FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THIRD MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Thursday, 17 March 1960, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. BURNS (Canada)


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<td>Mr. K. CHISTOV</td>
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<td>Canada:</td>
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<td>Czechoslovakia:</td>
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<td>Mr. Z. TRHLIK</td>
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<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:</td>
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<td>Mr. A.A. ROCHSHIN</td>
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PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:
Rt. Hon. D. ORMSBY-GORE
Sir Michael WRIGHT
Miss B. Silt

United States of America:
Mr. F.M. EATON
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Rear-Admiral F.L. DUDLEY

Secretariat:
Personal Representative of the Secretary-General:
Dr. D. PROITCH

Deputy Personal Representative of the Secretary-General:
Mr. W. EPSTEIN
The CHAIRMAN (Canada): 'I declare open the third meeting of the
Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament. The first on the list of speakers today is
the honourable representative of Poland.

Mr. NASZKOWSKI (Poland) (translation from French): The task of
our Committee, as I emphasized in my statement at the first meeting, has been
clearly defined in the United Nations General Assembly's resolution of
20 November 1959. According to that resolution it is our task to work out a
plan for general and complete disarmament and to reach an agreement on this
plan in the shortest possible time.

The Polish delegation believes that these aims can only be achieved if
disarmament measures accompanied by appropriate control machinery are
taken -- measures which should lead to the complete liquidation of military
institutions in all countries and make it impossible to organize and build up
military forces anew, in any form whatsoever. The time factor, too, is of no
little importance. For we know that any delay in taking a decision on
disarmament makes it more difficult to stop the armaments race. Hence our
primary task is to take decisions which aim at achieving really complete, general
and rapid disarmament.

In our view all these factors are fully taken into account in the plan
presented by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/4219). We do not wish
to go into all the details of this plan now, at the beginning of our discussion;
besides, the Head of the Soviet delegation spoke about some features of it yesterday.
I would like, however, to refer to one of the parts of the Soviet plan, its first
stage, and use this example to show the concrete nature of the plan. It provides,
in fact, for reduction of the armed forces of the five greatest Powers in the world,
under appropriate control, to levels considerably below the present levels. It also
provides for reduction of the armed forces of other countries to a level to be
agreed at a special session of the United Nations General Assembly or at a world
conference on general and complete disarmament. An appropriate reduction in the
armaments available to the forces of the different countries is the logical
complement to such a reduction of their strength. The level of the remaining
armaments would thus meet the needs of the armed forces to be maintained.
It seems obvious to us that these measures are entirely realistic. We begin with conventional armaments: these are the least difficult to reduce. It would be wrong to contend that such a step would be of no importance; for to set the machinery of disarmament in motion would in itself be a big step towards stopping the arms race. This in turn would improve the climate of international relations, strengthen mutual confidence and facilitate the adoption of new disarmament measures. At the moment, indeed, the essential point is to break the deadlock which has so long prevented a solution of this problem. The limitation of armed forces and conventional armaments would also have very important immediate practical results.

The military expenditure included in the budgets of many countries, large and small, weighs heavily on their economies. The maintenance of forces and conventional armaments is not the least expensive item, even though it costs less than nuclear weapons. Thus the limitation of armed forces and conventional armaments would reduce such expenditure and make it possible to use vast sums of money much more constructively, for economic and cultural development.

The document (TNCD/3) submitted to us by the five Powers also includes a first stage of which we would now like to make a preliminary examination. What is provided for in this first stage?

It is proposed to set up complicated control machinery whose functions would in the beginning at least, be undetermined. It is proposed to collect all kinds of information regarding the present level of land, sea and air forces. A question arises here: What is the purpose of drawing up such an inventory? I take leave to express serious doubts on this question: Would such action slow down the armaments race?

It is proposed to collect information regarding the financial systems of the different countries and data showing what percentage of their budgets is for military expenditure. Here again, it is difficult to agree that centralization of this kind of information constitutes a disarmament measure. Nearly forty years ago the Mixed Commission of the League of Nations began its activities with a similar undertaking. We know the results of its subsequent work. It may also be useful to recall that in 1921 the report of this Mixed Commission for the reduction of armaments — also drawn up in Geneva — while declaring that such statistical data were useful, at the same time emphasized that in themselves they certainly could not solve the problem of disarmament.
A few years later, in 1926, when the Preparatory Commission of the Disarmament Conference was entrusted with the drafting of a disarmament convention, one of the eminent statesmen of that time, Lord Robert Cecil, recognized that to study the particulars of every country's military potential would take so long and would so complicate the problem that it would not be possible to reach agreement. The work undertaken at that time dealt both with armed forces and armaments, and with the economic potential of the various countries. Precisely in view of the experience of the League of Nations, we must conclude that results cannot be achieved in disarmament by taking this course.

The five-Power plan provides, in its first stage, for complicated studies on the technical aspects of missile launching and nuclear weapons and for the study of means of preventing surprise attacks and numerous other problems, of which the document mentions no less than eight. What is proposed is thus a series of investigations, studies, and theoretical dissertations. There is no question of any concrete decision such as the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly enjoins us to take. There is no question of any time limit; the study period could therefore continue indefinitely. The United Kingdom representative, Mr. Ormsby-Gore, told us yesterday that the first stage might take about a year. But this does not seem to be much of a commitment, since no time-limit for the execution of the plan as a whole has been set, and, according to Mr. Ormsby-Gore himself, this was intentional.

The only concrete measure provided for in the first stage of the five-Power plan is the establishment of a ceiling level for the armed forces of the United States and the Soviet Union. But can we regard even this as a concrete disarmament measure, when the ceiling proposed is 2,500,000 men? It is difficult to regard this measure a reduction; it rather confirms the present position.

What is more, in the case of the Soviet Union, the 2,500,000 proposed in the five-Power plan is above the level at which the armed forces will remain after the unilateral reduction recently announced by the Soviet Government. It must be added that even the reduction of forces proposed by the five Powers would only be carried out after a system of initial and continuing verification had been set up. The question is treated differently in the Soviet plan, the first stage of which provides for effective reduction of the armed forces of the Great Powers.

Mr. Chairman, I have made a few preliminary comments on the first stage of the disarmament plan submitted by the Soviet Union and on the first stage of the
document concerning which the United Kingdom representative spoke yesterday on behalf of his delegation. On the basis of those comments, I ask your permission to put the following questions to the authors of the five-Power plan.

1. The plan provides for the establishment of an international disarmament organization. What are the functions of this organization in regard to concrete disarmament intended to be during the first stage, which is almost wholly given over to negotiations?

2. The plan provides in the first stage, for the storage, under the supervision of the international disarmament organization, of certain quantities of conventional armaments, bearing a relationship to the agreed force levels. Since the level of the armed forces of the two greatest Powers is not to undergo any change and the reduction in the forces of other States has not been specified, what armaments are to be placed in the storage depots?

3. Any discussion of military budgets can only be justified if it concerns their reduction. What, then, is the purpose of collecting information on military budgets during a stage which does not provide for their reduction?

Mr. Eaton (United States of America): I will not endeavour to respond directly to the three questions which have been raised by the representative of Poland, other than to say that I think they are very useful questions and that the exploration of those questions and their answers will be quite useful to our proceedings here as I know we all so earnestly desire to reach an agreement.

I would also like to say that, so far as my own delegation is concerned, we could in large part endorse much of the early part of the statement by the representative of Poland. I think he has put the problem in a very clear way. He has indicated the need for progressing in a careful manner. We may have a different emphasis as to those matters which we would put first, but those are matters which I hope this Conference will materially help to clarify. I, therefore, would like to thank the representative of Poland for contributing to the useful work of this Conference.

I think perhaps one of the most encouraging factors, as we begin our discussions here, is that it would appear to be commonly agreed among us all that general disarmament is an important means of obtaining the objective which we all so earnestly seek of a generally disarmed world where men can live at peace with themselves. I believe that to start with that as a general objective upon which we are so universally agreed is quite a move in itself.
Therefore, I think it is important that we should leave this subject for the moment, for there are so many other areas on which we must reach agreement. I, for one, am willing to assume that we are all desirous of achieving the goal of general and complete disarmament and, so far as I am concerned, I do not see any need to continue to repeat it as that would only consume time of which we have so little, as has been pointed out so well and so many times by various delegations of those that are assembled here. We should concentrate on the problem of how we can get on to this work. How do we reach this goal? We have to make a start.

It is our feeling that if we spend our early hours here, our early weeks, our early months in the discussion of those measures which, in the course of events, can only appear when the early measures have been agreed, we shall only tend to frustrate our efforts. Past conferences have fallen down on the fences that lay across many fields ahead. I would urge that we should initially address ourselves to those early measures which all of us can agree must be taken, adopted and assured before the final steps of disarmament can be attained. In the normal course of events, one must walk before one can run — and none of us has really learned to walk in this field of disarmament. The race has been going on now for many thousands of years. The first disarmament conference in recorded history took place around the 9th Century B.C. between the Chinese pirates on the Shanghai River. From that day to this we have been discussing disarmament, but very little has been achieved.

I would suggest strongly that one of the reasons for this lack of progress has been that our predecessors have permitted themselves to become bogged down in the details of measures which should be preceded by other, earlier measures, to which I hope we shall address ourselves. I am, therefore, once again grateful to the delegate from Poland for stressing early in his speech the need to address ourselves to preliminary measures. The question of what those measures should be and which of them permit of the earliest agreement is one that may usefully be discussed at a quite early stage.

A great deal has been said here to the effect that we should arrive suddenly at this goal of final disarmament. For that reason I was glad that Mr. Zorin — and I believe I quote him correctly — commented, that it would be unrealistic to deprive the system of control of its effectiveness since this could lead to evasion of disarmament obligations by certain governments, which would be dangerous for the cause of peace.
Here is an area which, of itself, calls for exploration. No experience has been gained of control organizations. That is one of the reasons why, in this free world plan, we have tried as best we may to place the international disarmament organization - one of the subjects that cannot be too controversial - in an early part of the first paragraph. I should like to say here that the paragraphing, and order of paragraphs, within the various parts of the proposal advanced yesterday by the representative of the United Kingdom does not in any way indicate any order of priority so far as we are concerned. We are prepared to talk about any of them early or late. We do not insist on any strict order of priority for the question of the international disarmament organization. We think it would be usefully discussed at that stage, but we have not attempted in the plan to indicate rigorously the order in which we might be prepared to discuss matters. I think that it was indicated the day before yesterday by M. Moshe that this was not a set or fixed thing: that we were prepared to discuss parts of the plan.

Be that as it may, somehow we must undertake some studies. This talk of suddenly being able to abandon all arms without discussion seems quite unrealistic and inconceivable. It may, of course, be through language difficulty that I understand some of the delegates to talk about throwing our arms away, about getting rid of them in some short period of time. General disarmament will not come like Venus, springing out of the waves off the Island of Cythera without any proper period of gestation; or as Pallas Athene from the brow of Zeus. There simply has to be some discussion. We are engaged in it here. Is this an abortive venture? Should we have thrown away our arms before we sat down here? Perhaps this should not be called a study: perhaps it is a discussion? Perhaps it is an area in which we will try to reach agreement? In our plan we have used the word "study" to indicate simply that thoughtful consideration must be given to problems as serious as those which we are considering here. It would be totally irresponsible for all of us sitting here to indicate to the world that in some irresponsible fashion we proposed simply to throw away those things which we have used and found so necessary in the past.

I regret that I may have perhaps spoken a little too rapidly for the interpreters and I do apologize, if what I have said has not come through faithfully. Our plan is put forward with the greatest seriousness. Part of the world press has indicated that this is not so. I can assure all of you here that the
plan, which may well be one that is not acceptable, was arrived at after only the most thorough consideration with a view to propounding something that we hoped would be acceptable to all, and would be marked by a lack of rigidity which would permit the fullest discussion.

It includes a number of features that are to be found in Mr. Khrushchev's proposal also. A careful comparison of the two will indicate that there are broad areas of common agreement. There are, too, very real differences. I have commented on the time factor. The speed with which we move will be determined entirely by the progress we make towards a responsible plan and the speed with which the measures here agreed upon can be implemented.

However, if there be any idea that my country will enter into substantial measures which would reduce our own security without adequate means to ensure that the commitments of other nations are being carried out, I urge that any who hold that belief abandon it, and abandon it now.

I should like to comment for a moment on what I think could quite properly be a misunderstanding of a plan which we have tried to reduce to its simplest form for presentation so that there will be as little room for misunderstanding as possible. But words never quite permit the accomplishment of objectives. There was a comment this morning about the first stage containing nothing but studies. This might well appear from a first reading of the plan, and therefore I was glad to hear yesterday that the most careful consideration will be given to the plan before decisions are taken. It is set up in three parts, but from our own standpoint we look on Parts I and II as simply being scenes in a single act and where we are prepared and where we would feel that all responsible nations would be prepared to take action without further reflection or study than that which can take place here. We say that action shall be taken forthwith and this has to do with the furnishing of information; it has to do with an immediate agreement to establish force levels at somewhere near existing levels, so far as we are concerned, and at levels which within a year and a half will be attained by the Soviets, according to Mr. Khrushchev.

Here again, let me stop on the four years. When you consider that to get rid of just the froth, the 1.2 million men that are found to be excess by the Soviets, will take a year and a half, and we talk about getting rid of all arms, abandoning them all, doing away with all armaments in four years: is this not in
itself some indication of the unrealism of any feeling that in four years time you could not only have the discussions that we are having here, reach agreements, set up reasonable procedures and then have all armaments disappear from the world?

But it is not my purpose here today in any way to discuss the Soviet proposals. This is for another day, and I only comment on this particular phase of it as it came to mind as I went down through my discussions here. We believe that we should take immediate steps to deny forever in outer space the presence there of weapons of destruction, and we think we ought to get on with that quickly so that the mistakes that were made twelve years ago, at the time that the race in the nuclear field might have been arrested, and which now in retrospect I am sure we all regret, had not been taken, that we will not find ourselves twelve years hence where we will regret that at these meetings we are now attending we did not take those steps which still could prevent outer space from being used as an area for destroying man.

In the missile field, a field that is giving all nations such concern, we believe that considerable relaxation could come to the world if all nations felt that there was some auditing, some feeling that the flight of missiles would not come about through error or miscalculation. We should like to have in the first stage an agreement which would give some measure of protection against this fear. Again let me say, so that it will not be misunderstood, and in this I am sure I speak for all of my colleagues who worked so hard to produce this proposal, that the first paragraphs, paragraphs I and II, we look on as constituting a single phase. They are broken down in this order merely because in the normal course of events those items that are contained in II will follow the items in I. But this does not mean that I is a stage which must be completed and then we move on to II; I and II merge. I should like, therefore, if we could have it understood, that when we are speaking of a first phase, a first stage, we are talking about that combination of measures which are included within Parts I and II of the paper to which Mr. Ormsby-Gore addressed himself yesterday.

In the first stage we believe that the production of fissionable materials must be stopped. You recall that in 1955 or 1956, both Mr. Bulganin and President Eisenhower recognized that we had passed the point of no return on the detection of nuclear weapons, that those weapons could be so shielded that unless you were within a relatively few yards of a weapon it would be hard to determine that that weapon existed. In speaking of weapons here, I speak not of the vehicles
for carrying the weapons but of the warhead, the destructive element. With fissionable materials, before there is a proliferation of production of fissionable materials and in the very first stage of the plan which we have presented here, we have suggested that we agree among ourselves that we will discontinue the production of these materials which have caused the world such concern. To put it later on, perhaps this will be necessary, but it seems rather a pity that if agreement could be reached now to stop this ever-growing stockpile of fissionable materials, that agreement not be promptly arrived at; then we could begin to transfer to peaceful purposes, to the use of mankind in a constructive fashion these materials which will be the foundation of a great new area of growth over the entire world.

I shall conclude now with only one comment. I think I speak on behalf of all of my own colleagues in saying that we are not wedded to a form. We want to get on with the work, and we would hope that after these initial talks which we will find, I hope, beneficial in clarifying our ideas, we will sit promptly down and not be impeded by formalism, that we will get down early to those essential early measures which must be taken if we are going to find our way successfully to our eventual goal.

Mr. NOSEK (Czechoslovakia): The representative of the United States, Mr. Eaton, stressed in his intervention the urgent need for early measures in the field of general and complete disarmament. It is very encouraging, I think, to hear the words "general and complete disarmament" from the representative of the United States. I fully agree with him that the working out of effective measures to be implemented as soon as possible in the field of general and complete disarmament is surely a very urgent task. To be realistic in our approach, I think we must first come to an agreement as to what is the real task ahead of us. Therefore, I would like to explain in my intervention this morning how general and complete disarmament is understood by the Czechoslovak delegation.

By General Assembly Resolution 1378(XIV), our Committee has been entrusted to work out means of reaching an agreement on general and complete disarmament in the shortest possible time. For the successful accomplishment of this task of historic importance the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament must approach the consideration of all submitted proposals having in mind the basic requirement that the proposed measures really solve the question of general and complete
disarmament. This criterion, in the opinion of my delegation, must serve as a

touchstone for all proposals. Until now such a degree of feverish piling up of

armaments as we are witnessing today has never been seen and never has mankind

faced such a burning problem as the one of averting the threat that the world may

be engulfed in a nuclear missile war. Enormous energy released by the splendid

discoveries of science can be misused to unleash a new world war with all its

catastrophic consequences. Therefore, it is up to us not to allow such a war.

It is our duty, the duty of this Committee, to find means of abolishing forever the

very possibility of starting a war.

During the past two days some members of this Committee, among them

representatives of the Western countries, have already warned us and very correctly

drawn our attention to the fact that the rapid development of means of warfare and

the danger of an armed conflict which ensues from it put before us a most urgent

task -- to reach an agreement as soon as possible on the solution of the vital

question of general and complete disarmament. If we do not, we shall inevitably

face the situation mentioned in the speech made by the representative of France,

Mr. Jules Moch, two days ago when he warned us of the danger that our negotiations

could be surpassed by the quick development of science. The words used by

Mr. Moch -- "science makes faster progress than our negotiations" -- remind us of other

words used thirty-three years ago, that is, twelve years before the outbreak of the

Second World War, during the disarmament talks in 1927 by the British representative,

Lord Cecil. The Polish delegate has already quoted Lord Cecil this morning but

I hope I shall be permitted to quote him once more. Lord Cecil, in his letter of

resignation wrote: "We shall meet on the banks of the Lake of Geneva at the

Ninth, Tenth and Twelfth Sessions and we shall talk about disarmament until,

unfortunately, war will interrupt our business". It is quite obvious that we

cannot afford a repetition of such a situation today. The danger of a nuclear

conflict, which could be provoked as a consequence of technical failure or

misunderstanding, requires the realisation of general and complete disarmament in

the shortest possible time and without any unnecessary delay. It is not by

coincidence that the words "general and complete disarmament" have been used

simultaneously in General Assembly Resolution 1378(XV). These two terms are inter-

related; they are mutually and inseparably linked together. The omission of one

of these terms would mean that we should never attain our goal, which we must

constantly keep in mind -- to rule out forever the threat of war for mankind.
It is not my intention to dwell on a profound analysis of the linguistics of this question, which could lead us from the substance of the matter. I would only like to stress that a comparison of the submitted proposals demonstrates that in the present formulation of these proposals there is but one which meets the requirement of general and complete disarmament. The proposal submitted by the Government of the Soviet Union at the Fourteenth Session of the General Assembly sets out unequivocally the goal of the realization of general and complete disarmament, while the proposal of the Western Powers submitted yesterday speaks of general and comprehensive but not general and complete disarmament. Inasmuch as the Western Powers have in mind the same goal as is laid down in the resolution of the fourteenth session of the General Assembly, there is no reason why we should not use the words "general and complete disarmament" in official documents and formal proposals as well as in speeches and interventions. Any proposal which tends to avoid such a clear determination of the purpose of our negotiations arouses some doubts and even some fear that it does not contain measures aiming at general and complete disarmament. Of course, there is not only the question of the title of the disarmament plan involved -- it is not only a question of words -- but also that of the concrete measures to be included in a general and complete disarmament plan. The term general disarmament means that disarmament measures include all States. General disarmament means that it is impossible to approach disarmament measures which involve only certain States or a group of States while other States stand aside. In such a way a dangerous disproportion would necessarily arise and thereby cause a threat to peace. Only the Soviet proposals for disarmament includes in all stages such measures relating to all States in an appropriate manner.

"General disarmament" means further that it includes all armed forces and all weapons. What do we mean by "complete disarmament"? The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in proposing the plan of his Government required the carrying out of such measures as would lead to the complete liquidation of armed forces and armaments as well as of all military institutions and organizations in all States without exception. After the realization of these measures there would remain at the disposal of States only strictly limited contingents of police forces equipped with fire arms for the maintenance of internal order and the protection of the personal security of citizens of individual States. No country would possess means which would enable it to commit aggression against other States.
One cannot imagine complete disarmament unless all stockpiles of conventional as well as atomic and hydrogen weapons, and stockpiles of all chemical and bacteriological means of warfare, are completely destroyed. The final destruction of these weapons, as well as of their stockpiles, is to be kept in mind not only as our ultimate goal but also during the implementation of disarmament measures. This means that the depositing of such arms, even if carried out under international control as provided for in the five-Power plan (TNCD/3) as submitted yesterday by the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Ormsby-Gore, in our opinion cannot be considered as a disarmament measure and cannot lead to complete disarmament. In order to achieve complete disarmament it is necessary to destroy successively in all stages all weapons so that they are eliminated from the armaments of armed forces.

The term "general and complete disarmament" involves necessarily the obligation not only to abolish completely all armed forces and to destroy their armaments but also to prohibit their re-establishment in any form. As an individual part of the fulfilment of this obligation we must consider also abolishing supreme military organizations in all States -- that is, war ministries and general staffs. After the implementation of general and complete disarmament -- that is, after disbandment of all armed forces and after liquidation of all arms -- the existence of war ministries and general staffs will not be justified and will even be dangerous, I would like to add.

Proposals such as that submitted jointly by the delegations of Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States which do not provide for carrying out these measures, and which on the contrary it seems to us intend to preserve military institutions, would make it possible at any time to return to the old policy of a feverish armaments race and to the preparation of new military plans for an armed conflict.

In this connexion I feel it would be useful to remind the Conference of the inconsistent accomplishment of the demilitarization of defeated Germany after World War I. The fact of the continuing existence of the German general staff, of military and paramilitary organizations and institutions was one of the essential factors causing a revival of German militarism which led directly to aggression by German Fascism and World War II. One of the first victims of this aggression was my own country of Czechoslovakia.
Parallel with the necessity for abolishing war ministries, general staffs and other military and para-military organizations and institutions during the process of carrying out general and complete disarmament goes the realization of other methods which should ensure that armed forces which are disbanded in the course of general and complete disarmament shall never be re-established in the future. Up to now it has been a matter of the disbandment of all military organizations and a banning of any military training for the citizens of individual States.

The thorough execution of all these measures would ensure that after the realization of general and complete disarmament there would be no chance to proceed once again with the re-establishment of armed forces and a renewed threat to a world of peace.

All the measures which I have just mentioned are embraced and exactly worked out in the proposal of the Soviet Union on general and complete disarmament, but we find these measures are missing from the joint plan of the five Western delegations.

Apart from this, I should like to mention a further aspect of general and complete disarmament. In his intervention yesterday the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Ormsby-Gore, stated that disarmament "must embrace all kinds of forces and weapons" (TNCD/PV.2, page 6). We can certainly agree with that statement and requirement. If, however, we compare that declaration by the United Kingdom representative yesterday with the language of the joint plan submitted yesterday, we must note with astonishment that the plan does not contain a single word about the abolition of military bases on the territories of foreign States and the withdrawal of all foreign troops to within their own national frontiers. In our view the very existence of military bases on the territories of foreign States represents a serious threat to peace, because it increases the danger of the possibility of the unleashing of an armed conflict in which nuclear weapons would be used. Therefore, in our opinion, any proposal for general and complete disarmament must also include the liquidation of these bases.

The USSR proposal on general and complete disarmament provides for the liquidation of all military bases on the territories of foreign States, in the second stage, simultaneously with the abolishment of the remaining armed forces. Under the USSR proposal armed forces, including armaments, will be withdrawn to their own national frontiers and disbanded, and their armaments will be destroyed.
Finally, I should like to stress one of the most important problems -- namely, that a solution of the question of complete nuclear disarmament must be one of the basic tasks of general and complete disarmament. There is therefore full justification for the fact that this requirement forms one of the main points of the USSR proposal, which provides that in the third stage of the disarmament programme there should be a total ban of atomic and hydrogen weapons, including the complete prohibition of their use, the cessation of the production of all types of such weapons, their elimination from the armaments of States, and the destruction of stockpiles of such weapons.

A consistent solution of the question of nuclear disarmament requires not only the achievement of prohibition of the production of nuclear weapons eventually -- as proposed in the joint plan of Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States -- providing for, as a future remote goal, the liquidation of all their existing stocks, but also the proclamation of an unconditional ban on the use of such weapons and the complete destruction of the existing stocks. To separate the ban on the production of nuclear weapons from the prohibition of the use and the complete liquidation of the stockpiles of such weapons necessarily means to avoid a consistent solution of the question of nuclear disarmament.

In my intervention today I have tried to explain the way in which the Czechoslovak delegation understands measures to achieve general and complete disarmament. I have also mentioned some points which are nuclear and some gaps in the proposal submitted by the delegations of the five Western countries. To avoid any misunderstanding and confusion the Czechoslovak delegation would welcome it if the authors of the joint Western proposal would be kind enough to answer some questions which I should now like to put.

My first question is the following. The Soviet Union programme for general and complete disarmament proposes as one of the important measures the liquidation of all military bases on foreign territories. I have referred to this point in my intervention. Does the proposal of the five Western delegations envisage the same kind of measures?

My second question is this. Does the plan of the Western delegations provide for the termination of military training, the abolition of war ministries, general staffs and various military and para-military institutions and organizations? Does it provide for the prohibition of the re-establishment of armed forces in any form?
My next question is the following. The proposal of the Western delegations contains no explicit provision concerning the banning of the use of nuclear weapons. We should like to know if there is any intention to make a declaration concerning these significant measures and, if so, at which stage.

My last question is this. The proposal of the Western delegations does not provide for the destruction of nuclear weapon stockpiles deposited in custody under international control. In the view of the authors of the Western proposal when will the complete liquidation of deposited weapons take place?

Mr. MOGH (France) (translation from French): I did not intend to speak today, but I will tell you in a moment what induced me to do so. First I should like to say to our Polish and Czechoslovak colleagues that the Western delegations will of course reply to the seven questions which those colleagues have just raised: but I shall not do so today. What I intend to do is less ambitious. I should like to take the liberty, on this third day of our discussions, of recalling exactly why we are here.

I am constantly hearing talk of "general and complete disarmament", and our Czechoslovak colleague has just said we are here to work out rapidly measures for general and complete disarmament.

I willingly acknowledge that those words do not appear in the Political Committee’s report; but we here are not an emanation of the United Nations Political Committee. Furthermore, I am going to cite the complete text, because by being attenuated and separated from its context, it is sometimes made to state the opposite of what is expressed.

We are here in consequence of a letter dated 7 September 1959 from the representatives of France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America to the Secretary-General (DC/144), which was itself the result of an Agreement, in identical terms, signed by the four Foreign Ministers including Mr. Gromyko, Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

What does this text, our fundamental basis, say? It first of all points out that the United Nations Charter recognizes that disarmament matters are of worldwide interest and concern. You will note that Mr. Gromyko signed this text, which speaks of the problems of disarmament in general and not of the problem of general and complete disarmament.
A little further on there is the following statement:

"The four Governments conceive of this committee as a useful means of exploring through mutual consultations avenues of possible progress toward such agreements and recommendations on the limitation and reduction of all types of armaments and armed forces under effective international control as may, in the first instance, be of particular relevance to the countries participating in these deliberations."

I would ask you to give a moment's thought to this sentence, which was agreed on by the four Ministers. The aim is to prepare agreements and recommendations on the limitation and reduction of all types of armaments and armed forces "of particular relevance to the countries participating in these deliberations", that is to say to the ten nations meeting here — and that under effective international control. That is our task, and I would almost say that is our only task. It consists in endeavours, by mutual exchanges of views, to discover the bases of agreement. Nowhere in this mandate is it stated that the only admissible basis is general and complete disarmament in four years. Of course, if we achieve this, it would be better to submit to our respective Governments an agreement on general and complete disarmament in four years, or in six, or even in eight, than partial agreements; but it is nowhere stated, as our colleagues from the Eastern half of Europe maintain that our only task is to conclude an agreement on general and complete disarmament. Where the alternative is "all or nothing", the choice is generally nothing. Personally, I prefer something to nothing.

I would moreover add that even the text sponsored by Mr. Fokini, the representative of Libya, on behalf of the First Committee, is less total — or totalitarian — than might be thought merely from its title "General and Complete Disarmament". It reads:

"Considering that the question of general and complete disarmament is the most important one facing the world today ..." (A/RES/1378 (XIV)).

On that point we all agree. That is a preambular clause. The decision is as follows:

"Transmits to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and requests the Secretary-General to make available to the ten-nation disarmament committee for thorough consideration ..." — What? —
"... the declaration of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of 17 September ..." — a plan which cannot be termed a plan for general and complete disarmament but is, rather, comprehensive —

"... the declaration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of 18 September 1959, and the other proposals or suggestions made, as well as the records ...", etc. ... (Ibid.)

Thus, I believe that we should abide by our task, and not show ourselves in any quarter or on any side to be intransigent, if we wish to achieve something.

I repeat that if I had the impression that a total, integral plan for the destruction of ministries and of military and para-military institutions, for the abolition of military budgets, the abolition of scientific research for military purposes — which is, by the way, very difficult to separate from scientific research for peaceful purposes, for when one makes a discovery one does not know where it will lead — if all that could be brought about by the wave of a magic wand, I should be the first to shout "Bravo!". But if all that is not possible — and you are well aware that the Western delegations are not ready to accept either such totalitarianism or the period indicated — then is it not better that, remaining faithful to our task, we should exchange views regarding such agreement as it may be possible to discover among us? I think that is the only possible road, and when our Polish colleague just now emphasized that the measures suggested in the Soviet plan in the first stage were the easiest to put into effect, I was tempted to reply to him: Perhaps you are right, perhaps they are easier to put into effect; but are they those which represent the heaviest weight of anxiety on the world, and on the day when we have decided that the Soviet forces, which are to be unilaterally reduced to 2,300,000 men — I am leaving out the tens of thousands — are to be further reduced to 2,100,000, will a great step forward have been taken on the road to international peace? I do not think so, because we know full well that some countries are already below the levels attributed to them, and because conventional armaments and force levels are becoming less and less important.

So that the operation of mutual concessions and compromises which we shall have to seek some day or other — and perhaps my remarks today are premature, since not everybody has yet presented his original plan — should perhaps bear
not only on the easiest questions but rather, and perhaps especially, on those which represent the greatest threat to the survival of mankind.

I do not wish to develop this idea at greater length. Mr. Eaton, who is an experienced lawyer, has just beaten the record I thought I held for reminiscences concerning disarmament. I have never gone farther back than the disarmament agreements between Greek cities two thousand years ago and between Swiss cantons eight hundred years ago. Mr. Eaton has discovered some much older agreements in China, and I congratulate him; but the lesson we have to learn is that on this occasion we must succeed. We cannot go on having failure after failure: the failure of the League of Nations, the failure of the first years of the United Nations, the failure of the Disarmament Commission from 1951 to 1957; this time we do some constructive work. We shall do such constructive work — I quote — by "exploring through mutual consultations avenues of possible progress toward such agreements and recommendations on the limitation and reduction of all types of armaments and armed forces ... as may, in the first instance, be of particular relevance to the countries participating in these deliberations."

Therein, in our view, lies our essential task.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Mr. Chairman and fellow delegates, I too did not intend to speak today but after the statement by Mr. Moch I feel obliged to say a few words, since in his statement he touched upon questions of principle. First of all, Mr. Moch spoke about the tasks facing our Committee and he drew attention to the letter of the four Ministers which refers to the agreement reached between the four Governments on the setting up of our Committee. From that letter he inferred that the task of our Committee is to work out an agreement on the limitation and reduction of armed forces. He said: "That is our task." But Mr. Moch has made one mistake. He spoke of the tasks of our Committee in the light of the communiqué of the four Foreign Ministers of 7 September 1959. But, on 20 November 1959, i.e., two and a half months later, Mr. Moch and the other representatives of the Western Powers voted for the General Assembly resolution in which it is quite clearly stated which tasks the General Assembly, all the eighty-two Member States, regard as the most important for the present stage of work in the sphere of disarmament. And in quoting that resolution, Mr. Moch, for some reason or
other, omitted the most important first operative paragraph; for some reason he quoted only the second paragraph. I do not quite understand why this was done. He began by saying that in this resolution it is stated that "the question of general and complete disarmament is the most important one . . ." and then he went on immediately to the second paragraph. But it is precisely the first paragraph of the resolution which says that the General Assembly "Calls upon Governments to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of this problem" — the problem of general and complete disarmament.

It is not quite clear why Mr. Moch omits this most important task which the General Assembly has set before us all. I am not sure whether the other representatives of the Western Powers on this Committee share this point of view. I merely wonder why the representative of France, who voted in favour of this resolution, does not now consider this to be the most important goal in our work. That is incomprehensible to me.

Moreover, in speaking about the second paragraph of this resolution, Mr. Moch pointed out that the declaration of the United Kingdom and then the declaration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were transmitted for thorough consideration to our Committee. And here Mr. Moch made a very important admission. He pointed out that the plan proposed by the United Kingdom is not a plan for general and complete disarmament. If that is so, it should, of course, be said point-blank to the United Kingdom representative himself.

Mr. Moch made an evaluation of this plan. I do not know whether the United Kingdom representative agrees with that evaluation, seeing that the United Kingdom is the author of the plan. But if that is so, it merely proves that the plan proposed by the Soviet Union really does differ from the plan now proposed by the Western Powers, since the present plan of the Western Powers, as Mr. Grimsby-Gore convincingly told us yesterday, is largely based on, and embodies the essential features of, the United Kingdom plan mentioned in the second paragraph of the General Assembly resolution of 20 November.

The real plan for general and complete disarmament is the Soviet Union's plan. And I am grateful to Mr. Moch for admitting that the other plan is not a plan for general and complete disarmament.

Mr. Moch also said that, in his view, it was impossible apparently to carry out a plan for general and complete disarmament. That, at least, is what I
understood him to say. If it is impossible, and if this is the view of all the Western Powers, it would be as well if this were stated openly, so that it might, at least, be clear to all the world what we are talking about and what we are striving for. I must say, not a single representative of the Western Powers has so far said that the plan for general and complete disarmament is not feasible.

We too do not lose hope that, in conjunction with our Western colleagues, we shall draw up such a plan.

I must say that Mr. Moch's statement today does, of course, raise definite doubts on this matter. These doubts, however, do not emanate from us but from a representative of the Western Powers. I would, therefore, ask for a clarification of the attitude of the other Western representatives so that we should, at least, know what we are going to talk about. We would very much like to hear as soon as possible the view taken of our plan by the representatives of the Western Powers — of a plan which was submitted six months ago and which could, of course, already have been carefully studied by all the representatives of the Western governments participating in our Committee. In any event, clarity is called for: what are we seeking to do, what are our objectives and what are we going to discuss? We have come here to implement a decision of the United Nations General Assembly, for which we all voted. We are not unhopeful that the Western governments, who voted for a resolution which put the problem of complete and general disarmament forward as the most important question and which called on all governments to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of this problem, will work for a constructive solution of this problem. There is every possibility of this being done: we have put forward a concrete plan and have presented our explanations of this plan. Let us take it up. We are ready to listen to any views, any amendments or additions to this plan and are prepared to discuss, in a constructive spirit, any points that are not clear. But, if our labours are to bear fruit, we must be quite clear about what we are aiming at and the direction in which we propose to work.

That is all I wish to say at the moment in connexion with Mr. Moch's statement.

Mr. MOCH (France) (translation from French): I am sorry not to satisfy Mr. Zorin's wish by yielding the floor to another Western representative; but we shall of course study his plan and say what we have to say about it.
Today we are engaged in a slight controversy — the first of the session. Mr. Zorin and I are used to this and it never impairs our cordial relations.

My reply to Mr. Zorin is that the reason why I did not quote the first operative paragraph of the resolution in question is that I thought it was covered by the third. But I readily agree that the first paragraph reads: "Calls upon Governments to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of this problem".

We shall try to show Mr. Zorin, in the days to come, that the Soviet solution is not exactly constructive, and that in any event we cannot accept it in the form in which it is presented. I must emphasize that the last paragraph of the resolution I mentioned just now — and this is a point on which we can be unanimous — reads as follows: "Expresses the hope that measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control will be worked out in detail ..." For my own part, although I do not consider that the Soviet plan entirely corresponds to this goal — far from it — I am prepared to study measures which lead towards the goal, even if the first stages do not take us all the way to it.

Mr. Zorin felt he should stress that the Soviet plan differs from the Western plan. Naturally it does. Had they chanced to be alike we could simply have gone home after adopting one or other of them, since they would have been interchangeable. It is precisely because they are far from being alike that we now have to make this comparative study, which is the main task assigned to us — the Committee set up by the four Foreign Ministers — with a specific objective which I read out just now, and try to work out a plan leading towards the ideal goal general and complete disarmament. What does the word "towards" mean? It means there will have to be two stages: we cannot change in one step, and within a predetermined time-limit, from a world of suspicion and dire threats to a world completely disarmed. I am sure that inwardly Mr. Zorin agrees, even if he does not say so in public; stages — many stages — are needed. We need to reverse the trend and make our way gradually to the goal set for us. It is impossible to draw up, now, a plan which in four years, or even longer, will inevitably lead to the attainment of this goal, when we are living in a world so remote from it. That is all I wanted to say. I wished to stress that agreement is possible on measures leading towards this goal.
Mr. ORMSBY-GORE (United Kingdom): I would just like to make a few short comments on the exchanges to which we have just been listening.

First of all, I was very glad that Mr. Moch continued the reading out of the United Nations resolution because, although Mr. Zorin corrected him for not reading out more than one paragraph, it was very noticeable that Mr. Zorin did not read out the final paragraph of that resolution which we have now just heard, that the United Nations

"Expresses the hope that measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control will be worked out in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time."

I think that certainly does express the hope that all of us who attended the United Nations did have, and it was in that spirit that we undertook our work here in Geneva.

However, I would reinforce what Mr. Moch has said, that this is, of course, not a body of the United Nations, and I was surprised to hear Mr. Zorin state that we were under instructions from the United Nations to carry out a particular task, because I well remember how adamant Mr. Gromyko was that this body should have no connexion with the United Nations. We have a task to perform, and I think the objective which has been stated, that what we wish to see is a disarmed and a peaceful world, is one with which we can all agree. It does not seem to me that we shall advance towards that goal by a debate on the adjectives which each of us likes to attach to his plan. Whether we reach that goal by a plan which is called "general and comprehensive", or whether we reach it by a plan which is called "general and complete", seems to me of far less importance than the actual merits of the plans that are put forward. It is on the merits of the plans that I hope our discussion will take place.

Mr. MEZINKISCU (Romania) (translation from French): Although I completely agree with the representative of the Soviet Union that we have before us only one plan for general and complete disarmament and that at the fourteenth session of the General Assembly we were in the same position, that is to say that we had only one plan for general and complete disarmament -- that put forward by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union -- while listening to our distinguished colleague from France just now I gathered that, in order to define more precisely the object of our forthcoming discussions and negotiations,
he was arguing from the fact that the General Assembly resolution which followed on the two proposals submitted at the fourteenth session, transmitted to the Committee one proposal for general and complete disarmament and another for comprehensive disarmament.

Mr. Moch drew a very clear distinction between the Soviet proposal for general and complete disarmament and the United Kingdom proposal for comprehensive disarmament. I remember very well that, when the question of general and complete disarmament was discussed in the First Committee, our United Kingdom colleague, Mr. Ormsby-Gore, explained to us — or at least did his best and used his well-known eloquence and power of persuasion to try to convince the Committee — that there was no difference between the idea of general and complete disarmament and that of comprehensive disarmament. If that was what the authors of the United Kingdom plan intended, it seems to me that the argument put forward by the representative of France is too insubstantial to be accepted. We could discuss — and at the time we certainly expressed our view on the point — whether the United Kingdom plan is really a plan for general and complete disarmament, and whether the two ideas — general and complete disarmament and comprehensive disarmament — coincide. But to draw from this an argument to divert the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament from the goal set for its work, both by the four Foreign Ministers and later by the General Assembly resolution, seems to me to mean pursuing, in this Committee on Disarmament, a policy different from that followed in the General Assembly. The same Governments which voted for the General Assembly resolution have sent their representatives here to negotiate. In any event, I thought our United Kingdom colleague could have referred to this point in the reply he made just now.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I should like to make only one brief observation, or rather to offer a clarification, in connexion with what has been said by the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Ormsby-Gore. I should like to make it clear that, when I referred to the General Assembly resolution, I did not say at all that our Committee was an organ of the General Assembly. Therefore, his remark on that subject is beside the point. All I said was that the General Assembly resolution assigned us a definite task and this came about mainly because all the States members of this Committee were agreed on that task. They voted for this resolution, and if they voted for this resolution,
naturally they accepted this task as members of this Committee. That is all I meant to say. I fully understand that we are a Committee set up by ten nations. Each of our countries has its own policy, has its own views on the questions we are considering. However, since all ten of us voted for one resolution and assigned one and the same task to our Committee, then elementary logic requires that we should strive hard to carry out that task in our Committee. That is all I appealed for, namely, that we should struggle to fulfil the task which we ourselves recognized to be the task of our Committee. If some particular representatives now take a different view of that task, I am prepared to listen to them too like all our fellow delegates. It would be important for us to know what has happened in the six or four months that have passed since this resolution was adopted. Has something perhaps changed? If it has, then we are prepared to hear about it. We believe, however, that the General Assembly resolution is a definite recommendation on which we were all agreed. Whether we are still in agreement on it is another question. We, at least, still agree with this resolution.

One word more. Mr. Ormsby-Gore said that we should not as it were argue about the adjectives attached to particular noun. I interpret that remark merely as meaning that the United Kingdom representative does not want us to argue about trifles, if I may put it that way, or to be diverted, so to speak, from the substance of the problem. Of course, if adjectives did not express a certain point of substance, it would be better not to bother with them. I must point out, though, in this connexion that Mr. Moch applied his gift of eloquence to talking about a single letter, not a single word -- the Russian letter "k"; he said that this is precisely what determines the main direction of the task which faces us. If a single letter is so important, then I think that words too are of some importance. I believe, therefore, that we would do well to pay close attention to the substance of the matter.

Mr. MOCHE (France) (translation from French): I should like to say one word to show that agreement is always possible. Mr. Zorin mentioned the letter "k", but in French this letter is rendered by a word, the word "vers" ("towards").
The CHAIRMAN (Canada): Since no other representative wishes to speak at this time, I should like to read out to you the proposed communiqué to be issued following this Conference:

"The third meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament was held on 17 March in the Palais des Nations in Geneva under the chairmanship of the representative of Canada.

"The next meeting of the Conference will take place on Friday, 18 March, at 10.30 a.m."

As no delegation has any objection or any suggestions as regards this proposed communiqué, I take it it is approved.

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m."