FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWENTY-NINTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Tuesday, 26 April 1960, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. ZOJIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)
**Present at the Table**

| **Bulgaria:**          | Mr. M. TANABANOV            |
|                       | Mr. K. CHRISTOV             |
|                       | Col. K. SAVOV               |
| **Canada:**           | Mr. E.L.M. BURNS            |
|                       | Mr. A.G. CAMPBELL           |
|                       | W/Cdr. R.J. MITCHELL        |
| **Czechoslovakia:**   | Mr. J. NOSEK                |
|                       | Lieut.-Gen. J. HECKO        |
|                       | Mr. Z. TRHLIK               |
| **France:**           | Mr. J. MOCH                 |
|                       | Mr. M. LEGENDRE             |
|                       | Col. L. CONVERT             |
| **Italy:**            | Mr. F. CAVALLETTI          |
|                       | Mr. L. DAINELLI             |
|                       | Mr. D. PHILLIPSON           |
| **Poland:**           | Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI           |
|                       | Mr. M. LACHES               |
|                       | Brig.-Gen. J. SLIWINSKI     |
| **Romania:**          | Mr. E. MIZINCASCU           |
|                       | Mr. C. BOGdan               |
|                       | Col. C. POPA                |
| **Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:** | Mr. V.A. ZORIN          |
|                       | Col.-Gen. A.A. GRYZLOV      |
|                       | Mr. A.A. ROSCHIN            |
PRESENT AT THE TABLE (contd.)

United Kingdom:

Rt. Hon. D. ORMSBY-GORE
Sir Michael WRIGHT
Miss E. SALT

United States of America:

Mr. F.M. EATON
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Rear-Admiral P.L. DUDLEY

Representative of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN
The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I declare open the twenty-ninth meeting of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament.

I have three speakers on my list, and call first on the representative of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Nosek.

Mr. NOSEK (Czechoslovakia): We are approaching the end of the first part of this Committee's negotiations. In the view of the Czechoslovak delegation, it is necessary, in the short time still left to us, to do our utmost to achieve positive results in the work of our Committee in the sense of resolution 1378 (XIV) of the United Nations General Assembly.

As is well known, that resolution laid down as the most important question of the present time the problem of general and complete disarmament, and invited all Governments to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of that problem. It must, however, be admitted that the work of our Committee so far has not made the progress that would be desirable towards the achievement of our task. If our work in this closing week of the first part of our negotiations is, after all, to reach some positive results, we must now, having in mind a constructive solution of the question of general and complete disarmament, which is our main task, look for such points as bring our views closer together rather than for those which still divide us.

In the whole course of our negotiations the delegations of the socialist countries have dedicated their maximum efforts towards the achievement of this goal. After the refusal by the delegations of the Western countries to discuss the proposal for general and complete disarmament submitted by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, and the elaboration of that proposal into an appropriate treaty, the delegations of the socialist countries submitted on 8 April a new document, TNCD/4, entitled "Basic principles of general and complete disarmament". Although they have been repeatedly invited to do so by the delegations of the socialist countries, the delegations of the Western countries have not, in the period of almost three weeks that has elapsed, submitted any concrete suggestions, changes or amendments in regard to that document.

At our meeting yesterday the representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti, gave a positive appreciation of the work of the Committee during the past weeks. Unfortunately, we cannot agree with that appreciation. That is because the
position of the Western delegations to the basic, key question of our work — that is, the question of what should be included in the programme of general and complete disarmament, which concrete disarmament measures should form part of that programme — has continued to be negative. So long as we have not clarified this question we do not think we can pass on to the successful discussion of other aspects of general and complete disarmament.

The representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti, also proposed repeatedly that we should proceed to negotiations on the statute and functions of an international control organization prior to reaching any agreement on general and complete disarmament. Mr. Cavalletti admitted as most that, simultaneously with the study of the international control organization, it would be necessary to think of the concrete disarmament measures.

In this connexion, we should like to stress once again — as we have done many times in the past — that this approach, that is, to think of concrete disarmament measures when discussing international control, is not acceptable to us because it is not possible to discuss control measures if we do not know what is to be the object of control.

These circumstances have proved once again that the delegations of the Western countries continue to put control before real disarmament and maintain their standpoint of control over armaments. Hence it follows that the delegations of the Western countries in fact hold the same view as they held in the past — namely, the view that they held before the unanimous approval of the resolution on general and complete disarmament at the fourteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly. Then, as now, the delegations of the Western countries took advantage of the question of control to hinder any progress on the question of disarmament.

In paragraph 1 of their document of 8 April, the delegations of the socialist countries have introduced measures which should form the programme of general and complete disarmament. In our view, general and complete disarmament must include all the following measures — which I should like to repeat once again: disbandment of all armed forces, liquidation of all armaments, cessation of all kinds of military production, liquidation of all alien bases on foreign territories, withdrawal from these territories and disbandment of foreign troops, prohibition of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and missile weapons, cessation of their production e
destruction of their stockpiles, abolition of organs and institutions designed for organizing military activities in States, prohibition of military training, liquidation of military training establishments, and banning of the appropriation of funds for military purposes.

It is up to the delegations of the Western countries to give, at last, a clear and unevasive answer to the question whether or not they subscribe to the realization of the concrete measures of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The fact that, despite repeated requests by us, the delegations of the Western countries refuse to advance their views on the list of concrete disarmament measures submitted by the delegations of the socialist countries cannot be explained in any way other than as an unwillingness seriously to approach the elaboration of the programme of general and complete disarmament. It has become evident that the delegations of the Western countries are not seeking possibilities for a further rapprochement of views.

A characteristic example of the approach of the delegations of the Western countries is the intervention of the United States representative, Mr. Eaton, at our twenty-seventh meeting, with regard to questions of control. In that intervention the United States representative tried to give the impression that the delegations of the socialist countries were taking a negative position regarding questions of effective international control over general and complete disarmament. He acted in this way despite the fact that the delegations of the socialist countries have repeatedly, during the course of this Conference, pointed out in detail that the establishment of effective international control over the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament must form an inseparable, an integral, part of that programme. In this respect we feel that Mr. Eaton is trying to force a door that is already open.

Questions of control have been profoundly discussed during our negotiations so far. It follows from the statements of the delegations of the Western countries that there are no serious differences between us regarding the basic principles of safeguarding control over general and complete disarmament. Why, therefore, in this stage of our negotiations, when we should concentrate the maximum of our efforts towards the confirmation of common points, do the Western delegations step forward with artificially-constructed divergencies? We cannot help but explain this fact as an attempt to lead our negotiations away from the
solution of the main task facing us, that is, from the achievement of an agreement on the programme of general and complete disarmament. On the other hand, however, we cannot agree with attempts to speak about a rapprochement of views where in fact no rapprochement has been reached. At our twenty-eighth meeting, for instance, the representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti, introduced as an example of this rapprochement the alleged consent of the delegations of the socialist countries to pass on to a detailed discussion and to the elaboration of detailed control measures. In support of this standpoint, Mr. Cavalletti quoted a sentence from the intervention made by the Czechoslovak delegation at our twenty-sixth meeting which reads as follows:

"In this connexion I should like to stress the fact that the delegations of the socialist countries by no means wish to keep aloof from a detailed discussion and elaboration of detailed control measures". (TNCD/PV.26, page 10)

I must say that we were very astonished at the fact that Mr. Cavalletti did not also quote the following sentence forming with the quoted sentence an indivisible unit. That sentence reads as follows:

"However, we hold the view that at the present stage of negotiations it is necessary to agree first of all on basic principles of international control over the implementation of general and complete disarmament" — I stress 'the implementation of general and complete disarmament' — "before proceeding to the details, all the more so because we have not yet reached any agreement on concrete disarmament measures which should form the scope of general and complete disarmament." (ibid.)

I used this second sentence in my intervention at the twenty-sixth meeting of our Committee and I think that this second sentence, which as I have already pointed out, must be read together with the first sentence, is so clear that it does not need any further explanation.

In the course of our negotiations so far we welcome the fact that the Western delegations, after some hesitation at the beginning, have admitted resolution 1378 (XIV) to be the basis of the work of our Committee. This fact is undoubtedly a positive point of our negotiations as it makes it possible to continue our further work on the programme of general and complete disarmament. The basic difference between our views, as we see it, arises from the fact that the Western delegations do indeed recognize resolution 1378 (XIV) on general and complete
disarmament in words, but in fact they are reluctant to pass on not only to the concrete elaboration of the programme of general and complete disarmament but even to a further definition of its scope and character. In the course of our negotiations so far the Western delegations have never explained how they understand the term "general and complete disarmament". The Western delegations refuse to discuss this basic question and propose instead to pass on to the negotiations on so-called concrete measures. But what are these concrete measures? A quick glance at the proposals submitted by the Western delegations so far shows that they are striving neither for measures of general and complete disarmament nor for real disarmament measures of a partial character, but only for measures which are in substance of a control nature.

The socialist delegations declare again that they are willing to pass on to the discussion of concrete disarmament measures but only on the assumption that these disarmament measures will be within the framework of the concrete programme of general and complete disarmament. If the Western delegations really recognize resolution 1378 (XIV) on general and complete disarmament to be the basis of our work, then we can hardly understand why they refuse to work out the programme of general and complete disarmament or, at least, to formulate and to agree upon the basic principles. If the Western delegations continue to persist in their negative attitude which, as has been proved, is the basic reason of the not quite satisfactory results of our work so far, then they should declare quite openly that they are giving up the programme of general and complete disarmament laid down by resolution 1378 (XIV). We think it is not admissible to deceive world public opinion by some apparent progress in the work of our Committee while in fact nothing is being done for the elaboration of the programme of general and complete disarmament.

As to the question of which disarmament measures should be discussed first, the socialist delegations have pointed out on many occasions that they are ready to discuss disarmament in the field of armed forces and conventional armaments as well as complete disarmament in the field of nuclear and rocket weapons. According to our proposals, every disarmament measure would of course be carried out under effective international control. The way proposed to us by the Western delegations, as again formulated in the nine points introduced by the United States representative, Mr. Eaton, at our twenty-third meeting, which are in substance limited to the establishment of control without disarmament, seems to us to be impracticable and unacceptable.
The delegations of the socialist countries cannot permit disarmament to be replaced by control over armaments. The delegations of the socialist countries have pointed out repeatedly that it is necessary to start from common standpoints and to confirm these in the form of basic principles upon which our further work of elaborating a programme of general and complete disarmament may be based. Our discussions so far have proved that quite a series of questions has been sufficiently clarified. The delegations of the socialist countries, for instance, elaborated in detail, in the course of our negotiations, on a series of points in the Soviet Union proposal on general and complete disarmament. We deem this fact to be a positive feature of our discussions so far.

It is necessary, however, to take further steps in this direction — that is, to pass on to the formulation of basic principles of general and complete disarmament. The time left to us for the accomplishment of our task is already very short. The Czechoslovak delegation would therefore like, in its intervention this morning, to draw the attention of all delegations once again to the necessity for the delegations of the Western countries to advance their views on particular points in the proposal of the socialist countries on "Basic principles of general and complete disarmament" and eventually to submit in this connexion and in the sense of resolution 1378 (XIV) their own suggestions and amendments, so that we may yet arrive, at the conclusion of this first part of our negotiations, at common principles which can serve as a concrete basis for the work of our Committee in the future.

In our view, the most essential of these principles is an agreement on the disarmament measures which must form the scope of general and complete disarmament. The delegations of the socialist countries have submitted concrete proposals on this question, both in the Soviet plan of 18 September 1959 and in the proposal on "Basic principles of general and complete disarmament" of 8 April 1960. The delegations of the Western countries, however, in the whole course of our negotiations so far, have not advanced their views on this question and they have never introduced a summary or a list of measures which should form the programme of general and complete disarmament. It is up to them to take a clear position at last on this question and to contribute to the attainment of agreement on this basic problem of our negotiations. We expect the delegations of the Western countries to submit their concrete proposals in this sense. In this connexion,
however, I should like to stress that any proposal which does not contain a summary or a list of concrete measures for the accomplishment of general and complete disarmament cannot be considered a constructive contribution to the solution of the main problem before our Committee. As we see it, such a proposal would not enable us to accomplish the basic task facing our Committee -- the task of solving constructively the problem of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, a problem whose successful solution is expected by the peoples of the whole world.

Mr. MOCHI (France) (translation from French): I should like to change the atmosphere of this meeting a little, and perhaps satisfy Mr. Nosek, while at the same time assuring him that my statement is not dictated by his. First of all, however, I wish to give a very brief résumé of events.

On 16 March 1959, we submitted our plan for general and complete disarmament in a free and peaceful world. It comprised two clearly defined stages susceptible, moreover, of interchange, since certain measures in the second could, by agreement, be undertaken before the completion of others contained in the first. The provisions thus grouped were to be negotiated and put into effect as rapidly as possible. The same plan enumerated, but without going into as much detail, additional measures -- and I quote -- "regarded as necessary for achieving the ultimate goal" -- which, in our view, as we said, should be negotiated at the same time as the operations provided for in the first two stages were being carried out.

Thus conceived, the plan constituted a whole in conformity, we thought, with the objectives of the United Nations resolution. The Eastern delegations did not accept our idea -- this has just been brought to our attention once again -- but I do not wish to revive this debate between us today.

On 8 April, Mr. Zorin tried to delineate another field of discussion by presenting a statement of principles. I immediately replied to him that the statement contained nothing new, as it reproduced in their entirety all the measures put before the United Nations by Mr. Khrushchev on 18 September 1959 and set out in the Soviet plan, together with the total time-limit of four years fixed by the Head of the Soviet Government for the implementation of his plan. The only difference pointed out by the Eastern representatives between the initial plan and the document on principles, was the greater flexibility in the structure of the successive stages, although taken as a whole they comprise exactly the same provisions, to be implemented in the same total time.
Owing to this identity of measures and time-limits, we rejected this statement of principles, for the same reasons as had caused us to reject the original plan.

But during our discussions -- often tedious, alas! -- Mr. Zorin and his colleagues urged us to submit amendments to their text, or to propose an alternative to it. Mr. Nosov, who repeated this demand just now, might perhaps have been well advised to await my statement before reproaching us with what he saw fit to call our "refusal to discuss". He asked us to submit amendments to the Soviet text. That is not exactly what we are now going to do. However, we are today going to meet the wish of the Eastern countries. It is not my fault that we could not do so earlier: we have been delayed by the hardening, in recent weeks, in the statements of our Eastern colleagues which has been so obvious that we sometimes came to doubt the value of such a confrontation.

However that may be, I have the honour to submit today, on behalf of the five Western Powers, a statement of principles constituting our counter-proposal to the proposal of 8 April. I shall first read it out, and then I shall comment on it briefly, comparing it with the document of the Eastern Powers, and relying on what our friend and colleague, Mr. Ormsby-Gore, may say about it later to make good any omissions of mine.

First of all, here is our text, which I now put before this Conference:

"The delegations of Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America,

Recalling the communique issued by the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America on 7 September 1959,

Recalling the terms of General Assembly Resolution 1378 (XIV) of 23 November 1959,

Noting that the Governments of the States participating in the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament have been called upon to seek a constructive solution to the problem of general and complete disarmament under effective international control and to work out detailed measures leading towards that goal in the shortest possible time,

Recognizing that general and complete disarmament requires the maintenance of international law and order in a disarmed world by strengthened international peace-keeping machinery within the United Nations,
Declare that the disarmament process and any agreement finally reached must fulfill the following conditions:

(a) disarmament must be carried out by stages, each stage to be completed as rapidly as possible although no fixed timetable can be laid down in advance for the process as a whole;

(b) nuclear and conventional measures must be balanced so that no country or group of countries will obtain, at any stage, a significant military advantage and so that equal security for all will be maintained and thus international confidence progressively increased;

(c) disarmament measures must be effectively controlled throughout by an International Disarmament Organization within the framework of the United Nations, to ensure that compliance with these measures is verified from their entry into force and that there is no evasion throughout the disarmament process and thereafter;

(d) disarmament measures must be negotiated progressively according to the possibility of their early implementation and effective control.

Conclude that the final goal of a programme of general and complete disarmament under effective international control must be to achieve the reduction and limitation of all types of forces and weapons to the levels required by each State for its own internal security and fulfillment of its obligations under the United Nations Charter and the elimination of all weapons surplus to those required for those purposes. The programme must also provide for the use of outer space for peaceful purposes only and for the final elimination of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery."

I shall now go over the text I have just read point by point, comparing it with our Eastern colleagues' text of 8 April.

Our first two paragraphs recall the basic documents which brought about this Conference: the communiqué of the four Foreign Ministers of 7 September 1959, and United Nations General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) of 23 November 1959.

In the Soviet proposal, the first sentence refers to the latter resolution, but Mr. Zorin can hardly refuse to add to it a reference to a communiqué signed by his Minister, Mr. Gromyko.

The next paragraph of our text notes that our task is "to seek a constructive solution to the problem of general and complete disarmament under effective international control and to work out detailed measures leading towards that goal"
in the shortest possible time". That formula reproduces two paragraphs of resolution 1378 (XIV), so that none of us can have any valid grounds for opposing it.

The fourth paragraph envisages the strengthening of international peace-keeping machinery. I shall revert to this subject a little later. It is not dealt with in the document of the Eastern countries.

There follow the conditions, four in number, which, in our opinion, any disarmament agreement must fulfil.

The first is that the operations must be carried out by stages. That is the idea contained in paragraph 2 of the Soviet document, but with a difference of which I appreciate the importance. According to our Eastern colleagues, "general and complete disarmament shall be ... completed within a strictly defined time-limit -- four years", although they have spoken of modifying that period. To this we reply that no fixed timetable can at present be laid down for the process of disarmament as a whole, but only for putting the initial measures into effect.

We maintain this thesis in good faith. We are convinced that, in the present state of the world, with the distrust accumulated through so many hostile acts on both sides since our joint victory and with the disputes subsisting in so many areas, general and complete disarmament will only be achieved at the cost of tenacious and patient efforts. We are all at one in our heartfelt desire for it. But we Westerners do not believe it possible to affirm today that within a specific time-limit -- even if it is extended from four years to five or six years -- trust will be re-established, the panic of spying will have disappeared, belief in the virtues of secrecy will have faded and political disputes will have been settled.

All these hopes will be fulfilled -- we are sure of it. But we cannot set a time-limit, much less embody it in a treaty which we intend to respect.

Let our Eastern colleagues understand us -- and I think this is one of the essential points. Like them, we wish to bring about disarmament as quickly as possible; we shall spare no effort to that end. We hope -- we ardently hope -- that the initial measures will generate a better atmosphere and more mutual understanding, so that those which follow can be put into effect more quickly. But, being resolved not to give any undertaking we are not sure we can fulfil, we cannot agree to put general and complete disarmament within the rigid framework of a time-limit fixed in advance, whatever it may be.
The second condition is that measures of nuclear and conventional disarmament must overlap in such a way that each stage increases the security of both parties simultaneously, and not that of one party to the detriment of the other. This idea does not appear in the Soviet document. But it has been supported so often by both sides that we do not think it raises any difficulties. Moreover, it must be necessary, because the converse would be absurd: how could unanimous support be obtained for a text which would reduce the security of one party while increasing that of the other?

The third condition is continuous and effective control by an international disarmament organization set up within the framework of the United Nations, such control operating from the time when the measure concerned enters into force and being maintained so as to prevent evasion by any Power during the disarmament process and thereafter.

The Soviet statement accepts the principle of control, restricts its scope according to the measures carried out at each stage, and accepts an international control organ -- the same body as we call an international disarmament organization. In theory the two texts are equivalent. I realize, however, that in practice the Soviet espionage phobia -- a phobia from which we do not suffer -- and their extensible idea of secrecy -- which we do not share -- will cause difficulties in negotiation. But as regards principle, to which I am strictly confining myself today, I do not believe there are any irreconcilable differences between the two texts.

Our fourth condition, finally, relates to the progressive nature of the negotiations, which, in our view, governs the speed of implementation.

The Soviet document says nothing on this subject. But we think it obvious that we must choose between two methods: either to undertake the first stage as soon as there is agreement on its content and put it into effect immediately, while continuing negotiations on later objectives, or, on the contrary, not to undertake anything until we have agreed on everything. If we agree on principles, i.e. on the final goals, it seems evident to us that the first method is the better one. Being the only pragmatic, realistic and effective method, it should not give rise to serious objections.

At the end of our document, corresponding to paragraph 1 of the Soviet text, is a statement of principles -- of the goals to be reached -- of which there are essentially two.
The first relates to the forces and conventional armaments remaining at the end of the disarmament process. These must only be sufficient for the requirements of States for their internal security and for fulfilment of their obligations under the United Nations Charter.

What do our Eastern colleagues want as regards this principle?

They propose the disbandment of all armed forces, liquidation of their armaments, and cessation of military production, which appears to be a more ambitious objective than ours. But they hasten to restore, in paragraph 4 of their text, "strictly limited contingents of police (militia) agreed for each country, equipped with small firearms and designed exclusively for the maintenance of internal order and the protection of the personal security of citizens" — that is to say, in terms borrowed from our own vocabulary, to ensure internal security.

The difference here is partly in wording and partly in an idea. The wording is of little concern to us: whether the forces maintained after disarmament are called armies, police or militia is in our view of no importance. What matters is the forces thus maintained and their armaments, which our colleagues call "small firearms", and which we, on our side, propose fixing by mutual agreement, qualitatively according to the power of the weapons, and quantitatively according to the forces authorized. Agreement thus does not appear to be unattainable on this point, especially as experiences I will not recall appear to show that such forces must be sufficient to maintain public order in circumstances which are sometimes extremely painful, and of which more examples can be quoted from the East of Europe than from the West.

Here, on the other hand, is a difference of principle: in determining these forces, we propose taking account not only of internal security requirements, but also of obligations under the United Nations Charter, which our Soviet colleagues do not mention at all. Their silence surprises us, because we know that they are deeply attached to the Charter. It also disquiets us, because we are convinced that the closer we get to a state of general and complete disarmament, and more necessary it will be to give the peoples of the world effective international protection against any attempt at hegemony, just as the citizens of any civilized country today enjoy protection against extortion and assassination in any form.

Similarly, respect for international law will constitute an obligation enforceable by an international court, just as private law is enforceable by the national courts. The international court will not only have to state the law in
particular cases, but also -- and perhaps above all -- ensure compliance with its judgments. That economic sanctions should be the first to be applied, we do not dispute. But, just as in domestic cases fines become useless penalties when the offender is rich, and severer measures of coercion are required in serious cases, so, in future international law, if economic sanctions prove ineffective against an industrialized State, in the last resort the law must prevail. How can that be achieved without an international police force?

This group of considerations is covered by the fourth paragraph of our resolution, to which I briefly referred just now.

I earnestly urge our Eastern colleagues to reflect on this idea. If it is ultimately rejected, weak States will be in danger of falling victim to more powerful neighbours, even after general and complete disarmament has been carried out. Are we entitled to make no provision against such a risk?

Beside this difference, which itself is not irreconcilable, others seem really secondary. For example, when our Soviet colleagues ask for the "abolition of organs and institutions designed for organizing military activities in States (general staffs, war ministries and their local organs), prohibition of military training, liquidation of military training establishments, and cessation of appropriation of funds for military purposes!", they nevertheless very properly reserve for themselves the right to retain "strictly limited contingents of police (militia) ... equipped with small firearms and designed exclusively for the maintenance of internal order and the protection of the personal security of citizens". That Soviet definition requires, if it is not to be devoid of meaning -- and I think our colleagues have thought of this -- that there should remain -- I now paraphrase the Soviet text -- "organs and institutions designed for organizing the police or militia of States (general staffs of police or militia, ministries responsible for the police or militia and their local organs), and that such contingents of police or militia be trained, that their officers be trained in police or militia training establishments, and that funds for the police or militia be appropriated in national budgets". Here the paraphrase ends.

My reason for adjusting the text of the Eastern delegations in this way, is to set concrete facts against abstract declarations. The latter may serve the purposes of propaganda or encourage dreams, but they crumble and fall to the ground when they
come up against facts. For facts are merciless. A disarmed State will remain a "policed" State, and most of the organs whose elimination is solemnly demanded here will have to be retained, though of course on a considerably reduced scale, in order to maintain public order and to permit the fulfilment of obligations under the United Nations Charter.

I pass on now to the second principle, the second goal of general and complete disarmament. It consists, in our view, in the final elimination of all weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, all of them without exception, and the use of outer space for peaceful purposes only. These ideas are included in full in the Soviet document. Hence there is complete agreement between us on this essential principle. I note this with particular satisfaction, and I hope I can take this accord on a point of the first importance as a good augury for more extensive agreements.

There are three further ideas which appear in the Soviet text, but not in ours, and which I shall now examine, as I do not intend to evade any difficulty.

One is the idea of bases on foreign territory. We do not mention them for two reasons. First, because it is obvious that forces strictly limited to the requirements of internal security and of obligations under the Charter can only be stationed on their own territory for carrying out their internal security duties, and in zones determined by virtue of the Charter, in the other case. This excludes bases not having these characteristics. Moreover, since all means of delivering nuclear weapons will have been eliminated, the hypothesis envisaged by our Soviet colleagues of a handful of civilians operating weapons of mass destruction on foreign soil also becomes completely inconceivable.

The second of these three ideas absent from our text is the ban on interrupting the implementation of the treaty or making it dependent on the fulfilment of conditions not stipulated in it. This Soviet provision, if Mr. Zorin will allow me to tell him so in a friendly manner, seems to us to be questionable because, once again, it is contrary to the facts themselves. Let us suppose that a State violates its obligations, ceases to disarm and even re-arm secretly. We recognize, of course, that if the peace was threatened in this way, the machinery of the Charter would come into play. That is obvious. We should be violating that same Charter if we did not immediately bring the matter to the attention of the Security Council.
But I should like to put a specific question to Mr. Zorin: Can our Soviet colleagues seriously maintain that if the security of the Soviet Union were really threatened, they would be content to bring the matter before the Security Council with all the risks of paralysis by veto which they know so well, or before the United Nations General Assembly with the danger of chance majorities, and that they would continue to disarm at the risk of increasing their own insecurity? Obviously not. They certainly would not carry the forgiveness of injuries to such lengths, but would hasten to cease disarmament, to call up their reservists and to reinforce their weapons.

We shall continue to repeat that we must study such important problems as realists and not as dreamers or doctrinaires. The disarmament of any State will only be carried through to completion if the leaders of that State are certain that all the other countries, or at least those liable to be a threat to it, are fulfilling their obligations at the same time. A serious violation of the treaty will not be merely a matter of informing the Security Council, but will paralyse the whole implementation of the treaty. Even if we stipulated the contrary in one of the articles, that stipulation would remain a dead letter. Why not look at the facts as they are? Why try to conceal them from ourselves, at the risk of worse disillusion later?

The third idea absent from our text is that which appears at the end of the Soviet draft. We do not agree to undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, for reasons which my Western colleagues have already stated and which I shall sum up.

First, legally speaking, it is clear that such an undertaking would duplicate the Charter, by which we have solemnly promised not to use force or even the threat of force. Hence, if we all respect the Charter there is no danger of our being attacked or, consequently, of our having to use nuclear weapons. The new undertaking proposed is therefore unnecessary in this case. If, on the other hand, a State attacks a neighbour in violation of the Charter, why, if it has not kept its promise not to use force, should it keep its promise not to be the first to use nuclear weapons? The new undertaking proposed would thus be particularly dangerous, in this second case, for Powers acting in good faith. As it would be superfluous in the first case and perhaps fatal in the second, it cannot be accepted.
From the moral standpoint, this proposal completely changes the nature of our goal. Our purpose is not to make wars less cruel: it is to abolish them. We are not aiming to declare certain weapons to be lawful, but to declare all weapons to be unlawful. Mr. Jackson, the United States Prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials, defined our mission very accurately when he said:

"Modern technology places at man's disposal weapons of practically unlimited destructive power. Any recourse to war, to no matter what kind of war, entails recourse to means which are criminal by definition. War inevitably becomes a sequence of murders, armed attacks, deprivation of liberty and destruction of property".1/

We agree with Mr. Jackson, and we refuse to proclaim implicitly that to be the first to use non-nuclear weapons could not be a recourse to means that are criminal by definition.

In addition to those two legal and moral arguments there is a third, a military argument. If war were to break out in spite of our common desire for peace, this "recourse to criminal means" would know no law. Modern war is the negation of human laws. A nation at war seeks to win, only to win. It determines its strategy and its tactics according to this consideration alone. It uses or does not use a weapon according to whether it considers that weapon would increase or decrease its chances of victory. Hitler did not use gas because he knew what the reply would be, and he knew that gas would bring him only local advantages that would be quickly neutralized, not final victory. But if he had possessed the atomic weapon in May 1945, do you doubt that, even supposing he had undertaken not to be the first to use it, he would have accepted destruction in order to keep his word? For my part, I am quite sure of the contrary.

For all these reasons we cannot accept the illusory and dangerous idea of war limited by contract. We want to eliminate war, not to seek an impossible "humanization" of it.

I have now finished my comparison of the two documents. It shows quite a number of points of agreement on principle and some differences which can easily be reconciled.

1/ Retranslated from the French.
The most important differences are the question of time-limits for carrying out the process as a whole, the automatic nature of its execution, the definition of the role of the forces retained, and the undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Are we going to let the whole of the principles go, for the sake of these few differences? I cannot believe that.

Mr. Ormsby-Gore (United Kingdom): I wish to speak in support of the statement we have just heard from Mr. Moch, and in support of the document which he has tabled at our Conference.

As the representative of Czechoslovakia has already pointed out this morning, we have now been sitting here for more than five weeks and only four meetings, including the present one, remain to us before we adjourn. We have therefore had to ask ourselves: where do we stand, and in which direction lies the best means of progress for our Committee?

Re-reading what has been said on both sides, and examining the attitudes which both sides have adopted, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, recently at least, we have been at something of a standstill. We, the Western delegations, still prefer the Western comprehensive disarmament plan, with its flexibility and realism, to the plan put forward by the Soviet Union. We wish to make a start with actual disarmament as soon as possible and, to this end, get down to detailed discussion of practical disarmament measures. The five Eastern delegations, for their part, whilst speaking of their flexibility and readiness to consider all other proposals, have in fact adhered precisely to the Soviet plan and to the rigid, and in our view unrealistic, theory underlying it, the theory that it is possible here and now to work out in detail and get everyone to agree to a fixed pattern of general and complete disarmament over a fixed number of years. A further difficulty is that the Soviet representative and his colleagues are refusing to discuss the details of any practical disarmament measures, even those set out in the Soviet plan, until we have considered what they call the "principles" on which a disarmament agreement should be based. In the process they have misinterpreted the Western approach to disarmament and what has been said about it by Western spokesmen, in an attempt to suggest that it is the Soviet Union which is the sole champion of disarmament. I do not think that the facts bear this out, and I would remind my Soviet colleague that it was an initiative by the three Western Powers which resulted in this Ten Nation Committee being set up. They have
also cast doubts upon Western good faith. One could reply in kind; there is no shortage of material; but accusations of this sort are not calculated to advance our work, and may indeed—almost certainly will—make it even more difficult. We, the Western delegations, honestly and earnestly seek international disarmament, and we are prepared to swallow a good many insults if doing so helps us to get started on practical negotiations towards that end.

What is the Western goal? It is no less than—and I quote from the Western plan:

"... a secure, free, and peaceful world in which there shall be general disarmament under effective international control and agreed procedures for the settlement of disputes in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter." (TNCD/3)

For this purpose we envisage the final reduction of military manpower and armaments of all sorts to the levels required for maintaining the internal security of States and the fulfilment of their obligations under the United Nations Charter. This goal is a lofty and an ambitious one. If we can reach it we shall have done much to advance the aims set out in the United Nations Charter itself, and which the United Nations General Assembly undoubtedly had in mind when it unanimously approved its resolution 1378 (XIV) of which we heard so much. No realist—and I venture to say no Marxist—could seriously maintain that international disarmament alone would bring about the perfection of human nature and that ideal state of society in which every man is free and equal and relieved of want and fear. The explanatory introduction to the Soviet disarmament plan itself admits this. It states—and I quote:

"Naturally, even after the completion of a general disarmament programme, contradictions between States will remain, particularly between States with different social and economic systems." (A/4219, page 9)

A great deal more has been said on the same subject by Communist spokesmen.

We think, therefore, that the aim which I have described is sufficiently ambitious. It is an aim, incidentally, which has been subscribed to by the Soviet Union over a number of years—for instance, in the Soviet proposals of 1955. Certain statements have been made by the Soviet and East European spokesman during the last few weeks suggesting that we should set ourselves an even more ambitious goal and perhaps seek to improve upon the aims of the United Nations Charter by creating a state of international relations so harmonious that it is unnecessary to
Mr. Ormsby-Gore, United Kingdom

contemplate even the possibility of a breach of the peace or threat to international law and order requiring application of military sanctions by the international community. I have in mind particularly the remarks made by the representative of Poland at our thirteenth and twenty-fifth meetings. But I suggest that it would not be fruitful here and now, at least, to speculate upon the hitherto untested effects on the human mind and human society of the knowledge that war on the old pattern was impossible because the weapons of war had been largely eliminated. Let us first achieve a state of world society in which armaments have been reduced to a minimum but in which the international community knows it can call upon sufficient forces to deter evil men from embarking on aggressive policies to attain their own selfish ends. That in itself is a fine and ambitious conception which could bring untold benefits to all mankind. If we can achieve that goal, the world will rejoice and it will be time enough then to examine whether forces might be reduced still further or even whether we could go further than the Soviet Union proposes and eliminate internal security forces. However it would, I suggest, be unwise to gamble on the assumption that the human character, as revealed over thousands of years of history, can be radically transformed in a period of four years.

Here we reach the core of the problem. We seek, through disarmament, to eliminate the possibility of war which has plagued all human history to this day. We seek to eliminate the possibility of States resorting to armed force in order to achieve their political, economic and ideological purposes. Not merely "conventional" war, or "aggressive" war, or "nuclear" war, but War itself, in any form. Much emphasis has been given during our discussions, rightly and understandably, to the appalling threat posed by modern nuclear weapons. But it is the unanimous opinion of experts that even if every nuclear weapon in the world could be eliminated tomorrow, the danger of nuclear war would still remain because the knowledge acquired in the making of nuclear weapons cannot now be erased. We have eaten of the apple of knowledge and it is too late to go back. The scientists assembled at Kitzbühel in 1958, including a scientist from the Soviet Union, agreed — and I quote from their report as I did at the General Assembly of the United Nations.¹/  

¹/  At the 1029th meeting of the First Committee.
"Although the nations may agree to eliminate nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction from the arsenals of the world, the knowledge of how to produce such weapons can never be destroyed. They remain for all time a potential threat for mankind. In any future major war, each belligerent State will feel not only free but compelled to undertake immediate production of nuclear weapons, for no State, when at war, can be sure that such steps are not being taken by the enemy."

And the statement went on:

"It appears therefore that atomic weapons are likely to be employed in any future major war with all their terrible consequences."

This fact is recognized in the Soviet document, to which I have already referred, when it states:

"In the present state of international relations and at the present level of military technology when any military conflict may lead to a nuclear missile war the only way to ensure the security of all States is to exclude the very possibility of war." (A/4219, page 7)

I agree, and that is why we must ensure that as we disarm we bring about at the same time a world order which will remove for all time the temptation of States to resort to war in order to achieve their ends.

So much for what we seek to achieve. Before coming to the method of achieving it we have to face, and face squarely, two unpleasant but unavoidable facts. The first is that the present world scene is one of acute international distrust. It has been referred to many times by speakers on both sides in this Conference, and even if it had not, their reactions to proposals put forward in the Conference itself would be adequate testimony to its existence. The Soviet representative has on several occasions criticized my country and our friends and allies for arrangements which, in his view, have unfriendly intention, though in our view those arrangements are purely pacific and but a natural response to the policies of the Soviet Union. The arms race referred to by East European spokesmen is certainly one of the manifestations of this distrust, though we might argue until Doomsday as to which is precisely cause and which effect. On the other hand, there are certain encouraging signs of a reduction in tension, and of a realization on all sides that some agreement on disarmament and connected problems like the cessation of nuclear testing would in itself improve the political climate
and lend added momentum to our efforts to reach the final goal. Even if we cannot reach the final goal in one leap, it is our task at this Conference to take advantage of this more favourable international atmosphere in an attempt to mitigate the effects of political and economic disputes and contribute to their solution.

The second unpleasant fact is that our present Conference is merely the latest in a whole series of attempts to achieve international disarmament made since the war — nearly all, I feel bound to say, on the initiative of the Western Powers. We have talked intermittently for nearly 15 years, but so far not a single measure of international disarmament has actually been agreed upon over that period. The armed forces of the principal military Powers have of course been reduced, but always as an act of purely national policy. We have heard much about the latest Soviet reductions from Mr. Zorin, but no one has suggested that, as a result of these reductions, the need for international disarmament is any the less. On the contrary, some of the Eastern European representatives and the Soviet Union maintain that the need is now greater than ever before — a view which I most certainly would not dispute.

In considering therefore the method by which we should seek to reach our goal of general and complete disarmament we must take these unpleasant facts into account. The history of post-war disarmament discussions, and the course of this Conference so far, strongly indicate that there is a direct and obvious connexion between them. The existence of international distrust is one of the main reasons why no agreement has hitherto been reached on practical measures of international disarmament. We must therefore approach our task with realism based on our experience.

How then should we try to find our way towards agreement on this vital problem of disarmament? How can we save succeeding generations from the threat which has increasingly overshadowed our own generation? It seems to follow from what I have said that one of our immediate aims should be to seek agreement on practical disarmament measures which will have the effect of creating international confidence. If this confidence can be built up, further disarmament measures will become possible; without it, States will never agree to disarm. It will be no help to draft a piece of paper full of high-sounding principles to remain forever in the dusty archives of the Palais des Nations. We must patiently and tirelessly work out, and I quote from the General Assembly resolution:
"... measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control ... in the shortest possible time."

The view I have just expressed about the importance of an agreement upon disarmament measures which will establish international confidence is, I am happy to find, shared at the highest level in the Soviet Union. Mr. Khrushchev, for instance, in an interview with Mr. Macdonald of the London Times in 1958 said — and here I quote from the official Tass Agency account of the interview:

"I have said already that the Western Powers greatly distrust us. We too do not trust them in everything. And so, in order not to destroy a thing which is of great and vital importance to mankind, disarmament, we suggest to begin not with a cardinal but with a gradual solution of disarmament problems, beginning with what offers hope, inspires confidence. Thus, step by step," — Mr. Khrushchev went on — "it will be possible to reach the main goal, that is the solution of the problem of complete disarmament."

These are admirable sentiments expressed by Mr. Khrushchev, and I wish to associate myself with them.

Mr. Zorin himself, at our twenty-third meeting, stated:

"As many examples show, every act of goodwill in international relations contributes to general improvement of the international atmosphere and the strengthening of mutual confidence in relations among States, and thus facilitates the solution of complicated international problems."

(MC/FP.23, page 12)

I am sure Mr. Zorin would not claim that agreement on international disarmament is a simple problem. It is also significant that the Soviet Union, while advocating its "total" disarmament plan, has not felt it valueless to put forward at the same time as an alternative certain disarmament proposals described as "partial". This seems to imply Soviet recognition that making a start upon disarmament has importance in itself. We have a long distance to travel, over uncharted country. We all say we are ready to start the journey. Instead of wrangling now about the difficulties we may encounter and the precise route which we should take up the final slope, would it not be better to start, and get the waggon rolling? Let us agree on the point to which we want to travel. Then we can chart the precise route ahead as each stretch of country comes into view.

That is, I suggest a practical and realistic method of achieving international disarmament, taking into account the difficulties and also the points of agreement of which we have already become aware.
This will explain why I and my colleagues have felt unable to accept the rigid Soviet plan, reflected in the so-called "principles" tabled by the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries on 8 April, as a realistic basis for achieving general agreement on disarmament. This is also why we have been reluctant to become involved in a detailed discussion of the Soviet list of "principles", or to put forward alternative proposals of our own on the same subject. The Soviet so-called "principles", in our view, are unacceptable because they are a recapitulation of the old Soviet list of unverifiable prohibitions, unrelated to the practical problems of internationally controlled disarmament. It is also, we have felt, difficult and of doubtful utility to discuss disarmament measures in general terms without also considering them in detail, for the very reason that the practicability of implementing them depends upon the details, including the important detail of effective international control. It follows that agreement on details must be reached before disarmament can actually begin. Yet, as I have already pointed out, it is unrealistic to aim at agreeing, here and now, on the whole range of individual acts in the process of disarmament which must precede the achievement of a state of international disarmament. We have also felt that there is a risk of the Conference's time being wasted in further lengthy discussions of generalities.

However, we are now faced with the procedural situation which I have already described at the beginning of my statement: our Soviet and Eastern European colleagues firmly adhere to their refusal to discuss specific disarmament measures in detail until the Conference has discussed the Soviet so-called "principles" of the Western delegations have put forward principles of their own. After this, we are told, the Soviet Union will be only too ready to discuss specific disarmament measures in detail, together with their associated measures of control. In an effort, therefore, to find a way out of our present impasse and to meet the views of our Soviet and Eastern European colleagues and to enable the Conference to get on with its practical work, my colleague, Mr. Moch, has introduced, in the name of the Western delegations, a statement of what are, in our view, the essential conditions for fulfilment of a programme of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. (TNCD/5)
I should like to emphasize that the tabling of this statement is a genuine attempt at presenting a document which everyone at the Conference should be able to accept. Its reception by the Soviet and Eastern European delegations and their reaction to it will show how ready they really are to make a practical move forward, and whether they are prepared to take into account certain clearly stated and sincerely held Western objections to the Soviet disarmament plan in a genuine attempt to start the disarmament process.

Briefly, I should like to add some comments of my own on the various paragraphs of the Western proposals and to re-emphasize certain of the points which have already been made in an admirable manner by Mr. Moch.

As he said, the first two paragraphs of the preamble, which start by "Recalling ...", simply mention the two documents which directly underlie the establishment of this Committee and the task before it. Mr. Zorin himself proposed General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) as the basis of our work. Like Mr. Moch, I take it that he will not object to a reference to the communiqué of the Foreign Ministers, which was signed by the Soviet Foreign Minister in person, and which resulted in the establishment of the present Conference.

The third paragraph of the preamble, starting "Noting ..." is a paraphrase of the General Assembly resolution. I have already emphasized the importance which we attach to the words "under effective international control", and also the working out of "detailed measures ... in the shortest possible time", and their importance has also been specifically recognized by Mr. Zorin himself.

In the fourth paragraph of the preamble, beginning "Recognizing ...", the general statement should be unexceptionable. There are two new elements: explicit recognition of a need for strengthened international peace-keeping machinery; and an indication that the functioning of this machinery will take place within the framework of the United Nations. It is clear that in the course of negotiating specific measures of disarmament leading towards the ultimate goal, we shall be creating new concepts in the field of international law which will necessitate the development of existing conciliation, arbitration and judicial machinery; and consideration will need to be given to the means whereby resort to force can be prevented when other means of settling disputes have failed.

On a number of occasions, and notably at our ninth meeting, Mr. Zorin has indicated that at some stage consideration should be given to a means of solving
disputes between States other than by resort to force. It is also generally
agreed that the United Nations peace-keeping machinery is not at present functioning
as it should. We believe too that the Soviet representative and his colleagues
do not disagree that international law and order in a disarmed world is a matter of
paramount importance and should be maintained within the framework of the United
Nations.

Then as regards the contents of the first operative paragraph which starts,
"Declare ...": first, we all seem to agree that disarmament must be carried out
by stages and that each stage should be completed as rapidly as possible. I have
already explained at some length -- and so has Mr. Moch this morning -- why it is
unrealistic to try to lay down a fixed time-table in advance for the disarmament
process as a whole though, I repeat, it will of course be necessary to agree time-
limits within which specific disarmament measures or groups of measures will be
brought into effect. The important thing is to make a start, and I hope that the
Soviet representative will now move forward to meeting us on this. Their rigidity
in insisting upon a fixed time-table, despite known Western objections, would
in fact mean that actual disarmament of any kind would be held up indefinitely:
the reverse effect, in fact, to that which the Soviet representative himself says
he desires to obtain.

Secondly, it is recognized that States might have a legitimate fear of
entering upon disarmament commitments, the inter-relation and compensating
advantages of which they could not foresee or calculate. This has indeed been
urged upon the Western delegations as one of the reasons for trying to agree on
a rigid time-table for the whole disarmament process in advance. It is to meet
this legitimate fear that we have included the concept of balance, and equal
security for all, at each and every stage of the disarmament process. This is
another aspect of the vital task of building up international confidence, to which
I have already referred and which I believe our Soviet colleague will find
acceptable.

Thirdly, the provision about the extent and scope of control and the establish-
ment of an International Disarmament Organization appears to be common ground
between the Western and Eastern delegations. A number of Soviet disarmament
proposals contain parallel provisions, and the importance of preventing evasion of
disarmament commitments hardly requires further emphasis from me today.
Sub-paragraph (d) of the declaratory paragraph is complementary to sub-paragraph (a). The inclusion of the words "early implementation" is very important. The field of disarmament is vast and it will take a long time and much patience to get agreement on all the details. While we are working out the details of more complicated measures there is no reason why the first steps of actual disarmament could not begin provided that they bestow equal advantages on both sides. Indeed, I have already explained why they must begin if the later steps are ever to be agreed upon.

Passing now to the final paragraph starting "Conclude", I hope that our Soviet and East European colleagues will find themselves able to come to meet us on this. They have already accepted and, indeed, themselves put forward the idea of limiting forces and weapons to the levels required by States for their own internal security, and I hope that the Soviet representative and his colleagues will not wish to object to the phrase "and fulfilment of its obligations under the United Nations Charter". It is true that they have indeed argued that no forces and weapons may be required, in a disarmed world, to fulfil the obligations of States under the United Nations Charter. I have already indicated my doubts earlier about the realism of this argument; but if they are right and if at some later date in a reformed world society, we can agree that the obligations of the United Nations Charter require no forces and weapons, then the "levels required by each State" will merely depend upon the requirements of internal security. They need not, therefore, object to the formulation as it is put forward here. It was, indeed, as far as the Soviet Government itself felt it wise to go for a great many years.

On outer space, the Soviet and East European representatives have accepted the idea of using outer space for peaceful purposes. The Soviet Government is participating, with other Governments, in an attempt under United Nations auspices to develop space research on an international basis, and the Soviet plan itself refers to "the cessation of the manufacture of ... military space vehicles". The Soviet Government's objections have hitherto been limited to the technical point that measures to ensure the use of outer space for peaceful purposes only, and guarantees that no nuclear bombs, for instance, are put into orbit are not, strictly speaking, measures of disarmament, as outer space is not yet armed. But Mr. Zorin himself has pleaded most convincingly the value of gestures of goodwill, and such a gesture on the part of the Soviet Union would certainly
reassure all Western Governments and peoples and help significantly to improve international confidence. Soviet refusal, on the other hand, can only sow further distrust and suspicion of Soviet intentions in this particular sphere. There is a parallel here with the current negotiations for an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests. This also is not, strictly speaking, a measure of disarmament either; but Mr. Zorin has quoted it with warm approval in the disarmament context, and I think he is quite right.

In this context of the final goal of a programme of general and complete disarmament the elimination of weapons of mass destruction finds its proper place, and I hope that all of us here can give it our support.

In conclusion, I should like to urge my Soviet and East European colleagues to consider very carefully the document which has been tabled today, and what Mr. Moch and I have had to say in support of it. We believe that this Western initiative can open up the path to progress in our negotiations. Let us try and reach agreement on our final aims and on the principles and conditions which can lead to their attainment. Then let us address ourselves to these particular measures which will start us on our journey. For let us not forget that world opinion is earnestly hoping for some practical, concrete indication that the two sides are getting closer together and that actual disarmament is soon to begin. Let us also not forget that the stage is now being set for the Summit meeting in Paris, and that the reaction of our Eastern colleagues and what they say now may directly affect the course of the discussions between the leaders of the four Powers. We have made a sincere effort to steer our Conference on to a course which holds out a more hopeful prospect, and we earnestly hope that these proposals will receive a favourable response.

Mr. NASZKOWSKI (Poland) (translation from French): I should like to make a few preliminary remarks on the proposal which the representative of France, Mr. Moch, has put before us on behalf of the five Western delegations, and which has just been supported by the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Ormsby-Gore. The representative of France has submitted a document which is not, I think, essentially more than a recapitulation of the principles on which, according to Mr. Ormsby-Gore's statement of 16 March, the Western Powers' disarmament plan is founded.

May I make some brief comments on the content of this document and, what is more important on what it does not contain?
It does contain certain general declarations about the stages of control, about what is called balance and so forth. Its importance, however, is determined by what is missing from it: its most prominent feature is that it does not mention what end is to be served by these principles, or what programme is to be based on them.

The unquestionable fact is that, in working out principles of general and complete disarmament -- for that is the kind of disarmament to which General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) refers -- the first need of all is to define this concept and determine the component parts which must make up the single whole called general and complete disarmament. In other words, it is not sufficient merely to mention the formula "general and complete disarmament" as a general objective. It is also necessary to state, and state first, all the disarmament measures which make up general and complete disarmament: namely the abolition of all armed forces and armaments, the abolition of all military bases and institutions, prohibition of the production and use of nuclear and rocket weapons, destruction of stockpiles of these weapons, and so forth.

The draft "Basic principles of general and complete disarmament" submitted by the socialist States' delegations on 8 April, and in particular the first principle, meet this requirement. The proposal submitted by Mr. Koch does not, unfortunately, contain any provisions of this kind. On nuclear disarmament it merely mentions very vaguely, and only as an ultimate objective not defined in time, the abolition of weapons of mass destruction, without saying what is to constitute this abolition. In regard to armed forces and armaments other than nuclear, it refers only to reduction and limitation and not to abolition.

The Western document contains no explicit statement on the very important matter of time-limits. We have explained at length within this Committee the importance of a precise definition of the time-limits for carrying out the whole programme, in order to make it possible concretely to put the disarmament measures into effect. I must say frankly that the arguments Mr. Koch has advanced today to show the impossibility of setting an exact time-limit for the implementation of the plan for general and complete disarmament completely fail to convince me.

The document submitted by the Western delegations does not mention the principle of continuity of the disarmament process, nor does it contain any guarantee that the implementation of the disarmament programme shall not be
arbitrarily interrupted at any moment. Yet such provisions are essential in any international undertaking. That is to say, the implementation of the disarmament programme should not depend on factors which have nothing to do with the programme itself.

On the contrary, it must be stressed that the condition, in sub-paragraph (d) of the draft submitted by the Western delegations, namely that the disarmament measures must be negotiated progressively, in fact precludes the drafting of a general plan providing measures for each stage. Consequently the document does not deal with the principles of a plan for general and complete disarmament, but only with a series of measures to be taken in ignorance of what measures ought to follow them.

I should like to emphasize that if at this stage in our discussions we are only to seek agreement on the principles of disarmament, these must be so clearly stated as to leave no doubt that their implementation will totally eliminate the danger of war and establish a lasting peace in accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV).

The draft basic principles of general and complete disarmament submitted by the five socialist States meet these requirements. At the meeting on 14 April the United States representative felt able to describe this draft as abstract, although at first the Western delegations had made the opposite criticism, that it was too concrete. Since, however, our draft has now been criticized for being too abstract, we find ourselves obliged to say that this criticism is better applicable to the document which has just been submitted. This document does indeed contain certain general statements which might have a certain value of their own if they were not isolated from the substance of the problem -- that is, from the essence of General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV), namely general and complete disarmament.

I wonder what would be either the effect or the advantage of adoption by our Committee of the principle of the need for control over disarmament -- and this control, according to the document and what is no doubt a correct principle, must operate from the moment disarmament comes into force until it ends -- if no agreement were also reached on the object at which the control must be aimed. What I have just said also applies in general to other principles enumerated in the Western draft.
These are the first comments we wanted to make on the draft submitted to us. We shall not fail to study it more attentively, although the Western delegations must admit that they have not left us much time to do so.

I would say, however, that the first general impression we have of this document is rather disconcerting. General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) did not instruct us to formulate vague propositions entailing no concrete commitment, but to draft a constructive programme of general and complete disarmament. At the beginning of his statement Mr. Moch insisted on the need to improve the atmosphere of our discussions and to bring our points of view closer together. That is what we have wanted to do since the beginning of our work, as we have proved more than once. But I am afraid that the road on to which the Western delegations want to take us does not lead there.

Mr. Eaton (United States of America): I trust that Mr. Zorin will give most serious consideration to the statements which have been made this morning by Mr. Moch and by Mr. Ormsby-Gore. It was, in large part, due to Mr. Moch's own patient individual efforts that this statement was worked out with his Western colleagues. This is an effort to meet the constant request of the Soviet delegation that they be told where we are aiming, their constantly reiterated statements that the formula of general and complete disarmament under effective international control as contained in the General Assembly resolution should be elaborated, and to meet the constant demands of the Soviet side that we define our conception of the term "general and complete disarmament under effective international control" before they are prepared to talk about measures. I hope that after such serious consideration Mr. Zorin will respond in a constructive manner. If, on the other hand, Mr. Zorin comes back insisting that there be included a series of general slogans such as Mr. Moch and Mr. Ormsby-Gore have referred to this morning, devoid of any practical significance for real disarmament, then I fear it will be merely another indication that the Soviet Union has no intention of reaching agreement on any practical measures on disarmament at this stage.

I should like again to express the hope that this new effort on the part of the Western delegations will meet with a constructive and positive response.
Mr. MOCH (France) (translation from French): I should like to thank Mr. Eaton for emphasizing the French delegation's contribution to the drafting of this five-Power document; and I should like to tell Mr. Naszkowski very briefly that, even if he has not had much time to examine this text, he has at any rate done so with a rather jaundiced eye. I should like to say, following Mr. Eaton, that we are not burghers of Calais coming barefoot with halters around our necks to implore the mercy of Mr. Ormsby-Gore's distant ancestors. We Westerners are non passionately seeking an understanding which would enable us to get started on disarmament. If we are not with the objection Mr. Naszkowski has just made, that to speak of "the final elimination of weapons of mass destruction" is much less precise than to speak of "prohibiting" them and "ceasing to produce" them, that is a sign that agreement is not desired. It is very clear that the expression "final elimination" includes prohibition, destruction of stockpiles and cessation of production. Otherwise there would be no final elimination. So the question I now ask Mr. Zorin, with the request that he shall not answer me today, is this: Do you want conciliation, or do you want us all, after the efforts we are making today, to make a joint statement of failure and give up trying to make further progress?

Mr. R. BALCOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): After the preliminary remarks made by the representative of Poland I should certainly not have asked to speak, because Mr. Naszkowski gave his first impression of the document which Mr. Moch has just submitted on behalf of the Western Powers. However, after hearing the representative of the United States, Mr. Eaton, I think I must make the following comments.

First Mr. Eaton and then Mr. Moch -- but especially Mr. Eaton -- have emphasized that, since we wanted general formulae on general and complete disarmament, they have done their best, with the help of the French delegation in particular, to give us some. It should be remembered first of all that, when we submitted our document "Basic principles of general and complete disarmament" (TMD/4), Mr. Eaton accused us of running counter to the United Nations resolution, saying:

"That resolution never mentions the word 'principles'. It instructs us to come here and work on 'measures' -- 'measures leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control'. It is now being suggested that we work not on measures but on principles". (TMD/TV.21, page 20)
Perhaps that is the true definition of what has just been submitted to us today.

I should like to thank Mr. Moch for the confidence he showed in us when at the beginning of his statement he said that he was complying today with the Eastern countries' desire to have such a document. The Western Powers seem to have understood our desire to examine concrete measures, to discuss a plan for general and complete disarmament. I think that in presenting that document and making that statement Mr. Moch has given us a token of confidence and shown his conviction that we really intend to discuss the problem of general and complete disarmament. That is my first point.

Secondly, I should like to observe that the first striking feature of this plan is the reference to the communique of the four Foreign Ministers, which has been repeatedly mentioned here and which we are told should serve as a basis for our deliberations and work. We think that this communique has already been superseded by the United Nations resolution. That is one point I wanted to make now.

Another question, however, is more important: the question of time-limits, with which many other questions are bound up. In speaking about time-limits Mr. Moch said that of course he hoped it would be possible to proceed quickly but that "with the distrust accumulated through so many hostile acts on both sides since our joint victory, and with the disputes subsisting in so many areas ..." it was impossible for the time being to accept time-limits which could straight away offer us a prospect of disarmament.

One sometimes wonders if the Western Powers really want to achieve disarmament before the political disputes have been settled. If they want to put an end to all political disputes before disarmament is achieved, the United Nations Charter will not be respected, for it obliges us to settle our differences by negotiation. One may really wonder whether we could do any good by trying to settle the present political differences before starting disarmament.

But a point which is perhaps more important, and which the representative of Poland also emphasized, concerns paragraph (d) of the document submitted by the Western Powers:

"disarmament measures must be negotiated progressively according to the possibility of their early implementation and effective control".

What does this mean? At first-sight it means that if we accept this document we shall be obliged to study, not a disarmament plan, but various measures, one
after another, as some of the Western delegations have proposed, particularly -- and forcefully -- the United States delegation. That is why I said at the beginning that the whole philosophy of this document may perhaps be contained in the remarks made by Mr. Eaton at our meeting of 12 April 1960.

The delegations of the socialist countries think that, instead of committing ourselves to the discussion merely of partial measures in which -- I do not wish to go into detail -- there is in most cases no content of real disarmament, and losing a great deal of time in coming to an understanding -- because we might deal with all the questions related to the control of these measures -- we ought to agree on general principles, on the aim, the ultimate purpose of our task, and then set to work and devise concrete measures.

May I again take up a point emphasized both by Mr. Moch and by Mr. Ormsby-Gore? They told us that they are opposed to such measures as an undertaking by the nuclear Powers not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and that this is why they do not include such a point in the principles they have now formulated. They said that they are afraid, first, that we would be neglecting the United Nations Charter, which obliges States not to undertake any action contrary to its provisions and which, so to say, forbids conflicts; and that secondly they want to keep their hands free for self-defence. But we have repeatedly proposed, and we again propose -- this is in the Soviet plan -- to reduce armed forces to such a level that States would no longer be able to commit aggression. Why do the Western Powers not want to take a course which would make it impossible for States to commit aggression with the conventional forces at their disposal? Yet they want to be able to defend themselves against such acts of aggression as would be possible if armed forces remained at a high level; or rather, they tell us: we should be able to use nuclear weapons first.

We shall of course study this document which has been submitted to us in the middle of this last week before the recess. I think this is a task which should be performed immediately if we want to reach agreement as quickly as possible on the proposals we have made, which are undoubtedly constructive proposals, on which we must agree if we are to have something constructive to put before the Summit Conference.

Mr. ORMSBY-GORE (United Kingdom): I think my colleagues will of course be extremely disappointed at the extraordinarily negative statement which they
have just heard from the representative of Bulgaria. I would like to answer him on just one or two points.

He referred to sub-paragraph (d) of the paper which has been tabled this morning, and he quoted it:

"disarmament measures must be negotiated progressively according to the possibility of their early implementation and effective control."

He wondered about and speculated upon the philosophy behind that kind of statement. I do not think I can do better than to re-read the words of Mr. Khrushchev, which I think are based on exactly the same philosophy. This is what he said:

"We suggest to begin not with a cardinal but with a gradual solution of disarmament problems, beginning with what offers hope, inspires confidence. Thus, step by step, it will be possible to reach the main goal. That is the solution of the problem of complete disarmament."

I think that is an indication of the philosophy which lies behind a great deal of what we have put into this particular document.

The representative of Bulgaria also stated -- and we have heard it before -- that he did not like a reference to the communiqué issued by the four Foreign Ministers -- including the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union. I would point out now, however, that it is on the basis of that communiqué that we are meeting here in Geneva -- this is the whole basis upon which this Conference was set up -- and to say that in some way what happened at the United Nations took over from the communiqué issued by the Foreign Ministers is to my mind a curious argument because Mr. Gromyko, who signed this communiqué on 7 September, must have been well aware at that time of the Soviet disarmament plan which was tabled only ten days later. I cannot honestly believe that the representative of Bulgaria thinks that Mr. Gromyko put his name to this communiqué while at the same time having no knowledge whatever that the Soviet Union was putting forward a plan of general and complete disarmament ten days later. This is inconceivable to me. Therefore, he knew that this plan was going to be tabled when he signed this communiqué, and I cannot understand why the representative of Bulgaria should not wish to have any mention of the communiqué, which set up our Conference here, put into a document tabled at this Committee.
Finally, he referred to the question of the ultimate goals. He did not, if I may say so, address himself to any of the arguments put forward by Mr. Moch and myself which explained why we set ourselves this particular goal — the conditions as they exist in the world today, the conditions which are likely to exist in the world for some years to come. In taking as our goal the reduction of armed forces to those needed for internal security purposes and for our obligations under the Charter, I do not think we set ourselves an unworthy goal, and I would remind both the representative of Poland and the representative of Bulgaria that this was the goal which the Soviet Union set themselves in the proposals they put forward in May 1955 and which they have frequently talked about with approval since then. And, I would add, that this was the precise goal they set themselves and they put no time limit for its attainment.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): If no one else wishes to speak, I should like to say a few words as representative of the Soviet Union.

I must first of all express regret that we are now called upon to discuss a document submitted at the very close of the work of our Committee — just before the train leaves so to speak. This document is to be discussed so late because the Western representatives participating in the work of our Committee have apparently only now, at long last, become convinced of the need to express their views on the series of basic principles of general and complete disarmament submitted by the socialist countries some time ago. Almost three weeks have passed since the socialist States first tabled their principles of general and complete disarmament on 8 April 1960, and during that time the Western delegations have been rejecting these principles outright. Now, judging by the document tabled and the explanations given today by the representatives of France and of the United Kingdom, the Western representatives have nevertheless found it necessary to proceed to a discussion of those principles.

Some of the principles which in their previous statements the Western representatives rejected out of hand now appear in one form or another in the document before us. The first impression we are left with, after perusing this document and listening to the explanations presented today, is that the Western representatives have felt compelled to answer many of the questions raised by
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the socialist delegations at this session of our Committee, and thus to try to appear in a somewhat more favourable light in face of the criticism voiced both by us in this Committee and by public opinion in various countries.

It is obviously impossible to give today any detailed appraisal of this document and of the explanations of it that have been given, since it naturally requires careful study and, like any other document, all its wording bears a certain meaning which must be clearly grasped. But its essential content and the explanations presented today tend, in my view, to reveal in general two main features that we must ponder very seriously. Why has this document been introduced? In order to find a basis on which our positions on the main problem discussed in this Committee could be reconciled? Or merely in order to ward off the more telling criticisms to which the Western position has been subjected, and thus to calm public opinion in various countries? When Mr. Noch asked me this morning whether we wanted agreement between ourselves or not, and went so far as to ask me not to answer this question today, I was rather astonished. We are in no doubt about this question. As representatives of the socialist States we naturally want agreement, or we should not have agreed to the appointment of this Committee; we should not have come to its meetings; and we should not have discussed patiently for almost two months the Western representatives proposals and considerations although on many occasions they have turned down our proposals almost as soon as these were introduced. With us the question does not arise: we want agreement, we want to find a basis for a mutually-acceptable solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament. But do you want it? That is a question that again arises in our minds as we study this document. What makes us raise this question in that form?

Two features, as I have already said.

The first feature is that, even when the document deals with the final goal, it speaks not of the abolition of armaments and of armed forces generally, but merely of a reduction and a limitation of armaments and armed forces.
The very expressions used, "reduction" and "limitation" of forces and weapons, quite naturally at once make us wonder why the Western representatives talk at all about the principles and conditions of general and complete disarmament. Surely, general and complete disarmament inevitably presupposes the abolition of armies, armaments and armed forces as such. But for some reason the Western representatives in this document say nothing about that.

Thus the very words relating to the final goal do not correspond to the title of the document; although we have to admit that the heading itself and the expression "general and complete disarmament" are now repeated a number of times, and quite unequivocally, if I may so put it. This we regard as a step forward.

If we look at some of the other items relating to the course of action that would lead to the final goal, we shall see that to all intents and purposes the whole military machinery of States is preserved in this document without substantial change. Furthermore, we seem to have here an attempt to maintain armed forces not only for internal purposes but also for external purposes, in relations between States; otherwise it is difficult to follow the proposals that refer to the setting-up of a special international organization to ensure security and to fulfil various obligations. Otherwise, also, it is impossible to understand the explanations that have been presented here about certain zones and areas of the world in which obligations of some sort would have to be fulfilled, in accordance, I would add, with the United Nations Charter.

Mention of zones, however, clearly implies something beyond a specific State or its internal security. Some obligations are to be fulfilled outside a State and in some sort of zone. In this connexion it does not appear accidental that the Western document does not mention the abolition of military bases on foreign territories. If it is intended that armed forces of some kind have to fulfil some kind of obligations outside their own State and mention is made of obligations in certain zones, then perhaps the idea is to utilize in these zones either existing or newly-established military bases on foreign territories.

These questions are inevitably raised by the explanations presented by Mr. Moch and Mr. Ormsby-Gore.

Therefore the primary reason why these doubts arise in our minds is that the document says nothing about the liquidation of armed forces and armaments even during the final stage; it merely refers to reduction and limitation.
In replying to the representative of Bulgaria, Mr. Ormsby-Gore referred to the communiqué of the four Foreign Ministers. Personally I think it is not by chance that reference is now made to this communiqué in the Western document, and for reasons quite different from those Mr. Ormsby-Gore tried to make us accept.

Had it been found necessary to make a simple reference to the communiqué in relation merely to the appointment of the Committee, that would have been one thing. But it would seem that this reference was not introduced for that purpose or because a formal reference to the establishment of the Committee was required, but apparently because the reference would provide an opening for the formula "reduction and limitation ... of forces and weapons". This seems to be the reason for the reference to that communiqué.

If this is so, the reference is unwarranted, because naturally after the adoption of the General Assembly resolution, to which the sponsors of the Western document now refer directly, the reference becomes meaningless, since the resolution speaks not of a reduction and limitation of armed forces but of general and complete disarmament.

The second feature that raises doubt in our minds about the document introduced by the Western representatives relates to the preparation of a programme of general and complete disarmament.

What have we here? A real programme of general and complete disarmament, or an attempt to define some general principles of disarmament and then begin to prepare some isolated measures, or just one stage of disarmament? It seems to be the second, not the first. True, the Western document itself uses the phrase "a programme of general and complete disarmament". In substance, however, it contains no provisions that would ensure the preparation of a single programme of general and complete disarmament from beginning to end. In his explanation Mr. Ormsby-Gore, if I understood him correctly, tried to persuade us just now that there could be no such programme. We shall no doubt have to revert to this matter, but on a first perusal this document does not appear to us to envisage a clear-cut programme of general and complete disarmament within some defined time-limit.

In this connexion the refusal also to set any time-limits for the carrying out of the programme is quite typical. Mr. Moch also assured us today that no such time-limits could in fact be fixed, that there could be time-limits in connexion with the first stage of such disarmament only, and that afterwards all depended on how the first stage was implemented, what the political situation would then be, what measure of confidence would then prevail, and how negotiations on subsequent stages would progress.
That is how the statements of Mr. Ormsby-Gore and Mr. Moch could be interpreted. But if that is so, then of course there is no difference between this document and the contents of the original Western plan. That plan provided exactly for the preparation of some kind of small first step which, as we have repeatedly pointed out, would represent not a stage in disarmament, but one mainly concerned with control, after which further negotiations were contemplated. This document also refers to further negotiations in its paragraph (d), about which the representative of Bulgaria spoke and Mr. Ormsby-Gore made a statement just now. Mr. Ormsby-Gore's reference in this connexion to N.S. Khrushchev's statement appeared to me unwarranted since N.S. Khrushchev's statement dealt generally with the approach to the disarmament programme -- how it should be discussed and prepared. But our principle is that, whereas the broad outlines of the programme must be agreed beforehand, its implementation should be governed by specific provisions contained in the actual treaty on general and complete disarmament.

Perhaps we do not quite understand one another about this point. Perhaps it needs some clarification. But to our minds the content of this new document seems to be another attempt to revert to the old course of protracted negotiations on each disarmament measure over a considerable period with no set time-limit. This, of course, is not agreement to work out a programme of general and complete disarmament. It is an attempt to get away from a programme of general and complete disarmament and a virtual refusal to work one out, even though the need for one appears to be recognized in the document -- a point in its favour.

Here, then, are the two features: first, definition of the final goals, so to speak; and second, recognition or non-recognition of the need to prepare a programme of general and complete disarmament, with definite time-limits, definite provisions relating to each stage worked out in advance, and so on. These two features make us ask what we are dealing with: a genuine attempt to provide a basis for reconciling our positions on the fundamentals of general and complete disarmament, or an attempt to evade solution of the main problems by advancing certain propositions which in a number of respects approximate to ours but in others are clearly rooted in old attitudes and drag us back?
Now a final remark on refraining from using nuclear weapons first.

Mr. Moch explained in some detail the position of the Western representatives on this question, and I must say this explanation has proved wholly disappointing to us. I will not now deal in detail with all his arguments. Obviously we shall have to do that later; but I must say that those arguments—legal, moral and political—do not in my opinion hold water. His assertion that the Western representatives are morally opposed to any kind of war but not to the abolition of certain specific types of armaments cannot do more than slightly obscure their real refusal to take the first step towards renunciation of the use of all types of armaments.

If we are to discuss this matter in general terms, surely Mr. Moch does not really think that the socialist States favour the retention of some types of weapons, or the use of some types of weapons, or war? Obviously no one could possibly accuse us of this. We, on the contrary, could accuse a number of countries of it; but this cannot in any case justify refusal to undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

After all, what we proposed to you before was an undertaking to refrain, not from using nuclear weapons first, but from using them at all. But you told us at that time that such an undertaking was unthinkable in the present circumstances because the situation was such that you had to have some confidence in mutual relations with the States which in your view represent a threat to you and so forth, and that you had to have a deterrent and so forth.

In reply to your negative attitude we suggested another formula—an undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. This, therefore, is not our original formula. Our original formula was to renounce the use of nuclear weapons altogether. More than that, it was complete prohibition of nuclear weapons and their elimination from the armaments of States, which is what we say quite plainly in our plan for general and complete disarmament. When the representative of Poland said today that the wording in your proposal was now not altogether clear, he was right, though you immediately retorted that it was obvious that you too were for complete abolition, complete elimination of nuclear weapons and so forth. But if that is obvious to you, if you are not against it, why not say so in your proposal? That would simply confirm that you really believe that nuclear weapons should be completely eliminated from the armaments of States. And if you add that you are in favour of eliminating all
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types of conventional armaments, it will become even clearer that you are really in favour of general and complete disarmament. But your actual wording does not give a clear answer to this question.

However, I am referring to this only in connexion with an undertaking not to use nuclear weapons. Your argument that we are, as it were, morally sanctioning war with the use of nuclear weapons and other types of armaments is thus frivolous, because you and the whole world know our position perfectly well: we are in favour of the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons and their elimination from the armaments of States. That we are now proposing a formula by which States would declare that they will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, is to some extent due to your own position. We want to make it easier for you to accept such a formula. But if you reject this too, that of course produces in the minds of all misgivings and doubts as to your real intentions.

One more point about renunciation of use. You said that if a war began, no laws would be observed at all. That was the gist of your statement. In this connexion you referred to Hitler, saying that he refrained from using poison gas merely because he knew that this would lead only to temporary success and eventually to tragic consequences for Germany. I understand that you are drawing a parallel and saying that if there is war, then it is not impossible that someone may act like Hitler -- that is the meaning of the parallel; and that if so there will be no laws whatever. Well, if such arguments are used today, we cannot help asking: Why, are there already some aspiring Hitlers? True, we have said and we go on saying that certain forces of German fascism are being reborn; but the Western Powers assure us that all this is under their strict control, that there can be no comparison with Hitler's regime, and so forth. Yet listening to Mr. Moch's remarks we cannot help gaining the impression that some, shall we say, public figures are already in being who would be prepared to use nuclear weapons by whatever means and in disregard of all laws. If that is so it is, of course, extremely regrettable. That is precisely what we want to prevent. And we should like the Western Powers to consider seriously our proposal for an undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. If they categorically refuse to do so, we cannot help entertaining grave doubts of their intentions. Say what you will, the arguments just put forward by Mr. Moch cannot explain to us why they reject that proposal. And of course this rejection, made I should say exhaustively, fills us with melancholy thought.
Such are the preliminary comments we have been able to make today on this document and on the explanations of it given at this meeting. It goes without saying that the Soviet delegation, like the delegations of other States, will carefully study the whole of this text with all the explanations, and will state its further views on this proposal. It is, of course, a pity that we have not enough time left to bring our positions into agreement; and that the Western representatives have for so long refused to discuss in concrete terms the principles put forward by the socialist countries, and have only now proceeded in fact to discuss them by submitting their document.

We will study this document in greater detail and comment further upon it. However, our first impressions as I have just described them are based on the one hand upon the document itself and the explanations of it, and on the other hand upon the position adopted by the Western representatives throughout our discussions.

Those are the preliminary remarks I wished to make.

Mr. MOCH (France) (translation from French): I am very sorry to note that the immediate replies of the three representatives of the Eastern Powers have gravely jeopardized the very future of our negotiations. I do not wish to go into the substance of the matter at this hour, but only to take up the disagreeable element of certain allegations made by Mr. Zorin, who taxes us with tabling this document towards the end of the session, three weeks later than his own. Mr. Eaton has already replied. I myself should have preferred to table it earlier. Mr. Zorin wants it to be studied more thoroughly, but he wonders why it was submitted: in order to find a basis of agreement, or to ward off criticism?

Let me tell you, Mr. Zorin, that criticism outside this room is of no concern to the French delegation, and the reason why we submitted this text together with the four other Western delegations was that we wished to make a last effort at conciliation.

As for the arguments you have just put forward, I would refer you for each of them -- with one exception -- to a careful reading of my explanation of this plan, for you will there find them answered already. I say "with one exception" because one among them, I venture to say, is specious: that is the argument you base on my reference to Hitler. I might equally well have named other
dictators -- some even from Soviet history -- instead of Hitler; and you have no right to deduce from this example that there is a recurrence of Fascism or Hitlerism in Germany, or that this is what I meant to say. To attribute such thoughts to me is, let me tell you, completely unfounded.

You say that you want a mutually acceptable solution: that is what you said at the beginning of your speech; whereupon you took up your own position again in its entirety. I repeat once again, and so far as I am concerned for the last time, that if a mutually acceptable solution is the Soviet solution accepted with hands and feet tied, then it seems to me pointless to continue these negotiations. That is all I have to say this morning.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Does anyone else wish to speak? Has no one any other comments?

Before passing to the communique, I should like to make one small remark concerning Mr. Moch's rather testy last intervention. I should simply like to say: "Jupiter, you are angry; that means that you are in the wrong".

If no one else has any other comments, allow me to read the communique.

"The twenty-ninth meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament was held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 26 April 1960, under the chairmanship of the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

"The representative of France submitted to the Committee a proposal by the delegations of Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, concerning principles and conditions for general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Wednesday, 27 April 1960, at 10.30 a.m."

If there are no objections, the communique is adopted.

The meeting rose at 1.55 p.m.