FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWENTY-EIGHTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Monday, 25 April 1960, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Măzărescu (Romania)
PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Bulgaria:
Mr. W. TARABANOV
Mr. K. CHRISTOV
Col. K. SAVOV

Canada:
Mr. E.L.H. BURNS
Mr. A.G. CAMPBELL
W/Cdr. R.J. MITCHELL

Czechoslovakia:
Mr. J. NOSEK
Lieut.-Gen. J. HECKO
Mr. Z. TRHLIK

France:
Mr. J. MOCH
Mr. M. LEGENDE
Col. L. CONVERT

Italy:
Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. L. DAINELLI
Mr. D. PHILIPSON

Poland:
Mr. H. NASZKOWSKI
Mr. M. LACHS
Brig.-Gen. J. SLIWINSKI

Romania:
Mr. E. IACUZINESCUC
Mr. C. BOGDAN
Col. C. POPA

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
Mr. V.A. ZORIN
Col.-Gen. A.A. GRYZLOV
Mr. A.A. ROSCHIN
PRESENT AT THE TABLE (contd.)

**United Kingdom:**
- Rt. Hon. D. OMBROSBY-GORE
- Miss B. SALT
- Maj.-Gen. RIDDELL

**United States of America:**
- Mr. F.M. EATON
- Mr. C.C. STELLE
- Rear-Admiral P.L. DUDLEY

**Representative of the Secretary-General:**
- Mr. W. EPSTEIN
The CHAIRMAN (Romania) (translation from French): The twenty-eighth meeting of the conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament is called to order.

I call first upon the representative of Poland, the first of the two speakers on the list so far.

Mr. NASZKOWSKI (Poland) (translation from French): The Soviet plan for general and complete disarmament is much concerned with nuclear disarmament. It provides for concrete and realistic measures whose execution would free mankind forever from the threat of war and, in particular, from the threat of weapons of mass extermination being used. In my statement today, I propose to dwell once more on this most vital problem. I wish to make a more detailed examination of the position of our Western colleagues on this subject.

At the twenty-third meeting of our Committee, Mr. Eaton, the representative of the United States, described a proposal on control over the cessation of production of fissionable materials for military purposes and the gradual transfer of these materials to peaceful uses. That proposal was meant to stress the great importance the Western Powers are supposed to attach to the question of nuclear disarmament. It was accompanied by a comment by Mr. Eaton to the effect that it dealt with "those first steps which it is necessary for us to take if we are ever to stop talking about disarmament and start doing something about it." (TNCD/PV.23, page 25)

That comment would, I must say, be most appropriate if it was in keeping with Mr. Eaton's proposal. But what does an examination of that proposal show? We find that the proposal provides only for control over the cessation of production of fissionable materials for military purposes, and says nothing about the cessation of production of nuclear weapons. We should thus have a situation in which fissionable materials would no longer be produced for military purposes, but production of nuclear weapons could be continued and stocks built up, using fissionable materials previously manufactured for military purposes and not yet transferred to peaceful uses. Hence the implementation of this proposal would not reduce the danger from nuclear weapons. For we all realize -- and this has already been mentioned at our earlier meetings -- that even a small part of the existing stocks of nuclear weapons would be enough to cause incalculable destruction... In this connexion I should like to refer to the press reports of the statement made by Professor Pauling at Englewood, New Jersey, on 19 April. Professor Pauling, a Nobel Prize winner, pointed out that even a small fraction of the weapons now
possessed by the nuclear Powers would be enough to annihilate any one of the world’s great Powers.

If we wish to remove tension from the world, to eliminate distrust and suspicion among the nations and to free the world from the danger of nuclear war, the measures we take must be of a radical nature. This necessity follows from the very nature of mass extermination weapons.

Here I would like to remind members of the Committee that the question of nuclear weapons has, for years, been the decisive factor in the disarmament problem and one of the central problems of international relations as a whole, although the stocks of nuclear weapons in former years were only a small part of present stocks.

In the light of what I have just said, it is clear that the Western proposals on nuclear weapons offer the prospect of a very long road ahead, which, however, does not lead in any foreseeable future to the goal set for us, namely to ensure peace and the security of States by disarmament and the elimination of weapons of mass extermination. For after all the lengthy operations envisaged in the proposals of the United States delegation, there would still be more or less sizeable stocks of nuclear weapons, and no prohibition of their use. It follows that the same anxiety, the same suspicions, and hence the same tension as we have today, would remain. That being so, is it possible to consider the implementation of such a proposal as a concrete disarmament measure, especially when, according to the Western proposals, properly equipped armies of several million men, and bases on foreign territory, would also be maintained?

The Polish delegation, like the delegations of the other socialist States represented here, is alive to the nuclear danger, and our proposals aim at solving this problem in a radical manner which would bring about an essential change — a qualitative change — in the present state of nuclear armaments and could free mankind forever from the threat of a nuclear war.

During our discussions in this Committee we have said several times — and Mr. Zorin, the Soviet representative, has twice recently repeated this emphatically, in particular at the twenty-third meeting — that the Soviet Union and the other socialist States propose that, at any agreed stage of the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament, total nuclear disarmament should be carried out, with prohibition of the use of all types of nuclear weapons, prohibition of production and destruction of stocks. We have always pressed for nuclear disarmament and we still do so.
We have been told repeatedly that the merit of the Western proposals concerning nuclear weapons is that the measures are controllable. Conversely, we have been reproached with the alleged defect in our proposals that it would be impossible to control the measures envisaged. Yet I have the impression that in their controversy with us the representatives of the Western States are making too free a use of the question of control. Two facts in particular have confirmed this impression: the Western Powers' rejection of the proposal that States should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons -- on the ground that such an undertaking could not be controlled -- and the statements on control made by the United States representative at the twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh meetings of our Committee. Over the period of more than ten years of disarmament negotiations which has now gone by, whenever some fundamental difference has arisen among the parties, the delegations of the Western Powers have tried to make it appear that the main obstacle to agreement was our alleged opposition to the establishment of effective international control. It is true that the problem of control has in several instances made a reconciliation of views on the problem of disarmament impossible. But that was not because of the alleged opposition by the socialist States, as Mr. Eaton tried to suggest at our twenty-seventh meeting; it was because the Western Powers forced the discussion in the direction of control alone and prevented discussion of the measures for disarmament itself.

The dilemma with which we were confronted by the United States representative at the twenty-sixth meeting is, in our view, an artificial one. It is, I think, natural, before starting to discuss control, to ascertain what disarmament operations will have to be controlled. At the same time it is clear that we cannot proceed to carry out these operations until a control system has been agreed.

At the twenty-seventh meeting Mr. Eaton, the United States representative, observed that the control problem was the most time-consuming part of disarmament negotiations, and drew the conclusion that we ought to concentrate mainly on this problem. This conclusion seems entirely false, not only because of the essential considerations that I have just put forward, but even for organizational reasons. For what would be the point of doing so much work on the question of possible control of some particular disarmament measure, when no substantive agreement had been reached on it?

As to the objection that an undertaking not to use nuclear weapons could not be controlled, I think that this results from a complete confusion of thought. The
postulate of control, which is also our postulate, cannot be applied to this kind of undertaking. I would remind you that an undertaking not to make use of certain means of fighting an enemy has already been given in the past. I will only mention the Declaration of St. Petersburg, 1868, the Hague Declarations of 1899 and 1907 concerning prohibition of the use of certain projectiles and certain types of bullet, and the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the prohibition of the use of gas and bacteriological methods of warfare. The question of control did not arise in any of these cases, and it was not because the idea of control as such was not considered at the time. Although in this respect the position may not seem quite clear as regards the Declaration of St. Petersburg or The Hague Declarations, there can be no doubt in the case of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, since the idea of control had already found expression in the peace treaties ending the first world war, though only, of course, in matters to which control could be applied.

At the twenty-second meeting, Mr. Loch, the representative of France, expressed the view that "The aim is to make any nuclear attack physically impossible before proclaiming moral prohibitions ..." (TNCD/FV.22, page 9), and he added "Such prohibitions can crown the work of disarmament, but cannot be its foundation" (ibid.).

Renunciation of the use of a certain weapon, however, only has meaning if it is physically possible to use that weapon. After the completion of the disarmament process, when it is no longer physically possible to use a given weapon, renunciation of its use will really become a mere formality. Hence the situation is the reverse of what Mr. Loch said it was. I would add that to state now that an undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons should be postponed to a later stage is not justified by the exigencies of the present political situation, for it is precisely the danger that the nuclear weapon may be used that is, as General de Gaulle, the President of the French Republic, has emphasized, one of the main factors making for fear and distrust.

Our proposal that States should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons thus has nothing to do with disarmament without control or control without disarmament. Moreover, in the document we submitted on 8 April this proposal is not included among the principles of general and complete disarmament, but is placed at the end as a concrete act of goodwill by the atomic Powers.

Renunciation of the use of certain types of weapon is of great value in itself. Besides, it could be an important complement to the disarmament programme.

Incidentally, Mr. Burns, the representative of Canada, recognized in principle, at our twenty-fourth meeting, that such a renunciation would be of some advantage.
The remaining point of disagreement concerns the time when the undertaking ought to be given. Why should the undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons be of some advantage, as Mr. Burns says, only at a later stage? In our opinion, the sooner this undertaking is given the better.

I should also like to recall that, in connexion with the explanations given by the socialist States concerning the lack of connexion between the problem of control and the undertaking by States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, Mr. Eaton, the United States representative, thought fit at our twenty-seventh meeting merely to say that "... such remarks do not contribute to confidence..." (TNCD/PV.27, page 20). So we may well ask whether the rejection of such a proposal without valid reason contributes more to confidence?

At the beginning of the last week of our work before the recess, I thought it useful to make these few comments which our discussions have rendered necessary. The importance and scope of the questions we are discussing are universally recognized. We consider that in the present state of saturation of the world with armaments, radical measures should be resolutely taken. That is why we oppose proposals and undertakings that get lost half way or even sooner, and disintegrate in the clouds of remote and undefined time-limits, and of results that are themselves undefined and doubtful.

That is why we submitted a programme providing for a body of measures — concrete and defined as to time — which as a whole ensure general and complete disarmament; that is why we later submitted a draft of principles which, if accepted, would facilitate our joint work of drawing up a detailed disarmament plan.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translated from French): The Italian delegation followed last week's discussions with particular interest and attention. It did not intervene in them directly. Nevertheless, I think I am entitled to give my opinion on the latest developments in our work.

I think that our discussion has become very thorough and increasingly valuable. It has, as it were, matured. The comparison of our disarmament plans and mutual intentions has continued. We have engaged in studies which, without having led to any conclusions — at least up to the present — cannot fail to be very useful for our future work, as they have led us to know and understand each other better. Our Eastern colleagues have made some statements that we can support, at least in part. For instance, what Mr. Naszkowski said on 20 April about the need to get rid of the
burden of military expenditure and devote the savings thus achieved to social purposes (cf. TNCD/PV.25), obviously meets with our entire approval. Indeed, we also believe that the widest possible disarmament, as indicated in the United Nations resolution, is essential not only to remove the danger of war, but also to enable us to build a new world on more just, humane and fraternal principles. With the economic means remaining available after we have renounced armaments, we could devote ourselves to the urgent task of improving the lot of our peoples, and of going to the help of our brothers who, on all continents, are waiting for our support and are entitled to receive it without fearing for their independence or their freedom.

While our assessment of last week's work is, on the whole, fairly positive, there are nevertheless some shadows in the picture. Often, the same sterile criticisms have been repeated by our colleagues of the East, thus delaying the constructive development of our work. These same representatives have also shown a tendency to ignore certain explanations of our position, although they were given with the greatest clarity. Sometimes too, unfortunately, the truth has been distorted and, I hope without any premeditated ill-will, our ideas have been represented incorrectly and in contradiction to our most obvious intentions.

I shall not be able to comment today on all these contradictions, which have been only too numerous. They have, moreover, already been amply and outstandingly criticized by my Western colleagues. I should like, however, to touch on certain points which particularly struck me.

The criticism which has most often been made against us is perhaps the following: the Western delegations -- we are told -- do not want agreement on total disarmament, but only on certain isolated parts of disarmament -- on partial and, it is added, insignificant measures. That, for instance, was what the Romanian representative said at the meeting on 19 April, when he asserted that we only wanted "partial and isolated measures". (TNCD/PV.24, page 10). On the same subject, the Polish representative said, at the meeting on 20 April, that we wanted only "a series of measures weakly linked together". (TNCD/PV.25, page 4).

I note, in passing, that Mr. Naszkowski, though he has not grasped the effect of our proposals either, nevertheless comes a little closer to the truth than his Romanian colleague, or rather he departs from it a little less. For we are not proposing measures which are isolated or weakly linked together. Quite the contrary; we are proposing a body of measures which are closely connected. Those
measures form a logical, harmonious whole which, if adopted in its entirety, will take us far towards the goal set by the United Nations General Assembly.

But we wish to apply ourselves to this work in a manner that is concrete, realistic and, therefore, necessarily gradual. If we wish to build a house, it is first necessary to lay the foundation stone, and on that stone to place others as the work proceeds. That is why, though maintaining intact our will to build the whole structure, we have proposed starting with certain initial measures which are relatively easy and could be put into effect at once.

Why are the socialist countries refusing to start this work? Why? Laying the foundation stone of a building is, with us -- and I believe, also, in the communist countries -- an important event, which entails an undertaking to continue and complete that building. Moreover -- since the Eastern delegations like the popular wisdom of proverbs -- I think people everywhere, with us as with them, say it is the first step that is the hardest and that counts. Do the communist representatives not fully realize the immense importance of a first step, of a first concrete achievement? A first step has already been taken by setting up this Committee after a two-year interruption in disarmament negotiations. Do the countries of the East attribute no importance to this first result? We, for our part, consider it very important.

Again, I think our Eastern colleagues will not deny that if an agreement on the suspension of thermo-nuclear bomb tests were concluded, that, too, would be very important. And what is that, but a concrete and partial measure? I admit, if you wish, that this measure would not, strictly speaking, relate to true disarmament; but it would give the nations great hope. And what substantial difference is there between an agreement on tests and an agreement on one of the concrete and immediate measures we have proposed, except that the former would be isolated, whereas the latter would, on the contrary, be linked with a whole series of other important obligations?

Do our Eastern colleagues not think that world public opinion would be relieved to see the first halt in the arms race emerge from the realm of vague words and vain discussions and enter the realm of reality? Do they think that it would be of no importance if the first savings resulting from limitation of the forces and armaments of certain countries became available for social uses and for assistance to under-developed countries? Would it be an insignificant matter -- I am speaking particularly to Mr. Naszkowski in connexion with what he said today -- for the first
quantities of fissionable material to be removed, on both sides, from the bombs now lying ready and used for peaceful purposes? Would all that mean absolutely nothing, and would it have no effect in the eyes of the Eastern delegations? If the answer can only be in the affirmative, why do they refuse to consider these measures? The only reply to our proposal so far has been an effort to outbid it. But is outbidding constructive? For some time it may perhaps deceive a public opinion that is ill-informed or has no free critical faculty -- and I am not even very sure of that -- but in the long run it will deceive nobody. Outbidding is a bad form of argument to conceal opposition to all reasonable and possible progress; it is sterile, because it prevents us doing what could be done at once.

Have our colleagues from the East carefully considered the favourable psychological effects a first agreement on concrete measures would have? There is no doubt that, in spite of the better atmosphere which now prevails in the world, mutual distrust is still very great. In the past few days, we have heard our Eastern colleagues maintain the untruth that our disarmament plan is intended only to provide the allied general staffs with additional information, as though the West were preparing to threaten the security of the communist countries. Is that not a proof that distrust -- a very ill-founded distrust -- still dominates the minds of our partners? This mutual distrust resulting from the long years of cold war which characterized the Stalin era cannot, unfortunately, be removed in a day. Nor can that purpose be served by declarations of intention such as those frequently proposed to us by the Eastern representatives, which are very easy to make but quite impossible to control.

I am not going to make a detailed criticism of these declarations; that has already been amply done by my Western colleagues. It is only by means of an agreement on certain initial, concrete and immediate measures of disarmament, accompanied by control, that it will be possible to strike the first blow at these walls of incomprehension and mutual distrust which still stand between us. Unfortunately, it is primarily mutual distrust that has led some of us to regard control as a new and insidious weapon. On the contrary, as has frequently been repeated, the acceptance of control without mental reservation and without reluctance, as it is envisaged by the Western allies, is the proof -- the best proof -- of the good faith and sincerity of our intentions towards each other.

In this connexion, I note with satisfaction that some first signs of reconcilia-
tion seem to be appearing in our discussions on control. I refer, in particular, to
the interesting statement by Mr. Nosek on 21 April in which he obligingly repeated the very words I had previously used myself, saying that disarmament and control are, "as inseparable as two sides of one coin." (TNCD/PV.26, page 6).

There are, however, points on which I do not agree at all with Mr. Nosek, particularly when he says that:

"When we arrive at agreement on measures which should form the scope of general and complete disarmament ... we are convinced that even on questions of control we shall be in a position to obtain a conformity of standpoints on this basis." (TNCD/PV.26, page 11).

I am, indeed, sincerely convinced of the contrary. Since we are living in a distrustful world, it is from an atmosphere of distrust that we must inevitably set out. That atmosphere can only be changed by a complete assurance that if arms are laid down on one side they will not be secretly retained on the other. It is then, when there is that mutual assurance, that it will be easy to go forward quickly towards disarmament.

I shall study what Mr. Naszkowski said to us this morning about control with the greatest attention. I have already studied with interest the brief information Mr. Nosek gave us on 21 April concerning the organization of control envisaged by the Eastern countries. I thank Mr. Nosek for having furnished these few explanations which I had requested myself when I spoke earlier.

At this point, since we know the two plans for the organization in question, I wonder why we should not begin studying them together and comparing the plan for a control organ, as envisaged by the Eastern countries, with the plan for an international disarmament organization, which I had the honour to submit to this Committee on behalf of the Five Powers. I suggest such a study without any ulterior motive and without the least intention of securing priority for control as against disarmament. Since we agree with Mr. Nosek that the timing of control

"must coincide with the beginning of the carrying out of corresponding disarmament measures, ..." (TNCD/PV.26, page 5)

what is the danger of examining now, the structure of the body which will have been set up when disarmament begins? What danger is there, since we agree that the organization in question can only function when disarmament begins and not a moment before? Naturally, parallel with the study of the control organization, and at the same time, we must study concrete disarmament measures. It is still, as we can see, the idea of the two sides of the same coin. However, such a study would be easier in that we should be certain that control by appropriate bodies would not be lacking.
That is the task which we should begin without delay. Of course, we do not refuse to be guided by general ideas and directions.

On this subject, the Italian delegation has already said, in its statement of 6 April:

"Naturally this working for concrete results would not prevent us from seeking — and reaching — agreement at the same time on the fundamental principles which should govern negotiations on general and complete disarmament. The Italian delegation is in no way opposed to these general principles of disarmament being formulated, provided "— of course —" that they are not propaganda slogans. Indeed, Italy's Minister for Foreign Affairs said at the last session of the General Assembly that it would have been well to recall them." (TNCD/FV.17, page 15)

I even believe, though I should not like to be too optimistic, that, as we saw in the case of control, certain common principles have begun slowly to emerge from our discussion, in spite of the controversies and differing views.

But it is not through general principles, which are necessarily abstract, that we shall bring our peoples the relief they await. Our peoples expect concrete facts. And if I urge the need for concrete achievements, it is not only because I am very sincerely convinced of that need, but also because it seemed to me, when listening to various statements by Eastern delegates last week, that they were beginning to reflect on the merits of our requests, and were no longer entirely unwilling to start, at last, on a practical discussion of concrete measures.

Speaking on 21 April, Mr. Nosek said:

"In this connexion I should like to stress the fact that the delegations of the socialist countries by no means wish to keep aloof from a detailed discussion and elaboration of detailed control measures." (TNCD/FV.26, page 10)

I also thought I found similar allusions — I hope I was not mistaken — in statements by Mr. Zorin and various other representatives of the Eastern countries.

As the Polish representative has already reminded us, we are today beginning our last week of work before the recess which has been decided on. May I express the hope that this week will be more fruitful than those which preceded it, and that our Committee will be able to make some progress at last, along the lines I have tried to indicate. That progress would be an invaluable contribution towards preparing a more favourable and more constructive atmosphere for the historic meeting due to be held in Paris in May, on which so many hopes are concentrated. We most sincerely hope that such progress may be achieved.
The CHAIRMAN (Romania) (translation from French): Does anyone else wish to speak?

If not, I should like to make a few comments as representative of Romania, on the statements just made by the representative of Italy.

Mr. Cavalletti said that one of the main criticisms levelled by the delegations of the socialist countries, and by myself in particular, against the plan submitted by the West, is that it is not an overall plan, a programme of measures designed to reach the goal of general and complete disarmament, but a conglomeration of isolated, partial and ill-assorted measures of control over armaments, rather than measures of disarmament.

My delegation -- and I think I can speak for the delegations of the other socialist countries as well -- still holds the same opinion on the plan and the proposals so far submitted by the Western Powers.

These are not proposals for a programme designed to reach the goal set by General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV), namely, general and complete disarmament, but partial, isolated and ill-assorted measures of control over armaments.

That is my first comment.

Mr. Cavalletti asked us whether we did not think that it would be preferable, before setting up the structure of general and complete disarmament in all its details, to lay the foundations for it.

I could agree with that proposition, but on one condition: that we undertake to lay the foundations of something definite; in other words before laying the foundations we must have a plan -- we must know what we are building, what we ought to build. Yet the characteristic feature of the proposals made by the countries of the Atlantic Alliance is, precisely, that they ask us to build something they are unwilling to name; they ask us to lay the foundations of a building for which plans have not yet been drawn up; they ask us to take the first steps in a direction that has not yet been decided.

We have taken account of all the points of agreement as well as of the differences that have emerged from our discussions. It was precisely in order to help the Committee to advance towards the goal set for us that we submitted the document with which you are all familiar, on the basic principles of general and complete disarmament (TNCD/4). The purpose of that proposal was, and still is, to define our objective, the scope of the disarmament measures to be adopted and put into effect, the principles of control, the machinery for preserving peace and respect for international law and order etc., as everyone well knows.
The adoption of such a document on principles would be particularly useful for our discussions, since it would enable us to go forward knowing the direction, the objectives, the underlying principles and the means to be employed.

Mr. Cavalletti also referred to what public opinion expects of our Committee's work. I believe he is right. The peoples of the entire world, including those of the countries represented here, of the East and the West alike, expect results from our Committee's work. But it is not satisfying the demands of public opinion to try to find some way of giving it the illusion that we are engaged on something connected with disarmament in our Committee, whereas in fact the Western countries are asking us and compelling the Committee to abandon the goal accepted by the adoption of resolution 1378 (XIV). It is not meeting the demands of the nations to allow ourselves to be led along that road. My delegation, for its part, and the delegations of the other socialist countries, will not let themselves be led in that direction.

I shall, of course, study the statement just made by the Italian representative with the attention it deserves, and if I find it necessary I shall amplify these brief comments.

Speaking now as Chairman, I ask whether anyone else wishes to speak at this meeting.

Mr. TARAPANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): You have already had occasion to point out, Mr. Chairman, that we cannot enter into a discussion of measures without knowing where they might lead us -- without a plan for our building. I should like to take up Mr. Cavalletti's remark, in regard to these measures, that since the Eastern delegations were very fond of proverbs he would quote one, namely, "it is the first step that counts". We agree: it is the first step that counts, provided we know where that first step will lead us. But we are very much afraid that the first steps we are being asked to take here will lead to nothing except long discussions which, as the Chairman, speaking as representative of Romania, has just pointed out, would merely give public opinion the illusion that we are doing something. That is what we are mainly afraid of. We do not wish to make public opinion believe that we are accomplishing something when that is not the case.

My second comment is of a different kind. Mr. Cavalletti told us -- I think I understood him correctly -- that it is feared that while one side lays down its arms, the other will keep them secretly. I think that is a rather arbitrary statement, or at least an unfounded one. For we have not yet seen which part of
the Western plan provides for laying down arms: indeed, we see no such provision either in the first, in the second or in the third stage of the plan.

If we saw that arms were to be laid down, it would certainly be necessary to think very seriously about control. But, unfortunately, there is no provision to that effect. Or if there is, let it be pointed out to us, so that we can see it and discuss it.

The CHAIRMAN (Romania) (translation from French): Does any other member of the Committee wish to speak?

Apparently not; so I will read out the draft communique:

"The twenty-eighth meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament was held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 25 April, under the Chairmanship of the representative of Romania.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 26 April, at 10.30 a.m."

Are there any objections?
The communique is adopted.

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.