FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWENTY-SIXTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Thursday, 21 April 1960, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy)
PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV
Mr. K. CHRISTOV
Col. K. SAVOV

Canada:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS
Mr. A. G. CAMPBELL
W/Cdr. R. J. MITCHELL

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. NOSEK
Lieut.-Gen. J. HECKO
Mr. Z. TRHLIK

France:

Mr. J. MOCH
Mr. M. LEGENDE
Col. L. CONVERT

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. L. DAINELLI
Mr. D. PHILIPSON

Poland:

Mr. M. NACZKOWSKI
Mr. M. LACHS
Brig.-Gen. J. SLIWINSKI

Romania:

Mr. E. NEZACESCU
Mr. C. BOCDAI
Col. C. POPA

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V. A. ZOPIN
Col.-Gen. A. A. GRYZLOV
Mr. A. A. ROZKOZHIN
PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Contd.)

United Kingdom:
Rt. Hon. D. ORMSBY-GORE
Miss B. SALT
Maj.-Gen. RIDDLE

United States of America:
Mr. F.M. EATON
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Rear-Admiral P.L. DUDLEY

Representative of the Secretary-General:
Mr. W. EPSTEIN
The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): The twenty-sixth meeting of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament is called to order. I call upon the representative of Czechoslovakia.

Mr. NOSEK (Czechoslovakia): The Czechoslovak delegation deems it necessary to revert once again to an important question immediately connected with general and complete disarmament, namely the question of effective international control. At yesterday’s meeting the representative of France, Mr. Moch, repeatedly referred to this question when criticizing the proposal of the Socialist countries and tried to create the impression that that proposal on general and complete disarmament contained only proposals relating to uncontrollable measures and thus, according to him, did not provide for effective international control.

This was not the first time that the basic position of the Socialist countries' delegations on the question of control over general and complete disarmament has, in spite of our explanations, been either misconstrued or even distorted. As an illustration I would like to recall the statement made by the representative of the United States, Mr. Eaton, at our nineteenth meeting. Mr. Eaton also tried to create the impression that the Socialist countries' delegations did not provide, in their programme, for the implementation of general and complete disarmament, for the establishment at the same time of effective international control. Mr. Eaton, referring to General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) said:

"It does not say, 'general and complete disarmament' and stop there; it says, 'general and complete disarmament under effective international control". (TNCD/FV.19, page 6)

Mr. Eaton went on to say:

"I fear that this is one of the basic differences between our two plans." (ibid.)

We are astonished by the statements of the Western delegations alleging that the Socialist countries' proposal does not safeguard effective control over general and complete disarmament, and we are all the more astonished since the representatives of the Western delegations, and even Mr. Eaton himself at our ninth meeting, have asserted quite a series of common viewpoints between the delegations of the Socialist and Western countries, just on the question of control. The standpoint of the delegations of the Socialist countries on effective international control over general and complete disarmament has been explained many times in the past.
The way in which the Socialist countries' delegations understand the principles of control over general and complete disarmament was outlined again in paragraph 3 of the document submitted by those delegations on 8 April. That paragraph reads as follows:

"All measures envisaged by the programme of general and complete disarmament shall be implemented under international control of scope corresponding to the scope and nature of the disarmament measures implemented at each stage. For the organization of control and inspection over disarmament, an international control organ shall be set up with the participation of all States and shall operate in virtue of a special provision constituting an integral part of the Treaty on Disarmament."

(TNDC/4, para. 3)

The provisions referred to concerning the basic principles of control in connexion with the programme of general and complete disarmament contain nothing relating to subjects on which no rapprochement of views had been reached in our discussions so far. In any case the delegations of the Western countries have not told us so far that this is not the case. As it appears from our discussions until now all the States represented in our Committee consider the question of control to be inseparably linked with the implementation of the disarmament measures. The establishment of a strict international control cannot, of course, be in the interests of one State only or of a group of States. All Member States of a treaty on general and complete disarmament would naturally be equally interested that all parties to the treaty should implement exactly and fully all agreed measures and all commitments undertaken by them, and it is for this very reason that the document of the delegations of the Socialist countries provides for the scope of international control to be fully commensurate with the scope and character of disarmament measures being implemented in the respective stages.

The delegations of the Socialist countries are of the view that control must be carried out simultaneously with the disarmament measures: that means that its timing must coincide with the beginning of the carrying out of corresponding disarmament measures, and that it will operate from the beginning until the end of the whole process of general and complete disarmament; and what is more, the control will continue to function even after the completion of disarmament so that no State will be in a position to prepare a war secretly. The control must be
directed against the possibility of unleashing a war — that means that the forms of the control have to be such that by its substance and scope the control should not be identical to the collecting of military data without disarmament measures; for the control over the implementation of measures for general and complete disarmament it would be necessary to establish an international control organ recruited on an international basis of representatives of all States, with due regard to the principle of equitable geographical distribution. The activity of this organ would be governed by a special statute forming an integral part of the treaty on disarmament.

The delegations of the Socialist countries provide for the establishment of the international control organ in such a manner that it could begin practical control activities simultaneously with the inception of the first disarmament measures. Its functions and powers would be extended from one stage to the other in accordance with the developments of disarmament measures being carried out in particular stages and with the increasing scope and character of control measures in particular stages. After the accomplishment of general and complete disarmament the international control organ would have, without any limitation, free access to all objects of the control. Besides the ground control, the international control organ would also be in a position to introduce a full system of aerial inspection and photography of the territory of all States. It is in this way that the delegations of the Socialist countries understand the basic principles of control over implementation of general and complete disarmament. The delegations of the Socialist countries do understand the terms "general and complete disarmament" and "under effective international control" mentioned by Mr. Eaton to be as inseparable as two sides of one coin.

In the further course of our Conference it is necessary, in our view, to confirm — as the new document of the delegations of the Socialist countries of 8 April also does — some conforming opinions and taking them as a starting-point to pass on to the discussion of questions on which a rapprochement of views has not yet been reached, and we believe that is exactly what is done in paragraph 3 of our new document which offers relatively considerable possibilities for achievement of a rapprochement of standpoints, even on other questions of control;
and this the more easily because, as I have already stated, even the delegations of the Western countries have admitted a rapprochement on certain basic principles of control. In order to attain this it is, however, necessary to eliminate the contradictions between the declarations and the concrete proposals of the delegations of the Western countries. The proposals of the delegations of Western countries are in obvious contradiction of the principles of control which these delegations themselves proclaim; and first of all with the basic principle that there can be no control without disarmament and no disarmament without control.

At our twentieth meeting, for instance, the representative of France, Mr. Moeh, stated that the delegations of the Western countries were prepared to discuss separately paragraph 3 of the new document of the Socialist countries, dealing with the principles of control. But he added at the same time that it was impossible to suppose that the discussion of paragraph 3 would mean approval by the delegations of the Western countries of paragraph 1 of the new document, where, as is well known, provisions and measures are laid down which should form the programme of general and complete disarmament. (Cf. TNCD/PV.20, page 25). What also could this statement mean but discussing the question of control without any connexion with disarmament? In our opinion, this means that Mr. Moeh is requesting control over armaments instead of controlled disarmament.

What did the Western delegations in fact propose as alleged concrete steps for our future work? At our twenty-third meeting the representative of the United States, Mr. Eaton, indicated:

"... these first steps which it is necessary for us to take if we are ever to stop talking about disarmament and start doing something about it".

(TNCD/PV.23, page 25)

In this same intervention he introduced nine proposals to be achieved as first steps. The attitude of the delegations of the Socialist countries as regards those nine points was already expressed sufficiently clearly at yesterday's meeting by the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Zorin. In our opinion, these provisions make it plain that in fact they have nothing to do with disarmament measures but that they are, perhaps with one exception, preponderantly measures of a control character linked to the Western proposals which have already been submitted during the course of our Conference. What proposals were submitted during all the negotiations in our Committee so far by the delegations of the Western countries in the framework of their plan?
The representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti, proposed in his statement at our tenth meeting that we should proceed to the detailed working out of an agreement on the establishment of an International Disarmament Organization, its powers and control functions. At our ninth meeting the representative of the United States, Mr. Eaton, proposed that the Committee should discuss the question of control measures over the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments without agreement as to whether and when there would be a reduction or to what level. At our fourteenth meeting Mr. Eaton proposed as a further measure that our Committee should start discussion on the question of control over placing into orbit of satellites carrying weapons of mass destruction into outer space — of course, without any agreement on the ban of the use of nuclear weapons, on their elimination from the armaments of States and on the destruction of all existing stocks of these weapons. Finally, at our twenty-third meeting, Mr. Eaton suggested that we should pass on to the discussion of the progressive cessation of the production of fissionable material for military purposes and on progressive reconversion of existing stockpiles of these materials for peaceful purposes. This provision on the control of the production of fissionable materials is, however, being proposed again without any connexion with measures leading to the diminution of the danger of a nuclear war. The States would continue to retain stocks of nuclear weapons at their disposal without any prohibition on their use.

What is the substance of all of these proposed measures? At first sight, it is evident that their substance is not disarmament but the establishment of control without respective disarmament measures. Therefore, it is not control over disarmament but control without disarmament or control over armaments, obviously destined to complement the military programmes of certain Western countries, as has already been stated here.

The proposals of the delegations of the Western countries are likewise in contradiction to the further principle agreed upon, it seems, that is, that the scope of the control and inspection has to be commensurate and should not exceed the framework of disarmament measures. The violation of this principle would necessarily offer an advantage to one State or to a group of States to the detriment of others; that is to say, it would help a potential aggressor to obtain information needed for the preparation of a surprise attack. As was
stated at our fifteenth meeting by the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Zorin, the Western plan is directly aimed at providing the Western Powers — first of all, the United States — with certain unilateral military advantages.

Let us take, for instance, the provisions of paragraph B of the second part of the Western plan (INCD/3) which requires prior notification to the International Disarmament Organization of proposed launchings of missiles according to predetermined and mutually agreed criteria. Further, it is proposed that the international organization be informed of locations of launching sites and places of manufacture of missiles and be charged with agreed verification including on-site inspection. Or let us take paragraph C of the second part where it is proposed that there be control of the production of fissionable materials, mentioned also by the United States representative, Mr. Eaton, at our twenty-third meeting, or the carrying-out of extensive aerial inspection according to paragraph B of the second part. To what end would these measures lead? Their realization prior to any disarmament measures, that is, prior to the complete ban of nuclear weapons, would seriously threaten the security of individual States and could be exploited by a potential aggressor for obtaining unilateral military advantages. In these conditions the same effects also would result from the unlimited ground control demanded. This could be misused for gathering information of exact locations of launching pads, ballistic missiles and means of air defence at a time when no realization of disarmament measures concerning these weapons had yet been started.

For the realization of a destructive surprise attack, it is necessary first of all to know exactly the location of the targets and their topographical co-ordinates. This fact has been clearly explained by the French General Pierre M. Gallois in the Western German military monthly "Jahrbuch" of July 1958 where he says: that should one of the opposite sides be prepared for a trial of strength, it would be obliged to destroy in advance the means of retaliation of the enemy without distinction, whether they be planes or rockets with nuclear warheads. The destruction of launching sites, says General Gallois, will for a long time be the only chance of the aggressor. These launching sites, however, are of small dimensions — they are almost pinpoint targets — and it is therefore indispensable to know their exact location. So much for General Gallois.
It follows from his conclusion, it seems to us, that only an aggressor needs to know the exact data on launching sites and other military installations or objects of aggression. A State which does not intend to unleash an aggression does not need this information.

In order to rule out any misconception, we deemed it necessary to clarify once again the main principles of our delegations' approach to the question of effective international control of general and complete disarmament. As I have already stated, these principles are included in paragraph 3 of the proposal made by the delegations of the socialist countries (TNCD/4). As the delegations of the socialist countries have already pointed out, a certain rapprochement of standpoints has been achieved, even on the question of control, that is, the principles according to which the control measures are to be governed. However, in our view the concrete proposals submitted in this connexion by the delegations of the Western countries do not comply with the agreed principles. How should we proceed further in our present situation? We deem it necessary to confirm the agreed standpoints and from there to look patiently for new ways leading to their concretisation and their further development. We believe that the way proposed by the United States representative, Mr. Eaton, on behalf of the delegations of the Western countries, formulated in the nine points submitted by Mr. Eaton at our twenty-third meeting, is not the way which could lead us towards this goal. On the contrary, we are convinced that a useful basis for this approach could be the new document of the delegations of the socialist countries, which confirms such a rapprochement on the question of control. If the delegations of the Western countries would like to enlarge further some of the points of this document it is up to them to submit concrete amendments which will, of course, be studied carefully, but only on the assumption that the control measures will not be separated from general and complete disarmament.

It was with great interest that we heard the representative of France, Mr. Moch, intimate at our meeting yesterday that the Western delegations would submit their new proposals in the very near future. In this connexion I should like to stress the fact that the delegations of the socialist countries by no means wish to keep aloof from a detailed discussion and elaboration of detailed control measures. However, we hold the view that at the present stage of negotiations it is necessary to agree first of all on basic principles of international control over the implementation of general and complete disarmament before proceeding to the details, all the more so because we have not yet reached any agreement on concrete disarmament
measures which should form the scope of general and complete disarmament. When we reach such a stage of discussing concrete disarmament measures we shall be ready, of course, to discuss even the details of the establishment of an international control organ, its functions and powers. When we arrive at agreement on measures which should form the scope of general and complete disarmament, for instance, on the basis of the proposal made in paragraph 1 of the document submitted by the Socialist countries on 8 April (ibid.), we are convinced that even on questions of control we shall be in a position to obtain a conformity of standpoints on this basis. We hope that the Western delegations will advance their views on the document submitted by the Socialist countries and will eventually introduce their own proposals aiming at general and complete disarmament so that we shall be in a position to pass on to a discussion of concrete disarmament measures as soon as possible.

Mr. EATON (United States of America): Yesterday we heard Mr. Zorin make a number of comments on the question of force levels and conventional armament reductions. So desirous is my Government of getting on with the discussion of specific disarmament measures that I dared to hope that Mr. Zorin's comments would indicate that he was prepared now to go forward in the next few days to the discussion of the most important question, that is, in the first stage -- the only measure in the first stage of the Soviet plan, and a measure in the first stage of the Western plan -- and get on with the discussion of that measure, not only the question of its control but the question of the measure itself, the amount of the reduction of troops and the amount of the reduction of armaments. From there we could devise a control system which would be a pattern for other measures to come.

I regret that Mr. Zorin used the words "shop-worn merchandise". However, the descriptive words are not important. What is important is that those measures were carefully thought out by the Western delegations here, they were proposed in a serious manner in an effort to make progress with our work, and I regret that they were called "shop-worn". Nevertheless, they are the measures which we propose, and they are the measures which we believe will lead us towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Leaving aside the descriptive words, the question which is essential here is whether we should resign ourselves to a deadlock before we ever get down to serious discussion of the problems, or whether we should continue to seek a way in which to develop serious mutual exchanges of practical significance from which a beginning
on disarmament can be made. My delegation firmly believes that the latter course should be followed, and it is in this spirit, and in the hope that Mr. Zorin will continue to address himself to the measures of force levels and conventional armament reduction, that I propose to elaborate further today on the proposals which we have made, and to elicit comments from Mr. Zorin on his own thoughts, in this connexion.

We have proposed a force level reduction to 2.1 million men for the United States and for the USSR. This is not a hypothetical figure, it is a concrete figure and one on which the United States is prepared to agree, as proposed in the Western plan. The Soviet Union has suggested a figure of 1.7 million men. Therefore, measures relating to force levels and armament reductions are contained in the first stage of each of our plans, and it is thus appropriate that we should address ourselves to these measures in the very first instance.

I will not dwell on the question of unilateral reductions of troops and arms, and their significance as a disarmament measure. The record of my own Government with respect to unilateral reductions, which have consistently taken place before those of the Soviet Union and which I reviewed briefly on 8 April (TNCD/FV.19 pages 4 et seq.), is sufficiently well known and publicly documented to require no further comment or explanation from me. Suffice it to say that unilateral reduction of armaments is quite different from controlled and verifiable reduction of armaments, for it imposes no obligations on States and it imposes no method by which other States can determine whether the force level reductions have in fact been made.

The question of control is clearly at the heart of the problem of reaching agreement on disarmament measures. I, for one, am not prepared to run away from the word "control". For some reason or other we hear apologies for the use of the word "control", and for references to "no control without disarmament". What is the matter with the word "control"? Is it a word which people fear? We do not fear it. It is at the heart of the very first of the disarmament measures which I would hope we will now discuss, that of the reduction of force levels and of conventional armaments.

Thus far the principal ground for opposition to our idea of exploring more closely the views of both sides on the practical features of a verification system for some specific measure of disarmament appears to be that there must first be agreement to accept a given disarmament measure before discussion can be undertaken of its related verification. At the same time, however, it is conceded that no specific disarmament measure will be undertaken unless it is the subject of effective control. This is the dilemma. How can agreement be
reached on a specific measure if one or the other side declines to discuss the practical aspects of its verification, which must be resolved to the satisfaction of everyone before the discussion can take the form of an agreement and be implemented?

Let us bear in mind the substantive difference between the two matters we are talking about, which I believe has been overlooked in the discussions hitherto. First, there is the assertion that we must agree on a disarmament measure before we discuss the means of its verification. This amounts, in effect, to committing ourselves to undertaking a measure of disarmament on which we may be unable to reach agreement with regard to control. This is a serious step and involves the security of States.

The second issue we are discussing pertains to the means of control which, if agreed, would result in the measure being immediately implemented. This protects both sides from being committed to a particular disarmament measure until they have satisfied themselves that it can be effectively controlled.

The weight of the argument, therefore, clearly rests in favour of a two-sided discussion of control of any proposed disarmament measure, if we are to move ahead with the task which has been set for us. I might also point out that it would be futile and dangerously misleading to the peoples of the world to agree to accept any disarmament measure or measures until we know that agreement was possible as to verification. People everywhere would be led to believe that a serious disarmament programme had been agreed and was about to be carried out, when in fact the verification system essential to the programme had not yet been agreed. This would be a cruel deception and my Government will not be party to it.

I believe that it has been made clear in our discussions thus far that, among other important measures, we all seek at least to limit and reduce force levels and armaments along with nuclear weapons, with adequate arrangements for verification. We are also agreed that we will undertake to implement a given measure only when we can agree upon its verification. My Government has made it abundantly clear that it seeks safeguarded disarmament but that it will not enter into any hollow agreement. There must be agreement on the necessary verification arrangements for a disarmament measure at the same time as we commit ourselves to the measure itself. Control arrangements do not go into operation until agreement is reached on the related disarmament measure. Our position in this is
forthright: if we can agree on the arrangements for verifying an otherwise acceptable disarmament measure we will agree on that measure -- and this is a lasting commitment.

To permit us to get on with our work it would be helpful to begin now to seek agreement on a verification system for force levels. The figure of 2.1 million men is included in the Western plan; 1.7 million, in the Soviet plan. Of course, the figure of 2.1 million must be reached if we are to reach the figure of 1.7 million. Therefore it seems to me that we should proceed to discuss the type of verification system which would be acceptable to both of us when a figure can be agreed, and as I have stated we are now prepared to agree to a figure of 2.1 million under the conditions set forth in the Western plan.

At our ninth meeting I mentioned a few of the questions which arise relative to the task of verifying force levels. I would now like to outline somewhat on this question and I hope that I can elicit thereby some help from my Soviet colleagues on this problem, which it has been indicated is of such interest to all of us. Let me emphasize that in selecting force levels for discussion I am in no way minimizing the importance which we attach to the closely related provision for armament reduction.

In paragraph I D 1 of the Western plan (TNCD/3), which relates to force levels, we intend that there should be agreed initial maximum -- I repeat, maximum -- force level ceilings, beyond which we will agree that we will not go, of 2.5 million each for the United States and the USSR, and agreed appropriate force levels for other States. We intend further that, at the same time, agreement should be reached on arrangements and procedures necessary for initial and continuing verification of force levels by the International Disarmament Organization when subsequent reductions are effected. We are not asking for the establishment of the verification system before agreement on the levels; we will now agree on the levels with you provided we can agree on the basis of a verification system and thence put it into effect in order to verify subsequent reductions. As rapidly as possible upon accession to the agreement by all militarily significant States, agreement would be reached to effect a substantial reduction in force levels as provided in paragraph II G of the Western plan -- that is, a reduction to 2.1 million men each for the United States and the USSR and to agreed levels for all other militarily significant States.
The agreed verification system would be installed at the time agreement was reached on this reduction in force levels, and would begin to operate at the time action was initiated to effect the agreed reduction.

We envisage further that the verification of these new and lower agreed force levels would require only a modest number of international verification personnel -- not hordes of people, but a modest number of people -- provided always that they have the requisite access within the territory in which they are operating. We should like to discuss this question of numbers fairly soon with our Soviet colleague.

We have in mind a verification system designed initially to function in the territories of the United States and of the USSR, which would be extendable, upon agreement, to the territories of other participating States. The system would also be extended with their consent -- by arrangements through the International Disarmament Organization -- to the territories of non-participating States in which forces of the participants may be located.

Force level verification personnel would operate, under the control of the International Disarmament Organization, to verify the accuracy of force level data reported by each participating State. Verification would be accomplished by travelling to declared locations and checking numbers of personnel at those locations, using acceptable sampling techniques, and travelling through or over areas in which no forces were declared to be located, in order to confirm the accuracy of the declared data.

Schedules of verification trips, routes and means of transportation would be determined by the International Disarmament Organization. It is essential that verification personnel, including their communication and logistics support, be accorded rights, privileges and immunities similar to those accorded to members of the diplomatic corps. Further, it is essential that verification personnel have the right of unimpeded access to all areas within the territories involved in the agreement and to and from those territories and the location of the headquarters of the International Disarmament Organization. To the maximum extent practicable, verification personnel would utilize the communication system of the host country, with suitable supporting communication facilities under the control of the International Disarmament Organization.

Verification personnel would be organized into international teams, composed of personnel of the various participating States. The selection of such personnel should be in accordance with the principle that reliable inspection is not self-inspection.
Now let me outline in some detail the procedure which might be adopted for verifying force levels. I recognize that the task would be to verify the force levels of each participating State. This would involve forces both within and outside their own territory and would — as I have mentioned — require agreement not only by the participating States but by the States on whose territories the participants were deployed.

For the purpose of this discussion, I will take up only the problem of verifying the force levels located within the territories of the United States and the USSR. I do this with all humility, because we have not had an opportunity to discuss requirements which the Soviet Union feels would be necessary to assure them that we will live up to our commitments. I therefore put this forward as an initial suggestion, and one on which I would hope there will be discussion.

The verification process might be established along the following lines. The Soviet Union and the United States and each participating State would declare initially, and periodically thereafter, the total numbers and general locations of the full-time uniformed personnel maintained by the national Government, and other agreed categories of personnel — such agreement to be reached after discussion, which I hope will take place here at this table, so that we can be sure that we are having comparable declarations of comparable forces. Initially, the total numbers of personnel within the agreed categories would be merely declared, also their general locations on the ground at which all large groups of personnel were located. For example, a State might declare a force level of 2.5 million men, giving a further breakdown of data for all general areas in which groups of, say, 5,000 or more men were deployed. States subsequently would report changes at agreed intervals.

The territories of the Soviet Union, the United States and other participating States would be subject to visit by verification personnel within the agreed interval — say, each three months — to ratify the declarations. The territories would be divided into areas. Selection of areas and of units within the areas would be at random, to forestall redeployment of forces to a particular location (to conform with declared data).

Verification personnel would on their own initiative and without interference proceed to the area and to the unit selected by the verification organization, and,
by checking forces present -- using acceptable sampling techniques -- would confirm or refute declared data, reporting the results of their work to the verification organization.

It should be noted that the foregoing discussion deals only with the verification of levels of ground, sea and air forces located within the Soviet Union and the United States. For forces at sea it would be necessary that each ship, its home port and its personnel complement should be disclosed, and that the number of personnel aboard ships should be verified while the ship was in port. In addition, there would be a requirement for verificational personnel at transportation centres to observe movements of forces in order to aid in detecting any undeclared location of forces. The number of personnel required for that purpose would be determined in the light of the actual transportation network of the Soviet Union and the United States. If low-performance aircraft were also used, it might be possible to reduce the time required for on-site observation of transportation centres, and thus radically reduce the total number of people required for the verification of the network.

The foregoing description is intended to give some idea of a concrete point of departure in the development of a verification system. I have set forth these views at some length in an effort to make clear what we envisage in referring to a safeguarded agreement on force level reductions. I would again emphasize that in choosing this as a first topic of discussion I do not in any way minimize the importance of the reduction of armaments.

It would be encouraging for the future of our work if we could hear the Soviet representative's views on this problem, for it is only by mutual discussion that we shall be able to develop a system satisfactory to us both. On the basis of such a serious discussion we could look forward to our Conference's proceeding to reach the measures which I feel all of us agree must be reached as we go down the road to those final measures which I hope we shall sit here patiently and work out and which will lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): We have listened with close attention to the statement just made by Mr. Eaton, the United States representative, on certain questions connected with the reduction of armed forces and armaments and with the establishment of control over that reduction.
To the substance of some of the general propositions he put forward today we have no particular objection, since what he said, especially in the first part of his statement, and in particular the propositions, first, that it was essential to agree upon disarmament measures and that none of these would be implemented except under control; secondly, that these measures could not be implemented until an agreement concerning control had been reached; and, on the other hand, that the control measures would not come into force until agreement had been reached on the disarmament measures themselves -- these general propositions stated by Mr. Eaton are unobjectionable and appear to accord with our general position, about which the representative of Czechoslovakia has today spoken in greater detail.

Mr. Eaton's statement today shows that our positions on control are relatively close in regard to general approach and general principles of control. Such is the initial impression I gained from the simultaneous interpretation. It will of course be necessary to study the shorthand record of the statement carefully in order to ascertain how far that first impression is confirmed by the actual wording of the United States representative's prepared statement.

Mr. Eaton also attempted today to develop to some extent his general propositions relating to control by providing some specific examples to illustrate what the approach should be to the application of these general principles to such a disarmament measure as the reduction of armed forces. Towards the end of his statement he actually said that he was giving specific examples so as to enable us to obtain a clearer picture of the tentative proposals which the United States may put forward when we come to discuss concrete control measures. That is the way in which I understand his statement.

These concrete views will, of course, require study. At first sight, however, Mr. Eaton's statement already raises some inescapable questions connected precisely with the general principles he indicated at the beginning of his speech. For example, if he considers that no control measure should come into force until agreement is reached on disarmament measures, this seems to mean that there must be no control measures not connected with concrete disarmament measures. If we understand the United States' position correctly, then it is not clear, for instance, why it is necessary to establish the control of which Mr. Eaton spoke over the whole location of the forces of the various arms: land forces, sea forces and presumably air forces too. And -- Mr. Eaton did not specify this,
possibly through an oversight or lack of time — why should location areas be visited and verified every three months? What is to be verified? According to Mr. Eaton's statement there are to be no reduction measures in these areas. So what is there then to verify? The troop location itself? But the troop location itself is not a disarmament measure. So what is to be verified? The actual disposition of the troops is to be verified. But is this a measure of disarmament control? I do not think it is. This is a measure of control over existing armed forces, control over their disposition, numbers, quality and so forth.

The question inevitably arises, what is the meaning of the general United States position that no control measure may be implemented unless it is a measure of control over disarmament? This measure is not measure of control over disarmament. It is a measure of control over existing armed forces.

Perhaps I did not understand everything Mr. Eaton said. It will be necessary to study the text of his statement more carefully. But this question arises unbidden.

A number of other questions arise too, but I do not want to speak of them now, because they have not at the moment any bearing on our immediate discussion.

The fact that general principles, when given concrete form in their application to a specific example, do not fit these control measures naturally raises a question. The United States accepts a general principle, but the application of that general principle appears to cut across the general principle, if we judge by the example cited by Mr. Eaton.

This is, I repeat, my preliminary impression from my hearing of the simultaneous interpretation. I am not going to make any final deductions. That seems to be a matter for later discussion.

Mr. Eaton also speaking of general principles of disarmament and control, pointed out the necessity of agreeing upon actual disarmament measures. By way of example he cited various figures mentioned in connexion with reduction of the armed forces of the United States and of the Soviet Union both in our plan and in the plan put forward by the Western Powers. The figures mentioned were force levels of 2.5 million, 2.1 million and 1.7 million men, the last being the figure proposed by the Soviet Union and the other socialist States.

Mr. Eaton invited us to discuss a system of verification applicable, say, to a force level of 2.1 million men, or, he even added, of any figure eventually agreed upon. That is what I understood from the simultaneous interpretation.
This at once gives rise to some doubts. Why should we discuss some verification system or other suitable for verifying a figure which has not yet been adopted? We do not think that would be productive work; it would be a waste of time, because we might consider a verification system in relation to some given figure and then not happen to accept that particular figure. What then would be the good of our considering this verification system, especially in all its details?

Mr. Eaton said, moreover, that agreement was necessary on the actual disarmament measures. He did not deny the necessity of this agreement, and yet for some reason or other the statements he made today contain no arguments and he did not deal at all with the actual disarmament measure for reducing the conventional armed forces and armaments even of the two great Powers, the United States and the USSR. Figures were mentioned of 2.5, 2.1 and 1.7 million men, but no explanation at all was given why the figure 1.7 million was unacceptable to the United States and why it thought the figures of 2.5 and 2.1 million correct. Nothing whatever was said about this. Any yet Mr. Eaton was to a certain extent answering my speech of yesterday. The Soviet delegation explained in detail yesterday why it thought the figure of 2.5 million men unsuitable but the figure of 1.7 million men acceptable and appropriate in relation to the first measure of general and complete disarmament. Mr. Eaton did not discuss the disarmament measure itself at all; he only described control measures.

But it appears from the general propositions Mr. Eaton put forward today that the United States recognizes the need first of all to agree upon actual disarmament measures. If that is so, then let us agree on disarmament measures. Let us discuss why the figure of 1.7 million is unacceptable to you, and why you insist upon 2.5 million and 2.1 million.

That is one category of questions.

Here is another. Why do you pick out the United States and the Soviet Union only and discuss the figures relating to these two countries only? After all, we could discuss those two figures together en tête à tête, the United States and the Soviet Union. We have never refused to do this. We could have a talk on this matter. But when the "Ten" of us are meeting here, why do we not discuss other figures of importance to a large number of countries, at least to the great Powers participating in our Conference? Not one word was said about those figures. One's impression thus is that Mr. Eaton, although he recognizes in principle the necessity of an agreement upon actual disarmament measures, is not inclined for some reason to discuss them in concrete terms. We do not understand why.
I think that all these questions which have come to our mind could be usefully discussed, and that some of what has today been said by Mr. Eaton may prove useful when all the details of the matter are further discussed, when we start considering the concrete stages of general and complete disarmament, and the measures which are to form part of this concrete stage of general and complete disarmament.

If the United States is prepared to discuss a plan of general and complete disarmament, we are prepared to consider a plan of general and complete disarmament and every stage of that plan. In discussion of each measure in that plan, we shall be ready to discuss all details, both of the substance and control over its implementation.

To our regret, however, we are still at a stage where we have not got the consent of the Western Powers to discussion of a comprehensive plan of general and complete disarmament.

They have in point of fact rejected our proposal to consider the whole of a programme of general and complete disarmament. They have also declined to discuss "Basic Principles of General and Complete Disarmament" (TNCD/4). We should therefore hardly be justified in passing today to a concrete and detailed examination of separate elements of the plan; although, I repeat, the actual statement Mr. Eaton made today may prove useful when all these details are fully discussed. We do not decline to make use of anything that may be valuable in that statement for further concrete discussion, once we have agreed upon a comprehensive plan of general and complete disarmament and the main stages of that disarmament, and passed on to consider the concrete measures in each stage.

Those were the preliminary remarks which I wanted to make today on Mr. Eaton's statement concerning certain measures of reduction of armaments and armed forces and of control. My general conclusion is that for some reason the United States does not wish to consider and agree upon concrete disarmament measures; it prefers to pass on to a discussion of details of control over measures upon which we have not yet reached agreement. That is my first impression of what Mr. Eaton said today.

I take this opportunity to make a few additional comments on statements made at our recent meetings by the representatives of the Western Powers.

My first remark relates to the statement of Mr. Eaton, the United States representative, made at our meeting on 14 April, that the United States will not agree to undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons (cf. TNCD/FV.23).
Speaking immediately after Mr. Eaton at that meeting we said then that, in view
of the United States' negative attitude towards the proposal that the States
possessing nuclear weapons should undertake not to be the first to use them, the
question inevitably arises whether the United States has the intention, in certain
circumstances, of being the first to use nuclear weapons. At that time we pointed
out to the members of the Committee that such intentions could in no way be regarded
as defensive and could not arise from consideration of national defence.

We should now like to say this. In introducing for consideration by the
Committee the proposal that the nuclear Powers should undertake a solemn obligation
not to be the first to use nuclear weapons the delegations of the Soviet Union
and the other socialist countries, in view of the completely realistic nature of
the proposal, assumed that agreement on such a solemn declaration could be reached
while our negotiations in this Committee were still in progress. One of the
nuclear Powers, the Soviet Union, had indeed already declared that it was ready
to undertake before the whole world not to be the first to use nuclear weapons,
if the other nuclear Powers would give a similar undertaking. The Soviet Union's
readiness to take such a step derives entirely from the peaceful policy of the
Soviet State, which has no intention of attacking anybody and is deeply convinced
that all international questions can be settled without the use or threat of force,
by peaceful means, through negotiation.

We remember, of course, that when in the past we have raised the question of
the nuclear Powers committing themselves not to use atomic or hydrogen weapons,
the Western Powers have usually declared that they could not give such an under-
taking without weakening their own security, since the Soviet Union possessed an
advantage in armed forces and conventional armaments. This far-fetched argument
convinced nobody even in those days; and now that the Soviet Union has decided
to reduce its armed forces to a level even lower than the force levels of the
United States of America, the absurdity of this "argument" has become obvious
even to the least well-informed. In reality, how can the assumption by the
nuclear Powers of a commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons weaken
the security of the United States and its NATO Allies, if the force levels of
those States will even exceed the force levels of the Soviet Union and its allies
under the Warsaw Treaty? It is perfectly obvious that under these conditions the
assumption by the nuclear Powers of a commitment not to be the first to use
nuclear weapons cannot upset the existing balance of forces which the Western Powers are so anxious to maintain. Rather would such a step have immense significance for the cause of peace and immensely strengthen the security of all States, both the nuclear Powers and those which do not possess nuclear weapons.

The threat of war would not, of course, be entirely removed merely because States undertook such a commitment. Only general and complete disarmament could remove it once and for all. But a declaration by the nuclear Powers that they would not be the first to use nuclear weapons would make the solution of this problem much easier and contribute definitely to the complete prohibition of weapons of mass destruction.

In the light of these considerations the position taken by the United States Government, on whose behalf the United States delegation in our Committee has declared that it rejects the socialist countries' proposal that the nuclear States should declare that they will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, cannot fail to be noticed by all who hold the cause of peace dear.

It is therefore important that the United States delegation should explain its position to those taking part in our negotiations, and not merely state that renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons is a measure not susceptible to control. Everyone, you see, realizes that this measure, by its very nature, needs no control whatsoever. It is a major moral and political obligation undertaken by a State before the eyes of all the peoples of the world.

Our second comment refers to the Western delegations' repeated allegations that the possibility of implementing radical measures of nuclear disarmament no longer exists, because nuclear armaments have developed on such a scale that it is already too late for mankind to turn back. That possibility -- the "golden opportunity" to use Mr. Ormsby-Gore's phrase (TNCD/FV.2, page 12) -- is said to have existed in the immediate post-war years, but to have been missed in 1946-47, with the result that a situation was created from which, as the Western delegates have said, there is "no return".

What is this all about. Are the Western representatives talking about the "golden opportunity" which is supposed to have been missed in 1946-47? Apparently they have in mind the Baruch Plan, as it was called, which even now, after all these years, some people are trying to represent as a plan for nuclear disarmament, obviously reckoning that people will have forgotten what its content really was.
But it is surely well known that this plan had nothing whatever to do with the prohibition of nuclear weapons. In reality — and I do not think those present here can have forgotten this — not only was the Baruch plan not designed to prohibit atomic weapons, but on the contrary its purpose was to perpetuate the United States monopoly over these weapons. The well-known Acheson-Lilienthal report of 17 March 1946, which was based on the Baruch Plan, stated directly — I quote —:

"The plan does not require that the United States shall discontinue such manufacture (i.e. of atomic bombs) either upon the proposal of the plan or upon the inauguration of the international agency".

It would be difficult to put the matter more clearly.

Indeed, instead of concrete measures for the prohibition of atomic weapons, the Baruch plan proposed that an "international agency for the development of atomic energy" be set up and endowed with exceptionally wide rights and powers, extending all the way to the further improvement and even employment of atomic weapons.

In the second report of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, which included a detailed exposition of the Baruch plan, we read:

"The international agency shall have the exclusive right, using its own facilities and its own personnel, to conduct research on, and development of, atomic weapons; it shall be required to conduct such activities when it determines them to be necessary to the discharge of its purposes and duties."


In the light of these facts how can the Western representatives maintain that the adoption of the United States plan of control over atomic energy could put an end to the production of nuclear weapons?

The Soviet Union and other peace-loving States could not of course agree to the United States plan of control over atomic energy, since the purpose of this plan was not to prohibit atomic weapons but to preserve the United States atomic monopoly, which had created a threat to peace and international security.

In 1946-1947 the problem of eliminating atomic weapons could of course have been solved, and the threat of atomic war thereby removed once and for all, by setting the tremendous power of atomic energy to work exclusively for the peaceful development of mankind. To do this it would have been necessary to accept and
implement the proposal on banning atomic weapons which was made at the time by the Soviet Union. This proposal of the Soviet Union, however, was rejected by the Western Powers and as a result the world entered upon the nuclear arms race.

These are historical facts. They show who bears the responsibility for the failure to solve the problem of eliminating nuclear weapons at that time, when these weapons had only just appeared on the scene. Nevertheless, these facts do not in the least indicate that this problem cannot be solved today. There are no grounds whatsoever for asserting that mankind has reached the point of no return. We believe that by joint efforts on the part of all the interested parties a positive solution can and will be found to the problem of completely prohibiting nuclear weapons, discontinuing their production, eliminating them from the armaments of States and destroying the stockpiles of those weapons.

It was on this premise that the Soviet Government put forward its programme for general and complete disarmament, in which an important place is given to the radical solution of the nuclear disarmament problem.

I have one more comment.

In certain statements made by the Western representatives it has been hinted that the Soviet Union is somehow opposing a prohibition on the use of outer space for military purposes. On this issue again it has been said that humanity can reach a point of no return. What is there to say on this matter?

First of all we think it essential to state quite clearly that the Soviet Union has always been against an arms race developing in outer space and has always declared that outer space must be used solely for peaceful purposes.

As early as March 1958, soon after the Soviet Union launched the first artificial earth satellites, the Soviet Government, being in favour of ensuring the security of all States and of developing international co-operation in space research for peaceful purposes, put forward a proposal for the banning of the use of cosmic space for military purposes, the elimination of foreign military bases on the territories of other countries, and international co-operation in the study of cosmic space. (A/381 and Corr.1)

At that time the Soviet Union proposed — and this proposal was discussed at the 13th session of the United Nations General Assembly — that a wide international agreement be concluded, which would include:
"A ban on the use of cosmic space for military purposes and an undertaking by States to launch rockets into cosmic space only under an agreed international programme" (I am quoting a paragraph in our proposals);

"The elimination of foreign military bases on the territories of other States, primarily in Europe, the Near and Middle East and North Africa" (we did not propose to abolish them in the United States);

"The establishment within the framework of the United Nations of appropriate international control over the implementation of [these] obligations". (ibid., page 7)

Was this not a fair proposal? This Soviet proposal placed no State or group of States in a privileged position. It was in the interests of all countries. Everyone understands that the danger to mankind lies not only in satellites which can carry nuclear weapons, not only in intercontinental ballistic missiles, but also in other means of delivery by which nuclear weapons can be directed to a target. Cannot missiles of any range -- not just intercontinental missiles -- cannot aircraft and other means of delivery be used to deliver nuclear weapons to their targets? Does not this create a threat that nuclear war may break out? Yet it is precisely these means of delivering nuclear weapons that the Western Powers have installed, not far from the borders of the Soviet Union and its allies, in numerous military bases from which a nuclear attack could be launched against these countries by means of aircraft or missiles of short and medium range. That is why in our 1958 proposal we linked the prohibition of the use of outer space for military purposes to the abolition of foreign military bases.

If this proposal of ours had been accepted, the question of banning the use of outer space for military purposes would have been settled two years ago. But, as we know, this Soviet proposal, which was discussed at the thirteenth session of the General Assembly, was rejected by the United States and its allies. It was rejected solely because the United States did not want to give up its numerous bases on foreign territory close to the frontiers of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. It did not even want to discuss any reduction of progressive abolition of these bases.
For your part, you are now proposing to prohibit only intercontinental ballistic missiles, leaving intact all other means of delivering nuclear weapons to their targets and also the military bases on foreign territory which are being used as sites for these means of delivery. This approach patently indicates that you are striving for a one-sided military advantage. Yet, realizing that you were not going to succeed in obtaining so unfair a settlement of the question, you yourselves were soon opposing discussion by the United Nations at that time of prohibition of the military use of outer space.

That is how matters stood two years ago. Since I was present at the thirteenth session of the General Assembly, I must say in passing that the United States at that time also refused to agree on the peaceful study of outer space and peaceful co-operation within a United Nations agency established on a basis acceptable to all countries. The United States tried at that time to impose a composition for this agency which would give twelve of the eighteen seats in the United Nations committee to countries belonging to military blocs allied to the United States. Twelve out of eighteen! At that time I told Mr. Lodge, the United States representative: "You, of course, have a majority in the United Nations and can get this decision carried; but you have no majority in outer space. An agency like this, created by you and imposed on the General Assembly, will not be able to function".

Mr. Lodge did not then heed our advice, did not agree to the compromise we offered him. So a year passed, and in 1959 the United States had to revise its decision and set up an agency composed in approximately the way we had suggested at the thirteenth session of the General Assembly; but even for the purpose of peaceful collaboration in the study of outer space a year had been lost.

I think these lessons are instructive for our work here.

The Western Powers are now again raising the question of prohibiting the use of outer space for military purposes and in particular the placing into orbit of missiles carrying nuclear charges. But you are now raising this question in isolation and leaving aside other important aspects of the problem. You are proposing to prohibit the launching into space of artificial earth satellites carrying nuclear weapons, and to establish international control over this measure, but at the same time you mean to keep at your disposal the nuclear weapon itself and the military bases on foreign territories. It is clear to everyone, however,
however, that the danger to humanity is not in the satellites and other means of delivery themselves, but in the atomic and hydrogen charges which can be placed in satellites or missiles or delivered to the target by the bombers or other aircraft now in position in numerous military bases not far from the borders of the socialist countries.

The Western approach to prohibition of the use of outer space for military purposes will obviously not remove the threat of nuclear war. But we advocate a solution to this question which would remove the threat of nuclear war, and of war in general, completely and permanently.

- The Soviet programme of general and complete disarmament really does provide a cardinal solution to this problem. Our proposal provides for the complete prohibition and abolition both of nuclear weapons and of rocket missiles, as well as of all arms of every type and all the material means of waging war.

Now, therefore, can it be asserted that the Soviet Union opposes prohibition of the use of outer space for military purposes? It is not the Soviet Union but the Western Powers which are continuing to raise one obstacle after another to the solution of the problems of banning the use of outer space for military purposes and general and complete disarmament as a whole.

If the Western Powers wish to show their concern, not in words but in deeds, that outer space should never be used for military purposes, they must renounce their one-sided approach to this problem and embark on a radical solution of all disarmament problems -- that is to say, on general and complete disarmament.

*The CHIANI* (Italy) (translation from French): Does anyone else wish to speak? If not, I will read out the communique:

"The twenty-sixth meeting of the Conference of the Non-Nation Committee on Disarmament was held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 21 April under the chairmanship of the representative of Italy.

"The next meeting of the Conference will take place on Friday, 22 April at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.