FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THIRTY-FIRST MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 28 April 1960, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. EATON (United States of America)
**PRESENT AT THE TABLE**

**Bulgaria:**
- Mr. M. TARABANOV
- Mr. K. CHRISTOV
- Col. K. SAVOV

**Canada:**
- Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
- Mr. A.G. CAMPBELL
- W/Cdr. R.J. MITCHELL

**Czechoslovakia:**
- Mr. J. NOSEK
- Lieut.-Gen. J. HECKO
- Mr. Z. TRHLIK

**France:**
- Mr. J. MOCH
- Mr. M. LEGENDRE
- Mr. B. GOLDSCHEIDT

**Italy:**
- Mr. G. MARTINO
- Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
- Mr. L. DAINELLI

**Poland:**
- Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
- Mr. M. LACHS
- Brig.Gen. J. SLIWINSKI

**Romania:**
- Mr. E. MEZINOCESCU
- Mr. C. BOGDAN
- Col. C. POPA

**Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:**
- Mr. V.A. ZARIN
- Col. Gen. A.A. GRYZLOV
- Mr. A.A. ROSCHCHIN
PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:
Rt. Hon. D. ORMSBY-GORE
Sir Michael WRIGHT
Miss B. SALT

United States of America:
Mr. F.M. EATON
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Rear-Admiral P.L. DUDLEY

The Secretary-General of the
United Nations:
Mr. D. HAMMARSKJÖLD

Representative of the
Secretary-General:
Mr. W. EPSTEIN
The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): It is my pleasure today, as Chairman, to welcome our distinguished guest, Mr. Hammarskjold. It is the hospitality of the United Nations which we enjoy here in the Palais des Nations and it is the hard work and efficiency of the United Nations Secretariat which has been responsible for the smooth running of this Conference. In welcoming the Secretary-General of the United Nations, it seems to me appropriate at the same time to express our appreciation of the cordial and effective support which we have received here from the United Nations staff, and in particular our thanks to Dr. Protitch and Mr. Epstein, who have so faithfully attended all our meetings as representatives of our distinguished guest.

Mr. HAMMARSKJOLD (Secretary-General of the United Nations): I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your kind words of welcome.

I am happy that other duties have brought me to Geneva in time for me to attend personally a meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament before the end of its first period of work. Through my representatives at the Conference and through the study of the records I have been able to follow closely the development of your discussions. This has been essential for me in view of the fact that, as the four Powers which initiated these discussions themselves said in their communication to the United Nations, this Organization carries the primary responsibility for disarmament.

Indeed, its primary responsibility for disarmament is only one reason why the Organization has a special interest in and a special importance for your discussion. The other one is its specific responsibilities as laid down in the Charter for the pacific settlement of disputes and for action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. Obviously, these three aspects of the policy for the maintenance of peace -- that is disarmament, pacific settlement of disputes and action in view of breaches of peace -- are inseparable and integrated elements of the policies of Member Governments within the framework of and through the United Nations. Just as efforts towards preservation of peace through negotiation and similar means and through action, if necessary, in case of a breach of peace need the support of action in the field of disarmament, so disarmament must be integrated with effective machinery in the other two respects. These policies cannot be divided and responsibility in one of the fields, therefore, necessitates corresponding responsibility in the other fields.
In a search for an agreement on disarmament in which complete disarmament is approached through concrete measures, of which each one is consistently seen and considered as an integral part of the effort to achieve such disarmament, you are bound to reach a point where you will have to study the United Nations Organization with a view to determining how its machinery can best be used and developed in support of disarmament. Your Conference, however, is not an organ of the United Nations, and the consideration of the functioning of the Organization, obviously primarily belongs to the Organization itself and to all its Member Governments alike. I would, thus, assume that the study that at some stage will have to be made of those matters which are covered by Chapter VII of the Charter and which would become of crucial significance in case of progressive or complete disarmament, will be made by the United Nations with a view to such possible decisions by the Organization as may be indicated in order to give it the necessary efficiency.

Likewise, a question will arise for you how to fit the control activities which will be called for into the organizational framework of the United Nations. The technical nature of this question is bound to make it a subject of your study, but the relationship which links together the various elements of a policy for the preservation of peace to which I have already referred, and the specific experience and knowledge of the administrative and political problems arising for and within the United Nations, renders it necessary for the Organization to provide you in this connexion with its full assistance, if we are to arrive at the best possible result. It would, in my view, be entirely premature at this stage to discuss this question. Be it enough to say that — as shown by the fifteen years of its history — the Organization has such possibilities of development and such flexibility that I do not foresee any difficulties in fitting an activity of this type into the United Nations framework in a way which would fully safeguard all legitimate interests involved.

The United Nations, like other international organizations, of course reflects only the political realities of the moment. Important though organizational arrangements are, they are subordinated in the sense that they do not change realities; what at a given time politically is attainable on one organizational
basis, is equally attainable on another one. Essential difficulties encountered within the United Nations are based on realities and not on the specific constitution of the Organization. In the work for achieving and maintaining disarmament they would not be experienced with less force were an attempt to be made to start, so to say, all over again; time will be gained and better results achieved if our efforts are developed with respect for what has been achieved so far and for the necessity of organic adaptation of these achievements to new needs within the framework of new possibilities.

These brief observations are natural for me as Secretary-General of the United Nations as an attempt to indicate the width and range of the integration of your specific problems with those of eighty-two Member Governments grappling through the United Nations, as their main instrumentality, with the building of an organized world community based on law in which peace is preserved through controlled disarmament, the full use of peaceful means for the settlement of disputes and efficient arrangements permitting action in case of a breach of peace.

In ending I wish to express again the sincere good wishes with which your work is followed by all the Member Nations of the United Nations and by the peoples of the world. You have back of you a period of intense work. Is it too much to hope that when you resume your discussions after the recess, you will be able to do so encouraged by an improvement in the international situation and with new possibilities for agreement on the first steps in the direction of disarmament?

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): Thank you, Mr. Hammarskjold.

I now call on the first speaker this morning, the representative of the Soviet Union.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I should in the first place like to thank Mr. Hammarskjold as the esteemed Secretary-General of the United Nations for the words of welcome and the good wishes he has just expressed at our meeting today. I, too, wish to express the hope that our work, the work of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament, will be carefully considered by the United Nations, and that the matters which the United Nations is to study will be considered in the light of the work we have already done and that which we have still to do before the session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.
Allow me now to pass to the questions which are the subject of our discussions.

Throughout the work of the Ten Nation Committee, the Soviet Union delegation and the delegations of the other socialist countries have spared no effort to bring about a constructive solution to the problem of general and complete disarmament through the preparation, in accordance with the terms of the General Assembly resolution, of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. During the first weeks of our work we explained in detail the Soviet programme of general and complete disarmament, including practical measures of both conventional and nuclear-missile disarmament, intended to be carried out in three stages within a fixed term, and proposed to the Western delegations that we proceed forthwith to the preparation of an appropriate treaty. But the Western delegations refused to follow this course, and began by attempting to question the need to prepare a practical and integral programme of general and complete disarmament.

In these circumstances the delegations of the socialist countries came to the conclusion that, even if it was impossible to make a direct start at once on the preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, it was at least essential to take the first real step in that direction, making use for the purposes of the points that had emerged in discussion at which the positions of the two sides on a number of important issues coincided. That first step ought, in our opinion, to have consisted in agreeing on the basic principles of general and complete disarmament. Indeed, if it was not possible to agree at once on such a big question as general and complete disarmament in every detail, it was necessary at least to agree on the basic principles, to determine the general framework of the treaty, and to agree upon a common approach to the main problems of general and complete disarmament.

Guided by these considerations, the delegations of the socialist countries submitted to the Committee on 8 April the "Basic Principles of General and Complete Disarmament" (TNCD/4). That document set forth such highly important issues of principle as the general scope of measures on general and complete disarmament, the phasing of the programme for such disarmament, the general time-limit for carrying out the programme, the need for setting up effective international control over general and complete disarmament, the establishment for States of strictly limited contingents of police (militia) for ensuring public order after general and complete disarmament, has been achieved, and, finally, the general order in
which the programme of such disarmament should be carried out. At the same time we proposed that States in possession of nuclear weapons should now, that is, before the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, declare, as an act of good will intended to create the most favourable conditions for general and complete disarmament, that they will not be the first to use nuclear weapons.

In putting forward these proposals the socialist countries sincerely hoped that the Western States would proceed to consider them in a business-like way and that, following appropriate discussion, it would be possible to agree, on a mutually acceptable basis, the basic principles of general and complete disarmament, and that a first, significant step would thus have been taken even at the present stage of the Committee's work towards the preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

The Western States, however, persisted in their negative attitude. Without adducing any arguments, they announced their refusal even to discuss the "Basic Principles of General and Complete Disarmament" submitted by the socialist countries, much less to accept them, which naturally threatened the effectiveness of all the Committee's further work. The delegations of the socialist countries were obliged to put to the Western delegations the direct question whether they had any intention of working on the preparation of a programme of general and complete disarmament, whether in fact they intended to give effect to the General Assembly resolution, for which, albeit not without some hesitation, they had already declared their support.

And then, on 26 April, the delegations of the Western Powers submitted to the Committee for consideration their own paper entitled "Proposal .... concerning Principles and Conditions for General and Complete Disarmament under Effective International Control" (TNC/35), a document which, as we gathered from their explanations, they regard as a reply to our question. The Soviet delegation has already had an opportunity of making some preliminary comments on this document. Specific observations and comments on the document of the Western countries were also made by the other delegations of the socialist countries, whose views, as expressed in this Committee, tally with our own on a number of important questions. At the present moment, the Soviet delegation, after thorough study of the Western Powers' document and mature reflection on its contents, wishes to make an additional statement.
The document of the Western Powers contains an apparently affirmative reply to our question whether they consider it necessary to draft and agree the basic principles and programme of general and complete disarmament in accordance with the General Assembly resolution. This arouses in us a feeling of satisfaction, because it is perfectly obvious that if the Western States are really ready to admit now the need for working out the basic principles and programme of general and complete disarmament, this is a definite step forward, brings us closer together and gives us hope that ahead of us lie prospects of fruitful work for a constructive solution of the most important problem confronting the world today—the problem of general and complete disarmament.

But our remark that the reply of the Western Powers was apparently affirmative was not a casual one. On the one hand there are references in their document to the need for solving the problem of general and complete disarmament and for working out a programme to that end. But on the other hand many important provisions, without which no progress can be made towards drawing up a programme of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, are missing from the document and, moreover, it contains provisions which are in direct conflict with the task of preparing such a programme.

The essential point is that, although the Western Powers talk about general and complete disarmament, they do not in their document envisage complete disarmament, that is, the complete abolition of all the armed forces and armaments of States, the complete dismantling of their war machine. On the contrary, they envisage the retention by States of armed forces and armaments—obviously in considerable strength, since their duties will be not simply to maintain the internal security of States, but related to external tasks. Thus the document of the Western States does not postulate the complete destruction of the material means of waging war. It only provides for the limitation and reduction of the armed forces and armaments of States.

Furthermore, so far as we can gather from the document of the Western Powers and from the explanations provided by Mr. Moch and Mr. Ormsby-Gore and other Western delegates, they have not abandoned the idea that, in addition to the armed forces thus to be retained by States, international armed forces should also be created. This, of course, is far from general and complete disarmament.
Neither does the document of the Western Powers provide for the abolition of foreign bases on the soil of other countries. From the explanations given by Mr. Moch and Mr. Ormsby-Gore it is clear that it is the intention to keep these bases, at least in certain zones, even after the disarmament process is complete. Is this general and complete disarmament?

Again, the document of the Western Powers makes no mention of the most important of the principles of carrying out effective international control over general and complete disarmament, a principle which, we thought, had already been agreed between us, namely, that the scope and nature of control must correspond to the scope and nature of the disarmament measures, or, as the Western delegations say, there must be neither control without disarmament nor disarmament without control. The absence from the Western document of a provision to the effect that the scope and nature of control must correspond to the scope and nature of the disarmament measures gives grounds for believing that the Western Powers have not yet renounced their intention of introducing control without disarmament, that is, of establishing control over armaments.

But that is not all. Careful examination of the document of the Western Powers has convinced us of the rightness of our original opinion, expressed at the meeting of 26 April, that the document really proposes the preparation, not of an integral programme of general and complete disarmament, but of certain separate agreements on separate, isolated measures of disarmament, and that the negotiation of all those measures, however, might be dragged out almost indefinitely (cf. TNCD/PV.29).

This is an old approach, that same approach that was reflected in the many points relating to studies and investigations to be found in the so-called "Plan for General and Comprehensive Disarmament", introduced by the Western Powers at the very beginning of our Committee's work (TNCD/3). This approach cannot, of course, lead to the preparation of a programme of general and complete disarmament, a fact that even the Western delegations themselves made no attempt to conceal in commenting on their plan at our early meetings.

Directly connected with this, obviously, is the refusal of the Western Powers - emphasized in their document - to establish time-limits for the execution of the programme of general and complete disarmament. Hitherto, the Western delegations have asserted that it is impossible to fix time-limits for allegedly technical
reasons: it was difficult, they said, to determine in advance how much time would be required to carry out any given measure put into effect in the final stages of general and complete disarmament. Now we see that the real reason for the unwillingness of the Western Powers to accept the principle of fixing a time-limit for the completion of the entire programme of general and complete disarmament is to be found elsewhere, namely, in the continued desire of the Western States to get out of preparing a practical, integrated programme of general and complete disarmament, even though they have now admitted in general terms the need for drafting such a programme.

But if the Western Powers really do not consider it possible to work out an integral programme of general and complete disarmament and to fix the time-limits for carrying out such disarmament, then doubts arise about the recognition in their document of the abolition of weapons of mass destruction as the final objective. What practical value is there in laying down a final objective, even the best one, if at the same time the path that it is proposed should be followed to that objective is such that it is impossible to tell when the objective will be reached, or whether it will be reached at all?

Where, then, do we stand? We stand precisely where we did after our first sight of the document. Although the document of the Western Powers recognizes the need to find a practical solution to the problem of general and complete disarmament and to work out to that end a programme of such disarmament, many of its provisions testify to the contrary, namely, that, as formerly, the Western Powers would prefer to keep to their "Plan for General and Comprehensive Disarmament", or even to separate measures lifted from that plan, which cannot, of course, serve as the basis for drafting an integral programme of general and complete disarmament.

Thus, the document of the Western Powers on principles and conditions for general and complete disarmament under effective international control (TNCD/3), in the form in which it has been submitted for discussion by the Committee by the Western delegations, cannot provide the basis for a move in the direction of the preparation of a practical programme of general and complete disarmament. It follows that it provides no basis either for working out a mutually acceptable agreement on the basic principles of general and complete disarmament.
Does this mean that we consider that the new document of the Western Powers should be rejected? No, it does not. We believe that it would be wrong to reject this document, if only because it contains, as we have already pointed out, an admission of the need for us to devise a practical solution to the problem of general and complete disarmament in the course of our negotiations and to work out a programme for such disarmament.

We consider that, if we have now agreed on the need to work out basic principles of general and complete disarmament, the negotiations on this question should be continued after the recess on which we have agreed. During our further work on the drafting of basic principles of general and complete disarmament, everything in the Western Powers' document which is in harmony with that aim can be taken into consideration.

We also hope that during the recess the Western Powers will rethink and reweigh the important propositions contained in the "Basic Principles of General and Complete Disarmament" put forward by the socialist delegations (TNCD/4); for unless those were adopted it would of course be impossible to agree on this matter. If the Western Powers really intend - as they have declared in their document - to strive for the working-out of a programme of general and complete disarmament, further study of our "Basic Principles of General and Complete Disarmament" must convince them of the need to accept the whole series of provisions in the socialist countries' document.

These were our supplementary remarks on the document submitted by the Western delegations.

The first phase of our Committee's work is drawing to its close, and each of the delegations represented in the Committee will have to inform its Government of the results of that phase. The Soviet Delegation considers that, although we have not yet implemented the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly on general and complete disarmament, and have not even so far begun to work out a treaty on such disarmament, the discussions which have taken place in the Committee have still definitely been useful.

During our discussions the positions of the two sides have become more clear and we have come to understand one another better. On a number of matters, including the particular importance of nuclear disarmament, the possibility and necessity of agreeing on the reduction of conventional armed forces and armaments, and general questions of control, our positions have come closer to a certain extent, although on many important questions of general and complete disarmament serious differences continue to exist between us.
The Soviet delegation believes that the most important positive result of the discussions in our Committee is our agreement that the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly on general and complete disarmament must be the main basis of our work, that the implementation of that resolution demands the working-out of a concrete programme of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and that the first important step towards the working out of such a programme must be to agree on the basic principles of general and complete disarmament.

We consider that these positive results of our negotiations should be recorded before we announce a recess in the work of our Committee. In what form can we do this? It seems to us that the most suitable form would be a concluding communique of the session of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament, briefly describing the work done by our Committee between 15 March and 29 April 1960, the chief results of that work, and the direction we all consider that our future negotiations should take. We understand, from informal talks with some of the Western delegations, that they also think it would be useful to issue a communique dealing with these matters.

First of all, we think the communique should mention that the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament, established in accordance with the communique of the Foreign Ministers of France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America and the United Kingdom, dated 7 September 1959 (DC/144), considered documents and proposals and in particular the Soviet programme of general and complete disarmament (A/4219), the Western "Plan for General and Comprehensive Disarmament" (TNCD/3), the "Basic Principles of General and Complete Disarmament", submitted by the delegations of the socialist countries on 8 April 1960 (TNCD/4), and the proposal of the Western delegations on principles and conditions of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, submitted on 26 April 1960 (TNCD/5).

Further, we might say that during the discussions all delegations stated their positions and that upon a number of matters there appeared a certain reproachment of points of view. There should also be recorded the statement, not now contested, that after the recess the Committee should continue its negotiations on the working out of the basic principles and a programme of general and complete disarmament under effective international control in accordance with the United Nations General Assembly resolution of 20 November 1959 on general and complete disarmament (A/RES/1378(XIV)).
We ought, of course, to explain that we are suspending our work from 29 April to 7 June 1960 in connexion with the forthcoming Meeting of the Heads of Governments of the Four Powers in May.

Permit me now to read out a draft communique to that effect prepared by the delegations of the socialist countries:

"Communique of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament"

"The Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament, composed of the representatives of Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, Italy, Poland, Romania, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, established in accordance with the communique of the Foreign Ministers of France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America and the United Kingdom dated 7 September 1959, sat from 15 March to 29 April 1960 and held ...... meetings. The Committee considered:

"The 'Declaration of the Soviet Government on general and complete disarmament' of 18 September 1959, submitted by N.S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, for consideration by the Fourteenth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations;

"'A plan for general and comprehensive disarmament in a free and peaceful world', submitted by the delegations of Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States of America on 16 March 1960;

"'Basic principles of general and complete disarmament', a proposal by the delegations of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Polish People's Republic, the Romanian People's Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of Czechoslovakia, submitted on 8 April 1960;

"The 'Proposal by the delegations of Canada, the United States of America, France, Italy and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, concerning principles and conditions for general and complete disarmament under effective international control', submitted on 26 April 1960.

"During the discussions the representatives of the Governments participating in the Committee stated their positions on the questions under consideration, and there appeared a certain reinforcement of their points of view on some of these questions."
"In connexion with the Meeting of Heads of Governments of France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States and the United Kingdom to be held in May, the Committee decided to suspend its work from 29 April to 7 June 1960. The members of the Committee recognized the need to continue, after the recess, negotiations on the working out of the basic principles and a programme of general and complete disarmament under effective international control in accordance with the United Nations General Assembly resolution of 20 November 1959 on general and complete disarmament.

"The next regular meeting of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament will be held on 7 June 1960 at the Palais des Nations, Geneva."

This is the draft which we submit to the Committee for consideration.

We hope that this draft will be supported by all the delegations, because it seems to us to state objectively the first results of our work, and to contain nothing conflicting with the positions of the delegations participating in the Committee as they have been expressed recently, and particularly in the latest document submitted by the delegations of the Western States.

The adoption of this single communique would undoubtedly be a positive element in the development of negotiations on disarmament. It might prove useful at the forthcoming Meeting of Heads of Governments, at which, as we know, the most important problem of modern times, namely the disarmament problem, upon which we have worked during these last few weeks, will be subjected to most serious consideration.

Mr. MOCH (France) (translation from French): The task of the defence in any international, or even national, trial is always difficult when it speaks after a prosecutor as able as the one we have just heard.

However, I note that at the end of his statement, after having solidly built up his indictment, he did not object to the admission of extenuating circumstances. We are thus, in his eyes, only moderately guilty. I should like, as counsel for the defence, to take up point by point the arguments of the prosecution.

First of all, a question of general tone. In listening to Mr. Zorin just now, I constantly had the impression, which embarrasses me in this discussion, that the Communist argument is as follows:

We have undertaken to carry out general and complete disarmament.
Now, no plan other than the Soviet plan leads to general and complete disarmament.

Therefore -- the third term of the syllogism -- it is necessary to accept all the Soviet arguments, or proclaim that we do not want general and complete disarmament.

Well, that is not our view. The United Nations resolution, which I have before me once again, but of which I will spare you a further reading, referred to us en bloc all the resolutions and suggestions made in the United Nations and left us very wide discretion. I could have called the United Nations Secretary-General, who was present at the whole discussion in New York, as a witness of this, if he had not had to attend to other duties.

Subject to this general reservation, I now come to the various points of the indictment.

The first is that we are making no provision for destruction of the means of making war, since we retain the forces necessary for the internal security of States and their international obligations.

Our colleague Mr. Burns has already made an excellent reply to that objection. He has shown that the existence of "police or militia" forces, bearing a singular resemblance to armies, would enable a State which was populous, and would thus have such forces in sufficient quantities, to conquer weaker neighbours.

I myself said in my first statement that I did not attach great importance to words, and that if Mr. Zorin wished to call "militia" what we call an "army" I saw no objection, but that the essential point was to fix the force levels and armaments. I do not wish to revert to that subject at too great length. But I should, nevertheless, like to point out that, in the organization of the Soviet public authorities, as we know it, there are whole divisions, which incidentally are quite heavily armed -- they have tanks, for instance -- whole divisions which do not come under the Ministry of Defence (they used formerly to come under the MWD which is merely the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and they now certainly come under another organization). And they amount, according to our information, in addition to the police -- those seen in the streets of towns and plain clothes police, who are numerous in Soviet countries -- they amount, I say, to several hundred thousand men; at least 400,000, perhaps more.
I am not saying this as any kind of criticism of the Soviet Union, for I think the same can be observed in many countries, and it can be concluded that besides the police forces seen in the streets because they control the traffic, arrest belated drunkards on the pavement and fly to the help of people who call on them -- besides these police forces, there are, in many countries, police forces which are militarily organized, concentrated, formed into companies or battalions (the name matters little) and generally highly mobile, and that these forces -- which in the Soviet Union are large enough to form divisions -- are police or militia, and not armies.

Consequently, the difference is not great, and Mr. Zorin is wrong in saying -- I apologize for telling him so and I wish to say it pleasantly -- that we are not providing for destruction of the means of making war when we limit the remaining forces precisely to those forces of militia or police of which he speaks himself.

He added that the West was not renouncing the formation of yet other armed forces, in addition to those necessary for internal security. He was referring to the forces needed to fulfil obligations under the United Nations Charter, and I think he got things slightly confused. Our idea is not to form both national forces enabling States to fulfil their obligations under the United Nations Charter and, in addition, international police forces. I think we shall have to opt for one or the other. If a permanent international force exists, it seems clear to me -- though I have not consulted my Western colleagues -- that purely national forces will be limited to what is required for internal security. If, on the other hand, we decide that the international forces are to be composed -- as they can be now -- of national contingents called on by the Security Council, then Member States will have to maintain sufficient forces to meet a request by the Security Council. But I do not think the two should be added together to make our crime look even worse than it really is.

I now come to the third point of the indictment, which relates to foreign bases. I think I have already said what was necessary on this subject. I shall revert to some of the ideas I put forward the other day. I said -- and I repeat -- that when national forces have been reduced to meet the requirements we have specified, it is obvious that there will only be two possible locations for them: in their own country, to preserve its internal security, and, possibly, in international garrisons established by the United Nations, if Member States are
called on to fulfil the obligations to which I referred. But the stations established by the United Nations have nothing to do with the present bases, which are either national bases on foreign soil or inter-allied bases on foreign soil, but which are in no case United Nations bases.

Now, as I shall shortly be giving Mr. Zorin back the excellent advice he gave us, to re-read his proposal during our recess, and shall ask him to re-read ours, I beg him not to forget what I say now. In our minds, there is no question whatever of keeping bases on foreign soil, but only of providing for the eventuality that the United Nations may call for international occupation to preserve peace.

We have a small example of this — I apologize to General Burns for calling it small: it is small as regards area, but very great in significance, and Mr. Zorin can challenge it because his country refused to take part — in the small United Nations Emergency Force which is mounting guard in Gaza, Sharm-el-Sheikh, and the Sinai periphery. That is an example of a United Nations force which has succeeded in putting an end to local disturbances and in establishing some stability along a frontier. There may be further such examples in the future. I do not see how, in good faith, this can be assimilated to the present bases.

I come now to the fourth point of the indictment: the scope and nature of control. I know that Mr. Zorin is extremely distrustful. I do not blame him for it. The distrust he is showing us, we have often shown him. So we are quits. But this kind of espionage phobia, if he will allow me to say so, is perhaps the last sign of weakness of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. That it may perhaps, in the past, have had many things to hide — even subscribers' telephone numbers, and the town plan of Moscow (I was in Moscow when the first town plan was put on sale) — that at first, with all the existing deportation camps, this idea of secrecy and the concomitant and correlative idea of espionage may have grown out of all proportion, I am aware. I do not say that I understand it, but I am aware of it. But today, when the USSR is the second industrial power in the world — none of us disputes it — and is aspiring to become the first, today when it seems there are no longer any of these forced labour camps and the standard of living of the workers is rising fairly quickly, although it is below other Western standards of living, at least for the moment, that panic fear of espionage should fade and disappear.
I am well aware that the USSR now accepts an idea of control which is fairly extensive and is relatively close to what we ask ourselves, and to what we judge essential for restoring confidence. I realize that this represents appreciable progress, at which I personally am gratified. But I also realize that when we come to discuss the realities of control, we shall again for a long time be up against this espionage phobia and this religion of secrecy which subsists in the USSR.

To avoid prolonging this reply, I would prefer not to give an example, and yet an idea occurs to me. If we wish, at any given moment, to verify that reductions in armaments, for example, have been carried out, it will certainly be necessary to see what remains -- in other words to look around. And then we shall be told: "That is espionage. You want to know the locations of the equipment we are retaining; you must be content to verify that we have destroyed equipment, without determining what we are retaining, because that would be espionage". And then we shall reply: "If we do not verify what you have retained, how can we be sure that you are within the limits fixed?"

That is the kind of difficulty we shall have; but it is not a difference of principle.

Fifth objection: the progressive nature of the negotiations. The indictment here takes the following form: the Western document proposes the working out, not of general and complete disarmament, but of a series of particular agreements interspersed with endless discussions; that is an old approach.

Here we have a very serious problem. We have agreed to define, with you, the principles and the final goals of disarmament. We agree -- we have always agreed -- to define the first stages, the initial measures. A straight line of which the beginning and end are known can be drawn. But the course of disarmament is not a straight line: it is a wavy line. And we say we are unable, at the moment, to establish the exact course of this line, from the beginning to the end. But what is important is that we should agree on the terminal point, that is to say the final objectives, and that we should start along the road, that is to say, agree on the first stages that can be implemented at once.

If you want more, if you want everything, you run a great risk of getting less or getting nothing. It is still the old dispute between those who want the most,
and those who want a little at once. Let us say, evoking an historical memory, that it is the difference between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. Well, we are now ready to achieve something. Say in your hearts that we are Mensheviks -- you may not be entirely wrong where I am concerned -- but be sure to tell yourselves that it is impossible for the Western Governments at present to put down in black and white all the stages of disarmament from start to finish.

Thus the choice offered you during this period which will not be a period of rest, but a period of absence, is whether you agree that we should try together to determine the end of the road -- what it will lead to -- and the whole of its first stage, or whether, persisting in your wish to mark out the whole road on the ground, you risk finding yourselves with no surveyors for the work, and the road still in the planning stage, with no start made on building it. That is the choice now open to the delegates from the East.

In connexion with this question and our refusal to fix an overall time-limit -- for which the reasons are the same -- you have told us that our aversion to fixing such a time-limit is due to our refusal to draw up an overall programme for general and complete disarmament. If, by that, you mean we refuse at present to set down in detail all the successive stages, from beginning to end, of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, then you are quite right. Only you would be unfair if you did not recognize at the same time that we agree to do everything we consider possible and reasonable at present, namely, to determine the general principles and final objectives on the one hand, and the first stage on the other hand. Not being able to determine the intermediate stages, we naturally cannot set an overall time-limit for the operations as a whole.

Those are the answers I wish to make to the arguments of the prosecution. I ask it to reflect on them. It has doubtless concluded that some of the original charges were unfounded, as it has abandoned them. There was no reference in the final indictment to our refusal to undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. I am glad of that; and I take note of it. I think that, on that point, Mr. Zorin has understood the significance of our arguments. As a matter of fact I am wrong to say that, because he will immediately tell me that he forgot, and that he also requires that undertaking. If that is the case, I shall simply refer him to the legal, moral and military arguments I put forward the other day -- on 26 April -- when introducing our proposal (cf. TNCD/FV.29), and which I am not going into again, because I am aware that I have already spoken too long.
Fortunately, I find, in conclusion, an extenuating circumstance recognized in the attitude which I summarize as follows: "We do not reject the document; to reject it would be wrong, since we hope that during the recess the Western Powers will again carefully weigh the principles of the Eastern Powers." I ask Mr. Zorin, during this recess, to weigh the principles of the West, and the reasons we have put forward in the cases where we disagree. Mr. Zorin said that further study of the Soviet basic principles would not fail to convince us. I am convinced, on the contrary, that a study of the Western principles, of the statements which Mr. Ormsby-Gore and I made on the 26 April (ibid.), and of the additional explanations I have given today may perhaps finally overcome this immeasurable distrust which at present stands in the way of an understanding.

And now the conclusion: the communique Mr. Zorin read out to us. I should like to make a preliminary comment. I do not attach very great importance to documents of this kind when they do not contain any concrete facts. If it is thought absolutely necessary, for the press and public opinion, to issue a joint communique, I personally shall not oppose it. But I think that such a communique contributes nothing new. I would add that, after the experience of General Assembly resolution 1373 (XIV), which has been made to say so much more than some of us ever imagined it contained, you will understand that I wish to weigh, word by word, the draft communique which has been distributed to us, because I am determined not to allow myself, as the slang expression has it, to be "rail-roaded" into going further than I wish, or to let this communique be used against me later, as the United Nations resolution has been used against us. Of course, as I do not favour bilateral negotiations, official or semi-official, it is with my Western colleagues that I shall study this document in detail this evening. On behalf of the French delegation, I accordingly reserve any kind of opinion until we have scrutinized each sentence, with an electronic microscope at least. What I fear is, that if we do not say that we agree to all the terms of the communique, we may embark on a discussion that will extend beyond tomorrow, which is the day set for our last meeting. That is exactly all I can say at present about the document proposed by Mr. Zorin, and I am sure he will understand and approve of my reserve.
The CHAIRMAN (United States) I have one other speaker on my list, Mr. Martino. After he has completed his statement I intend to speak in my capacity as the representative of the United States.

Mr. MARTINO (Italy) (translation from French): In my remarks yesterday, I stressed the importance which the Italian delegation attaches, not only to the formulation of basic principles necessary for making a start towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control, but also to the possibility of an agreement on initial measures, even if limited, which would furnish evidence of goodwill on either side, and thus establish and progressively strengthen trust between States. It is precisely this lack of trust which is at present preventing us from reaching agreement quickly on a plan for general and complete disarmament. When our Eastern colleagues refuse to consider the possibility of initial concrete measures of disarmament, that is clearly because they are afraid those measures might really be final and not initial measures, and that the Western Powers are trying by this means to avoid any concrete approach to the greater problem of total disarmament. But in so doing — in refusing to consider initial concrete measures — our Eastern colleagues are, in their turn, arousing our suspicions and justifying our fear that they do not really wish to reach agreement on a programme of true disarmament, but only to engage in political propaganda.

Can all this be avoided? Is it possible to some extent to get rid of the distrust which is poisoning our negotiations?

For these reasons I wish to ask my colleagues kindly to give very careful and favourable consideration to the matters which the representative of the United States of America is going to put to us in a few moments.

I would add that the Italian delegation is favourably disposed to the proposal, just made by the representative of the Soviet Union, that our work should be concluded by a final statement in the form of a communiqué. To this end, we would consider it essential to appoint a small committee composed of one member from each delegation, to prepare a text to be submitted to us, since it would obviously be impossible for us to approve or reject the draft submitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union without discussion.
The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I will speak at some length this morning so that, as we come into our closing days, if there be any lingering doubt as to the position of my Government I hope it will be dispelled. Before starting, however, I should like to make three short comments with respect to Mr. Zorin's remarks this morning.

In the early part of his remarks he asked whether we were prepared to work out a programme looking towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The answer is "Yes". And I think I can speak without consulting all my Western colleagues. The second question was whether we are prepared to implement it. And I give you the same answer. There is one comment I understood, and I hope I find it in his statement, although I may well take it out of context -- I hope I do not -- that is that there is no practical value in entering into lengthy discussions and definitions of the final goal which is so far away.

Now I will turn to the remarks which I prepared and intended to make. As we conclude the first stage of our work and adjourn for the recess, it is with a feeling of profound sadness and disappointment that I have reviewed our proceedings of the past seven weeks in terms of the task assigned to us. I see little in these proceedings that would give a basis for the hopeful communique which has been proposed this morning by Mr. Zorin. I am sure that when this Conference started on 15 March we all shared the high hope that it might constitute a turning point in the postwar history of disarmament, a history which we all know has been replete with failures. The resolution which was unanimously adopted and approved by all the Members of the United Nations expressed this hope. Even Prime Minister Khrushchev in his opening-day greetings to this Conference emphasized that we should "work out within the shortest possible time" -- what? Principles? No; rather "practical ways of ... putting into effect the recommendation of the General Assembly". (TNCD/1) He further said: "The Soviet Government has given instructions to its representative on the Ten Nation Committee to contribute in every possible way to fruitful work by the Committee" (Ibid.). What I assume Mr. Khrushchev meant by that was that we work out in the shortest possible time practical ways of putting the recommendation into effect. However, by rigidly insisting on general and complete disarmament of all nations everywhere in a specified and unrealistic time-period, it seems to us that the Soviet delegation has neither sought practical ways to carry out the
recommendation of the General Assembly nor has it, as instructed by Mr. Khrushchev, contributed — in his words — "in every possible way to fruitful work by the Committee".

What is the present Soviet approach to disarmament? Let us look at the approach as set forth in the Soviet plan. It recommends — and I refer to Mr. Zorin’s remarks at our second meeting — that all armed forces be disbanded, all armaments eliminated and all military production brought to an end within four years. The injunction from the United Nations General Assembly was that measures leading towards the disarmament goal be agreed upon within the shortest possible time, not that the entire disarmament process be carried out in an impractically short and unrealistic period. That was not what the resolution said and it was certainly not what the Members of the United Nations intended, because they could have been more explicit had they so intended, and they could have adopted the plan put forward by Mr. Khrushchev, as in some of our earlier meetings it was indicated that they had. Mr. Zorin has said that such a programme of general and complete disarmament "would ... create serious technical problems, inasmuch as States nowadays possess powerful and large armed forces and armaments, the elimination of which would demand a certain amount of time." (TNCD/PV.2, page 15)

He also made another admission:

"Similar difficulties" — he said — "would be experienced on the political plane for under the conditions of distrust still prevailing between States, no State obviously would agree to dispense immediately with all its armed forces and armaments." (ibid.)

What are we to believe? Even in Mr. Zorin’s own words doubt is raised in the mind of any reasonable person whether the Soviet four-year plan is a practical plan, but again this morning we are told that unless we accept this unrealistic timetable we indicate no desire for disarmament. I wonder whether any of us here at this table really believe that. I fear that the only conclusion to be drawn from this is that the Soviet plan for disarmament, although undoubtedly not so intended, can only be a deceptive propaganda device to lead the mass of people to believe that complete disarmament is possible overnight, and this is a tragic deception.

Now what is their "fall-back" position? Inasmuch as the plan itself does not provide a practical approach to achieving agreement on measures leading towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control, we must look
elsewhere. We look at the fine print of what Mr. Khrushchev has said on a number of occasions, and here he seems to offer a somewhat more realistic approach. He has said that if it is clear that the problem of complex complete disarmament cannot be solved immediately there is another solution -- initial steps, on which we might more easily agree, leading to our disarmament goal. For such statements I refer you to his article written in last autumn's issue of the magazine Foreign Affairs, to his speech at the United Nations on 18 September 1959 (cf. A/PV.799) and to his speech before the Supreme Soviet on 31 October 1959. I shall quote from only one. In his article in Foreign Affairs he said it had become clear to him that it was very difficult "to solve the complex disarmament problem immediately". He then went on to say:

"Let us concentrate our attention on those problems which lend themselves most easily to a solution. Let us undertake initial partial measures on matters concerning which the views of the different parties have been brought closer together."

This is the view of my own Government, and I believe it reflects the views of my colleagues of the West.

While we have grave reservations about the particular measures which Mr. Khrushchev went on to propose, reservations of which the Soviet side is well aware, the approach of beginning with initial measures is the one my delegation advocates. Let us immediately turn our attention to those initial measures, to those matters, to use Mr. Khrushchev's words, "concerning which the views of the different parties have been brought closer together". This is what I believe the United Nations meant when it said that "measures leading towards the goal ... should be "worked out in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time." (A/RES/1378 (XIV))

On 18 September, when Mr. Khrushchev presented the Soviet plan to the United Nations, he expressed a significant afterthought, as though he well understood how unrealistic the Soviet plan was. I need not quote his exact words. We all recall his offer to move on to a discussion of the Soviet version of partial measures if, as he put it, the Western Powers were not prepared to embark upon general and complete disarmament in accordance with his plan -- which he then must have known full well was the case. The manoeuvre here is plain for anyone to see. Knowing its plan to be unrealistic, the Soviet Union wishes to gain a
quick and easy propaganda advantage by trying to persuade the world that because the West opposes the Soviet plan it therefore does not support the United Nations resolution. Now the next manoeuvre is already apparent. If the West will not make this admission, as the Soviet Union knows it will not, then the Soviet Union will conclude that the West is not in favour of general and complete disarmament. Then there will be a trumpeting of concessions to the West and eventually -- and I say, hopefully, trusting it will be at an early date -- they will move on to partial measures; not those partial measures that were indicated specifically in Mr. Khrushchev's plan but to those described in those other, happier words to the effect that the Soviet side would be willing to discuss any partial or initial measures.

I repeat again here that my Government voted for the United Nations resolution and supports that resolution and its three principal ideas: first, that the question of general and complete disarmament is the most important question facing the world today; second, that governments should make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of this problem; and third, that measures leading towards the goal should be worked out in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time. Let us proceed with this task without delay when we return in June, and put aside the unrealistic, impracticable and obstructive plan of the Soviet side.

I now turn to a discussion of the Western plan and the Soviet response. I agree with Mr. Khrushchev when he says that we should concentrate our attention on those problems which most easily lend themselves to solution and that we should then undertake the negotiation of those initial, early concrete measures. Let us by all means do that. The day before yesterday the Western delegations submitted a statement of the general conditions to govern the fulfilment of a programme of general and complete disarmament under effective international control (TNCD/5). This paper reflects the basic considerations which nations must recognize and must be willing to accept if the goals expressed in the United Nations General Assembly resolution are to be achieved and not merely to be paid homage to. The thoughts set forth in this paper can serve as a guide to all of us.

So that there may be no misunderstanding, I wish to make it clear that the purpose of the United States delegation in elaborating its understanding of the term "general and complete disarmament" has been solely to induce the Soviet side
to enter into discussion, negotiation and agreement on those initial measures which are essential to the attainment of the goal, as Mr. Khrushchev has himself recognized so many times. It has been made in response to the constant Soviet insistence that we should advise them in more detail of the meaning which we attach to these words. We do not believe that any useful purpose would be served by entering now into a discussion which would have, as its result, the reconciliation of our views in this regard. This would only divert us from our task of arriving in the shortest possible time at an agreement on those initial measures which are essential to attain the goal -- whether it be defined in Soviet terms or in our terms.

I speak of those initial measures which would bring about a reduction of tension, as a result of which agreement could then be reached on those final measures which would result in the reduction of armed forces to agreed levels and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction which cause such concern to peoples everywhere. Attention must be given to those concrete initial measures which lend themselves most easily to solution. These are spelled out in the Western plan of 16 March 1960 (TNCD/3), with its conditions and safeguards -- I repeat, conditions and safeguards -- that my Government will require to precede any substantial disarmament measures. I shall not labour the point that my Government will require these to precede any substantial disarmament measures. I shall not labour the point that my Government will require those conditions and safeguards, because I do not believe that there is any doubt about that in the mind of anyone here or in the world at large.

First, there is the prohibition against placing into orbit or stationing in outer space vehicles carrying weapons of mass destruction, as an initial step towards ensuring the use of outer space for peaceful purposes only. This proposal, if accepted, would have tremendous importance for the future of mankind in that it would have as its objective -- and, I hope, result -- denial to all nations of the use of outer space for military purposes. We all know that satellites exist today. So far as we know, none has, as yet, carried weapons of mass destruction, and it is to prevent this that we believe we should turn our first attention here -- to prevent the situation from getting out of hand and becoming uncontrollable.

What has been the Soviet response? Mr. Zorin has said that the Soviet Union has always been opposed to the extension of the armaments race to outer space.
We agree. But then he adds that this must be conditioned on the liquidation of foreign military bases. This is a Soviet way of saying, "We are not interested in doing anything about outer space". Mr. Zorin knows well -- for reasons which I need not elaborate -- that my Government is not prepared, as a first step, to eliminate what the Soviet side choses to call "foreign bases" -- actually, they are friendly to us, they are not foreign. Further, apparently he does not understand the Western proposal, as he says that what we are proposing is the prohibition of intercontinental ballistic missiles. We do not include in our outer-space measure the prohibition of intercontinental ballistic missiles. It is a separate matter, and it is not contemplated within that particular part of the plan.

Second, there is the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapon purposes and the transfer of agreed quantities of fissionable materials from past production to non-weapon uses in order to halt the further increase and to begin the reduction of present stocks of nuclear weapons as an initial measure towards the final elimination of those weapons. I have tried in those relatively few words to spell out a very large concept, and to do it in a way which I trust will finally dispel any misunderstanding about whether we are prepared to stop the production of material for use in weapons and are prepared to transfer material contained in initial stocks to peaceful uses, as an initial step towards the final elimination of those weapons. If anyone continues to say after this that we are not interested in an early reduction of weapons, that we are not interested in the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, I shall not bother to answer, because if I have not been able to make the point clear now, no further efforts by me would add to its clarification.

Mr. Zorin has responded that the reduction of these stockpiles by international agreement is "devoid of practical content as a measure of disarmament". I shall not comment further.

Third, there is prior notification of proposed launching of missiles as an immediate step to reduce the risk of war by accident or miscalculation. The primary purpose of this notification is to reduce the danger that missile firings conducted for experimental or for training purposes might be mistakenly interpreted as a sign of hostile action and thus, against the will of all of us, trigger off a nuclear war. Such a measure would go far to help reduce the fear of military preparations carried out in secret, which is one of the prime causes of existing international tension.
(The Chairman, United States)

What is the Soviet reaction? Mr. Khrushchev, on 14 January, said that his Government wishes to do everything possible "to develop rocket armaments and to take a leading position in the field". Mr. Zorin, after rejecting this as not being a disarmament measure, on 21 April stated that we were now proposing to prohibit only intercontinental ballistic missiles and were thus striving to achieve a unilateral military advantage (cf. TNCD/FV.26, page 27).

There is nothing in the first two parts of our plan which calls for the prohibition of intercontinental ballistic missiles. All we ask is that a beginning be made to control this means of delivering nuclear weapons.

Fourth, there is the establishment of initial force level ceilings of 2.5 million for the United States and the USSR and force level ceilings for all militarily significant nations to come into effect simultaneously with the establishment of further force level ceilings of 2.1 million for the United States and the USSR, as an initial step towards the reduction of national armed forces to levels required for internal security, and the fulfilment of the obligations which we have all undertaken under the Charter of the United Nations.

I shall not repeat the Soviet response to this, as it is well known.

Fifth, there is the deposit of agreed quantities and types of modern armaments in internationally supervised storage depots as an initial step -- I repeat: an initial step -- towards the final reduction of armaments to the levels required for internal security and the fulfilment of United Nations Charter obligations.

What is the answer? Mr. Zorin, on 23 April, rejected these measures as not being very significant and not being real disarmament measures. Instead, he called them a pretext for setting up a wide range of control (TNCD/FV.25, page 11).

The Soviet side then went on to make much of the unilateral reductions brought about because of the demands of its own economic system and the change in the nature of weapons. Mr. Zorin perhaps indicated his own evaluation of the unilateral steps which have been taken by the Soviet side when, with some pride, he pointed to the destruction of a single cruiser -- but we have been destroying cruisers and battleships for the last fifteen years.

Sixth, there is the establishment of appropriate measures to give participating States greater protection against surprise attack as an initial step for the achievement of an open world in which all nations are safeguarded against surprise attack.
It is well known that President Eisenhower is keenly interested in the development of such safeguards as a means of reducing tension and making the world a more secure place. His "open skies" proposal made at the Summit Conference in 1955 was an offer to open the entire United States to internationally-supervised aerial inspection if only the Soviet Union would do the same. But the Soviet Union, with its obsessive secrecy and apparent fear of openness, never accepted the offer, which still stands.

These, then, are the key concrete measures which lead towards the goal in which my Government believes, and which we believe offer a basis for consideration in carrying out our task. If Soviet intransigence about discussing these or similar measures, in such terms as they may desire, continues it is impossible for me to see how we are going to make progress in fulfilling the task given to us by our Governments -- to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of the problem and to attain the goal in the shortest possible time. This is the black side.

I would now like to look to the future, and say that I hope we may see a change. I sincerely hope that future prospects for our negotiations still hold the promise of moving forward on the task assigned to us. While the remarks I made earlier with respect to the negative attitude of the Soviet side are unfortunately true, it is likewise true that Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Zorin have left the door open to a realistic consideration of those concrete measures which will lead us towards our mutual disarmament goals. This fact, itself, is an augury of promise, an augury of progress.

Almost all the partial measures referred to in the statement made by Mr. Khrushchev on 18 September centre around one geographical location, Western Europe. However, as I indicated earlier, Mr. Khrushchev, in that same speech stated that he considers that the 10 May 1955 proposals constitute a basis for agreement at this time. Mr. Khrushchev also indicated in the statement to which I alluded earlier that:

"The Soviet Government is prepared to come to terms with other States on appropriate partial measures relating to disarmament and the strengthening of security." (A/PV.799, para. 91)

Thus, as I have indicated, the so-called Soviet plan, the specific partial measures which are set forth in the 18 September speech, do not, in our view, present a reasonable basis for accord.

There is in this statement room for vast hope. We would not call these measures "partial measures", but we accept that terminology. We would look on them as initial measures which might lead us down the road to the attainment of our goal.
The primary question now — after a review of the proceedings to date and of the other Soviet pronouncements in the field of disarmament — is, which are the concrete measures that seem to hold most hope for agreement? Among these I suggest protection against surprise attack, reduction of forces and armaments, control of outer space, cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapon purposes, and the reduction of nuclear stockpiles upon that cessation.

I would hasten to add that I do not by this enumeration indicate that my Government is not prepared to discuss any of the measures contained in the first two stages of the Western plan. I am only expressing a hope, based on the discussions here, that these four measures may be the areas into which we can first move and with respect to which we may first be able to obtain agreement.

I shall not again labour the point — I have already laboured it — that all of this is subject to adequate verification, international verification, mutual verification, verification by both sides — applying equally to one side and the other — of any measures, whether the ones I have mentioned, ones that the Soviet side chooses or some others. There will be no hope if adequate verification is not accepted.

I recognize that Mr. Zorin has rejected the Western plan as not meeting Soviet requirements for a programme for general and complete disarmament. We have done the same with respect to his plan. This does not mean that we have lost hope, and I, therefore, dare to hope that it does not mean that the Soviet side has lost hope and that we can still move on to attain this noble goal by means acceptable to all of us. When we do this, when we move on to a discussion of specific measures, I feel sure that we shall find that some of the measures in the Western plan and some of the measures in the various Soviet plans are not too far apart to be reconciled.

If we only follow this course after the Summit Conference, our work will have some hope of success. We shall have begun the execution of the task assigned us by the General Assembly resolution. We shall then have begun to realize the high hopes with which this disarmament conference started. Its dedication to achieving the aspirations of all mankind will mark a turning point in the long post-war history of lost opportunities and successive failures.

As President Eisenhower said in his message to me at the beginning of the Conference:

"We must not be pessimistic because of the lack of success in past disarmament negotiations. Nor should we necessarily expect immediate, dramatic and far-reaching strides, although we would certainly welcome such progress. Rather, it should be our objective in these negotiations to contribute by carefully-balanced, phased and safeguarded arms control
agreements to the ultimate objective of a secure, free and peaceful world
in which international disputes will be settled in accordance with the
principles of the United Nations Charter." (TNCD/2)

Mr. NASZKOWSKI (Poland) (translation from French): I should like to preface
the few remarks I intend to make today by telling the representative of France,
Mr. Moch, that his assertion this morning, that anything not identical with the wording
of the Soviet plan is unacceptable to the socialist countries, is completely unjust.
We have repeatedly given proof of our constructive attitude towards any proposition
in keeping with the mandate entrusted to our Committee, namely to work out a programme
of general and complete disarmament. The Western Powers have in fact acknowledged
this mandate in their last document. The speech made today by the representative of
the Soviet Union, Mr. Zorin, is further proof of our constructive attitude.

It is difficult for me to understand the somewhat impatient remarks made yesterday,
and even today, about the impasse in which we are supposed to be as a result of the
attitude adopted by the socialist States in regard to the Western proposal. Some of
our Western colleagues obviously have short memories. I should therefore like to
recall the Western delegations' reaction to the draft basic principles of general and
complete disarmament which we introduced on 8 April (TNCD/4). Without putting forward
any substantive argument, the Western representatives rejected the draft submitted by
the five socialist States. The delegations of the socialist countries, on the other
hand, have paid the closest attention to the proposal submitted by Mr. Moch on behalf
of the Western Powers. They are discussing it and, as Mr. Zorin pointed out this
morning, they are not rejecting it. Our criticism of certain points in this proposal
is no reason why its authors should reply so irritably, particularly in view of their
reaction to our draft.

I should now like to make a few remarks about the actual document submitted by
the Western delegations.

As Mr. Zorin has today very rightly pointed out, we should not with satisfaction
that the Western delegations, who not so long ago were categorically rejecting the
very idea of working out principles of general and complete disarmament, and who went
so far as to say that this idea ran counter to General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV),
have recognized the usefulness and necessity of reaching agreement on the principles
of disarmament. It is much to be regretted that the Western Powers did not reach
this conviction earlier.
I should like to say a little more about one point in the document which has been submitted to us, namely the question of ensuring respect for international law in a disarmed world. The representative of France has again defended this point today. The question is not new; it has been dealt with very clearly in the Soviet plan for general and complete disarmament and in the document on the basic principles of such disarmament drafted by the socialist States. I myself devoted a recent speech to this question.

We have repeatedly explained that maintenance of peace, and not only in an armed world, is a duty of the United Nations, an international organization which has been in existence for some fifteen years. There is no need to create a new rival organization of the kind mentioned in the preamble to the Western delegations' document, even if that organization were to function within the framework of the United Nations. What matters above all is that the United Nations Charter be respected, and that all material means of violating the main provisions of the Charter relating to maintenance of the security of nations should be abolished.

So long as armed forces exist, the danger that they may be used will also exist, and consequently the danger of war. That, not the structure of the international organization or the machinery through which it will function, is the essence of the problem. That is why we are asking for the programme of general and complete disarmament to be put into effect as quickly as possible.

That is also why we consider inadequate the reduction or limitation of force levels and armaments proposed by the Western Powers. In explaining the Western document and anticipating our opposition to this point, Mr. Moch stated that it mattered little whether one spoke of internal police forces or armed forces. He asserted this again today. In his view the difference is only one of words. At the same time, however, he recognized that there is a fundamental difference of function between these forces. There we have it! There is a very substantial difference between contingents of police or militia, strictly limited and having exclusively internal functions, and the maintenance by States of armed forces which would have to carry out duties supposed to devolve from the United Nations Charter.

The argument advanced by the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, that the police will have more powerful armaments than the armies of 1812 is totally unconvincing. First, we are not living at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and the arms then adequate for aggression would be inadequate today. Secondly,
the decisive point is the functions of the particular body. The functions of the police or militia differ from those of the army so widely that there is no need to spell out the difference.

That is why Mr. Moch's argument that we are calling for the abolition of ministries of defence and general staffs while maintaining ministries of internal affairs and so-called police general staffs is no more convincing. Moreover, his speech implies that the Western States are anxious to maintain armed forces in the form of international forces which should even protect certain undefined zones. Would this by any chance mean maintaining bases on certain territories, but in another form?

It is obviously possible that even in a world freed from armaments there might be offenders against peace and international law, although their violations could no longer, by the force of circumstances, be armed violation. But there is already provision for this contingency in the Charter, which permits a number of non-military measures for the purpose of compelling a State or a group of States to respect the principles of life in peace.

The draft principles submitted by the socialist States provide that, if a State attempts to circumvent or violate the treaty on general and complete disarmament, the question of such a violation would be immediately considered by the Security Council and the United Nations General Assembly for the institution of measures against the violator in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. These would obviously be non-military measures, for in a completely disarmed world there could naturally be no logical place for any armed force under any label. I indicated on 31 March (cf. TNCD/PV.13) the peaceful measures which in our view would be quite sufficient and effective to call to order any lawbreaker, and I do not want to repeat these now.

These are some of the reflexions which occurred to me in studying the proposals of the five Western States and comparing them with the draft principles submitted by the socialist States. That is one of the reasons why we criticize these proposals; but we hope to be able to resume discussion on this topic after the recess.

For the time being we believe that the best method is to conclude this stage of our work by adopting a final communique the draft of which was submitted today by the representative of the USSR. This draft communique does not really contain any controversial matter, despite the distrust it has aroused in Mr. Moch.
I hope, however, that after the detailed study of this text that he promised to undertake, Mr. Moch will be in agreement with me. It is self-evident that the draft communiqué on the Committee’s work is not, as its title indicates, a document intended to replace the substantive decisions which it has not yet been possible to embody in other documents. It is a text which should indicate the present state of our work and give real information about this state of affairs. We have worded this information in our draft communiqué concisely, but objectively and quite uncontroversially; and I do not think it would be quite useless, as Mr. Moch has said.

Mr. MOCH (France) (translation from French): Since I spoke in reply to Mr. Zorin and before Mr. Naszkowski spoke, Mr. Naszkowski could find some answers beforehand, particularly on the retention of bases, about which I spoke at length, and I regret that he did not take them into account.

When he said that nineteenth century arms would not be adequate to start a war today, that is true so long as other arms exist. But in a world in which armies were reduced to the level required for internal security we should be in roughly the same situation as in the nineteenth century, and the arms in the hands of the police would be sufficient to start an invasion.

I would add that, when a complete distinction is made between the army and the police, it is forgotten that in a great many cases, unfortunately, the army has had to intervene with the police. Just I mention the names of certain cities – Poznan, East Berlin and, alas, Budapest?

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The Soviet delegation would like to make a few comments on the statement we have just heard from Mr. Moch and on Mr. Eaton’s lengthy statement.

We might perhaps have let pass some of the remarks contained in these statements; but we are approaching the end of our work and an attempt has been made in them, particularly in Mr. Eaton’s statement, to present a general appraisal of our position as well as of that of the Western States. We therefore feel we should revert to this matter and reply to some of the assertions with which we cannot agree.

We will begin with Mr. Moch’s statement. I will not speak in any detail now about his arguments relating to our criticism of the Western proposal. Some of
these arguments have already been answered by Mr. Nazskowski, the Polish representative, who spoke before me, and we ourselves have answered others in our statement of this morning and in our previous comments, and so have other representatives of the socialist countries, notably the representative of Romania who spoke yesterday, and also those of Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. Furthermore, since we do not actually intend today to resume detailed discussion of the proposal submitted by the Western States, I do not think there is much point in dwelling now on all the aspects of the remarks made by Mr. Moch in defence of the Western Power's position.

I would merely like to ask the Committee to notice this. First of all, Mr. Moch for some reason gave his speech the form of a speech by counsel for the defence, and represented my statement as a speech for the prosecution. For myself I must decline the role of prosecutor; and as for Mr. Moch, I cannot help wondering why he should be a defendant. Is he guilty of anything, I wonder? I feel bound to ask, because Mr. Moch's whole speech was constructed as a speech for the defence, on the footing that someone was guilty of something. I am only asking. I do not want to suggest an answer, but I cannot help asking. Mr. Moch seemed to have some reason for doing this.

Secondly, I want to say that the road which the Western representatives invite us to take, as described by Mr. Moch, is obviously one that does not suit us.

Indeed, Mr. Moch said that the road towards the final goal of general and complete disarmament must for some reason be not straight but curved. But why precisely should it be curved? Why do you want to take byways instead of the straight road?

In this connexion Mr. Moch referred to certain disputes in the history of our Party, such as our disputes with the Mensheviks, whom he actually mentioned. That reminded me of Lenin's remarks about the road which the Mensheviks and the economists proposed we should take in the early stages of the revolutionary struggle then unfolding in Russia.

Lenin said the Mensheviks proposed that we should move in a slow, timid zigzag. That is something like what Mr. Moch is now proposing we should do: first, go slow; secondly, go not in a straight line but in a zigzag.

Mr. Moch further told us that he proposes to determine the end and the beginning of the road for us but does not want to define its intervening course. That, of course, is not a road we can accept.
To begin with, the end itself is not sufficiently clearly or precisely defined. We have already spoken of this, and in our further discussions of the "Basic Principles" we shall have to present a clearer picture of our aim than that contained in the Western Power's proposal.

About the beginning of the road I will speak presently. The Western representatives suggest that we should simply not fill in the intervening course of the road; in other words that we should not define the main stages of the road from start to destination. What does this mean? Are we going to jump over this middle part? Are we going to define the beginning, define the end and leave the middle blank? This, of course, is not a programme of general and complete disarmament. This is just a few bits and pieces of a programme.

Moreover, a road of which the intermediate stages cannot be seen is like a course not charted beforehand; but this must always be done if a destination is to be reached. If the course is plotted like that, the ship can never reach the desired haven. It will wander courseless even if it makes a correct departure. Ships are never navigated like that. The course is always plotted beforehand, the ports of call are known, and the helmsman steers with open eyes, not blindfold.

And when we speak of so important a political problem as general disarmament we certainly cannot set out to reach our goal blindfold. We must work out at least the main stages of this programme, so as to know the whole road which we are to take. Otherwise we should look like children playing blind man's buff rather than statesmen who wish to define in advance the course of their work in order to reach a great historic goal.

Just one last remark.

Mr. Moch said that something must be achieved, but that we wanted to achieve everything.

Mr. Eton said much the same thing. And as Mr. Moch has reminded us of the historic disputes in Russia about how a revolution should be prepared and how the fight for the people's interest generally should be waged; I must say that this lesson of history does not support either Mr. Moch's argument or the method he advocates. It was precisely the petty-bourgeois parties - the Mensheviks and Social-Revolutionaries, who proposed that "something" should be achieved. All they wanted were elementary bourgeois-democratic reforms.

The Bolsheviks, with Lenin at their head, proposed that a course be followed through a bourgeois-democratic revolution to a socialist revolution.
And what the Mensheviks and Social-Revolutionaries proposed at the time was refuted by the course of history. The Bolsheviks proved to be right. They set themselves a great objective, the grand goal of socialist revolution, and history proved that they were justified.

If that was true of Russia, of a single country, why should it not also be true of great international problems? Why should we achieve only "something", instead of setting ourselves the more ambitious task of general and complete disarmament? Why should we not set about carrying out that task? All the more so, as the representatives of the Western Powers have now come to realise the need for stating in their draft plan, too, that they are in favour of a programme of general and complete disarmament, of the goal laid down in the General Assembly resolution. If you yourselves consider that it is feasible to lay down this goal, why do you not want to achieve the fullness of it? Why do you want to work only for something short of it? This is incomprehensible to us.

My general conclusion is that what Mr. Moch has just said in his statement, and what Mr. Eaton has said in greater detail - or I would say rather more frankly - shows that, unfortunately, our disputes over even the most fundamental issues are not yet finished, although it would seem that during the seven weeks for which we have been working here we have already clarified many points and it looks as though we have reached unanimous understanding on many matters.

I turn to Mr. Eaton's statement.

Mr. Eaton's statement seems to me to come rather belatedly, because he has unfortunately taken no part in our discussions on these general matters during practically all our Committee's work. But now in the last stage, he has again raised a question which seemed to have been settled already in the course of our discussions, settled even by the submission by the Western Powers' proposal. We even expressed our gratification that that question seemed to have been settled. However, as Mr. Moch says, we are cautious people. That is why, in our statement today, to be on the safe side, we said it seems to have been settled. And we were right, because Mr. Eaton's statement shows that, so far as his own position at least is concerned, the fundamental issue with which this Committee has been faced from the outset and on which we have spent so much time, has not yet been settled.
Mr. Eaton asked once again: why did we come here? With what aims did we come here, and what is our main task? He has reverted to this question. I did not want to go back to it, but since he has done so, we must do likewise.

Mr. Eaton mentioned N.S. Khrushchev's statement and the directives given to the Soviet delegation by the Soviet Government, going even so far as to say that the Soviet delegation has gone against the Soviet Government's instructions. That, I believe, is our own family affair. We shall somehow or other come to an understanding with our Government about all these questions, but since he has raised the question in that way, I will take the liberty of reminding him of the directive we received from our Government, about which, incidentally, it made a public statement. Mr. Eaton read out a phrase from the letter addressed to our Committee by Mr. Khrushchev, but for some reason did not complete the sentence he began. He read out:

"The Soviet Government has given instructions to its representative ..."

—I quote from Mr. Khrushchev's letter, which is in our Committee's archives—

"... has given instructions to its representative on the Ten Nations Committee to contribute in every possible way to fruitful work by the Committee ..."

(TNCD/PV.1, page 27)

That is what Mr. Eaton read out. But that same sentence went on as follows, even without a full stop between——

"... and to strive for the speediest preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament". (ibid.)

Why did you not read that out too, Mr. Eaton? Because it does not fit in with your ideas? All the same, you ought not to speak about the directive we received, which was the subject of a public statement, and quote only the first part of it, saying nothing about the second part. The Soviet Government's instructions were that we should make every effort, — "to contribute in every possible way to fruitful work by the Committee, and to strive for the speediest preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament." (ibid.)

Mr. Eaton said -- or could have been understood to say -- that he agreed with the instructions given to our delegation by the Soviet Government, because he said that the United States delegation, too, was striving for the same thing, whereas the Soviet delegation had departed from those instructions.
No, Mr. Eaton, we have strictly adhered to the Soviet Government's directive, and, for better or for worse, have worked for a treaty on general and complete disarmament. What has prevented us from achieving results? The position taken up by the United States and the other Western delegations, because they came out against a treaty on general and complete disarmament. This is a fact that is enshrined in the archives of our Committee, and every unbiased reader of these archives will confirm that this is so. Even now, you are really against a treaty on general and complete disarmament. It is only a pity that you should have said so so late in the day.

Furthermore, you have subjected, so to say, to fresh, additional criticism the very plan put forward by the Soviet Government — by the same Mr. Khrushchev to whom you referred and who, in your view, issued the right instructions. But that same Khrushchev seems for some reason to have put forward the wrong plan for general and complete disarmament. Moreover, whereas you previously criticized certain provisions of that plan on the grounds that they were impracticable, or because they did not suit you for some reason or other, whereas the United States delegation has done very little by way of specific analysis of the plan — other delegations have done more in this respect — whereas that was your earlier line of argument, you have now, it seems to me, taken a somewhat different position. Today you said that it was simply a propaganda plan.

I should like to remind you, Mr. Eaton, that similar criticisms were made at the beginning of the discussions in the General Assembly. Immediately after the plan had been submitted, some delegates tried to pick on the plan and criticize it. But I must admit that, to their credit, the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the other great Powers — and not those of the great Powers alone, but all who spoke subsequently — rejected this approach. They said that the plan was a serious proposal that ought to be studied.

Mr. Eisenhower, your President, too, proposed that this serious proposal be studied, precisely because it was a serious proposal. But that was in the autumn of 1959, that is, at a time when you could not openly oppose a plan for general and complete disarmament, when you could not dismiss it on the simple pretext that it is propaganda. What is more, you were obliged to vote for the idea of general and complete disarmament, and this idea, as N.S. Khrushchev recently said, is the essence, the pith of our proposal submitted to the General Assembly on 18 September 1959.
Why do you now — eight whole months after the General Assembly — revert to these utterly mistaken, I would even say frivolous, arguments which were rejected by your own representatives, by the most eminent statesmen in the United States, the moment the plan was submitted? Why do you now want to dismiss it with what I may call a hackneyed phrase about propaganda? I think it is because you have no more serious arguments. And when there are no serious arguments, some sort of ease must be made. An apparently telling argument for the general public is: this is Soviet propaganda. But surely this is already out of date. Soviet proposals can no longer be countered on this old ground. They have won an acknowledged place in the history of man's progress, and rest on a surer foundation than some representatives imagine.

Mr. Eaton went on to speak of the unrealistic nature of this plan, or, more strictly speaking, of its unrealistic time-limits as one of the factors on which he based his conclusion. But, if you may regard the time-limit we proposed as unrealistic, we have already asked you to tell us what you consider to be a realistic one. This you have not done. Why? Not because you can name a realistic time-limit but do not want to do so, but because you are against any time-limit. What you want — and I make so bold as to say so — is to get out of your difficulty by recognizing in general terms the need of a move towards the goal of general and complete disarmament without assuming any obligations as to when and by what route you will arrive at it. That is what you want. But this only shows that you voted for the General Assembly resolution without in the least believing that you could solve this problem or that you would tackle it. You voted for the idea because the circumstances were such that you could not vote against it. Now you want to get away from it and return to your old positions. But it is too late for that now. And you have demonstrated this by your own proposal, which you have just introduced. You yourself now say that the members of the Committee have been called upon:

"... to seek a constructive solution to the problem of general and complete disarmament under effective international control and to work out detailed measures leading towards that goal in the shortest possible time" (TNCD/5).

This means that you consider it to be possible and necessary not only to state the problem, but also to seek a constructive solution to it and to work out detailed measures leading towards that goal.
What is more, you say in your document that "... the final goal of a programme of general and complete disarmament..." (Ibid.) must be to achieve, and so on and so forth. This means that you do consider it necessary to work out a programme of general and complete disarmament. Or was this written to soothe the public conscience? That is why we raised the question today, expressing some misgivings about whether you could be said to stand squarely for a programme of general and complete disarmament. We added one word — that you "apparently" stand for this. But your statement today creates even greater doubts. The impression is built up that you have written this into your draft reluctantly, that you do not in fact intend to work out a real programme of general and complete disarmament, that you have been obliged to insert that phrase. Yet you did write it in. And what is once written down in black and white cannot be expunged by crude force. We therefore assume that you deem it necessary to draw up a programme of general and complete disarmament. If you believe that it is not, say so frankly, be man enough to say openly that you have no intention of drawing up a programme of general and complete disarmament.

But you told us today, at the very outset, that your answer to our questions is in the affirmative: yes, we are prepared to draw up such a programme, we are prepared to carry it out, and so forth. You confirmed that to us today. But if this is truly so, then your statements today in which you, in effect, seek to get out of drawing up the programme are incomprehensible.

The third point I would like to make in this connexion concerns your reference to Khrushchev's article on peaceful co-existence and to his subsequent statements, including the statement he made before the General Assembly.

You emphasized that Khrushchev himself is in favour of first taking initial measures and working out partial measures of disarmament. This leads to the following conclusion: you are in agreement with Khrushchev, but Zorin is not in agreement with Khrushchev. Well, the true position must be made clear. Your quotation was taken from the statement made by Mr. Khrushchev on 18 September. But I would ask you to read that passage again attentively. Khrushchev said:

"... if at present the Western Powers ..."

not the Soviet Union as you tried to make out, implying that Khrushchev himself doubted the possibility of carrying out his own programme --

"... do not, for one reason or another, express their readiness to embark upon general and complete disarmament, the Soviet Government is prepared to come to terms with other States on appropriate partial measures relating to disarmament and the strengthening of security." (A/FV.799, para 91) in other words, if you do not agree to take steps towards general and complete disarmament.
But you, Mr. Eaton, have already agreed to take steps towards general and complete disarmament. You have put that in writing in your latest draft of 26 April (TNCD/5) — that you are prepared to work for a practical solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament.

Then why do you now take this first formula of agreement with general and complete disarmament and add to it the second part of Khrushchev's formula, which is aimed at your rejection of general and complete disarmament? Why do you now make out the situation to be that Khrushchev is in favour of partial measures of disarmament, and say to us: Let us take up these partial measures.

Khrushchev is in favour of partial measures of disarmament only if and when you reject general and complete disarmament. But you told us today — and other representatives have said so repeatedly — that you are in favour of general and complete disarmament. But once you put your hand to the plough, you cannot turn back, "B" comes after "A". Once you favour general and complete disarmament, it follows that it is no longer a question of partial measures, but one of a programme for general and complete disarmament. You were obliged to say so yourself in your own document. You said "A", that you are in favour of a practical solution to the problem of general and complete disarmament, and you therefore said "B", that there should be a programme of general and complete disarmament.

Why do you now deny this? Why do you want to abandon the programme of general and complete disarmament and turn to the preparation of preliminary partial measures? This is an abdication of your position on the side of general and complete disarmament.

I am labouring this point because it is of fundamental importance for our future work. We must be absolutely clear about this. I do not know whether Mr. Eaton can make this absolutely clear to us today, or whether it will have to wait until after the recess; but I hope that at the Summit Conference the President of the United States will take up a perfectly clear position on this question in accordance with what he said during his conversations with Mr. Khrushchev, as published. We shall then at least clearly see what sort of road lies ahead. I note that you have stated in the document both that you are in favour of a practical solution to the problem of general and complete disarmament, and that you are in favour of working out a programme of general and complete disarmament. That being so, there is no need to veer off on the course of separate, partial measures.
Mr. Eaton having referred repeatedly today to Mr. Khrushchev, I shall take the liberty of citing some of Mr. Khrushchev's statements which have not been quoted from today and which, in our view, it would be useful to recall in connexion with our Committee's work. This is all the more important in that the statement Mr. Khrushchev made at Baku dealt directly with the work of this Committee. May I quote some extracts:

"The idea of general and complete disarmament, which is the essence, the pith of our proposals, received the unanimous approval of the General Assembly of the United Nations. The Soviet proposals were transmitted to the Ten Nation Committee for consideration, together with the proposals made by a few other States. But when the representatives of the ten nations met in Geneva for practical consideration of this problem, a far from encouraging picture began to develop."

I would ask Mr. Eaton to listen carefully to what follows, since he accused us of acting contrary to Mr. Khrushchev's instructions. Mr. Khrushchev went on to say:

"The Soviet delegation, just like the delegations of the other socialist countries, is doing everything it can to give effect to the decisions of the General Assembly of the United Nations, whereas the other five participants in the negotiations -- the representatives of the States of the North Atlantic bloc -- unfortunately, not only do not show any inclination to move forward, but in fact cling to the positions they took up before the General Assembly's session. These positions are far removed from the objectives of general and complete disarmament."

It seems that here we are completely at one with Mr. Khrushchev; there is complete unity between the Soviet delegation and its position on the one hand and the views expressed by Mr. Khrushchev on the other. It does not seem that Mr. Eaton can use this excerpt as a stick to beat us with.

Later, Mr. Khrushchev draws a general conclusion:

"It is difficult to avoid the impression that the Western Powers are retreating from what they voted for last autumn in the United Nations."

I believe that the statement Mr. Eaton made today confirms this conclusion in every respect - a conclusion that was reached not by us, but by Mr. Khrushchev.

A few words now on Mr. Eaton's comments on the so-called initial measures proposed by the United States delegation and listed in the famous nine points.
I shall not dwell on each of these nine points, as both the Soviet delegation and the delegations of the other socialist countries have already conveyed their appraisal of each of these points and shown that none of these proposals leads to the objective of general and complete disarmament. Nine tenths of them consist in details of control over armaments, and one tenth in a detail of disarmament, albeit an extremely limited and inadequate one -- the point dealing with the reduction of armed forces and armaments. Hence the conclusion drawn by Mr. Eaton today, that these proposals are key measures leading to the objective of general and complete disarmament, is absolutely without foundation. These proposals do not lead to that objective. And if Mr. Eaton thinks that after the recess we shall accept those nine points as the point of departure for our further negotiations, he is sadly mistaken.

I am obliged to make this point about our further negotiations because Mr. Eaton spoke about them -- he spoke about the future -- and in this connexion to draw attention to something Mr. Eaton said this morning. He said that the United States is prepared to discuss the nine measures it has proposed, and as a makeweight he threw in any other measure from the Western plan as well. Thank you for the permission to choose measures only from the Western plan. With such an approach, I am bound to say that we shall get nowhere at all. This must be said quite frankly so that there can be no misunderstanding. You have tried to accuse us of putting forward only the Soviet plan. In the first place, that is substantively incorrect. We are championing the Soviet plan, we believe that it provides the most suitable basis, but we have repeatedly said that we are prepared to discuss any measures leading to the objective of general and complete disarmament and corresponding to the task assigned to us. We were prepared to discuss any amendments, additions and so forth to our plan. So that this is incorrect in substance. But when you say that you are prepared to discuss only your own nine points plus any other single measure from the Western plan, that, of course, creates no sort of basis for our labours. That is the precise fault of which you are undeservedly accusing us, but it is truly what you can be accused of yourselves. You put forward your own plan alone, and nothing else. Equitable negotiations cannot be conducted on such a basis. Nothing useful can be achieved by such negotiations. Therefore, if you have time during the recess to ponder everything that has been said in our Committee, I beg you to ponder carefully this question as well. One should not try to conduct negotiations on a unilateral basis. We
are prepared to discuss anything that will contribute to a solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament. That we are prepared to do. To are prepared to listen to any proposal and, as our reply today showed, we are prepared to approach rationally and critically any proposal, however inadequate, however erroneous in many of its parts, it may be.

But you are trying to exact from us acceptance of your points and nothing else. In that case there is no need to carry on any discussions at all. In that case, the State Department can simply put out a new brochure with a plan for general and complete disarmament which will be put forward as the sole choice for all States. But this is not conducting equitable negotiations. Serious negotiations cannot be carried on on such a basis. I think that that must be clear to you. And we are agreeable to continue the negotiations provided they proceed in the direction of implementing the General Assembly Resolution for which we all voted. We are prepared to negotiate taking all positions into account, in order to work out the fundamental principles and programme of general and complete disarmament which you are now advocating in your document. Naturally, we shall defend our own positions because we consider them to be the best. But that does not mean that we are not prepared to discuss other positions. We are prepared to discuss other positions, but not on a basis of inequality.

Those are the observations I wished to make today.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): In my capacity as representative of the United States I shall make a brief comment.

I shall not endeavour to respond to Mr. Zorin, now or at any later time, to reply to the remarks Mr. Zorin has made this morning. Nothing that I could say would convince him. But I hope, on further reflection, that he will find that he has incorrectly stated our views. What he has said does not reflect either the views of my Government or, so far as I know, the views of the other Western Governments here. I speak, however, only for myself.

One further comment. So far as the question of propaganda is concerned, and the dilatoriness with which we have come to our conclusion in this respect, I shall read the statement made by Mr. Herter on 23 September 1.52, very shortly after Mr. Khrushchev's speech to the General Assembly and considerably before the resolution was adopted:
"I have become a little impatient at those who merely wave off Mr. Khrushchev's suggestion as propaganda. It is propaganda. It is, in its details, something that can be looked at with scepticism. But it represents an effort of mankind to reach the solution of one, at least, of the major problems of the world, which is a great threat to the world itself."

So much for the position of my Government. So far as I, personally, am concerned, I would say that when I read Mr. Khrushchev's proposal I had great hope, and I argued at great length with many of my colleagues that he really was willing to accept control and that, when he spoke at the end of his speech of a control mechanism which should continue to police the peace, he meant effective international peace-keeping machinery. It is only since coming here, and hearing the explanations which have been made here by Mr. Zorin and others on the Soviet side, that I have begun to fear that that was not the intention. There has been no indication whatsoever that their idea of control — the word used in Mr. Khrushchev's speech — bears any relation to what the Western side would consider control, adequate verification or inspection. Further, it has been completely denied that at the end of the road there should exist any international peace-keeping machinery to preserve the peace of the world and to save small States from aggression by their neighbours.

I use the word "Fear" advisedly because my Government — and I, personally — still entertain the hope that the objective of the Soviet side is to achieve genuine disarmament; but I am at a loss to find anything that has been said in the course of the last several weeks which gives reason for such hope.

**Mr. TANDBANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French):** Replying to the representative of the Soviet Union, who had emphasized that the representatives of all the countries of the world assembled at the United Nations had seriously pondered the Soviet proposals put forward by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union on 18 September, and that they had accepted in principle the idea underlying those proposals, as could be proved by innumerable quotations from their statements in the discussions at the United Nations, you said, Mr. Chairman, that on 23 September the United States Secretary of State had said that the Soviet plan was largely propaganda and should be set aside. But in your previous intervention you did not even quote the second part of Mr. Hertel's statement at his Press Conference on 23 September.
You have persisted in saying that the plan submitted by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union was only a means of propaganda. That comment was current at a time when attempts were being made to depict the Soviet proposals as propaganda. But since then we have had the Camp David communique; we have had the statement of the United States representative in the First Committee of the General Assembly; we have had all the other statements. I would only point out that there is a slight difference in the way in which these matters are presented here.

You also said just now that it is difficult to agree on the preparation of a plan for general and complete disarmament because the programme in itself is difficult to draw up. You emphasized that many difficulties might arise; that many obstacles have been placed on the road to disarmament; that it was necessary, as other speakers have said, to zigzag and to decide on certain measures. But most of those measures give a one-sided advantage to certain Western countries or are only control measures.

Although you could not tell us how this objective, which you cannot define precisely, will look, you said today that it is absolutely necessary to have an organization to keep the peace. But how can you know that when you do not know what course the road to disarmament will take? How can you tell what the situation will be in the future?

During the recess, it would be wise to ponder all these contradictions and to study all the arguments which have been put forward here. It would be wise to go back to the proposals which you submitted on 26 April and which you have tried to disown today.

We must reflect a great deal before resuming work if we want to reach agreement on some questions at least, on the questions of principle raised by the Western Powers on the one hand and by the socialist States on the other. As the representative of the Soviet Union said a little while ago, we are determined to defend our views because we believe that they are the best.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I should not like us to lose sight of any practical point brought up in the course of our discussion today.

In connexion with our submission of a draft of a final communique, we welcome the statement by the representative of Italy to the effect that it would be desirable, in order to prepare a final draft of the text of the communique in a
businesslike way, to appoint a representative from each delegation to deal with that work. It would appear to be best to do this today so that we could have an agreed text of the communiqué by tomorrow's meeting.

The Soviet delegation and, so far as I am aware, the delegations of the other socialist countries accept this proposal and are prepared to detail a representative from each delegation to consider the text of the final communiqué at a working meeting.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): If there is no objection to the Soviet Union representative's suggestion, we will accept it and I will ask Mr. Stelle, my deputy, to arrange for such a meeting at a time mutually convenient to us all.

If there are no more comments from representatives at the end of this, our longest meeting, I will read the communiqué:

"The thirty-first meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament was held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 28 April 1960 under the chairmanship of the representative of the United States of America.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 29 April 1960, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 14.00 hours.