmost importance.

The new Soviet plan of 2 June 1960, although it clearly leads towards acceptance of those principles, is, nevertheless, in the opinion of the Italian delegation, still far from satisfactory from that standpoint, because it postpones to the final stage the application of measures to strengthen the system of international security within the framework of the Charter.

For my part, I believe I have made it sufficiently clear, although in brief comments, that it is, on the contrary, essential to start and pursue the work of setting up an efficient system of international security, within the framework of the Charter, from the moment real disarmament operations are begun.

The representative of Poland recently gave us a detailed account of the rules on this subject laid down in the Soviet plan. Now what actually does it provide? That units from the contingents of police remaining at the disposal of the various States once general and complete disarmament had been achieved should be placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Personally I have already raised the question once recently, and I do so again today: Is it not contradictory to propose to allow States only the police forces strictly necessary for the maintenance of internal public order, if, subsequently, part of those forces is to be taken away, in case of need, from its normal duties for secondment to an international force?

There is still another consideration, namely, that if each State were allowed, for international service, to have additional police forces, that is to say, police forces larger than those regarded as strictly necessary for the maintenance of internal public order, the result would doubtless be increased mistrust in the relations between States, particularly between large and small States. I have already mentioned the possibility that, in international relations,
police forces might even be turned into forces of aggression. There is an
undoubted danger there. In fact, as regards the need for an international police
force, it must be recognized that the best means of meeting it is to take as a
model for development the undeniably positive example offered us by the

It was not without good reason that, some years ago, the Nobel Peace Prize
was awarded to Lester Pearson, the former Minister of External Affairs of Canada.
In awarding him the Norwegian prize, the intention was to express to that
eminent politician the gratitude of all men, of whatsoever faith or country, for
the initiative he took in the United Nations during that anxious autumn of 1956
in the creation of an international police force. That step clearly marked the
beginning of a new system.

Max Weber has written that the early Christians themselves knew that the
world is governed by demons, and that anyone who mixes in politics, that is to
say who uses force and violence, is concluding a pact with the devil.

We must admit that if, within States, politics has lost its demonic
features, that is solely due to the fact that the force of law has managed to
replace the law of force. But that replacement has been possible because law has
been given the means of compelling everyone to respect it. Law, upheld by force,
has been established by men precisely to enable them to live without recourse
to violence.

It is now necessary that we should do the same in the international sphere.
In that sphere too, it is henceforth essential and urgent that the law of force
should be replaced by the force of law. That is what the conscience of mankind
aspires to. It is almost incredible that it should not be possible to reach
immediate agreement on such obvious principles. One is almost tempted to doubt
human wisdom and to repeat the words of the dying Axel: Videbis, fili, quam
perva sapientia regitur mundum!

Nobody can dispute the fact that the Emergency Force I mentioned just now
as an example, UNEF, unique of its kind, has been a valid instrument for
ensuring peace. We must be guided by that example. And yet that does not mean
that it may be enough, for establishing an encouraging system of international
security, to do no more than study the possibilities of taking up again and
developing, on a permanent basis, the means suggested by the shrewd enterprise
of Lester Pearson. We must not lose sight of the fact that Article 42 of the
Charter provides for such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary. It may be said that a body of international police would suffice to meet the requirements of international security once the process of disarmament was completed. But it is precisely while a vast programme of disarmament is gradually being carried out and so long as individual States still have considerable war potential available, that international security must be established on the broadest scale and by all the means permitted by the Charter. One way might be to provide that a part of national armed forces, so long as States retain them, should be organized with a view to being held available to the United Nations in conformity with Articles 42 et seq. of the Charter. Basically what is required is the kind of agreement mentioned in Article 43. Attention should also be drawn to Article 47, from which it is clear that the Charter establishes a close relationship between the solution of problems of international security and the solution of problems of disarmament.

Account must also be taken of the fact that the Security Council might be paralysed by the veto, and that the General Assembly, in its "Uniting for Peace" resolution, has only power to recommend. But General Assembly recommendations could acquire binding force if States were to undertake beforehand, in a treaty, to accept them as having such force.

There are precedents of that kind. As an example I would remind you that in Annex IX of the Treaty of Peace with Italy, the United States of America, France, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union undertook to accept such recommendations as the General Assembly might make with regard to the fate of Italian territorial possessions in Africa.

The problem must be studied with the greatest attention, and if agreement on the basic principles of international security could be reached among members of the Committee, that would be a good omen for the success of the work which could subsequently be undertaken in that vital field, in the appropriate United Nations organs.

It is with great and sincere emotion that mankind will see the day when it will no longer be States, but the community of peoples, which will have at its disposal armed forces for the maintenance of international order. When that day comes, it will be possible to say with truth that armed forces exist only to maintain peace among the peoples and to guarantee the rule of law.
As I already said, the problem must be studied attentively. Without thorough study, it might be premature to commit ourselves to any particular design of machinery for guaranteeing international security.

The representative of Poland declared against any kind of supranational force, on the ground that such forces might be used for the subjection of nations striving for independence, or for intervention in the domestic affairs of States. Our colleague perhaps feared that such a supranational body might turn out to be a new Leviathan which would oppress and destroy national freedom. In my opinion, such an attitude will not stand up to impartial examination. We want progressive, controlled and guaranteed disarmament for we want peace, security and independence for all the peoples of the earth. Now, it is not possible to think about saving peace without saving at the same time freedom and independence, which is the freedom of peoples. The defence of peace and the defense of freedom are one and indivisible. The security ideals proclaimed in the United Nations Charter must of course be attained within the framework of the Charter; but no one can have any hesitation about recognizing frankly that the attainment of the goal of our labours, namely progressive, controlled and guaranteed disarmament may possibly entail the need to adjust the Charter to the new requirements. It is clear that we must proceed with the utmost caution, but we must also proceed realistically and recognize that world progress depends, in large measure, on the progress of the world-wide organization of nations.

When the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted the resolution of 20 November 1959 on general and complete disarmament, it in a certain sense went beyond the provisions of the Charter, which does not speak of general and complete disarmament but of "disarmament and the regulation of armaments" — Article 11 — and "the regulation of armaments and possible disarmament" — Article 47.

The Italian delegation is of opinion that the Soviet Government cannot but be aware of the need for an adjustment of the Charter to the new requirements, for the Soviet Government is proposing the final abolition of military staffs, thereby implicitly recognizing that the Charter's existing provisions, under which the Military Staff Committee, consisting of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council, is the organ of the Council for questions of disarmament and security, would become obsolete.
As I have clearly stated, what is needed, for the moment, is prior agreement among the members of this Committee on the fundamental principles which must govern controlled and guaranteed disarmament. My appeal is an appeal to realism, and is, at the same time, a demonstration of faith in the development of the United Nations in the service of peace. The United Nations actually came into being through a great act of faith in peace and unity. It represents the yearning of mankind for a means of co-existence and co-operation which would obliterate within its fold the tragic division between peoples. We cannot and we must not forget that. Let us try to see that our work is firmly guided by that same faith. That is the only way to obey not only the letter but also the spirit of the resolution of 20 November 1959, to which all of us here mean to render homage by our efforts.

Mr. MEZINCESCU (Romania) (translation from French): Today I would like to touch on the essential problems of international control over practical measures for general and complete disarmament, as they present themselves at this stage of our Committee's negotiations.

I would also like to deal with some problems just raised by the representative of Italy who, more precisely, has taken up some of the "unsold goods" from the discussions before the break in our work, and some of the "unsold goods" from the detailed discussions, on some of the points he raised, in the United Nations.

I must say at the outset that my statement on control is not dictated by the need to clarify the position of the socialist countries on this matter, since their position has been set forth with great clarity and in great detail in the new document submitted for the Committee's consideration. (TNCD/6/Rev.1)

To quote only one of the best informed commentators on foreign policy, who is at the same time one of the most persistent critics of the policy of the socialist countries, I would mention that Thomas J. Hamilton, of the New York Times, has said that:

"The control apparatus outlined in the revised proposal would go as far as anything publicly suggested by the Western Powers".

This quotation is taken from the New York Times of 3 June 1960.
Further, the delegations of the socialist countries have replied in a positive and, I might say, exhaustive manner to all the important questions on control which the Western delegations have asked. This being so, no one can reasonably assert that progress of negotiations on general and complete disarmament is being delayed by the refusal of the socialist countries to make known their position with regard to control, as far as is possible at the present stage of our discussions.

The document which the Soviet delegation submitted on 7 June for consideration by our Committee contains basic provisions both on general and complete disarmament and on control.

The general principles and methods of control by which States are to be guided throughout the whole process of general and complete disarmament, and even after it has been completed, and which apply to all disarmament measures, can be summed up as follows:

(a) control must be exercised over concrete measures of disarmament and not over armaments. In other words, controlled disarmament and not control without disarmament;

(b) the treaty on general and complete disarmament must include all concrete measures of disarmament, as well as provisions for effective international control of these measures;

(c) control of practical measures of disarmament must be realistic and effective. It must offer every possible guarantee that no State will be able to evade its responsibility for carrying out disarmament measures within the time-limit fixed or circumvent the treaty on general and complete disarmament in any way whatsoever;

(d) control will be applied from the beginning of the process of general and complete disarmament and exercised not only during the period when the agreed disarmament measures are being carried out, but also after the process of general and complete disarmament has been completed;

(e) the character, methods and extent of control, and likewise the functions and powers of the control body must, at every stage in the process of general and complete disarmament, be in conformity with the nature and scope of the concrete disarmament measures;

(f) control will be international. It will be carried out by an international control organization, with the assistance of controllers recruited on an international basis. The international control organization will be set up within the framework
of the United Nations, and start work the moment the treaty on general and complete disarmament comes into force. To set up the international control organization and bring it into effective operation, a preparatory commission will be established immediately after the signature of the treaty on general and complete disarmament. To enable the international controllers and inspectors to carry out their duties, States must undertake: (i) to give them timely and unrestricted access within their territory to any place where disarmament measures subject to verification are being carried out or to any area in which on-site inspection of such measures is to be made; (ii) to make available to them all means of transport needed for travel within their national territories; (iii) to guarantee them such privileges and immunities as may be necessary for exercising "independent and unrestricted" control over the implementation of the disarmament treaty.

These principles have been stated and reaffirmed by representatives of the socialist States on many occasions, both before and since the beginning of the Committee's work.

The document submitted to the Committee describes in detail disarmament measures to be taken in the various stages of a programme of general and complete disarmament, as well as the control measures necessary for verifying their implementation.

Some days ago, the representative of Italy raised a question about the voting procedure in the Control Council of the international control organization. He asked whether the reference to cases "otherwise especially agreed upon" included the right to use the veto in the Control Council. (Cf. TNCD/FV.41, page 18) I would like to reply to this question by saying that, according to the new Soviet proposals, which are supported by the other socialist States members of the Committee, decisions in the Control Council will be taken by a two-thirds majority of votes on substantive matters and by a simple majority of votes on procedural matters.

There is no mention of the right of veto in the Control Council in the new Soviet proposals. However, it is difficult at the moment to forecast all the possible kinds of cases which will call for decision by the control body. We have some experience in this matter from the discussions on the drafting of a treaty for the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. In the course of these discussions, the parties have agreed, for instance, that the appointment of the administrator
of the control organization shall be made by agreement between all the original members of the Control Commission. Similar questions may also arise during the drafting of the treaty on general and complete disarmament, and that is why the Soviet proposals use the phrase "except where otherwise especially agreed upon" in connexion with voting in the Control Council. All such cases will have to be decided by agreement in the treaty.

All this demonstrates the practical and realistic fashion in which the socialist countries approach the control problem, having regard to the present stage of our negotiations.

On the general principles referred to earlier, there are strictly speaking, no differences between the socialist countries and the Western countries; and this is good reason for passing on without further delay to the discussion of disarmament and control measures, in accordance with the programme of general and complete disarmament, submitted in the Soviet Government's new proposals.

But, instead of engaging in a serious discussion of the basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, the Western representatives — and Mr. Martino has just given us a further example of this — are trying to get the Committee bogged down in detailed discussions of certain particular aspects of the control problem, which they have raised, quite arbitrarily, to the rank of principles.

They pretend to forget that as yet we have not even started serious negotiations on the basic provisions of the treaty on general and complete disarmament, and that is because the Western representatives are unwilling to make known to the Committee their views on the substance of the new proposals submitted to the Committee for discussion. They want us to mark time on the discussion of disarmament measures, and go full speed ahead with regard to control.

If our discussions could proceed on a constructive basis, we might justifiably expect, during this stage of our discussions, to reach agreement in principle on the goal to be reached, the measures to be applied to attain this goal, the practical programme of general and complete disarmament by progressive stages, with detailed lists of disarmament measures to be carried out during each stage, and measures of effective international control needed to verify their implementation.
In the further stages of our negotiations – during the discussion, for instance, of each article of the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament – we shall certainly have to come back to the question of control which must be worked out in greater detail, just as the disarmament measures to be carried out will have to be worked out in greater detail, their order fixed, and time-limits for applying them laid down. We must not forget, either, that final details regarding the operation of international control can only be settled by the international control organization, as its work progresses.

That is the normal sequence and order of any negotiations if we are to achieve results. To try and reverse this normal sequence, by insisting that details or special aspects of a given problem should be settled in the first stage of negotiations, suggest that the aim is not to make the most of agreement already reached on important questions of principle but, on the contrary, to seek pretexts for obstructing the progress of the negotiations.

One very revealing example is the request for further details on methods of verifying the quantities of military equipment that would remain after the implementation of disarmament measures, or methods of detecting evasion and clandestine activities.

The representative of France, supported by the representative of Italy who has repeated some of his refrains, wants to make this special feature of control a criterion of the efficacy of all control measures. It is nothing of the kind.

In certain cases a given method might be valuable, in others not. The important thing is to recognize the need for effective international control. We shall always be able to settle in detail the methods for making control effective in a given case, for a given disarmament measure.

Before the break in our work it was the French representative himself who asserted that the verification on which he now sets so much store was of no importance in the case of strength of armed forces and could not be effective for nuclear weapon stocks because there will be no means of finding them.

While prepared to accept the word of States in the case of other measures of great importance, such as the reconversion of fissionable materials for purely peaceful purposes, certain Western representatives would like us to discuss here and now the methods of control over this or that type of armaments
which would remain at the disposal of States if any reduction were decided upon.
But they remain prudently silent when asked to say when they propose to begin
reducing force levels and armaments.

I had not intended to refer to this today, but since Mr. Martino has
brought up again some of the questions he raised at the forty-first meeting,
I should like to explain my views on this subject. Mr. Martino said:

"In yet another sector -- that of control -- the explanations given
by the delegations of Eastern Europe in response to our requests have so
far left much more than shadowy areas; they have left a deep uncertainty,
so that it now appears difficult to make progress in this sector, in spite
of the hopes we had entertained." (TNCD/IV.41, page 17)

But, Mr. Martino, it is not the explanations given by the socialist States
on the problem of control, nor is it the statements on the problem of control
contained in the new document submitted to the Committee for discussion that
have left you in this deep uncertainty as to the future of our negotiations and
the progress of our discussions on an agreement on general and complete dis-
armament. What has left you in this state of uncertainty before the Committee
is the position of your Government, which does not want general and complete
disarmament, any more than the other Western countries represented here. So
far in our discussions on disarmament, we have had a lot of detail on the sub-
ject of control, but so far we know nothing -- or nothing encouraging -- about
the position of your country; or that of the other Western countries, as regards
the new programme of general and complete disarmament, which we -- in the light
of the observations and criticisms made before the break in our work -- have
submitted to the Committee for discussion.

In asking us for detailed explanations which are not justified at the
present stage of our negotiations, do you not think that you are asking too
much in exchange for nothing? And do you believe that we shall consent to
take part in a mock auction instead of in serious negotiation? Do you really
want to persuade public opinion that it is only this that is preventing you
from engaging fully in negotiations for a treaty on general and complete dis-
armament, or at least on the basic provisions for such a treaty? At one point
in our discussions I put a specific question to that effect to the representa-
tives of France and the United Kingdom, but so far I have received no reply.
If the Western representatives wish to assist the progress of our negotiations they must start from the idea that the socialist countries are just as interested in scrupulous verification of the implementation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament as their Western partners, if not more so.

We have no special reasons for trusting you, the distinguished representatives of NATO, and particularly those of the United States. It is well known throughout the world that the decisions regarding the recent aggressive incursions by United States aircraft into the air space of the Soviet Union were taken without the knowledge of the Governments of other countries members of the aggressive blocs directed by the United States and, in particular, without the knowledge of the Governments of the countries whose territory was used as the starting point for these irresponsible acts.

As has since been proved by the debates in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the United States Senate, neither the Senate nor the other members of the Government were informed of these incursions which brought the world to the brink of war.

If decisions of such seriousness are taken in such a manner in the so-called "free society" of the United States, what guarantee, other than adequate international control, could we have that the United States would really fulfil its obligations under a treaty on general and complete disarmament?

In actual fact, however, it is not differences of view on the subject of control that prevent the progress of negotiations on the basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

Today we are further advanced than ever -- as you are well aware -- both in exchanges of views on the various aspects of the principles and methods of control and as regards agreement on the general principles and the methods of control to be applied for verifying the implementation of a disarmament programme.

What must be noted is that we are considerably behind in our exchanges of views on the substance of the problem of general and complete disarmament. Nearly three weeks have elapsed since the resumption of the work of our Committee; it will soon be a month since the fresh proposals were brought to the knowledge of the Western Governments. These past few days we have had some half-hearted professions of faith in the well-known United Nations
resolution. Only just now Mr. Martino reverted to the tactics -- or technique, if he prefers it -- of quoting only the third paragraph of that resolution and, moreover, of interpreting it in a manner quite contrary to its spirit, and I may say, to its letter.

Such professions of faith in the United Nations resolution seem to have become a matter of routine with the Western representatives. But no serious positions have been taken with regard to the substance of our new proposals.

Up to the present the representatives of the Western countries have refused to commit themselves on the ultimate goal of our negotiations, as that aim is defined in the new proposals. Nor have they been any more forthcoming as regards the measures as a whole which must be taken for the achievement of this ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament. They have refrained from commenting on the now progressive programme by stages, which must constitute the basis for a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

It is obvious that all this hair-splitting on the question of control is intended as a smoke-screen to conceal from public opinion the reluctance of the Western Powers to engage in serious negotiations on general and complete disarmament.

That is the only interpretation that can be placed on the proposals outlined on 15 June by the United States representative, proposals which consist, in essence, in replacing negotiation on a treaty on general and complete disarmament by negotiation of a few isolated measures of control over armaments.

The United States representative declared before the Committee that his country was not disposed to embark on any "radical, immediate" disarmament measures such as those proposed by the Soviet Union. (TNCD/PV.39, page 22)

We must therefore conclude that the United States would like us to negotiate disarmament measures which are neither "radical" nor "immediate", and which consequently would have practically no effect either on the armaments race or on the military potential of States. Why not be frank about it and just invite the Committee to waste its time?

At this point in my remarks, I must say a few words about a theory of which the champion in this Committee is apparently the representative of Italy. For the second or third time Mr. Martino has today defended what he calls the
psychology of disarmament. According to what he said this morning, as well as on various previous occasions, this psychology consists essentially in throwing dust in the eyes of the world in order to conceal the lack of progress of our negotiations, especially to cloak the reluctance of the Western countries to engage in negotiations on general and complete disarmament, to mask the fact that these countries quite obviously do not want anything to do with general and complete disarmament and would like to substitute for the task entrusted to the Committee a discussion of measures for arms control.

Perhaps it was this disarmament psychology that led the United States representative to state in the Committee that his Government could not commit itself to any disarmament measures which were as yet untried. Is it not obvious that such a statement amounts to a refusal on the part of the United States to accept any effective measure of disarmament, since everybody knows -- and I believe the United States representative has now been made aware of this -- that there is no "tried" historical precedent for any measure of disarmament, still less for general and complete disarmament?

All that is needed now to complete the picture is for Mr. Eaton to add to the "major preliminaries" already stated by the representative of France the idea that any disarmament measure must be "tried" before becoming the subject of negotiation, which would be the height of absurdity. But, in reality, when Mr. Eaton demands that any disarmament measure must be tried before being negotiated -- without saying how this could be done -- and when Mr. Martino proposes to abandon substantive examination of the new proposals of the Soviet Government on general and complete disarmament and to embark on a study of questions which have no connexion with the present stage of our negotiations, that means exactly that the aim of the disarmament psychology advocated here is to create a dangerous illusion in public opinion, namely, that the Committee is engaged in negotiating on general and complete disarmament whereas, in actual fact, it is doing nothing of the kind.

I would now like to say a few words about the philosophy of disarmament preached here by the Western representatives. To the United States representative, for example, disarmament appears as an experiment full of risks, a leap into the unknown or, to use one of his own metaphors, a forest haunted by wolves. All the Western delegations -- and the Italian delegation provided just now a fresh example of this -- pretend to ignore the dangers of a continuation
of the armaments race, though occasionally paying them lip service. They seem rather not to notice the abyss towards which humanity is being impelled by the continuation of the armaments race, and yet, at the same time, they display extreme awareness of the danger of possible disarmament, and general and complete disarmament to boot.

The philosophy preached in this Committee by the Western delegations is practically the extolling of the balance of terror. One step more and they would be extolling the principle of "brinkmanship", of pushing mankind to the brink of war. It is the philosophy of fear, and perhaps of terror, of disarmament.

On the other hand, the Western delegations now seem to be working out a philosophy of "prior conditions" that the socialist States would have to fulfil before the Western States agree to engage in disarmament negotiations.

The Western delegations appear to regard disarmament as a concession which the socialist countries ought to buy from the Western countries. They seem to think that disarmament is an article of merchandise which the Governments of the Western States can keep in their warehouses or sell, as they wish, at black-market prices. Is there any need to emphasize the extraordinary, say the ludicrous, nature of this idea?

The representatives of the Western Powers will have to tell the Committee whether or not their Governments are really prepared to engage in a serious discussion of the new proposals of the socialist States on the basic provisions of a treaty for general and complete disarmament. And it is not by brandishing before the Committee the danger of infringing the provisions of the Charter, as Mr. Martino was doing just now, that the Governments of the Western countries will convince us of their will to negotiate a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

Is it the fear of infringing the provisions of the United Nations Charter that prevents the representative of Italy from expressing himself in favour of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control? It must not be forgotten, when quoting dogmatically the provisions of the Charter that, among the purposes of the United Nations, the one that is set out first reads: "... to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind...". General and complete disarmament is precisely the means of excluding war from international life by eliminating, once and for all, the material means with which States wage war.
It can be confidently asserted that all the elements needed for beginning serious negotiations on general and complete disarmament are available to this Committee. All that the Western Powers lack is the will to negotiate general and complete disarmament and that is the brake that prevents our negotiations from progressing.

Mr. LEGENDRE (France) (translation from French): After the statement we have just heard, I would merely like to re-read two passages from the statements made here by the representative of France on 14 and 16 June respectively:

On 14 June the representative of France said:

"Do the Eastern delegations agree:

....

(2) that the control authorities shall be able to observe not only what equipment has been eliminated, but also the quantities remaining after such elimination, to the full extent necessary to verify their conformity with obligations under the treaty;

(3) that the control authorities shall be able to verify not only the accuracy of the declarations made by the governments accepting control, but also their honesty, by making certain, in accordance with procedures to be discussed, that there are no clandestine stocks ...." (TNCD/PV.38, page 10)

And on 16 June the representative of France said:

"But, at least pending further statements by Eastern representatives contradicting my conclusions, we must set against the foregoing points of agreement the following points which appear to form part of the Soviet doctrine, and which we cannot accept: the international control machinery thus established will be able to verify only the quantities of equipment eliminated, and not the quantities which remain; it will thus provide no assurance whatever that the provisions of the treaty are being implemented. Furthermore, control will be applicable only at the places indicated by the governments accepting control; the control authorities will not be entitled to search, outside the places indicated, for any clandestine stocks which may have been concealed. Thus the control organization will not be able to exercise any initiative. It will be merely the passive, stock-taking organ I spoke of, and not an institution with the necessary freedom of action for full performance of its mission, which is, essentially, to restore confidence by affording each government the certainty that the others are fulfilling their obligations properly." (TNCD/PV.40, page 9)
Mr. MEZINCESCU (Romania) (translation from French): I have listened to the quotations by the representative of France and would like to draw his attention to paragraph (c) of my statement today which explains better the position of the socialist countries on the problem in question than Mr. Moch's observations on the position of the socialist countries on control, as he understood it.

Paragraph (c) reads as follows:
"(c) control of practical measures of disarmament must be realistic and effective. It must offer every possible guarantee that no State will be able to evade its responsibility for carrying out disarmament measures within the time limit fixed or circumvent the treaty on general and complete disarmament in any way whatsoever". (page 12 above)

I have already emphasized in my statement that, at the present stage of our discussions on the basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, we do not feel it is necessary to go into details. If, for example, we were to reply to the highly technical and very specific questions which, in the words of Mr. Moch himself which I have just quoted to the Committee, might apply in one case and not in another, we should then be asked even more detailed questions. We might be asked, for instance, whether, when entering factories, international inspectors should use the main door or the service entrance.

I think the socialist countries' reply, which appears in paragraph (c) of my statement, largely covers the questions raised a moment ago by the representative of France. If anything needs to be added, it is merely that we are not prepared to agree to "preliminaries" being put as a condition of continuing negotiations on general and complete disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN (Canada): Are there any other speakers? Since there are no other requests to speak I shall read the draft communiqué:

"The forty-third meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament was held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 21 June 1960, under the chairmanship of the representative of Canada.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Wednesday, 22 June 1960, at 10.30 a.m."

If there are no objections to this draft communiqué, I shall take it as accepted.

The meeting rose at 12 noon