FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THIRTY-NINTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Wednesday, 15 June 1960, at 10:30 a.m.

Chairman: MR. ZORIN  (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)
PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Bulgaria:
Mr. M. TARABANOV
Mr. K. CHRISTOV
Mr. G. GUELEV

Canada:
Mr. F. L. M. BURNS
Mr. A. G. CAMPBELL
W/Odr. R. J. MITCHELL

Czechoslovakia:
Mr. J. NOSEK
Lt./Lt. Gen. J. HEČKO
Mr. Z. TRHLIK

France:
Mr. J. MOCH
Mr. M. LEGENDRE
Col. L. CONVERT

Italy:
Mr. G. MARTINO
Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. L. DAINELLI

Poland:
Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
Mr. N. BLUSZTAJN
Maj.-Gen. J. SLIWINSKI

Romania:
Mr. E. MZINCUESCU
Mr. C. BOGDAN
Col. C. POPA

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
Mr. V. A. ZORIN
Col.-Gen. A. A. GRYZLOV
Mr. A. A. ROSHOCHIN
PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:
Rt. Hon. D. ORMSEY-GORE
Maj.-Gen. RIDDLE
Miss B. SALIT

United States of America:
Mr. F.M. EATON
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Rear-Admiral P.L. DUDLEY

Representative of the Secretary-General:
Dr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General:
Mr. W. EPSTEIN
The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The thirty-ninth meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament is called to order. I call on the representative of France.

Mr. MOCH (France) (translation from French): Mr. Chairman, I am speaking once again because on 13 June you asked the following question:

"We should like to know the present position of France on this very important disarmament question, and I believe that not only we but the whole world is interested in knowing it. We look forward with interest to a statement of the present position of France on the substance of this question /i.e. the problem of vehicles/". (TNCDFV.37, page 23)

In replying, on 14 June, to some of my questions — and I intend to revert to your replies — you again stressed your very keen desire to be informed of our position.

I hope to give a clear answer to that enquiry, as to all others addressed to me. This will be made easier by the fact that the French position on vehicles for nuclear weapons has been frequently explained by the highest authorities of my country.

It has, however, been distorted or misinterpreted. Consequently I must, first of all, quote certain statements.

On 7 April this year, before the House of Lords and the House of Commons of the United Kingdom, the President of the French Republic spoke as follows:

"France believes that this peace can only be attained if the general fear of sudden annihilation is first removed, which entails the limitation and control of armaments in both camps. Above all, she wishes the stocks of nuclear weapons to be destroyed, the installations where they are made to be converted to other uses, and the missiles and aircraft capable of delivering them, as well as the fixed or floating bases from which these vehicles of death can be launched, to be placed under joint surveillance".

On 25 April, before the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States, the President of the Republic again expressed the same idea:

"... Peace and life will nevertheless be doomed if the temptation and the threat of war remain hanging over the world because of nuclear weapons. To destroy these weapons by common consent, to undertake not to manufacture any more of them, and to throw all territories open to reciprocal control — there is no other hope for the future of the human race. But contractual
measures can first be applied to the vehicles of death — rockets, aircraft, and ships — and these can today still be prevented from carrying bombs and kept under joint surveillance. It is precisely in this way that France recommends that disarmament should be begun ..."

On 31 May 1960, at the Élysée Palace, after the incidents of which all are aware, the President of the Republic spoke as follows:

"Two camps are confronting each other under conditions such that it depends solely on Moscow or Washington whether a large part of mankind is to be crushed in a few hours. In such a situation, France believes there is no territorial dispute or doctrinal issue worth considering compared with the need to avert this monstrous danger. In her view, this entails three conditions. The first is an easing of tension, in other words the conduct of improved relations, avoiding provocative speeches and actions, and multiplying economic, cultural and tourist exchanges in order to create a peaceable atmosphere. Failing this, discouraged spirits will be overcome by the dizziness of despair, so that suddenly one day, for no matter what reason, the world will find itself at war ..."

After referring to previous wars, the President continued:

"... The second condition is a categorical measure of controlled disarmament, preferably applied to rockets capable of carrying bombs for strategic distances, in order to put an end to the possibility and, at the same time, the temptation of suddenly provoking general destruction. The third condition is a beginning of organized co-operation between East and West in the service of mankind ..."

And the statement continues with an analysis of the effort, which should be international, urgently required on behalf of the under-developed nations.

Finally, on 10 June, in his reply to Mr. Khrushchev's letter, the President of the Republic wrote:

"Moreover, bearing in mind the conversations we had on this matter at the time of your visit to France, I note the emphasis placed by the Soviet Government on the elimination of vehicles for nuclear weapons. As you know, I myself consider that control over these vehicles to prevent them carrying nuclear charges, and reciprocal control over the bases for them, would be a decisive step towards the objective we have to aim at."
All these quotations are self-explanatory. They interpret very clearly what has been the constant view of France. I could, indeed, go back further, and recall the warning we gave, nearly a year ago, on 22 October 1959, to the General Assembly of the United Nations. We warned it against repeating the mistake, so fraught with consequence, made in 1946 and the following years, which now makes any control over stocks of fissionable materials impossible for lack of an agreement which would have been possible at that time. We adjured it not to make a similar mistake with regard to vehicles for nuclear weapons. At our Conference, I explained our views in this very room on 15 March, 1 April and 5 April 1960, which should make it unnecessary for me to revert to them. On 1 April, in particular, I analyzed the sequence of measures which we suggested should be adopted.

Those previous statements, like the quotations I have just read out, prove that we have always envisaged a methodical progression in the matter of eliminating vehicles.

Any other method in fact comes up against political or technical impossibilities, of which I shall only mention the most important:

The modern world has based an unstable peace on a balance of terror, which reflects, in the sphere of armaments, the mutual suspicions that poison relations between governments. But, precisely because such suspicions exist, it is necessary to reduce them, and progressively to restore greater trust, if we wish all States to renounce their deterrent power. That is the main political difficulty we should encounter if we attempted to pass immediately, without a methodical progression, from the present situation to that of which we all dream.

Other political problems have, however, been linked by the Soviet delegation with the elimination of vehicles. The association with it of measures only more or less remotely connected with this elimination singularly complicates a problem which is already difficult in itself. I shall leave it to some of my colleagues to comment on this.

In the second place, the elimination of these vehicles raises technical problems which we believe can still be solved, but at the cost of arduous technical studies. The precedent — already frequently cited — of the problem of controlled discontinuance of nuclear tests, which has been under study for nearly two years, confirms us in our opinion that we have the following choice:
either we include in the first stage of a disarmament plan measures so complex that their preliminary study — which is, however, necessary — will delay for years any start on carrying out the plan;

or, on the contrary, we agree to arrange the difficulties in series and grade them, so as to introduce in the shortest possible time those measures which are the simplest and the easiest to put into effect and to control, while simultaneously studying those which raise political or technical problems whose solution requires more time.

The question of vehicles provides us with a striking example of the two methods. To try to eliminate them all in the first stage of the treaty would result, unless only vague and ineffective provisions were included, in postponing that first stage for a long while — and hence in continuing the race for devastating weapons, with all its dangers and all its cost. On the other hand, by dividing up the difficulties, we can map out a solution that is not only politically acceptable to all, but can also be quickly put into effect, at least as regards the first measures to be adopted.

That has been our view all along. To convince yourselves of the fact you need only refer to the most detailed statement I have made on these problems, that of 1 April this year. You will find in it proof of the necessity for methodical progression, and a suggested phasing of the measures.

In order to clarify my statement, I shall group all the vehicles in three categories: first satellites, then long-range and medium-range rockets, and, finally, surface vessels, submarines and aircraft. For, the methods to be used differ from one category to another.

Satellites would become the most dangerous weapon of the future because, launched in peace-time — and thus in all security — with nuclear charges, their orbits carefully corrected and regulated, they could drop on the chosen target with certainty during any one of their revolutions, thanks to a reserve of power under remote control.

Here there would be no difficulty, because we negotiators are for once ahead of the research workers and technicians. For, in point of fact, this ultimate weapon is as yet not in production. We need only prevent it from coming into being — and there is just time to do so — which seems much easier than eliminating it after it has become operational.
There is, it seems, complete agreement between us. We can propose, all together, that as soon as the treaty comes into force, satellites be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

That restriction on use presupposes, in the first place, that we agree on the peaceful activities that are to be left unrestricted, and on the means that are to be authorized.

In the second place, it calls for advance notification of the international disarmament organization— which the Soviet Union representative calls the international control organization, and he nearly convinced me yesterday that his name for it is better than ours; provisionally I will simply call it the international organization — as I say, in the second place, it calls for advance notification of that international organization for any launching of a satellite, and the presence at the launching of international inspectors to confirm that the satellite carries no nuclear charge. This would be a set of simple and, in addition, effective measures, since any clandestine launching of a satellite would be quickly reported by specialized observation stations.

For all these reasons, prohibition of the launching of military satellites and the corresponding control can be included in the first stage of the treaty.

As regards rockets, which unlike satellites are no longer only experimental but already operational vehicles, control, to be effective, would need to have various features which I will only summarize.

Provision must be made for the following:

(a) control of the launching sites declared by governments, which is clearly the simplest to establish and can, if there is agreement, be introduced gradually over a period to be fixed by common consent;

(b) search for undeclared sites, in which aerial photography and various other observation techniques will make it possible to locate installations if, like those for satellites, they are still large and stationary; account will also have to be taken of advances in propulsion technique which will lead to "miniaturation", as formerly in the case of nuclear devices, and hence to easier camouflage and even mobility;

(c) control of the detection of possible clandestine launchings, by a system of supervision and spotting based on electronic detection or infra-red rays. This will be effective if the mesh of the international network does not exceed
about 2,000 km according to French estimates, which means a total of 150 to 250 stations for the land surface of the world. This network, when suitably adapted, would also be useful in signalling the passage of aero-dynamic devices, intermediate between rockets and aircraft, whose lower speed compensates, as regards detection, for movement at a lower altitude than rockets which is less easily shown on the screens;

(d) control of existing stocks and production, for production will be reserved at the end of the operations for exclusively peaceful uses. This control should apply to the propulsion equipment industry, the chemistry of propergols and other sources of propulsive energy, to electronic and mechanical guidance systems, and, in particular, to the manufacture of certain high-precision equipment such as accelerometers and gyroscopes.

This series of studies on the various controls over strategic rockets and satellites should naturally be made pari passu with the study of controls over sea and air vehicles for nuclear weapons. Those controls, which are easier to devise, would be applied in aircraft factories and shipyards, and at supply and repair bases. It is unlikely that clandestine arsenals of high technical quality and necessarily large dimensions would escape control. Similarly, the clandestine loading of weapons as dangerous as nuclear devices could only be carried out at naval bases or large aerodromes, which could not escape air-land investigation.

That is already a programme of extensive studies, which are difficult to conduct and require the collaboration of experts.

As soon as these studies, made jointly, had defined the measures to be adopted and the means of control necessary for each type of vehicle dealt with, we should proceed to the execution of the measures. The first to be put into effect, apart from the prohibition already mentioned on placing satellites carrying destructive weapons in orbit or in outer space, would be the notification of the international organization of rocket launching projects satisfying criteria fixed in advance, and the progressive declaration of launching-sites for such rockets and of their places of manufacture, both being subject to international inspection.

There would be parallel reduction, to levels to be fixed by mutual agreement, of the numbers of the surface ships, submarines and aircraft of given characteristics, the surplus being destroyed or converted.
Next would come the prohibition of manufacture of military rockets and the elimination of existing stocks, while the production of rockets and satellites for exclusively peaceful purposes and in the general interest would continue, but under effective international control.

At the same time, surface ships, submarines and aircraft of given characteristics kept in service after the preceding eliminations -- whether temporarily or permanently matters little for the moment -- would be prohibited, under effective international control, from transporting or launching nuclear weapons of mass destruction.

To sum up, we believe that elimination of the vehicles for strategic nuclear weapons is still controllable, but that, to be acceptable to all, it must be carried out in a realistic manner -- that is to say, gradually and methodically. It would, from the outset, be total for satellites, and partial for rockets and air and sea vehicles, which would all be destroyed as and when the corresponding controls were established.

These means of control would be introduced at the same rate of progress. They are at present definitely effective for satellites, and for rockets and bombs launched from air or sea vehicles. They are less satisfactory and more complicated, but nevertheless still effective, for rockets launched from fixed ramps; by using the various possible procedures concurrently, we still have a very good chance of detecting violations, if the powers and freedom of action of the control authorities are adequate.

But these various methods call for precise technical studies. This consideration, even without others of a political nature, shows how unrealistic would be any declaration that the vehicles were to be totally eliminated within a time-limit fixed regardless of the necessity for such studies.

Let the delegates of the Eastern countries not misunderstand the intentions of France. The ideas I have just put forward really go further than those of our Soviet colleagues: they are superior because they trace a practical path of achievement, arrange the difficulties in series — as I explained at the beginning of my statement — and give complicated studies the necessary scope, without thereby delaying the implementation of such measures as are immediately practicable both technically and politically.

We are convinced that a methodical progression of the kind I have just outlined for demonstration purposes would lead us to our goal faster than the adoption of a vague measure which had not been previously studied in detail.
It is because we wish to go far — to go right to the end — in carrying out an idea, originally French, which aims at delivering the world from the anguish of the nuclear threat, that we urge our Eastern colleagues not to make a sound and fruitful idea impossible to put into effect. I earnestly ask them to weigh our arguments, and to agree to eliminate the vehicles for nuclear weapons in a manner which is both realistic and practicable, that is to say, by basing their elimination on serious studies and effective controls.

That would be, for our colleagues as for us, the most useful way to work for peace and the protection of the human race.

Mr. Nosek (Czechoslovakia): Although almost two weeks have passed since the Government of the Soviet Union put forward its new and far-reaching proposals on the basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, the delegations of the Western Powers have not yet expressed their views on the substance of these important proposals. On the contrary, as is shown by the negotiations which have so far taken place in our Committee, the Western Powers have evaded discussion of the substance of the proposals of the Soviet Union, trying to focus attention on some technical, non-essential, minor questions of secondary importance. The delegations of the socialist countries have done and are still doing their utmost to clarify and explain in great detail the new proposals of the Government of the Soviet Union. Their approach to all questions raised by the Western delegations has been constructive and flexible. Most questions so far put by the Western delegations have been given positive replies. This attitude has been characteristic of the delegations of the socialist countries during the whole course of the discussions in our Committee. Even during the first part of our Conference the delegations of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries represented in this Committee approached the views and standpoints of the Western Powers with maximum goodwill, and, wherever possible within the framework of the basic task of our Committee — which is the solution of the problem and general and complete disarmament — the socialist delegations tried to meet the views of the delegations of the Western countries. The new proposal of the Government of the Soviet Union, which takes into account a number of views previously expressed by the Western delegations, and particularly by the French delegation, is evidence of this constructive approach of the delegations of the socialist countries.
This constructive approach by the delegations of the socialist countries has had to be recognized by all Western delegations represented in our Committee. For example, at our thirty-eighth meeting yesterday, the representative of Italy, Mr. Martino, stated:

"I wish to acknowledge to the Soviet Union representative that a reading of the new document does indeed show this desire to bring our positions closer together and the effort made by the Soviet Government to facilitate the continuation of our work by making some concessions to the Western viewpoint".

(TNCD/PV.38, page 11)

We should have expected the delegations of the Western countries also to show goodwill and take steps forward to meet the proposals of the socialist countries. Unfortunately, as has already been noted, we do not see any signs of such an approach on the part of the delegations of the Western countries. On the contrary, they maintain their previous standpoints and views. Furthermore, the Western delegations have not even expressed their views with regard to the new and far-reaching proposals of the Government of the Soviet Union, which, as I have already stated, take into account the views and ideas of the Western countries, and they are trying to divert discussion from matters of substance to secondary questions. This attitude is all the more surprising because it was the Western delegations which advanced a number of the proposals now contained in the new document submitted by the Government of the Soviet Union.

During our discussions so far the delegations of the Western countries, and particularly the United States, in addition to raising technical and procedural questions, have alleged that the new proposals of the Soviet Union do not take into consideration the necessity to ensure equal security for all States in the course of the implementation of general and complete disarmament.

At our thirty-sixth meeting the representative of the United States, Mr. Eaton, alleged that the prohibition and complete liquidation of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons would abolish the so-called free world's major capabilities for protection against aggression; and Mr. Eaton categorically rejected the idea of the liquidation of military bases on foreign territories and the withdrawal of foreign troops from alien territories to within their national frontiers. The representative of the United States has not yet clarified in greater detail his position on these important questions, though he has been repeatedly requested to do so.
Since the completely unfounded arguments of the representative of the United States were repeated by the representative of Italy, Mr. Martino, at our meeting yesterday, I should like once again to touch briefly upon this problem.

An indispensable prerequisite for any disarmament proposal or programme to be acceptable to all States and to become a suitable basis for negotiation is the strict application of the principle of equal security for all States during the entire disarmament process. Like the previous proposals of 18 September 1959, the new proposals of the Soviet Union on the basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament consistently and satisfactorily meet this requirement.

In the proposals of the Soviet Union of 2 June 1960, it is explicitly stated: "II. General and complete disarmament shall be carried out by all States over one and the same strictly defined period of time to be agreed upon, the process of disarmament being carried out gradually, in three consecutive stages, bearing in mind that at no stage shall any State gain military advantages over other States as a result of the course of disarmament. (TNCD/6/Rev.1, page 7)

The socialist countries consider the programme of general and complete disarmament, within the meaning of General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV), as a self-contained process whose important feature is the consistent application, both in the programme as a whole and in its respective stages, of the principle that in the entire course of the disarmament programme the security of no State concerned should be endangered and, vice versa, that no State should be in a position to acquire unilateral military advantages as a result of the course of disarmament.

The first stage of the disarmament programme envisages the removal from the armaments of States of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons, the discontinuation of production and the liquidation of all such means. Simultaneously, it is proposed to withdraw all foreign troops from alien territories to within their national limits and to liquidate all military bases on foreign territory. Our Committee has already recognized that putting the liquidation of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons at the very beginning of the disarmament programme is a significant step which the Soviet Government has taken to meet the requirements and proposals submitted by the Western Powers, and particularly by France. These far-reaching measures, coupled with the liquidation of military bases and
the withdrawal of all foreign troops from alien territories to within their national frontiers, would, as has already been stressed, create reliable safeguards against a surprise attack as early as at the first stage of general and complete disarmament. It goes without saying that there would have to be complete liquidation of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons and not only of some of such means.

The implementation of these measures would result in a significant strengthening of the security of States, and nations would be saved from the threat of a surprise war, even such a war as might be started by accident or through some technical defect.

It is necessary to emphasize that the consistent application of the principle of ensuring equal security for all States in the course of the implementation of general and complete disarmament requires that the question of the prohibition and liquidation of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons be inseparably linked with the liquidation of military bases on foreign territories and the withdrawal of foreign troops from alien territories to within their national frontiers.

During recent years the countries of the socialist system have been encircled by a chain of military bases designed to serve as a platform for attack against the socialist countries. One of the most important purposes of these bases is to bring the means of delivery of nuclear weapons into close proximity to the frontiers of the countries of the socialist camp, thus seriously increasing international tension.

Permit me in this connexion to quote Mr. T. Hoopes, a former adviser to the United States Department of State on overseas bases. In the October 1958 issue of "Foreign Affairs", he wrote that carefully selected base areas in close proximity to the borders of the socialist countries "would permit approaches from virtually all points of the compass, and this would greatly complicate the problem of Soviet defence".

Recent developments have clearly proved the complete untenability of the contentions of the representatives of the Western Powers, including the assertion of the United States representative, Mr. Eaton, that these bases had been built exclusively "for protection against aggression". It has been proved that United States bases are systematically used, even in time of peace, for aggressive acts against the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist system and,
moreover, without the consent of the governments of States on whose territories these bases are located. The governments of those countries which allow the building on their territories of these bases from which aggressive acts are committed against the countries of the socialist system should realize that such bases not only do not safeguard their security but, on the contrary, could lead to very unpleasant consequences for them.

The socialist countries propose the prohibition and complete liquidation of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons despite the fact that the Soviet Union is at present generally recognized as having superiority in the most modern weapons of this type, particularly intercontinental ballistic missiles.

From the facts I have just mentioned, it becomes clear how unfounded are the objections of the United States delegation and its Western partners. Both the requirement of prohibition and complete liquidation of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons and the withdrawal of foreign troops, as well as the liquidation of military bases on foreign territories, correspond to the principle of ensuring equal security for all States. Measures to be taken with respect to the means of delivery of nuclear weapons would apply equally to all States. In addition, the withdrawal of foreign troops applies in equal measure to the units of the United States armed forces and to the units of the Soviet army stationed outside the Soviet Union under the Warsaw Treaty.

The course of the action taken by the delegations of the Western Powers in our Committee provides grounds for the suspicion that they are raising artificial objections to the new Soviet proposals and are trying to create problems which are in fact non-existent. The contention that the new Soviet proposals do not provide for the necessary balance between nuclear and conventional disarmament serves as evidence of this. The development of the standpoint of the Western Powers on this question during the negotiations in our Committee is a classic example of their approach to the question of general and complete disarmament.

Let us see how the Western Powers, in an attempt to evade concrete discussion of disarmament, have several times substantially changed their standpoint during recent months. The original proposals of the Soviet Union of 18 September 1959 took into account the position of the Western Powers, which contended that they had to make up for the alleged superiority of the Soviet Union in armed forces and conventional armaments by nuclear weapons. Therefore,
they required that disarmament in the field of armed forces and conventional armaments should precede nuclear disarmament, which would be implemented at the end of the disarmament programme. Thus, the proposals of the Soviet Union of 18 September 1959 provided that the process of disarmament should start with measures in the field of armed forces and conventional armaments and should end with nuclear disarmament.

In this situation, as is known, the Western Powers completely reversed their standpoint on conventional armaments. Following the submission by the Government of the Soviet Union of its proposal and its declaration that it would reduce its armed forces below the present level of the armed forces of the United States, the Governments of the Western countries again changed their position. In the first stage of our Conference they began to require that the question of nuclear weapons and devices capable of delivering such weapons — the most important means for waging modern wars — be placed at the beginning of the programme of general and complete disarmament. The representatives of the Western countries, as, for instance, the representative of France, Mr. Moch, pointed out that disarmament measures in the field of armed forces and conventional armaments were of little importance under existing conditions. However, when the delegations of the socialist countries expressed their readiness to solve the question of complete nuclear disarmament without delay, even before the signing of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, the delegations of the Western countries did not accept this proposal.

In its proposals of 2 June 1960, the Government of the Soviet Union has again taken into consideration this new requirement of the Western countries. It has proposed the prohibition and the liquidation of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons as early as the first stage and the completion of nuclear disarmament at the second stage. Having in mind the unwillingness of the Western Powers, which was demonstrated during the first stage of the negotiations in this Conference, to proceed immediately to a substantial reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments, the Government of the Soviet Union advocates in its new proposals beginning the process of the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments at the second stage and completing it at the third stage of general and complete disarmament.

However, as may be seen from the present reaction of the Western countries to these proposals, they have simply once again completely reversed their
attitude and have returned to their old requirement of a certain reduction of
armed forces and conventional armaments at the first stage.

However, as the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Zorin, has pointed
out, the delegations of the socialist countries, guided by a desire to reach
agreement, are willing again to take into account the new change in the position
of the Western countries. If the Western countries wish to reduce the levels
of armed forces and conventional armaments as early as the first stage of general
and complete disarmament, it is, as was stated yesterday by Mr. Zorin, up to
them to submit concrete proposals in this respect. However, the measures to be
proposed should lead to a substantial reduction of armed forces.

It may be clearly seen from this short summary that during the last several
months the Western Powers have fundamentally changed their position on this
question three times, merely in order to avoid serious and businesslike dis-
cussion of radical measures in the field of general and complete disarmament.

During the course of the negotiations which have been conducted so far in
our Committee, there have emerged two different lines of approach to the
solution of the question of general and complete disarmament, which is the basic
task before our Committee. On the one hand, the Governments of the Soviet Union
and the other socialist countries are making every effort to further discussion
of this question and to solve this most urgent present-day problem.

They have shown maximum goodwill to reach an early agreement, as requested
by United Nations General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) on general and complete
dismament. The socialist countries have taken into consideration the view-
point of the Western Powers, particularly France, and in their proposals they
have agreed to the total prohibition and liquidation of all means of delivery
of nuclear weapons, together with the liquidation of all military bases on
foreign territories and the withdrawal of foreign troops from alien territories
as early as the first stage of general and complete disarmament. During the
course of the first part of our Conference, the delegations of the socialist
countries agreed, in view of the objections on the part of the delegations of
the Western Powers, to implement complete nuclear disarmament even before the
conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. In their previous
proposals, of 18 September 1959, they proposed total liquidation of armed forces
and conventional armaments in the first two stages of general and complete dis-
armament. Finally, during our present discussions the delegations of the
socialist countries have shown maximum readiness to meet the position of the Western Powers and to discuss the inclusion in the first stage of general and complete disarmament, of measures in the field of armed forces and conventional armaments.

From this enumeration it is apparent that the delegations of the socialist countries are exerting maximum efforts to reach an agreement on general and complete disarmament. On the other hand, the delegations of the Western countries are rigidly maintaining their old unacceptable positions.

It is up to the delegations of the Western countries finally to express in clear terms what they actually desire; it is up to them to say what they really want. We think it is high time for the Western delegations to come to mutual agreement among themselves and decide and tell the Committee what should be the first measure or measures of general and complete disarmament and, above all, to make it clear whether, and if so how, they wish to start the elaboration of general and complete disarmament and the drawing up of the relevant treaty.

By refusing to discuss seriously the programme of general and complete disarmament and by looking for artificial pretexts which hinder our work, the delegations of the Western Powers, and in particular the delegation of the United States, have proved that they are following a policy which has nothing to do with the implementation of resolution 1378 (XIV) of the General Assembly of the United Nations and with the elaboration of general and complete disarmament. We expect that the Western delegations will reappraise their position so that we can shortly and without unnecessary delay proceed to concrete negotiations and the elaboration of a treaty of general and complete disarmament, as world public opinion is waiting for our Committee to do.

Mr. EATON (United States of America): Mr. Zorin has asked for a more precise expression of the views of my delegation concerning the Soviet proposals for the immediate destruction of all nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and the immediate withdrawal of forces located on foreign territories. Mr. Zorin's interventions on the two proposals thus far have not, unfortunately, added much clarification to our further consideration of them. I had hoped that they would, and I had delayed answering until we had received this clarification. However, as it has not been forthcoming, I will make a few remarks. I shall expand on certain of the points that I made on 10 June with regard to these proposals and what we believe to be natural misgivings.
Those proposals for immediate first-stage measures give us concern because, among other things, they are contrary to the principle that no State should derive military advantages from the disarmament process. I referred to this in the opening days of this session; it has been referred to since, and I repeat it now.

It is true, as Mr. Zorin stated, that these measures would be undertaken by all participating States. But it does not follow from this that these measures would bear equally on the military capabilities of all such States. Where the basic factors in the military situations of States differ — such as in their geographical location, available lines of transport and communications, and the entire logistic system — the impact of a given disarmament measure will vary among States. In the present situation, members of the free world alliance are separated from each other by large expanses of water. What would assure our own security across the Atlantic at this time, looked at solely from the standpoint of the United States, is quite different from what would assure the security of our friends and allies with whom we are associated on the continent of Europe.

But the communist bloc occupies a virtually continuous land mass. Under the Soviet proposals, all military aircraft and vessels capable of carrying means of mass destruction, of carrying nuclear weapons, would be eliminated in the very first stage; I emphasize the very first stage because it is this that gives us the concern and the trouble. This, however, means in effect the elimination of practically all aircraft and ships, since today almost all of them are capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Thus, withdrawal of forces from the territories of other States and the elimination of all aircraft, surface ships and submarines would, in the case of NATO for example, preclude the transfer and support of forces within the alliance to meet any attack. But, based on simple geography, these measures would not preclude the transfer and support of communist forces over the continuous land routes. Moreover, the distance and the time factors involved would clearly favour the Soviet side. Thus, these parts of the Soviet proposals; to be undertaken as immediate measures, clearly would create a military advantage for the Soviet Union.

It might be argued that these difficulties could be overcome by immediately undertaking only the Soviet proposal to eliminate all means capable of delivering nuclear weapons, while postponing the withdrawal of troops until a later stage. Here again a one-sided advantage would be gained by the Soviet Union. In this
case NATO forces in Europe, including those of Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, would be stripped of the modern weapons which would permit a smaller force to defend itself against larger forces, while the larger communist forces which confront NATO on the continent would not be reduced in any way. Furthermore, the elimination of aircraft, ships and submarines in these circumstances would, as I noted earlier, make it impossible for Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States to reinforce and support their forces now on the continent and enable them to meet any attack; but the larger communist forces could be reinforced and supported over land routes without fear of being confronted with modern weapons.

Conversely, it might be stated that these difficulties could be overcome by immediately undertaking only the proposal to withdraw forces from the territories of other States, while postponing the elimination of the nuclear weapons delivery vehicles to a later stage. This would leave the Soviet forces undiminished in size with their full array of missiles and nuclear weapons only a few hundred miles east of their present most advanced locations; while NATO forces would be drastically reduced by the withdrawal of United States forces and their modern armaments several thousand miles across the Atlantic.

Mr. Zorin has advanced the well-worn argument that these difficulties are unreal because the Soviet Union is already reducing its forces — and, I might add, reducing them over a period of a year and a half or two years to levels which we attained many months ago. As is well known this claim is completely unverified at present, and Mr. Zorin has not been willing to discuss how forces retained by States might be verified. We on our side are genuinely hopeful that if our discussions here continue this reluctance on the part of Mr. Zorin will disappear and we can get down to discussing the question of how each of us would determine what forces the other had. Even if the total United States and Soviet force levels were found to be about the same, the immediate withdrawal of United States forces from Europe would unbalance the military situation in Europe in favour of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union proposes that the United States immediately withdraw its forces several thousand miles away, and that all aircraft and ships capable of carrying nuclear weapons should also be eliminated. Under these circumstances the return of United States forces to Europe would not be feasible, and the smaller nations of Europe would be at the mercy of their larger Eastern neighbour.
Mr. Zorin also states that Soviet nuclear weapons delivery vehicles, including intercontinental missiles, are superior to those of the West, and that, therefore, the West would benefit more than the Soviet Union by the elimination of these armaments. I should like to state that the evidence available to my country in no way supports Mr. Zorin's claim. I am thankful for this, particularly in view of the frequent and reckless Soviet threats to launch nuclear attacks on other countries — especially on smaller countries on the periphery of the Soviet bloc. Nevertheless, I am hopeful that the relative merits of our respective weapons will remain a matter of only academic interest. Mr. Zorin's use of this argument in defence of the Soviet proposal is unconvincing, and if it is addressed to us with the purpose of convincing us I can assure him that it has not. No matter how I look at the Soviet proposals for the immediate elimination of nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and the withdrawal of forces to their own homelands, they appear to give the Soviet side a clear-cut military advantage through the disarmament process, and I would hope that, if there are reasons which would compel us to draw a different conclusion, they will be advanced in the course of our discussions here.

A further factor, which could very well be of decisive military significance, relates to the control and verification aspects of so radical a measure as the elimination of all vehicles capable of carrying nuclear weapons. The new weapons which the technological revolution is bringing into being can before too long be readily dispersed and hidden. They permit a potential aggressor to prepare in secrecy a surprise attack of enormous destructiveness which can be unleashed in a matter of moments. So long as reasonable doubt remains, either as to the technical feasibility of adequate control and verification or as to the willingness of all parties to submit to the controls required to ensure against possible evasion, no open and free society can uncritically rush to embrace such a proposal. And it must of course be noted that such examination of the control and verification aspects of these proposals has not even begun. The latest Soviet paper, in fact, calls for the adoption of the proposals without even providing prior study of the many and infinitely complex factors which we all know are involved.

The changes in language in the proposals of the Soviet Union will require further study. The Soviet Union itself has said that these are profound changes, and, if so, they are worthy of our attention and we shall certainly give them that attention. However, in addition to the foregoing factors, which bear on the appraisal we are now giving of these two first stage proposals, there is another
significant factor: the Soviet side has laid much stress on the claim that the existence of nuclear weapons delivery systems, together with so-called foreign bases, threaten peace and stability and increase the danger of war. I do not wish to explore here the roots of those tensions and differences, of which armaments and armed forces are but the expression rather than the cause.

A strategic balance makes an important contribution to the maintenance of peace, and this should be preserved through the disarmament process. I must point out also that radical, unbalanced disarmament measures can upset the strategic equilibrium. Rather than promoting peace and stability, radical measures which violate the principle of safeguarded, phased and balanced disarmament would create an unstable situation in which the danger of military conflict would increase, not diminish. This is a danger that must be carefully weighed before asking the world to embark on hasty, untried, radical, immediate measures such as those proposed by the Soviet Union.

I should like to make a passing comment on Mr. Zorin's quotations from United States military writers, which were made in an attempt to prove that the United States has aggressive intentions. I do this only in passing because I do not believe that the statements made by Mr. Zorin are convincing to the world, nor are the charges in this regard. I state it as a fact that my country is not aggressive, and I see no reason to defend it. The quotation that "offensive military action would follow the decision to use military force" was supposed to prove that the United States contemplates aggressive attack. The facts are the opposite. United States forces are intended to deter aggressive attack or, in the event that it is launched, to respond effectively. This is the essence of United States military doctrine. I would like to remind Mr. Zorin that Soviet military doctrine contains many passages which could be quoted to indicate that the Soviet Union has favourably evaluated the importance of striking the first blow. I shall give but one example. A well-known Soviet military figure, Marshal Rostislav, has written that the Soviet armed forces should be prepared "not only to repel attack successfully" but also to deal "even pre-emptive surprise blows of terrible destructive force." My point in making this quotation is not, as I indicated, to enter into discussion of aggressive intent but simply to demonstrate that the use of quotations can cut both ways. Mr. Zorin will allow me a debating point.
My remarks are intended to make clear that the two Soviet proposals under discussion here -- the two first steps, to be immediately taken -- as seen in the context of the new Soviet paper, give us concern. But the concern is only that they are a first step, for we ourselves insist that vehicles of all kinds must be eliminated later. Moreover, it is perfectly clear that Soviet insistence that these two measures must be undertaken immediately will in itself delay disarmament. This approach would prevent the immediate undertaking of those initial and controllable sound measures which are specified in the Western plan and recognized in the latest Soviet paper. We can, for example, here and now agree on measures to deny to outer space weapons of mass destruction, to increase protection against surprise attack through advance reports of missile launchings and through on-site inspection of missile launching sites. These are tangible measures which are now referred to in both the Western and the new Soviet proposals. The constant refusal of the Soviet side to discuss these measures until we have first agreed to eliminate free world bases has made it impossible to enter into discussion of the details of these important measures, which we both recognize to be important.

Moreover, we need not await complete agreement on all aspects of general and complete disarmament before we here discuss and agree to undertake initial concrete and useful measures. When we have reached agreement here on these initial controllable measures which can be safely undertaken by the States represented in this Committee -- and I emphasize "States represented in this Committee" -- before all States join us, we can proceed to seek agreement on those further measures required to reach our goal. These first steps are not partial measures. They are initial steps on the road to a complete agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. I hope that with these few remarks I have helped in some way to clarify our position so that Mr. Zorin may understand it.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Does anyone else wish to speak? If there are no further speakers, I will read out the communique:
"The thirty-ninth meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament was held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 15 June 1960 under the chairmanship of the representative of the Soviet Union.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 16 June 1960 at 10.30 a.m."

Are there any objections? The communiqué is adopted.

The meeting rose at 12.10 p.m.