FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THIRTY-EIGHTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva;
on Tuesday, 14 June 1960, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. MIZINCESCU (Romania)
Bulgaria:
Mr. M. TARABANOV
Mr. K. CHRISTOV
Mr. G. GUELEV

Canada:
Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. A.G. CAMPBELL
W/Cdr. R.J. MITCHELL

Czechoslovakia:
Mr. J. NOSEK
Lieut.-Gen. J. HECKO
Mr. Z. TRHLIK

France:
Mr. J. MOCH
Mr. M. LEGENDRE
Col. L. CONVERT

Italy:
Mr. G. MARTINO
Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. L. DAINELLI

Poland:
Mr. M. NASZOWSKI
Mr. M. BLUZSTAJN
Maj.-Gen. J. SLIMINSKI

Romania:
Mr. E. MEZINCESCU
Mr. C. BOGDAN
Col. C. POPA

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
Mr. V.A. ZORIN
Col.-Gen. A.A. GRYZLOV
Mr. A.A. ROSCHCHIN
PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:
- Rt. Hon. D. ORMSEY-GORE
- Maj.-Gen. RIDDELL
- Miss B. SALT

United States of America:
- Mr. F.M. EATON
- Mr. C.C. STELLE
- Rear-Admiral P.L. DUDLEY

Representative of the Secretary-General:
- Dr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General:
- Mr. W. EPSTEIN
The CHAIRMAN (Romania) (translation from French): The thirty-eighth meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament is called to order.

There are two speakers on my list so far: the representatives of France and of Italy. I call on the representative of France.

Mr. MUCH (France) (translation from French): When I spoke yesterday, 13 June, I dealt mainly with the time-limits and the time-table for disarmament and I summed up my statement in five points.

Mr. Zorin, the representative of the Soviet Union, though he said he would re-read my statement at leisure, which is quite natural, raised no particular objections to the considerations I put forward, and stated that, subject to additional explanations, his reply would be positive and favourable. I am glad of that.

In particular, I should value very highly Soviet approval of the fourth and fifth points of my conclusions of yesterday. For -- and I shall come back to this in a moment -- it would open up wider prospects for us.

Today I shall deal with another, even more fundamental difficulty, which took up a large part of the meetings during our previous negotiations, though we were never able to achieve a complete rapprochement of our points of view in full clarity. I refer to control.

First of all I must stress our constant and firm position of principle, which the delegation of the Soviet Union must realize is unchangeable. I can summarize it thus: even if, as we ardently desire, rapprochements were to appear on certain matters, the West would never accept an agreement on disarmament without an effective system of control providing the guarantees essential for security. I summed up that position six years ago, in a phrase which has often been quoted since: "Neither control without disarmament, nor disarmament without control".

It was precisely with that fundamental principle in mind that I referred yesterday to the possible differences of conception, application and general philosophy between the French and Soviet proposals.

I therefore urge our colleague, Mr. Zorin, and his Eastern partners, not only to pay attention to my statement -- which they certainly will -- and to
make precise replies to it, but also to believe that I am making it, not in order to render agreement more difficult, but, on the contrary, in order to facilitate agreement by clarifying certain basic problems.

I shall confine myself today to general considerations relating to the basic principles of any system of control, which I shall support if necessary, with numerous examples taken from the Soviet plan. If, as I hope, we find common ground for agreement, we shall then be able to proceed together to make detailed studies of the methods of applying those principles.

But first I should like to try to show the position which has now been reached, by summarizing what Mr. Zorin said during our first series of meetings and what I understand from the general provisions relating to control included in the new Soviet plan. After that, I shall show what, in our view, is still indefinite, and shall put questions to the representative of the Soviet Union in the spirit I have just explained.

During our first series of meetings we understood that the Soviet Government accepted:

the establishment of an international disarmament organization, responsible for control of the agreed disarmament measures;

the principle of control of the execution of each disarmament measure from its beginning until its completion, and the subsequent maintenance of such control;

the transmission, by each government, to the international disarmament organization, of declarations relating to its armaments and force levels;

effective control of the quantities of armaments and men eliminated;

application of control by international organs and inspectors.

Are we agreed on these starting points? I believe so, for these general principles are confirmed and, on some points, further developed in the new Soviet plan.

On the other hand, the plan contains no further information on the basic questions I have already had occasion to bring up, which have remained unanswered. Or rather, such information as it does contain unfortunately seems to give to my questions a negative and therefore unsatisfactory answer.

The first general problem -- there will be three in all -- concerns the necessary link between the studies, the agreements, and the implementation of
provisions relating, on the one hand, to disarmament measures and, on the other hand, to their control. We cannot content ourselves with a schematic formula, indicating that a specific operation will be controlled from beginning to end. The precise measures necessary for that purpose must be prescribed. Now certain provisions in the preamble to the new plan, like certain passages in Mr. Zorin's statement of 7 June, leave us in uncertainty, or even in anxiety.

The representative of the Soviet Union made one objection to our thesis in advance. He told us on 10 June:

"You take the position that there must be control from the very outset to the very end, and we agree with this. But if you take that position", Mr. Zorin continued, "how can you exercise control over this treaty, if you have not fixed time-limits for carrying out measures in each stage of the treaty?"  

This appears to the Soviet delegation to be neither logical, well-founded nor flexible.

But it is not our position. Here again we are in danger of misunderstanding each other, and I should like to try to clarify the positions of both sides.

We are willing to fix now the principles and final objectives of a disarmament treaty and time-limits — at least indicative time-limits — for carrying out the disarmament measures constituting a first stage. We do not think it realistic to go further or, in particular, to specify now the duration of the subsequent stages. I explained why yesterday and I will not revert to that. Those are, indeed, differences between us; but they will be much reduced if the Soviet Union confirms, as I hope it will, the interpretation I gave yesterday of the provisions of the Soviet plan concerning the significance and consequences of the report to the Security Council at the end of each stage.

Thus explained, the Western and Soviet positions would not be incompatible. We shall wait with great interest for confirmation of the interpretation to which I have just referred.

Here is a concrete example explaining our view: in sub-paragraph III a) of the preamble we read, and the Soviet representative confirmed this on 7 June, that the preparatory commission responsible for taking practical steps to establish an international control organization will only be set up after the signing of the treaty. It is true that further on we read that the general provisions relating to those steps, which would form the subject of an agreement,
would be embodied in the treaty on general and complete disarmament. Radio Moscow, replying to the Daily Mail on 11 June, confirmed this point.

These statements leave certain matters obscure, however: how can we follow a procedure whereby only necessarily vague general provisions on control would appear in the treaty, which must be signed without our knowing whether there will be a subsequent agreement on practical control measures?

In other words, if I have understood correctly, the following order of operations is proposed to us:

1. Signature of the treaty on general and complete disarmament;
2. Negotiation of the practical control measures in a preparatory commission;
3. Entry into force of the treaty and, simultaneously, setting up of the control bodies for the measures of the first stage.

What would happen — this is a question I put to all of us — if after the treaty had been signed, no agreement was reached in the preparatory commission? We should have subscribed to disarmament obligations without any corresponding control.

That, I can say definitely, is a situation in which the French Government cannot agree to be placed. It is a risk it refuses to run.

I must therefore make it clear, once again, that the French Government will only agree to the application of real disarmament measures, which it strongly desires, if it can be certain of the simultaneous establishment and effective operation of the corresponding control system.

The establishment of these systems — I shall give examples of it in a later statement — which will differ considerably from one disarmament measure to another, calls for joint studies which will sometimes be technically difficult, unanimous conclusions, and precise agreements culminating in the setting up of an international body with the necessary powers and means to carry out its task.

The chronology of the operations should thus be as follows:

1. Negotiation of disarmament measures and the corresponding control measures, both general and practical;
2. Signature of a treaty embodying both kinds of measures;
3. Entry into force of the treaty and, simultaneously, setting up of the control bodies for the measures of the first stage.
Thus you see the difference between the two chronologies, which both end with an identical third term.

If, as I hope, these principles and this order of events are accepted by the Soviet Government, more detailed questions could be put about the practical application of the principles.

The second general problem also concerns a fundamental issue of which I spoke at length during the first series of meetings. That will enable me to be brief today.

Hitherto, we have understood, subject to correction, that the Soviet Government accepts control over the quantities of armaments eliminated or destroyed. But it has said nothing about control over either the quantities of the same armaments existing previously, or the quantities remaining after reductions.

I want to be very precise. The mere verification of destructions or eliminations is not very effective, and is only of limited interest. If the treaty lays down, for example, that a particular army can only keep 1,000 tanks of a given type at the end of the first stage, what is the use of ascertaining that it has scrapped 500, if it is impossible to verify either that it had 1,500 before, or that it has only 1,000 afterwards? For if it had possessed 2,000 before the reduction, it would have 1,500 afterwards, and not 1,000.

In other words, if the Soviet representative considers that verification of the total number on hand before or after the prescribed operation constitutes an act of espionage, ascertaining the destructions carried out, to which the Soviet Government agrees, is useless, since it provides no assurance whatever that the treaty is being properly implemented.

The French Government cannot be content with such partial control. It is the whole of the remaining armaments which it is necessary to know, at the same time as the quantities eliminated.

Will the Soviet Union representative reply that this knowledge of the equipment retained in service can be derived directly from the initial declarations of the government concerned, by deducting the quantities whose elimination has been observed? If that were his position, I should answer in advance that it renders the control operations entirely worthless, since it makes them dependent on the good faith of everyone concerned and on mutual trust, when it is that good faith which has to be proved and that trust which has to be restored.
If, on the other hand, the Soviet representative gives us the necessary explanations, and if he confirms that control should make it possible to know not only what has been eliminated, but also the quantities that remain, we shall be able to pursue our joint studies on the organization and control procedures provided for in the new Soviet plan.

The foregoing question leads me to put a third and last one, which is also of a general nature, for it applies to most of the measures envisaged in the Soviet plan. I shall formulate it as follows:

Any control body, to be effective, must possess attributes of two different kinds. First, it operates in accordance with information supplied to it by the government accepting control. This might be called its passive role. It has no initiative in the matter. It is informed, for example, that a particular arsenal contains so much equipment of a given type. It checks on the spot that the stock on hand corresponds to the information supplied.

But it must also be able to assure itself that undeclared equipment of the same kind does not exist elsewhere than in the arsenal indicated. This should be regarded as its active role, as opposed to the passive role I have just described.

Does the Soviet Government agree that the body responsible for controlling a given operation must be able to play this active role as well as the passive role?

Mr. Zorin, incidentally, felt this need and expressed it in a phrase which I at once noted, when he told us on 10 June that if all the means of delivery of nuclear weapons are liquidated, it would seem not only difficult, but impossible, to commit aggression with nuclear weapons; but he immediately added -- and very rightly in my view -- this little phrase which I quote textually:

"... unless we assume that someone will be concealing some such means of delivery". (TNCD/PV.36, page 15)

That is, indeed, the whole problem, and Mr. Zorin's reservation -- unless we assume that someone will conceal etc. -- is equally applicable to the vehicles for nuclear weapons, the weapons themselves, conventional armaments and force levels. The Soviet representative thus emphasized in advance -- and I am tempted to thank him for it -- the importance of the question I have just put.

If the answer is in the negative, that is to say if the Soviet Government refuses investigations of the second type -- the active type -- and assimilates them
to espionage, and if, consequently, it only agrees to those of the first type, we are brought back once again to a situation which presupposes international trust -- a trust which would, incidentally, make control entirely superfluous. For the inspectors would only be able to verify the stocks declared by the government accepting control. They would thus have to accept such declarations as honest. They would not be entitled to look for deception. Thus there would be no control, but merely stock-taking, as practised in the stores of large undertakings. This would be a mere travesty of control, by which no certainty of disarmament could be obtained and no measure of trust restored.

If the answer is in the affirmative, on the other hand, and control is to have the necessary freedom of action, then we shall be ready to discuss the practical procedures for application of this principle, as of the preceding ones, with the hope that our discussions may be fruitful.

I shall sum up what I have said -- at the risk of repeating myself -- for it is our duty to be extremely clear.

Do the Eastern delegations agree:

(1) that the control procedures shall be discussed before the signature of the disarmament treaty, and that they shall be embodied in the treaty and put into effect to the full extent required for the first stage as soon as the treaty comes into force, and to the extent required for the other stages when they are begun;

(2) that the control authorities shall be able to observe not only what equipment has been eliminated, but also the quantities remaining after such elimination, to the full extent necessary to verify their conformity with obligations under the treaty;

(3) that the control authorities shall be able to verify not only the accuracy of the declarations made by the governments accepting control, but also their honesty, by making certain, in accordance with procedures to be discussed, that there are none of those clandestine stocks the danger of which -- as I have said -- was recognized by Mr. Zorin.

The Soviet delegation will perhaps reproach us for reverting to questions which have been raised before. I assure it in concluding, as I did in beginning my statement, that I raise them not in order to embarrass it, or in a spirit of controversy which is far from being mine, but in a desire for sincere collaboration. For after devoting so many years to disarmament, I earnestly hope that it will at last got under way and be quickly carried out.
But those questions dominate our subject. It would never be possible to make any progress in studying a disarmament plan, however interesting its provisions, unless both sides clarified their views on the major preliminaries. Such explanations will make our task easier and enable us to make rapid progress in joint studies. I have set forth, as clearly as possible, our position on the basic principles of control. I believe it to be reasonable and in conformity both with the security needs of each nation and with the necessity for restoring international trust. I most sincerely hope that it is compatible with the position of the Soviet Government, and I reserve the right to continue this analysis later.

Mr. MARTINO (Italy) (translation from French): When I spoke on 7 June, at the resumption of our work, I stated the Italian delegation's intention of studying the new Soviet proposals carefully and thoroughly; not, I said, in order to point out what might appear negative from the Western point of view, but rather in order to abstract whatever, from that point of view, might appear to represent progress or an improvement on the previous proposals -- in short, in order to bring out the positive aspects. (cf. TNCD/PV.33, page 19)

It is in this spirit that during the last few days we have made a thorough study of the Soviet document and I am now in a position to give the Italian delegation's first deliberate and considered views.

At last Friday's meeting Mr. Zorin, the representative of the Soviet Union, was at great pains to stress the effort made by his Government to bring its positions closer to those of the Western Governments represented here, so that our negotiations might continue on ground more productive of useful results. I wish to acknowledge to the Soviet Union representative that a reading of the new document does indeed show this desire to bring our positions closer together and the effort made by the Soviet Government to facilitate the continuation of our work by making some concessions to the Western viewpoint. We can even say, without presumption, that the changes made in the Soviet plan -- at least some of them -- go rather beyond more concessions to the Western viewpoint: they are concessions to common sense and logic.

In particular I can see a rapprochement in the following matters:
1. International organization for the preservation of peace. This is one of the subjects which provoked the most striking differences of opinion and the most lively discussions between the two sides during our first series of meetings. By its new proposals, the Soviet Union recognizes the necessity for providing an international organ with its own police force, which could be entrusted with the task of preventing or putting down international aggression. Disregarding for the time being the methods of doing this proposed by the Soviet Government, to which we shall have occasion to revert later, we can say that this acceptance of one of our relatively important contentions can only be welcomed with the greatest satisfaction.

2. Control. There is no doubt that the new Soviet proposals give a much more important place to control than did Mr. Khrushchev's proposals of 18 September 1959; and Mr. Zorin, in transmitting his Government's note to our Ambassador in Moscow, was kind enough to say that the new document took account of the proposals on control made by the Italian delegation at Geneva.

Although we acknowledge to the Soviet delegation that progress has been made in this matter, we must confess that the Soviet proposals on international control, in their present form, are still far from being in accord with those of the Italian delegation. At the risk of repeating the arguments advanced several times during our first series of meetings, we intend to explain later, with regard to the substance, the reasons why we are in partial disagreement with the Soviet understanding of this question. Let us say for the moment that, of course, we accept without reservation the idea that control must apply to disarmament, i.e. that there must be no control without disarmament. On the other hand, we cannot agree with the view that control cannot be applied to the subject of the disarmament agreement.

If the agreement relates to quantities of armaments to be eliminated or destroyed or to armed forces to be disbanded, then control must apply to the operations of elimination and destruction and to those of disembament. But if, on the contrary, the agreement relates to specified levels of armed forces and armaments to be attained, control must apply to the limits or levels of armaments and armed forces. That is the most elementary logic. Control serves to assure each of the contracting parties that the agreement will be respected and scrupulously implemented by all the others. To fulfill the function assigned to it, control must be permanently and rigorously applied to the subject of the agreement. Otherwise the instrument will become inadequate by force of circumstances; and its inadequacies can only serve to engender distrust, which in itself will make agreement rather difficult.
I shall say no more on this matter for the moment, especially as the French representative has already made a very important and detailed statement on it this morning.

3. Joint studies. This, in appearance at least, is perhaps the most tangible concession made by the new Soviet proposals to the Western viewpoint. We all remember the irony, and even sarcasm, with which our Eastern colleagues referred in this very room to the numerous joint studies provided for in the first stage of the plan presented by the five Western Powers. The fact that the Soviet side now recognizes the necessity for joint study of the technical aspects of the disarmament process is undoubtedly a sign of goodwill.

The joint studies provided for in the new Soviet proposals relate only to the cut-off and the destruction of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and to the organization and preservation of peace. But those are not the only complex and difficult problems calling for joint studies; there are others which should be taken into consideration. It would thus be advisable to set up a working party composed of representatives of the ten delegations to examine the question and submit its conclusions to the Conference within a reasonably short time.

The introduction to the Soviet document submitted on 7 June rightly states, in the last paragraph on page 1, that "many types of armaments become obsolete and are scrapped even before they have left the factories". (TNCD/6/Rev.1) On 23 October 1959, the Italian representative at the United Nations General Assembly drew attention to this problem of the quick rate of progress of modern technology; I quote the original English text:

(continued in English)

"The particular nature of modern technology and science not only has in fact profoundly revolutionized the strategy of war, but has brought about radical consequences which I would like to list tentatively as follows:

"First, the continued change and evolution of means of aggression on a large and ever more unpredictable scale.

"Second, the pre-eminent value — for peace — acquired by security measures in respect of disarmament measures.

"Third, the increasing difficulties of controlling tests, production, installations and nuclear 'stockpiles'." (A/6.1/PV.1031, page 38)
(translation from French)

The passage in the Soviet document to which I referred was probably included for reasons very different from those the Italian representative at the General Assembly had in mind. But the substance of the problem remains the same. Moreover, the fact that provision is made for studies, inter alia, of sectors in which there are very many unknowns confirms Soviet concern with this problem.

I should now like to anticipate the course of the discussion by asking Mr. Zorin two questions about these studies.

First, why are these studies provided for in some sectors and not in others that are quite as important?

Secondly, why are these studies not really conceived as a preliminary to any true disarmament measure?

I will at once introduce another element into this initial exchange of views: the continuity of technical development. As we know, this affects security, balance, and the demands of gradation, and there follows from it the need to provide for setting up a permanent study organ which can ensure the effectiveness of disarmament and of the corresponding control better than any general or comprehensive undertaking given long before the actual time of implementation.

4. Nuclear disarmament. One of the Western criticisms of Mr. Khrushchev's previous proposals concerned the absence of concrete measures of nuclear disarmament in the first stages of the Soviet plan. Conventional weapons would have been abolished, but whereas the countries lacking nuclear weapons would be disarmed, the countries possessing such weapons would remain powerfully armed. It was only at the end of the disarmament process that the countries possessing nuclear weapons would have been required to destroy them.

In the new Soviet proposals the situation is reversed. Nuclear disarmament comes first, and conventional disarmament follows. Mr. Zorin has told us that this reversal is especially well calculated to meet a desire of the French delegation; it was indeed the French delegation which proposed that the nuclear threat be removed by abolishing all means of delivering nuclear charges.

We do not wish to suggest, as others have intimated in a friendly manner, that the Soviet change of front is intended to open a breach in Western solidarity. I will merely say that the new solution would, in the first stage, dangerously change the present balance of forces in Europe, to the point of making any agreement absolutely impossible.
The need to maintain the present balance of forces is, however, explicitly acknowledged in the Soviet document, which specifies that
"...the process of disarmament [shall be] carried out gradually, in ... consecutive stages, bearing in mind that at no stage shall any State gain military advantages over other States as a result of the course of disarmament". (TNOD/6/Rev.1, page 7)

Everyone knows the ratio of the conventional forces of the East and the West in Europe. The abolition of nuclear weapons and the retention of conventional armaments would give Eastern Europe a marked advantage. That advantage would be even greater if, at the same time, as the Soviet plan requires, United States and British troops had to be withdrawn from the continent of Europe, and their depots and bases liquidated. All foreign troops stationed on the territory of any country would, under paragraph 2 of the first stage of the Soviet plan,
"... be withdrawn from foreign territories to within their own national frontiers. Foreign military bases and depots of all kinds ... will be eliminated." (Ibid, page 8)

This amounts to saying that during the first stage of disarmament, Western Europe would have to abandon its own defences completely, whereas the Soviet Union would maintain its powerful conventional armament intact and fully effective.

As to Mr. Zorin's argument that the Soviet Union too would withdraw its forces from the territories of the eastern European communist countries, nobody can attach any importance to that. Between those countries and the Soviet Union there is no ocean such as that which separates the countries of Western Europe from America, but only easy country which can be quickly traversed by modern armoured vehicles.

That being so, can it really be maintained that the new plan is so conceived that no one can gain any military advantage as a result of disarmament at any stage?

It is true that there would remain the written undertaking to carry out conventional disarmament subsequently. But there is nothing to prevent that undertaking, in practice, from being like the famous note sent, as a pledge of fidelity, by Ninon de Lenclos to M. de la Châtre, when he was leaving for the wars — a note which on his return made him an object of derision to his fellow citizens, who pointed at him exclaiming, "A fine I.O.U. La Châtre has!"
If maintenance of the balance of forces is really the objective sincerely sought, then we should endeavour to make nuclear disarmament and conventional disarmament go hand in hand, by a suitably graduated process. Otherwise there would be justification for questioning the honesty and sincerity of the intentions underlying the new Soviet proposals.

I have given a brief outline of some of the main themes. My reason for discussing them is that they constitute the constructive element in the new Soviet proposals. The concern now shown by the Soviet Union has long been felt by the Western delegations. The Italian delegation therefore proposes that each of these themes, together with others, should now be thoroughly studied by both sides and that each side should provide further clarification.

I venture to hope that Mr. Zorin and the other representatives of the countries of Eastern Europe will take the initiative. For it is only on the basis of thorough study and clarification that we shall be able to undertake the examination of concrete procedures for controlled disarmament.

I will even go so far as to propose that the study of these questions be entrusted to working parties, if indeed the hope that I have expressed is well-founded and the Soviet Union is willing to follow a course more consonant with reality. That would also be the best evidence of good faith that could be given with a view to further progress in our common task.

The CHAIRMAN (Romania) (translation from French): If no other member of the Committee wishes to speak, I should like to speak as head of the Romanian delegation.

The resumed proceedings of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament are dominated by the new proposals submitted by the Soviet Government in agreement with the Governments of the socialist States represented on the Committee. These proposals show once more the sincere desire of the socialist countries to reach agreement on general and complete disarmament.

The Romanian Government considers that the draft "Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament" submitted by the Soviet Government provide a realistic programme for solving the disarmament problem under effective international control, in accordance with the resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations.
These new proposals represent an attempt to build on the negotiations which took place during the Committee’s first series of meetings. They take account of the views expressed by the Western delegations and provide a new basis for useful negotiations with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable agreement in the shortest possible time.

The people and Government of Romania wholeheartedly support the new proposals of the Soviet Government, which are a contribution it would be difficult to underestimate towards the accomplishment of the task assigned to the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament.

This has, moreover, been shown by the favourable reception given to the new Soviet proposals by public opinion throughout the world.

At this stage of our discussions the Romanian delegation wishes to call attention to three aspects which most clearly show the constructive character of the new proposals submitted to the Committee for consideration.

General and complete disarmament remains the goal of the new proposals of the Soviet Government supported by the other socialist countries. On that point, I must say, there is no change in the position of the socialist countries and there can be no change.

General and complete disarmament is unequivocally defined in the document as the situation in which, after the total elimination of States' armed forces and armaments of all kinds, the abolition of their military establishment and of military conscription for citizens, States would retain at their disposal only strictly limited contingents of police (militia), equipped with light firearms, for maintaining internal order and ensuring the personal security of citizens.

The new Soviet proposals provide the basic elements for drafting a treaty which should include the programme and constitute the international legal instrument on the basis of which general and complete disarmament would be carried out in progressive stages under effective international control.

I wish to confirm the correctness of an assumption put forward yesterday by the representative of France. The socialist countries regard the new proposals as a basis for discussion. As to the flexibility and adaptability of the socialist countries’ position, I think the new proposals themselves provide very eloquent proof. The fact that in drafting the new proposals the position of the Western
countries has been taken into consideration as far as possible, has been pointed out both by certain representatives who have spoken since the resumption of our work and by public opinion.

It is in the same spirit of flexibility and adaptability that we shall consider any concrete proposal or any suggestion by the Western delegations which is calculated to facilitate the conclusion of a mutually acceptable agreement, first on the "Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament" and then on the disarmament treaty itself.

I must point out that up to this stage in our discussions, although innumerable questions have been asked, most of which did not concern essential elements of the subject of our negotiations, no such proposals or suggestions have been made.

The second point I wish to draw attention to is that the new proposals of the socialist countries contain a full and detailed exposition of the basic principles and methods of control by which execution of a programme of general and complete disarmament should be verified. The inclusion of such an exposition in the document submitted by the Soviet Union is further evidence of the desire of the socialist countries to remove all obstacles to an agreement -- even those which have been raised deliberately and without any justification.

In the much debated question of control, to judge from the statements made in the Committee by the Western representatives themselves, there was a considerable rapprochement, if not an identity of views, between the socialist countries and the Western countries, at least on the general principles and methods of control necessary for carrying out disarmament measures.

In our opinion, this measure of agreement would have enabled us to pass on to the practical examination of a programme of general and complete disarmament and the corresponding control systems, if only the Western Powers had shown the desire to do so.

Referring to the new Soviet proposals in connexion with control, Mr. Eaton, the United States representative, said the other day that:

"This could be a welcome development if it means that the Soviet delegation is prepared to discuss in concrete terms the requirements for verification of specific disarmament measures". (TNCD/PV.36, page 5)
My delegation has already had occasion, during the Committee's first series of meetings, to resist the attempt to replace the negotiation of an agreement on general and complete disarmament by sterile discussions on control itself, apart from any agreement on disarmament. Our position has not changed since then.

The socialist countries have always been in favour of broad and effective control over any disarmament programme and over all real disarmament measures. We are still in favour of controlled disarmament and opposed to arms control, which can only mean legalizing espionage at the international level to the advantage of the instigators of aggressive war.

We consider that control provisions should be negotiated at the same time as disarmament measures and should form an integral part of the treaty on general and complete disarmament; that is expressly stated in the new proposals submitted to the Committee. That answers at least one of the questions put by the French representative in his statement today.

The third essential aspect of the Soviet Government's new proposals is the great effort at conciliation they represent. The new document submitted for consideration by the Committee shows that the socialist countries have gone some way to meet the views of the NATO countries, and in re-formulating their proposals have taken account of all the criticisms and suggestions of the Western countries that are compatible with the goal set for our work, i.e. general and complete disarmament. Although the representatives of the Western countries have been very reluctant to give their views so far, they have been unable to refrain from noting the attempts at rapprochement made by the socialist countries.

No matter whether we consider nuclear disarmament, the vehicles for nuclear weapons, the preservation of peace in a disarmed world, the scope and position of conventional disarmament or the time-limits for implementation, the socialist countries have gone as far as possible to meet the views and desires expressed by their Western partners.

During the first series of meetings of our Conference, the Western delegations stressed, for instance, the need to give a higher priority, in the plan for general and complete disarmament, to nuclear disarmament measures. At that time the socialist countries said they would agree to complete nuclear
disarmament being carried out in the first stage of the programme of general
and complete disarmament, i.e. to the prohibition of nuclear weapons, to
cessation of their manufacture and to the destruction of stocks of these weapons.

The Western delegations did not accept this approach to the problem, their
main argument being the impossibility of controlling prohibition of the use of
nuclear weapons. In this connexion the French representative said:

"The aim is to make any nuclear attack physically impossible before
proclaiming moral prohibitions not amenable to control or giving
undertakings not to use nuclear weapons in certain circumstances. Such
prohibitions can crown the work of disarmament, but cannot be its
foundation". (TNCD/FV.22, page 9).

While the plan submitted on 16 March by the five Western Powers (TNCD/3)
did propose some measures of control over the means of delivering nuclear weapons,
the French representative said that we should:

"Tackle — while there is still time — the means of carrying these
weapons — satellites, missiles, aircraft, aircraft carriers, submarines,
launching ramps, etc. Once the vehicles have been banned and destroyed,
the military stocks of nuclear weapons will appear worthless."
(TNCD/FV.1, page 16)

The new proposals of the socialist countries, as can be seen, have embodied
the French suggestions on vehicles for nuclear weapons, together with some other
provisions of the Western plan. The first stage of the new plan submitted by
the Soviet Union includes elimination from the armed forces of States, cessation
of the manufacture, and destruction, of all means of delivering nuclear weapons,
including strategic and tactical rockets, pilotless aircraft and military
aircraft of all types, surface warships and submarines, artillery systems and
any other means that can be used as vehicles for atomic and hydrogen weapons.

Under the new proposals,

"From the very beginning of the first stage and until the final
destruction of all means of delivering nuclear weapons, the placing into
orbit or stationing in outer space of any special devices, the leaving of
their territorial waters by warships and the flying beyond the limits of
their national territory by military aircraft capable of carrying weapons
of mass destruction, will be prohibited." (TNCD/6/Rev.1, page 8).
It is also provided that

"The launching of rockets will be carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes and in accordance with predetermined and mutually agreed criteria, and will be accompanied by agreed measures of verification, including inspection at the rocket launching sites." (Ibid.)

These provisions reproduce the essential part of paragraphs A and B of the second stage of the Western plan. (TNCD/3)

The first stage of the socialist countries' plan also provides that

"States having nuclear weapons at their disposal will undertake not to transfer such weapons, or to transmit information necessary for their manufacture, to States which do not possess them. At the same time, States not possessing nuclear weapons will undertake to refrain from manufacturing them." (TNCD/6/Rev. 1, page 9)

The introduction of this point calls the Committee's attention to General Assembly resolution 1380 (XIV) which suggests that the Ten-nation Committee on Disarmament should consider appropriate means of averting the danger of an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons -- a resolution which the Powers that supported it at the time seem to have forgotten. According to that resolution, such an increase would have the effect of "aggravating international tension and the difficulty of maintaining world peace, and thus rendering more difficult the attainment of general disarmament agreement".

In the first stage of the new proposals it is also provided that

"joint studies will be undertaken of the measures to be implemented in the second stage relating to the discontinuance of the manufacture of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and to the destruction of stockpiles of such weapons." (Ibid.)

This provision reproduces the essentials of paragraph F, sub-paragraphs 3 and 4, of the first stage of the Western plan. (See TNCD/3, page 2)

The new document submitted to the Committee sets forth in detail the concrete control measures needed to verify that the disarmament measures provided for are carried out.

The elimination from the armaments of States, and the destruction, of military rockets, aircraft, surface warships and submarines that can be used as vehicles for atomic or hydrogen weapons would take place under on-site
international control. International control would extend to military bases, airfields, ports and rocket launching sites, and to enterprises, plants, factories and shipyards previously engaged wholly or in part in the production of rockets, aircraft, surface warships, submarines or any other means of delivering nuclear weapons.

It is also provided that, by agreement, permanent control teams may be established at some plants and installations and that, like the inspection teams, they will have the right to carry out a thorough examination of rocket devices to be launched for peaceful purposes, and to be present at their launching.

I have mentioned these control provisions because they show what full particulars are given in the new proposals and prove that the question of control can no longer be invoked as a reason for refusing or postponing discussion of the basic provisions of the disarmament treaty.

The complete prohibition, under effective international control, of nuclear, chemical, biological and other weapons of mass destruction, together with the cessation of manufacture and the destruction of all stockpiles of such weapons, are provided for in the new proposals of the socialist countries for the second stage of a programme of general and complete disarmament.

A short while ago the Italian representative again took up the argument that in view of the contents of the first and second stages, the new proposals might cause a change in the present balance of forces in Europe. According to him, the elimination of vehicles for nuclear weapons from the armaments of States and the liquidation of military bases on foreign territory would alter the present balance and give the countries of Eastern Europe a military advantage over those of Western Europe.

The representative of Italy, like the United States representative — who was the first to raise this problem — has not yet replied to the concrete questions asked about it. These representatives have not told the Committee how such a change in the balance might be brought about, neither have they explained how they consider, for instance, that trust can be restored in international relations. If we were to give up all vehicles for nuclear weapons, but to leave intact the military bases situated all round the frontiers of the socialist countries, which are equipped, as we know, with all the devices and vehicles needed to launch an attack against the socialist countries at any time, not to mention other aims to which attention has been specially drawn by certain recent incidents, do they really believe that they could promote trust between States?
I should also like to point out in all seriousness to the representatives of the Western countries that we will give any clarification that might really lead to progress in our discussions for negotiation of the basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. But that does not mean that we can agree to the Western countries indefinitely postponing a clear statement of their position on the basic ideas of our proposals. It does not mean that we shall allow ourselves to be drawn into discussion on matters of secondary importance and thus diverted from what should be the main subject of our debates. Since the Italian representative has raised the question of joint studies, I should like to observe in passing that it is true we have recognized the necessity for carrying out such studies in the first stage of a disarmament programme. But that does not mean, for example, that the appointment of a working party to examine the problem of the studies required during a disarmament programme, or of a permanent body for that purpose, could assist the progress of our negotiations in any way.

I shall now revert to an idea which I had occasion to expound to the Committee before the recess. If certain Western representatives regard such studies as a means which should help us reach a conclusion on the possibility or impossibility of general and complete disarmament, I must say that we do not share that point of view at all. I think—and I believe this is not only my opinion or the opinion of the socialist countries, but the profound conviction of increasingly large sections of public opinion—that the possibility of carrying out general and complete disarmament is a matter which should hardly be questioned. We have before us the very clear terms of a resolution adopted unanimously by all the States Members of the United Nations, which recognizes general and complete disarmament as the most important problem facing the world today and calls upon all States to make the effort needed to achieve a solution of this problem in the shortest possible time (See A/RES/1378(XIV)).

If the Italian representative regards these studies as a means of settling the question whether disarmament is possible or not, that confirms the impression that certain delegations have come here not to carry out the mandate of the United Nations General Assembly, but for other purposes.
As regards the technical problems to be solved during our negotiations, and in particular during the execution of a programme of general and complete disarmament, we still have a long way to go. We must agree on the definition of the objective of our negotiations, which is very clearly stated in the new proposals, on the operations to be carried out in a programme of disarmament, on the actual programme of successive stages under international control, etc., which must form the basis of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. It must be noted that so far the discussion of precisely those basic ideas of the new proposals has been avoided. That is not calculated to help us to make progress in our discussions.

As to the question raised the other day by the United Kingdom representative regarding the disposal of fissionable materials contained in nuclear warheads, the socialist countries consider that all recoverable fissionable materials destined for military use should be recovered and used for peaceful purposes.

We think that once agreement has been reached on the questions of principle it will be easy to reach agreement on this problem, which is one of those I referred to just now as diverting us from the main substance of our discussion.

I should also like to point out that the progressive measures proposed by the socialist countries substantially reduce the military potential of States as early as the first stage. The abolition of all vehicles capable of delivering nuclear weapons and of military bases on foreign territory, fixed or floating, to use the expression of the President of the French Republic, would have the effect of considerably reducing the risks of a nuclear war, if not of eliminating them entirely. The implementation of the measures provided for in the first stage of the socialist countries' plan also solves the problem of surprise attack, which contemporary military thought recognizes as being linked to nuclear weapons and their vehicles, of whatever kind they may be.

In support of this opinion here, for example, is what Contrôleur-Général of the Army Genevey wrote last year:

"Surprise means, in fact, the use of instruments of surprise. Today these instruments are called long-range aircraft, ballistic missiles, submarines -- any vehicle for nuclear weapons."
By proposing the elimination of all means of delivering nuclear weapons and the liquidation of military bases on foreign territory which make the aggressor's targets accessible to vehicles of more limited capabilities, the new Soviet proposals practically eliminate the danger of a surprise attack as early as the first stage.

As we see it, the situation as a whole since the resumption of our discussions clearly shows that the socialist countries have taken advantage of the recess to make fresh efforts to gain a better understanding and to find points of rapprochement between the positions of the two sides, with a view to facilitating the progress of negotiations on general and complete disarmament.

It must be noted, however, that the Western countries, which do not appear to have made any effort during the recess to meet the socialist views, are putting off explaining their attitude towards the essence of the new proposals of the socialist countries.

The trend shown in the statements of certain Western representatives is calculated to lead us backwards, rather than to help the Committee go forward in its work.

The United States representative, for instance, proposed that we should again consider the proposals made by the five Western Powers at the beginning of the Conference -- proposals which the Italian representative himself admitted, at the same meeting, could no longer be regarded as an acceptable basis for discussion.

It appears that certain Western representatives -- in particular the representative of the United States -- understand our Committee's work of negotiation solely with reference to the effort the socialist countries should make to come closer to the Western positions, which should and can remain immobile, unchanged and unchangeable.

That is a strange position from which to preach flexibility and adaptability to the socialist countries.

The socialist countries have given eloquent proof of their desire to negotiate an agreement on general and complete disarmament, by taking the positions of their Western partners into account as far as possible in their new proposals.

It would be a great mistake to conclude from this that the socialist countries accept inequality of the parties as a principle of negotiation.
We reiterate the desire of the socialist countries that the representatives of the Western Powers should comment on the substance and the essence of the new proposals submitted by the Soviet Union, and we consider that the Western countries should make an equal effort to meet the proposals of the socialist countries. It is only through equal efforts by both sides, directed towards one and the same goal in a spirit of mutual understanding, that progress can be made in the negotiations on a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

Mr. ORMSBY-GORE (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, first of all I would like to thank you in your capacity as representative of Romania for answering one of the questions that I put in my statement yesterday concerning the transfer of fissionable material to peaceful uses. In giving a very clear answer the representative of Romania said that of course this was a comparatively minor matter and was not the crux of our negotiations. I would certainly agree with him about that. Still it is useful that we have clarified that particular point.

He urged us not to be diverted from the important subjects which are before us into a discussion of minor points. On the other hand he and, I think, all the representatives of the Eastern European States have made it very clear that they regard this question of control over disarmament as of major importance; that this is not a minor matter.

Therefore I was interested to hear what he had to say about control arrangements. In particular he referred us to paragraph 7 in the first stage of the latest Soviet proposals, concerning control, where it is stated:

"The control organization will have the right to inspect ... all enterprises, plants, factories and shipyards, previously engaged wholly or in part in the production of rockets, aircraft, surface warships, submarines and any other means of delivering nuclear weapons ..."

(TNCD/6/Rev.1. page 9)

I wish particularly to stress the words "factories and shipyards previously engaged", because what I would like the representative of Romania to explain is, how do we have an assurance under this arrangement that other factories that were not previously engaged in this task are not now making aircraft or rockets? I think if we could have an answer to that question we would see very much more clearly the extent of the control which is provided for in the first stage.
Mr. MOCH (France) (translation from French): I most heartily endorse what Mr. Ormsby-Gore has just said. The sentence he read is, indeed, one of those I should have quoted as an example to show the difference between the active role and the passive role of control. The factories previously engaged in producing the equipment in question, having been declared by the government, constitute the passive object of control and do not give us, as Mr. Ormsby-Gore has just said and as I emphasized in discussing one of my three questions this morning, any guarantee that clandestine manufacture has not been resumed elsewhere. There are cases in which it is difficult, for we know the few factories capable of such manufacture, but there are other cases in which it is less complicated to start up clandestine manufacture and the question asked by Mr. Ormsby-Gore, like the one I asked earlier, is therefore of decisive importance for our discussions.

The CHAIRMAN (Romania) (translation from French): I apologize to the Committee if I am making undue use of my position as to-day's Chairman, but I should like to reply to the two questions raised by the representatives of the United Kingdom and France by putting another question.

Am I to understand from the way in which the representatives of the United Kingdom and France put their questions, that their Governments agree to the measures we have proposed in paragraph 1 of our "Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament", which I can of course read out if it is considered necessary? If the reply to this question of really capital importance is in the affirmative, we can take all the necessary steps to go into the fullest detail on the problem of control. It is to this question, which has been asked before, that the representatives of the Western countries have not yet given any reply and it is really essential that they should do so.

I apologize to the Committee again for having intervened in the discussion and, resuming my function as Chairman, I now ask if anyone else wishes to speak.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Since no other Western representative wishes to speak, and since the questions raised today are of considerable interest both to us and to those who follow the Committee's work, I would like to speak about these questions and also deal with certain general positions of principle which have emerged in the course of our discussions.
In the first place I would like to say a few words about today's statement by Mr. Moch.

I followed carefully the entire statement of his position on the important question of control and I must say it seems that, as a result of the work we did in the first stage of our negotiations, and perhaps also as a result of Mr. Moch's own efforts as representative of France, our positions are very close, and even identical, on most, if not on all, of the questions of control to which he referred.

Indeed, Mr. Moch spoke about the way the French delegation understands the Soviet Government's position on the principles of control; he mentioned in particular that the Soviet Government, like the Government of France, accepts the establishment of an international control organ. (I would prefer not to use the term "international disarmament organization", because I believe we should give this body a name which at once defines its essential functions; therefore we speak of an "international control organization" and not of a "disarmament organization".)

Further, he said that we accept the principle of control of the execution of each measure from its beginning until its completion, and that declarations relating to armaments and force levels would be sent to the international control organ. He spoke about the application of on-site control by the international control organization and international inspectors, etc. The points he mentioned at the beginning of his statement call for no comment on my part. They do in fact, as a whole, reflect our position.

Mr. Moch went on to say that on some questions, and particularly the question of time-limits and control, there were points as to the meaning of which he was not clear. In that connexion, I believe that his reference to his statement of yesterday, and to the reply we gave to it, shows very clearly that our position on this matter is flexible.

We believe that, by further consideration of the general disarmament plan and appropriate control measures, we shall probably be able to find a common approach and a common view on this question. Therefore I do not feel it necessary to dwell on this question in greater detail now.

Further, Mr. Moch told us how he understands our scheme or chronology for control, and the scheme he thinks it appropriate to suggest. I must say that in describing our scheme he was not quite accurate, for he said for some reason that
the first point in our scheme was the signature of a treaty without any control measures, if I understood him correctly. That is not our position. We propose the conclusion of a treaty in which control measures precisely would be included. We are in favour of this.

Further, he said that he is somewhat anxious about negotiations in the preparatory commission. I do not understand why he is anxious about them, since the task of the preparatory commission is clearly defined. In our preamble, item III(a), it is stated that:

"immediately after the signing of the treaty a preparatory commission will be set up with the task of taking practical steps to establish an international organization for the control of general and complete disarmament." (TNCD/6/Rev.1, page 7)

It is quite clear that we intend the preparatory commission to proceed with the practical organization of control. Does this really call for objections from the French representative? I cannot quite understand why it gives rise to doubts or objections. I think this is due to a misunderstanding. Perhaps you do not understand exactly what we intend here. We intend that the preparatory commission shall engage in a practical consideration of all questions connected with the organization of control, on the basis of the main provisions of the treaty, which will lay down both the disarmament measures and the main control measures.

True, this commission may discuss particular points of detail — indeed it will be difficult to imagine that we can settle all the details of the treaty in advance. To settle all the details will obviously be impossible. But we shall certainly have to determine the basic provisions dealing with the substance of control, and we certainly shall determine them, with you, if of course you accept the disarmament measures themselves. We must of course agree on disarmament measures; otherwise there is no sense in talking about control. At all events, I do not see any differences between us on this matter.

Mr. Moch then dealt with item III of the Soviet scheme — the coming into force of the treaty and the establishment of the control organ. Under our scheme, however, the preparatory commission is to carry out all the preparatory work in this respect; this will already include the actual deployment of control elements at their sites, preparation, complete selection of the persons who are to carry out this control, etc., etc.
Perhaps the reason why France has some difficulty in understanding our proposal regarding the preparatory commission is that France is not taking part in the negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. In those negotiations, too, it is proposed to establish a preparatory commission and I think we have reached there, between the representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States of America and the United Kingdom, something approaching identity of views on the question of the functions of that preparatory commission.

I think that, if we have found a basis for agreement there with the two States of the Western bloc, then we shall find a basis for agreement on this matter with France as well, inasmuch as France says it will never oppose its allies.

With regard to the chronology proposed by Mr. Moch, we have no objections to it either. If Mr. Moch likes it better, then we accept it. He has proposed: first, the negotiation of disarmament measures, and the corresponding control measures. That is just what we believe in. In other words, what we are saying is that control measures must be included in the treaty.

I would also like to answer the observations made by Mr. Eaton on this matter in his statement of 10 June. Mr. Eaton said:

"...We deem it essential that control arrangements be spelled out and fully agreed, as a part of the basic agreement, at the time when any disarmament commitments are undertaken". (TNCD/PV.36, page 7)

I declare that we are fully in agreement with this proposal.

As you see then, we have complete identity of views, both with France and with the United States on this matter.

Further, Mr. Moch then mentioned as the second point in his chronology the signature of a treaty embodying both kinds of measures, that is, both disarmament measures and control measures. We agree with this.

Point three is the entry into force of the treaty and the setting up of the control bodies for the first stage. We agree with this too. Although Mr. Moch believes his chronology is better than ours, I would all the same suggest to him that point three in this chronology be the establishment of the preparatory commission and the work of this preparatory commission in making practical preparations for the establishment of the international control machinery.

I do not think this would conflict with the position of France, particularly as it does not conflict with the position of the United States and the United Kingdom, whom France says it supports.
Therefore, we have no objections to the chronology for solving the question of control.

Finally, the last question raised by Mr. Moch. He addressed certain questions to me and asked me to state precisely whether we agree with verification of the quantities of armaments existing before, and of the quantities that would remain after, a prescribed measure of disarmament. I have already told Mr. Moch in the first stage of our negotiations that questions of control cannot be solved in the abstract. They must be solved in an entirely concrete way, because it is impossible to say in advance how this or that control system can be established, before we know what is to be controlled. And that is entirely relevant to this question.

If, in fact, in the first stage, we propose the abolition of all means of delivering nuclear weapons, and all bases, then of course the question of what remains, or does not remain, after such a measure does not arise. Everything must be abolished, and everything must be subject to control. The question of what remains, and what is not to be controlled, does not arise at all. Everything is to be controlled. So your question is ruled out altogether.

Now I have a question for you. Do you, or do you not, agree that everything must be abolished? After receiving the answer to this question, we shall be able to solve the question of control, and how to organize it.

But for some reason you do not reply to this question, although I think it concerns France more than the others, inasmuch as France took the initiative in raising the matter. Therefore, it seems to me that it is impossible to deal with these questions in the abstract: they must be solved in a concrete way. And, after we have reached unanimity on the main principles of control, let us proceed to consider the concrete disarmament measures which should be adopted in the first, second and third stages, and the control measures which we have drafted and submitted. If you do not agree with this or that measure, say what measures you propose. Do you, or do you not, agree with our disarmament measures? Tell us. If you do not agree, first tell us why, and then let us know what measures you suggest. Then we can have a businesslike discussion. But up to now, I am sorry to say, you have declined to do this. So far, you have not started to consider concrete measures of disarmament.
I shall therefore conclude my remarks on Mr. Moch's statement by saying that, on the main questions of control that have been raised, we do not disagree, at least so far as concerns Mr. Moch's statement of the position, in conjunction with the explanations I have just given. But the question of course arises: what is France's position on the substance of the disarmament measures proposed in the Soviet plan? What is France's attitude to those suggestions regarding disarmament which, to a large extent, have been prompted by the initiative of France itself? We cannot understand the French representative's silence on this matter. We are expecting an answer to this question, too. As you see, we are answering every statement in considerable detail, including Mr. Moch's statements both yesterday and today, and we in turn would like to hear from the French representative a detailed reply on this question.

Now for some remarks on the statement by Mr. Martino, the representative of Italy. He gave us a kind of review of the points on which there has been a rapprochement of our positions. However, some of his remarks were not as well put as others and we cannot accept them in their entirety. He said for instance, that we — as far as I could understand — are in agreement with the establishment of an international organization for the preservation of peace. No, we have not included that in our plan and we are not in agreement with it. We are ready to consider the question of measures for the maintenance of peace after disarmament, and we are ready — and we have included this in our plan — to agree that police forces should be used on the instructions and under the guidance of the Security Council in case of need. That we have included. But what Mr. Martino says does not coincide with our position at all. He is right, however, in saying that on this question our position has come closer to that of the Western States, and particularly of Italy, which put forward proposals on this question in our first series of meetings.

He went on to say that we have also taken into account the views both of the Italian delegation and other Western delegations on questions of control. As I have just pointed out, this is quite obvious. But he also said that on a number of questions — I did not quite catch which — our position does not coincide with the Italian position, and that therefore the Western States cannot, so to speak, regard our position as having already been brought into line with theirs.
In this connexion I would like to make just one remark. You yourselves have pointed out that we have come nearer to your position. But you have not taken a single step to come nearer to our position, and you do not want to. In Mr. Martino's statement, at any rate, I have not noticed any wish to come nearer to our position. What, then, is your idea of moving towards the solution of a question -- merely that we should move towards you and not you towards us? That will not get us anywhere.

Negotiations on the basis of equality cannot be conducted in this way. Mr. Mezinescu was right when he said here today that we must observe the principle of negotiations on a basis of equality. We have advanced a considerable distance towards you. We are waiting for a corresponding advance on your part. So far, you have done nothing, cannot see that you have made a single step forward. Naturally, this does not testify to any desire on your part to conduct serious negotiations with a view to reaching agreement.

There is only one more point in Mr. Martino's statement which I would like to mention, since Mr. Mezinescu has already replied to several of the questions raised in it. Mr. Martino again raised the question of some dangerous change in the present balance of forces, and he said that the Soviet plan now put nuclear disarmament first and conventional disarmament second, and that this was disturbing the balance. It seems Mr. Martino was not present at our meeting on 10 June. All the same, he could have read the record. We said clearly that, if the Western Powers think there is an imbalance here, we are quite prepared, in the interests of agreement, to correct this here and now, though we do not believe there really is any lack of balance. You know our plan of 18 September 1959 perfectly well. There, in the first stage, there is a proposal that the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the United States should be reduced to 1,700,000, and there is also something about reducing the armed forces of other countries. I ask you, are you prepared to accept this reduction to 1,700,000? Tell us. We are ready to discuss the matter at once. At the end of the relevant part of our statement of 10 June we said -- and I quote what was said, which you may have read:

"In my opinion, therefore, as regards the principle, we should have no difficulties and no difficulties on this question. We can overcome this difficulty easily. We await your proposals." (TNCD/FV.36, page 12)
Now, instead of advancing proposals, you come forward and say there is a lack of balance, as if we were opposed to correcting what you describe as the "lack of balance". If you wish to reduce armed forces, say so plainly, straight out, here in the Committee, so that the whole world may know that you are in favour of a reduction of armaments and armed forces in the first stage. To what figure do you suggest they be reduced? Then your position will be clear. Instead of this, you keep your position dark, and reproach us with something. Why? In order to give public opinion the impression that the Soviet Union is opposed to the reduction of its armed forces? But this does not correspond with reality. It contradicts the facts. It contradicts the statement we made on 10 June. If you want to propose a reduction of armed forces in the first stage, put your proposal forward. We are ready to consider it at once, and I believe we shall quickly reach agreement on this question, if you make a concrete proposal. So far, however, you have not proposed anything; you have been trying to create the impression that we are opposed to something. In fact, it is you who oppose any measure of disarmament, including the reduction of conventional armed forces. If you are not opposed to this, name the figure to which you suggest conventional armed forces should be reduced.

With regard to troops stationed abroad and bases on foreign territories, I understood the situation to be the following. On this matter we put a question to the United States representative, Mr. Eaton. We repeated the question yesterday. But he has not spoken this morning, we are sorry to say. Are we to understand that Mr. Martino was speaking in the place of Mr. Eaton, that he was answering our question, or will Mr. Eaton still answer our question on behalf of the United States? Or, perhaps, Mr. Martino is expressing the view of the United States, and not of Italy. All this should be made clear, and then we will know who it is we are arguing with. Since Mr. Eaton raised this matter, however, I shall take the liberty of replying to Mr. Eaton and not to Mr. Martino, because it seems to me that Mr. Eaton's position on this matter is somewhat more important than Mr. Martino's. I hope you will excuse me but, from the point of view of the actual situation, that is really the case, since it is United States armed forces and military bases which are on foreign territory. It is naturally more appropriate, therefore, to deal with this matter by answering Mr. Eaton and
not Mr. Martino, because in this matter Italy seems to be rather the victimized party. I do not know — perhaps Italy is content with this situation, but it seems to be the victimized party. For that reason, I will not answer Mr. Martino on this question, but I will reply to Mr. Eaton.

Now, we would like to make some additional observations with regard to yesterday's statement by Mr. Ormsby-Gore. Mr. Ormsby-Gore said that he was putting his questions "in response ... to Mr. Zorin's desire for speedy consideration of the new document and rapid advance in our work" (TNCD/FV.37, page 18). We have carefully studied the United Kingdom representative's questions, and we feel bound to say we are convinced that not a single one of these questions relates to the substance of the main provisions put forward in the new Soviet proposals. In his questions, in fact, there is no mention either of the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, or of the elimination of military bases on the territories of other States, or of the withdrawal of foreign troops from those territories, or of the other main provisions which lie at the very heart of the new Soviet proposals. While mentioning this fact, however, we still do not intend to leave Mr. Ormsby-Gore's questions unanswered, though we believe they are extraneous to the main line of our discussion on the substance of the new Soviet proposals.

Mr. Ormsby-Gore asked us whether the Soviet delegation, under our latest proposals, still stands by the general proposition put forward by the Polish delegation in our first series of meetings, when the Polish representative said it was envisaged that there would be a disarmament conference before the signature of the treaty on general and complete disarmament. This position taken by the delegations of the socialist countries on the matter in question still holds good. We think this also answers Mr. Ormsby-Gore's question on the procedure for the adherence of all States to the treaty on general and complete disarmament which we have to draft here in the Committee. It is obvious to us, however, that, if we, the ten nations, reach agreement on the contents of this treaty, then this will create the necessary conditions for the rapid acceptance of the treaty by other States, which, we are deeply convinced, are interested in ridding themselves as soon as possible of the burden of armaments and in ensuring a lasting peace. All this, of course, will have to be the subject of agreement. We can and must agree on all the details of this procedure, and in this connexion we would like to know what is the position of the United Kingdom delegation or of the delegations
of the other Western Powers on the matter in question, and what are their proposals on this subject. We should be prepared to consider such proposals, if the Western Powers have any. As you see, our position here is flexible.

The United Kingdom representative also asked whether the Soviet Government was proposing that the process of ratification of the treaty after signature by States represented on this Committee and by other States should take its normal course, or whether the Soviet Government considered that a time-limit of some sort should be laid down for the period between signature and entry into force. Mr. Ormsby-Gore said there were constitutional and practical reasons for asking this question. Although we consider that this matter also should be the subject of agreement, and although we do not think that there is anything particularly urgent about its solution at the moment, when we still have not got down to the task of reaching agreement on the main provisions of the treaty — however, since Mr. Ormsby-Gore is so interested in this question now, we can offer some explanations.

As regards the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries which are members of the Committee, our position on this matter is flexible. Either course may be adopted — that of establishing no particular limit for the period between signature of the treaty on general and complete disarmament and its entry into force, or that of establishing such a limit. In our view, this is a question of what seems more convenient in practice. At all events, our proposals envisage that the period between signature and ratification of the treaty should be used by the preparatory commission for the purpose of taking practical steps to establish an international organization for the control of general and complete disarmament, so that, subsequently, the international control organization can proceed to carry out its tasks the moment the treaty enters into force.

The United Kingdom representative further asked if we proposed to take into account certain special features in the situation of a State such as the United Kingdom, which has territorial waters in many parts of the world. It is quite obvious that a question of this sort will have to be the subject of discussion and agreement in our Committee; but it is equally clear that, until agreement has been reached on the main questions arising in connexion
with the treaty on general and complete disarmament, and particularly on the
substance of the paragraph prohibiting warships from leaving their territorial
waters from the very beginning of the first stage, it would be pointless to discuss
the particular situations in which some States may be placed in relation to this
paragraph. When such agreement has been reached, however, it will of course also
be necessary to consider the special position of certain States. Mr. Ormsby-Gore
spoke in this connexion of the right of passage across the high seas. We have no
objections to this question also being taken up as a subject for our discussion at
an appropriate stage in the drafting of the treaty on general and complete
disarmament. As you see, our position is flexible on this question as well.

Mr. Ormsby-Gore's question about fissionable materials has already been
answered by Mr. Mezincescu, and we agree entirely with his reply.

Finally, Mr. Ormsby-Gore asked how it was proposed to determine the
relationship between armed forces and armaments in the second stage, when both are
to be reduced. Our position is that it will be possible to decide this question
too by agreement. But a detailed agreement on this question can and must be
reached after we have agreed on the actual reduction of the armed forces and
armaments of States in the second stage of general and complete disarmament.

Those are our replies to Mr. Ormsby-Gore's questions.

In connexion with them, we ourselves have a question to ask. Why are these
questions really being asked? As we have seen, they are not related to the
substance, to the main contents, of the new Soviet proposals. The Western
delegations, including the United Kingdom delegation, have as yet not made known
their attitude to the substance of these proposals, to the concrete disarmament
measures envisaged by us and the corresponding control measures. We would repeat
our request -- which Mr. Ormsby-Gore promised yesterday to bear in mind -- that the
Western representatives should proceed more rapidly to a consideration of the
substance of the new Soviet proposals, and should not allow themselves to be
distracted from the main issues raised in those proposals.

 Permit me now to say a few words about the statement made on 10 June by
Mr. Eaton. We expected Mr. Eaton to present some further clarifications on the
questions that interested us in connexion with the United States position on the
main points of the disarmament programme, especially on the questions dealt with
in the first stage of the Soviet programme. But we are sorry to say Mr. Eaton
avoided replying to these questions. Nevertheless, Mr. Eaton's own statement of
10 June itself contained certain elements on which possible future replies might be based. I regret that Mr. Eaton was unable to present a full explanation of his position, because then perhaps we could have had a more definite idea of the United States position. But even from what he said some preliminary conclusions can be drawn.

After a study of the United States representative's statement in the verbatim record, it is clear to us that we shall have to dwell in greater detail on some of his remarks, particularly those dealing with the measures included in the first stage of the new Soviet plan for general and complete disarmament. It would be no exaggeration to say that it is precisely on the proposals included in the first stage of our new programme that the attention of world opinion as a whole is mainly concentrated. These are the measures with which it is intended to start implementing the programme of general and complete disarmament, and it is this first stage of the new Soviet programme which includes important disarmament measures that take into account the views voiced by the Western Powers, and particularly France, on the subject of the most appropriate way of starting to implement the disarmament programme.

The new Soviet programme provides in the first stage that all means of delivering nuclear weapons will be eliminated from the armed forces of States; their manufacture will be discontinued and they will be destroyed; that all troops will be withdrawn from foreign territories to within their own national frontiers; that foreign military bases and depots of all kinds, both those released after the withdrawal of troops and those kept in reserve will be eliminated; that from the very beginning of the first stage the placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of special devices, the leaving of their territorial waters by warships and the flying beyond the limits of their national territory by military aircraft capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction will be prohibited; that States will undertake not to launch rockets except for peaceful purposes and in accordance with predetermined and mutually agreed criteria; that States having nuclear weapons at their disposal will undertake not to transfer such weapons, or to transmit information necessary for their manufacture, to States which do not possess them; that States not possessing nuclear weapons will undertake to refrain from manufacturing them; and that States will reduce their military expenditures correspondingly.
In the new Soviet programme, it is proposed that all these important measures, which constitute a good beginning to general and complete disarmament, should be carried out under strict and effective international control, the nature and scope of which are set out in some detail in the new Soviet plan.

And what did the United States representative have to say to us about these measures in his statement of 10 June? He said the following:

"... the Soviet proposals call for, as the very first step in the first stage of disarmament, the immediate abolition of the free world's major capabilities for protection against aggression." (TNOD/PV.36, page 6)

Such an assessment at least calls for some clarification. On what does Mr. Eaton base his allegation that the implementation of the above important disarmament measures would deprive the Western Powers of their capabilities for protection against aggression? What exactly did Mr. Eaton have in mind when he made this statement?

Surely it is obvious that the measures provided for in the first stage of the new Soviet plan not only do not weaken, but, on the contrary, considerably enhance, the security of every State without exception. Indeed, the first of our proposals for the first stage is that all means of delivering nuclear weapons will be eliminated from the armed forces of States; their manufacture will be discontinued and they will be destroyed. The list includes military rockets of all types, all military aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons, all surface warships that can be used as vehicles for these weapons, submarines of all classes and types, and all artillery systems, as well as other means, that can be used as vehicles for atomic and hydrogen weapons.

It should be clear to anyone that the carrying-out of this measure would really be of enormous value from the point of view of eliminating the danger of surprise attack by one State on another, a matter to which Mr. Mzeineescu referred this morning in greater detail. Surely everyone understands that if this measure were carried out, the danger of any kind of aggression would be largely removed.

Incidentally, Mr. Moch has observed that last time I spoke I made the reservation that that would hold good unless we assumed that someone would be concealing some such means of delivery. In this connexion he asked what kind of control there should be. But I take this opportunity of repeating that all means of delivery, and all bases, must be placed under control, so that neither you nor we can have any doubt that everything is included. Thus all doubts on this score will disappear.
The representatives of France have repeatedly drawn attention in their statements to the importance of destroying the means of delivering nuclear weapons, and the Soviet Government has agreed with this point of view. How then can it be alleged that such a measure would deprive the Western Powers of their "capabilities for protection against aggression"? I naturally cannot help asking myself: if France was the first to introduce this proposal, surely France did not expect that this measure would deprive the Western States of all their capabilities for protection? Surely France was not making a move against all the other Western Powers in this matter? I do not think that was the case. In his statement yesterday Mr. Moch told us again that in these matters there can be no disagreement between France and the other Western Powers. That being so, why does Mr. Eaton consider that, by accepting the French proposal, we will at once deprive all the Western States of their capabilities for protection? We cannot understand this. After all, what we are proposing is the destruction of all means of delivering nuclear weapons now at the disposal, not of any particular State, but of all States, not of just one side, but of both sides.

But perhaps the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, while increasing the security of all States, would at the same time for some reason be more advantageous to the Soviet Union than to the United States? Nothing of the sort. Surely the entire world knows that at present it is the Soviet Union that possesses the most up-to-date means of delivering nuclear weapons, and not the United States, which continues to lag behind in the sphere ofrocketry. Incidentally, the United States is at present also behind in the field of submarine construction. This too shows that it is not a question of the Soviet Union's obtaining an advantage.

Only the other day this was again confirmed by so prominent an American expert as Dr. Edward Teller, who is referred to in the United States as "the father of the H-bomb". He stated that, notwithstanding the successful launching of the American Atlas rocket on 20 May 1960 in Florida, there is no doubt that the United States is lagging behind in the sphere ofrocketry. But if that is so, it is surely obvious that the USSR proposal to begin general and complete disarmament with the destruction of all the means of delivering nuclear weapons represents a gesture of goodwill on the part of the Soviet Union, which, in the interests of reaching a solution of the disarmament problem as soon as possible, is prepared to renounce the advantage it possesses in this most important sphere. It is not the United States, Mr. Eaton,
but the Soviet Union which will have to renounce this advantage if the Soviet proposal to eliminate all the means of delivering nuclear weapons to their targets is adopted and carried out.

If the representative of the United States still tells us that the implementation of the measures provided for in the first stage of the Soviet plan would deprive the West of its major capabilities for protection against aggression, then we are led to wonder whether there is something behind these words which the United States representative is leaving unsaid.

Perhaps Mr. Eaton's statement has something to do with those new measures which the United States Government has recently been adopting in the sphere, not of disarmament, but of the armaments race? As everyone knows, not the least prominent among these measures, apart from the new military appropriations that are being voted in the United States, is the transfer to West German revenge-seekers and militarists of new means of delivering nuclear weapons. It is precisely for that purpose, according to the United States Press, that the Defence Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Strauss, came to the United States a few days ago.

Was this, by any chance, what the United States representative had in mind when he asserted that the implementation of the measures provided for in the first stage of the new Soviet plan would deprive the West of its major capabilities for protection against aggression? But does the transfer, to those who unleashed the First and Second World Wars, of the latest means of delivering nuclear weapons represent capability for protection against aggression? Would it not be more correct to say that to transfer to the West German militarists military rockets designed to carry nuclear warheads actually creates a danger of aggression and a threat to world peace?

In any case, Mr. Eaton's assertion that the West would be deprived of its "capabilities for protection against aggression" if the means of delivering nuclear weapons are abolished, requires some explanation. What are the real motives behind this assertion and what exactly is its aim?

Let us now take another item in the Soviet proposals, namely the paragraph in the section dealing with the first stage of general and complete disarmament which provides for the elimination of military bases and depots of all kinds on foreign territories. We know of course that certain circles in the United States are particularly attached to the idea of having military bases thrust far forward
towards the boundaries of the socialist States. We know what role is assigned to these bases in the strategic plans of the United States. Incidentally, when replying here yesterday to Mr. Tarabanov, Mr. Ormsby-Gore alleged that the Western strategic concepts regarding these bases were misunderstood by Mr. Tarabanov. If that is so, we would like to know where it is that we are making a mistake. The representatives of the Pentagon themselves make no secret of the fact that it is certainly not a defensive strategy for the United States armed forces that they have in mind, and that in the plans for a future war military bases on foreign territories are regarded as advance posts to be used mainly for the installation of the means of delivering nuclear weapons to their targets, in order to strike a blow against the future enemy. It is no accident that General D.O. Smith, in his book "United States Military Doctrine", wrote that a United States defensive policy can properly be spoken of "only up to the point when the decision is made to use force; after that" -- says Smith -- "offensive military action would follow".1/ That is the current military doctrine of the United States. If this is wrong, please let us know.

This aggressive purpose of United States military bases on foreign territories cannot be obscured by any talk about the "defence of the West". And I think it was to no purpose that Mr. Martino assumed the thankless task of defending that position.

It is now generally known how these military bases are being used in peace. They are springboards for military aggression, and in peacetime they are springboards for espionage and for aggressive invasions of the air space of peace-loving States. That is what the United States bases on foreign territories are. The facts bear convincing witness to this. And this, of course, applies not only to United States military bases but also to the military bases of other Western States, including Western Germany, which, with the approval of its NATO allies, is now setting up military bases and depots on the territory of almost every country in Western Europe. This, of course, applies also to the military bases in Japan, the Japanese people's disapproval of which is well known and is being confirmed every day and even every minute.

1/ Retranslated from Russian.
Surely it is clear that the very existence of these bases on the territories of foreign States creates a threat not only to the cause of universal peace but also to the security of the States concerned. This is now beginning to be realized by many States on whose territories these bases are established.

In its statement in this Committee on 7 June, the Soviet delegation already had occasion to point out yet another very important aspect of the question of the elimination of military bases on foreign territories. We then showed that this question is inseparably linked with the question of the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons. This morning Mr. Mezincescu also spoke of this. Indeed, if States agreed on the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, and one of them objected to the elimination of its military bases on foreign territories, this would only lead to the suspicion that that particular State did not actually intend to carry out its obligations to destroy the means of delivery and was counting on concealing them from control in order to be able to use them for aggressive purposes. I imagine everyone understands what I mean. And since Mr. Moch demanded that in our control system we make sure that nothing is concealed, we ask that controllers be posted to all the bases to see that nothing is concealed and that these bases are eliminated -- each and every one.

In the light of all this we should like to have some enlightenment, as to the views of the United States delegation on our proposal that all military bases on foreign territories should be liquidated in the first stage of general and complete disarmament.

In the first stage of our programme it is also envisaged that all foreign troops will be withdrawn from the territories of other States to within their own national frontiers. It is quite obvious that this also is a very important measure, and that putting it into effect would lead to a considerable reduction in international tension and to a strengthening of the security of States, and would represent a great step forward on the way towards the establishment of, in the words of the representatives of the Western Powers themselves, "a secure, free and peaceful world" -- I am quoting Mr. Eaton (TNCD/PV.33, page 5).

Can one really regard it as normal that at the present time the troops of certain States are stationed, not within their own national frontiers, but on foreign territories? Of course not. It is precisely this abnormal situation that we are now proposing to eliminate, and on a reciprocal basis. At the very beginning of our negotiations, on 22 March 1960, Mr. Eaton voiced the supposition that the Soviet Union was not ready to consider:
"... questions of a very serious political nature ... which will involve the deployment of Soviet troops in areas which, by some, might be deemed foreign to them". (TNCD/FV.6, page 36)

We pointed out to Mr. Eaton even then that the question of the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other States on a reciprocal basis could not create any difficulties for the Soviet Union. Now, in the new Soviet plan for general and complete disarmament, we are directly envisaging the withdrawal from the territories of other States of all troops — be they from the United States or the Soviet Union, or from any other State — stationed outside their own national frontiers. And what does Mr. Eaton tell us in reply to this? In the first place, in his statement of 10 June, he spoke as though it were only the armed forces of the United States which were to be withdrawn from the territories of other States. But this is a plain distortion of the Soviet plan, and I cannot bring myself to believe that the United States representative really thought that our plan refers only to the withdrawal of United States troops, if of course he has studied our proposals carefully. Secondly, Mr. Eaton alleged that the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other States was irreconcilable with "the principle that no State should derive a military advantage from the disarmament process at any stage". (TNCD/FV.36, page 7) But this statement itself gives rise to a number of questions, if one remembers that the reference here is to the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territories of other States, regardless of the State to which the troops belong. We would like an explanation of the United States position on the withdrawal of foreign troops.

With regard to the observations made by Mr. Martino in this connexion today, I must say that they are out of date and do not apply to the present situation. Mr. Martino said that the withdrawal of United States troops from Europe was not the same thing as the withdrawal of Soviet troops from countries in Europe where they are at present stationed, and he supported this argument by saying that the vast land forces of the Soviet Union would remain close at hand, while the United States forces would be on the other side of the ocean.

In the first place, this kind of thing was, I think, already being said ten years ago. At that time the Western Powers used to justify the statement by referring to the vast and unknown size of the Soviet army. But now the size of the Soviet army is known. Besides, in the very near future it will not exceed that of the United States army. In all probability, the United States army will
even be larger than the Soviet army. And apart from the United States army, the Bundeswehr is growing, while France, the United Kingdom and other countries in Europe each also has a large army. The balance of conventional armed forces is now quite different from what it was before. And there is no use now in trying to scare people by referring to the vast size of the armed forces of the Soviet Union. This is not in keeping with the facts.

Secondly, we are proposing to you that the armed forces of the Soviet Union, as well as of the United States, be reduced to 1,700,000 men. But you do not accept our proposal, although you say that some kind of balance is essential. We propose to you: let us reduce the armed forces of the Soviet Union, as well as of the United States, to 1,700,000 men. Then they will not represent a threat to you at all, if indeed one can speak of any threat. But you do not accept this proposal. Instead, you frighten people by talking about Soviet troops which are supposed to be on the verge of attacking the West. This allegation is not in accordance with the facts, and is devoid of logic. Furthermore, the whole position taken up by Mr. Martino and Mr. Eaton can only be understood as implying an intention to perpetuate the presence of troops on the territories of other States.

When will you finally agree to the withdrawal of troops from the territories of other States? Will that time ever come, or do you consider that without foreign troops Italy cannot exist? Is this the real intention of the United States Government, or does the United States after all intend, some time in the near future, to withdraw its troops from the territories of other States, taking into account the Soviet Union’s agreement to withdraw its own troops to within its frontiers on a reciprocal basis? We should like to have a reply from Mr. Eaton on this important question, a question which pertains directly to the first stage of the disarmament programme.

In the following paragraph of the Soviet proposals, we propose that, from the very beginning of the first stage and until the final destruction of all means of delivering nuclear weapons, the placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of special devices capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction should be prohibited, and that the leaving of their territorial waters by warships and the flying beyond the limits of their national territory by military aircraft capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction, should also be prohibited.
Is it possible that these measures can in any way be detrimental to the security interests of the Western States? I do not think so, because the Western Powers themselves proposed these measures. I hardly think they would have proposed these measures if they were to their own disadvantage.

These measures are obviously not detrimental to the security interests of the Western Powers, provided, of course, that the right meaning is attached to these fine words -- security interests, protection against aggression -- and that they are not made to mean the exact opposite: the perpetration of acts of aggression such as, for instance, the invasion of the air space of peace-loving States by military aircraft.

We believe that an important measure in the first stage of general and complete disarmament should be the assumption of an undertaking by States having nuclear weapons at their disposal not to transfer such weapons, or to transmit information necessary for their manufacture, to States which do not possess them; and also the assumption of an undertaking by these latter States to refrain from manufacturing nuclear weapons. Mr. Mezinesseu referred to this matter today, so I will not dwell upon it at any length.

I would merely like to say that, if Mr. Eaton affirms that the measures provided for by us in the first stage would deprive the Western States of their protection against aggression, then the question arises here whether there is not in fact an intention on the part of the United States to transfer its nuclear weapons to some other States. We all know that preparations for equipping the aggressive West German Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons are now being expedited. Is not this the reason why the United States is displaying concern? It would be important to have some explanation from the United States delegation on this score.

Those were the additional observations and questions which come to our mind as the result of a careful study of the statement by the representative of the United States on 10 June. We were told in that statement that the United States is still carefully studying the new Soviet proposals and that consequently the observations made by the representative of the United States at the meeting held on 10 June were of a preliminary nature. That is how we regard them. That is why we have today addressed a number of questions to the United States delegation, particularly since that delegation has avoided replying to the questions we put to it earlier.
We hope that, when considering its replies to these questions, the United States delegation will go more deeply into the substance of the new Soviet proposals and that it will adopt a constructive attitude towards them.

As a preliminary, we might try, in a few words, to sum up what has been happening at our recent meetings.

First, we may note that so far there has been no consideration in substance of the main questions raised in the Soviet plan. An obvious desire to evade this is becoming apparent, and attempts are being made to divert our attention from the main problems by raising all kinds of minor points.

Secondly, the negative attitude of the United States representative towards some of our basic proposals justifies the conclusion that apparently the Government of the United States and its delegation here are evidently pursuing a United States policy of opposing general and complete disarmament, continuing the armaments race and maintaining and increasing tensions in international relations. At all events, recent facts fully justify such an assessment.

Thirdly, we have not so far seen any attempt on the part of any Western delegation to move towards the proposals of the Soviet Union, which itself had moved towards many proposals put forward by the Western Powers.

The position adopted by the Western Powers is an old, ossified, position, against which not only we but many people in the Western countries themselves have objected. This may be regarded as evidence of an unwillingness to proceed by really serious negotiations towards the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. We should be happy if in fact these preliminary observations of ours turned out to be not in accordance with the real intentions of the Western representatives who are members of this Committee. But so far the proceedings in our Committee have given us no reason to change our appraisal. If we are mistaken in any way, let the Western representatives declare their real intentions and take a definite stand on the main proposals put forward by the Soviet Union and supported by the socialist States. Let them embark on a businesslike study of those proposals, which deal both with disarmament measures and measures for effective international control. We are prepared to embark on such negotiations, but we can see that the Western Powers are not yet ready to do so. That can only be regretted, and they must once more be urged to get down to businesslike negotiations on a programme of general and complete disarmament and the preparation of a treaty for such disarmament.
The CHAIRMAN (Romania) (translation from French): If no other member of the Committee wishes to speak today, I will read out the draft communiqué:

"The thirty-eighth meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament was held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 14 June 1960, under the chairmanship of the representative of Romania. The next meeting of the Conference will take place on Wednesday, 15 June 1960, at 10.30 a.m."

The communiqué is adopted.

The meeting rose at 1.35 p.m.