FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FORTIETH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Thursday, 16 June 1960, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. ORMSEY-COLE (United Kingdom)
PRESENT AT THE TABLE

**Bulgaria:**
Mr. M. TARABANOV
Mr. K. CHRISTOV
Mr. G. GUELEV

**Canada:**
Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. A.G. CAMPBELL
W/Cdr. R.J. MITCHELL

**Czechoslovakia:**
Mr. J. NOSEK
Lieut.-Gen. J. HECKO
Mr. Z. TRHLIK

**France:**
Mr. J. MOCH
Mr. M. LEGENDRE
Col. L. CONVART

**Italy:**
Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. L. DAINELLI
Capt/Frégate A. SENZI

**Poland:**
Mr. M. NASZKOFSKI
Mr. M. BIJSZTAJN
Maj.-Gen. J. SLIWINSKI

**Romania:**
Mr. E. NEZINCESCU
Mr. C. BOGDAN
Col. C. POPA

**Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:**
Mr. V.A. ZORIN
Col.-Gen. A.A. GRYZLOV
Mr. A.A. ROSCHCHIN
Present at the Table (cont'd)

United Kingdom:
Rt. Hon. D. ORMSBY-GORE
Maj.-Gen. RIDDELL
Miss B. SALT

United States of America:
Mr. F.M. EATON
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Rear-Admiral P.L. DUDLEY

Representative of the Secretary-General:
Dr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General:
Mr. W. EPSTEIN
The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): The fortieth meeting of the Conference is called to order.

Mr. MOCH (France) (translation from French): With a view to the future progress of our work, I should like to sum up the position with regard to Mr. Zorin's answers to the questions I put on 13 and 14 June. I attach great importance to this because it is on these answers that the fate of our negotiations largely depends.

On 13 June, after noting that the Soviet delegation agreed to nuclear and conventional disarmament being carried out simultaneously, I asked some specific questions:

First: must the Soviet plan be approved or rejected en bloc or, on the contrary, can it be divided up or amended?

Secondly: is the approval of the control organization's report by the Security Council at the end of each stage really something other than a purely formal act, and is the Council to give its decision by a vote?

Thirdly: if it rejects the report, does that adverse vote oblige the Council to discuss future operations and their time-limits again?

To those specific questions, the Soviet representative replied the same day, reserving the right to study the verbatim record later, in the following terms:

"... the points made by Mr. Moch ... do not call for any particular objections on our part ...". (TNCD/PV.37, page 22).

Mr. Zorin went on to say:

"... Accordingly, as regards our reply to the question as a whole raised by Mr. Moch, I can say that this reply is in general affirmative." (Ibid., page 23).

The next day, 14 June, Mr. Zorin, who had meanwhile been able to study the verbatim record, received on the afternoon of the 13th, made no correction to his statements of the day before.

On the contrary, he replied in the same vein to part of my second statement, that of 14 June, in the course of which I had said that we did not believe it was realistic to specify the duration of the subsequent stages now. I added -- and I apologize for quoting myself -- the following:

"... I explained why yesterday ... These are, indeed, differences between us; but they will be much reduced if the Soviet Union confirms, as I hope it will, the interpretation I gave yesterday of the provisions of the Soviet plan concerning the significance and consequences of the report to the Security Council at the end of each stage". (TNCD/PV.38, page 6).
To that reminder of the argument I had advanced on 13 June, Mr. Zorin replied textually as follows:

"Mr. Moch went on to say that on some questions, and particularly the questions of time-limits and control, there were points as to the meaning of which he was not clear." (Ibid., page 28).

I was in fact speaking of the time-limits for the stages. Mr. Zorin continued:

"In that connexion, I believe that his reference to his statement of yesterday, and to the reply we gave to it, shows very clearly that our position on this matter is flexible.

"We believe that, by further consideration of the general disarmament plan and appropriate control measures, we shall probably be able to find a common approach and a common view on this question. Therefore I do not feel it necessary to dwell on this question in greater detail now."

(Ibid.)

Thus, Mr. Zorin's first answer, that of 13 June, to my question on the nature of the time-limit mentioned in the Soviet plan and on the consequences of the reports to the Security Council, was not only not corrected after the verbatim record had been read, but Mr. Zorin also confirmed on the 14th the agreement with my thesis which he had expressed on the 13th.

Thus we are all agreed — and this is of very great importance to the Western delegations — that, as I had supposed,

\[1\] the report to the Security Council at the end of the first and second stages is not a matter of pure form, but a document on which the Council will have to vote, in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Charter;

\[2\] an adverse vote by the Council on either of the two reports would oblige the Powers to reconsider all the operations to be carried out after the Council's proceedings and, consequently, the time-limits for carrying them out — hence also, the total time allowed the Powers to complete the implementation of the treaty;

\[3\] the overall time-limit, which the Soviet delegation asks should be fixed and embodied in the treaty on general and complete disarmament, is thus not mandatory, but merely indicative: it will have to be observed if the two votes of the Council are favourable to the report, but will be reconsidered if one of them is against the report,
Such are the logical conclusions I draw from the Soviet representative's answers of 13 and 14 June. They follow directly from what he said. But if they go beyond what he had in mind, there is still time for him to modify his answer. However, I do not see how he could reconcile his two answers with opposition to my deductions.

I attach, as I said before, very great importance to these answers. For they show that the Soviet Government has abandoned its long upheld thesis of the automatic implementation of the treaty, the unrealistic nature of which I have often pointed out. Without agreeing, as we asked it, to limit the chronology to the first stage only, it does agree that the fate of the operations subsequent to that stage depends on the votes of the Security Council, and that the overall time-limit automatically becomes subject to review if the Council does not approve one of the reports.

My Western colleagues and I shall study with the greatest care the situation created by the statements of the Soviet representative. I hope we shall be able to deduce a new rapprochement from them. That will be easier if, as suggested in my first question, which also received a positive reply from the representative of the Soviet Union, the Soviet plan need not be considered as a whole, but can be divided up or amended.

I now come to another matter.

On 14 June, after noting our agreement on certain control concepts, I asked three questions relating to control.

With regard to the first, which dealt with the order of operations, I note Mr. Zorin's satisfactory reply and also his counter-claim regarding the preparatory commission. I accept it, as far as the French delegation is concerned. The order of operations, on which we are thus in agreement, would then be as follows:

1. Negotiation of disarmament measures and the corresponding control measures with all possible particulars;
2. Setting up of the preparatory commission, responsible for detailed formulation of the practical steps in so far as they are not specified in sufficient detail in the draft treaty;
3. Signature of the treaty;
4. Entry into force of the treaty and, simultaneously, setting up of the control bodies for the measures of the first stage.
The order of (2) and (3) could of course be reversed. That is a secondary matter.

On this whole chronology too, we are thus in agreement.

On the other hand, I feel some doubt about the fate of my other two questions, the first of which was this: will the control authority be able to ascertain not only what equipment has been eliminated, but also the quantities remaining after such elimination, to the full extent necessary to verify their conformity with the treaty obligations?

To which the delegate of the Soviet Union gave me the following answer:

"I have already told Mr. Moch earlier in the first stage of our negotiations that questions of control cannot be solved in the abstract. They must be solved in an entirely concrete way, because it is impossible to say in advance how this or that control system can be established, before we know what is to be controlled." (TNOD/FY.38, page 31)

I must confess that that answer is far from satisfactory. I took care to choose a concrete case, that of an army having, at the end of a stage, the right to retain 1,000 tanks, of which the government had declared that it initially possessed 1,500 and was presenting 500 for elimination under control. I asked how the other States were to be certain that there were only 1,000 tanks remaining, as stipulated in the treaty, if it were forbidden to verify either those on hand before elimination, or those remaining afterwards. I pointed out that it was a negation of control to make it obligatory to accept as valid the unilateral declarations of the State accepting control, without the right to counter-check them or, which amounts to the same thing, to counter-check the total remaining after elimination. And I gave a simple example, to clarify the position. I am of course prepared to consider any other example in any other sector of disarmament. Here we are concerned with what I have called the "major preliminaries". Let the Soviet delegation have no illusions: no progress will ever be possible without a positive settlement of these preliminaries.

In support of his argument Mr. Zorin, having avoided answering me, gave an example which is not valid:

"If, in fact, in the first stage, we propose the abolition of all means of delivering nuclear weapons ... then of course the question of what remains, or does not remain, after such a measure does not arise. Everything must be abolished and everything must be subject to control ... So your question" — Mr. Zorin concluded somewhat curiously — "is ruled out altogether" (Ibid.)
The representative of the Soviet Union was simulating virtue by taking an example that did not answer my question, and, far from being ruled out, the question remains as well founded as it was on 14 June.

Problems as important and complex as the total liquidation of some particular category of armaments cannot be solved by the wave of a magic wand. No sensible man would take that seriously.

As long as I get no clarification from Mr. Zorin, the representative of France, and, I think, the other Western representatives, must regretfully conclude that the Soviet Government only accepts control over the quantities eliminated, and not over those which remain, so that nobody will know whether obligations under the treaty have been fulfilled or not. That is a serious consequence, which follows directly from the reply of the Soviet delegate.

My third question was as follows:

"Will the control authorities be able to verify not only the accuracy of the declarations made by the governments accepting control, but also their honesty, by making certain, in accordance with procedures to be discussed, that there are no clandestine stocks?" (Ibid., page 10)

That question was all the more important because, as I pointed out, Mr. Zorin had just stated, in regard to vehicles, that their elimination removed all risk of nuclear warfare, and had added "unless we assume that someone will be concealing some such means of delivery." (TNCD/FV.36, page 15)

The question is, it appears, so embarrassing that it has not been given any answer. Yet the example of vehicles given by the Soviet representative in connexion with my previous question proves that, even if a given type of equipment is to be completely eliminated, it is necessary to be sure that this is really done. What I have called passive control — that relating to the declarations of States — in no way proves it. Hence the need for the active role of control outside the depots declared by the government accepting control, wherever it may be useful.

That remark applies equally to cases of partial elimination of the kind I referred to previously. My example related to tanks; I showed that it is not enough to check the quantities eliminated — say 500 — but that those remaining — 1,000 in the example chosen — must also be checked if it is desired to verify that the provisions of the treaty are being implemented. But even that is not enough, because verification of declared stocks is no safeguard against the existence of clandestine stocks. A similar example could be given in every other sector of disarmament.
We thus have the necessary data to define control as conceived by our Soviet colleagues.

We are in agreement on a certain number of points: on the general measures, on the establishment of the international control organization, on the information it is to receive from governments, on the role of a preparatory commission, on the fact that any disarmament operation must be controlled from start to finish and that the control must be maintained thereafter, and on the need to negotiate the control over a measure at the same time as the measure itself.

All that is certainly not negligible.

But, at least pending further statements by Eastern representatives contradicting my conclusions, we must set against the foregoing points of agreement the following points which appear to form part of the Soviet doctrine, and which we cannot accept:

The international control machinery thus established will be able to verify only the quantities of equipment eliminated, and not the quantities which remain; it will thus provide no assurance whatever that the provisions of the treaty are being implemented. Furthermore, control will be applicable only at the places indicated by the governments accepting control; the control authorities will not be entitled to search, outside the places indicated, for any clandestine stocks which may have been concealed. Thus the control organization will not be able to exercise any initiative. It will be merely the passive, stock-taking organ I spoke of, and not an institution with the necessary freedom of action for full performance of its mission, which is, essentially, to restore confidence by affording each government the certainty that the others are fulfilling their obligations properly.

I need hardly say that I state these provisional conclusions with deep and sincere regret. I consider that, if they remain valid, they are such as to make all agreement impossible not only on control, but even on the operations to be controlled.

That is why I still hope that the Soviet delegation's position is not final, but that it will be willing to reconsider it, and that it will realize that by evading an answer to one of these two questions and not even mentioning the second, it forces us into unpleasant conjectures about the sincerity of its acceptance of the thesis of control.
I need hardly say that I shall take account of any future change in that at present — negative position, and should be happy to be able to communicate it to the Government of the French Republic.

Those premises which I have called the "major preliminaries" dominate our subject. When Mr. Zorin asks us, often insistently, to tell him how we judge of the substance of his proposals, we find it difficult to answer him as long as those preliminaries have not been clarified. For our answer largely depends on the explanations to be given us, since for us, as for any reasonable man in the world, disarmament, in all sectors, is intimately and indissolubly linked with control. I have the honour to reaffirm here most solemnly that the French Government, for its part, is prepared to accept on its territory, subject to reciprocity, the most extensive and complete control. If a similar declaration were to be made by the other governments, then rapid progress could be made by common consent towards disarmament, and, first of all, towards elimination of the vehicles for nuclear weapons, a problem to which the French Government attaches fundamental importance.

Mr. NASZKOWSKI (Poland) (translation from French): I wish to discuss the situation now developing in our Committee. Although, since the Soviet Union submitted its new proposals on general and complete disarmament there has been ample time to form an opinion on the document, the Western delegations have not expressed their views on it clearly and precisely.

This is all the more strange because, while sheltering behind assurances that their respective Governments are studying the Soviet proposals, the Western delegations are nevertheless obliged to recognize several positive features of these proposals which bring the positions of the two sides closer together. The statement we have just heard from Mr. Moch is a further illustration of this point, and I must say that generally speaking it is particularly applicable to the statements of the representative of France.

We have noted these expressions of recognition with satisfaction. But it is clear that non-committal observations on various features of the plan are no substitute for a basic position on the plan as a whole. Since the Western delegations recognize that so many of these features coincide with their own views — which, as we know, is because we have gone some way towards meeting their views — it may well be asked what prevents the West from finally recognizing these flexible proposals, offered in a spirit of compromise, as a common basis for discussion. For, as the saying goes, "in for a penny, in for a pound."
Certain disclosures, however, especially the statements of Mr. Eaton, the United States representative, do seem to lift the veil of secrecy.

Instead of adopting a clear and constructive attitude, they are trying once more to side-track the Committee into minute speculations on technical matters and the discussion of isolated measures. Of course, we should have no objection to the clarification of many questions which might arise during the consideration of our proposals. But what matters is the purport of the questions asked and the intention behind this mode of procedure. As to the essential questions, we answered them frankly and fully without delay. Unfortunately, the majority of the questions asked by the Western delegations do not concern the substance of the problem. One group of questions relates mainly to matters of minor importance, to technical problems whose solution should present no difficulty if agreement is reached on the essential problems of substance. Another group is made up of what I would call rhetorical questions, since they are already answered in the draft we have submitted. Finally, there are questions about problems which should be settled by a joint effort. And as the representatives of the socialist countries have already said in their recent statements, our attitude to these problems is by no means rigid.

We expect the Western delegations to state their position on the actual substance of our proposals and to submit their own drafts of detailed solutions, which we are willing to consider.

For instance, let us take the question of control. By raising a whole series of minor problems, which it will only be possible to settle by mutual agreement during the drafting of the disarmament treaty, they are trying once more to create distrust regarding our proposals on this subject, although Mr. Moch noted in his statement of 14 June that as a result of the new Soviet proposals a similarity of views had emerged on almost all the essential principles relating to the application of control. He confirmed this in general terms today, adding that this measure of agreement was not negligible. Although there are still differences of opinion between Mr. Moch and ourselves on this matter, it is to be hoped that they can be narrowed down in the course of our discussions.

Misrepresentation of the substance of the changes embodied in the new Soviet proposals on control does not help to bring our views closer together. From what Mr. Eaton said, at our meeting on 10 June, for instance, it might be concluded that the Soviet Union had not been willing in the past to accept the need for strict
control measures. I should like, therefore, at this point, to state with all the necessary emphasis that the position of the socialist States on this matter has been continually distorted, although we have always expressed ourselves — in our own interests too — in favour of strict international control of the fulfilment of disarmament obligations. And I think there is no doubt that it is not the attitude of the socialist States on the question of control which has impeded progress in the disarmament negotiations.

The essence of our new proposals on control is not revision of the principle of control of disarmament — which we have always accepted — but rather development of this principle in accordance with the wishes of our Western partners — in other words, a more detailed formulation of the composition and structure of the control bodies, of the scope of control at each stage, and of the functions and powers of the international inspectors. It goes without saying that not only the principles but also the general operating plan of the international control organization, once agreed, will be embodied in the future treaty on general and complete disarmament, and will form an integral part of it. There is, therefore, no reason to fear that control questions will not be explicitly dealt with in the treaty. On the other hand, the formulation of certain details of the methods of operation of the control system should, quite naturally, be left to the preparatory commission which would be convened immediately after the signing of the treaty, and would make the necessary preparations for bringing the permanent control organization into operation. This approach is logical and fair.

Mr. Moch agreed with this approach today, except that he has rather different ideas on the order of events such as the establishment of the preparatory commission and the signing of the treaty. But the representative of France added that this was a secondary matter.

I now turn to another matter in which, I believe, attempts are also being made to confuse a picture which is really quite clear. In his statement on 10 June Mr. Eaton apparently tried, this time by a rhetorical question, to cast doubt on our willingness to take practical measures for maintaining peace and security after the programme of general and complete disarmament has been carried out. But the new proposals of the socialist States explicitly stipulate that measures for maintaining peace and security in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations will be put into effect and that, where necessary, units from the contingents of the police or militia remaining at the disposal of States will be placed at the disposal of the Security Council.
We have repeatedly stated here, and we remain firmly convinced that, in a
disarmed world, any offenders against international law and order could be
effectively brought to order by applying a series of non-military sanctions,
particularly economic sanctions. Once the world is rid of armaments, favourable
conditions for the peaceful settlement of all international disputes will obtain.

However, taking into account the repeated requests of the Western delegations
that, in addition to the other means provided for by the United Nations Charter,
military sanctions against violators of international law and order should remain
possible after disarmament, we agreed that part of the national contingents of
police or militia should be used for this purpose.

I would point out that the Western delegations based their requests on
Article 43 of the United Nations Charter which provides that:

"All Members of the United Nations ... undertake to make available to the
Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement
or agreements, armed forces ... necessary for the purpose of maintaining
international peace and security".

It is obvious that, after general and complete disarmament has been carried
out, it will not be possible to place armed forces at the disposal of the Security
Council, but only units from the contingents of police or militia remaining at the
disposal of States for the maintenance of public order.

The relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter are thus sufficiently
clear, unless the intention is not to comply with them, but rather to disregard
them and submit plans which are unacceptable and unrealistic in view of the present
balance of forces in the world, and which aim at raising permanent supra-national
forces that could easily be used for the suppression of peoples who are struggling
for their independence and social progress, and for interference in the internal
affairs of other States. That is something we cannot accept, and we are sure no
country that values its sovereignty will agree to this approach to the problem.

I find it difficult to avoid the impression that the procedure adopted by
the Western delegations up to now is intended to delay any constructive discussion
of general and complete disarmament. The statements by Western representatives --
and particularly the statements made by Mr. Eaton, the United States representative,
on 10 and 15 June -- give no grounds for optimism. One reason for our doubts is,
for instance, the statement by Mr. Eaton that:
"disarmament measures which can be implemented and effectively controlled at an early stage should be negotiated now and put into effect at the earliest possible moment." (TNCD/PV.36, page 4)

Can this approach to the problem be interpreted otherwise than as a further attempt to concentrate the Committee's work on arbitrarily selected measures, which, it should be noted, are mainly measures of control over existing armaments and not disarmament measures, as the preceding discussion proved?

Yesterday's statement by the United States representative that he was not suggesting partial measures but initial measures, changes nothing. If initial measures are to be carried out, it is necessary first of all to establish what these measures are supposed to precede and what is to follow afterwards. But this, by all appearances, is what the United States delegation is unwilling to do.

At the meeting on 10 June, Mr. Eaton expressed his desire to carry out as soon as possible, "practical .... measures which can be undertaken immediately." (TNCD/PV.36, page 7). For our part, we can assure him that we are just as interested in doing this. It is, precisely, practical measures of this kind which the first stage of our new proposals comprises. These measures would quickly and radically eliminate the danger of surprise attack, and at the same time they would be easily controllable. But they must form an integral part of the plan for general and complete disarmament. That is why we urge the need to reach agreement as quickly as possible on the programme of complete disarmament, for that would enable us to get the disarmament process started quickly by taking up the detailed arrangements for implementation of the practical measures which can be undertaken immediately, as Mr. Eaton called them, and by putting such measures into effect. So long as the Western Powers evade this approach to the problem, their declarations of fidelity to the idea of general and complete disarmament will remain empty slogans.

We have heard the representatives of the Western countries here state their conception or specific philosophy of disarmament. I have no wish to start a philosophic discussion; but it is difficult to refrain from making a few remarks on certain peculiar features of this conception, of which our Western colleagues have told us. Does the peculiarity of the Western conception of disarmament consist in the desire to perpetuate the existence of bases and the stationing of armed forces on foreign territory? Or perhaps, in the fear of a dissolution of military blocs alleged to have been formed for collective defence, even if the object of, and reason for, such blocs are to be removed?
The statement made by Mr. Eaton yesterday illustrates this line of thought. It shows that this conception of disarmament is, in fact, nothing but the very negation of disarmament. Mr. Eaton can accept neither the elimination of rockets and other vehicles for nuclear weapons, nor the withdrawal of troops from foreign territory, nor the liquidation of foreign bases, nor even, in fact, the reduction of conventional armed forces. And all this, it is claimed, because of the need to maintain the balance of forces. Does the United States delegation believe that only the arms race can maintain the balance of forces? Mr. Eaton’s arguments about alleged inequalities arising from geographical location cannot convince anyone. If, as a result of the liquidation of the means of delivering nuclear weapons and of bases on foreign territory, the United States fears the preponderance of the conventional armed forces of the Soviet Union, nothing could be easier than to accept the Soviet proposal, already presented to this Committee, that conventional forces should also be reduced in the first stage.

It is clear that this conception, which is full of contradictions, is diametrically opposed to the attitude of the socialist States regarding general and complete disarmament. When we, on our side, speak of general and complete disarmament, we think in terms of abolishing the very idea of war, by destroying all kinds of armaments and disbanding all the armies of the world. We believe that is the only basis on which, in the present circumstances, a lasting peace between the nations can be built.

In opposing the liquidation of bases Mr. Eaton stated, somewhat emphatically, that the United States would not abandon its friends. That seems to imply that after the liquidation of the United States bases, those friends would be threatened. I should therefore like to ask who is now threatening Japan or Pakistan, for example. If there is a threat, it can only be a result of the selfish policy of certain military circles in the United States which, for their own ends are maintaining military bases in those countries, directed against the socialist countries.

If that is the situation today, how can it be claimed that the allies of the United States would be threatened after the liquidation of all vehicles for nuclear weapons?

There is certainly no question of the United States abandoning its friends, though I may mention, in passing, that certain events of the last few days provide much food for thought about those friendly feelings. But that is a domestic concern of the Western States.
For our part, we wish to eliminate the danger of a surprise attack by doing away with the means of launching it.

Before I finish, I should like to draw attention to another provision contained in the first stage of the Soviet disarmament plan. It is stipulated that States having nuclear weapons at their disposal will undertake not to transfer such weapons, or to transmit information necessary for their manufacture, to States which do not possess them. It is also stipulated that States not possessing nuclear weapons will undertake to refrain from manufacturing them.

This provision has been included in the first stage of the plan, because it is necessary as a preparation for giving effect to the second stage, during which all stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction would be destroyed and the production of such weapons would cease. For if total nuclear disarmament is to be accomplished during the second stage, the number of States possessing or manufacturing such weapons cannot be allowed to increase in the meantime.

The prerequisite for all negotiations, and especially negotiations on disarmament, is the establishment of mutual trust, not the pursuit of a policy of fait accompli or aggravation of the existing situation.

Unfortunately, the speeding up of the arms race in the West and the process of equipping the Bundeswehr with the most destructive weapons of our time -- which is becoming an increasingly ominous reality -- must give rise to serious fears and well-founded doubts in all the nations of the world, concerning the desire of the Western Powers to carry out nuclear disarmament, despite all the grandiloquent statements they make on the subject.

We know that Mr. Strauss, the Defence Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, recently went to Washington to negotiate the purchase of new missiles even more powerful than those the Bundeswehr already has. "Polaris" missiles were mentioned in the press. I think only the peculiar philosophy of the West could reconcile the disarmament negotiations with simultaneous re-militarization of the most aggressive forces in Europe, which openly advocate changing the order established in Europe after the Second World War.

Such a policy is especially disturbing for us Poles, and public opinion in our country finds it very difficult to believe in the good intentions of the Western Powers in regard to disarmament, when they place weapons of mass destruction in the hands of our recent oppressors.
It is obvious that completion of the first stage of the Soviet proposals would reduce the serious obstacles that bar the way to establishing lasting peace and would, above all, eliminate the danger of a surprise attack with modern means of delivering the terrible nuclear weapons. This applies, in particular, to the security of small States, especially those in densely populated parts of Europe. In the event of an atomic war those States would be drawn into the hostilities; they would become theatres of military operations and would be totally annihilated. That is also true of States outside Europe, which as a result of the installation of foreign bases on their territory would be exposed to the terrible effects of a possible conflict.

Hence the anxiety of those States at the speeding up of the arms race is fully justified; and the support given by public opinion to the proposals of the socialist countries is all the more easily understandable.

We hope the Western Powers will realize the full gravity of the tasks devolving on the Ten Nation Committee and the responsibility it bears, that they will stop their tactics of postponing all serious discussion, and that they will adopt a constructive attitude to the proposals submitted by the socialist States.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): If nobody else wishes to speak at this time, perhaps I might be allowed to make some remarks in my capacity as representative of the United Kingdom.

This morning, we have listened to an interesting speech by the representative of Poland in which he made various accusations against the Western Powers — most of them, I think, wholly ill-founded.

Mr. Naszkowski mentioned in particular the reluctance — or what he regarded as reluctance — of the Western Powers to consider seriously the question of the abolition of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons or the final abolition of military bases. I do not see how he manages to reconcile this with the document submitted to this Committee on 26 April in the name of the five Western delegations. If the representative of Poland will refer to that document he will find that it concludes that the final goal of the programme of general and complete disarmament should include, under effective international control, the elimination of all weapons surplus to those needed by internal security forces, and the fulfilment of countries' obligations under the United Nations Charter, about which he himself spoke. The document also states that:
"The programme must also provide for the use of outer space for peaceful purposes only and for the final elimination of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery". (TNCD/5)

I do not think this could be more clearly stated. But Mr. Naszkowski did touch on the problem of military bases, and this is a question, particularly as regards the phrase "foreign bases", which has been discussed by a number of representatives in our recent meetings. Today, I wish to address myself to this topic in particular.

We all recall that the elimination of foreign bases received special attention in the second stage of the Soviet disarmament plan of September 1959, and it was the subject of extensive — one might almost say quite disproportionate — treatment in speeches by the Soviet and Eastern European delegations during the first session of the Conference of this Ten Nation Committee. For instance, Mr. Zorin claimed on 22 March that:

"... foreign bases are not only a political factor which aggravates the international situation and constitutes an important element in the tense international relations of our time ... They are, too, a political factor, not only in the relations between States with differing political orientations ... The question of bases has a political character, even from the angle of relations within particular political and military groupings." (TNCD/PV.6, page 31)

The elimination of foreign bases now reappears as a measure in the first stage of the revised Soviet proposals of 2 June 1960. I shall return later in my remarks to these revised proposals.

The Soviet Union has, of course, been pursuing this particular hare about foreign bases for a long time, and I can recall a speech made by the late Mr. Vyshinsky at the eighth session of the General Assembly in 1953, in which he attacked "bases on foreign soil" established in line with the "belligerent plans of the aggressive North Atlantic Pact". I think the phraseology is familiar to many people round this table. Mr. Selwyn Lloyd replied to him on 23 November 1953, pointing out that a base:

"... established by one ally on the territory of another ally, a base established by free consent whether or not formalized in a treaty" brought many advantages to a host country, "above all by increasing its capacity to defend itself against its actual or potential enemies."
He then went on to say that, operating as they do upon interior lines, the Soviet Union could either offensively or defensively shift at will from North to South or from West to East within the great land mass extending across two continents. But the security of many of the Western nations, having no similar land mass to fall back into, depended upon their having defensive facilities far afield from their own shores. Mr. Selwyn Lloyd continued:

"The banning of bases in foreign countries would not harm the Soviet Union at all but it would gravely impair the collective security of the free world".

(Cf. A/C.1/673, paragraph 24)

This is a statement of fact and yesterday it was reiterated in the clearest terms by the representative of the United States, Mr. Eaton.

Now, in this Conference we have the same theme adopted by Mr. Vyshinsky in 1953 repeated by Mr. Zorin in 1960, and it seems to my delegation that the time has come to subject this concept in the Soviet plans to a more searching examination, since it appears not merely to be unsound but to be for the Soviet group an important factor in the timing of the disarmament programme as a whole. If, therefore, the statement of Mr. Zorin which I have quoted at the beginning of my remarks and the concept on which it is based are unsound, it will follow that this part of the structure of the Soviet plan is unsound also. As we are anxious to find a broad ground for negotiation on those aspects of the Soviet and Western approaches to disarmament which are comparable, it is important to cut away what is logically dead wood.

As Mr. Martino pointed out as early as our sixth meeting, there is prima facie no reason why foreign bases should be singled out for special treatment in any disarmament programme, since in the disarmament context no valid distinction can in fact be drawn between bases established by any State at home and those established overseas. If I may express it in rather general terms, the advantages of placing bases in a particular location are those of geographical and strategic convenience.

The Soviet thesis seems to rest on three main assumptions, which Mr. Zorin explained in some detail in the course of the speech to which I have already referred. These assumptions are:

(a) that foreign bases are directed towards offensive rather than defensive needs;

(b) that they constitute a special danger for neighbouring States; and

(c) that they also constitute a special danger to the State in which they are situated, both by inviting military reprisal and as a source of political interference in a State's domestic affairs.
In examining the Soviet thesis more closely, we should perhaps first of all attempt to define our terms. What does the Soviet Union mean by a "foreign base"? This expression appears to be defined by the Soviet and Eastern European delegations to this Committee as including all units or even groups of military personnel situated in territory of which they are not nationals. It seems also to extend to physical installations and training establishments. On occasion the words "foreign bases" have seemed even to embrace dumps of armaments and military equipment capable of being converted into military potential at short notice, like the military facilities enjoyed by some of our allies in the United Kingdom and by the Soviet Union in Eastern European countries and elsewhere. In Eastern European eyes, therefore, the term "foreign bases" is obviously very broad in scope. It could indeed be defined as embracing all armed forces and armaments, all military and even para-military fighting potential, situated outside a State's own national boundaries. The Soviet Government chooses to regard all these as a threat to peace, a threat to the States in which they are situated as well as to their neighbours, and an automatic cause of international tension carrying within them the germs of war.

The first point that must strike an objective critic about the philosophy stated in these terms is chiefly that it makes no political or geographical sense at all. It entirely ignores the size of the States concerned, their political or economic relations with each other, their national military potential, their physical position, their policies and their intentions.

The second point which strikes the observer is that the Soviet thesis makes no military or strategic sense either. Mr. Zorin stated at the sixth meeting: "...it is impossible to imagine that, say, the United States is preparing to defend its own country when it has bases at its disposal, say, in Italy. I do not think that the United States can defend itself against an attack on the United States in Italy, which is tens of thousands of kilometers away from the United States itself." (TNCD/PV.6, page 32)

This remark might have had some meaning half a century ago, especially coming from the representative of a large, mainly self-supporting, almost landlocked Power in the middle of a large continent. It is the sort of statement which might have been made by a general, say, in the days of the Tsars. But if the last two world wars have taught us anything surely it is that distance, that kilometers have
shrunk to relative insignificance in the context of modern military strategy. The world is now too small and the range and power of weapons too extensive for aggression to be contained within prescribed limits applicable to by-gone days. Indeed, that is why we are all now sitting round this table. In the last war the forces of the Allies, including those of the Soviet Union were active against the enemy from Alaska to the Antarctic from Wake Island in the Pacific to the North Atlantic. It is thus only in tune with the logic of modern strategy and modern weapons that States should in the second half of this twentieth century seek to develop an interlocking defensive pattern as extensive as their defensive alliances permit. Thus, not only does the United States benefit and defend its territory by placing military bases in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, but those countries also benefit and gain defensive strength from the presence of those bases.

The crux of the matter is that, so long as the present international tension and distrust continue, small countries which are neighbours of large and powerful countries and wish to maintain their freedom and independence have every right to say that a friendly base or friendly forces in their territory help to ensure this freedom and independence. Such bases are therefore a deterrent against aggression by a larger neighbour and consequently a factor in the preservation of peace. Indeed, Mr. Zorin at the sixth meeting appeared to accept part of this thesis, since he admitted that States themselves are justified in establishing national military bases manned by their own personnel for the national tasks of the State concerned, and notably to serve the purpose of defending the national territory.

I hope he will be ready to admit that the course of history has shown the truth of the second part of the thesis: namely, that it is natural for a smaller State to seek the assistance of a more powerful friend and ally in defending its national territory and integrity. Mr. Zorin would surely not claim that in times past a country such as Lithuania had the same capability of defending itself against the Soviet Union as the Soviet Union had of defending itself against Lithuania. That is clearly an absurd proposition.

I have argued that there is no reason why a peace-loving State should see any threat in the existence of a defensive alliance between other States which leads to the maintenance in their territories of bases occupied by foreign nationals or supplied with foreign military materials and equipment. I would go further and say that it is difficult to see what distinction can reasonably be drawn in the
context of disarmament between such bases and those occupied by nationals of the State itself and equipped with nationally manufactured equipment. In what way, for instance, does a base in Turkey manned by NATO units differ strategically or militarily from a base occupied by Soviet nationals on the other side of the Caucasian border? It is idle for the Soviet delegation to reply that the former represents a threat while the latter is a defensive arrangement. In the light of what I have already said, an objective observer might equally conclude that the reverse was the truth.

Turning to the latest Soviet plan, I observe that that provides in the first stage for the withdrawal of all foreign troops within national boundaries and the removal of all foreign military bases and stores. This measure is placed between two measures dealing with the question of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons. One might therefore assume that the intention was to demonstrate the connexion between this problem and the question of bases. But this connexion would apply only to air bases or missile bases. The Soviet proposal goes much further, however, and covers bases for land and sea forces. It is in fact precisely calculated to give the Soviet Union a large strategic and military advantage over the countries of the NATO alliance. Anyone can see the obvious military advantage of this proposal from the point of view of the Soviet Union, and this has been pointed out by the representatives of Italy and the United States.

Withdrawal of United States, United Kingdom and Canadian forces from the continent of Western Europe would in no way be compensated for by the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the territories of the Warsaw Pact States. This is so, as was pointed out yesterday by Mr. Eaton, because troops of the Soviet Union could re-enter the territories of States from which they had been withdrawn very much more easily and very much more speedily than United States forces and the others I have mentioned could return from overseas to territory they were under allied obligations to protect. Similarly the withdrawal from Western Europe of bases equipped with ICBMs would in present circumstances also give increased military advantage to the Soviet Union, since the existence of such bases tends to offset any inequality arising from the threat to the countries of Western Europe posed by the numerous missile installations within the Soviet bloc which Mr. Khruushchov and Marshal Malinovsky have so frequently mentioned in recent days. They have made repeated references to the possibility of the total destruction of the smaller
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Powers which are their close neighbours. In May 1959 Mr. Khrushchev said that it would take only eight hydrogen weapons to destroy Germany. He added, "How many are needed to put other Western European countries out of action? Obviously not more". The presence of such IRBM bases in Western Europe can only be regarded at the present time, therefore, as a rational defensive measure and as a counter to those Soviet missile establishments which, we are repeatedly told, are even now aimed at many countries of the Western联盟.

The Soviet proposal which I have mentioned, that is to say paragraph 2 of the first stage of the 2 June proposals, impinges at least as much on conventional disarmament, which is postponed to the second stage, as on nuclear disarmament. But in any case the proposals are based on concepts which in my earlier remarks I have tried to show to be fallacious. If we regard the matter correctly, foreign bases and national bases will all take their place in the process of progressive realization of general and complete disarmament. As armed forces are reduced and nuclear and conventional armaments -- especially the means of their delivery -- are limited and destroyed, the use of bases of all kinds will be similarly reduced, and the bases, whether national or foreign, will automatically be dismantled since there will be no men to man them or materials to fill the depots.

As this process develops, international confidence will increase and the lack of these bases will be entirely acceptable to all States, once fear of an attack has been eliminated. This indeed is what disarmament is all about. To talk of foreign bases as a special category is to divert us from our task of negotiating disarmament into the fields of slogans and propaganda. I hope that we can avoid such confusion in our discussions and can agree to examine the real problems concerning disarmament which now confront us.

Speaking as Chairman, I would ask whether any other representative wishes to speak. If not, shall we turn to the communiqué? I shall read out the draft communiqué:

"The fortieth meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament was held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 16 June 1960, under the chairmanship of the representative of the United Kingdom.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 17 June 1960, at 10.30 a.m."

Is that agreed? If so, the communiqué is adopted.

The meeting rose at 12.5 p.m."