FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THIRTY-SIXTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Friday, 10 June 1960, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. CAVALLETI (Italy)
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<th>Country</th>
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<td><strong>Bulgaria:</strong></td>
<td>Mr. M. TARABANOV</td>
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<td>Mr. K. CHRISTOV</td>
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<td><strong>Canada:</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Czechoslovakia:</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Italy:</strong></td>
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<td>Col. C. POPA</td>
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<td><strong>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:</strong></td>
<td>Mr. V.A. ZORIN</td>
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<td>Col.-Gen. A.A. GRYZLOV</td>
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<td>Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN</td>
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PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:
Rt. Hon. D. ORMSBY-GORE
Maj.-Gen. RIDDELL
Miss B. SALT

United States of America:
Mr. F. M. EATON
Mr. C. C. STELLE
Rear-Admiral P.L. DUDLEY

Representative of the Secretary-General:
Dr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General:
Mr. W. EPSTEIN
The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): The thirty-sixth meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament is called to order.

Mr. KITSON (United States of America): When I spoke on 7 June at the opening meeting of our resumed Conference, I expressed the hope that we could join together in discussing and clarifying the positions of each side in order that we might open up the areas of agreement between us and identify more clearly the problems which must be resolved in order to move forward in these negotiations.

The Soviet document of 2 June reflects changes in the Soviet position which, in some respects, seem to represent positive movement toward positions which the allied delegations have set forth during the course of the Conference. We welcome this. At the same time, the revised Soviet proposals (TNCD/6/Rev.1) raise questions which require clarification in order to permit profitable discussion of the substance of the document. In line with the serious study and considerations which my Government is now giving that document I wish today to make some general and preliminary observations which I hope will constitute a useful framework for our coming sessions. Those observations fall into three areas: first, a brief summary of the fundamental features which we believe must characterize any realistic approach to the problem of general and complete disarmament; secondly, some comments on those aspects of the proposals of 2 June which indicate a measure of positive movement toward elements of the Western disarmament proposals; and thirdly, some comments on those aspects of the Soviet paper which we still find difficult to reconcile with a workable approach to the disarmament problem.

Let me first restate the fundamental concepts which underlie our approach to disarmament. We believe that disarmament must be carried out by stages, with each stage to be completed as rapidly as possible, but that it is impossible to fix in advance a timetable for the process as a whole. We believe that in the process no country or side should obtain military advantage and that, to this end, nuclear and conventional measures must be balanced. We hold that disarmament measures must be verified from their entry into force. To ensure that there is no evasion, there must be an effective international disarmament organization within the framework of the United Nations. Finally, we believe that disarmament measures which can be implemented and effectively controlled at an early stage should be negotiated now and put into effect at the earliest possible moment. We believe
that this is the proper approach to the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, as called for in the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Now, as to the latest Soviet proposals that have been put before us, I am encouraged to note that in some respects, as I have stated, the Soviet paper gives the appearance of movement toward some elements of the Western disarmament position. My Government is engaged in a careful study of the June 2 document; and to facilitate this, my delegation, together with the other Western delegations, will in the coming days seek that clarification which is essential to a fair appraisal of the Soviet position. Naturally, it is my hope — a hope that I am confident is shared by my Western colleagues — that the clarifications we seek will open up a vista of negotiating possibilities which will facilitate progress towards our common goal.

What are the areas in which there seems to be an encouraging modification of the Soviet position? First, there is the vital matter of controls. The new proposals devote more space to the question of controls and to the nature and composition of a control organ than was the case with the earlier Soviet proposals advanced in this Conference. This could be a welcome development if it means that the Soviet delegation is prepared to discuss in concrete terms the requirements for verification of specific disarmament measures. I need not stress here that the past Soviet reluctance to engage in such discussion has been a source of major concern to us. We believe that the Soviet Union has not been willing in the past to accept the need for that degree of control required to ensure compliance with disarmament measures. I am also aware that the Soviet Union claims that the West seeks too much in the way of controls. This is not the case, for what we seek is the minimum control necessary to provide adequate and effective verification of any particular measure of disarmament. We sincerely hope that, as our efforts to clarify the Soviet position proceed, the old position will prove to be a matter simply of historical interest. We hope, in a word, to discover that our views on controls have come closer together.

Secondly, the Soviet proposals include for the first time a provision for the "cut-off" of the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons — and this at an early stage. This too could be an encouraging sign, especially since it may reflect Soviet recognition of the utility of joint studies in furthering progress toward disarmament. On the other hand, the Soviet plan appears to
condition acceptance of this important measure on a solution of the whole complex problem of complete nuclear disarmament. This is an area we shall have to explore thoroughly, and together, since the nuclear weapons build-up is one of the basic elements of the disarmament problem.

Thirdly, the Soviet proposals seem to abandon the earlier proposition, which appeared to us to be unrealistic, that general and complete disarmament must be set down in a four-year timetable. Here again, however, this welcome change in position seems to be qualified by a continued insistence on fixing a hard and fast timetable in advance for the entire process of general and complete disarmament. This, in our view, is an unrealistic approach since we cannot determine how long the process would take. But again, we hope that our discussions will lead to an acceptable solution.

Fourthly, the Soviet proposals recognize, at least in principle, that there must be some means for keeping the peace when national armies have been substantially eliminated. It would be a significant change indeed in the Soviet position if our discussion should disclose that the Soviet Union is prepared to endorse an adequate and workable arrangement. The concept of international peace enforcement machinery is of concern to all Members of the United Nations, and it would be helpful to have further clarification of Soviet views in this regard.

Thus there are hopeful signs of positive movement in these new proposals. It is these aspects that we should first like to explore with the Soviet delegation because we firmly believe that agreement in individual areas would not preclude broader, general agreement, but would instead facilitate it.

There are some problems which we hope can be overcome through serious negotiations and through discussion in our later meetings. In order to facilitate this discussion I should like to illustrate several of the problems which I have in mind.

There seems to be lacking in the Soviet proposals a balance within each stage of the various elements of military power. Such a balance is essential to the security of all countries, and this is provided in the Western plan. We hope that the Soviet delegation will be flexible on this point.

More important, the Soviet proposals call for, as the very first step in the first stage of disarmament, the immediate abolition of the free world's major capabilities for protection against aggression. The Western plan, on the other hand, provides for balanced, phased and safeguarded steps toward our common goal.
Another major concern is the Soviet proposal for the liquidation of all free world collective security arrangements through the complete and immediate withdrawal of all United States forces from areas overseas where they are now stationed at the specific request of our friends. It is difficult to reconcile this provision with the Soviet Union's professed acceptance of the principle that no State should derive a military advantage from the disarmament process at any stage. The United States will not desert its friends nor abandon its participation in the collective defence of the free world.

There are, furthermore, certain basic differences of approach that we find in the Soviet document. There is the apparent insistence that before any measure of disarmament can be undertaken the whole range of general and complete disarmament must be negotiated and agreed, and that this complex and comprehensive agreement must then be negotiated and approved by all the nations of the world.

This approach would deprive the world of any start toward our disarmament goal until the entire complex process had been completed. The world should not be forced to wait that long for us to get started with these practical early measures which can be undertaken immediately. The Western plan does not suffer from that shortcoming.

In addition, the Soviet proposals appear to require a commitment to move automatically and unconditionally to radical disarmament steps before the proposed studies have been completed and the necessary controls worked out for the measures to be undertaken and regardless of the outcome of these studies. We deem it essential that control arrangements be spelled out and fully agreed, as a part of the basic agreement, at the time when any disarmament commitments are undertaken.

These observations are made in the hope that the Soviet Government will understand more clearly both the hopes and the concern which will motivate our subsequent questions and discussion on the Soviet document. They have been made with goodwill and in the hope of advancing our negotiations. If the Soviet delegation should attempt to misconstrue my remarks to mean that we do not intend to examine the Soviet proposals in all seriousness, then it would in fact be obstructing the progress of our negotiations. If this should be the Soviet reaction, we would be led to believe that it is the Soviet delegation which is not prepared to engage in serious discussion. We hope that is not the case. Such an "all-or-nothing" approach could not advance our work,
Let me repeat that my comments this morning reflect our purpose to move forward with disarmament. Our negotiations bear on the security of all States. They deal with matters which are vital to national existence. Proposals by either side are bound to contain points which will be searchingly questioned and problems which will be difficult to solve. We have today, in all candour, pointed out those areas of the most recent Soviet proposals which give us concern, as well as those which give us encouragement. This is the forthright way to undertake serious negotiation, and it is in this spirit that I have spoken. We all recognize that there is a compelling need to reach sound agreements as rapidly as possible. We know that the passage of time in itself makes our task more difficult. It is our firm belief that in our quest for agreement on measures to reach our common goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control we should begin with discussion of measures either in the Western plan or in the Soviet plan which can be carried out now without prejudice to the vital interests of any party or any State. This is the sensible path to a comprehensive agreement.

Once such measures are negotiated and agreed, we here can then work out the additional measures required to achieve our common goal. Thus, if we can follow this course, we can hope to surmount the problems which we face and move forward.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The comments we have heard this morning from the United States representative, as well as some of the previous observations made by the United States representative at the very beginning of our work -- and also by other Western representatives -- make it possible for us today to express, in a preliminary way, our opinion regarding the approach so far displayed during the consideration of the proposals put forward by the Soviet Union. At the moment, of course, we cannot dwell in detail upon all the observations that have been made, since, as can be seen from the statement made by Mr. Eaton today, these observations are essentially preliminary in character and are mainly intended, as I have understood them, to be a sort of probing of the subject-matter of our proposals. It is clear that during this coming week, and subsequent weeks, it will be possible to embark on a more substantial consideration of our proposals and of the positions taken up by the Western representatives. From the statement made today by Mr. Eaton and, to some extent, from the statement made at
one of our previous meetings by Mr. Ormsby-Gore, one may conclude that certain initial points put forward by the Western representatives -- though these were mainly of a general character -- have not so far provided any evidence that the Western representatives themselves have to any degree reconsidered some of their views which, as will be recalled, were criticized by the socialist countries in our last series of meetings. Of course, this is not very encouraging to us, since we for our part have made definite efforts, as has been noted just now by the United States representative, Mr. Eaton, as well as previously by other Western representatives, to bring our positions closer together and, as Mr. Eaton said today, there has in his view been some positive movement on our part to find some common ground for solving the problems of general and complete disarmament which we have before us.

The picture, therefore, is as follows. We, for our part, have taken definite steps forward to try to bring our positions closer together and, as Mr. Eaton rightly pointed out this morning, we do have certain new proposals which take into account, to a considerable extent, the views expressed by Western representatives on a number of questions. The Western representatives, on the other hand, and Mr. Eaton in particular today, have not as yet shown any readiness to make even a small move forward on points on which we had criticisms to make, and on which some definite steps must be taken to bring our respective positions closer together. It is quite clear that we cannot expect to reach any agreement if there is a one-sided movement forward on the part of the socialist countries and there is no movement forward at all on the part of the representatives of the Western Powers. I believe this is clear to everyone, and is elementary for the conduct of any serious negotiations. We assume, therefore, that further reflection by Western representatives on our new document will enable them to adopt a constructive approach to the questions raised in our document, and we hope that they, for their part, will take steps to come nearer to our positions. It is only under such conditions that fruitful negotiations are possible.

Of the questions touched upon by Mr. Eaton this morning, I should like to refer only to a few.
In the first part of his statement, Mr. Eaton gave a kind of summary of the fundamental concepts which, as he said, underly any fruitful consideration of proposals relating to disarmament. From what I understood from the simultaneous interpretation he mentioned, first of all, that these proposals must be arranged in stages and that each stage must be completed as rapidly as possible; secondly, that no side may obtain any advantage while the agreement is being carried out, and that there must be some balance between the various elements of disarmament; thirdly, that from the very beginning to the very end there must be effective control; and fourthly, as I understood him, that it is essential at the earliest possible time to take some initial measures, which would then make it possible to proceed to carry out other measures in the total plan of general and complete disarmament.

I think something similar was said by the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Ormsby-Gore, at one of our previous meetings. I must say that some of these points do not call for any particular objections on our part. Indeed, we too believe that the whole disarmament plan must be arranged in stages, with each stage to be completed as rapidly as possible. Further we also agree that no side should obtain military advantage and we agree too that from the very outset to the very end there must be control.

We have some doubts only in respect of the last point made by Mr. Eaton, because this appears to be tied up with all the previous positions taken by the United States delegation, to the effect that, strictly speaking, one cannot at present talk of a plan for general and complete disarmament, and that it is only possible to negotiate on some kind of initial measures, and that only when these have been carried out will it be possible to proceed to the next measures, and to prepare the plan as a whole. If this is so, if I have understood correctly the comments made this morning, then I must say here and now that we do not agree with this approach. We refused to agree with it at the very outset of our work here in the Ten Nation Committee, and we explained in detail why we did not agree. We consider that this approach in fact amounts to a refusal to draft a treaty on general and complete disarmament; yet our main task is to draft such a treaty on general and complete disarmament. If the United States does not wish to proceed with the drafting of this treaty on general and complete disarmament, let it say so frankly. Then we
shall have hardly any grounds at all for working together, since we base ourselves on the direct task deriving from the General Assembly resolution on general and complete disarmament, and we have submitted a concrete plan taking into account the position of the Western Powers in regard to a treaty on general and complete disarmament. We have put forward basic provisions for such a treaty; and, whereas we were criticized previously for the fact that our former proposals were not detailed enough, now, it seems, this charge is no longer being levelled against us. From this we conclude that we have done some serious work, and have submitted a more detailed and elaborate plan which may be used as a basis for serious discussions, for serious negotiations. That is the first comment I wanted to make on Mr. Eaton's statement today.

The second point concerns some critical observations made by Mr. Eaton today on the actual contents of our plan.

Apparently Mr. Eaton said, though not in a direct fashion, it is true, that our plan is not balanced in each of its stages and in particular that there is no balance between disarmament in the field of conventional weapons and disarmament in the field of atomic weapons. If I have understood his statement correctly, if he really holds this view, then I should like to explain in the first place that the fact that the Soviet Union in its new proposals has not included in the first stage of the general and complete disarmament plan, any concrete proposal for the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces is directly due to the position adopted by the Western Powers, a position which was clearly expressed during our previous discussion. Indeed, neither in the first stage of the Western plan, nor in the statements made by Western representatives during the seven weeks of our negotiations in March and April, was there ever any mention of any wish for a concrete discussion of any measures of disarmament in the field of conventional armaments and armed forces in the first stage of disarmament. The Western Powers did not suggest any figures for a reduction of armaments and armed forces in the first stage, and the figure mentioned with respect to the force levels of the Soviet Union and of the United States showed that no reduction was contemplated, and that the armed forces were merely to be fixed at their existing levels.
Further, it will be recalled that neither in the Western plan nor in the statements made, were any concrete figures suggested for a reduction in armed forces or even for the force levels, say, of the United Kingdom or France. Everyone who took part in our negotiations will remember perfectly well that we received no positive replies to our repeated questions as to why this point did not appear, and what suggestions could be made in this connexion. Under these circumstances it was quite natural, in examining the results of our seven weeks' labours, to take the real facts into account. If the Western Powers, neither in their plans nor in their statements, have made any concrete proposals for the reduction of conventional armaments or armed forces in the first stage of the plan for general and complete disarmament, then it is obvious that this, apparently, does not suit their interests.

Within the limits of what is possible, we have tried to take into account to the fullest extent the wishes expressed by the Western representatives during our negotiations. It was with this in mind that in our present plan we did not include in the first stage any proposals for the reduction of conventional armed forces and armaments. If the Western representatives, and particularly the United States representative, consider that this creates an imbalance in the first stage of our plan — which, incidentally, we do not believe to be the case — then it can be corrected very easily; and if the Western Powers, and in particular the United States, have some concrete proposals and they can introduce some exact figures for the reduction of conventional armed forces and armaments in the first stage, we shall be ready to discuss them at once. Thus the lack of balance to which Mr. Eaton referred, if there is any as the Western representatives believe, does not arise from a negative attitude on our part towards the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces. Not at all. It is due rather to the unwillingness of the Western Powers to proceed to the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces in the first stage. If they now agree to this reduction, we are prepared to consider their proposals on the matter.

In my opinion, therefore, as regards the principle, we should have no differences and no difficulties on this question. We can overcome this difficulty easily. We await your proposals.
My third observation is connected with what I was saying at the very beginning. I said that some of the statements and positions expressed today, and some expressed previously by Mr. Eaton and other representatives, indicate that they have not abandoned their mistaken views which prevent agreement being reached on the questions before us. One of these questions concerns time-limits for the conclusion of agreements, or more exactly, for the implementation of the whole treaty and for carrying out the separate stages of the treaty.

Mr. Eaton said today that he hoped that our position on this point would be flexible. In this, he is not mistaken. Our position will indeed be flexible. But your position unfortunately remains inflexible, because you are still on the wrong course as before. Today you say it is impossible to fix in advance the length of time for each stage for carrying out the treaty on general and complete disarmament. That means you have not moved from your old position. You do not want to fix any time-limits for carrying out the plan for general and complete disarmament. We have already argued about this in the previous series of meetings and it seems we shall have to go on arguing about it now as well. You have not put forward any serious arguments in support of this position.

When you were talking to-day in appraisal of our proposals, you spoke as if the provision about the four years needed for carrying out the plan of general and complete disarmament had been completely omitted from our proposals. This is an incorrect conclusion — our proposal does include the four-year time-limit, but it is formulated more flexibly than it was before. In the preamble to our proposals, it is stated that:

"... all this disarmament programme should be carried out, on the basis of an international treaty, within a fixed period of time — four years", "and this is where the flexibility comes in, or some other agreed period under effective international control."

(TNCD/6/Rev.1, page 5)

In fact, as a starting-point for discussion, we are now proposing, as we proposed previously, four years. But we are prepared to consider another possible agreed time-limit which is acceptable to our partners. Judging by the position you have taken up to-day, you are opposed to any time-limit at all. If this is so, then of course we have serious differences here. We cannot propose a treaty without a time-limit, a treaty on concrete measures in the field of disarmament without a time-limit, for it is impossible even
to control the implementation of such a treaty unless time-limits for carrying out the various measures are fixed. You take the position that there must be control from the very outset to the very end, and we agree with this. But if you take that position, how can you exercise control over this treaty, if you have not fixed time-limits for carrying out measures in each stage of the treaty? We feel that your position on this point is not logical and is not based on serious considerations; and we must note with regret that you are not showing any flexibility in this matter, and that so far you are not willing to take even the smallest step forward in a matter which is of substantial importance in solving the whole question of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

The fourth remark I would like to make concerns the so-called "shortcomings" which, so I understand, the United States delegation has noted in our plan. Mr. Eaton mentioned some of these "shortcomings" this morning. As regards the first "shortcoming", namely a lack of balance within each stage as regards various types of armaments, if he is referring to balance in respect of measures concerning conventional armaments and armed forces and other disarmament measures, I have already explained our position in this matter. Here we could soon find a basis for agreement, if the Western Powers had a real desire to carry out some practical disarmament measures in the field of conventional arms and armed forces. As for the other two "shortcomings" mentioned by Mr. Eaton, we would like to know more precisely the point of view of the United States and of the other Western delegations, because, strictly speaking, these relate to the very heart of the first stage of disarmament as proposed by us.

I gather that Mr. Eaton considers as a "shortcoming" in our plan what he vaguely described as "the abolition of the ... capabilities for protection against aggression". This refers apparently to the fact that we propose in the first stage to liquidate all means of delivering nuclear weapons, which according to the United States delegation's way of thinking, amounts to the abolition of the capabilities for protection against aggression. Why the United States delegation should regard this as the abolition of the capabilities for protection against aggression is not quite clear to us. After all, we are proposing the liquidation of all such means of delivery in all
the States that possess them. Therefore no-one will be in a position to launch 
aggression by utilizing these means of delivery, and I remember some rather 
convincing statements made by Mr. Moch on this subject in the course of our 
previous discussion of this matter. We have re-read those statements and have 
come to the conclusion that they deserve attention.

Indeed, if all means of delivery of nuclear weapons are liquidated it 
would seem that the possibility of launching aggression by means of atomic 
weapons will thereby become not only difficult but indeed impossible — unless 
we assume that someone will be concealing some such means of delivery. Therefore, 
what the United States delegation considers to be a "shortcoming" in our plan 
we consider to be precisely its virtue, because it is this radical measure which 
would immediately change the situation in the world, would immediately do away 
with the possibility of aggression by any party, not unilateral aggression but 
by any party — I am speaking of aggression by means of nuclear weapons — even 
before the nuclear weapons themselves are destroyed.

Another "shortcoming" which Mr. Eaton claims to see in our plan is the 
withdrawal of United States forces from foreign territories. I do not quite 
understand why Mr. Eaton speaks of the withdrawal of only United States forces. 
In our plan we do not say that only United States forces should be withdrawn. 
All armed forces, including Soviet armed forces, should be withdrawn from foreign 
territories. That we have an identical approach here is quite obvious, as is 
also the fact that identical conditions apply to all. Why this should give any 
military advantage to anyone — as would appear from Mr. Eaton's remarks — is 
incomprehensible. We would like to ask for some clarification. The withdrawal 
of all troops from foreign territories to within their own national frontiers 
and the liquidation of all bases on foreign territories is indeed a radical 
measure which, in the first place, is connected to a large extent with the 
liquidation of the means of delivery, to which I referred in my statement of 
7 June, and secondly it has by itself, of course, an importance of its own, 
since it would drastically reduce tensions in the relations between States and 
the danger of military conflicts.
Therefore, on this question also, what the United States delegation considers a "shortcoming" in our plan is in our view its virtue. Here we apparently differ in our appraisals.

I do not propose today to analyse the whole of Mr. Eaton's statement; we shall try to do this after we have made a careful study of the verbatim record, but the preliminary remarks which I have ventured to make today show that on a number of important, essential matters there undoubtedly exist between us substantial differences in approach. It gives us satisfaction to note what Mr. Eaton pointed out as the positive aspects of our plan, since Mr. Eaton did recognize that we have indeed moved towards the positions of the Western Powers and have definitely improved our plan, even from the point of view of the United States delegation, whose attitude towards our positions, as we know from our previous discussions, was very sceptical. If today the United States delegation finds four important elements of improvement in our plan, we note this with satisfaction; it means that we have established the prerequisites for bringing our positions closer together. The whole question now is how the Western delegations, and particularly the United States delegation, will respond to this move forward on our part. We are looking forward to this response. We would like to proceed as soon as possible to a business-like discussion of our plan and to elucidate the positions now taken by our Western partners; and in those positions we would like to see real changes which would bring them closer to our positions. We are entitled to expect this because we have made important changes in order to come closer to the positions of the Western Powers. If we wish to make progress towards a solution of the problem we are facing, the problem of general and complete disarmament, then of course moves must be made by both sides and not by one side only.

The Soviet delegation regrets, of course, that the first week of the work of our Committee has not yet made it possible for us to set about in real earnest the practical consideration of the new proposals of the Soviet Government on the basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. A business-like discussion of these proposals, which seems to be our common desire, has not yet begun because the Western delegations, as they themselves have indicated, are not yet quite ready to engage in such a discussion as they have not completed the study of our proposals and their consultations about them. We are compelled, of course, to take this fact into account.
We are also bound to draw attention to the fact that although the representatives of the Western States participating in this Committee have so far said little on the substance of our proposals, nevertheless what they have said, and in particular what the United States representative has said both at the start of our work and this morning, reiterates, in point of fact on a number of vital questions, their previous position which, as is known, was not directed towards a solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament but merely towards the working out of separate measures of control without disarmament.

So far we have not had even a hint from the Western Powers that they are prepared to reconsider their position in order to take the path towards a practical solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament. However, since the Western Powers have stated their intention of giving serious and careful study to the new Soviet proposals, we hope and expect that as a result of this study they will reach constructive conclusions and that on their part they will take steps to bring our positions closer together, as has already been done by the socialist States in the new proposals submitted by the Soviet Government.

Such a constructive approach on the part of the Western States represented in this Committee would create the necessary prerequisites for a successful development of our labours in order to work out a treaty on general and complete disarmament, which is so ardently awaited by millions of people in all countries.

We hope that as from the beginning of next week we shall have a practical discussion of the new proposals of the Soviet Government on the basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): If no other member of the Committee wishes to speak I will read out the draft communiqué:

"The thirty-sixth meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament was held at the Palais des Nations, Genova, on 10 June 1960 under the chairmanship of the representative of Italy.

"The next meeting of the Conference will take place on Monday, 13 June 1960, at 10.30 a.m."

The communiqué is adopted.

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.