FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Friday 22 April 1960, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. NASZKOWSKI (Poland)
PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Bulgaria:
Mr. M. NARABHOV
Mr. K. CHRISTOV
Col. K. SLIVOV

Canada:
Mr. E. L. M. BURNS
Mr. A. G. CAMPBELL
W/Off. R. J. MITCHELL

Czechoslovakia:
Mr. J. NOSEK
Lieut.-Gen. J. HECKO
Mr. Z. TRHLIK

France:
Mr. J. MOCH
Mr. N. LEGENDRE
Col. L. CONVRIET

Italy:
Mr. G. MARTINO
Mr. F. C. VALLERITI
Mr. L. DAIMONI

Poland:
Mr. M. HASZKOWSKI
Mr. H. LACH
Brig.-Gen. J. SIWIŃSKI

Romania:
Mr. L. GHIZIGECU
Mr. C. BODAN
Col. C. POPA

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
Mr. V. A. ZORIN
Col.-Gen. A. A. GRYZLOV
Mr. A. A. ROSECHIN
PRESENT AT THE TABLE (contd.)

United Kingdom:

Rt. Hon. D. ORME-SY-GORE
Miss B. SALP
Maj.-Gen. RIDEELF

United States of America:

Mr. F. M. BATON
Mr. C. C. STILLE
Rear-Admiral P. L. DUDLEY

Representative of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN
The CHAIRMAN (Poland) (translation from French): The twenty-seventh meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament is called to order.

There are two speakers on the list. I call upon the first, the representative of Bulgaria.

Mr. TARARANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): In considering such an important matter as disarmament, it is always useful to return to certain starting points.

Without wishing to dwell on the various positions taken by the Western delegations, I think it of some interest to recall that the statement by which the head of the United Kingdom delegation introduced the Western disarmament plan contains the following words:

"The first basic principle is that the plan" -- that is, of course, the Western plan -- "is a complete and comprehensive one, providing for complete and comprehensive disarmament". (TNCD/PV.2, page 7)

It should also be recalled that during the long discussion here all the delegations of the Western countries have stated that their Governments support the United Nations General Assembly resolution which defines the task of our Committee. In addition, they have stressed that they will continue to sit in the Committee until the conclusion of an agreement which will lead to the accomplishment of that task, i.e., general and complete disarmament. The most recent of such statements is probably that of the United States representative, who referred on 14 April to:

"... the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which we came here to discuss and which we will remain to discuss to its very end". (TNCD/PV.23, page 16)

Throughout the discussion in the Committee, however, very clear statements have been made and a very pessimistic attitude has been adopted by certain Western delegations with regard to general and complete disarmament, which, in view of their equivocal statements at the beginning of our work, are not calculated -- quite contrary -- to reassure us of their intentions concerning the goal of the Western disarmament plan.

Now, in explaining what he termed the philosophy of disarmament, Mr. Moch provided us, at the meeting on 5 April, with further evidence of the state of mind of the Western delegations -- a state of mind which is hardly consistent with
their declarations of fidelity to the General Assembly resolution on general and complete disarmament. In an attempt to show us how these three words "general and complete" entered the vocabulary of the United Nations at the last session of the General Assembly, Mr. Moch said:

"They were not yet current, you will find, on 17 September 1959". (TNCD/PV.16, page 21)

Then, after trying to prove that the words "general and complete" had slipped into General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) as though by chance and quoting the well-known text of that resolution, Mr. Moch said:

"Neither the French delegation nor any of the four other Western delegations wishes to abstract anything from these texts: We think, like our Soviet colleagues, that the question of general and complete disarmament is the most important of all; we are determined to make every effort to resolve it; we are ready to study measures 'leading towards the goal' in question". (ibid., page 22)

And pointing out that not only the Soviet plan, but all the proposals and suggestions were transmitted to our Committee, Mr. Moch went on:

"This comprehensiveness of the matter transmitted to us proves that we are free to adopt whatever text we wish. Furthermore, how could the United Nations restrict the authority of a body created by four Foreign Ministers and placed by them outside the framework of the United Nations?" (ibid.)

It may perhaps be true that the words "general and complete" were not in the United Nations vocabulary before 17 September 1959, but it is no less true that they did not get into it by accident or by some procedural device. They were adopted because they reflect the will of all the peoples of the world to have done with the arms race, to have done with the threat of war, and to see a durable peace established at last among the nations, which would make it possible to develop fruitful relationships of co-operation and friendship between them.

We should also like to point out that the reason why the General Assembly transmitted all the proposals and suggestions submitted at its fourteenth session was not, as we have been asked to believe, in order to revert to the communiqué of the four Foreign Ministers or to oblige us to explore "avenues of possible progress toward such agreement and recommendations on the limitation and reduction of all types of armaments and armed forces", but in order that decisions which would secure general and complete disarmament might be taken.
(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

We quite understand that when Mr. Moch tells us that "we are free to adopt whatever text we wish" he would like to induce us to adopt a text on disarmament omitting the words "general and complete" and referring only to the limitation of armed forces and armaments.

Having said that, we think it extremely important to point out at this stage in our discussions that the setting-up of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament, and more especially the proposals for general and complete disarmament made by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union at the fourteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly and the ensuing discussions in the United Nations, have shown the unshakable determination of the peoples of all countries to put an end to the arms race.

The proposals of the Soviet Government and resolution 1378 (XIV), adopted under conditions of which we are all aware, undoubtedly created favourable conditions for the discussion and solution of the disarmament problem. As we had the honour to point out, as early as the first meeting, those favourable conditions had

"real foundations in the profound changes in international relations which have occurred in recent years, and in a new attitude to the problem of disarmament which is steadily gaining ground". (TNCD/PV.1, page 8)

I have taken the liberty of quoting myself, because I have the impression that that point of view is shared by other delegations, and because I do not think I am mistaken in saying that it is a feeling common to all. For instance, the United Kingdom representative said in his statement on 15 March:

"I am sure we all hope that the opening of this conference will constitute a turning point in post-war history". (ibid., page 31)

and later he went on:

"... but I have gained the impression that our negotiations on this occasion take place in an atmosphere more favourable to success than at any time since the end of the war". (ibid.)

If we agree in recognizing that conditions favourable to a solution of the problem exist, we must expect all the delegations here to have the same desire to profit by those favourable conditions. Nevertheless, our desire for clarity compels us to note that neither the plan submitted by the Western delegations, nor the proposals for allegedly concrete measures based on that plan, are adapted to the present situation, and that no new attitude adapted to that situation has been shown by the Western countries.
During the weeks that have gone by, the representatives of the socialist countries have amply proved, taking the measures proposed in the Western plan one by one, that that plan does not lead to general and complete disarmament. What we should like to stress here is that the measures proposed by the Western Powers are in no way adapted to the favourable situation created by the efforts of all the nations and by certain governments, but on the contrary take us back to methods and procedures like those used by the old League of Nations which, as we know, after twenty years of vain efforts led to total bankruptcy and war. It will be remembered that the old League of Nations, which began collecting information in 1920, was still doing so in 1940, when war was already raging in Europe.

We now have the impression that the difference between the Western Powers' disarmament philosophy and the sincere desire of the socialist countries to see general and complete disarmament carried out as quickly as possible, is becoming increasingly clear. Whereas the Western delegations, while declaring their support of the United Nations resolution, are trying to lead the Committee towards limitation, or, at the most, towards certain reductions in armed forces and armaments, the delegations of the socialist countries are endeavouring to make our work benefit from the favourable situation that has recently arisen, in order to arrive at the conclusion of agreements ensuring general and complete disarmament as defined in General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV).

If the Western delegations are also in favour of general and complete disarmament, as they have stated on several occasions, they should show it much more clearly and definitely than they have done so far; because at the moment, the philosophy of disarmament, as explained in the discussions and reflected in the plan and proposals of the Western Powers, tends rather to exclude general and complete disarmament from the work of this Conference and to substitute a few isolated measures.

It was no mere chance which led the representative of France, when presenting the Western thesis on 5 April, to conclude that it was the communiqué of the four Foreign Ministers of 7 September 1959 that should serve as a basis for our discussions; for that communiqué speaks of "avenues of possible progress toward ... agreements and recommendations on the limitation and reduction of ... armaments and armed forces", and in that respect it comes much closer to the Western plan than does United Nations General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV), which speaks of general and complete disarmament.
Moreover, the first stage of the Western plan does not even provide for reductions of armed forces or of armaments, while the second stage -- for the implementation of which no time has been set, or even a forecast made, as in the case of the first stage -- provides only for an insignificant reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments, in spite of Mr. Eaton's statement that that measure "represents a substantial reduction of presently declared Soviet force levels, as well as a considerable reduction of the already lower levels reached by the United States". (TNCD/PV.9, page 28)

It should be noted that the corresponding measure contained in the first stage of the Soviet plan for general and complete disarmament provides for a reduction of armed forces by 800,000 men, to be made within a period of twelve to eighteen months. At the same time the Soviet plan provides for the armed forces of the other great Powers to be reduced to lower levels, as follows: 1,700,000 for the People's Republic of China, and 650,000 each for France and the United Kingdom, with a corresponding destruction of armaments.

Nevertheless, this Soviet proposal is called unrealistic by the Western representatives. Why is it unrealistic? It is well known that such a reduction is perfectly possible within such a period of time as that laid down in the Soviet plan. That being so, what is unrealistic about the proposed measure? Perhaps it is unrealistic because the Western countries do not wish to embark on general and complete disarmament and do not wish to confrom to the General Assembly resolution which calls upon governments to reach agreement "in the shortest possible time"? But in that case the causes of the problems, the alleged impossibility of putting such a measure into effect within the time specified in the Soviet plan, would not lie in objective difficulties, but in the lack of goodwill of the governments of the Western countries.

According to the statements of their representatives, the Western Powers are tremendously interested in the adoption of nuclear disarmament measures. Whenever this subject is discussed, the representative of France stresses the predominance of nuclear disarmament over all other disarmament measures. For instance, in his statement on 15 March, Mr. Mouch said:

"What the world expects of us, what it hopes for above all, is nuclear disarmament. Conventional weapons and the strength of armed forces are secondary considerations". (TNCD/PV.1, page 16)
For his part, Mr. Eaton, the representative of the United States, said in his statement of 14 April:

"The people of the world are deeply concerned about nuclear weapons. We should start serious negotiations at once on the cut-off in order that we may bring the building-up of nuclear weapons to a halt. We should also address ourselves to measures designed to decrease the stockpiles of weapons -- nuclear weapons, of course!" (TNCD/FV.23, page 16)

In what, then, does this measure of nuclear disarmament, so often mentioned by the representatives of the Western countries and put forward both in their disarmament plan and as a particular or specific measure, consist? Paragraph C of the second stage of the Western plan provides for:

"The cession of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes immediately after the installation and effective operation of an agreed control system to verify this measure, conditional upon satisfactory progress in the field of conventional disarmament". (TNCD/3, page 3)

But we have already had occasion to see what this alleged measure of real disarmament contained in the Western plan represents. The delegations of the socialist countries have repeatedly emphasized that, even after cession of the production of fissionable materials, and even after withdrawals and successive conversions, there will still be enough fissionable materials for States to continue production of nuclear weapons, just as there will still be stocks of nuclear weapons. As Mr. Moch himself said:

"the surplus of stocks in existence as conversion proceeds will remain unknown". (TNCD/FV.6, page 6)

What would be the use of all the measures relating to cessation of production for military purposes, or of all the conversions, whatever their rate, if it could not be known whether all stocks had been converted, because existing stocks are not known?

Whether controllable or not, a conversion of the kind proposed by the Western Powers will still depend on calculations. In fact, all that the Western side is able to propose as regards the abolition of nuclear weapons is still the promise contained in paragraph B.2 of the third stage of the Western plan, of "further steps, in the light of the latest scientific knowledge, to achieve the final
elimination of these weapons”. On the other hand, such a measure is treated as unrealistic by the representatives of the Western countries when it is proposed to put it into effect immediately or within a short space of time.

There are other proposals in the Western disarmament plan which have been represented as real disarmament measures, such as the proposal, appearing in several paragraphs of the Western plan, for prohibition of the use of outer space for military purposes. The purpose of that proposal is to ensure a unilateral military advantage for the Western countries.

In his statement yesterday, the representative of the Soviet Union explained in detail that if that measure was not linked with the liquidation of military bases on foreign territory it could only serve the military plans of States possessing such bases.

The other measures in the Western plan are only control measures not linked with disarmament measures, or studies of control measures with a view to organizing control over existing armaments. We recognize that disarmament measures and their execution must be controlled from beginning to end, but control without disarmament measures, as proposed both in the Western plan and in the various allegedly specific proposals, is a measure designed to complement the military organization of certain Western countries, in particular, that of the United States as Mr. Herter, the United States Secretary of State, emphasized on 4 April.

The third stage has been almost forgotten by the Western representatives. It is no mere chance that, since the beginning, there has been no further mention of this third stage of the Western plan; for not only is it desired to relegate all disarmament measures — and general and complete disarmament — to a remote and unknown future, but if there were any discussion on the content of the measures proposed in the third stage, it would become obvious that, like the two previous stages, it contains no real disarmament measures.

Realizing that the proposals contained in the Western plan cannot lead — and never will lead — to general and complete disarmament, and that consequently they cannot be accepted as a basis for discussion with a view to attaining the goal set for our Conference by the United Nations resolution, the representatives of the Western countries have recently been at pains to propose partial measures, or so-called specific measures.
It is not necessary to dwell on all the allegedly concrete proposals that the representatives of the Western countries have put forward here, for they are mere repetitions and detailed presentations of the various measures included in the Western disarmament plan. Like the latter, they are not true disarmament measures, but are solely or mainly measures for the control of existing armaments. The same applies, in our view, to the nine points put forward by Mr. Eaton at the meeting on 14 April. It may, indeed, be noted that those nine points all relate either to control over existing armaments, or to measures calculated to create a military advantage for the Western countries. The only measure appearing to have some connexion with disarmament is that proposed in the first point, concerning the establishment of ceilings for the force levels, or reductions in the force levels, of the United States and the Soviet Union, which, as we said before, is far from being an important measure of real disarmament, since it fixes the armed forces of the United States and the Soviet Union at a high and consequently unacceptable level, without giving any indication of the forces the other great Powers would be allowed. These proposals are far removed from our goal of securing general and complete disarmament in the shortest possible time, as laid down in the United Nations resolution. Consequently, they cannot serve as a basis for discussion if it is really intended to work constructively for general and complete disarmament. They can only serve to divert our discussions and our work towards other goals than general and complete disarmament, while giving the public the impression that disarmament negotiations are proceeding.

As is shown by all that we have said, and by all that the delegations of the socialist countries have said during our discussions, between the statements of the Western delegations proclaiming their adherence to the General Assembly resolution and to general and complete disarmament, on the one hand, and the real content of their plan and the various proposals made here on the other hand, there is an enormous difference which it is useless to try to conceal. All the moves attempted in our Committee by the Western delegations are quite contrary to the spirit and the letter of the General Assembly resolution. The recommendation in the resolution to reach agreement in the shortest possible time has been completely obscured. Conventional disarmament has been reduced to control measures, of which, only yesterday, the United States representative gave us a detailed plan. So-called nuclear disarmament leaves intact unknown stocks of
nuclear devices capable of annihilating mankind. At the same time, nothing is
done about scientific research for military purposes; the arms race goes on;
the production and accumulation of new weapons and their deployment at bases
everywhere are speeded-up, thanks to the policy of Western military alliances
such as NATO.

In view of the stage our discussions had reached, and considering that it
was no longer possible to make progress towards general and complete disarmament,
the delegations of the socialist countries decided to submit document TNCD/4,
entitled "Basic Principles of General and Complete Disarmament".

We have tried to put in that document only principles which cannot give
rise to controversy, which take into account the views expressed during our
discussion, and which will enable us to clear the way towards general and
complete disarmament if we truly wish to reach it.

We believe that if we were to set earnestly to work, and if we made an
effort to seek the points on which opinions have drawn close together — and
the representatives of the Western countries have said several times that such
points exist — we could reach an agreement, and thus lay the foundation for
fruitful work in the future. We still hope that at coming meetings we may
manage to agree if we show the necessary good will. That is all the more
essential because our Conference is approaching a recess for the period of the
Summit Conference which is to be held in Paris next month.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from
Russian): Mr. Chairman and fellow delegates: today humanity commemorates a
significant date — the ninetieth anniversary of the birth of Vladimir Ilyich
Lenin, the founder of the Soviet State.

It is now universally recognized that no other statesman or politician of
the twentieth century has influenced the development of world history more than
did Lenin. A particularly important place amidst Lenin's great labours is
occupied by his consolidation in all its aspects of the principle of peaceful
coexistence of States with different social systems.
The principle of peaceful coexistence, expounded and developed by Lenin at the dawn of the existence of the first socialist State in the world, flows from the very nature of the development of human society in an era when along with capitalist States there emerged, and began a full-blooded life, the socialist States which have in our lifetime formed a world wide socialist system. The history of socialist States on our planet does not cover many decades; yet the struggle of these States to strengthen peace and peaceful coexistence has already made a vivid imprint on the whole of modern history.

It was not by accident that the birth of the first socialist State in the world -- Soviet Russia -- coincided with the proclamation of Lenin's peace decree. That decree expressed the will of the broad masses of the workers of Russia who had decided to finish with war once and for all. In announcing his decree on peace at the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets, Lenin proclaimed the principle of peaceful coexistence between the young socialist State and the capitalist countries. He said in his statement that the Soviet Government condemned secret treaties containing "robbery with violence" clauses. At the same time he stated that "all clauses containing good-neighbourly conditions and economic agreements we gladly accept and cannot reject". This he said on 8 November 1917.

Since that time the struggle for peace, for good-neighbourly relations with all States, and for the development of economic, cultural and other peaceful connexions has been a general principle of Soviet foreign policy. Developing and formulating this general principle, Lenin pointed out that there lay ahead an historical period "when socialist and capitalistic States would exist side by side". He postulated that the co-existence of States with different social systems must be peaceful, that the workers in the socialist and the capitalist States alike were concerned in the maintenance and strengthening of peace. He thought the whole foreign policy of the young Soviet State must be directed at that great objective. He said:

"All our policy and propaganda are directed, not towards dragging peoples into war, but towards putting an end to war."

At various times certain circles interested in the maintenance of tension in international relations, in the armaments race and in the preparation of war, have distorted Soviet foreign policy and Lenin's principle of coexistence by asserting that the Soviet Union intended to impose the socialist system on other
countries by force. Lenin constantly attacked and demolished this gross calumny. He used to point out that revolution could not be exported, and that no kind of "export of revolution" did or could form part of the Soviet State's duties. At that time Lenin wrote: "Some believe that the interests of international revolution demand that it should be helped onwards, and that this could only mean war and certainly not peace ... A 'theory' of this kind would directly contradict Marxism, which has always been against helping revolutions onwards, for they ripen as class contradictions become more acute". This dictum of Lenin's is one of the cornerstones of the foreign policy of our Soviet State, which has never, does not now and does not intend ever to resort to methods of interfering in the internal affairs of states, to pressure upon them, or to threats of force.

The Leninist foreign policy of the Soviet Union postulates that peaceful coexistence of States with different social systems is now an actual reality and that the problem is to consolidate this peaceful coexistence and frustrate any attempts to violate it. Its violation could bring about all kinds of conflicts and eventually war.

Now that States possess arms of immense destructive power and war could prove a terrible catastrophe for whole States and peoples, Lenin's theory of peaceful coexistence acquires particular relevance. "With the present relation of forces on the world's arena", said N.S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, on 31 October 1959 at the Third Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, "and with the present level of military technique, no one can without losing his sense of reality propose any other way of developing relations between States with different social systems than that of peaceful co-existence".

Whereas in the past, only a few decades ago, the forces of peace were not sufficiently powerful to prevent the unleashing of world wars, now that the peace-loving world-wide socialist system has grown and become strong, and in all the countries of the world there is an immeasurably greater awareness of the need to prevent a new world war, the fatal inescapability of war has disappeared. The growing preponderance of the forces of peace over the forces of war enables one to say that there already exists a real possibility of excluding war from the life of human society. The problem is to make use of this possibility and translate it into reality.
The solution of the disarmament problem must play a highly important part in the consolidation of the peaceful co-existence of States and the elimination of wars for ever from the life of human society. It is hardly necessary to remind you that negotiations for disarmament have been going on for many years. It seems to us now more important to stress that the activity of the forces of peace in the world has revealed a new approach to the solution of the disarmament problem, the approach embodied in the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly on general and complete disarmament. That resolution expresses the hopes of millions and millions of people who are deeply anxious at the threat of a nuclear missile war hanging over the world and who therefore long for a radical solution of the disarmament problem and abolition of all the material means and weapons for waging war.

We are assembled here in this Committee for the precise purpose of translating into reality that resolution of the General Assembly. We are faced with a problem of tremendous historical importance: to work out and agree upon a concrete programme of general and complete disarmament. This lofty aim would be fully achieved by the Soviet plan for general and complete disarmament, which provides for the complete liquidation within a short period of time of all armed forces and armaments of States; the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons, their elimination from the armaments of States and destruction of their stockpiles; abolition of bases on foreign soil; termination of all military training, abolition of war ministries, general staffs and other military organizations, and discontinuance of the appropriation of funds for military purposes. The acceptance of the Soviet plan for general and complete disarmament would mean the achievement of agreement by States upon the practical ways by which mankind might reach a world without weapons, a world without war. In that world no State would possess any armed forces and armaments, and all threat of war would thus be eliminated. States would retain strictly limited and agreed contingents of police, or militia, equipped with small arms for the protection of the personal security of citizens.

The delegations of the Socialist countries have during six weeks of the Committee's work persistently yet patiently striven, and continue to strive, for a new way to reach a mutually acceptable agreement with the Western States on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. We propose a direct advance to the solution of this problem by working out a treaty on general
and complete disarmament. In view, however, of the Western States' opposition to this proposal, the delegations of the socialist countries submitted to the Committee their "Basic principles of general and complete disarmament", a document intended to set forth all the points of contact between the parties revealed in the discussions, and so to lay an acceptable foundation for further progress towards the drafting of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. It is to be regretted that this proposal of the socialist States has not yet commended itself to the Western delegations.

Instead of joining us in a search for a practical solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament through the drafting of an appropriate treaty or, as a start, through agreement on the "Basic principles of general and complete disarmament", the Western delegations have persistently tried, and are still trying, to divert our negotiations from the solution of this problem. How else can we judge the attempt to make us accept, as a basis for our work to implement the General Assembly resolution on general and complete disarmament, first the so-called Western plan, which provides neither for general nor for complete disarmament, and afterwards certain isolated measures, relating almost exclusively to control, borrowed from the initial sections of that plan and embodied in the so-called nine points put forward by the United States representative at our meeting on 14 April?

It is really impossible to accept the individual measures submitted by the Western Powers in those nine points as a realistic way towards general and complete disarmament. Whatever measures we choose to take: cessation of production of fissionable materials for military purposes, with retention by the States of their stockpiles of nuclear arms; or the establishment of control over the launching into space of artificial satellites and missiles without the simultaneous liquidation of military bases on foreign territory; or the storing under international control on the territory of States of certain quantities of their conventional armaments; or any other of the measures proposed to us by the Western Powers -- not one of them can be regarded as a realistic and serious disarmament measure. They all have one aim: the establishment of control without disarmament and, essentially, the establishment of arms control. This can do no good, because the establishment of arms control can only create an illusion of security and lull the vigilance of
peoples while a State contemplating aggression retained in its possession powerful armed forces and armaments, including weapons of mass destruction, the use of which the Western States refuse to renounce.

Realistic measures of general and complete disarmament -- that is what we must negotiate about. Such realistic measures are provided for in the Soviet programme of general and complete disarmament. We are not requiring the Western States to accept this programme unconditionally. On the contrary, we have repeatedly declared here in the Committee that we are prepared to consider any concrete, businesslike consideration relating to the whole programme or to any of its provisions. We are prepared to take into account any comments, proposals or additions which would help towards a practical solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament. Unfortunately, however, the Western delegations are not putting forward any such businesslike considerations or proposals. In fact they refuse to discuss in concrete terms either general and complete disarmament or a programme for it. Yet at the same time they maintain that their Governments continue to support fully the General Assembly resolution on general and complete disarmament.

Support of the United Nations resolution cannot, however, be combined with refusal to take practical steps to implement it. No positive result can be achieved if, during negotiations on general and complete disarmament, there is a constant struggle to evade a practical solution of the problem.

This is why, now that the first stage of our negotiations is drawing to its close, we think the Western delegations should at last clarify their position. Standing before the peoples of the world, who are vitally interested in the success of our negotiations and who see in the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament the surest way to the consolidation of peace, the Western Powers must answer a simple and clear question: what are they striving for; what do they stand for? Do they or do they not intend to solve practically the problem of general and complete disarmament as an urgent duty of today? Do they or do they not want to work out, with us, a programme of general and complete disarmament? Do they mean to start putting into practice the United Nations resolution on general and complete disarmament, or do they repudiate that resolution?

All further development of our negotiations depends upon the Western delegations' reply to these questions.
The Soviet delegation and the delegations of the other socialist countries for their part remain ready to conduct practical, businesslike negotiations on general and complete disarmament. For us, general and complete disarmament is not a matter of a particular situation, or of tactics, or of propaganda. It is a serious proposal by the socialist States to the Western Powers, flowing from our anxiety to consolidate peace and achieve peaceful co-existence; it is a proposal directly expressing the basic Leninist foreign policy of the socialist States.

We shall make every effort for the practical realization of this great idea, which enjoys the support of millions of people in all the countries of the world on every continent.

Mr. Moch (France) (translation from French): I quite understand that Mr. Zorin wished to commemorate the anniversary of Lenin's birthday today, though in the first part of his statement this led us rather far away from our subject, to which he reverted in the second part. It is only to the first part of his statement that I wish to reply.

That Lenin preached peaceful co-existence in theory, we do not doubt. We are familiar with the old rivalry between that thesis and the thesis of permanent revolution -- I will not mention the name of the author of the latter thesis, it is banned in the USSR -- but that Lenin was the father of peaceful co-existence I rather doubt. I have a chronology beginning 3,460 years ago and ending in the last few weeks. I note that at the Peace of Myconae, 3,450 years ago, alliances were created with a view to preserving peace; that 2,500 years ago Pythagoras, in one of his maxims, proclaimed the prohibition of killing and secured approval (or it; that at the Council of Clermont 875 years ago the Truce of God was instituted, the periods during which hostilities could be carried on were limited and -- a great lesson in modesty for us -- the use of the weapons then considered most dangerous was restricted; that 335 years ago the Barons' Oath at the Assembly of Soissons was to observe the Truce of God for ten years; that 350 years ago there was the Perpetual Peace of Sully, then 247 years ago the Perpetual Peace of the Abbé de St. Pierre and finally 165 years ago, Kant's philosophical plan for perpetual peace.
My purpose in recalling all this is to say that we must guard against granting monopolies. There are always antecedents for everything, and I should have preferred this historical review not to have passed over the twenty-nine years which separated the coming to power of two men mentioned by Mr. Zorin: that of Lenin, then that of Khrushchev. On this point Mr. Zorin was discreet. I shall be equally discreet. I shall confine myself to taking careful note of the statement on the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States which we have just heard, in the hope that it will prove as real in practice as in theory.

Mr. Eaton (United States of America): I thank Mr. Moch sincerely for his comments. I would like to try to turn back to the work of the Conference, after hearing Mr. Zorin on Mr. Lenin. I look back over our work of the past six weeks and it is obvious, at least to me, that the position of the Soviet side of control and inspection remains far apart from that of the Western delegations.

Looking ahead to the future work of the Conference, it is equally obvious that very little real progress can be hoped for unless we can bring closer together the detailed views of both sides on this issue — the issue of inspection, of verification, of control.

Today it is my intention to make some observations on this question, observations which I feel called upon to make by reason of Mr. Zorin's comments of yesterday; and I intend to make comments on the related problem, the problem which is created not by those on the Allied side but by those on the Soviet side, the problem of secrecy.

To date, we on the Allied side have attempted to elicit current Soviet thinking on controls and inspection in connexion with the discussion of concrete measures of disarmament. We have laid out in some detail our own views on the question of control and verification. The Soviet delegation has failed to demonstrate that Soviet opposition to effective international control, which has proved the chief stumbling-block in past disarmament negotiations, has changed in any significant way. Statements at this Conference from the Soviet side on control and inspection have merely paid lip service to the principle of strict international control. They have been uniformly silent on what specific control provisions the Soviet side had in mind. Unfortunately, this only strengthens
the suspicion that the Soviet Union is sticking fast to its old concept of
maximum secrecy and no effective control. We have had particular misgivings
concerning the Soviet attitude on measures for which there are as yet no known
means of control, and the effort to put such measures first on our agenda for
discussion here.

In coming out, as a first step, for a declaratory ban on the use of nuclear
weapons, Mr. Zorin on 14 April asserted that:

"the argument that such a measure would not be controllable is completely
irrelevant" (TNOD/FV.23, page 19)

and that it

"would not require any control at all except self-control". (ibid, page 18)

I can only say that such remarks do not contribute to confidence that the
Soviets are interested in controlled disarmament. In the Soviet Union view
States apparently are asked to rest their security on the hope that disarmament
agreements will be, as Mr. Khrushchev said in his speech of 14 January, "honestly
carried out by all sides"; and this even though no reasonable, adequate or
effective means of verification can be guaranteed.

This formula hardly offers a constructive approach to the problem of
disarmament under effective control. Is not the fundamental reason for control,
for verification, to protect all of us against dishonesty? What is the point
of talking of control and, in the same breath, saying that we should rely on
morals, on honesty alone? Why not abandon the fiction entirely?

If we could rely solely on each other's word, there would be no purpose in
holding a disarmament conference.

As I asked yesterday, what is the matter with the words "control", "inspection"
and "verifications". Are those words which people fear? We do not fear them.
And we cannot help asking why the Soviet Union regards control as something to be
avoided like the plague and why, despite its boasts of strength and superiority,
it fears to accept inspection on equal terms with the West. Or is there something
within the Soviet Union of which it is ashamed?

During this Conference we have heard the Soviet side frequently charge
that the Western delegations are impeding progress on disarmament by focussing
too much attention on the question of control. On the contrary, progress on
disarmament is being blocked by the constant refusal of the Soviet side to
face up to the question of control.
The working out of adequate and mutually acceptable controls is perhaps more
time-consuming and more complex than any other part of disarmament negotiations.
History has shown that to be true. It is therefore logical that in our
negotiations, the issue of control deserves not less but more mutual effort to
achieve clarification than the Soviet side has thus far been willing to apply to it.

We have heard the charge made that the Western plan itself places too much
emphasis in its early stages on control, and not enough emphasis on disarmament.
Further, it is the Soviet contention that controls can become extensive only after
an atmosphere of trust and confidence has been created through earlier substantial
dismament. But that puts the problem in exactly the reverse order. It is
precisely because trust and confidence are lacking at the beginning of the
dismament process that it is necessary and logical to give great attention to
the development of adequate safeguards and controls in the earlier stages. As
dismament progresses under effective control, mutual trust and confidence should
increase and, we hope, flourish. Verified knowledge that all parties are
observing their commitments in the early stages will be an indication of good
faith on the part of all and will facilitate the working out of agreements and
the implementation of the latter stages of the disarmament process. The expressed
Soviet view that controls will become really complete only when complete
dismament has been achieved — that is, at the end of the road, at the end of the
process, when the objects of control have already been disposed of — is obviously
a contradiction in logic.

A discussion of the reasons why the Western delegations are firmly dedicated
to establishing effective control machinery would not be complete without some
reference to past experience. I do not want to rake up old issues, but I feel
that our point can be made by mentioning at least one recent example — namely,
the Korean armistice. An agreement was made at Panmunjom which called for the
verification and control of the forces and arms of North and South Korea. The
Communist side chose to violate that agreement. The inspection teams were
obstructed, to the extent that they were unable to carry out their assigned
functions. Other reasons contributed to collapse. For our part, we regarded
the Korean armistice agreement as a solemn obligation and faithfully observed its
terms, despite the fact that as a result of Communist non-compliance the control
machinery had failed completely.
I mention that example only to emphasize that we have taken our lessons to heart and that we will not make the same mistake again — that is, we will not enter into agreements affecting the security of the world without effective means of verifying compliance with them. We would be remiss in our obligations to the people of our own country and to all the peoples of the world if we held any other view or changed our conviction.

It is our sincere hope that the Soviet Union will come to appreciate and understand that equitable international control is to the mutual advantage of us all — as much to that of the Soviet side as to that of our side. We recognize that this may be a difficult problem for a country which continues to put such obsessive emphasis on secrecy. I use the word "obsessive" advisedly, for that is the opinion that we in the open societies of the free world cannot help but hold about a country in which even telephone books have been jealously guarded in the interest of secrecy. We are aware of the Soviet answer to comparisons between their traditional policies of secrecy and the open access to all sorts of information which prevails in the West. The Soviet contention is that secrecy is needed to protect the Soviet State from an aggressor's attack.

Applying this argument to the disarmament process, the Soviet side asserts that control as envisaged by the West would amount to espionage, presumably to facilitate aggression against the USSR. Does not this attitude arrogate to the Soviet Union a monopoly of good intentions while assigning to the Western nations a monopoly of malign intentions? To us and to the rest of the on-looking world it seems incontrovertible that secrecy is the cloak of an aggressor. We feel no need for obsessive secrecy about our affairs, military or otherwise, because we are not preparing to attack anyone. Were my country planning an aggressive war, we should want to draw the same cloak of secrecy around our own activities rather than, as we do, urge and show by our example that we would welcome the fullest possible international inspection, an equitable and effective international inspection, that would bring into the light of day the military activities and preparations of all countries, including our own. Now, in Mr. Zorin's view, could a control and verification system be expected to function effectively, in a country which insists on keeping vast areas of its territory closed to all foreign nationals, unless the Soviet Union is prepared to abolish such extreme secrecy, not at the end of the last and final stages of disarmament
but early on when it is so necessary to build up a feeling of trust and confidence? Unfortunately, the Soviet Union has not accepted the repeated offers of the United States to eliminate, on a reciprocal basis, the areas in my country which, as Mr. Zorin well knows, were reluctantly declared closed to Soviet nationals only in response to the Soviet Union's long-time practice of maintaining closed areas, and with the hope that this might elicit some change on the part of the Soviet Union.

So long as obsessive secrecy is coupled with stubborn resistance to effective control on the part of the Soviet Union, there unfortunately appears to be slight prospect of fulfilling the world's hope for a solution to the great problem of disarmament.

To illustrate how closely the Soviet fetish for secrecy and distaste for control are bound up with the solution of the disarmament problem, let me refer to the question of finding effective means for verifying any measure which might be explored by this Conference for the control of nuclear and rocket weapons. In Mr. Khrushchev's speech of 14 January he pointed out to the world that Soviet rocket bases are being "dispersed" and "camouflaged" to ensure "double and triple" reserve positions. Let us assume that at some stage in the disarmament process we find ourselves negotiating measures aimed at the control and eventual elimination of these weapons. How could such negotiations be conducted without facing up squarely to the problems of inspection, the problems of verification, the problems of control? And during the early period which the Soviet Union emphasizes in the first and second stages of their plan, those bases are to remain doubly and triply camouflaged, for it is only at the end that it is suggested that there may be any effective control.

I should like to point out that our military bases at home and those which we share with our allies for our mutual defence against possible aggression are not concealed from anyone in the world. They are located openly for everyone to see. We have nothing to hide. By contrast, the world cannot help but feel a deep anxiety about the threats of concealed bases from which destruction could be launched in secret against countries anywhere in the globe from within the Soviet bloc. It is this secret threat which gives rise to fear and suspicion among all people. This fear must be laid to rest by an equitable system of international control before the world can breathe easily again. If this
attitude of extreme secrecy continues, I am afraid that it is certain to sharpen fear and suspicion rather than reduce it, and the efforts of this Conference will not have the success which we are all hopeful they will obtain.

I should like to emphasize in unmistakable terms that, when speaking of control of any kind, we do not ask for a single privilege or provision which we are not prepared and willing to grant equally to the other side. This equal acceptance applies whether we are talking of measures of control over arms reductions as such or measures to bring under control the armaments competition, which we all — all of us at this table, all peoples in the world — fear may bring about war, if not by intent then by miscalculation or miscience.

In concluding my remarks, let me express the hope that the Soviet Union will come to understand, as the world so clearly understands, that equitable and effective international control is to everybody’s advantage. I have made these observations in the greatest seriousness on what seems to us a fundamental question involving the security of all nations. I hope that they will be carefully considered and that the Soviet side will find it possible to share with us the view that equitable and effective international verification is to the great benefit of all concerned. We hope also that the Soviet delegations will soon join us in a concrete discussion of the control question along with specific measures of disarmament, not as partial measures but as initial and integral parts of an over-all approach toward achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Mr. NOSEK (Czechoslovakia): I shall be very brief. I merely wish to say a few words in connexion with the statement just made by the representative of the United States, Mr. Eaton.

In my statement yesterday the Czechoslovak delegation pointed out, and we hope clearly, the deep interest of the delegations of the Socialist countries in effective international control over general and complete disarmament. I should like to say now that we do not fear control. On the contrary, we are deeply interested in it. However, we can ask: why do the delegations of the Western countries fear general and complete disarmament and why do they only stress control over armaments? Why do they speak of control without any relation to effective disarmament measures?
Perhaps the answer to this question was given by a very well known United States General, Mr. James Gavin, the former Chief of United States Army missile research. In an article published in the Royal Air Force Flying Review of 1959, General Gavin pointed out that at present the use of artificial satellites was most essential for the United States owing to the fact that it was impossible to say that the ballistic missiles of the United States would hit certain geographic points in the Soviet Union with precision due to the lack of exact knowledge of the location of certain important points in the Soviet Union except for, as General Gavin states, some observatories which existed before the October Revolution. General Gavin goes on to complain that the cartographic data on the Soviet Union available in the United States are simply not exact or are even completely lacking for certain areas of the Soviet Union. It seems to us that we can find some hints at least in this article as to the meaning of all these requirements such as the collecting of information, advance notification, prior notification, exchange of data and so on.

Yesterday I mentioned paragraphs B and E of part II of the Western Plan, and today I should like to point out as an example the eighth of the nine points proposed by Mr. Eaton on 14 April. This point reads as follows:

"Action to exchange data on military establishments, including military expenditures, to facilitate verification". (TNCD/PV.23, page 26) Mr. Eaton stated that "action to exchange data on military establishments" is again required. Thus in this situation we cannot understand the attitude taken this morning by Mr. Eaton.

I should like to conclude this brief statement by saying again that the delegations of the Socialist countries are deeply interested in effective international control over general and complete disarmament. What we want is effective control over disarmament and not control over armaments.

Mr. MEZINCESCU (Romania): I should like to make two very brief comments on what has just been said by Mr. Eaton: If I understood him correctly, he told us that verification that all States are honouring their commitments in the early stages of the disarmament programme would create confidence among nations. My comment on this assertion is that there are no commitments on disarmament in the early stages of the Western plan: there are only commitments on control over armaments.
Mr. Eaton tried to bring up some worn-out columns about the aggressive designs of the Socialist States, and the question of the alleged unwillingness of the Socialist countries to accept effective international control on general and complete disarmament was again brought up. My comment on this is: if it is senseless to exhume a dead horse, to try to ride a dead horse is simply hopeless.

Mr. Zorin (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I have taken the floor in order to reply briefly to the remarks made by Mr. Moch and Mr. Eaton.

Mr. Moch, in his statement, took upon himself a task which I think is beyond him, in trying to prove that Lenin's ideas on co-existence were not original, that these questions were discussed 2,000 years ago, and that various ideas and proposals were not novel when they were put forward by Lenin and as part of Lenin's ideas in general. I was surprised to hear the matter stated in this way, since co-existence between States with different social systems could of course arise only when States with different social systems appeared on the scene, and conflict between two systems arose in an acute form. Everyone knows that this happened only after the Great October Socialist Revolution and could not have occurred in an earlier epoch.

In earlier times these problems were not on the same plane. It was no mere chance that in trying to prove his case Mr. Moch adduced arguments and assertions which actually concerned quite different problems. They concerned the prohibition of killing, the stopping of wars, and so forth. But this is only one side of the problem.

Peaceful co-existence consists not only of stopping wars but also of definite relationships — economic, political and cultural — and peaceful competition between different systems. The problem of peaceful co-existence could therefore arise only in a period when these questions were raised by life itself. They could not emerge in the life of society until two antagonistic systems appeared on the scene, each struggling for its own existence. Then the problem arose: there may be an armed struggle, but, on the other hand, there may be a peaceful struggle. Lenin's great merit is that he put forward the idea of peaceful coexistence and of the peaceful settlement of all disputes between States.
Under modern conditions the idea of peaceful co-existence has acquired immense political meaning simply because the crucial question for the future development of mankind is whether it will follow the path of war or the path of peace. In this connexion Lenin's idea plays a tremendous and positive part. I think Mr. Moch followed the wrong path in trying to compare incomparables. If Mr. Moch claims that other people have spoken to this effect, I shall leave him this privilege. I do not understand why he took exception to anything I said. Does he not favour the idea of peaceful co-existence? Why does he criticize our ideas on this matter? I thought that Mr. Moch, and France which he represents here, favoured the idea of peaceful co-existence. If I am wrong, I must ask you to forgive me.

In connexion with Mr. Eaton's statement, I again do not quite understand why he has now moved away from the questions which are really controversial between us and tried to carry our differences on to a totally different plane.

Mr. Nosek has put the matter correctly. The dispute between us now is not whether we are for or against control; that is not in dispute. Indeed, as Mr. Moch has said in our Committee, and as Mr. Eaton himself said in one of his speeches in our Committee, there are no longer any differences of opinion between us in our premises with regard to control— and that is my view also. There may be differences between us about concrete problems of control. I admit this. When we pass on to concrete discussion of the question, there may be differences between us. But is this really an obstacle to the solution of any problems? This is not where the dispute now lies.

Our dispute with you is on other lines: are you for general and complete disarmament, or are you against general and complete disarmament? Are you for a programme of general and complete disarmament, or for separate and partial measures? That is where the dispute now lies; but Mr. Eaton is trying to carry it on to a different plane. I understand, of course, why he is doing so. To argue on the plane I am speaking about is not convenient to the Western Powers; and it is not convenient because, to speak frankly, they are against general and complete disarmament; but they cannot say so, because they voted for the General Assembly resolution on general and complete disarmament. But to say they are for general and complete disarmament and at the same time to propose a programme of measures which has nothing whatever to do with general and complete disarmament of course makes it inconvenient to debate this issue. Mr. Eaton is therefore trying
to carry the controversy on to another plane, which from his point of view is more convenient. I do not think that the idea which Mr. Eaton has today expressed in the clearest possible form has any serious basis, and I shall now try to show why.

First of all Mr. Eaton said that the Soviet Union has always remained silent on questions of control. This, Mr. Eaton, is not consistent with the facts. I do not know whether you have been able to acquaint yourself with the whole history of the disarmament negotiations, but even if you yourself are not familiar with their whole course, your advisers must be, and they should have prompted you and told you that the Soviet Union had suggested many disarmament programmes in which it treated the control system in very great detail. And the distinguished Western representatives did not accept these programmes, not because we did not raise control problems in them but because they did not want to accept these programmes in substance; they did not want to accept the actual disarmament measures. That was where the dispute between us lay. Since Mr. Eaton has challenged me, I shall recall the facts.

On 10 May 1955 we put a major proposal on disarmament measures before the Disarmament Sub-Committee. That disarmament programme contained a long section dealing specifically with control over disarmament, in which there was a very detailed description of the central control authority, followed by a description of the control measures for the first stage of implementation, for the second stage, and so forth. We, the Soviet Union, were the first to move a proposal for control posts on foreign territories, including the territory of the Soviet Union and of other countries in the socialist camp. We proposed a control system against the territories of other States for preventing surprise attack. Why then does Mr. Eaton say that we are afraid to allow foreign controllers on our territory? Nothing of the sort. But why did the Western Powers, as soon as we introduced this proposal on 10 May 1955, adjourn the meetings of the Sub-Committee and not resume them on that basis. Why? — because they could not accept the actual substance of our disarmament programme, because they did not want to adopt this programme; and not because there were no control measures in it. That is the first fact.
Mr. Ormsby-Gore mentioned at one of our meetings (TNCD/PV.11) the proposals we made in March 1956 at the Disarmament Subcommittee, and asked me whether their basic provisions remained in force. I understood him to mean that he thought they contained serious and far-reaching control proposals, and that he was checking with us to see whether we were still standing by these proposals or not. Mr. Ormsby-Gore understood that these proposals had a substantial bearing on the solution of concrete control problems. I understood him and I answered him. But Mr. Eaton says that we have always remained silent on control. Again -- nothing of the kind.

In 1956 a detailed control system was proposed in connexion precisely with disarmament measures pertaining to conventional armed forces and armaments. Why did the Western Powers not accept this programme? Was it because they did not like the control system? Not at all. It was because they refused to reduce their armed forces and armaments to the extent we proposed. So the point was not control; the Soviet Union was proposing a control system. There is the second fact.

Next: on 14 June 1957 -- I myself had occasion to take part in the London Subcommittee, Mr. Moch will remember too -- we proposed a system of control points for observing any explosions of atomic bombs that might take place, on the territories of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom or the United States or on the islands where nuclear tests were being held. We proposed this; we and not you were proposing control points on foreign territory.

After this, when circumstances had become such that it was no longer possible to avoid discussing discontinuance of tests, the Western Powers, including the United States, suggested that we should first find out whether control was possible at all, although in our own minds there was absolutely no question that control was possible. This, then, is where the difference between us already lay: not about whether we were refusing control, but about the United States' doubts whether control was possible. We agreed to convene experts. The experts foregathered and confirmed what we had said, that control was possible over all nuclear explosions. After that there was no longer any way out; you had to enter into negotiations about discontinuing nuclear tests, because your basic argument, that
control was impossible, had fallen to the ground. The experts — your experts, the Western experts — said that control was possible.

The talks began, and here we are eighteen months later discussing problems connected with cessation of tests. Is the issue now really whether or not the Soviet Union is prepared to accept a control system? Is this really now the main question on which we differ? Nothing of the sort; the main question is, does the United States want to stop all tests, including underground tests, or does it not? There you have the main question. So once again the dispute is not about control but about the substance of one disarmament measure. Why then, Mr. Eaton, do you hand out this incorrect information? If you hand out this information to us we can correct it, but you hand out to the press information which we cannot correct, because your press will not print what we want it to. The press will publish only what you have said; yet you hand out wrong information to your press. I want our colleagues, at least, to know that the actual facts are not as Mr. Eaton stated them.

The Soviet Union has not remained silent on control even in the past, and it does not remain silent now. In our first statements — as far back as 15 March — we spoke in detail about the control system which it would be necessary to operate at various stages. We have had no discussion of this question because you have refused to discuss our concrete plan; but if we had begun to discuss the concrete plan we should have gone deeper into those questions. We should have examined concrete problems of control as applied to concrete measures of disarmament.

Concerning general approach to control, I would note that there have been no serious differences of opinion at this Conference, and the Western representatives, including Mr. Eaton on one occasion, have also noted this. Even if some differences of opinion did begin to arise, they were about certain concrete problems of applying those principles to the concrete measures which are being proposed.

The Western representatives had said more than once that they think "there must be no control without disarmament", and also that "there must be no disarmament without control". We agree with this. We have said so. But when you start to put this general principle into practice, then — as you said today — in the first stage of your programme you deliberately give priority to control measures. Why?
Today Mr. Eaton has explained that
"it is ... because trust and confidence are lacking at the beginning of the
 disarmament process it is necessary ... to give great attention ... to
 controls during the earlier stages" -- in order to establish confidence.

This, however, Mr. Eaton, contradicts the formula which you yourselves have upheld
of "no control without disarmament". Why then are you now suggesting control
measures without disarmament? Why? This contradicts the line you have taken on
principle, which you have expounded and which has been so ably expounded by
Mr. Moch. Why then are you now going back on this line?

Yesterday you expounded what purported to be an example of control measures
in connexion with the problems of reducing conventional armed forces.

I must say that my reaction was very reserved and very cautious, because I
wanted to understand what you were proposing. I asked questions which were
quite natural in such a discussion. I asked: if we understand the United States
position correctly, then we cannot see why, for example, it is necessary to establish
the controls of which Mr. Eaton spoke over the disposition of all forces of the
various arms -- land, sea and air? Why is it necessary to visit the locations
every three months and verify? What is actually to be verified? No measures
for reduction in these areas are proposed, if we are to judge from Mr. Eaton's
exposition; so what is it that has to be verified? The actual disposition of
the troops? But the actual disposition of troops is not a disarmament measure.
The disposition of troops, of course, is not a matter of the telephone directories
which Mr. Eaton mentioned.

I have put questions to you. Are they legitimate? I think they are.
But you do not answer them. Instead, you have alleged today that we are against
control. This is not true at all. We are for effective international control.
We are in favour of accompanying each disarmament measure by control. What is the
basis for your inference that we are against control, that we are afraid of control?
You have no basis for this.

So the history of past negotiations and the situation today give no grounds
for the inference drawn by Mr. Eaton. These inferences have no foundation
whatsoever.
Now I want to say a word about certain historical facts mentioned by Mr. Eaton. He recalled the alleged violation of the armistice conditions in Korea. Now I do not quite understand why this example should be brought up at the moment; perhaps because there is trouble in that region at present which is causing Mr. Eaton some disquiet. Since, however, this example has been brought up, it must be dealt with, for it too is unfounded. It is one thing, you know, for you — one of the parties — to declare that the armistice conditions are being violated. But you know very well, Mr. Eaton, that another party which took part in the armistice control measures holds a different view. Why do you think that your view is unexceptionable? After all, the Commission was composed of a number of countries.

I believe the representative of Poland was present in this Commission; I believe Czechoslovakia participated, and on the Western side representatives of Sweden and other countries. They did not accept the whole of your point of view, you know, and they proved the contrary by evidence. So why do you think that we should immediately agree with you here, should agree that your position was right and that the violation of the armistice was really the fault of the North Korean side? We deny that, and the evidence does not prove what you say.

What has actually been proved is that the United States took steps which violated such an agreement as the Geneva Agreement on Vietnam. That is a fact, and that fact was acknowledged by international public opinion and a large number of countries.

I do not think you will be able to deny this fact: that the United States really did violate the decision of the Geneva Agreement on Vietnam, violated the agreement on general elections in Vietnam, violated the agreement on the armistice of the South Vietnamese army, sending its inspectors there and so forth. What is more, the United States started violating the Laos Agreement.

When we proposed convening all the parties to the Geneva Agreement in order to discuss this question, the United States rejected this proposal, as incidentally did other Western Powers, although it was not quite clear to us why France and the United Kingdom did so. But that is another question. For the moment I am joining issue with Mr. Eaton.

I should like to make one more comment on the Korean affair.

Whatever happened there, the armistice did give some measure of tranquillity both to North and to South Korea. That armistice should have been used in order to try to settle the relations between the two States which have now come into existence on the Korean Peninsula, and to convert the Armistice into a Peace.
But, Mr. Eaton, you know that this did not take place, through no fault of ours. What is now happening in South Korea is your fault, the fault of the United States, which is directly responsible for what is going on in South Korea. You say: We are sorry; South Korea is an independent State and we have nothing whatever to do with it. But Mr. Herter holds a different view. He called the Korean Ambassador and sent a message to Mr. Syngman Rhee. In this message Mr. Herter, according to the press reports, recommended the South Korean Government not to take such drastic measures against people who were rising against his regime. So the United States does think that it is somehow responsible for the situation in that area. After all, it must be responsible, for its troops are on South Korean territory. So if things happen there it is not our fault; it is the fault of Syngman Rhee and the United States advisers who are helping him.

I have touched on this matter only because Mr. Eaton raised the question of the Korean armistice. I think the time he chose for doing so was obviously a very unfortunate one for himself.

Finally, the general conclusion which I want to draw from Mr. Eaton's statement is this. It is useless, as I see it, for the United States to try to turn our controversies in this Committee into controversies about control. This is not the main issue between us at the moment. When we come to examine concrete disarmament measures, there may be controversies on concrete control measures, and I do not see anything surprising in that.

Each Government will of course be concerned to ensure conditions of security for its country, and again I do not consider this in any way irregular.

Therefore the reproach that we have something to hide and so forth is, in my view a piece of United States propaganda which is already almost, if not entirely, discredited.

The United States press used to write that nobody at all could go to the Soviet Union, that we had an "Iron Curtain" and so forth. But since the well-known cultural agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union was signed, thousands and tens of thousands of Americans have visited our country. Americans on their first visit to the USSR used to spend a long time looking for the "Iron Curtain" and could not find it in the Soviet Union. Then people stopped writing about it, but remnants of their writing still appear -- such as the telephone directories that you are supposed not to be able to get in Moscow.
If this sort of argument is adduced as one of the main proofs of the secrecy that exists in Moscow and the Soviet Union generally; I do not think it worth refuting. I do not think it deserves attention. The many thousands of foreigners who visit the Soviet Union and follow all the tourist itineraries do not notice the secrecy that Mr. Eaton has mentioned. But, just as in any State -- as in the United States, of course -- there are restricted areas and restricted establishments under special rules. There is nothing surprising in that, and in my view there are no grounds for making an issue out of it.

I think that the dispute between us at present is not about this but about the essence of the matter: for or against general and complete disarmament; for a programme of general and complete disarmament, or for separate, partial measures nine-tenths of which are control measures. There you have the issue between us. This is the question we are asking you to answer: what is your position on the main question which is holding up all our work? The control problem is definitely not holding us up at present.

If we now reach agreement on a programme of general and complete disarmament, on the main points of this programme or even on basic principles, we shall proceed to work out each separate measure and examine it both for its substance and for all the details of control. We do not in the least refuse to do this; on the contrary we should welcome such an approach.

Mr. MOCH (France) (translation from French): Mr. Zorin did not wish to dispute with me, preferring to reserve his attack for Mr. Eaton, and I have no wish to dispute with him. I should like to point out to him, however, that I did not, of course, criticize the idea of peaceful coexistence; I confined myself to suggesting in all humility that the idea existed long before Lenin. If I wished to produce some evidence of this I might say that in ancient times Sparta and Athens had different regimes; that later the Roman Empire and its neighbours were founded on rather different principles; that the October revolution -- and here, at the risk of perhaps shocking some people, I agree with Mr. Zorin that, with the Bandung Conference, it is probably one of the most important events of the twentieth century -- was nevertheless preceded by the French Revolution, and that when Les Fédérés, as the soldiers of the people's army were then called, came up from Marseilles to Paris to go and defend the frontiers of France, and they sang
"against us is raised the blood-stained banner of tyranny"; which is still the hymn of all oppressed people throughout the world, it would have been desirable for peaceful coexistence to have been established between the French Revolution, which had proclaimed "peace to the cottages and war to the castles", and the defenders of the old, feudal regime, with which you are all familiar. That is the first point I wished to make.

My second point -- and I approach it with all due respect and caution -- concerns the destiny of exceptional men, whoever they may be. I willingly recognize that Lenin was one of them. I willingly recognize that by the continuity of his actions even more than of his thought -- by the role he played when he was able to take power by overthrowing a socialist-directed government, the Government of Kerensky, by signing the separate peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk while we carried on the fight, and by his work to reconstruct a country on new foundations -- he fulfilled that exceptional destiny which has now earned him the veneration of the millions who file past his embalmed body. But these exceptional men, whose every word and speech -- even the shortest utterances -- is carefully collected, have said very many different things in the course of their long and full lives.

Mr. Zorin gave us a few quotations from Lenin tending to show him as the father of peaceful coexistence. I shall give other quotations that show the opposite.

In his report to the Central Committee at the Eighth Party Congress, speaking of the Soviet Republic and capitalist States, which he called "imperialist", Lenin said:

"One or the other must triumph in the end, and, before that end comes, a series of frightful clashes between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois States is inevitable".

That is a rather different form of peaceful coexistence from that described to us by Mr. Zorin just now.

In 1920, in an extempore speech to the Moscow party-cell secretaries, Lenin said:

"As long as capitalism and socialism exist, we cannot live in peace; in the end, one or the other will triumph ..."

A little later, on 26 November 1920, again speaking to the Moscow party-cell secretaries, he maintained the same thesis:
"We are surrounded by imperialist States, which detest the Bolsheviks with all their heart and soul, which are spending vast sums of money, using ideological forces, the forces of the Press and so on, and which yet were unable in three years to defeat us in war ..."

And the same day, he said:

"As long as we have not conquered the whole world ... we must adhere to the rule that we must know how to take advantage of the antagonisms and contradictions existing among the imperialists."

Writing in 1921 on the "Task of Political Education Departments" — I think written statements are often more important, because they are more carefully considered — he expressed himself as follows:

"We must say that either those who wish to cause our destruction must perish, those who we think must perish — and in that case our Soviet Republic will live — or the capitalists will live and in that case our Republic will perish."

This, too, is a form of peaceful co-existence rather different from that which has been described to us. I would add that this idea outlived Lenin, for in a resolution of the now defunct Comintern, dated 1928, we read that:

"The proletariat of the Soviet Union harbours no illusions as to the possibility of a durable peace with the imperialists."

I could give many more such quotations, but it is not necessary. I merely wish to say how glad I am that today priority has been given to the quotations on peaceful co-existence and not to those on the inevitability of war between two different social systems.

But I do not wish to come between the anvil, represented at the moment by Mr. Eaton, and the hammer, which is one of the two emblems of Mr. Zorin's country — and which he wielded just now — to speak of control. Yet I hope Mr. Zorin will permit me to say that, however favourably disposed he may be towards control, what he proposes are mainly measures which he knows are non-controllable, and that as regards measures which may prove to be controllable, we are having great difficulty in finding out how far he is prepared to go.

Thus Mr. Zorin's reasoning, however subtle it may be, seems to me to be somewhat fallacious. I would add that when I see how we can reach quite different positions on the simplest issues, I am convinced that very great clarity is needed.

Is there any simpler question than this: did control at Korean ports work or did it not?
Yet we have two opposite answers: Mr. Zorin tells us that it worked and advances evidence of the fact; Mr. Eaton says that it did not work.

Has the United States violated the agreement with North Vietnam? Mr. Zorin says it has, while Mr. Eaton, and others with him, will deny that.

I remember how one of Mr. Zorin's predecessors, Mr. Malik -- a very charming man, like Mr. Zorin himself -- spent weeks accusing the United States Air Force of dropping poisoned flies, poisoned sweets and even poisoned feathers on unhappy China. This went on for a very long time, and it was beginning to seem true by force of repetition. It was difficult to refute. But one day someone thought of producing photographs, taken by the Chinese, of the devices by which the poisoned flies had been scattered over China. It all ended in a burst of laughter, for the device was a "container" which had been used for years by the various air forces, equipped with a revolving cage that scattered leaflets in the air as it turned, so that they would fall over a very wide area. So the whole business of the poisoned flies probably boiled down to the scattering of leaflets over China.

When, some time later, I again mentioned this incident to Mr. Malik, at a time when everyone was keeping quiet about it, he replied: "Oh, that is all forgotten". There was no further talk of it.

So let us be very modest and very precise. And, speaking of modesty, I should like to conclude with two quotations from two French authors, which seem to me to sum up this discussion. The first is from Lavoisier, the great chemist, who was one of the innocent victims of our Revolution. He said: "In nature nothing is created and nothing is lost; everything changes".

The other quotation is from an eighteenth century writer, La Bruyère, whose statement is doubly false, but true nevertheless. He wrote: "Everything has been said ... during the 7000 years that men have existed and thought".

The statement is true: "everything has been said". But it is false, first, because men have existed for very much longer than 7000 years, and secondly because I am not sure that they think, even today. Sometimes I doubt it, in this room and elsewhere.

Mr. Tarabanov (Bulgaria) (translation from French): Mr. Moch has just flown to Mr. Eaton's aid. I do not propose to intervene on that issue; Mr. Eaton will have an opportunity of speaking again. But I should like to say a few words about quotations from Lenin and peaceful co-existence.
Mr. Moch quoted several sentences from Lenin, which correctly state the position as it was evolving with the continuing life of the new socialist State; and the statements of which he spoke are certainly borne out by the acts of intervention — not one but many — committed against the Soviet Union at that time. And yet, even then, Lenin was the apostle of peaceful co-existence of the two systems.

However, the fact that Mr. Moch set out to quote all the cases in which some attempt was made to express a different intention in the past, that he quoted several saints of the Christian calendar, is another matter. I am sure that the saints of the Christian calendar would not feel much at ease with Lenin. But peaceful co-existence means, precisely, peaceful co-existence between two opposing systems.

I now come to my second point, which relates to Mr. Eaton's statement. The United States representative accused the socialist delegations — the Soviet delegations as he called them — of not wishing to understand. But let us not forget that since the beginning of our discussion in this Committee, the delegations of the Western countries, first and foremost, the United States delegation and Mr. Eaton himself, had refused to discuss disarmament questions and measures, and had been unwilling to accept any disarmament measure, to reduce armed forces, or even to undertake not to be first to use nuclear weapons. What then do the Western countries want? They want control of armaments, not of disarmament. That being so, how can armaments be controlled? The representative of Czechoslovakia was quite right: the generals and the general staffs of the Western countries are ready to make use of all the information they can obtain on all places in the Soviet Union and the socialist countries at a certain stage, when no substantial measures of disarmament have yet been carried out. Why do you wish to keep intact the power of the armed forces — the whole striking power — and at the same time have all the information you want, together with innocuous or false disarmament measures?

We think such an attitude can hardly contribute to the progress of our Conference. On the contrary, it shows that the Western countries, in this instance the United States, do not want disarmament, but want to be able to verify armaments.
Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I should like to say literally one word about Mr. Moch's last remarks. Mr. Tarabanov has already replied to the main points of those remarks, but I should like to add to what he has said.

The passages that have been so abundantly quoted by Mr. Moch do not bear out his case, because they merely show that at the start of its existence the Soviet Union, or Soviet Russia, was encircled by capitalist States which, as the quotations from Lenin's statements show, hated it and wished to destroy it. It would have been strange if in these circumstances Lenin had said: "They want to destroy us, but we shall not resist." It was natural for Lenin to say: Those who wish our destruction must perish. That was quite natural because we were not prepared to sit with folded hands and wait to be strangled, as one of the British politicians of the day put it, "in the cradle". We did not allow ourselves to be strangled in our cradle, but declared that if anyone tried to strangle us we should resist, and those would perish who tried to destroy us. That is the meaning of those passages that Mr. Moch quoted. They in no way conflict with the main line of the Soviet Government's foreign policy, nor with the line of peaceful co-existence which Lenin advocated from the early years of the Revolution until the last years of his life, and which is now followed by our Government and Party.

Those are my supplementary remarks to what has been said.

Mr. MOCH (France) (translation from French): I merely wish to say that this discussion has been constructive and has helped us to make progress towards general and complete disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN (Poland) (translation from French): So much the better.

Mr. MOCH (France) (translation from French): So much the better!

Mr. MEZINCESCU (Romania) (translation from French): To what Mr. Moch has just said I should like to add the words: particularly thanks to Mr. Moch's own contribution.
Mr. MOCH (France) (translation from French): Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN (Poland) (translation from French): I think this very interesting discussion has now come to an end, so with your permission I will read out the communique:

"the twenty-seventh meeting of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament was held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 22 April 1960 under the chairmanship of the representative of Poland.

"the next meeting of the Conference will be held on Monday, 25 April 1960, at 10.30 a.m."

Are there any objections? The communique is approved.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.