FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THIRTIETH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Wednesday, 27 April 1960, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Sir MICHAEL WRIGHT (United Kingdom)
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<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republic</td>
<td>Mr. V.A. ZORIN</td>
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PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir Michael WRIGHT
Miss B. SALT
Maj.-Gen. RIDDELL

United States of America:

Mr. F.M. EATON
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Rear-Admiral P.L. DUDLEY

Representative of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN
The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): The thirtieth meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament is called to order. The first speaker on my list today is the representative of Italy, on whom I now call.

Mr. MARTINO (Italy) (translation from French): On the eve of a lengthy break in our Conference, it is incumbent on each of us to survey the various disarmament problems which have arisen during these past weeks. I am certain that, in so doing, each of us will bring a fresh contribution to the task allotted to us.

Of course, we have not yet reached an agreement, at any rate not so far. We have not prepared any treaty text, and we have certainly not sealed or initialled one. Nor have we reached agreement among ourselves on declarations of principles, nor studied together any concrete measure of disarmament. I think, however, I can safely say useful work has been done; and it could well be, in spite of the liveliness of our discussions, that we shall be able to progress in the future towards the common goal which we have set ourselves.

The document submitted yesterday by the French delegation on behalf of the Western countries (TNCD/5) seems to me to furnish fresh proof of our common efforts. It might, indeed, help our colleagues from Eastern Europe to interpret the Western point of view. In setting out the principles which should lead to a programme of disarmament, we nevertheless do not fail to recognize the need to undertake speedily the application of initial measures within the context of a treaty.

That document will, addition, provide incontrovertible proof of our firm will to go forward along the road which we have chosen.

Our colleagues from Eastern Europe have told us that measures submitted must conform to a series of general principles; well, ours do so. And our hope is that this common ground, this rapprochement of which Mr. Zorin has several times spoken, may as a result be more clearly defined.

What we have at present is — to use a metaphor — two patches of oil — two patches of oil of fortuitous shape, unfortunately still separated from each other. What we have to do is, by patient joint endeavour, to see that they gradually take on more clearly defined outlines, so that their fusion may produce a positive result.

Today, I should like to help to make clearer — even if only on general lines — the reasons why the fundamental misunderstandings and differences of which we are aware have arisen between us — the reasons why any rapprochement is still, by force of circumstance, the result of a natural process, and not the outcome of my
leliberate design. Mr. Zorin, clearly, was aware of this when he considered it advisable to set aside the Khrushchev plan and steer negotiations towards the proposal of 8 April (TNCD/4). His reasoning was extremely clear: if all ten of us are agreed on resolution 1378 (XIV), let us then try to agree about the principles which follow from it so that we can then start work on a treaty, leaving aside for the moment the differences which divide us.

Well, our colleagues from Eastern Europe now know, and no longer just from our statements but from a written text, what we think should be the principles for general and complete disarmament.

The gap which has developed between us originates, in my view, in the premises from which the two parties start in approaching the problem.

On the Soviet side, it is considered that armaments are the main cause of international tension, and that their total abolition would ipso facto bring confidence and world peace. From that, it is concluded that the sole objective of our effort is general and complete disarmament, the source of all good and the radical solution of all problems.

We Western representatives, on the other hand, maintain that, between armaments and international tension, a process that chemists might call autocatalytic has been going on, and that there would not have been any re-armament if it had not been preceded, in the strictly political field, by factual situations which I will call pathological, which have never been resolved, and which have been allowed to go on aggravating more and more the dangers of international tension.

Further, I would say that the ideological conflict is one of the phases of those political aspects. Mr. Zorin will no doubt agree, because when the West was compelled to re-arm, thereby, of course, following the example of the Soviet Union, the policy of co-existence had been buried in the Eastern camp.

The Western countries are, moreover, of the opinion that what we must really aim at is to build a safe, free and peaceful world. Admittedly, general and complete disarmament is one way of doing it, but it is not the only one.

One of the main tenets — and thus one of the principles — of the Western countries, is that confidence between States should be progressively strengthened. It is perfectly clear that we must first dispel the distrust which has built up to much too great an extent during the past fifteen years. And that is not very easily done if the distrust, which is at the same time both the cause and the effect of the arms race, derives originally from the political problems which remained unsolved
after the war. That is why we are convinced that, to start with, a certain number of things must be done which may at first sight appear simple, but whose very lack of complexity would in fact help to break down reserve dictated by mistrust. Among these things are a system of notification, a joint system of work, the initial determination of levels, and the realistic measure we have suggested, the prohibition of outer space to weapons of mass destruction, a measure which might itself produce almost immediate results.

This first series of measures would not have just merely the merit of avoiding, by its very nature, the most dangerous pitfalls; it would in addition permit a start to be made with some collaboration between the two parties, and would lay solid foundations for a far-reaching programme.

We think that, if we are to advance along the thorny path proposed to us, we must create confidence for each step. I would almost say that every gain of mutual confidence will enable us to advance towards the next stage of our work. That is why we do not scorn, as a start, measures which appear modest — indirect or limited measures. If we could agree on these, and apply them, our goodwill would, in fact, be proved. But what is yet more important is that we would have cleared the way for other fruitful work in an atmosphere of greater mutual confidence.

We consider that the complexity of the technical problems of a world in very rapid evolution determined by scientific advance can only permit agreements based on technical and continued study of each problem. That is not a vague form of work, as one of our colleagues called it; on the contrary, it is the only impartial and serious basis for real and controlled disarmament.

Moreover, we Western countries have crystallized this desire to stick to the technical reality of the problems we have to solve, not as a negative reservation, but as a definite act of co-operation. We want a joint study of each problem, and we are prepared to undertake it forthwith.

Measures of disarmament, besides their fitness as a means of achieving the desired aim, and besides being applicable and controllable — strictly technical aspects — are capable of progressive extension to the field of confidence only to the extent to which, in their progressive development, they avoid upsetting the equilibrium of the opposing forces and tend to increase the security of each and all.
Soviet views on the subject of confidence cover, it is true, security and the 
ulibrium of forces. None the less the resultant approach is, alas, very different 
rom ours! I do not think I am wrong in interpreting it as follows: the delegation 
of the Soviet Union thinks that the best means of creating an atmosphere of 
confidence is to compel the two parties, not so much to undertake concrete obligations 
of increasing importance as to make declarations of intention, to give moral undertaking 
important no doubt but not susceptible of control and in reality lacking any immediate 
practical value.

Another principle of disarmament which we believe to be essential is that every 
measure, and consequently the whole programme, should be subject to safeguards to 
ensure its wide application.

The Italian delegation proposes later on to make a contribution in connexion 
with the principles relating to control. For the moment, let it be stated that with 
certain measures of disarmament the desired objective can be achieved and that these 
can be applied simply because it is a practical possibility to control them.

I would, however, emphasize that for control to be a practical possibility the 
agreement of both parties must be obtainable. The Western countries have no intention 
of creating a control body before disarmament or without disarmament, but for 
disarmament.

Our colleagues of Eastern Europe often accuse us of not really wanting any 
useful result on disarmament, and of trying exclusively for the establishment of 
control, that is to say, of wanting control without disarmament, and that because, 
among the various initial measures, we have proposed a prohibition against placing 
into orbit vehicles capable of mass destruction. Admittedly this would be a 
prohibition on weapons which are as yet non-existent, only potential. But it is a 
prohibition which is easy to apply and to control. Now if we could declare today 
a prohibition on the placing into orbit of vehicles capable of mass destruction, we 
should at least be creating a positive precedent. That precedent would undoubtedly 
enable us to progress more easily towards agreement on general and complete disarmament

To return now to the analysis of the principles concerning guarantees of 
implementation of the disarmament treaty. Although the two opposing positions have 
got considerably closer, our colleagues of Eastern Europe still persist in rejecting 
those controls which would constitute a real guarantee of implementation. It is 
true that they provide a guarantee by various other factors, but these are not enough. 
What is at the bottom of the fear which our Eastern colleagues appear to feel in
regard to the measures of verification and control to be applied in their
territory? Does it not arise precisely from this distrust that we are trying to
dispel? If that is the case, should it not be realized that, in an overweening
suspicion of systems and measures of guarantee, and anxiety to guard against them
and reject them, lies one of the main obstacles to the dissipation of distrust
and the restoration of confidence?

Mr. Zorin, at the twenty-sixth meeting, referred to the Baruch Plan and
ridiculed it. Now that is a typical case of what I have just mentioned. In
rejecting through suspicion the content of the recommendations and proposals
contained in the United Nations Resolution of 4 November 1948, the Soviet
authorities actually opened the door to the nuclear weapons race.

I feel some apprehension about looking back in this fashion, because it would
be more promising for the success of our task to be able to face the future
instead of dwelling on the past. But I feel it is essential to do so, for it is
essential to see past events in their true light.

It will be recalled that, in addition to the proposal submitted by the United
States to the United Nations, there was a proposal of 11 June 1947, put forward
by the Soviet Union. I take the liberty of quoting here in extenso, in English,
the report and the resolution on the Soviet proposal, adopted by the Working
Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission of the United Nations on 5 April 1948:

(Continued in English):

"The Soviet Union proposals of 11 June 1947 should be considered
against the background of the Commission's work up to that date.

When the Atomic Energy Commission began its work in June 1946,
it received for its consideration:

(a) A United States plan which provided for the elimination of
atomic weapons through the establishment of a system of
international control and development of atomic energy
for peaceful purposes only; and

(b) a Soviet Union proposal for the immediate outlawing of
such weapons and the destruction of existing stocks.

In contrast to the United States plan, the Soviet Union
proposal made no provision for a scheme of international
control." (AECS/31/Rev.1, pages 29, 30)
I emphasize that last sentence: "In contrast to the United States plan, the Soviet Union proposal made no provision for a scheme of international control."

The position is again stated clearly in paragraph III of the Committee's report which states:

"III. The Soviet Union Government insists that the convention establishing a system of control, even so limited as that contained in the Soviet Union proposals, can be concluded only after a convention providing for the prohibition of atomic weapons and the destruction of existing atomic weapons has been 'signed, ratified and put into effect'."

(translation from French):

Are we to think that the Soviet position in this respect has not changed since then? I nevertheless persist in hoping that the Soviet authorities will in the end recognize that appropriate control is to the benefit of all the States concerned. When that happy day arrives our Conference will find itself able to move forward and put into final form practical measures for general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

We do not of course demand that our colleagues from Eastern Europe should drop their proposals and change their ideas from one day to the next. They can no longer, however, continue to accuse us of having failed to expound our line of thought on a programme of general and complete disarmament. We remain faithful to the United Nations Resolution and to the principles that follow from it. But, for us, those principles are valid to the extent to which they are linked with the will to apply initial measures. We hope that our colleagues will be kind enough to consider our point of view with comprehension. Given goodwill and a spirit of cooperation, it is not impossible that the two patches of oil which I mentioned at the beginning of my remarks may spread and take shape so as one day to form a single design.

Mr. MAZINCESCU (Romania) (translation from French): I must first apologize to the Committee, for I am going to make a rather long speech. To paraphrase a familiar idea, we have not had time to make it shorter.

My delegation has carefully examined the document submitted yesterday for the consideration of our Committee, in which the views of the Western Powers on the principles of general and complete disarmament are set forth.
The points of similarity as well as the differences which have emerged during our debates have made it necessary, as a first definite step towards the conclusion of an agreement, to work out fundamental principles of general and complete disarmament. It was precisely for the purpose of meeting this requirement that the delegations of the socialist countries submitted on 8 April the document entitled "Basic principles of general and complete disarmament" with which you are all familiar.

It is no spirit of recrimination, but rather concern for the truth and for historical accuracy that compels me to remind the Western delegations that they have refused, from the start, either to acknowledge the necessity for such principles or to examine the draft that we have submitted. They have rejected it without discussion and without telling us, for a long time, what their position is in regard to the problems which our document raised.

We interpret the fact that the Western delegations decided in the end to present their counter-proposal in the form of the document submitted yesterday for consideration by our Committee, as formal recognition on their part of the necessity for securing an agreement on the principles of general and complete disarmament which should precede and facilitate the progress of our future negotiations. That confirms the correctness and appropriateness of the proposal on the basic principles of general and complete disarmament which the delegations of the socialist countries submitted more than three weeks ago.

We cannot but express regret that the Western Powers should have chosen to expound in concrete form their views on the principles of general and complete disarmament a bare three days before the end of the first session of our conference. We express regret on this score, not because the time the Western delegations have left us to examine their document has not given us a chance to realize the fundamental differences between the Western proposals and the proposals of the socialist countries -- unfortunately they leap to the eye -- but because we have not had more time to make every possible effort to discover the slightest foundation that might serve as a starting point for a fresh effort to narrow the gap between us.

We are not satisfied with the content of the document submitted to us yesterday. This I must admit unequivocally from the very start, as did some of my colleagues yesterday. We are here, however, to negotiate and not to turn down straight off all proposals which do not coincide with our own views on the project we have to discuss.
It is in this spirit that I should like to emphasize with satisfaction that, in the document submitted on 26 April 1960, for the first time since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV), the Western Powers unequivocally acknowledge, in black and white, that general and complete disarmament is the goal of our negotiations. If we recall the distrust, suspicion and sometimes even irritation which the mere mention of the objective defined by resolution 1378 (XIV) used to provoke in some of our Western colleagues, we cannot but recognize that our discussions have already had some result.

We also regard as a positive element the fact that the Western proposal, in the third paragraph of its preamble, reproduces in the spirit and in the letter the first and third operative paragraphs of General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV). It is well known that, up till now, the Western delegations, while from time to time re-affirming their adherence to the principles and ideas embodied in that resolution were inclined to consider that it was only by its third operative paragraph that our Committee was to be guided in its work, and that because the ideas contained in that paragraph seemed to them — wrongly as it happens — more suitable for quotation as a justification for rejecting a programme of general and complete disarmament.

I must add that I also consider as a positive element the fact that the new Western proposal, in contrast to the position previously adopted, several times mentions the idea of a programme of general and complete disarmament. But alongside these factors which, as I have already said are indicative of some progress in our discussion, the new Western proposal reaffirms some of the positions which have so far made it impossible to reach an agreement that would enable us to come nearer to the goal assigned to our Committee.

I should like to indicate some of the more important negative aspects of the document submitted by the Western countries. Of course I make no pretensions to exhausting the subject. First I should like to say a few words about the final goal of a programme of general and complete disarmament under effective international control as it seems to be defined in the last paragraph of the document submitted yesterday for our consideration. In good logic the goal of such a programme should be the elimination of all material means at the disposal of States for waging war. It is precisely in order to attain this goal that, the document defining the "Basic principles of general and complete disarmament submitted by the socialist countries on 8 April laid down in paragraph one that:
"General and complete disarmament includes disbandment of all armed forces, liquidation of all armaments, cessation of all kinds of military production, liquidation of all alien bases on foreign territories, withdrawal from these territories and disbandment of foreign troops, prohibition of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and missile weapons, cessation of their production and destruction of their stockpiles, abolition of organs and institutions designed for organizing military activities in States (general staffs, war ministries and their local organs), prohibition of military training, liquidation of military training establishments, and cessation of appropriation of funds for military purposes." \(^{(\text{TNCD/4})}\)

I have taken the liberty of quoting at some length -- although this may perhaps have seemed tedious to our Western colleagues -- in order to emphasize the very clear-cut definition of the goal given in the document submitted by the socialist countries and the importance that we attach to the definition of this goal.

On the other hand the document submitted by the Western countries states that:

"... the final goal of a programme of general and complete disarmament under effective international control must be to achieve the reduction and limitation of all types of forces and weapons to the levels required by each State for its own internal security and fulfilment of its obligations under the United Nations Charter and the elimination of all weapons surplus to those required for these purposes. The programme must also provide for the use of outer space for peaceful purposes only and for the final elimination of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery." \(^{(\text{TNCD/5})}\)

On reading the document submitted by the Western countries, therefore, we find that, in their view, disarmament, though general, ought not to be by any means complete, since instead of abolishing armed forces and armaments of all kinds the Western countries propose merely to reduce and limit them.

The level of reductions and limitations to be effected should be determined, according to the Western proposal, by the requirements of each State's internal security and by the military obligations of States under the United Nations Charter. But two different ideas have got mixed up here. The maintenance of internal order is a matter for the police or the militia of each country. Point 4 of the "Basic principles of general and complete disarmament" submitted by the socialist States amply covers the problem of the maintenance of internal order and the personal
security of citizens. As to the other problem, that is, the military obligations of States under the United Nations Charter, this is, to put it bluntly, merely the problem of international police forces.

During the debates which have taken place we have had several fairly thorough exchanges of views on the problem of international police forces. At the beginning of our debates, I myself for example asked whether, in the view of our Western colleagues, international police forces were intended to meet all threatened breaches of international law by States which, if the Western plan were adopted, would still have a military establishment of their own with some limitations and reductions that no one has been able to specify. I have not received a satisfactory answer to this question. Mr. Ormsby-Gore on the other hand, in his statement at our meeting yesterday, asserted for example that military machinery for the maintenance of international order would be necessary in order to achieve:

"... a world order which will remove for all time the temptation of States to resort to war in order to achieve their ends."  

(TNCD/PV.29, page 23)

Do you realize what forces this military machinery would require in order to deter those States which had retained their military establishment from resorting to war? Is not this just a new version of the deterrent theory, which has more than once turned out to be worthless?

I do not believe that the mere transposition of the deterrent theory and the balance of terror from the domain of relations between States to that of a supranational organization could help us to eliminate war from the life of peoples.

As regards nuclear disarmament, I recognize admittedly that the idea of the "final elimination of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery" (TNCD/5) is a very valuable idea. It was contained in the document entitled "Basic principles of general and complete disarmament" submitted by the socialist States on 8 April, in explicit terms:

"... prohibition of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and missile weapons, cessation of their production and destruction of their stockpiles ..."

(TNCD/4, paragraph 1)

In replying to the preliminary observations by the representative of Poland, the representative of France, Mr. Moch, explained yesterday that:

"... the expression 'final elimination' includes prohibition, destruction of stockpiles, and cessation of production. Otherwise there would be no final elimination".  

(TNCD/PV.29, page 34)
I fully agree with that explanation. But then, if that is so, why not accept the formula that we have proposed? Why propose another formula to express the ideas with which you say you agree and which are set out explicitly in the document we have submitted? Still less so I understand, I must admit, why, in these circumstances, when we are both talking about the same thing — because that is what the representative of France affirmed — you should be so sensitive about it.

Why, in relation to the question whether a common idea should be expressed explicitly or implicitly, raise the supreme question of confidence? Let me quote again from what the representative of France said yesterday:

"Do you want conciliation, or do you want us all, after the efforts we are making today, to make a joint statement of failure and give up trying to make further progress?" (ibid.)

Having accepted the idea, is it so difficult for the Western delegations to accept also the explicit expression of that idea?

I shall now pass on to another question. In sub-paragraph (d) of the proposal by the five Western countries, we read that:

"disarmament measures must be negotiated progressively according to the possibility of their early implementation and effective control." (TNCD/5)

This interpretation of the way in which a disarmament agreement should be negotiated faithfully reproduces the ideas set out in the plan submitted by the five Western countries at the beginning of our Conference. We have already had occasion to demonstrate that the choice of such a method would preclude all possibility of drawing up a programme, a plan or a treaty of general and complete disarmament. Nevertheless, this method of negotiation was presented to us yesterday as the result of a great effort at conciliation. Here is what Mr. Beton said:

"This is an effort to meet the constant request of the Soviet delegation that they be told where we are aiming, their constantly reiterated statements that the formula of general and complete disarmament under effective international control as contained in the General Assembly resolution should be elaborated, and to meet the constant demands of the Soviet side that we define our conception of the term 'general and complete disarmament under effective international control', before they are prepared to talk about measures." (TNCD/FV.29, page 33)
I pass over the inaccuracies in this statement as regards the position of our countries. But in what does this effort at conciliation consist if, in praxi, all we get is a verbal recognition of the need for a programme of general and complete disarmament, while at the same time a method of negotiation is proposed which would preclude any possibility of attaining the goal we have been set. That is not a subjective interpretation of the document which has been submitted to us. In giving this interpretation of sub-paragraph (d) of the Western proposal, I am basing myself on what the Western representatives said, yesterday more particularly, in championing the principles set out in their document.

It was certainly not by chance that Mr. Ormsby-Gore, for instance, began his statement yesterday in support of the Western document by attacking the argument of the socialist States that

"it is possible here and now to work out in detail and get everyone to agree to a fixed pattern of general and complete disarmament over a fixed number of years." (TJCD/PV.29, page 20)

I do not wish to return to the question of the value of the goal, as defined in the last paragraph of the document submitted by the Western Powers; but even if the goal -- or rather the definition of the goal -- were fully acceptable to us, even if we had not the slightest objection on that score, adoption of the document in question would have only a purely declaratory value, and would have no more value than one of those "slogans" Mr. Eaton is so fond of talking about. Every method of reaching the goal defined by the paragraph in question is practically eliminated by the condition laid down for agreeing to negotiate on disarmament measures.

The method of negotiation suggested in the document of the Five Western Powers proves that they have not yet given up the idea of pushing the Committee to abandon general and complete disarmament as the goal of its labours.

A few days ago -- on Monday, I think -- the representative of Italy objected to the fact that certain representatives of the socialist countries -- including myself -- had affirmed that the Western proposals were no more than a conglomeration of partial, isolated and ill-assorted measures of control over armaments. But the document put forward yesterday does in fact propose that we should accept, as a condition of any disarmament agreement, the principle that the measures of "a programme of general and complete disarmament under effective international control" should be negotiated separately.
That is, quite simply, a contradiction in terms. Who is going to negotiate the programme of general and complete disarmament mentioned in the last paragraph of the document of the five Western Powers? Can we accept, from the strict point of view of formal logic, that a whole programme can be negotiated in little disjointed bits, and that under existing conditions, that is to say, under conditions where a programme of general and complete disarmament must quite naturally be the subject of an agreement between sovereign States. It is obvious that if, by the terms of sub-paragraph (d) of the Western proposal, we have to accept as a condition that we confine ourselves to negotiating isolated measures of disarmament, we shall never succeed in drawing up a programme of general and complete disarmament. Is it for this reason that the Western Powers seem to have been a bit more generous in the definition of the final goal than they have been?

It is perfectly clear that we shall never succeed in reaching any final goal at all if we do not work out a stage-by-stage programme to reach that goal, if we do not adopt machinery which will ensure an uninterrupted progress towards the final goal, that is, towards general and complete disarmament. That is precisely what we provided in our document on the "Basic principles of general and complete disarmament", which we submitted to the Committee.

In paragraph 2 of our document we set out the principle of stages and time-limits. The question of stages, whether there should be two, three or four of them, is open to discussion. The question of time-limits, whether four, five, or six years are needed, is open to discussion. But there can be no denying the necessity of fixing stages and time-limits, if only to provide the necessary check-points for controlling disarmament measures of whatever kind.

In paragraph 5 of our document we proposed machinery to ensure uninterrupted progress towards the goal of implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament. I should like, if I may, to make yet another lengthy quotation from our document:

"Implementation by States of the programme of general and complete disarmament may not be interrupted or made dependent on the fulfilment of any conditions not stipulated in the Treaty.

"If a State attempts to circumvent or violate the Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament, the question of such a violation shall be submitted for immediate consideration by the Security Council and the United Nations General Assembly for the institution of measures against the violator in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter." (UNCD/4)
In proposing a method of negotiation that would preclude the possibility of adopting a programme of general and complete disarmament, Mr. Ormsby-Gore said at our yesterday's meeting:

"We wish to make a start with actual disarmament as soon as possible and, to this end, get down to detailed discussion of practical disarmament measures." (TNCD/FV.29, page 20)

Consequently, the Western delegations propose to exclude, right from the start, negotiation on a programme of general and complete disarmament and to accept only negotiation on isolated measures of the kind we know since the United States representative has offered us the choice of nine measures of control of armaments without however, proposing the discussion of any measure of real disarmament.

The first feature of the method proposed in paragraph (d) is thus the exclusion of any possibility of negotiating a total programme of general and complete disarmament and of ensuring uninterrupted progress towards a definite goal. The second feature is the subordination of all progress in the negotiations on disarmament to the acceptance of prior conditions by the socialist countries.

I believe that in this context it is worth while stressing the very title of the document which was submitted to us yesterday:

"Proposal by the delegations of Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, concerning principles and conditions for general and complete disarmament ...". (TNCD/5)

Again, at yesterday's meeting Mr. Ormsby-Gore expressed this idea in the following way:

"Instead of wrangling now about the difficulties we may encounter and the precise route which we should take up the final slope, would it not be better to start, and get the waggon rolling? Let us agree on the point to which we want to travel. Then we can chart the precise route ahead as each stretch of country comes into view."

This seemed to Mr. Ormsby-Gore -- "a practical and realistic method of achieving international disarmament ...". (TNCD/FV.29, page 25)

For my part I should be tempted to call it a method for loafers, but not for statesmen negotiating on the most important problem confronting mankind today.

General and complete disarmament requires a solution commensurate with the scale of the problem. It cannot be achieved without a unified programme and in
circumstances where, at any moment, because of some trifling incident in the international situation, any country might set off on a different track or just simply go into reverse, without there being any machinery provided to prevent such an eventuality.

But the precise meaning of what Mr. Ormsby-Gore said yesterday we find in the words of Mr. Eaton at the fourteenth meeting of our Conference. He said:

"We are prepared, as a start, to discuss and negotiate in detail ... measures of disarmament ... of the scope contained in parts I and II of the Western plan."

And he went on:

"When those first measures have been agreed, we are prepared to negotiate ... further measures ...". (TMOND/FV.14, page 9)

The same idea was taken up at yesterday's meeting by the United Kingdom representative when he said:

"... one of our immediate aims should be to seek agreement on practical disarmament measures which will have the effect of creating international confidence. If this confidence can be built up, further disarmament measures will become possible." (TMOND/FV.29, page 24)

International confidence is thus considered as a condition of progress towards disarmament, and that is certainly true; but whilst making disarmament conditional on the development of international confidence, the Western Powers propose a method of negotiation which, according to their own words, excludes precisely the possibility of creating and developing international confidence. In support of this assertion I shall again quote what Mr. Ormsby-Gore said in presenting the Western plan:

"The third essential element needed for the creation of confidence is that of steady progress towards a definite and openly declared final goal." (TMOND/FV.2, page 6)

This third element which Mr. Ormsby-Gore considered essential for the creation of confidence -- namely, I repeat, steady progress towards a definite and openly declared final goal -- is practically excluded by paragraph 2 of the document of the five Western Powers. How can steady progress towards a final goal be ensured by negotiations which are at every moment sensitive to the slightest change in the international situation?

To understand still better the significance of the method which we are asked to accept as a condition of negotiations on general and complete disarmament, I recall also what the representative of France said at our sixteenth meeting:

"We cannot accept, in this uncertain world in which we live among so many political disputes, the idea that we should append our signatures to a document which would determine no varietur all the stages of general and complete disarmament from the present situation until all the operations are completed."

(TMOND/FV.16, page 24)
The idea, therefore, that disarmament measures should be negotiated separately, expresses the intention of the Western Powers to make the progress of the negotiations on disarmament conditional on the solution of current political disputes, some of which may continue, while fresh ones may arise. Mr. Martino, the representative of Italy, who spoke about an hour ago, confirmed what I have just said, the interpretation I gave of Mr. Hoch's assertions. What the representative of Italy said was:

"the distrust ... derives originally from the political problems which remained unsolved after the war". (supra., page 5)

Here is the familiar vicious circle: disarmament depends on confidence; confidence naturally requires that existing distrust should be dispelled; distrust arises out of the political disputes resulting from the Second World War. No progress, therefore, on disarmament so long as existing political disputes are not settled. That amounts to laying down political conditions for negotiating on disarmament. But what does that mean? Does it not amount to saying that the Western Powers would like to retain their armed forces and their armaments in order to force the solution of international disputes? We put the question. It is clear that that would be not only contrary to the United Nations Charter but would also be entirely unrealistic and particularly dangerous for the international community.

In submitting our proposal on "Basic principles of general and complete disarmament" we offered the Committee a basis for agreement which would have allowed us to make some progress towards working out a treaty on general and complete disarmament, which is what all the peoples expect from us. The counter-proposal of the Western Powers does not offer such a basis. Quite the contrary, for it excludes the possibility of negotiating at least a programme of general and complete disarmament; it elevates to the rank of a principle the acceptance of prior conditions by the socialist countries, as the price of negotiation on partial and isolated measures of arms control.

The least that can be said of such a position is that it ignores realities. If we are to make any progress in the direction of general and complete disarmament, we must start from the idea which was expressed at the opening of our Conference, that the two parties at the table -- East and West -- are equally interested in general and complete disarmament. If we start from the idea that East and West are equally interested in general and complete disarmament then we really are clearing the way towards an agreement acceptable to both parties. That implies
the abandonment of the absurd claim that one of the parties should accept the prior conditions imposed by the other as the price of negotiation.

I have no wish to contest Mr. Zorin's right to interpret Mr. Khrushchev's ideas, but to the 1958 text quoted yesterday by Mr. Ormsby-Gore and which Mr. Zorin helped the Committee to understand, I would like to add a quotation from 1959; it is taken from the speech by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR at the fourteenth session of the General Assembly.

"All representatives will agree, I am sure, that we must direct the collective intelligence of all States, as of the United Nations, towards the search for a new approach to the solution of the disarmament problem.

"Our task is to find a lever with which, when we grasp it, we can stop mankind from sliding into the abyss of war. There is one necessity today to eliminate the very possibility of an outbreak of war. So long as large armies, air forces, navies, and nuclear and rocket weapons exist, so long as the young people who come into the world make the arts of war their first study, and so long as the general staffs plan future military operations, there will be no guarantee of a lasting peace.

"The Soviet Government, after examining from all angles the situation which has arisen, has reached the firm conclusion that the way out of the impasse must be sought through general and complete disarmament. This approach completely eliminates the possibility of any State gaining military advantages of any kind. General and complete disarmament will remove all the obstacles that have arisen during discussion of the questions involved by partial disarmament, and will clear the way for the institution of universal and complete control." (General Assembly, Fourteenth Session, Official Records, 799th Plenary Meeting, paragraphs 67-69)

It was on the basis of this Soviet proposal that the General Assembly of the United Nations included the item on general and complete disarmament in the agenda of the fourteenth session and that the discussions took place with which you are familiar and which resulted in the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV).

It was the Prime Minister of a member of the British Commonwealth who speaking the day before yesterday, I believe, openly declared that the Soviet proposal on general and complete disarmament -- and I am quoting Mr. Nash, Prime Minister of New Zealand -- marked "a new era in the history of mankind".

That is why the negotiations on general and complete disarmament to be conducted in our Committee cannot be treated as a mere episode in the discussions which have taken place on disarmament ever since the ninth or the sixth century B.C. The principles and
methods which we are to adopt must ensure certain progress towards the goal of
general and complete disarmament, as it can be logically, humanely and scientifically
defined.

The "Basic principles of general and complete disarmament" proposed by the
socialist countries tally with the task assigned to our Committee. The counter-
proposal submitted by the five Western countries does not tally with this task.
It lacks clarity and leaves a great deal to be desired as regards the definition
of the goal to be reached, while it proposes a method of negotiation which excludes
all possibility of reaching the final goal which may have been envisaged. It is
hardly likely that in the short time remaining we shall be able to smooth out the
differences there are between the two drafts of basic principles of general and
complete disarmament submitted to the Committee. But if a lesson has to be drawn,
are and now, from the negotiations which have gone on for the last six weeks in
our Committee, I consider that the first thing to be noted should be the fact that
United Nations General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) retains its full importance
and that the idea of general and complete disarmament cannot be set aside, now
that it has begun to impress itself on the conscience of the peoples.

Despite all the negative aspects I have mentioned, the document submitted
yesterday by the five Western Powers reflects that truth, and, disregarding
occasional irritations, this enables us to remain optimistic about the future
of our negotiations.

Mr. Burns (Canada): The Canadian delegation is very disappointed by
the reaction of the delegations of the Eastern European countries and the Soviet
Union who spoke following the presentation yesterday, by the representative of
France, of the Western countries' proposal on the principles and conditions of
general and complete disarmament under effective international control. I had
thought that this might possibly have been a hasty reaction, but after listening
to the considered and comprehensive speech which has just been made by the representative of Romania I see that this is not the case, and our effort to progress towards
the possibility of fruitful negotiations seems to have taken us no further along
that road. In view of what he said earlier in his speech, I am afraid that it
does not seem to me that the optimism expressed by the representative of Romania
in his concluding sentence has very good grounds.

In spite of the most careful explanations by Mr. Moch and Mr. Ormsby-Gore of
the similarities and differences between the Western views on the principles of
general and complete disarmament and those of our Eastern colleagues, and in spite
of the explanation of the reasons because of which we hold different views on
certain points, when the reaction of the Eastern delegations came it was the same
rigid rejection of our viewpoint that we have been experiencing during the whole
of this Conference.

We had thought that this exposition of our principles would show them to
be sufficiently similar to those of the Eastern countries, so that all of us could
agree that we were aiming at the goal contemplated in General Assembly resolution
1378 (XIV), and that we could then proceed to constructive efforts to work out
detailed measures. But instead we meet with the same objections that we have met
whenever we put forward our views as to how general and complete disarmament might
be approached. In effect, we are met by the dogma that nothing -- nothing
whatever -- but the Soviet plan could be considered as general and complete
disarmament. We feel that this is rather an arrogant attitude. The General
Assembly resolution did not define general and complete disarmament, nor did it
make the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries sole arbiters of what
general and complete disarmament should be. Our Soviet and Eastern European
colleagues seem to take the position that nothing they do not define as general
and complete disarmament can be what the United Nations want. We believe that
the principles which we have set forth conform to what the majority of the United
Nations want. Speaking for the Canadian delegation, we are willing to have our
set of principles and proposals for working out general and complete disarmament
judged by the United Nations, and judged in comparison with the proposals of the
Soviet Union, as they have been expounded in this Conference.

We do not believe that the United Nations would want to listen to proposals --
or even read a draft treaty -- which would be a mere elaboration of the objectives
in the Soviet plan presented to them on 18 September, 1959, however seductive and
gratifying a vision these objectives may constitute. No, they would expect
agreements -- positive and specific agreements -- to do things constituting the
initial steps on the road towards general and complete disarmament. In other
words, the other nations would expect us to get moving along that road, and not
stand still shouting slogans about how wonderful it will be when we get to our
destination.

I should like to read again the third operative paragraph of the United
Nations resolution, in which the General Assembly's hope is expressed. I do not
know how many times this has been read before, but I will read it again. Hope of what? Hope that "measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control will be worked out in detail, and agreed upon in the shortest possible time." That is what they told us to do — to work out measures; not, as the proposal of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries suggested, that we Ten Nations here were to "accept as an urgent practical task the implementation of general and complete disarmament of all States" (TNCD/4) on the basis of principles laid down by the Soviet Union. The General Assembly did not instruct this Committee to proceed with the disarmament of the world, as the language of the proposal of the Soviet and Eastern countries would imply.

We are to work out in detail practical measures leading towards that goal, and this is what the Western nations here propose: we think it is our task to begin disarmament ourselves, and then to present to the United Nations — or to such nations as we consider are important from the viewpoint of disarmament — what we have done and what we propose they should join us in doing to make the world safer.

There is something else I should like to say. We have heard continually that Soviet Union proposals are the only ones which provide for complete disarmament. I should like to point out that in the plain meaning of language the proposals are not for complete disarmament. Why not? Because they leave arms in the hands of police forces or militia, and these forces can be very large. What kind of arms? Rifles, machine-guns and perhaps mortars, for we know that some police forces are so equipped. I should like to point out that that kind of armament is superior to the armaments with which great wars were fought a hundred and fifty years ago — superior to the armaments with which the campaign of 1312 was fought.

The Soviet proposals would not disarm the peoples of the world to the extent that international aggressions would be made impossible. Therefore there is a need for some international force to safeguard international peace and security, as proposed by the Western nations. This is the principal difference between the Soviet Union proposals and the Western nations proposals for the final stage of disarmament. All other differences, of minor significance, flow from this principal difference.
To remind my colleagues here that just because armed forces are called police forces they will not be incapable of aggression, I should like to draw the attention of representatives to troubles that have arisen recently between two great Asian nations, very serious troubles which carry the possibility of becoming graver. The aggressions in question were carried out by soldiers or policemen, who had only the sort of small arms with which the Soviet plan proposes to equip police forces—or militia. Going back about fifteen years to the beginning of another serious international dispute in the same part of the world, we know that the invasion of Kashmir was carried out by forces with only small arms, not in any sense by a highly organized military force.

Therefore, disarming down to the scale which the Soviet Union plan would call "complete" is not actually complete in the strict sense of the word. Everything is relative in this world. To quote a proverb, "in the country of the blind, the one-eyed man is King". When tanks and artillery have disappeared, the rifle, the machine-gun and the grenade will be arms powerful enough to coerce people, powerful enough to be used by anti-social groups or even nations to impose their will by force. So that the claim of the Soviet Union that their brand of disarmament is complete, while ours is not, cannot be sustained. As I said, the Western nations are willing for the truth of this to be judged by any and all nations.

We have set forth our principles in response to considerable urging from the Soviet and Eastern countries. We have had them rejected in a manner which seems to me to be little less than contemptuous. We will nevertheless continue the efforts that we are making to carry these negotiations forward, and patiently offer our proposals of a series of measures which are initial moves towards disarmament. This was done on our behalf by the representative of the United States at our meeting on 14 April (TNCD/Fv.23), and this corresponds to what, in our opinion, the General Assembly resolution called on us to do.

We are putting forward measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament, measures to be worked out in detail and to be agreed upon in the shortest possible time. And what do the Soviet Union and the Eastern delegations offer us? Not immediate measures of disarmament, or a speedy move towards disarmament, but slogans, promises of distant benefits, a prolonged debate on dogmas about what shall be at the end of the disarmament process.
The Canadian delegation would hope that we all here, representatives of the ten nations, can put an end to sterile wrangling, about disarmament dogmas and shibboleths, and at least decide, before we recess, on some measures common to the Western and the Eastern plans on which, when we reassemble, we can base negotiations that can have some chance of bearing fruit.

Mr. Nosk (Czechoslovakia): First of all I would like to say that during the last two days a new feature has appeared in our discussions. It seems to us that the vocabulary used in our Conference is being enlarged by the addition of certain expressions. We do not regard this new attitude of the Western delegations as helpful to our work, and therefore we do not propose to follow their example.

I would now like to make some comments on document TNCD/5 submitted yesterday on behalf of the Western countries by the representative of France, Mr. Moch, entitled "Proposal ... concerning principles and conditions for general and complete disarmament and effective international control".

The delegations of the Socialist countries have already expressed their regret at the fact that this document was submitted only just before the closing of the first stage of our negotiation. We emphasize this fact all the more because the joint proposal of the delegations of the socialist countries on the "Basic principles of general and complete disarmament" had already been submitted on 8 April 1960. Despite all our invitations the delegations of the Western countries, however, were all the time refusing a businesslike discussion of it.

It goes without saying that the document submitted by the delegations of the Western countries requires careful study. Nevertheless, I would like to make some remarks on various points of the new document of the delegations of the Western countries. We welcome the fact that this new document talks about general and complete disarmament and effective international control. Likewise, we welcome the fact that in this document resolution 1378 (XIV), as well as the fact that in that resolution the General Assembly has called upon Governments to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and to work out detailed measures leading to this goal in the shortest possible time, are stressed. On the other hand, first acquaintance with the text of the document as a whole already
Mr. Nosek, Czechoslovakia

indicates that the measures contained in it do not provide for general and complete disarmament; and it seems that the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, has just confirmed this conclusion of ours.

As has already been pointed out by the delegations of other socialist countries, the new document of the delegations of the Western countries does not provide for disbandment and complete liquidation of all armed forces, and the destruction of armaments, but only for "reduction and limitation". We deem this fact to be one of the basic deficiencies of the document submitted at yesterday's meeting by delegations of the Western countries. We cannot rid ourselves of the impression that this wording testifies furthermore that the Western countries continue to avoid the implementation of general and complete disarmament notwithstanding the fact that they have at last, for the first time after six weeks of negotiations, subscribed -- at least, in words -- to the programme of general and complete disarmament.

Another shortcoming of the document submitted by the delegations of the Western countries is, in our view, the fact that it repeatedly avoids any mention of the necessity to liquidate, in the process of the accomplishment of general and complete disarmament, military bases on foreign territories as well. The arguments introduced in this connexion at yesterday's meeting by the representative of France, Mr. Moch, are quite unconvincing and unsatisfactory. If the delegations of the Western countries are honestly reckoning on the liquidation of military bases on foreign territories in the course of the implementation of the programme proposed by them, then we cannot understand why they refused to include in their proposal the liquidation of these bases as well.

In my intervention this morning I do not intend to touch on all aspects of the proposal submitted by the delegations of the Western countries. Quite a number of them have already been discussed at yesterday's meeting, as well as in today's intervention by the representative of Romania, Mr. Mezincescu.

The Czechoslovakian delegation would like to dwell briefly only on paragraphs (a) and (c) of the document of the delegations of the Western countries.

Paragraph (a) says:
"disarmament must be carried out by stages, each stage to be completed as rapidly as possible although no fixed timetable can be laid down in advance for the process of disarmament as a whole."
We welcome the fact that in the first part of this paragraph the delegations of the Western countries adopted the principle formulated in paragraph 2 of the proposal of "Basic principles of general and complete disarmament" submitted on 8 April by the delegations of the socialist countries, that is, that the programme of "general and complete disarmament shall be carried out ... by stages", but a serious difference between the document submitted by the delegations of the socialist countries and the document tabled yesterday by the delegations of the Western countries appears in connexion with the question of the timing of the programme of general and complete disarmament. While the proposal of the delegations of the socialist countries provides for an exactly fixed time-limit for the implementation of the whole programme of general and complete disarmament, the delegations of the Western countries not only omit completely from their document this essential point but even declare that no fixed and binding timetable can be set for the whole process of general and complete disarmament.

The question of time-limits has been discussed many times during our negotiations so far and in our view it has been clarified that a fixed time-limit for various disarmament measures and also for individual stages can be set down, and this has also been confirmed by Mr. Ormsby-Gore in his intervention of yesterday. Therefore we see no reason why it should not be possible to fix also a timetable for the implementation of the whole programme of general and complete disarmament as a summary of individual disarmament measures having to be accomplished in individual stages. It is not quite clear to us why the delegations of the Western Powers so stubbornly resist the setting down of a time-limit for the implementation of the whole programme of general and complete disarmament.

The representative of France, Mr. Moch, however intimated, as it seems, in his yesterday's intervention the real reasons leading to the negative attitude of the delegations of the Western Powers to the establishment of a time-limit for the whole programme of general and complete disarmament. Mr. Moch stated:

"But we Westerners do not believe it possible to affirm today that within a specific time-limit — even if it is extended from four years to five or six years — trust will be re-established, the panic fear of spying will have disappeared, belief in the virtues of secrecy will have faded and political disputes will have been settled." (INCD/PV.29, page 13)
Hence it follows that the reasons for refusing the setting down of a timetable for the realization of the whole programme of general and complete disarmament are not based on the nature of disarmament measures or on the alleged impossibility of setting down such a timetable, or such a time-limit, but on the fact that the delegations of the Western countries intend obviously to link the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament to the solution of controversial international political questions and to the renewal of mutual confidence in relations among States.

As it follows also from paragraph (d) of the new document of the delegations of the Western countries and from the explanations we have been given at our yesterday's meeting by Mr. Moch and Mr. Ormsby-Gore, the delegations of the Western countries make the accomplishment of various disarmament measures dependent on the fulfilment of preliminary conditions lying outside the field of disarmament. In paragraph (d) it is directly provided for that the disarmament measures have to be discussed and agreed upon progressively. It becomes evident, as it has just been stated by the representative of Romania, Mr. Mezinescu, that the delegations of the Western countries are not interested in working out a programme of general and complete disarmament as a whole but only individual measures.

As the representative of France, Mr. Moch, clearly intimated, the Western delegations have in mind that passing on from one measure to the other should be made dependent on the solution of various political questions lying, as I have said already, outside the field of disarmament. This approach of the Western Powers is very similar to that which was in the past one of the serious reasons why all negotiations on disarmament have failed.

The Czechoslovak delegation, although it welcomes the first part of paragraph (a) of the new document of the delegations of the Western countries cannot agree with its second part because, as we have stated many times in our previous interventions, the setting down of exact time-limits for the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament is a basic prerequisite of its realistic nature. The importance of this fact is also determined by the necessity of safeguarding an effective international control over general and complete disarmament. How is it possible to imagine an effective control over the implementation of a certain disarmament measure if it is not decided when this measure has to be implemented?
The fact that the delegations of the Western countries refuse to set down an exact time-limit for the realization of general and complete disarmament means that they themselves deprive their proposal of a concrete and binding character and that they render an effective control over its implementation impossible.

I should like to make some comments on paragraph (c) of the proposal of the Western countries containing the general principles of international control over general and complete disarmament. As we had already the opportunity of noting in the past, agreement has been reached during our negotiations that disarmament measures must be permanently and effectively controlled by an international disarmament organ. Particular disarmament measures would be subject to this control from the very moment of their coming into force and during the whole process of disarmament, and the international control would continue even after the accomplishment of the whole disarmament programme.

In the course of our discussions we have also reached another agreement on the question of control, that is to say, that the control must be commensurate with, must correspond to the scope and character of the disarmament measures to be controlled. This principle emanates directly from another principle dealt with many times by the representatives of the Western countries, that there must be no control without disarmament and no disarmament without control.

In the view of the delegations of the Socialist countries the formulation of paragraph (c), submitted yesterday by the delegations of the Western countries, avoids these mutually recognized principles of control and is therefore incomplete. In its present wording paragraph (c) of the proposal of the Western Powers would admit a control not commensurate with the scope of disarmament, which means in other words that there would be control without disarmament. We consider this to be a further serious gap in the new proposal of the Western countries, and the statement made this morning by the representative of Italy, Mr. Martino, did not convince us that this is not so.

The shortcoming in paragraph (c) of the proposal of the Western delegations on the question of control clearly comes to light by comparing it with paragraph 3 of the "Basic principles of general and complete disarmament" submitted by the delegations of the Socialist countries on 8 April. This proposal covers all the aspects of control and fully complies with all principles on which we have so far reached a rapprochement of views in the course of our negotiations on the question of effective international control over general and complete disarmament.
We would welcome if it the delegations of the Western countries would explain to us why they did not include in their proposal "concerning principles and conditions for general and complete disarmament under effective international control", such essential principles of control as, for instance, the principle that "there must be no control without disarmament and no disarmament without control", and further that "the scope and character of control measures must be commensurate with the scope and character of disarmament measures being controlled".

As I have already pointed out in the first part of my statement this morning, the proposal of the delegations of the Western countries submitted yesterday -- in spite of its shortcomings, which were referred to by the delegations of the Socialist countries in their statements -- contains some positive aspects. We especially welcome the fact that the delegations of the Western Powers admitted, after all, their adherence to the programme of general and complete disarmament as the main task given our Committee by resolution 1376 (XIV) of the United Nations General Assembly. This fact allows us the possibility of striving for the working out of principles of general and complete disarmament under effective international control in the shortest possible time on the basis of this resolution on general and complete disarmament. We believe that the proposal concerning "Basic principles of general and complete disarmament" submitted by the delegations of the Socialist countries on 8 April is the best basis for the accomplishment of this task. On the contrary, as we have demonstrated, the proposal presented by the delegations of the Western countries, contains many shortcomings. The Czechoslovak delegation has pointed to some of these shortcomings in its intervention today. We would welcome it if the delegations of the Western countries further clarified their proposal.

Mr. MOCH (France) (translation from French): In order to shorten a debate which is already too long, I should like to subscribe fully to the forceful and judicious remarks of Mr. Burns. They applied to the preceding statement made by Mr. Mezinescu, the representative of Romania, and they apply equally, a priori, to the later statement of the representative of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Nosek. I can only regret that we have been heading at increased speed into a dead end.
The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): As no other representative wishes to speak, I will now read the communique:

"The thirtieth meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament was held in the Palais des Nations in Geneva on 27 April 1960, under the chairmanship of the representative of the United Kingdom.

"The next meeting of the Conference will take place on Thursday, 28 April, at 10.30 a.m."

If there are no objections, the communique is adopted.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.