FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THIRTY-SECOND MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Friday, 29 April 1960, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria)
PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Bulgaria:
Mr. M. TARABANOV
Mr. K. CHRISTOV
Col. K. SAVOV

Canada:
Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. A.G. CAMPBELL
W/Cdr. R.J. MITCHELL

Czechoslovakia:
Mr. J. NOSEK
Lieut.-Gen. J. HEŠKO
Mr. Z. TRHLIK

France:
Mr. J. MOCH
Mr. M. LEGENDRE
Col. L. CONVIERT

Italy:
Mr. L. DAINELLI
Mr. D. PHILIPSON
Maj.-Gen. D. FANALI

Poland:
Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
Mr. M. LACHS
Brig.-Gen. J. SLIWINSKI

Romania:
Mr. E. MEZINESCU
Mr. C. BOGDAN
Col. C. POPA

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
Mr. V.A. ZORIN
Col.-Gen. A.A. GRYZLOV
Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
Present at the Table (cont'd)

United Kingdom:
Rt. Hon. D. ORMSEY-CORE
Sir Michael WRIGHT
Miss B. SALT

United States of America:
Mr. F.M. EATON
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Rear-Admiral P.L. DUDLEY

The Secretary-General of the United Nations:
Mr. Dag HAMMARSKJOLD

Representative of the Secretary-General:
Mr. W. EPSTEIN
The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from French): The thirty-second meeting of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament is called to order. The first speaker on my list is the representative of the Soviet Union, on whom I now call.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): At yesterday's meeting the Soviet Union delegation, by consent of the delegations from the other socialist countries, submitted for consideration a draft communique of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament to be issued in connexion with the agreed recess. It was agreed that representatives from all delegations should meet as a working group in order to settle a final text for the communique. It now appears that at the meeting of representatives of all delegations which took place yesterday agreement on a final text could not be reached.

The representatives of the Western delegations did not agree that the following matter should be included in the communique.

First, the passage:

"And there appeared a certain rapprochement of their points of view on some of these questions" --- meaning the questions we have discussed in the Committee (TNCD/FW.31, page 14) --- and secondly the passage:

"The members of the Committee recognized the need to continue, after the recess, negotiations on the working out of the basic principles and a programme of general and complete disarmament under effective international control in accordance with the United Nations General Assembly resolution of 20 November 1959 on general and complete disarmament." (ibid., page 15)

Since agreement was not reached at the meeting of the working group, we think it appropriate to take up the question here in the Conference.

The delegations from the socialist countries are surprised at the attitude of the Western delegations. Whyever should these passages be unacceptable to the Western representatives? Have not the Western representatives themselves said in this Conference that on a number of the questions discussed here a certain rapprochement of points of view has appeared? In particular, the representative of France, Mr. Moch, said this about control;
did the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Ormsby-Gore, in regard to a number of other questions; so did the United States representative; and the representatives of Italy and Canada have referred to this approximation during our Committee's work. The reason why the Western delegations introduced their proposal of 26 April was that certain points of view had been brought closer together and that a common point of view might be worked out even on the important question of the principles of general and complete disarmament.

After this it is quite incomprehensible that the Western representatives should reject our draft communique out of hand. We are especially bewildered by their refusal to include in it the passage about the need to continue negotiations after the recess. Did not the Western representatives themselves write in their proposal of 26 April that it was necessary to work out the basic principles and a programme of general and complete disarmament under effective international control? Have they not stated in this Committee that they intend to continue working in accordance with the General Assembly resolution of 20 November 1959 on general and complete disarmament? All of us who have taken part in the discussions here remember very well that they have said this more than once.

The obvious fact should also be noted that we have not yet nearly worked out the basic principles of general and complete disarmament, and that the proposals submitted on this question by the socialist countries and the Western delegations have not been finally discussed. But the question then arises, why do the Western delegations object to the inclusion of this passage in the communique? All this obliges us to ask them the reasons for their position. This is especially important in order that we may get a clear idea of the prospects for our work after the recess. We would ask the Western delegations to make clear their attitude on these questions.

**Mr. Ormsby-Gore** (United Kingdom): At the beginning of his remarks Mr. Zorin said that he had been rather surprised by the attitude of the Western delegations towards the question of this draft communique. I am bound to say in reply, before I turn to the substance of the matter, that we in the Western delegations have been rather surprised by the conduct of the Soviet delegation and its allies in respect to this question. I have no doubt that Mr. Zorin knows that
at a certain reception last night in which we all took part the press was handed copies of this draft communiqué, which, as I understand it, is the subject of discussions between us within these four walls and not something to be handed out to the press for propaganda purposes before we have agreed upon it. I am bound to say that I found this procedure very surprising, indeed quite extraordinary.

As regards the substance of the matter, Mr. Zorin said that a number of Western delegations had indicated that there had been a rapprochement between our viewpoints on certain questions. I think that, on balance, it would be truer to say that there had been a clarification of substantial differences between us on certain matters under discussion. I very much doubt that it would be useful to include in a communiqué a judgment on whether there has been a rapprochement or a clarification of a difference of views. However, simply to state in the communiqué that a certain rapprochement had taken place would certainly be to give a very unbalanced picture of the course of the negotiations in this Committee. Since that statement is, in our view, unbalanced and misleading, we cannot accept it.

I turn now to the second point, the question whether we should set ourselves a specific directive for our work when we return. To my mind, it is unusual for a committee which is already in the middle of its work suddenly to stop and say that it is going to issue a directive for its future work. We are all capable of making up our minds about what would be a useful course for this Committee to take. On this particular occasion I think it would be extremely misplaced to issue such a directive because, as we all know, an important meeting is going to take place shortly among the Heads of State and Heads of Government of four great Powers, and one of the subjects that they intend to discuss among themselves is this very subject of disarmament. All of us hope that as a result of that discussion some indication may be given to us in this Conference as to how we might carry out our work most fruitfully for the rest of the summer. I therefore repeat that on this particular occasion it would be exceptionally unfortunate to try and set ourselves the precise task which we should undertake when we return here on 7 June.

It is true, that if we feel unable to accept this final sentence in the penultimate paragraph of the Soviet draft communiqué, we have then omitted any reference to the resolution of the General Assembly of 20 November 1959, and in
order to meet the Soviet Union on this particular point we have suggested in our
draft communique -- which is, I think, before all members of the Committee --
the addition of a sentence to the first paragraph. This sentence would read:
"The members of the Conference reaffirmed their support of resolution
1378 (XIV) of the United Nations General Assembly of 20 November 1959,
and considered ..."

The communique then reads in the next part exactly the same as the one put forward
by the Soviet Union.

I hope I have made quite clear, on behalf of my Western colleagues, our
attitude to the Soviet draft communique and I hope, that having heard that
explanation, our colleagues will find themselves able to support the draft
communique which has been submitted by the Western delegations.

Mr. NOSEK (Czechoslovakia): The Czechoslovakian delegation was
disappointed to hear the objections of the representative of the United Kingdom,
Mr. Ormsby-Gore, to the draft communique submitted yesterday by the representative
of the Soviet Union, Mr. Zorin. We think that the Western delegations, too,
should be fully aware of the importance of having a communique adopted unanimously
at the conclusion of the first period of our work. We think that the joint
communique is all the more significant because we are dealing with a question
directly affecting the vital interests of all peoples, who are following the
development of our negotiations with an extraordinary interest and attention.
In our view, the draft communique submitted by the delegations of the socialist
countries does not contain anything with which the delegations of the Western
countries could not agree.

What the draft communique does is to reflect the course of our negotiations
so far. The delegations of the Western countries refuse, first of all, to
include in the communique that:

"The members of the Committee recognized the need to continue, after the
recess, negotiations on the working out of the basic principles and the
programme of general and complete disarmament under effective international
control in accordance with the United Nations General Assembly resolution
of 20 November 1959 on general and complete disarmament".

(TNCD/FV.31, page 15)
We cannot really understand the reasons for which the delegations of the Western countries refuse this part of the communiqué proposed by the delegations of the socialist countries. Is there, perhaps, no agreement in our Committee on the necessity to go on with our negotiations after the recess? I think there is; in the whole course of our negotiations so far the Western delegations have never taken an opposite position. It is, therefore, very strange that at our last meeting the Western delegations come forward with objections against that part of the proposed communiqué which I have just read. In our view there is not a single reason why the delegations of the Western countries should raise objections against the first part of the sentence I read out.

The second part of the sentence I quoted speaks of the character and scope of our future work. On this question, too, it has been repeatedly stressed by the delegations of the Western countries that the task of our Committee should be to go on patiently looking for common standpoints on the basis of general and complete disarmament on the basis of resolution 1378 (XIV) of the General Assembly.

Do the delegations of the Western countries now, perhaps, retreat from this position? Well, if our understanding is correct, they do. But if that is so, then let them say so openly: if not, if we are wrong, then we see no reason why the communiqué should not contain a provision on the character and scope of the further work of our Committee. This part of the draft communiqué of the socialist delegations logically emanates from our negotiations so far, as well as from the positions of the delegations of the Western countries as they were set out in their proposal of 26 April on principles and conditions for a programme of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

In the communiqué proposed by the delegations of the socialist countries it is, in fact, also pointed out that on some questions a certain rapprochement of views has been reached in the course of our deliberations so far. We believe this assumption, too, to be based on reality as has been confirmed both by the delegations of the socialist and the Western countries, and this was pointed out this morning by the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Zorin.

We all have fresh in our memories a series of interventions in this sense by the delegations of the Western countries. I do not think it is necessary for me to recall, for instance, the statement of the representative of the United States, Mr. Eaton, at our ninth meeting, or that of the representative of France, Mr. Moch, at our eighth meeting. We all remember these statements very well.
In the light of these facts, we deem the objections of the delegations of the Western countries to the draft communiqué submitted jointly by the delegations of the socialist countries to be quite unfounded.

Mr. MOCH (France) (translation from French): Although we probably still have seven statements to hear on this small and even minor matter, I think it is high time we separated. We do seem, during these six weeks, to have acquired an extraordinarily well developed gift for useless discussions and waste of time.

The question is very simple: do we accept the communiqué as submitted by our Soviet colleagues? The answer is no. Consequently, as a communiqué must be adopted unanimously, this communiqué would not be the communiqué of our Conference. We propose another. If our Soviet colleagues accept it, it will be the official text. If they reject it — as they are entitled to do — there will be no official text and we shall be none the worse. Hence, all we are saying at the moment, including what I am saying myself, is a waste of time.

Having said that, I endorse the criticisms made by Mr. Ormsby-Gore. The most important points of agreement we have noted are that we should meet at 10.30 a.m. and yesterday, as an exception, that our alternates should meet at 6 p.m. That is not worth putting in a communiqué.

As regards Soviet concessions, I have seen none, and that being so I do not wish to give the public false hopes. Consequently, I do not accept the first contested sentence of the text.

As for the second sentence, must I again recall how, with diabolical skill, the terms of the United Nations resolution transmitting all the documents and suggestions to our Conference have been interpreted and distorted, and how for the last six weeks that resolution has been represented as obliging us to approve all the Soviet proposals exactly as they stand. We have fallen into that trap once and, as I said yesterday, we shall not fall into it again. And when we are asked to accept the second formula, we are now sufficiently well up in dialectical linguistics to know that if we voted for it, our Eastern colleagues would interpret that to mean that we had accepted the Soviet plan for general and complete disarmament under effective international control. As we have not accepted that plan, and as we shall not accept it, we will not support a formula which we know our Eastern colleagues interpret in that way.
It is an extremely simple matter and I end as I began: there must be unanimity, and you will not get it on that text. Let us now waste as much time as you like.

Mr. MOCHE (Romania) (translation from French): I am sorry to have to act once again as "opposite number" to my French colleague. I cannot, however, refrain from taking up some of the assertions he has just made, which in my opinion are extremely important for an understanding of what is at issue, or, as the Russians say, "where the dog is hidden". I venture to make this free translation, in the hope that my Soviet colleagues will forgive me if it is not accurate.

Mr. Moch said just now that the question before us, that of the final communique, is a small and even minor matter -- I see that Mr. Eaton supports him in that opinion -- and that the present discussion can be classed with the useless discussions and waste of time which have taken place during our Conference. I wish to reply, first, that I do not regard the final communique as a matter of no importance. Next, I must emphasize that I do not consider that the discussions we have had in the Committee have been useless. If it is necessary to point out where their importance mainly lies, I would say that these discussions have greatly helped us to understand the Western delegations' way of thinking and acting, and that they have thrown a certain light -- personally I should have preferred it to have been quite different -- on the Western Powers' intentions as regards disarmament and, in particular, general and complete disarmament such as the United Nations General Assembly has instructed us to negotiate.

There are two points which the Western Powers do not agree to mention in the communique. First, they do not wish our communique to say that during discussion of the questions submitted to the Committee, there appeared a certain rapprochement between the viewpoints of the two parties on some questions.

I could make some very long quotations to prove that, on several occasions, the representatives of the Western Powers themselves have stressed the rapprochement they noted on concrete matters we were discussing. I shall take the liberty of quoting Mr. Eaton, for example, who told us on 25 March that he was particularly glad
"... to note that Mr. Zorin agreed with the concept ... that there should be no disarmament without control and no control without disarmament". (TNCD/FV.9, page 25)

I pass over the inaccuracy of the sentence, which implies that we, the socialist countries, accepted this concept allegedly put forward by the other party, which is not the case. It does show, however, that Mr. Eaton noted a considerable rapprochement on the question of control at one point in our discussions.

I ask members of the Committee to re-read the statement made by Mr. Eaton on 25 March, in which on several occasions he noted a number of points of rapprochement on this question of control, which is made out to be more controversial than it really is. I would add that the day before Mr. Eaton made that observation, Mr. Moch -- who always reacts more quickly than Mr. Eaton -- expressed his satisfaction that on this question of control there was, not rapprochement, but identity of views. I quote Mr. Moch's own words:

"I note with satisfaction that we agree on a number of points ...". (TNCD/FV.8, page 8)

Mr. Moch then mentioned six points relating to control.

But I will not dwell any longer on this; for in any agreement, as in many human affairs, there must be two parties, and, in the case of an agreement, there must be two parties who share the same views. But I am bound to note -- and this is one of the lessons of our Conference -- that after having expressed their satisfaction at the rapprochement between the positions of the Western countries and those of the socialist countries on a number of matters we have discussed here, the Western Powers are refusing to mention that fact in the final communique.

What conclusion can be drawn from the clear refusal to mention the points of rapprochement which emerged during our discussions, except that the Western Powers were not sincere when they made those statements about the points of rapprochement noted? They were making those statements, not to mark the progress in our work, but for other purposes which it would be interesting to know.

I now come to the other passage whose inclusion in the final communique is not approved by the Western Powers. What does it say? I shall not spare the Committee; I shall quote it again:
The members of the Committee recognized the need to continue, after the recess, negotiations on the working out of the basic principles and a programme of general and complete disarmament under effective international control ..."

How is it possible to refuse to mention in a final communique the fact that we agree to continue our discussions on the basic principles and on the working out of a programme of general and complete disarmament, when the Western Powers themselves have submitted counter-proposals to our proposals on the basic principles of general and complete disarmament, in which they refer several times to a programme of general and complete disarmament, and outline its content and goal.

When we were confronted with the document submitted by the Western Powers on 26 April -- i.e., three days before the adjournment of our Conference -- we expressed some doubts as to the real intentions of the Western countries. We had reasons for wondering then whether the representatives of the Western Powers had presented their document with a view to submitting it to our Committee for discussion, or simply with a view to doing something, not for the members of the Committee, but for public opinion. We had, as I say, reasons to doubt, because as usual the Western Powers presented their proposal with the habitual slogan, "Take it or leave it!" -- just as Mr. Moch said a few minutes ago.

Now we are confronted with a refusal to include in our communique the idea that we are going to continue, after the recess, to consider the principles, and a programme, of general and complete disarmament.

No later than yesterday, we heard Mr. Eaton reply to Mr. Zorin's question whether the Western Powers were in favour of working out a disarmament programme. I have not got the document before me, but I quote from memory. He very definitely answered "Yes -- the Western Powers are in favour of working out a programme of disarmament". You will certainly find that in the record of yesterday's meeting.

And yesterday afternoon the Western Powers, after having stated at the meeting in the morning that they were in favour of a programme of general and complete disarmament, announced their refusal to mention that fact in the communique.

I must point out that we are in no wise insisting that the communique should include ideas which do not reflect the real facts as they are. We do not wish to mislead public opinion; but we cannot avoid noting that, not from one day to...
another, but at a few hours' interval, the representatives of the Western Powers, after declaring themselves in favour of a programme of general and complete disarmament, refuse to say that that should be the objective of our discussions after the recess.

I should now like to revert to some of the ideas expressed just now by Mr. Ormsby-Gore. First of all he said that it would show lack of modesty on the part of our Committee to attempt to give directives for itself. But we are not here in our personal capacity. We are acting in this Committee in accordance with the instructions of our Governments. I think that applies to all the delegations present here. As regards my own country, the Romanian People's Republic, and the other socialist countries, I can say without any reservation whatsoever that our Governments see no difficulty in the Committee adopting, as a directive for its future work, the formulation of a programme of general and complete disarmament.

If the Western delegations do not agree to putting this idea in the final communiqué, it is, precisely, because the instructions they have received from their Governments do not correspond to the task set us by the United Nations resolution.

I now turn to another idea just put forward by Mr. Ormsby-Gore. The United Kingdom representative said it would be misplaced to mention such an intention in our communiqué, because an important meeting was going to take place shortly — we all know that Mr. Ormsby-Gore was referring to the meeting of the Heads of Government of the four Great Powers — and that we should not appear to commit the four Heads of Government who are shortly to begin their conversations. Permit me to recall what Mr. Ormsby-Gore said himself two days ago:

"For let us not forget that world opinion is earnestly hoping for some practical, concrete indication that the two sides are getting closer together and that actual disarmament is soon to begin. Let us also not forget that the stage is now being set for the Summit meeting in Paris, and that the reaction of our Eastern colleagues" — not that of our Western colleagues — "and what they say now may directly affect the course of the discussions between the leaders of the four Powers."

(TMCD/FV.229, page 30)
That is to say that Mr. Ormsby-Gore was expecting from the representatives of the socialist Powers a reaction which would contribute to the progress of the Summit discussions.

But why should we not be entitled to expect a joint reaction from our Committee, i.e. a joint reaction from the representatives of the Western Powers, on the one hand, and from the representatives of the socialist countries, on the other hand, which could help "directly affect the course of the discussions between the leaders of the four Powers", to quote Mr. Ormsby-Gore's own words once more?

I wish also to refer to an idea expressed just now by the representative of France. He told us — and I am more or less quoting his words, perhaps not literally, but giving the sense correctly — "We have fallen into the trap once, and we shall not fall into it again". That means that the Western Powers once fell into the trap of declaring themselves, before world opinion, to be in favour of general and complete disarmament, and Mr. Woch wished to reassure us by making it clear that such was not the intention of the Western Powers, and that they would not again give world opinion the satisfaction of thinking that they might commit themselves a little further, or at least continue on the course to which they are committed by United Nations General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV), which they proposed and adopted, like all the other Members of the United Nations.

In conclusion, I wish to recall Mr. Eaton's attitude to the Western Powers' own proposal on "Principles and conditions for general and complete disarmament" (TNCD/5), submitted for our consideration on 26 April. I shall spare you a long quotation, which you can find in the record, and shall only quote the end of a passage in which Mr. Eaton as co-author of the document on the "Principles and conditions of general and complete disarmament", explained his attitude to the proposal with which he was directly associated:

(continued in English)

"We do not believe that any useful purpose would be served by entering now into a discussion which would have, as its result, the reconciliation of our views in this regard". (TNCD/PV.31, page 27)

(translation from French):

That is to say, our views in regard to the principles and conditions of general and complete disarmament,
That is just the attitude which impels the Western Powers to refuse to mention the rapprochement which has taken place during our discussions — however slight it may have been — and to refuse to mention our intention of resuming discussions on the principles, and a programme, of general and complete disarmament after the recess. Such an attitude amply proves that between the declared intentions and the real intentions with which the Western Powers have come to these negotiations, there is a notable difference. We regret it.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I ask your indulgence, but since Mr. Ormsby-Gore apparently wants to answer certain points now, may I with his permission ask him a further question?

A question has occurred to me on the speech he made after my own short statement. He said that from his point of view, because of the Summit Conference, it would be misplaced for us to take upon ourselves the task of deciding the future course of our work. Would he then perhaps agree to a slight amendment in the draft he has proposed? The first paragraph of that draft ends:

"The members of the Conference reaffirmed their support of resolution 1378 (XIV) of the United Nations General Assembly of 20 November 1959, and considered ..."

That is the text proposed by the Western delegations. Now would Mr. Ormsby-Gore accept the following amendment to this text? I will read it out as amended:

"The members of the Conference reaffirmed their support of resolution 1378 (XIV) of the United Nations General Assembly of 20 November 1959 on general and complete disarmament, recognized the need to work out basic principles, and a programme, of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and considered ..."

The communique would thus refer not to the future but rather to the past. We should not then be taking upon ourselves the function of issuing directives for our own later work, which is the point causing concern to the Western representatives, but would merely be noting what had happened in our Committee.

I ask this question in order to find out whether we can somehow still reach some sort of compromise solution of this problem of the communique.

I am sorry to have interrupted Mr. Ormsby-Gore, but with his permission I put this question to him.
Mr. ORMSBY-GORE (United Kingdom): First of all, I would like to reply to some of the previous statements, which I shall try to do fairly briefly.

... The representative of Romania displayed once more his extraordinary facility for restating at rather greater length precisely the same arguments as have been adduced by his Eastern colleagues. But he quoted as his own example of a rapprochement a phrase from one of Mr. Eaton's speeches, which he then went on to say did not represent the position of the Eastern delegations. He referred to the question of deciding where the dog is buried. I would say to him that we have a phrase -- we use it quite often -- which also has a canine connotation, and that is: "Once bitten twice shy". If he wants me to give an example of it, I would refer him to the resolution tabled by the Soviet Union in the Conference of the Economic Commission for Europe only a week or two ago, in which the phrase was used that the United Nations had given approval to the Soviet plan of general and complete disarmament. It is because, on occasions such as that, the Soviet Union has in our view misrepresented what was included in the United Nations resolution, that we are going to be very careful as to what words we are prepared to put our name to in the future.

As regards the particular amendment which Mr. Zorin has suggested to us, it seems to me that once we use the phrase "recognized the need", this has the implication that our future work should be confined to the elaboration of an agreement on basic principles. As I indicated in my first intervention, we do not know to what extent some agreement may be reached on disarmament at the Summit meeting. It is conceivable that at the Summit meeting some agreement will be reached specifically on a set of principles. If this were the case we would hope that our work here in this Conference might be directed to elaborating specific, concrete measures of disarmament, which it has been our purpose to elaborate ever since we came to this conference table. Therefore, I am afraid that at first hearing I find the same objections to this phraseology being transferred from the penultimate paragraph to the first paragraph.

I hope that in these circumstances the Soviet representative and his Eastern colleagues will be able to accept the draft we have put before them. As I said, we have already tried to meet their point of view by including that last sentence in the first paragraph of our draft.
Mr. WASZKOWSKI (Poland) (translation from French): I had not thought I should have to speak again today on the text of the communique concerning the work of our Committee. As I told Mr. Moch, the representative of France, yesterday, I thought the question was simple and indisputable. The attitude of the Western delegations, however, shows that this is not so. It seems I was too optimistic. Mr. Moch has even told us today that it would be a waste of time to seek agreement on a final communique which, as we believe, could indicate that a certain rapprochement has taken place within our Committee. I regret to have to say that this is a disappointing attitude.

As I stressed yesterday, the draft communique we proposed was worded as a precise and objective report. On examining, first, the passage in the communique which indicates that a certain convergence of views has appeared on various questions, it will be found that this is an accurate statement of fact. Yesterday, in the working group, objections were raised to this passage. We were told that it was not a question of fact, but a question of judgment. The observation of a certain convergence of views is certainly a question of judgment; but in this case the judgment is based on the undeniable course of our discussions. A reading of the records of our meetings will readily show that the representatives both of the socialist States and of the Western Powers have drawn attention in their statements to the emergence of a certain convergence of views on particular questions.

I will go further. In listening to those statements one had the impression that the Western representatives, including Mr. Moch, were pointing out, even rather emphatically, that there was a certain rapprochement of views on particular matters. Today when we come to the adoption of a communique on the course of our work we find the representatives of the Western Powers acting as though they do not wish to admit the fact that there has been some rapprochement, as though they want to abandon it. That is what Mr. Ormsby-Gore and Mr. Moch have done today. How can this contradiction be explained?

The Western delegations are also contesting the second sentence in the penultimate paragraph of our draft communique, which says that the negotiations after the recess will be devoted to the

"working out of the basic principles and a programme of general and complete disarmament under effective international control in accordance with the United Nations General Assembly resolution of 20 November 1959 on general and complete disarmament."
That it should be precisely this sentence which gives rise to objections on the part of the Western delegations is significant. Yet in the document which the Western delegations themselves submitted to us barely three days ago, the postulate of general and complete disarmament is mentioned twice, in particular in the fourth paragraph, which refers to the necessity of seeking a constructive solution of this problem, and in the last paragraph, where the Western Powers, in defining the goal, use exactly the same terms: "a programme of general and complete disarmament". Our intention, in submitting our draft communique, was to emphasize those aspects of the situation on which there seemed to be agreement, so that they might serve as a starting point for the Committee's work when it is resumed. Besides, they were among the few achievements in our Committee's work. That is why we are deeply disturbed to find the Western delegations abandoning this joint formula too. Do they wish to abandon the formula they have just put forward in their draft principles?

In conclusion I am bound to note that if the Western delegations persist in opposing the formulas I have mentioned, even in the amended form proposed a few minutes ago by Mr. Zorin, the representative of the Soviet Union -- an amendment relating only to the past and not to future prospects -- this will mean a further retreat from their position and show their lack of any desire to seek an understanding on disarmament in a constructive manner.

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from French): If no one else wishes to speak, I should like to say a few words as representative of Bulgaria.

At yesterday's meeting the Soviet delegation submitted a draft communique on behalf of the five delegations from the socialist countries. I must point out, as have the other representatives of the socialist countries, that neither at yesterday's meeting nor at today's has anyone opposed the idea of issuing a communique. On the contrary, the representative of Italy, Mr. Martino, spoke yesterday in favour of the Soviet representative's proposal. He said:

"I would add that the Italian delegation is favourably disposed to the proposal just made by the representative of the Soviet Union, that our work should be concluded by a final statement in the form of a communique." (TNCD/FV.31, page 22)

It is true that Mr. Moch, whose virulence never fails him when faced with documents from one of the socialist countries' delegations, after saying that he
did not attach much importance to documents of this kind, did not reject the
idea of ending our present labours with a communiqué, and merely said he would
scrutinize the draft communiqué "with an electronic microscope at least" (ibid, page 2).

The Western delegations, then, are opposed, not to the idea of a communiqué,
but to the content of the text submitted by the Soviet Union. Presumably,
therefore, Mr. Koch and his colleagues have kept their promise and examined this
text with a microscope. Indeed only such an examination, performed by experts,
could yield any so-called arguments in support of a position with no real
foundation. This attitude indicates an interesting state of mind. The
microscopic method, however, has the disadvantage that it can only produce truly
microscopic arguments.

We have been told today, in effect, that it was certainly a waste of time
to discuss a final communiqué, since a final communiqué is a document saying
nothing of importance. We do not think this is so, particularly when we look
at the arguments presented here.

It has already been said — and the representatives of other socialist
States have stressed it — that the Western representatives have repeatedly
insisted that a certain rapprochement of views has taken place. I will not
quote all the statements made here on this point, but it is a fact. The
Western delegations now tell us they do not want to record this in the final
communiqué. Why not? Why do you not want to record it in the final
communiqué? Is it not true that you have stated that there is a rapprochement
of views on certain questions? Or do you perhaps think it very dangerous to
tell the world that there has been a certain rapprochement?

Why do you think we should not indicate what we have noted here in this
very room? Why do you think we ought not to say that there has been a
rapprochement of positions on certain questions and on certain principles?
Are we to suppose that when you told us, the delegations from the socialist
countries, that there had been a certain rapprochement, you wanted to make us
believe there was one and so persuade us to accept your proposals? I think
it would be a mere waste of time to think that such statements can be made
to us and mislead us. It is strange to think that something said here in our
Conference cannot be said to the international public, which is impatiently waiting to learn how we have been getting along with our work.

I should like to take up another of the United Kingdom representative's arguments. He said that a very important meeting was to take place and that we, who are only representatives of Heads of Governments—that is to say, a little less important, in a sense, than those who are to take part in that meeting—could not immediately accept such a commitment and would wait and see what the others, the Heads, would say. But does anyone suppose that the forthcoming Summit meeting can produce anything new in the sphere with which we are concerned? Is some position being prepared other than the one represented by the United Nations resolution and the proposals submitted here by the Western delegations themselves? Is it thought, for example, that the great Powers' representatives will tell us that, after the suspension of our work on drafting the basic principles and a programme of general and complete disarmament under effective international control in accordance with the General Assembly resolution, we are not to take that resolution into account and follow the directives it gives us? Is that what is being prepared? Is it expected that our future task, if we meet again—as we are going to—will not be to work out a programme of general and complete disarmament? Is it thought that the Summit Conference will throw us into reverse? We are truly astonished at this attitude. The issue relates not only to the communique and what it means, but also to statements made in this Committee. We do not want to tell the world in a communique that there has been a certain rapprochement, even though we have all, including the Western delegations, found that there has been one. We do not want to say that we are going to work in accordance with the directives laid down by the United Nations resolution. We do not want to say that we are going to work out a programme. But why not? Is it because we think that when we resume our meetings we shall not be working in that direction? If we are instructed to proceed further we shall do so. But why should we have the impression that we must go into reverse? We were told just now, "We have fallen into a trap once before, and we are not going to fall into another". What does that mean? Is the United Nations resolution a "trap"?
I think these remarks had to be made now that we are drafting a communiqué at the end of this period of our work. The question, particularly in view of the positions taken, is rather important, and it had to be raised.

Mr. Burns (Canada): I had not intended to speak on this subject but as it seems to have become necessary today for every delegation to express its views on this matter, which at first sight did not seem of very great significance, I feel it is desirable that the Canadian delegation should state its views. I shall have little more to say on this subject than has already been said by Mr. Ormsby-Gore, the representative of the United Kingdom, and by the representative of France.

First of all, we have had enquiries directed to us by the Eastern European countries as to why we cannot accept the wording of the draft communiqué put forward by the representative of the Soviet Union, and in particular the phrase:

"... and there appeared a certain rapprochement of their points of view on some of these questions."

I think that, as Mr. Ormsby-Gore has said, this would not be complete. We could say that some features in the Soviet Union plan and in the principles put forward by the Soviet and other Eastern delegations were similar to those in the Western plan and in the Western proposal on principles and conditions for the achievement of general and complete disarmament. But we would hesitate to say that there was a drawing together of viewpoints until the actual measures which appeared to be similar had been discussed in detail, because it has been the experience, or perhaps I should say that it is my view, that when such a discussion has taken place here we have found that unsuspected divergences develop. So while we could perhaps say that there appeared to be some drawing together of viewpoints we would also have to say, to be truthful, that there were a great many areas in which we had found considerable and wide disagreement. What would we say, therefore? That
we agree on some points but disagree on others. That does not seem to me to convey a great deal of useful information to the general public.

With regard to the second point, in which it is proposed in the communique drafted by the Soviet Union to say:

"The members of the Committee recognized the need to continue, after the recess, negotiations on the working out of the basic principles and a programme of general and complete disarmament ...", our feelings are the same as those of the other Western representatives who have spoken: we do not think that we should like to subscribe to a communique which laid down the programme of our work when we come back again after the recess, for the reasons which have already been stated. We feel that that would commit us to a continuation of the type of discussions we have been having for the past seven weeks. As other members of the Western delegations and I myself have previously stated, and with respect to what the Chairman has been saying, that does not in our opinion carry forward the hope expressed by the General Assembly in resolution 1378 (XIV):

"... that measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control will be worked out in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time."

As I have said before, that is what the General Assembly resolution called upon us to do -- not to elaborate basic principles and write out a treaty of disarmament or even elaborate a programme going to the end of disarmament. It asked us to work out in detail and agree upon measures leading towards the goal, in the shortest possible time. In my view, by accepting such a sentence as the one proposed in the Soviet draft communique, we would not be contributing in our future discussions to a speedy achievement of that hope expressed by the General Assembly.
Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I should like to correct at once an obvious distortion of the situation. Mr. Ormsby-Gore at the beginning of his speech made for some reason insinuations about a distribution of the communiqué to the press. So far as the Soviet Union and the delegations of the other socialist countries are concerned, no text of the communiqué has to our knowledge been given out to the press by our side. If, as Mr. Ormsby-Gore asserts, the press has learnt of it and this has caused surprise and even indignation among the Western delegations, I should ask him to address his remark to the delegations of the non-socialist States.

My second remark refers to the general evaluation of what we have just heard, and to the features of the discussion which has developed upon a question which, although a minor one, is from our point of view important. Mr. Moch mentioned waste of time, including his own speech in that judgment. I will not attempt to evaluate Mr. Moch's speech. I should not like to pass that judgment on it. Obviously he himself is the best judge. But we do not consider our statements a waste of time, because they, and also, I should say, the statements of some of the Western representatives, have helped to clarify the positions of the Western delegations; especially now that the end of our work is near and we are considering the whole course and results of the Committee's work, their significance is considerable. The fear of falling into a trap a second time has also been mentioned here, and "once bitten, twice shy" and other metaphors relating to animals have also been used. I notice that of late the United Kingdom representative has for some reason shown an interest in animals. He has mentioned a wolf and a dog. It is true that he has not mentioned a lion, but that may be because the lion does not matter so much to him now.

I think that the references to the danger of new traps testify to one substantial fact: that the Western Powers are critical of their fall from grace in voting for the United Nations General Assembly resolution. I am confirmed in this thought by a remark which Mr. Ormsby-Gore made twice today: he said that the delegations of the Western countries made in their draft a concession to us, endeavoured to meet us, when they said they agreed to confirm the General Assembly resolution. I could not help wondering why this in particular should be a concession to us. Did not you vote for the resolution? Do you consider this resolution something alien to you? Did you vote for it only as a concession to
the Soviet Union? Those are natural questions. We consider that the resolution is ours because we voted for it, and we regard it as a very important landmark in the work of the United Nations and in the whole movement of the peoples for the consolidation of peace. If you consider this resolution alien to you, if you voted for it insincerely and only as a concession to the support which world opinion gave to the Soviet Union's initiative, then that is your business; but it merely demonstrates that you lack that firm attitude towards the General Assembly resolution which you ought to have towards a document of such paramount importance, adopted unanimously by all the members of the United Nations. What has been said about this today at the close of our session, testifies to some truly serious features in the work of our Committee.

Mr. Ormsby-Gore has referred to motives, and motives were also mentioned by some other representatives of the Western delegations. He said that mention must not be made only of rapprochement of positions, but that it would be right -- or so I understood -- to mention differences also. He and the representative of Canada have just spoken of this. Mr. Ormsby-Gore also affirmed that otherwise an unbalanced picture would be given. But the whole question, in documents of this kind, is where to place the emphasis. Your stress on differences is of course evidence of certain tendencies on your part.

We have striven to bring our positions closer. You seem bent on widening the gaps; or at any rate you do not wish at this stage to emphasize a rapprochement of positions. Why you should do this we do not quite understand. It may be evidence of your general preparation for the Summit meeting; because many of your representatives, not in this room only, are embittering the situation and creating tension, perhaps in order to make your positions easier to defend at the Summit meeting. At all events, during the discussion of this communique this tendency has appeared very clearly.

So, what conclusions can be drawn?

The refusal of the Western delegations to adopt an agreed communique in connexion with the suspension of the Committee's work, and the objections they have raised in the discussion, can only be attributed to a desire to embitter the situation at the end of our work, and regarded as an attempt to evade implementation of the statements and proposals of the Western representatives themselves during the Committee's work.
The statements on the Committee's future work made by the Western representatives during discussion of the communique show that, in spite of their formal declarations, they are not really trying to bring closer the positions of the sides on the problems before the Committee. While professing to agree that the Committee's main work should be to implement the United Nations General Assembly resolution, and that efforts should be made to work out agreed principles and a programme of general and complete disarmament, they actually refuse to record that agreement when the course of the Committee's future work is being defined.

They have also refused to record in the communique agreement on these propositions even in relation to the Committee's past work. That is clear evidence of the shifts they are employing in order to hide their true position from the world.

We cannot help drawing the appropriate conclusions from all this, both in assessing the whole position of the Western Powers and in considering the future work of our Committee.

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from French): As no other representative wishes to speak, before reading the draft communique I will, as representative of Bulgaria, say a few words at the end of this stage of our work.

The first period of the work of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament set up in accordance with the communique of the Four Foreign Ministers of the Great Powers (DC/144), of its work based on the General Assembly resolution on general and complete disarmament voted unanimously at the Fourteenth Session of the General Assembly (A/RES/1386(XIV)), is drawing to a close. During the coming period from 29 April to 7 June attention will undoubtedly be centred on the meeting of the Heads of Government of the four great Powers which is to take place in Paris on 16 May 1960 and which has the question of disarmament on its agenda.

It is always useful on such occasions to strike a provisional balance which may give a rough idea of the principal features of the problems discussed and offer an overall picture of future prospects.

For a month and a half, the ten delegations have bent their efforts to a comparison of the proposals and plans of the countries concerned for solving the problem of general and complete disarmament. They have tried to present their
proposals in the best possible light and to show the virtues and advantages of these while emphasizing the faults and weaknesses of the other side's proposals. This work of clarification and comparison has been very useful because it has enabled the world as well as the statesmen to gain a better understanding of the advantages and drawbacks of the various proposals.

It has seemed at some moments in our work that our points of view on questions of principle were drawing closer together. Despite the Western delegations' reserves and retractions during the early days of our discussion on the definition, given in the resolution voted by the United Nations General Assembly, of the task assigned to the Ten Nation Committee, those delegations recognized in the end that the goal was indeed to reach agreement on general and complete disarmament. It is true that, while recognizing that goal, the Western delegations tried by all possible means to switch the discussion in our Committee to the working out of partial measures aimed principally at control over armaments, or of disarmament measures which would give a unilateral advantage to the Western Powers.

As serious difficulties had arisen in our discussions on the methods to be followed in working out a programme and a plan for general and complete disarmament, the delegations of the socialist countries introduced on 8 April 1960 a document entitled "Basic Principles of General and Complete Disarmament" (TNCD/4) in an endeavour to direct the Committee's work towards principles on many of which it had appeared during previous discussions that our views were coming rather closer together. However, these proposals were at once opposed resolutely by the Western delegations, who categorically refused to discuss them. That attitude could not be maintained in the face of informed international opinion conscious of the present great danger created by the constant and continuous accumulation of armaments, and of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction in particular.

On 26 April the Western delegations introduced a document containing the principles and conditions which, in their view, should govern the preparation of a programme and an agreement leading towards general and complete disarmament. (TNCD/5) However, neither the principles contained in the document
submitted by the Western delegations, nor the conditions which a programme and measures of disarmament were to fulfil, provided an adequate basis for an agreement on general and complete disarmament. The Western Powers' concept still diverged substantially from that expressed by the majority of the delegations to the United Nations General Assembly. Whereas the Western Powers were still trying to revert to the four Foreign Ministers' communique of 7 September 1959, which speaks only of limitation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, the great majority of the delegations to the General Assembly, interpreting the unanimous will of the peoples of the whole world, in fact resolutely advocated general and complete disarmament. As you know, this idea was expressed by the representative of India in the First Committee on 2 November 1959.\footnote{At its 1042nd meeting.} Mr. Krishna Menon said:

"There is no possibility of achieving any of the things we have spoken about ..." that is, general and complete disarmament -- "... unless we have a world in which there are no national forces for so-called internal security. This is not again either a new thought or something that we managed ..."

The fact that the Western Powers submitted their document concerning principles and conditions for general and complete disarmament is certainly an indication of the development which has taken place within the Western delegations, and also evidence of the soundness of the initiative taken by the socialist countries towards working out basic principles capable of opening the way to an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

While it is true that a certain development has taken place within some of the Western delegations, it is no less true that their desire -- amounting to an obsession -- to go back, to entrench themselves in sullen opposition to preparation of a programme of general and complete disarmament is a characteristic feature of the Western countries' position.
We had an instance of this yesterday in the United States representative's statement. After the Western delegations had introduced their document concerning principles and conditions for general and complete disarmament, he set out to prove to us that general and complete disarmament cannot be achieved under present conditions or in the more or less near future.

It was surely in this connexion that the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union said in his recent speech in Baku — excuse me for quoting it in Russian:

*(translation from Russian)*

"The Western Powers are in fact maintaining at the Geneva negotiations the position they have occupied throughout the preceding years, that of abandoning real disarmament,emasculating the substance of the problem and reducing the entire issue solely to mere control. But that is a backward movement. One cannot, after all, pretend that there has been no General Assembly resolution calling upon Governments to make every effort to achieve a solution to the problem of general and complete disarmament. It is difficult to escape the impression that the Western Powers are withdrawing from what they voted in the United Nations General Assembly last autumn."

Let us hope that during the six weeks' recess some representatives will again be able and willing to reflect on the proposals which we, the socialist countries, have submitted during this Conference, and on the Soviet plan for general and complete disarmament (A/4219). Let us also hope that contact with public opinion in their countries will lead them to reconsider their position and their arguments. That would unquestionably create a better atmosphere for our work and enable us to fulfil our task more fruitfully and succeed in working out a programme for general and complete disarmament.

**Mr. Naszkowski** (Poland) *(translation from French):* Before we part, I think it useful and necessary to make a few brief comments on the work accomplished by our Committee up to now.

When it came to Geneva for the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee, the Polish delegation was aware that the task assigned to us is of tremendous, I might say decisive, importance for the future of mankind.

Our Committee's heavy responsibility derives from the fact that, by the unanimous resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, eighty-two States have called upon us to find a constructive solution to the problem of general
and complete disarmament. We were, and are, aware that this is not an easy task, and that the obstacles on the road to disarmament which have piled up over the years cannot be swept away at a single stroke. The arms race has increased international tension and at the same time created an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion between States. We are convinced, however, that better conditions now prevail for solving this problem, which is the most urgent one facing the world today.

There is, at this moment, no question more important than that of delivering mankind from the threat of war — a threat all the greater and more terrible because of the present state of military technique. The delegations of the socialist countries came here with a concrete programme offering a complete solution of the disarmament problem — a programme of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which was submitted last autumn by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union. We considered, and we still consider, this programme to be the one best suited and most expedient for fulfilling the task set us. On the other hand, the programme submitted to us by the Western representatives at the start of our Committee's discussions departed fundamentally from the mandate given us by the United Nations. Contrary to the letter and the spirit of the General Assembly resolution, for which the Western Powers also voted, the Western plan proceeded from postulates which have become traditional for the position of the Western Powers. It was based essentially on the concept of control over existing armaments. The socialist States expected our Committee, after a preliminary discussion, to start working out the details of a disarmament treaty. Unfortunately, through no fault of ours, we have been unable to do so. However, in the desire to advance the Committee's work we submitted a draft on "Basic Principles of General and Complete Disarmament". We proceeded from the standpoint that if we could agree upon a common approach to the execution of the programme of general and complete disarmament, that would in turn facilitate the drafting of the disarmament treaty itself. The fact that the Western delegations, after a long period of opposition, have also recognized that it would be useful to adopt a preliminary document on principles, seems to mark a certain success for our Conference. The last two days, however, with yesterday's statement by Mr. Eaton, the United States representative, and today's discussion on the
communicate, have shown that the Western delegations are trying to deny any rapprochement even on this point on which it seemed to have been achieved.

As to the Western draft on principles, we studied it with all due care, which cannot be said of the Western Powers' attitude to our draft. We recognized that this draft in its present form could not, for reasons we have already explained, serve as a basis for working out common principles of general and complete disarmament. At the same time, however, we emphasized that the draft contained certain formulas showing a rapprochement of our positions and, in particular, showing that the West recognized the usefulness of drawing up a programme of general and complete disarmament.

Here again, however, Mr. Eaton's statement must have a disappointing effect. For it suggests that the United States delegation is again trying to make our Committee go back to discussing isolated, partial measures consisting mainly of control over armaments, with only an insignificant proportion of disarmament measures. However, the fact that the Western delegations have accepted the actual concept of general and complete disarmament and the usefulness of drawing up a disarmament programme cannot be denied, and we therefore trust that during the several weeks' suspension of our Committee's work the Western delegations will make a detailed study of the course of our discussions and draw constructive conclusions from it for our future work. There is no need to stress that the attitude of the socialist delegations will still be marked by the constructive will to reach agreement which we have proved so often.

We hope that the international climate in which we shall resume our discussions in June will enable us to reconcile our views on the questions on which we have not yet been able to reach agreement. For we shall be resuming our discussions after the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Great Powers, which, we firmly believe, will further improve international relations.

During our discussions we have often expressed the Polish nation's ardent desire to see the world delivered, once and for all, from the danger of war, which has caused us Poles so much suffering. We have also repeatedly stressed that deferring the solution of this urgent problem accelerates the arms race, whets the appetite of militarist circles in the Federal Republic of Germany and strengthens the spirit of revenge and revisionism which is undermining peaceful relations in Europe.
The Polish delegation will spare no effort, after the resumption of our work, to help the Committee reach a final solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament as quickly as possible.

Mr. Miezincescu (Romania) (translation from French): The Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament adjourns today, to resume its work on 7 June, after the Conference of the Heads of Government of the four Great Powers.

In six weeks of debate, exchanges of views which we consider important and useful for our future discussions have taken place on the problem of general and complete disarmament.

The rapprochement of positions which has emerged on certain aspects of our work, although subsequently denied by the Western delegations, nevertheless retains its value and will remain on record in the documents of the Conference.

During our discussions, the delegations of the Western countries declined to discuss in detail the plan for general and complete disarmament submitted by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union to the United Nations General Assembly and transmitted to this Committee for consideration, by General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV). To that plan they opposed a plan of isolated and partial measures, mainly of control over armaments, in three stages, the third of which was practically abandoned by its own authors themselves during our discussions.

The Western Powers then refused to discuss the basic principles of general and complete disarmament, proposed by the socialist countries. Only at the end of the Conference did they submit counter-proposals, without really agreeing to a discussion of this subject.

The progress of our negotiations has been blocked because the countries of the Atlantic Alliance wished to give public opinion the illusion that the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament was negotiating a treaty on general and complete disarmament, whereas they had rejected the idea of negotiating such a treaty.

It is true that the delegations of the Western Powers were forced, during our discussions, to reiterate their support of the United Nations General Assembly resolution, to declare themselves in favour of a programme of general and complete disarmament and, at first, of drawing up basic principles for such a programme. But to judge by their statements at the last few meetings of the Committee, and their refusal to include any reference to the principles or the programme of general
and complete disarmament in the final communique, it appears that their only object in adopting these positions was to reassure public opinion, which is justifiably concerned at the lack of progress in our negotiations.

There is, however, a valuable lesson to be learnt from our discussions, namely, that general and complete disarmament has become necessary by virtue of existing international situations which have found expression in the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly. The discussions in our Committee have confirmed the worth of the United Nations resolution on general and complete disarmament. They have shown how difficult and dangerous it is to try to disregard that resolution.

Despite the meagre results of the first weeks of our discussions, the Romanian delegation remains convinced that a radical solution of the disarmament problem is within the bounds of possibility. We hope that during the recess the delegations of the Atlantic Alliance countries will succeed in clarifying their position on general and complete disarmament in accordance with the spirit and the letter of the United Nations General Assembly resolution and that they will come back better prepared to discuss a programme of general and complete disarmament, in order to fulfil their obligations to the international community.

For its part, the Romanian delegation, in accordance with the instructions of the Government of the Romanian People's Republic, will always be prepared to make its contribution to progress in the cause of general and complete disarmament.

Mr. NOSEK (Czechoslovakia): As we stated in our opening speech on 15 March, the Czechoslovak delegation has come to Geneva instructed by the Czechoslovak Government and entrusted by the people of Czechoslovakia with the task of making every effort towards a constructive solution of the question of general and complete disarmament, the solution of which all States Members of the United Nations, and first of all the Governments represented in our Committee, have been called upon to provide by resolution 1378 (XIV) of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The people of Czechoslovakia, like all other peoples, are deeply interested in the early achievement of general and complete disarmament, because it is fully aware that realization of the programme of general and complete disarmament would free mankind for ever from the threat of war and would establish a lasting world
peace. The people of Czechoslovakia have therefore followed with close attention and great interest the development of the negotiations of our Committee, which unfortunately, however, have not yet led to desirable results. Despite all the efforts of the delegations of the socialist countries during the past six weeks we have not succeeded in inducing the delegations of the Western countries to proceed with us and in conformity with resolution 1378 (XIV) to concrete discussions on the elaboration of a treaty of general and complete disarmament or a businesslike discussion of its basic principles.

This does not, however, mean that our negotiations have not brought some positive results in a certain sense. In the course of our negotiations a detailed clarification of the standpoints of both sides on the proposals submitted has been achieved, and it has been generally admitted that on some questions the standpoints of both sides have come closer together to a certain extent. But I have to add that at our meeting today the delegations of the Western countries have, it seems, abandoned their previous positions. The Czechoslovak delegation, together with the delegations of other socialist countries, considers that the most positive result of our negotiations is that the delegations of the Western countries have at last, despite their initial hesitation, unanimously admitted resolution 1378 (XIV) to be the basis of the work of our Committee, and have subscribed — at least in words — to the conclusion that the programme of general and complete disarmament is our basic task.

Unfortunately, however, the proposals submitted by the delegations of the Western countries in the course of our negotiations so far do not justify their real striving for the accomplishment of general and complete disarmament. We expect that after the resumption of our discussions we shall be in a position to move forward in working out basic principles of general and complete disarmament in the way expected by peoples all over the world. As far as the Czechoslovak delegation is concerned, I can assure all other delegations that for its part they will be given maximum support and goodwill for all proposals leading towards the achievement of this goal.

In concluding, I would like, on behalf of the Czechoslovak Government and the Czechoslovak delegation, to express our gratitude to the Government of the Swiss Federation, and to the authorities of the Canton, Republic and City of Geneva, for the hospitality they are offering to our Conference. At the same time, we
also thank the members of the Secretariat of the United Nations, Dr. Protitch, Mr. Epstein, and all other members of the Secretariat, and particularly the members of the documents bureau, the verbatim records writers and our interpreters, for the efficient and most satisfactory help which they have rendered to us during our negotiations.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):
The refusal of the Western delegations to associate themselves with an agreed communique on the results of our work obliges us, at the close of the present stage of the Committee's work, to state our views on the results achieved.

After seven weeks of work, the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament is being suspended until 7 June next in connexion with the forthcoming meeting of the Heads of Government of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France.

The Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament began its work in circumstances of a marked relaxation of international tension, in conditions where 82 States -- that is, all States Members of the United Nations without exception -- had, at the fourteenth session of the General Assembly, following the noble initiative of the Soviet Government, unanimously recognized the need for devising as quickly as possible a practical solution to the problem of general and complete disarmament -- the most important problem with which the world is faced today. The Soviet Union itself had taken an important step in that direction by deciding to carry out a new and substantial reduction of 1,200,000 men in the armed forces of the USSR.

That meant that the Committee began its work in favourable circumstances and had every opportunity of getting down to business straight away, to accomplishing what N.S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, described in his message to the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament as:

"... a most important and responsible task, namely, to work out within the shortest possible time practical ways of bringing about general and complete disarmament, thus putting into effect the recommendation of the General Assembly at its fourteenth session, which was unanimously approved by all Members of the United Nations". (TNCD/1)
It is no exaggeration to say that the attention of the peoples of the world has been riveted upon the Conference from the first day of its work for they expected the Conference really to work for a solution of this great problem and to set out along the road to its practical implementation.

What, then, are the results of the first stage of the work of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament? Has this work resulted in any progress towards the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament? Have the hopes and expectations of the peoples of the world been justified?

Today, at the last meeting of the Committee before the recess, the Soviet delegation deems it necessary to state that, although during the past seven weeks there have been many -- and in the case of a number of questions, useful -- discussions in the Committee that have helped to clarify the positions of the parties and to bring them closer together, nevertheless, so far as the practical solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament, so far as the implementation of the General Assembly resolution on general and complete disarmament are concerned, we have as yet made no progress. What are the reasons for such a situation?

From the very outset of the Committee's work two fundamentally different lines became apparent in our discussions. One line was followed by the delegations of the socialist States -- the line that had as its objective the implementation of the resolution on general and complete disarmament of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the preparation of a treaty on such disarmament and the agreeing of a practical programme for carrying it out. The other line was advocated here in the Committee by the delegations of the Western States Members of the North Atlantic Alliance; this line can only be described as very far from the objective of general and complete disarmament and as in essence directed at substituting control for disarmament and at putting the disarmament negotiations back to the period when there was as yet no resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations on general and complete disarmament and when the opponents of disarmament dragged out from year to year the practical solution of any disarmament problems, merely seeking to obtain unilateral military advantages.

Guided by a desire to obtain practical results more quickly, to get down more rapidly to the preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, the delegations of the socialist States expounded in detail at the Committee's meetings the Soviet programme of general and complete disarmament, and showed that it is
precisely that programme that contains all the necessary ingredients for the
fulfilment of the requirements of the General Assembly resolution concerning a
constructive solution of the problem of a programme of general and complete
disarmament in the shortest possible time.

This programme provides for complete liquidation of all national armed forces and
armaments, the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons and the cessation of their
manufacture, the prohibition of the use, and the destruction of all stockpiles of such
weapons, the liquidation of all military bases on foreign territories and the withdrawal
of all foreign armed forces from the territories of other States, the termination of
all military training and the cessation of the appropriation of funds for military
purposes, the abolition of all war ministries, general staffs and all other military
institutions. In other words, the Soviet programme provides for the total abolition of
all the material means of waging war. According to the Soviet programme, general and
complete disarmament is to be carried out in three stages within a period of four years,
the first stage providing for a large reduction in the armed forces of the USSR, the
People's Republic of China and the United States of America to the level of 1,700,000
men, and of 650,000 men in the case of the United Kingdom and France, with

 corresponding reductions in armaments.

The Soviet programme is based upon the idea that all measures of general and
complete disarmament shall be carried out under effective international control, the
scope and nature of which shall in each case correspond to the scope and nature of the
disarmament measures, so that there would be neither control without disarmament nor
 disarmament without control. The Soviet delegation deems it necessary to lay special
emphasis on this point and to state clearly that the socialist States are advocates of
the most thorough and comprehensive control over disarmament, because they consider it
necessary to establish and maintain a situation such as to make it impossible for any
State to evade the fulfilment of its obligations concerning general and complete
disarmament, thereby again plunging the world into an armaments race.

The delegation of the Soviet Union displayed its readiness to take into account
any amendments or additions to the Soviet programme, and, in response to the wishes
of the Western delegations, announced its agreement to transfer the measures relating
to complete nuclear disarmament to the very first stage of the programme of disarmament.

The socialist States are profoundly convinced, and their conviction is widely
shared by the general public in all the countries of the world, that the implementation
of the Soviet programme of general and complete disarmament would completely and for
ever remove the threat of war at present hanging over mankind and guarantee conditions
in which the men and women of the whole earth could flourish, economically and
culturally, as never before.
The Western Powers, having voted at the fourteenth session of the General Assembly with the socialist States for the resolution on general and complete disarmament, and having declared in the Committee, albeit with some hesitation, their support for that resolution, have nevertheless evaded detailed consideration of the Soviet programme and refused to start work on the preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, introducing their own so-called "Plan for general and comprehensive disarmament" instead.

This plan, in essence, rejects the idea of general and complete disarmament, it provides for no measures of general and complete disarmament, it altogether lacks any reasonably serious disarmament measures, and the whole matter in reality boils down to the establishment of control without disarmament, to control over armaments. The Western plan does not lead to the abolition of the means of waging war and the weapons of war, such as hydrogen and atom bombs, missiles, military aircraft, tanks, warships and submarines; nor does it mention the abolition of military bases on foreign territory, or the cessation of military production, or the discontinuance of appropriations of funds for military purposes, or the abolition of war ministries, general staffs and other military institutions. Suffice it to say that the Western plan, for instance, presents as a measure of disarmament the establishment for the United States of America and the Soviet Union of a ceiling of 2.5 million men for their armed forces, in other words, a ceiling higher than either the existing level of their armed forces or the level that is likely to obtain in the near future, while any reduction in this level of 2.5 million men, even a most insignificant one, to 2.1 million men, is made dependent upon various conditions creating obstacles to the attainment of agreement on such a reduction. The reduction of the armed forces of the United Kingdom and France is not mentioned at all. And yet an attempt is being made to present this Western plan as a real, practical programme of general and complete disarmament, although no one can deny that it does not guarantee any real progress in the matter of disarmament.

The Western plan is a fresh attempt by the Western Powers to abandon real disarmament, to emasculate the very substance of the disarmament problem, and to reduce the whole matter to mere control. That is why the delegations of the socialist States have declared in this Committee that the Western plan conflicts with the United Nations General Assembly resolution on general and complete disarmament.
But why is it, then, that the Western Powers do not want general and complete disarmament? Can it be because their main everyday concern is not disarmament but the armaments race? Is this not borne out by various acts of the Western Powers during the Committee's work, for example the construction of United States missile bases in Italy, Turkey and Crete; the decision of the Conference of War Ministers of the NATO States to establish West-German military bases all over Western Europe; the growing attempts to rebuild the German-Japanese revenge-seeking bloc that was smashed to pieces during the Second World War; and the acceleration of the armaments race in the areas of the SEATO and CANTO military blocs? Considering those facts it is no accident that certain American statesmen, including the Deputy Secretary of State, Mr. Dillon, have quite recently been appealing in their speeches for strength to be built up, military blocs strengthened, and the armaments race continued. There is also a direct link between those appeals and the stubborn unwillingness of the United States and the other Western Powers to declare that they will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, in spite of the enormous potential moral and political importance of such a gesture of goodwill by the States possessing nuclear weapons.

A policy such as that demonstrated by the sad experience of South Korea bodes no good either for the United States or for the other Western Powers.

The refusal of the Western delegations to begin to prepare a treaty on general and complete disarmament, and their setting-up of their own plan for establishing comprehensive control instead of disarmament in opposition to the Soviet programme of general and complete disarmament, have seriously hampered the work of our Committee. To enable progress to be made even in spite of the difficulties created by the attitude of the Western Powers, the delegations of the socialist States proposed, as a first step towards the preparation of a programme on general and complete disarmament, agreement on the basic principles of such disarmament; and on 8 April they submitted suitable proposals to the Committee. Obviously, if agreement on the basic principles of general and complete disarmament had been possible, many obstacles to our negotiations would have been removed and important ground prepared for further progress towards the preparation of a concrete programme of general and complete disarmament.
But the Western Powers adhered to their negative policy and made hastily-prepared statements in which they refused even to discuss the basic principles of general and complete disarmament. The state of affairs in our Committee grew even worse. A situation developed in which the Western delegates virtually refused to negotiate about general and complete disarmament, and instead proceeded to impose on us a discussion of so-called individual measures, mainly of control, based on their "Plan for general and comprehensive disarmament". Even so, however, we resolutely continued to clarify the Soviet programme of general and complete disarmament, and the basic principles of such disarmament proposed by the socialist States. We continued to point out the need for practical and concrete measures implementing the United Nations General Assembly resolution on general and complete disarmament; and towards the close of this first phase of our work these efforts seemed to be having some effect. The Western representatives realized that it was not so simple to push aside the United Nations General Assembly resolution, for that would be openly condemned by all the peoples of the world.

On 26 April the Western delegations put forward a proposal which at last contained some positive features — a proposal on the principles and conditions of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Although this document lacked a number of important principles of general and complete disarmament, and contained provisions in obvious conflict with the duty to bring about such disarmament, it nevertheless recognized the need to work towards solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament, and the value of working out and agreeing on the basic principles of such disarmament, and also the working out of a programme of general and complete disarmament.

It seemed that a certain prospect of progress was possible, and that a situation had begun to take shape which encouraged belief that during further negotiations agreement might be reached on the basic principles of general and complete disarmament, and a programme for such disarmament worked out.

Yet almost as soon as the Western Powers introduced their new document recognizing the need to reach agreement on the basic principles of general and complete disarmament and then to work out a programme for such disarmament, strong doubts emerged about their real intention to proceed on this course. Statements by Western delegates began to express the idea that the basic principles of general and complete disarmament should be agreed upon, not so that progress might then be made towards the working out of a programme of general and complete disarmament,
but apparently only so that, as soon as the general lines of these principles had been settled, they should be jettisoned and a return made precisely to the "Plan for general and comprehensive disarmament", which the Western Powers had submitted at the start of the negotiations, or to individual control measures of that plan.

We think it necessary to note that this policy, which bears no relation to the duty to give effect to the United Nations General Assembly resolution on general and complete disarmament, has been particularly evident in the statements of the United States representative. It has also been reflected in the discussion on the draft communique submitted by the delegations of the socialist countries on the outcome of the first stage of our Committee's work. The Western Powers refused to include in the communique just those passages which recorded the agreement apparently reached on the need to settle the basic principles of general and complete disarmament and to work out a programme of such disarmament.

All this puts in issue the Western Powers' true position: do they recognize -- as they do in their document of 26 April the need to work out the basic principles and a programme of general and complete disarmament and are they prepared to work with us to this end, or do they want to limit themselves to mere discussion of basic principles and a programme, and not in fact to do anything about these?

We have a growing impression that the Western Powers do not in fact intend to work out the basic principles and a programme of general and complete disarmament, and are only concerned to conceal from world public opinion their reluctance to carry out the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations on general and complete disarmament by debating so-called initial disarmament measures which, upon examination, turn out to be merely measures of control over armaments. The Western Powers should understand that in the present circumstances this policy cannot succeed. They can no longer mislead the world into believing that they desire to progress towards disarmament, and at the same time really obstruct every advance in this direction. No one can now abuse the peoples' hopes and patience with impunity. The peoples demand immediate and resolute action to stop the arms race and ensure a stable peace and the peaceful coexistence of States. General and complete disarmament is no empty phrase or slogan, as has been intimated here; it is a practical task of immense importance, the accomplishment of which is of concern to all mankind. This is understood today by all who have the cause of peace at heart. And we base ourselves on the axiom
that, in the present world balance of power, the Western Powers must certainly be no less interested than we are in maintaining peace, and consequently in solving the problem of general and complete disarmament.

That is why we still hope that the Western Powers, having repeatedly weighed their position on general and complete disarmament, and having soberly assessed the situation which has arisen in the negotiations, will advance with us towards agreement on the basic principles of general and complete disarmament and the working out of a unified programme of such disarmament, including at each stage concrete disarmament measures and appropriate measures of control. The Western Powers themselves have recognized the need to work in this direction, and we hope that they will put this statement into practice and not let it remain a dead letter.

We shall report to our Governments on the results of the first phase of this Committee's work. These results will no doubt be considered in the discussions between the Heads of Governments on the disarmament problem, the most important problem of today.

We shall resume our negotiations after the recess.

The Soviet Union's position in these negotiations is that, in pursuance of its consistent peaceful foreign policy and its resolute course towards relaxation of international tension, it will spare no effort to achieve success in our negotiations on a concrete programme of general and complete disarmament, so as to bring closer thereby the fulfilment of mankind's great aspiration: to eliminate war from the life of man.

Mr. MOCH (France) (translation from French): I do not think the results of our thirty-odd meetings justifies the long speeches we have heard today, with all their repetitions, reiterations and interpretations, which we do not accept. Only a desire for propaganda can explain this. I shall therefore refrain from making a speech of that kind, and confine myself to expressing the hope that the four Heads of State, or of Government, meeting in Paris in a fortnight's time will trace for us a new road towards peace which is both bold and realistic. Otherwise, on the basis of the present theses, their endless repetition and their renewal in different forms, but with the same substance, I do not see what we can usefully do when we meet again in June.
The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from French): If no one else wishes to speak, I should like, as Chairman of our meeting today, to say a few words of thanks to all those who have helped us in our work up to the present.

I am sure I shall be speaking for all the delegations round this table, when I express our gratitude, before we separate for six weeks, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld, to his personal representative, Dr. Protitch, who is now absent, and to his deputy, Mr. Epstein, for the care they have taken to ensure efficient organization of the work of this Conference. We must also thank the Secretariat, including the interpreters, who during these seven weeks have made a tremendous effort to provide favourable conditions and all the facilities essential for the smooth progress of our work.

I believe that I shall also be expressing the sentiments of all delegations when I convey our deep gratitude to the Swiss Federal Government and to the authorities and citizens of the Canton of Geneva for offering our Conference the traditional hospitality of their city.

If there are no comments and no one else wishes to speak, I will read out the communique:

"The thirty-second meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament was held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 29 April 1960 under the chairmanship of the representative of Bulgaria.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on 7 June 1960 at the Palais des Nations, Geneva."

If there are no objections, the communique will be taken to be adopted.

The meeting rose at 1.25 p.m.