FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THIRTY-THIRD MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Tuesday, 7 June 1960, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: MR. BURNS (Canada)
PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Bulgaria:
Mr. M. TARABANOV
Mr. K. CHRISTOV
Mr. G. GURELEV

Canada:
Mr. E. I. M. BURNS
Mr. A. G. CAMPBELL
W/Cdr. R. J. MITCHELL

Czechoslovakia:
Mr. J. NOSEK
Lieut.-Gen. J. HECKD
Mr. Z. TRHLIK

France:
Mr. J. MOCH
Mr. M. LEGENDRE
Col. L. CONVET

Italy:
Mr. G. MARTINO
Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. L. DAINELLI

Poland:
Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
Mr. M. BLUZSTAJN
Brig.-Gen. J. SŁIWINSKI

Romania:
Mr. E. MEZIN-ESCU
Mr. C. BOGDAN
Col. C. POPA

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
Mr. V. A. ZORIN
Col.-Gen. A. A. GRYZLOV
Mr. A. A. KOSHCHIN
PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Rt. Hon. D. ORMSBY-GORE
Sir Michael WRIGHT
Miss B. SALT

United States of America:

Mr. F.M. EATON
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Rear-Admiral P.L. DUDLEY

Representative of the Secretary-General:

Dr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN
The CHAIRMAN (Canada): I call the thirty-third meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament to order.

I think that all delegations here would wish me to express the thanks of the Conference to Mr. Hammerskjold; to Mr. Spinelli, the Director of the European Office of the United Nations; to Dr. Protitch, the Secretary-General's immediate Representative, whom we are glad to see here with us again; and to Mr. Epstein and all members of the United Nations Secretariat and services who will be helping us in our forthcoming meetings, for the arrangements which have been made for the convenient carrying on of our discussions.

I should also like to express on the Committee's behalf, to the Swiss Government and to the authorities and people of the Canton and Municipality of Geneva, our sincere thanks for their continued hospitality to this Conference.

I believe that most representatives here know that, by a long standing agreement, the International Labour Organization has occupied certain areas in the Palais during its annual Conference, which takes place about this time each year. This room in which we are meeting is included in these premises which are traditionally reserved for the International Labour Organization. Recognizing the special importance of our Conference in the eyes of the United Nations, and feeling that we should be given every facility to pursue our work conveniently, the members of the International Labour Organization, through their Director-General, Mr. Morse, have graciously left this room at our disposal, at some inconvenience to themselves. I would therefore ask Dr. Protitch to convey to Mr. Morse, and through him to the membership of the International Labour Organization, our thanks for their courtesy and consideration in making this room available to us.

The first name on my list of speakers is that of the representative of the United States of America.

Mr. Eaton (United States of America): We are today resuming the meetings of a Conference in which many place great hope for progress toward a saner and safer world. We had hoped that before resuming we would have received some useful guidance for and impetus to our work. This did not occur. The important thing now is to address ourselves to our future work, and in so doing to recognize the realities of the world in which we live. These realities include, most importantly, the ever-mounting capabilities of nations suddenly to destroy much of what we cherish in the civilization to which, over the ages, all nations have contributed.
President Eisenhower recently stated:

"All of us know that, whether started deliberately or accidentally, global war would leave civilization in a shambles. This is as true of the Soviet system as of all others. In a nuclear war there can be no victors, only losers. We have a mutual interest in reducing the dangers to humanity that exist in such a situation."

These realities also include the continuing technological revolution in weaponry, which forces the major Powers continually to invest vast portions of their wealth and their inventiveness in new military systems, not to forge ahead in the arms race but to stay in the race.

The better uses to which this wealth and effort could be devoted if the arms race could be halted have by now become obvious to us all. Surely we have a mutual interest in putting an end to the mockery which man's inability to halt the arms race makes of human society, a human society as advanced as ours.

We believe that it is the task of this Conference to deal with these realities. We believe that this will be done by negotiating and implementing carefully drawn measures of controlled disarmament. We can deny outer space to weapons of mass destruction. We can reduce the dangers of miscalculation and surprise attack and halt the acceleration and proliferation of modern armaments. And we can, in balanced, phased steps, reduce armaments and armed forces to the levels consistent with our goal -- a secure, free and peaceful world.

Our belief in the need to get on with our work here is based on recognition of these hard facts, and not on sentimentalism. These hard facts of which I speak, though they are a shadow on man's hope, are also a challenge and a responsibility to us here. We cannot meet the challenge, we cannot meet the responsibility, with slogans, with glittering pictures of distant goals, nor can we meet them with invective. We can meet this challenge only by patient negotiation.

Our hope that this work will prove fruitful is based on the belief that there is a mutual recognition of a common interest in meaningful disarmament. That is why we are here. It is not that we are governed by wishful thinking.

Before the recess in our meetings both sides presented their views on various aspects of the problem of disarmament. For their part the Western delegations submitted a series of proposals. These included measures designed to begin the disarmament process at an early stage and to deal realistically with those perils which will exist for all countries if the major Powers permit an unstable military balance to develop.
They were designed to form the basis for serious negotiation which would take into account the security interests of all States. In addition, there was on the part of the Western delegations an effort to focus attention on inspection requirements. These are essential if disarmament is to become a reality.

During our meetings before the recess there was also discussion of principles and conditions which should guide us in our effort to achieve the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. This is a goal on which we all are agreed, though we have differed on how it should be attained.

The Western delegations also considered the explanations given by the Soviet delegation of the suggestion submitted by Mr. Khrushchev on 18 September last year. As the discussions developed it unfortunately became clear to the Western delegations that the Soviet suggestions did not provide a suitable or sufficient basis for negotiation of specific enforceable measures of disarmament.

Now, as we resume our meetings, let us move on to more detailed discussion of specific measures of controlled disarmament in which both sides can find a mutual interest and which will lead to the attainment of our eventual goal. It is only by finding early first-stage measures upon which we can all agree, and in which all of us will find some mutual interest, that we can move forward.

It is in this spirit that the United States delegation is prepared to resume these discussions. It earnestly hopes that the Soviet delegation is also prepared for this kind of serious negotiation.

The Soviet document made public on 3 June is being given the most serious and thorough analysis by my Government. That document is lengthy and somewhat involved — perhaps necessarily so — and therefore will require further study before we can comment upon it in detail. Clarification of various aspects of the Soviet position will be necessary, as I am sure the Soviet delegation recognizes.

As we, on our part, seek clarification of the position of the Soviet Union on the various aspects of the disarmament problem as set forth in its latest document, we shall also be prepared to clarify further the views submitted by the five Western delegations at the beginning of this Conference. We assume that the Soviet delegation will seek such clarifications since it is only through a joint exchange of views, exploration and discussion of each other's position that we can make progress here. From such an exchange can come a greater understanding not merely of the respective positions but of the underlying rationale of each side for its positions. If we adopt this approach to our work, areas of agreement and understanding may appear, and that is of course the purpose of our Conference.
In our participation in this Conference we shall spare no effort to make progress toward and to reach our goal. That goal is a world in which man can live at peace with himself, where freedoms will flourish, where man can live secure from the fear of invasion by forces of oppression, a world of peace under law. We believe that we and all nations represented here owe this much to our own people as well as to the hopes and aspirations of mankind. Let us therefore get down to our work.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): After a five-week recess, the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament is resuming consideration of the problem of general and complete disarmament. As we know, the Committee interrupted its meetings on 29 April in view of the projected meeting of Heads of Governments, which was to take place in Paris in May. The peoples placed very great hopes on this meeting which, among a number of other international problems, was also to examine the problem of disarmament. All peoples throughout the world impatiently awaited the meeting of the Heads of the four great Powers, in the belief that this meeting would consider questions whose solution would help to create a normal atmosphere in international relations, and that it would further advance the solution of the most pressing problem facing the world today, namely the problem of general and complete disarmament.

Unfortunately these hopes which the peoples entertained have not been fulfilled. The summit meeting did not take place: the United States of America torpedoed it by its aggressive acts. I shall not recall the facts which led to the breakdown of the meeting of Heads of Governments. They are common knowledge. I merely wish to emphasize that recent events, which have shown that aggressive forces are still carrying on their subversive activities against peace and the security of nations, make it even more urgent and imperative to solve the disarmament problem. We consider that, in the circumstances which have arisen, the need to take courageous and radical measures to deliver mankind for ever from the terrible threat of an atomic and rocket war has become particularly acute. Now more than ever the problem of general and complete disarmament calls for a practical solution without delay.
The Soviet Government, having considered the situation which has arisen, has come to the conclusion that new efforts are needed in order to carry out as speedily as possible the insistent demand of the peoples, as expressed in the resolution on general and complete disarmament which was adopted unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly. The Soviet Government, which is constantly guided by the policy of peaceful co-existence of States with different social systems, has been striving and will continue to strive for the speediest possible solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament.

Accordingly, the Soviet Government has prepared, and in agreement with the Governments of the socialist States members of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament — the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Polish People's Republic, the Romanian People's Republic and the Czechoslovak Republic — it has put forward proposals regarding the basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. These proposals represent a further development of the Soviet programme of general and complete disarmament submitted by the Government of the USSR to the United Nations General Assembly last autumn. On 2 June the head of the Soviet Government, N. S. Khrushchev, forwarded the new Soviet proposals on general and complete disarmament to the governments of all countries of the world. The Soviet Government considers that these proposals should be thoroughly studied, particularly by the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament. The Soviet delegation formally submits the USSR proposals on the basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament for consideration by the Committee, and requests that these proposals be published as an official document of the Committee. 1/

In preparing the new proposals, we have taken into account the results of the work of the first stage of negotiations in the Ten Nation Committee last March and April, and also the proposals, views and wishes, expressed both by States members of the Committee and by other countries.

1/ Subsequently distributed as document TNCD/6/Rev.1.
The Soviet Government has carefully considered the proposals made by various States, and has come to the conclusion that some of them merit attention. This applies above all to the considerations put forward by France to the effect that the implementation of the disarmament programme should begin with the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction to their targets. This problem was touched upon during the exchange of views between the Head of the Soviet Government, N. S. Khrushchov, and the President of France, General de Gaulle, which took place last March-April, while the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was visiting France. In his statement of 31 May President de Gaulle, speaking of the need to prevent the terrible danger of war, referred again to the question of devices capable of delivering nuclear warheads to their targets.

The members of our Committee will no doubt recall that in the course of our meetings Mr. Moch, the representative of France, repeatedly stressed the need to prohibit and destroy the means of delivering nuclear weapons to their targets. In a statement at the Committee's first meeting on 15 March, for instance, Mr. Moch said it was necessary — and I quote from the verbatim record of the first meeting. —-

"... to tackle -- while there is still time -- the means of carrying these weapons -- satellites, missiles, aircraft, aircraft carriers, submarines, launching ramps, etc. Once the vehicles have been banned and destroyed, the military stocks will appear worthless."

(TNCD/PV.1, page 16)

In order to facilitate the speediest possible solution of the disarmament problem, the Soviet Union agrees to carry out the destruction of all means of delivering atomic and hydrogen weapons in the first stage of the disarmament programme, even before the prohibition of nuclear weapons themselves. The Soviet Government expresses its readiness to adopt this course in spite of the fact that it has at the present time a generally recognized superiority in the most modern and effective means of delivery, namely inter-continental ballistic missiles.
The Soviet Government proposes that in the first stage of the programme of general and complete disarmament all means of delivering nuclear weapons, including strategic and tactical rockets, all military aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons, submarines of all classes and types, surface warships, all artillery systems and other means that can be used as vehicles of nuclear weapons should be eliminated from the armed forces of States and destroyed under effective international control. At the same time we would like to emphasize that it is essential to destroy all means of delivering nuclear weapons without exception, and not only some particular types of carriers of such weapons, since this is the only way of making it impossible for any particular State or group of States to acquire unilateral military advantages.

In the first stage of the programme of general and complete disarmament, simultaneously with the destruction of all means of delivering nuclear weapons to their targets, all foreign military bases should be eliminated and foreign troops should be withdrawn from the territories in which they have been stationed. One cannot fail to see the direct connexion between these measures in the field of disarmament; for it is known that bases have in fact been established by certain States on other countries' territories for the primary purpose of placing the means of delivering nuclear weapons closer to the frontiers of the socialist States. It is clear therefore that, if it is decided to destroy all means of delivering nuclear weapons, then objections to the simultaneous elimination of foreign military bases can be raised only by a State which has evil intentions -- in other words, a State which plans to conceal a certain number of the means of delivery, to circumvent control measures and to use such means in the future for a surprise attack against peace-loving States.

In addition, it is clearer now than ever before that bases on other countries' territories are intended solely for aggressive purposes and their very existence creates a threat to peace and, incidentally, to those States on whose territories they are situated. Recent events, when United States bases on the territories of Turkey and Pakistan were used for aggressive intrusion by United States military aircraft into the USSR, have made this perfectly clear. In these conditions, the elimination of foreign military bases at the very beginning of general and complete disarmament is particularly necessary.
The elimination, in the first stage of the programme of general and complete disarmament, of all means of delivering weapons of mass destruction to their targets would make an invaluable contribution to the reduction of international tension. At the same time this step would also solve the question of preventing surprise attacks, a question to which, incidentally, the United States representative, Mr. Eaton, referred this morning. Indeed, when war rockets of all ranges, military aircraft, submarines, surface warships and other vehicles of nuclear weapons have been destroyed, then States will have practically no means left for carrying out surprise aggression.

True, there have been attempts by certain States, particularly the United States, to use the present genuine danger of surprise attack as a pretext for putting forward plans for conducting espionage on an international scale — they call this the "open skies" plan. Everyone can see, however, that this policy of the United States has nothing to do with preventing surprise attack and, on the contrary, can only increase the threat of such an attack against peace-loving States: for it is clear that information acquired by aerial photography could only help the aggressor to choose the time and target for his attack.

The radical solution of the whole disarmament problem and the destruction in the first stage of all means of delivering nuclear weapons to their targets constitute a truly reliable and realistic solution of the question of preventing surprise attack.

I shall now take up the question of the elimination of nuclear weapons themselves. On this question also we have taken into account the observations made by the representatives of the Western Powers, in particular by the representative of France, who has repeatedly stressed the need for giving priority to the solution of the problem of nuclear disarmament. Even before our recess we stated our willingness to transfer measures for the complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons from the third stage, as envisaged in the Soviet proposals of 18 September last, to any stage in the programme of general and complete disarmament. In our new proposals we provide that nuclear disarmament measures should be carried out during the second stage. Also, bearing in mind the wishes of our Western partners, we propose that in the first stage joint studies should be made of measures for discontinuing the manufacture of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction, and for the elimination of stockpiles of such weapons.
During the course of the fourteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, statements were made about the necessity of adopting measures to prevent States possessing atomic and hydrogen weapons from transferring such weapons to other States. The General Assembly adopted an appropriate resolution (A/RES/1360 (XIV)) on this question, which was transmitted to this Ten Nation Committee for consideration. Taking account of the provisions of that resolution, the Soviet Union proposes that as early as the first stage of the programme of general and complete disarmament States having nuclear weapons at their disposal should assume the obligation not to transfer such weapons or to transmit the information necessary for the manufacture of such weapons to States which do not possess them. It is also provided that at the same time States which do not possess nuclear weapons should undertake to refrain from manufacturing them.

We also endeavoured to take into account the position of the Western Powers on the question of armed forces and conventional armaments. As is known, the Western plan submitted for this Committee's consideration on 16 March last (TNCD/3) did not envisage any measures for the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments during the first stage. The Western plan mentioned only the establishment of levels of 2.5 million men for the armed forces of the United States and the Soviet Union; in other words, it was proposed to maintain the existing levels of armed forces of these Powers. It appears that the Western Powers are not disposed to start disarmament by a reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments. We think that since the first stage of the programme of general and complete disarmament provides for the implementation of broad measures for the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, measures for the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments, which under present conditions would not play a part that would decide the outcome of a war, could be transferred to a later stage. Consequently, we propose to start the implementation of measures for the reduction of armed forces during the second stage. However, such a reduction should, in our opinion, be a substantial one leading to an important reduction of the war potential of States. Accordingly, we propose that in the second stage the armed forces of all States should be reduced to agreed levels, including reduction of the armed forces of the United States and the USSR to a level of not more than 1.7 million men. At the same time the conventional weapons and munitions thus released would be destroyed.
Our partners in the negotiations have expressed the view that it would hardly be possible to carry out the complete disbandment of armed forces as early as the second stage of the disarmament programme. Taking this into account we now propose that the measures for the completion of the liquidation of the armed forces of all States be carried out during the third stage of the programme of general and complete disarmament.

I should now like to deal with the question of control over disarmament. Whenever the Soviet Union puts forward concrete proposals on disarmament, all manner of attempts are made in the West to distort our position on the question of control, the assertion being made that the Soviet Union is opposed to the establishment of effective international control. The Soviet Government has been repeatedly obliged to repel these attempts to use the question of control for the purpose of frustrating the solution of the disarmament question. The Soviet Union has always stood and still stands for strict and effective control over disarmament because it wants to be fully assured that the other parties to the disarmament agreement will also carry out their obligations as honestly as we do. That is why strict and effective control is necessary.

In working out its proposals on the basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament the Soviet Government has deemed it necessary to give a more detailed description of the control system which we propose. In our new proposals we show the manner in which control over all disarmament measures should be organized. It goes without saying that we mean control over disarmament and not control without disarmament.

It is clear from the text of our proposals that the Soviet Union envisages the establishment, immediately after the signing of the treaty, of a preparatory commission whose task would be to carry out practical measures for the creation of an international control organization. The provisions relating to this organization must be agreed upon in the treaty on general and complete disarmament. This control organization should be created within the framework of the United Nations the moment the treaty on general and complete disarmament comes into force. As regards the composition and procedure of the control organization, these should form a subject on which agreement is to be reached.

Even in the first stage the Soviet Union provides for the implementation of broad control measures. At this stage there should be international on-site control over the elimination of rocket weapons, military aircraft, surface
warships, submarines and other means which could be used to carry atomic and hydrogen weapons. The control organization will have the right to inspect without hindrance all enterprises, plants, factories and shipyards which are wholly or partly engaged in the manufacture of rockets, aircraft and any other means of delivery of nuclear weapons, in order to prevent the organization of clandestine manufacture of armaments which could be used as vehicles of nuclear weapons. By agreement, permanent control teams may be established at some plants and installations. International inspection teams will be despatched to places where military bases are situated and troops stationed on foreign territories, in order to supervise the elimination of the bases and the withdrawal of military personnel and troops.

During the second stage of our programme of general and complete disarmament representatives of the control organization will be able to conduct on-site inspection of the destruction of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons. The control organization will have the right to inspect all enterprises which extract raw materials for nuclear production or which produce or use fissionable material or atomic energy. During this stage also international on-site control over the disbanding of troops and the destruction of armaments will be carried out.

I have enumerated only some of the control measures which are provided for in the new Soviet proposals. Appropriate control measures will be carried out also during the third stage of our programme, as well as on the completion of the disarmament process.

After the Soviet Union had submitted, last September, its proposal on general and complete disarmament for consideration by the General Assembly, there was much talk about ensuring the maintenance of international order after the completion of the disarmament process.

The Western Powers submitted a proposal to create a so-called international armed force. But what would this lead to? It would lead to the world continuing to live as before, in fear of the use of weapons. Instead of national armies there would be created an international army, which would in fact be the army of one side directed against the other side. We must look at things realistically. The world today consists of two parts – one socialist and the other capitalist. It is clear to everyone that neither side will agree to the other side dominating the international armed force. It is absolutely clear that the Western Powers would not agree to the socialist countries playing a leading role in such a force. And we would not agree to assign such a role to the Western Powers.
Thus, it would be wrong and unrealistic to set out to create an international armed force. It would be another matter if we agreed to place at the disposal of the Security Council, when necessary, in order to ensure the maintenance of peace, units from the contingents of police (militia) remaining at the disposal of States after the implementation of general and complete disarmament.

That is an entirely realistic measure which is also in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, and it is provided for in our new proposals. Needless to say, such police (militia) detachments would be used solely for the purpose of maintaining peace among nations and not for the suppression of peoples struggling for their independence and social progress, or for interference in the internal affairs of States.

Those are the explanations which the Soviet delegation deemed it necessary to set forth at to-day’s meeting, in submitting the Soviet proposals on the basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

After the Soviet programme of general and complete disarmament had been presented at the fourteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the wish was expressed that we should set forth this programme in greater detail. Now the Soviet Government has not only set forth its programme of general and complete disarmament in greater detail — I think Mr. Eaton has expressed some displeasure at the programme being too extensive, as though it would be difficult to study it — but has introduced substantial clarifications and additions, taking into account all useful proposals that have been made by various States in the course of the discussions of our proposals. That is why we are convinced that the new Soviet proposals provide a good basis for the working out of an agreement on general and complete disarmament. They fully meet all the requirements of the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly on general and complete disarmament, in regard to which the representatives of the Western Powers once again re-affirmed their full support at the meetings of our Committee prior to the recess.

Of course, we still face quite a number of difficulties. We know that in the world there are enemies of disarmament and of the relaxation of international tensions. It is they who are interested in stepping-up the cold war and intensifying the armaments race. It is they who commit acts of aggression.
Our task is to brush aside all obstacles to the achievement of the great and noble objective of general and complete disarmament, and to reach agreement more speedily on a practical solution of this question.

The peoples of the world expect from our Committee positive decisions which will make it possible at last to end the deadlock in solving the problem of general and complete disarmament. As the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, N. S. Khrushchev, said at his Press conference in Moscow on 3 June 1960:

"The problem of disarmament brooks no delay. It is insistently knocking at the door. In the modern age of the atom, intercontinental missiles and electronics, further delay in solving this problem is fraught with tragic consequences."

In carrying out the directives of the Soviet Government, the Soviet delegation will spare no effort to ensure that a treaty on general and complete disarmament can be drafted as speedily as possible. We should like to believe that other members of the Committee will also show a sincere desire to reach agreement on general and complete disarmament.

Mr. Eaton (United States of America): I shall not dignify with a response the routine comment of Mr. Zorin on the cause of the failure of the Summit and on so-called aggressive acts of the United States. This is not the forum in which to debate these issues. Our task is to get on with the negotiation of sensible measures of disarmament, and I suggest that we do get on with it.

Mr. Martino (Italy) (translation from French): There is a story of the misadventure of a Spanish monk, a professor of theology at the University of Salamanca, who was arrested on leaving his class and spent twenty years in prison for political reasons. No sooner had he been set free than he hastened to the University to resume his teaching, which he opened with the traditional words: "Hoc dicbamus". After twenty years of absence his lecture followed perfectly on his previous exposition, as though there had never been any interruption. Well, we shall need -- and we shall be able -- to follow that example. The fact that little more than thirty days have elapsed since our last meeting -- and not twenty years -- can only serve to encourage us. As I say, we shall have to do as the monk did, for obvious reasons.
The task assigned to us, which is arduous by reason of its nature, of the gravity of the problems to be solved, and, equally, of the present state of international relations, requires infinite patience and infinite tenacity. I affirm that we shall be able to proceed in that way precisely because of the failure of the Summit Conference, which was expected to help us resume our conversations in a more constructive spirit by improving the atmosphere of international relations. When we separated on 29 April, we could only note the sterility of our long discussions. It is true that those discussions had, at least, the merit of revealing our different positions more thoroughly, and of showing the limits set by each of the two parties to their acceptance of the other's views. We hoped then that the work of the Conference of the four Heads of Government, for which we had suspended our deliberations, would extricate our Conference from the dead-end it appeared to have reached on 29 April. We hoped that, through the final communiqué of the Summit Conference, we should receive instructions which would enable us to devote our efforts to more concrete matters. But those hopes came to nothing. It is not for us, of course, to investigate or isolate responsibility for the failure of the Summit Conference, and here I shall not follow the example just given us by the representative of the Soviet Union. The fact is that the Summit Conference did not take place; consequently, we lack the instructions and guidance which we hoped would enable us to work on a firmer foundation.

Furthermore, the atmosphere of improved international relations which the Summit Conference was to have engendered, and which would have made it so much easier for us to find the solutions we seek, is also lacking. It has often been said — and may, I think, be usefully repeated — that what poisons relations between peoples is distrust — that distrust which is both the cause and the effect of international tension. The essential point is to remove, or at least to reduce, that distrust in order to promote an easing of tension. But words are not enough; nor can it be promoted by goodwill alone. We believed that the spirit of Geneva in 1955, or that of Camp David in 1959, would suffice to bring about an easing of tension. Events have taught us that we were cherishing illusions. We had faith because we had hope; but, in reality, we had no serious grounds for thinking that détente had already begun or that it was taking shape in acts or in reality.
For a real easing of tension, concrete elements are necessary - facts which are capable of removing, or at least reducing, the existing distrust. The events in Paris last month hardly served to dispel that distrust; they tended rather to increase it. Thus, as I said just now, our task has become much more difficult. At the same time, however, this makes our efforts all the more necessary.

Agreements on disarmament, which require the re-establishment of confidence for their conclusion, can in turn promote confidence, however. If our negotiations were to make progress, and if an agreement, however limited, could be concluded, confidence could be restored and hope could be re-born in the hearts of men.

The Disarmament Conference, whose work should have been facilitated by the results of the Summit Conference - though in fact it was not - could itself facilitate the resumption of negotiations between the four Great Powers. This gives our meetings increased authority and prestige, and at the same time greatly increases our responsibilities.

At the end of the first series of meetings, we had reached a conclusion on which we were all agreed: neither the Soviet Plan nor the Western Plan, though they had been discussed at length, could serve as a basis for our negotiations. The Western delegations were unable to accept the Soviet Plan, and the delegations of the communist countries found it impossible to consider the Western Plan. Hence the proposal of Mr. Zorin, the representative of the Soviet Union, that we should abandon both plans and seek a common basis of agreement, founded on general principles deriving from the United Nations resolution, which was recognized and accepted by all.

In accordance with this idea, various specific principles were put forward for discussion by both sides, and it seems that our difficulty in considering them was lack of time. The fact is, however, that here, too, our efforts came to nothing. The Italian delegation nevertheless considers it necessary to urge once again that we should persist in this course. We cannot proceed otherwise than by starting from the United Nations General Assembly resolution in order patiently to abstract its general principles and subsequently to translate them into agreed rules.

If the work is to have any chance of success, however, it must be done patiently. The fear or suspicion that the Western delegations might refuse to accept really general and complete disarmament led the Eastern delegations to demand the adoption, not of specific measures, but of integrated groups of measures,
and to demand the acceptance, not of specific principles, but of a whole collection of principles. As a result, our Conference was dominated by a rule, unwritten and perhaps even unrecognized, but nevertheless rigidly observed—the rule, or law, of "all or nothing".

We should change our method and proceed by stages. One principle should be put forward, discussed by us as a body and then jointly approved before we go on to enunciate the next principle. The various disarmament measures which may be the subject of an initial agreement should be examined one by one, and then we should wait until we have reached agreement as a body before going on to enunciate the next measures.

That does not mean, of course, that the new proposals for general and complete disarmament put forward by the Soviet Government and transmitted to our Governments in the last few days should not be taken into consideration. On the contrary the Italian delegation has every intention of studying them carefully as soon as it has detailed knowledge of them. We intend to study them in a constructive spirit, that is to say, not in order to point out the aspects which, from the Western point of view, may be regarded as negative, but in order to abstract whatever, from the Western point of view, may appear to represent progress or an improvement on the previous proposals—in order to bring out the positive aspects.

If our present information is correct—and what the Soviet Union representative has just told us appears to confirm it—various points in the new proposals show a favourable trend, in particular as regards control, the periods for implementing agreements, and international measures for the maintenance of peace; that is to say, they seem to show a closer approach to the ideas which the Western delegations have at heart. We shall endeavour to dwell particularly on these points, in order to assess in realistic terms their practical effect in regard to the conclusion of an agreement.

It is obvious, however, that the statements I have just made regarding the integral plans put forward in the first phase of our Conference remain valid and will also apply to the new proposals. If it is really desired that these proposals should serve the purpose for which they are intended and that they should make a practical contribution to the conclusion of sincere and honest agreements, our Conference must not again be subjected to what I have called the law of "all or nothing". We must proceed in such a way that those points which prove acceptable to both parties can be put to good use, regardless of the fate of those considered less acceptable.
If precise conditions were laid down, that is to say if it were to prove impossible to accept such of the proposals as meet with general approval without also accepting those of which some delegations disapprove, we should inevitably find ourselves, in regard to the new Soviet proposals, in the same psychological situation as both sides were in during the first series of meetings of our Conference, when we had the two plans under discussion.

It is essential to be quite clear on one point: our main goal obviously remains the negotiation of general and complete disarmament. But that goal must not preclude the possibility of seeking accessory objectives no less important, relating to specific measures of partial disarmament. Our colleagues in the communist camp have so far refused to consider the possibility of partial agreements, for fear that the demand for such agreements may conceal a desire on our part to evade the responsibility of a total agreement. That fear is born of distrust and, once again, distrust is the obstacle to agreement. It must be recognized that the conclusion of an agreement, even though limited, can, in its turn, help to dispel distrust; causes and effects become merged.

There are certain sectors of disarmament policy in which the conclusion of an agreement, even in the present precarious state of international relations should hardly present any difficulty. There are others in which, just because international relations are in that state, an agreement is particularly urgent. I am thinking, for example, of the prevention of surprise attacks, which was mentioned just now. It is our duty to make every effort to achieve such agreements, not in order that a partial agreement may take the place of a general agreement, but on the contrary, in order that, through the partial agreement, the task of reaching a general agreement may be facilitated.

The Italian delegation wishes, once again, to make its attitude to limited agreements absolutely clear. Partial measures must not prevent the parallel negotiation of general and complete disarmament.

Limited agreements and partial measures are desirable primarily because they will be factors calculated to reduce or remove the distrust which fills men's hearts today. They could thus further the negotiation and conclusion of a wider agreement which, by its very nature, would necessarily call for great efforts and a considerable amount of time. They could also be of no small service in the easing of tension and the cause of peace. By removing distrust from men's hearts, they would make a meeting of the great Powers easier, and facilitate an honest and sincere attempt to find fair solutions, accepted by all, of the grave problems now dividing the world.
Such are the aims and hopes of the Italian delegation on the resumption of our work.

The CHAIRMAN (Canada): I have no more names on my list of speakers. Does any representative wish to speak at this time? If not, I will read for your approval the draft communique:

"The thirty-third meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament was held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 7 June 1960 under the chairmanship of the representative of Canada.

"The representative of the Soviet Union submitted to the Conference the proposals of the Soviet Government on the basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Wednesday, 8 June 1960, at 10.30 a.m."

Is there any objection to the terms of the communique? I see no objection, and therefore it is adopted.

The meeting rose at 11.55 a.m.