FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FORTY-SECOND MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Monday, 20 June 1960, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria)
PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Bulgaria:
Mr. M. TARABANOV
Mr. K. CHRISTOV
Mr. G. GUELEV

Canada:
Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. A.G. CAMPBELL
W/Cdr. R.J. MITCHELL

Czechoslovakia:
Mr. J. NOOSK
Lieut.-Gen. J. HECKO
Mr. Z. TRHLIK

France:
Mr. J. NOCH
Mr. M. LEGENDRE
Mr. J.V.A. CUNY

Italy:
Mr. F. CAVALLUTTI
Mr. L. DAINELLI
Commander A. SCONZI

Poland:
Mr. M. NASZKOMSKI
Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Maj.-Gen. J. SLIWINSKI

Romania:
Mr. E. MAZINOLSCU
Mr. C. BODGAN
Col. C. POPA

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
Mr. V.A. ZORIN
Col.-Gen. A.A. GRYZLOV
Mr. A.A. ROSECHIN
PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:
Miss B. SALT
Maj.-Gen. RIDDELL
Mr. L. VINCENT

United States of America:
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Rear-Admiral P.L. DUDLEY
Mr. G. MCMURTRIE GODLEY

Representative of the Secretary-General:
Dr. D. PROFFITT

Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General:
Mr. W. EPSTEIN
The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from French): The forty-second meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament is called to order. Does anyone wish to speak?

As no member of the Committee wishes to intervene at this stage in the discussion, I shall take the opportunity of speaking as representative of Bulgaria.

I propose to deal first of all today with a question which strikingly reflects the need to reach an agreement on disarmament as quickly as possible. The urgency of such an agreement is of course fully acknowledged by all, though some delegations often forget it, to judge by the rate at which things are going.

If there is one question which deserves special attention, it is that of the prevention of surprise attack. In all the statements by representatives of the Western countries, as well as in the speeches and declarations made by responsible statesmen of the Western Powers, the fear of surprise attack has always been stressed as one of the main causes of the lack of trust in international relations, and as one of the major difficulties which frustrate every attempt at disarmament. It has frequently been emphasized that no easing of tension can be achieved in international relations and in collaboration between peoples if the fear of surprise attack continues.

In the past, plans for reducing, preventing or eliminating the danger of surprise attack have been proposed by eminent representatives of the Western countries. Quite recently, plans were put forward by certain Western Powers — at least according to the statements of their qualified representatives — for the prevention of surprise attack and the re-establishment of trust among the nations. This question is, of course, closely linked with the preservation of peace, and it therefore concerns all peoples.

Speaking before the House of Lords and the House of Commons of the United Kingdom on 7 April, General de Gaulle said that peace could only be attained "if the general fear of sudden annihilation is first removed, which entails the limitation and control of armaments in both camps", and he added:

"Above all, France wishes the stocks of nuclear weapons to be destroyed, the installations where they are made to be converted to other uses, and the missiles and aircraft capable of delivering them, as well as the fixed or floating bases from which these vehicles of death can be launched, to be placed under joint surveillance."
In our Committee, this same problem has been the object of marked attention by the representatives of the Western countries. In his statement on 14 April, trying to bring the discussion to bear on what he called initial measures of disarmament -- and which in reality, comprised only control over armaments -- the representative of the United States proposed among other things that we should deal with
"Action to institute agreed measures to increase protection against surprise attack and thus create an atmosphere of trust and confidence in the world." (TNC/3/FV.23, page 26)

Other statements by representatives of Western countries can be quoted to show the interest they took in the problem of preventing surprise attack. For example, the representative of the United Kingdom in his statement on 16 March, spoke of "measures agreed upon to reduce the dangers from surprise attack" and a little later in the same statement he referred to "the adoption of measures against surprise attack." (TNC/3/FV.2, page 11)

There is no doubt that the interest taken in the problem is justified in the highest degree, at a time when exceptional factors -- of which the world is becoming increasingly aware -- make the threat more and more real.

The first of these factors lies in the progress made with armaments, the rapidity of which is increasing and aggravating the danger of surprise attack.

The second factor is that at the present time a surprise attack means a nuclear attack -- an attack made with devices which strike like lightning and are capable of delivering nuclear charges and other weapons of mass destruction almost instantaneously to any point on the globe, and thus of unleashing a general devastating war.

Finally, there is this no less stupefying aspect of the question, that a surprise attack could be launched without any deliberate decision, that is to say through a mistake, accident or miscalculation.

The situation might thus be summed up by quoting once again an eminent statesman who recently said that at the present time peace and life are not only threatened but "doomed if the temptation and the threat of war remain hanging over the world because of nuclear weapons."

The socialist countries, which love peace and are devoting themselves to a gigantic work of construction, are of course particularly interested in seeing the danger of surprise attack removed. The new Soviet proposals of 2 June 1960
deal directly with this problem. They not only provide for general and complete disarmament in successive stages by means of a set of harmonious measures, but they have the considerable advantage of immediately reducing the threat of surprise attack, as soon as the first stage is carried out, and of eliminating it in the fullest and truest sense of the word, since the physical means of making such an attack are to be abolished under effective control. Thus, with the destruction of the vehicles for nuclear weapons, the liquidation of military bases on foreign territory, the withdrawal of the forces stationed at those bases and the implementation of the other measures proposed in the first stage of the socialist countries' new plan for a treaty on general and complete disarmament, all the problems involved in the prevention of surprise attack would be solved. For when strategic and tactical rockets of all types, pilotless aircraft of all kinds and all military aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons have been destroyed; when surface warships that can be used as vehicles for nuclear weapons have been eliminated; when submarines of all classes and types have been destroyed; when all artillery systems and other means that can be used as vehicles for nuclear weapons have been abolished; when the troops stationed on foreign territory have been withdrawn; when the military bases and depots of all sorts, which are used, as has been shown several times, for aggressive purposes and from which attacks against neighbouring countries could be launched at any moment, have been liquidated — then the fear and the danger of surprise attack will not only be considerably reduced, but will certainly be practically eliminated. For there is no doubt that at the present stage of rapid development in the technology of weapons, especially weapons of mass destruction, it is precisely these weapons and the bases where they are situated, which constitute the main danger of surprise attack.

In view of the Western countries' objections to the Soviet proposal that each State possessing nuclear weapons should undertake not to be the first to use them, and in view of their opposition to the prohibition of nuclear weapons and their elimination from the armaments of States, the only means of preventing those weapons from being used to launch a surprise attack is, in these circumstances, the destruction and elimination of the vehicles and of all means, including fixed and floating platforms, that can be used to deliver nuclear weapons. It was Mr. Moch who made the statement that "Once the vehicles have been banned and destroyed, the military stocks will appear worthless."

(TNCD/FV.42. page 16)
It will doubtless also be recalled that Mr. Moch, in his statement on 29 March, said that:

"To be precise, the only method of laying the foundations for a guarantee is to prohibit the vehicles, for when they are prohibited — I am keeping to my formula — he emphasized the accumulated stocks will lose their value, until the States themselves have no interest in keeping them and convert them to peaceful ends". (TNCD/PV.11, page 24)

It was in the light of such suggestions by the representatives of the Western Powers that the new proposals of the socialist countries were formulated, in order to provide for elimination of the most redoubtable means by which a surprise attack could be launched at the present time. If, however, we really wish to work for the elimination of surprise attacks, we must undoubtedly also seek to eliminate the foreign military bases, which are in fact the launching ramps for these redoubtable devices, and at the same time a source of friction and tension in relations between States.

We therefore believe it necessary to emphasize strongly that the new Soviet plan affords, in its first stage, real means of solving the problem, and of finally and radically removing all threat of surprise attack, because it provides for the abolition, under effective international control, of the physical means of launching such an attack.

It must be observed, however, that at the very time when the Soviet Union, acceding to the wish and to the suggestions of the Western countries, is proposing the surest means of preventing and removing all danger of surprise attack, the Western delegations seem to have lost their interest in this problem. Indeed, in his statement of 15 June the representative of the United States said:

"These proposals for immediate first-stage measures" — he was referring to the first stage of the Soviet plan — "give us concern...". (TNCD/PV.39, page 19).

Thus we find that proposals calculated to prevent the danger of surprise attack, and to eliminate it, are beginning to cause the United States representative concern.

Like the representative of the United States, the representative of the United Kingdom, too, is adopting a negative attitude to the measures proposed by the Soviet Union, which are calculated to remove the danger of surprise
attack. Instead of being glad that the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries are proposing disarmament measures that would eliminate all danger of surprise attack — a matter they have stressed so often — the Western representatives, on the contrary, declare that they feel concern and oppose these proposals.

We believe, moreover, that it is necessary to recall an essential aspect of the discussion which is taking place here. As the representative of the United States said on 10 June:

"Our negotiations bear on the security of all States. They deal with matters which are vital to national existence".  (TNCD/FV.36, page 8)

Thus it is not only the interests of the Western countries or of the socialist countries which are involved. Account must be taken of the interests and the security of all countries, including the small countries and those which do not possess atomic weapons or weapons of mass destruction.

As we have just pointed out, acceptance of the Soviet proposals for the first stage would result in a considerable reduction and final elimination of the danger and threat of surprise attack. It would also protect from such an attack the small countries, those which do not possess nuclear weapons, and, in particular, those having a very densely populated but relatively small territory, which is particularly vulnerable to weapons of mass destruction. It was, moreover, no mere chance that, at the time of the discussion on disarmament at the fourteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, all those countries unanimously approved the resolution on general and complete disarmament. That attitude was certainly dictated by their national interests and concern for their very existence.

In the present circumstances, all countries, whether they possess nuclear weapons or not, could be drawn into a general war which will make no distinction between countries that have or do not have such weapons, for the effects of such a war would be felt more or less everywhere. The new Soviet proposals have, among other merits, that of providing for the elimination of all danger of surprise attack by the end of the first stage, and the exclusion of all possibility of nuclear warfare with the beginning of the second stage.

Implementation of the new Soviet proposals would be of great benefit to the underdeveloped countries and to all those which have recently gained their sovereignty. After the execution of the first measures envisaged, which would
remove the danger of surprise attack, the security of those countries would no longer be threatened. The enormous sums they are obliged to spend, in the present circumstances, on armaments which soon become useless as a result of developments in modern weapons technology, would be used to develop their economy and improve the living conditions of hundreds of millions of human beings.

After the measures envisaged in the third stage of the new Soviet proposals for general and complete disarmament had been put into effect, the advantages derived by these countries would be increased by the fact that, as was emphasized during the debate in the General Assembly, part of the sums now spent on modern armaments could be used to give them the necessary assistance.

Seeking to explain their negative attitude to the measures proposed in the first stage of the Soviet plan, the representatives of the Western countries have ignored the matters we have just raised and confined themselves mainly to defending the existence of military bases on foreign territory.

For instance, in his statement on 16 June, the representative of the United Kingdom again endeavoured to justify the existence of these bases and to separate this problem from the problem of eliminating vehicles for nuclear weapons. We are bound to say that the arguments used by Mr. Ormsby-Gore in support of his thesis in no way convinced us. Those arguments do not stand up to an examination of the facts; but the United Kingdom representative nevertheless attempted to draw the conclusion that the military bases were absolutely necessary and should be maintained in the future. Mr. Ormsby-Gore, like Mr. Eaton, strongly opposed the measures envisaged in the first stage of the plan for general and complete disarmament submitted by the socialist countries. Their opposition was based on the principle that no country should, at any time, obtain a significant advantage from the process of disarmament. They then attempted to argue that the maintenance of American troops on the continent of Europe and on the other continents was necessary for the security of the United States and for that of the countries of the Atlantic alliance.

The military bases on foreign soil, with all their installations for rockets and other means of delivering nuclear weapons, may, indeed, be useful to the Western Powers. They may be useful in so far as they constitute the instrument of a policy of aggression and, also, as a means of deflecting any counter-thrust by the countries attacked. But when the facts of modern strategy are taken
into account the foreign bases can in no case be regarded as offering safeguards and security for the countries on whose territory they are installed. On the contrary, even if they give any advantage to the Powers which have established them -- which in this day of intercontinental missiles, is, of course, an illusion -- they constitute a permanent danger for the countries in which they are situated. Not only would that danger exist if a general war broke out -- which, in the present situation, would be a nuclear war -- but it is also a real danger in time of peace, simply because the foreign military commands behave as absolute masters in those countries.

Some of the speakers who defended foreign military bases endeavoured to represent them in a favourable light. However, if further evidence were needed to show the danger presented by foreign military bases, the events marking the reconnoitring flights by aircraft of certain countries taking off from such bases, and the provocations offered by those aircraft, would suffice to show the great risks the bases entail for the countries where they are installed.

Attempts to represent those military bases as being desired by the peoples of the countries where they are established are vain. Those peoples are constantly campaigning to free their territory from foreign intrusion. If there were any need to show the unpopularity of foreign military bases, it would not be necessary to go far back into the past. The recent events in Japan which resulted in the indefinite postponement of the visit of the President of the United States to that country, and also the demonstrations which took place at Okinawa, would be sufficient to show the true feelings of the peoples with regard to foreign military bases and the insecurity they create for the countries where they are installed.

The adoption of the new proposals put forward by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, and the application of the measures provided for in their first stage, would have the sure result of guaranteeing the security of the countries on whose territory foreign military bases are installed. For with the abolition of those bases and the withdrawal of the foreign troops stationed there, the threat they constitute would disappear. All the arguments about the need for foreign military bases were put forward on the pretext that the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries have numerically superior conventional forces. We do not wish to dwell on the method if interpreting figures used by
certain Western representatives. It would not, indeed, be difficult to show the arbitrary nature of such an assertion, supported by geographical and other arguments which are not valid.

What we wish to emphasize here is that the Western representatives, particularly some of them, endeavoured to prove, during the first part of our Conference, that the Soviet proposals were neither realistic nor feasible because they gave priority to disarmament measures relating to conventional armed forces.

Now, when the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries propose beginning with disarmament measures relating to nuclear weapons and their vehicles, the Western representatives try to prove that that would mean disturbing the balance of military forces and would give a significant advantage to the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. They seem to be trying to ignore -- when it suits their purpose, of course, -- the statements made by the Soviet Union representative, in agreement with the representatives of the other socialist delegations, to the effect that the socialist countries are willing to examine, at the same time as the abolition of means of delivering nuclear weapons and the elimination of foreign military bases, the question of reducing conventional armed forces -- and this in the first stage. In this connexion, however, the United Kingdom representative went so far as to complain that the socialist countries were showing so much flexibility that it might be wondered whether they really had a disarmament philosophy and whether the Western countries could rely on it in negotiating with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. Mr. Ormsby-Gore went on to say that for their part the Western countries had a consistent philosophy, which had not changed since the autumn of 1959.

Having tried to present the concessions made by the socialist countries to meet the desires of the Western countries as an incoherent and even irresponsible attitude, as a proof of inconsistency in the disarmament policy of the socialist countries, Mr. Ormsby-Gore asked:

"What is the purpose behind those rapid changes of policy? We are told that it is to meet changing Western criticisms. But as I have shown by extensive quotation the Western position on balanced disarmament has remained consistent and unchanged throughout our negotiations ... But in
The light of the hectic switching of measures from one stage to another, from one time sequence to another, we are naturally a little uncertain as to what we should regard as being in Soviet eyes a matter of principle and what a matter of tactics. Measures are discarded or restored with extraordinary abandon. If this is flexibility it is the flexibility of quicksilver: one can never catch hold of it long enough to be able to examine it." (TNCD/PV.41, page 8)

So we find that, confronted with the concessions made by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries in response to the suggestions of the Western countries -- concessions made in an attempt to reach agreement on the most important problem of our time, i.e. general and complete disarmament -- the representatives of the Western countries are left, as Mr. Ormsby-Gore says, quite breathless. That may well be so, since the Western countries are faced with the necessity of coming to terms with the socialist countries or of admitting before world opinion that they are opposed to general and complete disarmament, and indeed to any disarmament. We are convinced that Mr. Ormsby-Gore's questions, which are intended to prove that the difficulty in finding a solution to the disarmament problem lies in the concessions made by the socialist countries to meet the requests of the Western countries -- concessions which, to suit the argument, are presented as elements of an inconsistent policy -- can do nothing to support his thesis. The socialist countries have a consistent peace policy aiming at general and complete disarmament, which may vary as to methods of applying disarmament measures and as to means of adaptation to the needs of difficult negotiations, but remains constant as to the measures to be applied and the object in view, namely, to ensure peace and the security of nations by general and complete disarmament.

On the other hand, it may be wondered what is the purpose of this allegedly constant policy of the Western countries on disarmament if it consists in rejecting any proposal for general and complete disarmament, or any set of measures which could bring it about. It is a curious kind of constancy which not only does not help us towards disarmament, but on the contrary is concerned to bar the way to any attempt at disarmament.

We certainly do not wish to return to the deplorable situation of 1955-1957 when the Western countries repudiated their own proposals after they had been
accepted by the Soviet Union. We do not wish to believe that a similarly constant policy will be applied to our present endeavours to achieve disarmament and to the concessions made by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries to the Western countries. Such constancy, which is really only intransigence regarding the acceptance of any effective disarmament proposal, would not only do nothing to advance the cause of peace and security, but would leave mankind under the terrible threat of a nuclear disaster.

We should like to hope that in their future statements, after consultation with their respective governments, the Western delegations will take positions that will enable us to clear the way for an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I should like to accommodate the Western representatives, to make their position easier and to put a number of questions to them, since they are not yet prepared to discuss the substance of the proposals we have advanced.

To get a better idea of the contents, substance and meaning of the statements made here by the representatives of the Western Powers, and in particular by the representative of France, I should like to ask the latter to answer a number of questions concerning his latest speeches, which have touched on a rather wide range of problems. Perhaps Mr. Moch will be kind enough to furnish me with replies, for example, to some questions concerning his statement on one of the basic problems with which we have to deal, the problem of eliminating the means of delivering nuclear weapons.

My first question concerns the statement made by Mr. Moch on 15 June on the means of delivery. In his statement on 15 June, Mr. Moch made a number of observations on the problem of eliminating the means of delivering nuclear weapons. We should like to know whether these statements reflect the general attitude of all the Western Powers represented on the Committee or merely that of France. That is the first question of interest to us.

The second question relates to statements made by the representative of France on 22 October 1959, at the fourteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, and on 15 March 1960 at the first meeting of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament. In those statements, the French representative
expressed the view that the prohibition and destruction of all means of delivering nuclear weapons was the chief and most urgent problem. Mr. Moch's statement at the meeting held on 15 June, however, was mainly devoted to the establishment of control over the means of delivery and not to their early destruction. We should like to know the reason for this change.

Now for the third question we should like to put. Although Mr. Moch spoke of the problem of eliminating the means of delivering nuclear weapons, he said nothing at all about the related problem of eliminating military bases in the territory of other countries. On the other hand, in his reply of 11 June 1960 to the communication from N.S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, General de Gaulle, the President of the French Republic, stressed the need for solving not only the problem of the means of delivery themselves but also that of the bases used for them. The question then arises: What is the attitude of France regarding the Soviet proposal for eliminating simultaneously, in the first stage of general and complete disarmament, both the means of delivering nuclear weapons and the military bases on foreign territories?

These are the first questions which our study of Mr. Moch's statements at recent meetings has suggested to us.

**Mr. MOCH (France) (translation from French):** The three questions put by Mr. Zorin are easily answered. But I do not want to give something for nothing, so I shall wait until Mr. Zorin has answered the questions I asked — which are also most important — in particular those concerning the concept of control and the possibility of verifying the honesty of the declarations made by Governments. We will make an exchange, on a give and take basis, some time this week.

**Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):** I am somewhat surprised at the manner in which Mr. Moch has just stated the problem. We have already replied to at least seven of Mr. Moch's questions. We are quite justified in asking him to reply to three of ours. I would add that the questions we put this morning go to the very heart of the disarmament problem and, moreover, have a bearing on precisely those aspects of disarmament on which Franco has taken up a definite and active stand. It is
quite natural, therefore, that before in any way evaluating the French representative's position here, we should like to have some explanations on this most important problem with which we have to deal. If Mr. Moch cannot see his way to answering these questions, it can only mean that he wishes to avoid discussing the substance of questions on which France's position has been an active one, and one which the Soviet Government has gone some way to meet. We are astonished at such an attitude. Furthermore, we have not so far established any rule whereby one set of questions must be answered before replies can be given to another set. So far, there has been no rule to that effect. If you insist on introducing such rules, then all negotiation is impossible. And I am afraid that today, in refusing to answer the quite legitimate questions we asked in connexion with his statement of 15 June, the representative of France is simply displaying his unwillingness to conduct serious negotiations. That is his affair, of course; but the conclusion I have drawn must be stated, since his refusal to answer questions on matters affecting his own and his country's position cannot but be interpreted as unwillingness to discuss in a businesslike way the substance of the problem raised by us in the Committee and by the representative of France himself.

Mr. MOCH (France) (translation from French): Since a controversy has started between Mr. Zorin and myself, I am quite willing to continue it with complete courtesy by telling him that it was certainly not in order to exert pressure that I made the reply to which he has just objected. But, all the same, it will be easier for us to reply when we ourselves have received an answer on those "major preliminaries" of which I spoke recently, and on which the attitude of France depends. For as I have often said, we are prepared to go a very long way in disarmament, but only provided that it is effectively controlled, in the full sense of the word "effectively" -- provided, that is -- that control is not confined to verifying the accuracy of declarations made by governments, but can also verify their honesty.

I apologize for dwelling on this point, but I wish to say that the reason why we attach so much importance to this distinction between accuracy and honesty is that we are certain in advance that all the declarations made will be accurate; no government will ever think of making a false declaration to an
international control organization, but we are not so certain that the declarations will also be honest, that is to say complete. Mr. Zorin himself expressed doubt about this a few days ago when, speaking of the abolition of vehicles, he quite rightly observed that this would prevent nuclear attacks, provided, he added, that a government did not constitute clandestine stocks. It is, indeed, this possibility of dominating the world by means of clandestine stocks which we are obliged to envisage. We cannot stake the future of our respective countries — and this applies as much to the Eastern as to the Western representatives — on the assumption that no government will ever constitute clandestine stocks of anything. This is why this question is so important.

I would add that as Mr. Zorin's first two questions, at least, involve France's allies, he will certainly understand that the French representative would like to consult those allies before replying. It so happens that I have to be in Paris tomorrow and the next day, so that I shall not be able to reply until the end of the week.

As to the third question, in which Mr. Zorin tried to contrast the position I have taken here with that stated by the President of the Republic in one of his speeches, I believe that the contradiction he thinks he sees is only apparent. The question of vehicles is linked with that of bases, as the President of the Republic said, but not specially with the question of foreign bases. Here I share the view expressed last Friday by Mr. Ormsby-Gore. With regard to vehicles, we cannot make a distinction between a foreign base on a given territory and a domestic base. The vehicle launched from the base is just as dangerous, whether it starts from a so-called foreign base or from a domestic base or any intermediate kind of base one can think of. Hence the problem that arises is to control the bases, as the President of the Republic said, and then to destroy the existing stocks of vehicles, regardless of whether the base in question is operated by men of the country in which it is situated or by men of an allied country.

That is the reply I can give to Mr. Zorin's third question, which concerns France alone.
Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): We shall of course await the replies to the first two questions, since Mr. Moch has said that on these questions he must consult with his allies. I cannot say anything against that. It is quite natural, but we expect that answers to these questions will be provided all the same.

As regards the answer to the last question, I had the impression that, on the question of foreign bases, the position of France is, to say the least, not very clear, because, as Mr. Moch said, he makes no real distinction between bases on national territory and foreign bases. We are, in fact, familiar with the position of France with regard to some bases on its own territory. We have not, I think, forgotten the French Government's statements about the establishment of air and rocket bases on French territory, and we had understood that the Government of France, and General de Gaulle in particular, objected to the establishment of foreign bases on French territory unless certain specific conditions regarding the use of these bases were fulfilled. What, then, are we to understand now? Are France's reservations with regard to bases on the territories of foreign States, and on French territory in particular, now withdrawn, or do they still hold good? Does it now make no difference to France whether or not there are to be foreign bases on its own or on other territories? This is not quite clear from Mr. Moch's answer.

Since Mr. Moch has today mentioned the so-called preliminary question he put, I should like to ask for some clarification on this matter myself. Mr. Moch believes it is essential first to settle what he described as the "major preliminaries" of control, before discussing the main disarmament measures. He even said that those "major preliminaries dominate our subject". (TNCD/PV.40, page 11)

Those were the words used in his last statement last week. This raises the following question: Is the French delegation, then, not agreeable to the principle of drafting at one and the same time disarmament measures and measures for control over their implementation? Does France wish to draft control measures first, and disarmament measures afterwards? Is this the way in which France's position should be understood?

These are the additional questions we want to ask in connexion with Mr. Moch's statement today.
Mr. MOCH (Franco) (translation from French): I should like to reply, first, to Mr. Zorin's last sentence: We fully agree that all control measures, each one of them relating to a given disarmament measure, should be studied and negotiated at the same time as the disarmament measure concerned. But I make a distinction between measures relating to a specific disarmament operation and certain major principles of a general nature on which we must agree first. Otherwise, the same question will arise again in connexion with each measure. Are the control authorities entitled to verify not only the accuracy of the declarations made concerning a given measure, but also their honesty? It would be better to deal with this question as a whole at the outset, rather than to repeat the same discussion for each measure and possibly arrive at contradictory settlements. There is, therefore, no contradiction between the various statements I have made.

With regard to the question of certain bases on French territory, Mr. Zorin will permit me to answer politely that this is a matter which concerns France alone, and that I am not called upon either to discuss it here or to give the reasons for the facts to which he referred.

Lastly, as regards the words of the President of the French Republic to which Mr. Zorin alluded, I will reed them out again to show that he never referred to foreign bases; for in his speech to the House of Lords and the House of Commons of the United Kingdom, the President of the French Republic said:

"Above all, [Franco] wishes the stocks of nuclear weapons to be destroyed ..." -- I will omit that part --

"... and the missiles and aircraft capable of delivering them, as well as the fixed or floating bases from which these vehicles of death can be launched, to be placed under joint surveillance." (TNC/FP.39, page 4)

That makes the position very clear. The word "bases" is used, but not at all in the sense just ascribed to it by Mr. Zorin. A "fixed base" may be a launching ramp or a complete military base. A "floating base" is, by definition, a ship or a submarine. A fixed base may also, incidentally, be a turret submerged at the bottom of the sea. This is a possibility we must not exclude. It is these bases, fixed or floating, whatever their nationality, and whatever country they are situated in -- permanently if they are fixed, or temporarily if they are floating or mobile -- which must be placed under international surveillance, that is, controlled.
I believe that if we could once manage to introduce this international surveillance, we should have removed much of the danger even before getting as far as complete elimination of all types of vehicle. For how -- and here it is my turn to ask Mr. Zorin for clarification -- how does the Soviet Union propose to eliminate all the vehicles safely and certainly in a first stage which, according to the Soviet representative, is to last about twelve to eighteen months? I must confess, I have no idea what means could be used to eliminate all the vehicles with certainty -- and that is the whole problem -- when the necessary methods have not yet been studied, when we do not know exactly how to proceed, and when we have never been given any detailed information on this subject.

Well, sometimes we French are reproached for being rationalists. We do not believe in miracles or in waving a magic wand; and really, in the present state of the world, with the wide variety of vehicles we know of, their different degrees of mobility and speed, and the different altitudes at which they travel, to say that these will all be destroyed -- and destroyed for certain, because otherwise the world will be dominated by the greatest cheat, whoever he may be -- in about twelve to eighteen months, when we have not even studied the procedure for destruction, is really to believe in miracles or to possess a magic wand, which we French do not. That is why my proposition is more cautious and, perhaps, if I may say so, more reasonable than one which is no more than an assertion.

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from French): If no other member of the Committee wishes to speak, I should like to put a question, as the representative of Bulgaria, to Mr. Moch. Reference has just been made to the preliminary question put as a condition by the representative of France in his statement on 14 June: that his questions should be answered and settled so that the discussions on disarmament can go forward. He has now set a prior condition for his replies. We quite understand that Mr. Moch needs to consult France's allies, but we did not understand whether he was maintaining his prior condition with regard to the replies.
I am now speaking again as Chairman. If no other member of the Committee wishes to speak, I shall read out the draft communique, which is as follows:

"The forty-second meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament was held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 20 June 1960 under the chairmanship of the representative of the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 21 June 1960, at 10.30 a.m."

The communique is adopted.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.