FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THIRTY-SEVENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Monday, 13 June 1960, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI (Poland)
PRESENT AT THE TABLE

**Bulgaria:**
Mr. M. TARADANOV
Mr. K. CHRESTOV
Mr. G. GUELEV

**Canada:**
Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. A.G. CAMPBELL
W/Cdr. R.J. MITCHELL

**Czechoslovakia:**
Mr. J. NOSEK
Lieu.-Gen. J. HFOKO
Mr. Z. TRHLIK

**France:**
Mr. J. Much
Mr. M. LEGÈNDE
Col. L. CONVRET

**Italy:**
Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. L. DAINELLI
Commander A. SENZI

**Poland:**
Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
Mr. M. HLEBIASTYN
Hrj.-Gen. J. SLIMINSKI

**Romania:**
Mr. E. KEZINCESCUL
Mr. C. BOGDAN
Col. C. POPA

**Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:**
Mr. V.A. ZORIN
Col.-Gen. A.A. GRIZLOV
Mr. A.A. ROPYCHIN
PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

**United Kingdom:**
- Rt. Hon. D. ORMSBY-GORE
- Maj.-Gen. RIDDELL
- Miss B. SALT

**United States of America:**
- Mr. F.M. EATON
- Mr. C.C. STELLE
- Rear-Admiral P.L. DUDLEY

**Representative of the Secretary-General:**
- Dr. D. PROFITCH

**Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General:**
- Mr. W. EPSTEIN
The CHAIRMAN (Poland) (translation from French): The thirty-seventh meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament is called to order.

There are two speakers on my list: the representative of France and the representative of Bulgaria. I call on Mr. Moch, the representative of France.

Mr. MOCH (France) (translation from French): I find some difficulty in giving an opinion on the new Soviet draft forthwith. We still need to clarify some obscurities and to obtain various explanations. But I can say, as my colleagues have done, that I am studying the draft with interest and in a spirit which is not negative a priori.

This plan does indeed denote an important change in the Soviet position, even though certain principles appear to be immutable. If there is a change, I am entitled to claim that we had something to do with it; the Soviet Government has understood that at least some of our objections to its previous proposals were undeniably sound, and that those proposals contained elements which were not only unacceptable to us, but were also bad because they were impracticable. I am glad the Soviet ministers and representatives have realized that.

While I do not wish to offer any judgment until I am clearer about the substance of the new document, there are, of course, questions which occur to me and situations which I cannot disregard.

Why has the Soviet Government presented this proposal? Several possibilities come to mind at once. I shall only consider that of sincere motives: really wishing for disarmament, both because it hates war, and because it has better uses for the men and materials that would be set free by the cessation of the arms race, the Soviet Government is seeking a compromise solution and has taken from the Western suggestions what it considers to be better than its own and at the same time compatible with its principles.

But there is one statement which it is my duty to make here, because Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Zorin have often stressed that they have borrowed from the French thesis; and because Mr. Zorin, in particular, emphasized the new Soviet position by quotations from speeches by the President of the French Republic and from some of my statements. If — which I do not believe — the authors of the
plan had devised it with the ulterior motive of using it to weaken or even to dislocate the Western alliance, they would have been making a grave mistake, for nothing will shake our solidarity. Even if some Western Governments felt themselves at times to be closer to, or less far from, certain Soviet ideas than others did, they would doubtless endeavour, among themselves, to persuade their allies to share their views, but they would not part from their allies on that account. For it is as ten nations that we have to find as many points of agreement as possible here, not as six, seven or nine, against four, three or one. In any event, Western solidarity will remain complete. Mr. Zorin, moreover, has no doubt of that, I am sure.

There is another point which I shall merely mention. The new plan was made public on the morrow of dramatic and regrettable incidents which I will not evoke in the climat of Geneva. This plan, as we know, preceded them. It was drafted for submission to the Summit Conference. That is a further reason for us to regret that the Conference did not take place. For it would have been better for the four Heads of State or of Government to have endeavoured to derive, from the various proposals, unanimous directives establishing the nature and the order of our tasks.

Among the general questions raised by this document, there is another which I think I should mention. To the constancy of the Soviet principles — most of which have already been the subject of criticisms or objections on our part — there is allied a remarkable flexibility in the definition and the order of the measures suggested. In the last proposal but one, the first two stages were devoted exclusively to conventional disarmament. In the last proposal, the first stage is devoted exclusively to nuclear disarmament. Since both proposals — as I have never doubted — have the full approval of the Soviet Government, it follows, at least to my way of thinking, that any combination of the two equally valid proposals is also acceptable, and, in particular, that an intermediate text, in which conventional and nuclear measures mingle and overlap at each stage could be considered by our colleagues of the East.

I supposed that to be the case before Mr. Zorin's statement on 10 June, in which he confirmed that he was willing to consider the reduction of conventional armaments and forces as early as the first stage. The French delegation is gratified to note this, particularly as regards conventional armaments, appropriate control of which makes it possible to prohibit their being reassembled as easily as demobilized reservists can be recalled. For we have always maintained that, in order not to reduce the security of one of the parties to the advantage of that of the other, it was necessary to combine measures of both kinds at each stage, in proportions to be established.
This question, to which I think I have given the answer, brings me to another, which I cannot answer for myself: does Mr. Zorin consider that one or the other of the two Soviet proposals, or a combination of them, forms an inseparable, indivisible whole, and that this whole must be approved or rejected en bloc? If that is the case, it is obvious that no discussion will be fruitful. We shall no longer be negotiators, on either side, but only robots emptying letter-boxes.

I therefore trust that if Mr. Zorin replies to this part of my statement it will be to confirm that the proposals are intended as a basis for discussion which is susceptible of amendment, and hence of deletions or additions as well as modifications. In short, that the proposals are flexible, as ours, which remain entirely valid, have always been.

There are, indeed, in the new Soviet plan — subject to additional information for which we shall ask Mr. Zorin, and which, I hope, will be given to us clearly and precisely — proposals which can claim our attention; but I should like to emphasize two points immediately.

I shall have occasion to revert to the first several times during my statements: certain French ideas appear to have been adopted, as Mr. Zorin and the other speakers from the communist countries have been at pains to point out. Had the spirit not been changed, we should be gratified at this. But we fear that the presentation, the methods of application, and the general philosophy of these proposals may not be in conformity with ours. We shall therefore need to clarify all these points with the help of the information I have just mentioned.

My second comment is as follows: although some of the proposals call for our attention, there are others — as the Soviet Government well knows — which we cannot accept because, if adopted too soon, they would jeopardize our security before adequate disarmament measures had been applied and effectively controlled. Such provisions would, moreover, be contrary to the general principles set forth in the preamble to the Soviet plan.

In the analysis I shall make today following on the foregoing general remarks, and which I shall continue tomorrow, I shall proceed methodically. I shall confine myself now to a single point — that of the time-limits for general and complete disarmament. In my subsequent statements I shall extend my enquiries to other points which require clarification and, in particular, to control.
As regards time-limits, one first question calls for our attention. In the preamble, we read that the proposed programme is to be carried out "within a fixed period of time -- four years or some other agreed period". (TNCD/5/Rev.1, page 5). In the operative part of the text, however, we find the following formula: "General and complete disarmament shall be carried out by all States over one and the same strictly defined period of time to be agreed upon". (Ibid., page 7).

From that I deduce that the mandatory time-limit of four years in the previous plan has been abandoned. This is only a formal improvement in our view, since the idea of an "agreed" time-limit is retained. Mr. Zorin made this position very clear in his statement on 10 June. Now, as we have already stated, we shall not subscribe to an agreement unless we are sure of being able to fulfil our undertakings. It is impossible -- and I ask Mr. Zorin to consider this carefully -- to specify today how much time will be needed, first, for the world conference to reach an agreement which must be both world-wide and regional; then for the various study commissions for which provision is made at the second and third stages to produce unanimous conclusions on problems that are particularly delicate, if only from the technical angle; and finally, for the various governments to implement the treaty in its entirety in the uncertain, troubled and nervous world in which we are living. The experience of the two years -- or nearly two years -- spent in negotiating on the question of controlled discontinuance of nuclear tests alone, which is much simpler technically, and less important for disarmament, confirms us in our scepticism with regard to overall time-limits. That is why, in all our previous plans, we did admittedly fix final goals, but at the same time in all of them we limited the mandatory part of the chronology to a period expiring much earlier than the end of the implementation of the plan. The example of nuclear tests which I have just mentioned makes me consider this position a necessity. I must therefore make reservations with regard to the words "strictly defined period of time to be agreed upon".

Is such a reservation on my part in fact really necessary? Despite the rigid position reaffirmed by Mr. Zorin on 10 June, which seems to deny in advance all that I am now going to say, has the Soviet Government not come further to meet us than I suppose?

Proceeding with my reading, I find that it has adopted an idea appearing in some French working papers, according to which the Control Council of the Disarmament Organization, at the end of the first and second stages, is to make
various reports, one of them to the Security Council. I consider that an important point, for the following reason. The Security Council, receiving a report, will have to examine and appraise it. Otherwise, what would be the use of the document? The Security Council's appraisal of it will necessarily be reflected by a vote. Otherwise, how will it be expressed? What will then happen if the Council rejects the report, either by the required majority of its members, or by exercise of the right of veto? The Soviet proposal says nothing on this point, which in our view is an essential one. For one of two things must happen: either the signatories to the treaty will remain bound by it and must continue to implement it, or the negative vote will interrupt operations. In the first case -- if the treaty continues in force as though the vote had not taken place -- the report to the Security Council would have served no purpose. The Soviet text would then contrary to the Charter, transform the Security Council into a registry without powers or authority. That is certainly not the desire of our Soviet colleagues. In the second case there is a contradiction between the overall time-limit fixed in advance, and the fact that the negative vote of the Security Council interrupts progress. The time-limit becomes a mere artifice of presentation. It will be respected if the Security Council finds, by its vote, that the previous stage has been properly carried out by all; otherwise it will be discussed again. This second hypothesis is, I hasten to say, much more sensible, reasonable and fruitful than the first. It brings the Soviet views on that point closer to ours, and also to the real facts of the case. What allows me to hope that in spite of Friday's statement this hypothesis may not be contrary to the tacit designs of the Soviet Government, is the following observation:

In the Soviet plan the first stage has a duration which is fixed approximately, since it is to be completed "within approximately 1 to 1.5 years". One might cavil at the adverb "approximately"; but I shall not dwell on that.

But even though it is so vague, this limit disappears at the end of the second stage, where there is no longer any mention of duration. The omission is all the more remarkable in that the formula used explicitly repeats, as regards the report to the Security Council, that employed for the end of the first stage, though nothing is said about the duration of the second stage.

How can this discrepancy be explained? It cannot be an oversight, which, incidentally, is repeated at the end of the third stage. Our Soviet colleagues are much too orderly and meticulous to make such omissions — particularly twice in succession.
There are two possible reasons for their silence on this point: either, like us, they have been struck by the extreme difficulty — or even impossibility — of fixing these time-limits, and if that is so, I would commend them for having, as we did previously, discovered and measured the height of the obstacle; or, no time-limit can be fixed — either for the second, or for the third stage — precisely because both are dependent on a vote by the Security Council, the result of which no one can predict. I should be glad to find, in connexion with the first difficulty I have taken up, a parallelism, at least implicit, in our trains of thought, which would be a favourable factor in our discussions.

My Western colleagues and I certainly require many other clarifications. But, as I said, I do not wish to abuse the patience of the Conference and shall confine myself, for today, to the points I have mentioned, which can be summed up as follows:

(1) I trust that no other design than its will, or its need, to disarm has dictated the Soviet Government's new proposal.

(2) I note, from Mr. Zorin's own statements, that conventional disarmament can be undertaken at the same time as nuclear disarmament.

(3) I assume that the plan submitted for our discussion need not necessarily be adopted or rejected en bloc, that amendments may be made to it, and that it represents a flexible, not an inflexible position.

(4) I take it that approval of the report by the Security Council at the end of a stage is not a purely formal act, and that the Council will have to take a decision by a vote.

(5) If it rejects the report, the hostile vote cannot be a platonic gesture. It would make it necessary to reconsider future operations and the time-limits for them. This view is, moreover, confirmed by the absence of any indication of duration for the operations subsequent to the first report to the Security Council. Thus the overall time-limit will only be valid in the event of successive favourable votes by the Security Council. Consequently it cannot be mandatory, but only indicative. In that form, that is to say if it were indicated in the treaty that the time-limit would only be valid if the end-of-stage reports were approved by the Security Council, we could examine the idea.

If those five assumptions are correct, I shall be glad I have expressed my doubts clearly; for then the discussion would continue under more favourable auspices. I shall endeavour to clarify other points later.
Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): We have just heard the first statement made by Mr. Jules Moch, the representative of France, since the resumption of our work. His remarks certainly deserve very careful consideration; but it must be said at once that, although he denied doing so, he made reservations regarding the intentions behind the new proposals presented by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. Indeed — and, I repeat, despite his denials — this became quite clear when he explained that the unity of the Western Powers could not be disturbed by the new Soviet proposals. We are certain that when, in the past, Mr. Moch presented comments as representative of France, he did so with the approval and consent of the delegations of the other Western Powers; that is why it was so important for the new Soviet proposals to take his comments into account.

Mr. Jules Moch also told us as thought the general philosophy of the new Soviet proposals differed from that of the Western proposals and from the position of the Western delegations. It certainly does, and we believe that in the discussions to be held here, both on the proposals and on any amendments that may be submitted, we should endeavour to bring our respective positions with regard to the different problems closer together.

We shall doubtless have to revert to Mr. Moch's remarks, especially as he intends to continue his statement tomorrow and perhaps subsequently; but I wished to make a preliminary comment now.

As has been pointed out several times, the resumption of the work of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament was marked by new Soviet proposals, submitted after consultation with the other socialist countries represented on the Committee. To judge by the comments in the Press, these proposals were very warmly welcomed by world opinion, which found in them grounds for hoping that at last the agreement on disarmament longed for by the whole world would be reached. According to some comments and appraisals, the recent proposals of the socialist countries show a new attitude; according to others they create an entirely different situation and favourable conditions for the resumption of our Committee's negotiations.

It seems that the new Soviet proposals have also had their effect on the Western delegations to the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee, and it is to be hoped that certain statements by representatives of Western countries will usher in a new phase in the discussions on disarmament. In these circumstances, can we expect that our future discussions will be genuinely directed towards seeking
agreement on the basis of the new Soviet proposals? That will be shown by the positions taken by the Western delegations in the days ahead.

We heard some statements on the new Soviet proposals by Western representatives last week. For instance, the United Kingdom representative stressed that his Government was

"more determined than ever to find a way of making practical progress toward the final goal of general and complete disarmament." (TNCD/FV.34, page 9)

He added that

"these new Soviet proposals are already receiving the most careful and thorough examination by my Government." (Ibid., page 10)

We also listened with keen interest to the statement by General Burns, the Canadian representative, who on 9 June said that

"the Canadian Government is giving to the Soviet plan of 2 June the very careful study which its importance requires." (TNCD/FV, page 4)

He emphasized that

"... the changes which have been made in the stages and order of events in the former Soviet plan have produced what is in effect a new plan, and one that will require very careful assessment on our part." (Ibid.,)

And he added

"We wish to approach it in the most constructive way, which will lead to more general agreement between the two sides." (Ibid.)

It is certainly encouraging to hear such appraisals of the new Soviet proposals. We expect these declarations of goodwill, and these intentions, to find practical expression in our work and we hope that the Western Powers will make a constructive contribution towards reaching an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

In these circumstances it was all the more strange the other day to hear the Italian representative tell us the story of the monk who, after twenty years in prison, resumed his lectures at the University of Salamanca with the traditional words "As we were saying" — as though nothing had happened during the twenty years he had spent in gaol. And Mr. Martino stressed that

"... we shall be able to follow that example because little more than thirty days have elapsed since our last meeting ...". (TNCD/FV.33, page 16)

Such comparisons are hardly consistent with the statements I have quoted, and this is all the more disturbing because, in Mr. Eaton's remarks during the discussion on the new Soviet proposals, we find, together with a moderate tone, some indications that the United States intends to maintain its former position as set forth in the plan of 15 March 1960. (TNCD/3)
The two statements made by the United States representative since the resumption of our work give a clear impression that the United States intends to bring the discussions and work of the Committee to bear on partial disarmament measures, which are in fact designed only to permit the establishment of control over existing armaments. On 7 June Mr. Eaton said:

"Now, as we resume our meetings, let us move on to more detailed discussion of specific measures of ... disarmament ...". *(TNCD/FV.33, page 6)*

This shows adherence to the old idea advocated by the Western countries which, as has frequently been shown in our previous discussions, could only lead to an intensification of the arms race.

There is also that persistent aversion to a time-limit for carrying out general and complete disarmament, on the pretext that it is impossible to foresee the progress of the disarmament process. This idea was expounded at length only this morning by the French representative, who attempted to show that disarmament should not be carried out in a fixed or approximately fixed period, but should be left to progress freely and be concluded whenever possible, according to events.

However, according to the United States representative himself:

"These realities of the world in which we live also include the continuing technological revolution in weaponry, which forces the major Powers continually to invest vast portions of their wealth and their inventiveness in new military systems...". *(Ibid., pages 4 and 5)*

Is there not therefore a danger that, while we are occupied with partial measures for an undetermined period, the arms race may develop in such a way as to make the threat of a general war with weapons of mass destruction even more dangerous?

We are surprised that some Western representatives, instead of going forward to meet the new Soviet proposals, in which many suggestions and wishes expressed by the Western delegations have been taken into consideration, should be maintaining positions which are not calculated to promote progress towards disarmament.

In making these comments our aim is not "to misconstrue Mr. Eaton's remarks to mean that he does not intend to examine the Soviet proposals in all seriousness", *(of. TNCD/FV.35, page 7)* but to discover the real meaning of some of the observations he made.
Nor do we wish to believe that this is the state of mind of the Western delegations as they prepare to take up the discussion of the new Soviet proposals. Those proposals were bound to be welcomed by public opinion, since they take into account not only the hopes of the peoples of the whole world, as expressed by the accredited representatives of States in the United Nations when they unanimously adopted the resolution on general and complete disarmament, but also, as was pointed out on the resumption of our meetings by the Soviet Union representative, certain proposals, views and wishes expressed by the delegations of various Western countries. (cf. TNCD/PV.33, page 8) Hence these proposals provide further evidence of the goodwill of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries and of their sincere desire to reach agreement for the solution of the most important problem of our time: that of disarmament.

In order to facilitate agreement on general and complete disarmament, the new Soviet proposals, as has been stressed, go a long way, on many important points, to meet the wishes and proposals expressed by the Western delegations during the discussion of the Soviet plan of 18 September 1959. (A/4219). As already pointed out, these proposals define in much more detailed and concrete fashion the position of the socialist countries on control of disarmament, on the abolition of atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons, on the manner of carrying out a joint study of methods for the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and for the destruction of existing stocks, and lastly, on the maintenance of peace after disarmament. Account has also been taken of the desire for prohibition of nuclear weapons vehicles in the first stage of the disarmament plan. It will be remembered that this desire was particularly stressed by the French representative, throughout our previous discussions. It will certainly be recalled that at the eleventh meeting of the Committee, M. Moch was asked why nuclear weapons should not be prohibited at the same time as their vehicles, in view of the opinion expressed by the Western Powers that "once the vehicles have been banned and destroyed, the military stocks of nuclear weapons will appear worthless". (TNCD/PV.1, page 16). M. Moch replied that the logic of that view seemed impeccable, but that without the possibility of control he would not be in favour of prohibiting the stockpiling of nuclear weapons. He then went to some pains to show the importance of destroying the vehicles. Among other things he said:
"To be precise, the only method of laying the foundations for a
guarantee is to prohibit the vehicles, for when they are prohibited --
I am keeping to my formula -- the nuclear stocks will lose their value,
until the States themselves have no interest in keeping them and convert
them to peaceful ends". (TNCD/FV.11, page 24)

It is precisely in order to find a solution of this problem that the remarks
made on several occasions by the French representative, and supported by his Western
colleagues have been taken into consideration in the new Soviet proposals, which
make considerable allowance for them. By the very fact of abolishing vehicles
for nuclear weapons and all means, without exception, that could be used for their
delivery, including military bases on foreign soil, the new Soviet proposals make it
possible at the same time to solve the problem of preventing a surprise attack --
a point particularly emphasized by most of the Western delegations. For at the
present time it is nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them to their
targets that constitute the danger of surprise attack.

The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries have several times shown
their interest in eliminating the danger of surprise attack. That is one of the
reasons why they have often raised the question of foreign bases. It cannot be
repeated too often that military bases on foreign soil represent a danger that is
increasing every day by reason both of the development of the means of delivering
weapons of mass destruction and of the perfecting of such weapons. When considering
the abolition of all means of delivering nuclear weapons, it is obviously necessary
to include military bases on foreign territory. For such bases are, in fact, the
most powerful of existing means which make it possible to place nuclear weapons
on the very frontiers of the socialist countries against which they are directed.
Now on this point, too, the United States position is one which does not permit of
progress towards disarmament. According to Mr. Eaton, the proposal to abolish
military bases of all kinds on foreign territory and to withdraw and disband all
foreign troops stationed on the territory of any State is a source of major concern
to the United States Government. This Soviet proposal, which would eliminate one
of the main causes of the present tension in international relations -- foreign
military bases -- is taken as a pretext by the United States representative for
stating that:

"The United States will not desert its friends or abandon its participation
in the collective defence of the free world." (TNCD/FV.36, page 7)
Such statements are obviously not calculated to open the way for general and complete disarmament. On the contrary, they sound rather like threats. Moreover, how can the maintenance of United States military bases in foreign countries be reconciled with the principle that "no State should derive a military advantage from the disarmament process at any stage". (Ibid.) Such an attitude to the question of abolishing foreign military bases is undoubtedly calculated to block all progress in the matter of liquidating the vehicles for nuclear weapons.

The accumulation of nuclear weapons along the frontiers of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries is not conducive to an atmosphere of trust in international relations, the need for which many delegations have particularly stressed. On the contrary, the very existence of foreign military bases and the concentration of large armed forces, the possession of means of delivering nuclear weapons and the possession of those weapons themselves are calculated to increase still further the distrust created during so many years of cold war.

On the baneful role of foreign military bases and the need to abolish them together with the other means of delivering nuclear weapons, we have, incidentally, the opinion of such a high authority as the President of the French Republic, who places on the same level as rockets the "fixed or floating bases from which these vehicles of death can be launched." (TNCD/FV.22, page 8)

Moreover, the opinion of highly qualified Western experts and more particularly United States experts, who enjoy great authority in this field, is also very instructive as regards foreign military bases. In his book "The Strategic Air Command", Richard Hubler, who is doubtless an expert on the subject, leaves no doubt that the bases referred to are foreign bases.

If that is not sufficient, very recent events which everyone has in mind, have drawn our attention to cases in which the Governments of countries where foreign bases are situated have openly stated that they do not know what goes on at those bases. This is a striking proof, if proof is needed, of who is the master at these bases and of what they are used for.

As to the defensive character of such bases, Dr. Alfred Wohlstetter, a well-known American expert, wrote in the American review "Foreign Affairs" in January 1959:

(continued in English)

"It would be extraordinarily risky for one side not to attempt to destroy the other, or to delay doing so, since it not only can emerge unscathed by striking first, but this is the sole way it can reasonably hope to emerge at all". (Op. cit., page 230)
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(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

(translation from French)

Now the means which are best adapted and present the least danger for those who wish to strike the first blow, are undoubtedly the foreign military bases placed along the frontiers of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

Moreover, striking proof is given in the same article, of the danger to the international situation and to world peace represented by the military bases along the frontiers of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. I quote:

(continued in English)

"Missiles placed near the enemy, even if they could not retaliate, would have a potent capability for striking first by surprise, and it might not be easy for the enemy to discern their purpose. The existence of such a force might be a considerable provocation, and in fact a dangerous one in the sense that it would place a great burden on our deterrent force, which more than ever would have to guarantee extreme risks to the attacker — worse than the risks of waiting in the face of this danger. When not coupled with the ability to strike in retaliation, such a capability might suggest ... an intention to strike first. If so, it would tend to provoke rather than to deter general war." (Op. cit., page 229)

(translation from French)

It follows that these bases, by their very existence, are not only a source of international tension, but are calculated to provoke a nuclear war.

We do not wish to dwell now on the danger presented by these nuclear bases for the countries which harbour them and for their people, but it may be useful to note that the peoples of the countries in whose territory foreign military bases have been established are beginning to understand the danger such bases entail for them.

Our reason for examining the problem of military bases in somewhat greater detail is not to engage in polemics on the subject or to prove its importance. It seems to me that no one in this Committee can undertake to maintain the contrary to what we have said about these bases. It is notorious that the existence of military bases is one of the causes of the cold war, and that these bases create international tension in the highest degree. It is also well known that the establishment of new bases and the accumulation of new weapons at existing bases are most characteristic features of the arms race and of the deterioration of the international situation.
This has become a problem of the utmost urgency, especially now that resurgent German militarism is seeking to establish new bases from the North Cape to the Mediterranean. This threat to peace is causing anxiety among the nations everywhere, since in the past it was German imperialism which precipitated two world wars and cost humanity tens of millions of lives and incalculable material damage.

The Bulgarian people, like many others, are particularly aware of this activity of the German military who are again prowling round the Balkans and elsewhere.

As regards military bases, we know that certain Western countries have adopted a position which is both negative and incompatible with any effort to achieve general and complete disarmament. It would be vain to believe, however, that we could abolish rockets and other, lesser vehicles for carrying nuclear weapons without at the same time proceeding to liquidate foreign military bases. To attempt to abolish rockets while maintaining the bases would mean blocking the way to negotiation, since it would give a military advantage to those who have built, and have at their disposal, military bases on foreign territory.

Now that the Soviet proposals have opened up new prospects for our negotiations, it is quite clear that a change in the attitude of certain Western delegations in regard to foreign bases is absolutely necessary if we really wish to take account of the realities of the world in which we live.

At the same time it must be hoped that the new proposals made by the Soviet Union in agreement with the other socialist countries, in which much of what was suggested by the Western Powers has been taken into consideration, will be received with more understanding by the Western delegations.

**Mr. Ormsby-Gore** (United Kingdom): I listened with interest to what the representative of Bulgaria has just said. He dwelt at some length on the question of military bases. I do not propose to take up this particular topic this morning, although it did seem to me that the remarks he made about military bases were not in fact very relevant to the real military position which we have in the world today, nor were they founded on modern strategic concepts.

I also listened with interest to what he had to say about time-limits in connexion with any treaty on general and complete disarmament. I listened with particular attention to hear whether he would reply to the very pertinent questions
which had been posed to him by Mr. Moch earlier this morning and which were particularly connected with the proposal which appears in the new Soviet plan that at the end of the first and second stages there should be a review of the results of the disarmament process and that reports should be made to the Security Council. The precise reason for this addition to the Soviet plan has still not been explained to us, and it was certainly not dealt with at all adequately by the representative of Bulgaria this morning.

At our meeting on last Wednesday I said that my delegation was studying the latest Soviet disarmament proposals with the care and attention due to them. I also indicated that those proposals contained certain obscurities, some of them perhaps arising from translation, but a number of them stemming from a lack of precision in the text of the proposals themselves. I mentioned then that my colleagues and I would wish to put a number of questions to the Soviet representative in order to obtain clarification, and that this would be necessary before we could express firm views on the substance of the new Soviet proposals now before us. My Government has not yet completed its study of the new proposals.

At earlier meetings, Mr. Zorin, on 8 June, and Mr. Nosek, on 9 June, reproached us for being slow to comment, on the ground that the elements in the proposals were already sufficiently familiar from our earlier discussions and that it should therefore be possible to negotiate about them straight away. In so far as the latest Soviet proposals do in fact contain familiar ingredients -- and I agree that there is much that we have seen before -- I would point out that it is not the ingredients alone which make the dish. The art of cooking is not confined to mixing a number of ingredients together in a pot: the quantities mixed, the method of cooking, the order in which they are added, have a perceptible effect upon the flavour. As it happens, the latest Soviet proposals also contain one or two unfamiliar ingredients which we have not encountered before in those discussions.

In response, however, to Mr. Zorin's desire for speedy consideration of the new document and rapid advance in our work -- a desire which I fully share -- I should like to address to him this morning a few preliminary questions, in much the same way as Mr. Moch, about certain features of the latest Soviet proposals which are obscure to us and on which we should like further explanation. As Mr. Zorin will see from the questions themselves, we are not trying to pre-judge
this or that; we simply want to clear up ambiguities and so avoid unnecessary misunderstanding later on. With this object in view we should be grateful for as full explanations as the Soviet delegation is in a position to give us.

The first group of questions -- and there are three of them -- relate to the general procedure and chronology surrounding the negotiations, the signing and ratification of a disarmament treaty by the ten countries represented here, and the accession to and ratification of that treaty by other States. I fully recognize the difficulty of the subject but I think it is necessary for us to have a clearer idea of the approximate sequence of events which the Soviet Government foresees would follow if the procedure recommended in its latest proposals were adopted, and the length of time it would take.

My first question is this: Section II of the preamble to the Soviet proposals, as they are set out in document TNOD/6/Rev.1, states:

"General and complete disarmament shall be carried out by all States over one and the same strictly defined period of time..." (TNOD/6/Rev.1, page 7)

This presumably means that the disarmament treaty must be acceded to and ratified by all States before it enters into force and disarmament actually begins. I also notice in this connexion that there is no qualification of the word "States" in the various stages of the plan itself and that paragraph 2 of the second stage specifically refers to the reduction of "the armed forces of all States". (Ibid., page 10)

At our sixth meeting the representative of Czechoslovakia stated:

"An essential factor of mutual equality and security for all States is a requirement which is fully recognized in the Soviet proposal under which disarmament measures should, from the very beginning, include all States." (TNOD/PV.6, page 14)

And again, on that same day, he said:

"The necessity of safeguarding mutual equality and security has, therefore, also to be reflected in the requirement that the limitation and reduction of armed forces unconditionally include all countries from the very beginning." (Ibid., page 15)

I should, however, be grateful for confirmation from the Soviet delegation that the assumption to which I have already referred is correct. The reason for this question is the rather puzzling reference to "the adherence of other
States to the agreement" in the second paragraph of section II of the preamble to the Soviet plan, and the following words used in the second sentence of section III b) of the preamble with reference to the control organization: "It will comprise all States Parties to the treaty". This would seem to indicate that there might be a period during which only a certain number of countries had undertaken the obligations of the treaty while other States were not yet parties to it. This would be in contradiction to the position set out so clearly by Mr. Nosek which I have already quoted. Are we to assume that there has been no change in the Soviet position? If not, and the Soviet Government considers that a disarmament treaty could enter into force before all States were parties to it, then I should be grateful for further explanation of when it considers disarmament should start and how and when other States should be brought in.

My second question is this: Does the Soviet delegation, under the latest Soviet proposals, still stand by the general proposition put forward by the Polish representative at our eighth meeting, when he said:

"It is envisaged that there would be a special session of the General Assembly or a disarmament conference as proposed in the Soviet plan before the signature of the treaty on general and complete disarmament". (TNCD/FV.8, page 7)

Or does it envisage that a disarmament treaty should be not only initiated but also signed, though perhaps not ratified, by the ten countries represented here before discussion of the treaty with other States begins? How, in fact, is it envisaged that a text worked out here should go forward, and what would be its precise status? I should welcome some indication of the Soviet Government's ideas on this important point, as this clearly has a bearing on the speed with which the disarmament process can be undertaken.

My third question, which is connected with the two preceding questions, is this: Does the Soviet Government propose that the process of ratification of the treaty after signature by States represented on this Committee and by other States should take its normal course, or does it consider that a time-limit of some sort should be laid down for the period between signature and entry into force? The answer to this question is of obvious constitutional and practical interest, particularly since, if I understand the Soviet proposals correctly, this would be the period during which a preparatory commission was arranging for the establishment of a permanent control organization.
My fourth question relates to paragraph 3 in the first stage of the Soviet plan. This states, among other things, that:

"From the very beginning of the first stage --- the leaping of their territorial waters by warships and the flying beyond the limits of their national territory by military aircraft capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction, will be prohibited." (TNCD/5/Rov.1, page 8)

It would be helpful to know how the Soviet Union envisions that this proposal would work, how it would be reconciled with existing international law on the matter, and what are the reasons behind it. How, for instance, does the provision apply to States, like the United Kingdom, which have territorial waters in widely separated parts of the world? Would there be no allowance for innocent passage by naval vessels across the high seas? Similarly, for aircraft, would adoption of the prohibition mean that military aircraft would be unable to fly from one part of a national territory to another even if it were possible to do this without over-flying the territory of any other State? These are, I think, proposals which have not previously featured in our discussions here and we have had no detailed explanation of them.

My fifth question concerns the elimination of nuclear weapons. It arises from paragraph 1 of the second stage, which speaks of the destruction of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons among other weapons of mass destruction. As the United States representative pointed out at our nineteenth meeting, provision has to be made for the disposal of fissionable materials already ensconced in the warheads of completed nuclear weapons. Under the previous Soviet definition, which differed in this respect from the Western definition, such materials were apparently in a special category of their own and were not included under the general heading "nuclear stocks".

Fissionable material of all sorts can of course be put to peaceful use. Under the Soviet plan is it intended that fissionable materials already ensconced in warheads should be destroyed rather than taken out and put to peaceful use in this way, or would the study on the control over the "cut-off" of production of fissionable material, now agreed to by the Soviet Union, include the study of the transfer of existing military stocks to peaceful uses?

My final question concerns paragraph 2 of the second stage. This provides for the destruction of conventional weapons and munitions thus released, that is to say, released by the reduction of armed forces of all States to fixed levels. How
is the relationship between the conventional weapons, munitions and military equipment and the forces to be disbanded to be determined? In particular, is it intended that this clause should include weapons and munitions kept as mobilization reserves, or is it intended, alternatively, that such mobilization reserves should not be destroyed under paragraph 2 of the second stage, but preserved intact to be dealt with at the third stage under paragraph 2, which refers to the destruction of all remaining types of conventional armaments and ammunition? If so, at what point in the disarmament process would an inventory of these reserves be prepared and checked by the control organization? As Mr. Moch has already pointed out this morning, we attach considerable importance to what happens to the weapons and armaments themselves, particularly in view of the fact that, if a reserve of such weapons and arms are kept in being, it is very easy to recall men to the colours and equip them with this stock of arms and equipment.

I should be most grateful if the Soviet representative would examine these questions and let us have answers to them in due course. They are designed to provide clarification for me, for my colleagues and for our respective Governments.

In conclusion, I should like to thank Mr. Zorin for the action he has already taken to resolve the translation difficulty mentioned at Wednesday's meeting. He has done this by arranging for the issue of a revised version of the latest Soviet proposals in document TNCD/6/Rev.1, and I am most grateful to him.

Mr. Zorin (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): We have listened carefully to the statements made today by Mr. Moch, the representative of France, Mr. Tarabanov, the representative of Bulgaria, and Mr. Ormsby-Gore, the representative of the United Kingdom.

With regard to some of the questions asked and the clarifications which the representatives of the United Kingdom and France wish to receive from us, I should like to say the following.

On Mr. Moch's statement I would like to make two observations. With regard to the questions he asked, and the views he expressed on them, in the middle of his statement — and he repeated them at the very end too — I am able to say, from the first impression I have gained after listening carefully to the simultaneous interpretation, that the points made by Mr. Moch on the matters he discussed do not call for any particular objections on our part although, of course, from the way in which he worded some of his observations, it seems we do not have entirely the same understanding of the matters he discussed.
Accordingly, as regards our reply to the question as a whole raised by Mr. Moch, I can say that this reply is in general affirmative. After studying the verbatim record, we may feel it necessary to give further explanations and to state some points more precisely. That is the first observation I wished to make.

My second observation concerns Mr. Moch's actual position in regard to the substance of the questions dealt with in the Soviet plan. I can see that in his statement to-day Mr. Moch has as yet refrained from expressing the attitude of France, which he represents here, towards the Soviet Union's new proposals, and especially towards the proposals which are formulated in the first stage of the Soviet plan, in particular towards the proposal for the immediate elimination from armaments of means of delivering nuclear weapons, a proposal, it will be recalled, that was made by the French representatives, as well as by the President of France. We should like to know the present position of France on this very important disarmament question, and I believe that not only we but the whole world is interested in knowing it. We look forward with interest to a statement of the present position of France on the substance of this question.

With regard to the questions asked and the wishes expressed by Mr. Ormsby-Gore, although explanations from us are called for and can be given on some questions -- and we shall endeavour to produce these explanations once we have been able to study the verbatim record of Mr. Ormsby-Gore's statement to-day -- I must say that in the first place many of these questions will simply have to be settled in the course of our negotiations, that is to say, on a number of questions we have no ready-made recipos, and, secondly, we believe that replies to several of the questions put by Mr. Ormsby-Gore might be suggested by the Western representatives themselves.

We are not attending this meeting here as persons under cross-examination by any one. We have put forward our views, our plan. I repeat, we are prepared to give certain explanations on a number of questions where this is called for. But, as the representative of Italy has said, and I believe Mr. Eaton too at one of our early meetings, we believe that our purpose here is collective discussion, and the expression of collective opinions on many questions. On a number of questions, therefore, we shall expect replies from the Western representatives as well, because many of the proposals which have
now been included in our plan are in fact proposals which originally figured in
the Western plan; and it would seem that the Western representatives have their
answers to these questions no less well prepared than we have.

This, of course, is my preliminary comment. We shall study carefully
what Mr. Ormsby-Gore has said, all the more so because he has expressed his
questions and his ideas in a sufficiently systematic fashion, as in fact he
always does, and we shall see from the record what exactly are those groups of
questions to which he has referred, and we shall try to give the necessary
explanations on those questions on which such explanations can be given
immediately.

Finally, I should like to refer to our meeting of 10 June, and remind the
United States representative that we put some questions to him and we have not
received any reply to them yet. In particular -- as will be recalled from the
record of our meeting -- we are proposing that in the first stage all means of
delivering nuclear weapons should be eliminated, and the United States dele-
gation believes that abolition of the means of delivery would mean "abolition
of the ... major capabilities for protection against aggression". (TNCD/PV.36,
page 5).

We asked why the United States delegation regards this as abolishing the
major capabilities of protection against aggression. We cannot understand why,
and in the statement made by Mr. Eaton on 10 June, no real reason is given,
there has been no real answer to that question.

We went on to say: In our plan we do not say that only United States
troops are to be withdrawn from foreign territories. All troops, including
Soviet troops, are to be withdrawn from foreign territories. That we have an
identical approach here is quite obvious, as is also the fact that identical
conditions apply to all. Why this should give any military advantage to any
one -- as would appear from Mr. Eaton's remarks -- is, we said, incomprehensible
to us. We would like to ask for some clarification. This of course applies
equally to the question of foreign bases, to which the representative of
Bulgaria has referred in greater detail to-day.

So we repeat the questions we put to the United States representative.
I will recall that we in fact formulated our position as follows: As to the
other two "shortcomings" mentioned by Mr. Eaton, we would like to know more
precisely the point of view of the United States because, strictly speaking,
these relate to the very heart of the first stage of disarmament as proposed by
us.
We expect the United States representative to give us the necessary explanations of the position of the United States on what we believe to be key questions of disarmament put forward in our plan.

The CHAIRMAN (Poland) (translation from French): If no other member of the Committee wishes to speak, I will read out the draft communiqué:

"The thirty-seventh meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament was held at the Palais des Nations, Genova, on 13 June 1960 under the chairmanship of the representative of the People's Republic of Poland.

"The next meeting of the Conference will take place on Tuesday, 14 June 1960, at 10.30 a.m."

If there are no objections, I will consider the communiqué adopted.

The meeting rose at 12.10 p.m."