FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOURTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Friday, 18 March 1960, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. NOSEK (Czechoslovakia)
PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Bulgaria:
Mr. M. TARABANOV
Col. K. SAVOV
Mr. K. CHRISTOV

Canada:
Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. A.G. CAMPELL
W/Cdr. R.J. MITCHELL

Czechoslovakia:
Mr. J. NOSEK
Lieut.-Gen. J. HEČKO
Mr. Z. TRHLIK

France:
Mr. J. MOCH
Mr. M. LEGENDRE
Mr. L. PERILLIER

Italy:
Mr. G. MARTINO
Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. L. DAINELLI

Poland:
Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
Mr. M. LACHS
Brig.-Gen. J. SLIWINSKI

Romania:
Mr. E. MEZINCESCU
Mr. N. MELINESCU
Mr. C. BOGDAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
Mr. V.A. ZORIN
Col.-Gen. A.A. GRYZLOV
Mr. A.A. ROZHCHIN
PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

**United Kingdom:**
- Rt. Hon. D. ORMSBY-GORE
- Sir Michael WRIGHT
- Maj.-Gen. RIDDELL

**United States of America:**
- Mr. F.M. EATON
- Mr. C.C. STELLE
- Rear-Admiral F.L. DUDLEY

**Secretariat:**
- Personal Representative of the Secretary-General: Dr. D. PROTITCH
- Deputy Personal Representative of the Secretary-General: Mr. W. EPSTEIN
The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia): I declare open the fourth meeting of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament. The first speaker will be the representative of Romania.

Mr. NEZINCESCU (Romania) (translation from French): An essential feature which seems to characterize the resumption of disarmament negotiations is the ever-growing awareness of the insanity of modern war. It is becoming increasingly evident that the only reasonable alternative for humanity is the cessation, in the shortest possible time, of the armaments race and the establishment of a world without arms and, consequently, a world without war.

While I have reservations regarding the solutions that have been proposed, I must say that I agree with the way in which the representative of Canada put the problem at the opening of our Conference. I quote:

"There are just two alternatives: a continuation of the race, whose only end can be nuclear war, with unimaginable death and destruction; or its cessation, a resolve to control" -- a view which I cannot share -- "and then abolish this kind of weapon and move towards a peaceful world." (TNCD/PV.1, page 11)

This way of formulating the problem does constitute a distinct advance as compared with the concept of the "deterrent", a balance of terror, which has been invoked for many years past in order to justify the armaments race.

The main question facing us, therefore, is to find the practical and most effective ways of putting an end for all time to the armaments race. The task of our Committee would certainly be made easier if all the delegates present here would keep in mind the exhaustive debates which took place on this question at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly.

These debates resulted in the unanimous adoption of Resolution 1378 (XIV), mentioned earlier, which "calls upon Governments to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament, considered to be the most important one facing the world today."

The great risks that are implicit in the continuation of the arms race are, first and foremost, linked to the existence of nuclear weapons. We cannot but agree with the representative of France when he says, "what the world expects of us, what it hopes for above all, is nuclear disarmament" (Ibid., page 16).
I would like to recall that the socialist countries have always expressed themselves in favour of nuclear disarmament. We cannot envisage a disarmament programme, whether it be general and complete, global or comprehensive, that does not embrace total and effective nuclear disarmament.

That is why total nuclear disarmament is an integral part of the general and complete disarmament plan put forward by the Soviet Union and supported by all the socialist countries. This disarmament plan proposes the only possible solution of the problem, namely, the prohibition of nuclear weapons and their use, the cessation of the production of all types of such weapons, their elimination from the arsenals of States and the destruction of existing stocks — all under adequate international control.

In any realistic programme for general and complete disarmament the time factor, as we have repeatedly emphasized, touches the very core of the problem. This factor acquires a very special importance in the case of nuclear disarmament. It is especially in the sphere of nuclear arms that the arms race has assumed a most urgent and threatening aspect. One of the most salient features of the general and complete disarmament plan proposed by the Soviet Union and supported by all the socialist countries is that it envisages the prohibition and complete elimination of nuclear weapons in a reasonably short period of time. Total nuclear disarmament, under the socialist countries' disarmament plan, is to be carried out during the third stage, the final stage of the complete and general disarmament plan.

Taking into account the role assigned to nuclear weapons by the Western countries for maintaining their security, the socialist countries' general and complete disarmament plan places the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons after the first two stages of disarmament, during which substantial disarmament measures will already have been implemented with a consequent reduction of the threat of war.

The proposals of the socialist countries regarding nuclear disarmament have also taken into account the apprehensions shown by the Western countries about the relationship between conventional disarmament and nuclear disarmament. These apprehensions were again voiced only two days ago by the representative of the United Kingdom in his speech when he said, in presenting the plan of the five Western countries:

"... nuclear disarmament by itself would merely leave certain countries with an overwhelming superiority in conventional forces and weapons, and this lack
of balance between forces of different groups of countries would accentuate suspicions, heighten tension, and thus increase the risk of war." *(TNCD/PV.2, page 6)*

Placed in the third phase of the plan for general and complete disarmament, total nuclear disarmament should be carried out at a time when armed forces, conventional weapons and bases in foreign territory have already been abolished. The total elimination of nuclear weapons could thus not change the balance of forces already achieved during the preceding phases, nor create strategic advantages for any country or group of countries, once there were no longer any armed forces or conventional weapons in the phase in which that would be brought about.

I should also like to stress the fact that the plan of the socialist countries is also based on the idea that, in the very near future, an agreement will be reached for the permanent prohibition of nuclear tests, and that that agreement will subsequently be ratified by all countries with nuclear capacity. The adoption of the socialist countries' plan would thus ensure the balance between conventional disarmament and nuclear disarmament, in view of the fact that the cessation of nuclear tests would limit the production of nuclear weapons by other powers and would, at least, slow up the grim job being done to improve mass destruction devices.

We consider that the method of approach to the question of nuclear disarmament implicit in the socialist countries' plan for general and complete disarmament is constructive, realistic and practical. Its provisions take into account the anxieties of the Western countries. We think that, if an agreement on principle were achieved on the prohibition of nuclear weapons and of their use, on the abolition of the armaments of States, the cessation of production and the destruction of existing stocks, the scientists and military experts could, in their turn, agree on the practical procedures for ensuring international control of the honest application of such an agreement. If nuclear disarmament were subordinated to the possibility of exercising absolute control in all phases and over all the factors in such a process — however far advanced the latest scientific knowledge may be — that would be tantamount to rejecting at the outset the idea itself, since the absolute — as we all know, whether we are from the West or the East — exists neither in the nature of things nor in human society. I am convinced that once agreement is reached on the essential point, namely the total and final abolition and prohibition and the destruction of stocks of nuclear weapons, it would be possible to agree as well on a system of control which would ensure the maximum security possible and give satisfaction to all the signatories of such an agreement.
This is not an expression of naive optimism, but of the sincere desire of my country and the other socialist countries to see the danger of nuclear war removed and nuclear devices banned for ever. There is no other way of attaining that objective than by total nuclear disarmament under international control, as a phase in a plan of general and complete disarmament. If the system of control adopted for ensuring the implementation of the prohibition and the elimination of nuclear weapons from the armaments of States contained so many flaws that it would make such measures illusory, do the representatives of the Western countries think that that would represent a lesser risk for the peoples of the socialist countries?

If it is desired to achieve nuclear disarmament, it is necessary to start from the real facts of the problem, namely that a nuclear arms race can only lead to nuclear war, and that the risks of a nuclear war would be catastrophic for all. If one of the partners were to start from the wrong idea that, in such circumstances, the other partner might be less interested in the effectiveness of the system of control to ensure the implementation of an agreement which would ban nuclear armaments from the armaments of States, he would be making a very regrettable mistake. We wish to bring about nuclear disarmament within the framework of general and complete disarmament, with the maximum control humanly and scientifically possible. But nuclear disarmament cannot be obtained by half-measures, quarter-measures or bogus measures. It would certainly not be realistic, for instance, to require the setting-up of control over the production of fissile materials without dealing with existing stocks of weapons or without prohibiting the use and production of nuclear weapons. What would be the use of control over the production of fissile materials without the prohibition, cessation of production, and destruction of stocks of nuclear weapons? Absolutely none from the point of view of nuclear disarmament. The same fissile materials can equally well be used for the production of nuclear weapons as for peaceful purposes. In order to avoid fissile materials being secretly used for aggressive purposes; extremely wide international control would have to be organized. Now, that kind of control only becomes possible under the conditions envisaged in the socialist countries' plan for general and complete disarmament which, at the end of its third phase, brings countries to the point where they have nothing more to conceal.

I have made these preliminary remarks about one of the essential aspects of general and complete disarmament in the hope that our Western partners would state their views on the practical and really effective measures proposed in the socialist countries' plan for general and complete disarmament. They would thereby facilitate the progress of our Committee's work.
Mr. BURNS (Canada): Yesterday the Polish and Czechoslovakian representatives addressed several questions to the authors of the five nations plan. On behalf of all five, I should like to inform them that we welcome these questions and propose to reply to them fully. However, since we wish to be certain of the precise form and intent of the queries, we delayed the completion of our answers until it was possible to study the verbatim report of yesterday's meeting, which has now come to hand. We hope at the next meeting to answer with the accuracy which these serious questions deserve.

Mr. MOCH (France) (translation from French): I should like to try to get to the heart of the matter by taking up one of the points made. But, first of all, I should like to tell the Romanian representative, who has just spoken, that he was quite right to press for nuclear disarmament and that he said things about the nuclear threat with which I entirely agree. But I must point out that in the plan he is supporting, the first two stages apply exclusively to conventional armaments, and nuclear disarmament only appears at the third stage; that is, at the end; the plan, moreover, mixes up what I may call moral prohibitions -- since they are not controllable -- such as the prohibitions of use with other real prohibitions which can be backed up by appropriate control. Thus, the prohibition on manufacture, and to some extent the prohibition on retention of stocks, or at any rate the obligation to reduce stockpiles can easily be controlled. So I hope that when he thinks the matter over more thoroughly our colleague will reach our own conclusion, namely, that, since nuclear disarmament is the most important measure -- and Mr. Mezincescu has kindly quoted one of my own remarks on the subject -- it must have a privileged place in disarmament measures and not be inserted at the end.

I was speaking just now of control. I should like to find out how far we are in agreement; and I am doing so, I may say, in the hope that I shall find we really are in agreement.

With this in view I have carefully compared four Soviet documents on control: the two statements made by Mr. Khrushchev in the Supreme Soviet on 31 October 1959 and 14 January 1960, the interview he granted Mr. Pierre Cot on 30 January, which was published in an international review, and, lastly, Mr. Zorin's statement to us here on 16 March.
I was not greatly surprised, I admit, to find that Mr. Khruschev and Mr. Zorin were thinking along exactly the same lines: even the examples given for the first two stages were identical in the statement made in Moscow on 30 January and the statement made here on 16 March.

Thus, our Soviet colleagues seem to have evolved a doctrine, and I believe I can sum it up impartially as follows:

1. Control must start with disarmament;
2. It must be exactly adapted to each measure of disarmament;
3. It must expand pari passu with the development of disarmament;
4. It must never be such as to be susceptible of exploitation for military or economic espionage.

This is what, it seems to me, emerges from the four texts I have mentioned. Does this general summary correctly reflect what our Soviet colleagues have in mind?

If it does, and subject to more detailed study, this line of thought is very similar to that which has always been ours. I say — subject to a more detailed study, because I still need to have some points explained. I should like them explained, not because I want to make it awkward for anyone, but because I really do want us to be able, bit by bit, to hammer out a joint doctrine.

The first point we should like clarified is this.

On the question of reduction of forces and conventional armaments, Mr. Khruschev said on 30 January; and I quote: "Control, too, must extend to these fields..." and further on — I am still quoting:

"Control is not an end in itself, but a means of checking whether States are carrying out the undertakings assumed..."

After a few sentences Mr. Khruschev continued:

"It is not our intention to attack anybody. We do not need, therefore, to collect confidential information. But neither do we want people coming, under the guise of control, to collect such information in our country".

That is what the Head of the Soviet Government said. Mr. Zorin spoke as follows on the same subject on 16 March:

"The control machinery will begin to operate simultaneously with the disbandment of the troops which are to be reduced in the first stage, so that the international checkers can be sure that States are complying exactly and strictly with the agreed measures for such reduction".
He added:

"It would be unrealistic to make control ineffective for this could lead to individual States evading compliance with their obligations in the sphere of disarmament, and such evasions would endanger peace." [Ibid., page 20].

I am in full agreement with this. I prefer it to the statements made earlier on in which we were told that it was sufficient for an agreement to be signed for everyone to implement it in good faith. We must always reckon with the possibility, which I hope will not materialize, of a partner not being straightforward.

And Mr. Zorin goes on:

"The Soviet programme ... does not give the control system any other functions whatsoever which are not directly related to disarmament measures."

[Ibid., page 21].

Those are, in my opinion, the two fundamental texts, and the explanation I should like here is this. I shall not put my request in the form of a question, because I remember from our past talks that Mr. Zorin does not like the question form very much. I shall put it in the form of a general remark, not a question.

Any kind of disarmament operation, no matter in what sphere, consists of reducing a given type of war material from an unknown amount to a smaller amount laid down in the treaty, by eliminating an unknown amount. Thus, in the case, say, of aircraft of a given type, the State concerned would possess a quantity which I shall call X and would have to keep only A, by putting a quantity X - A in store.

If we are asked to verify only the quantity placed in store or eliminated in some form or other from arsenals, we shall know the total of X minus A thus withdrawn from military assignments. However, as we do not know the original figure X, we also do not know the final figure A, and our control will be illusory. For it to be effective, therefore, we must verify not only the amounts removed (X minus A) but also one of the two other figures, either the old total figures X or the remaining total figures A.

This is very elementary mathematics. I should not like to discourage you from following my argument because I spoke of X and A. But this is just the point where I fear our views differ. To verify the amounts removed or eliminated will not be difficult, according to the texts that I have just read. But I have also just shown that such inspection, confined only to the result of subtracting A from X.
will still be illusory and that we must know in addition either the old total figures or the new total figures, if we are to be exactly informed. Does Mr. Zorin consider that verification by checking on one or other of these two figures constitutes espionage? The problem needs to be carefully studied, because whether control will be effective or illusory depends on the answer.

I quite realize, of course, that the conclusions may vary according to the object of investigation. For certain operations which are not of decisive importance -- the strength of armed forces, for example -- the signatory Powers will probably be satisfied if each signatory Power declares the initial figures and if the numbers taken out of service are verified; from this it will be possible to deduce the number remaining in service. But this means relying on everyone's good faith, without any guarantee. If the initial total is incorrectly declared, the amount of material retained will not be correctly known. In the case of hydrogen bombs, for example, this would be of vital importance. I repeat, therefore, this point may not be very important in certain fields, such as personnel strength, but it is quite important in the case of material on which world mastery could, at a particular moment, depend.

If we are to be able to accept the approach suggested by Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Zorin, we must agree on the point that verification of the quantities existing either before or after reduction -- it does not matter which -- plus verification of the quantities eliminated, constitutes a normal control operation and is not a form of military espionage.

I must insist very strongly on this point. In the past, and I may say in the not very distant past, we have differed violently and for long periods in our respective concepts of control. I believe that on both sides, we are now trying to come closer together, and it is certainly my fervent hope that we do. But we must be sure that we are giving words the same meaning if this rapprochement is to be fruitful and not be based on an initial misunderstanding.

The same desire for clarity makes me want to ask for more precise information on a second point:

The control of a particular operation must, in our view, be ready to function as soon as that measure begins to be implemented, in order that, first, the implementation of the measure and, secondly, its results, may be observed. It cannot be put into operation only at the end of the implementation process. In other words, any operation undertaken under control must be followed through from beginning to end. Do we agree on this point?
The third and final point which I should like to clarify is the following. If we agree that control of an operation must begin as soon as the operation itself begins, the international officials responsible for control must be at their posts and ready to function the very first day the operation starts. This assumes that the agreement between the two parties on the methods of control, on the organization responsible for it and so forth must be concluded not later than the date on which the agreement providing for the material execution of the operation to be controlled is signed. Do we agree on this?

Lastly, I would urgently ask the USSR representative not to take issue with me because I am speaking today of control and not of disarmament. My question has a general character and has a bearing on all disarmament measures. We agree with the Soviet delegation that there should be no control without disarmament just as there should be no disarmament without control. Years ago, speaking on behalf of France, I used this very formulation. We agree in wanting only the control of disarmament. To get this started, we must agree also on a number of general ideas, the first and most important of which I believe to be that control must be in a position to verify that the commitments assumed are being correctly carried out, and consequently that the control body must have at its disposal the data which are strictly necessary for this verification, and that efforts to obtain such data will not be regarded as economic espionage; finally, that the agreement on inaugurating the appropriate controls and the implementation of the control itself must not be delayed to a point where it would jeopardize or prohibit the necessary verification operations.

Naturally, I am not asking for an answer today on the points which I have just raised, but I would like to conclude by emphasizing the importance of those points in the eyes of the French delegation and, I am sure, of other delegations as well. If we can really agree on the points I have raised, I believe a great step forward will have been made; the air will be cleared and a cloud which has hung over all our deliberations for a long time will have been swept away.

If, on the other hand, we do not agree on these points, if, from the very outset, there are irreducible differences on the concepts of control, then, of course, our task will be much more difficult. That is why, in order to remove this difficulty, I have raised those points at the outset of our deliberations.
Mr. NASZKOWSKI (Poland) (translation from French): I should like, first, to thank the representative of Canada for his kind assurance today that the questions we asked yesterday would be considered and will shortly be answered.

I should now like to review briefly certain aspects of yesterday's discussion. As you know, at yesterday's meeting some doubts were expressed concerning the tasks of our Committee and the aim of our deliberations. The explanations given at the end of the meeting should, I feel, have dissipated those doubts. Nevertheless, I think that it would be useful to settle this problem once and for all.

Two documents, in particular, were referred to during the meeting: the Four-Power communiqué of 17 September 1959 and the General Assembly resolution of 20 November 1959.

As to the first document, it must be noted that its main purpose was to set up a new type of negotiating body — and I emphasize the word "new" — the Ten Nation Committee, its functions being set forth in very general terms. In our view, this document therefore reflects a preliminary understanding.

The more detailed document laying down the aim of the Committee's work is the above-mentioned United Nations resolution. That resolution was adopted after a long debate in the United Nations. It was also the result of negotiations, whose importance is well known, conducted outside the United Nations. It is precisely as a consequence of all these events that the specific question of general and complete disarmament has arisen.

Yesterday, our distinguished colleague, Mr. Jules Moch, tried to give these documents a narrow, restrictive interpretation. However, I need only recall that the agenda of the United Nations included precisely the following item: General and complete disarmament.

What is more, the resolution itself is entitled "General and Complete Disarmament", and in its second operative paragraph it confirms the fact that the question of general and complete disarmament was discussed at plenary meetings and at meeting of the Political Committee. However, we are not discussing a question of semantics. We are not discussing here the formal aspect of the question. What concerns us is the actual substance of the problem. That is why we consider it essential to demonstrate that it was this concept of the problem that was in the minds of those who took part in the debate.
Let me quote for example the statement of the Canadian Minister of External Affairs, Mr. Green, on 24 September 1959:

"For the time being I can say that I fully subscribe to the general aim enunciated in Mr. Khrushchev's draft resolution — a world without arms."

And later he said:

"We should all like to see general and complete disarmament realized."

There can be no doubt that the Canadian Deputy Minister of External Affairs, Mr. Nesbitt, was referring to the same thing when in his statement of 2 November 1959 in the First Committee he said:

"The broad objective of a world without arms is one which the Government and the people of Canada have long cherished."

Similarly, I might cite a large number of other representatives who shared this point of view.

As in all cases when the contents of a document or the terms of reference of a body are questioned, it is necessary to examine the intentions of those who took part in the preparatory work. It is thus evident that, in the present case, the circumstances referred to and the text of the document itself give us a clear and definite answer, namely, that the Ten Nation Committee has to deal with general and complete disarmament.

Still with reference to the statements made yesterday, I should like to recall Mr. Ormsby-Gore's statement of 19 October 1959 in the First Committee of the General Assembly. Speaking of what is meant by "general and complete disarmament" the United Kingdom representative tried to prove that his Government in submitting its plan, the plan of Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, was basing itself on the idea of general and complete disarmament. This is what he said:

"But I assure you that this single adjective 'comprehensive' has the same meaning for us as the two adjectives 'general and complete', which have been preferred by some speakers in this debate."

I am not passing any judgement now on the question of the identical nature of those terms. In our view they are not identical. I am simply pointing out the trend in the United Nations as exemplified by the United Kingdom representative,
Before concluding, I should also like to refer to the statement of the head of the United States delegation, Mr. Eaton, who expressed some doubt as to the possibility of a speedy reduction of armed forces. Obviously, a reduction of armed forces raises certain problems, and in the first place, those relating to the number of men under arms, the reduction of production for military purposes, and the reduction of military expenditure. When we analyze each of these problems we come to the conclusion that they can be solved in a relatively short space of time. Each delegation here knows that the men under arms consists of officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates. The privates are the most numerous but the most easily demobilized. The number of new recruits called to the colours can easily be limited. Also, privates already in military service can be demobilized sooner. It is relatively easy to reduce the number of reservists called up for active duty. Every country, large or small, represented here has had considerable experience of this kind in the period just after the Second World War. This applies, above all, to the Great Powers and, among others, to the United States, which demobilized several million soldiers within a very short period. Even if every country drew only on its own experience, that would be enough to confirm the realistic character of the plan for general and complete disarmament in four years as put forward in the Soviet text.

Mr. Eaton (United States of America): There may have been some misunderstanding regarding my comments on the reduction of armed forces. I simply indicated that Mr. Khrushchev in his January speech had said that it would take the Soviet Government up to a year and a half to demobilize 1,200,000 men. I did not comment that this was a problem of great difficulty necessarily for all of us, but that it did present a problem for the Soviet Union because I am sure that they would like to demobilize just as quickly as they can, as their Premier had indicated.

I should just like to make one comment of general application. In the past three days those noble words "general and complete disarmament" have been mouthed 135 times in a lesser number of minutes by certain of the delegations. They have as a result become hollow words -- words shorn of all meaning. In my view, this has led to confusion and if it continues may inevitably lead to
chaos. I do not think our efforts are going to be furthered, or the results of this conference to become more fruitful, by the continuing use of any set of words, avoiding thereby getting down to the substance of the matter to which we wish to direct ourselves.

I make this comment and it may apply to those who take it unto themselves. I do not direct the criticism to any delegation or to the head of any delegation. I simply comment on the amount of time that is being utilized in what can only mean general and complete confusion and general and complete chaos if it continues.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Mr. Chairman, fellow delegates, I do not intend today to speak in detail about the questions which were raised at yesterday's meeting and which, in our view, are of substantial importance for the success of all our work. I should only like to make one remark in connexion with what has just been said by Mr. Eaton. It would, of course, be useful for us to pass on to a discussion of concrete questions and to pay less attention to generalities. That seems to me the right thing to do, and we must save time to devote to our work on the substance of the problem. I must say, however, that, to our regret, neither the representative of the United States nor the representatives of the other Western Powers have so far expressed any views on those concrete proposals which were put forward six months ago by the Soviet Union and which, in our opinion, form a serious basis for consideration of the problem facing us. It appears to me, therefore, that it would be useful if we were to proceed to discuss the specific questions touched on in the document submitted on 18 September 1959, which evoked so much interest all over the world. This does not, of course, mean that that document is the only document around which the discussion should pivot. But it is, in any case, a document which provides a direct answer to the question of general and complete disarmament, which, from our point of view, is the main subject of our discussion. I may recall in this connexion a statement made by Mr. Lodge, the United States representative on the First Committee of the General Assembly, on 14 October 1959, in which he said:

"These considerations lead the United States to conclude that the detailed consideration of the Soviet proposal, and of other proposals as well, should be the job of the new Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee,
on the establishment of which the Soviet Union and the United States have agreed. As far as the United States is concerned, we shall join in the Ten-Nation Committee in giving to the Soviet proposals the most serious scrutiny,"

This was said over five months ago and I hope that Mr. Eaton will keep the promise made by the United States representative at the United Nations General Assembly. We shall be interested to hear any concrete remarks which will result from a serious study of the Soviet proposals submitted to the General Assembly fully six months ago.

I hope that the other representatives too, who are members of our Committee, will express their concrete views on this document and so facilitate practical examination of the problem of general and complete disarmament which worries the whole world.

It goes without saying that the questions which have arisen in our minds — not only in those of the Soviet delegation but of other delegations as well — as a result of yesterday’s statement by Mr. Moch, also call for clarification, because what Mr. Moch said yesterday evokes melancholy reflections as regards the objectives which are being set before our Committee by some, at least of its members. I realize, of course, that it will take a certain amount of time to consider the substance of these questions. Accordingly I do not insist on these doubts being dissipated immediately, but in any case replies will inevitably have to be given to those questions so that we should know in what direction members of the Committee propose to work, inasmuch as we have a definite position laid down in the General Assembly resolution in favour of which we all voted.

Those are the brief remarks which I wished to make in connexion with the considerations advanced today by Mr. Eaton.

Mr. Eaton (United States of America): I should like to thank Mr. Zorin very much for his very constructive comments. I think they make a very happy platform from which to move on into next week for the detailed exploration of the various elements of a disarmament plan.
The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia): Is there any other speaker? If not, I should like to read out the communique which it is proposed to issue following upon this meeting:

"The fourth meeting of the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament was held at the Palais des Nations in Geneva on 18 March 1960 under the chairmanship of the representative of Czechoslovakia.

"The next meeting will take place on Monday, 21 March 1960, at 10.30 a.m." Is there any objection to the proposed communique? If not, I take it to be approved.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.