FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Wednesday, 20 April 1960, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. MOCH (France)
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<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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PRESENT AT THE TABLE (contd.)

United Kingdom:  
Rt. Hon. D. ORMSBY-GORE  
Miss B. SALT  
Maj.-Gen. RIDDELL

United States of America:  
Mr. F. M. EATON  
Mr. C. C. STELLE  
Rear-Admiral P. L. DUDLEY

Representative of the Secretary-Secretary-General:  
Mr. W. EPSTEIN
The CHAIRMAN (France) (translation from French): I declare the twenty-fifth meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament open. I call on the representative of Poland.

Mr. NASZKOWSKI (Poland) (translation from French): From the beginning of our Committee's discussions, the Western delegations have opposed to the Soviet programme of general and complete disarmament a series of measures weakly linked together, or rather a series of half-measures. That, in our view, is where the main difference between us lies.

We have frequently been criticized here on the grounds that considerations relating to complete disarmament are abstract in character, since the goal itself is Utopian. This criticism was recently applied to the draft basic principles of general and complete disarmament submitted by the five socialist States.

I shall therefore take the liberty of reverting to this subject once again, in order to show that the socialist countries take an entirely realistic view of the execution of the programme of general and complete disarmament, and of the whole complex of relations which will govern the world after it has been carried out.

The measures the Western Powers propose that we should concentrate on are not, strictly speaking, disarmament measures, for their predominant feature is control over existing armaments. The same applies to the recent proposal made by Mr. Eaton, the United States representative, that control should be established over the production of fissionable materials and that stocks of such materials should be partly reconverted.

But quite apart from what I have just pointed out the Western delegations' approach to the problems before us is not right, and is not adapted to the main task assigned to our Committee. In point of fact, the Western proposals really come down to postulating some reduction, or merely some limitation -- which, incidentally, is insignificant -- of the military capacity and armaments production of the various States.

It is, however, necessary to take into consideration the fact that in recent years there has been a radical change in the very nature of modern armaments. As a result of new technical inventions, the means of waging war have undergone a complete reassessment. In an issue of the periodical Politique Étrangère, a French military man, General Gallois, wrote that now that there are weapons with
the power of mass destruction, if they are used there will be an enormous reduction in the period of destruction. He calculated, moreover, that the same results as in the last world war, and even more extensive results, could now be produced not in five years, but in a few hours or even tens of minutes.

The introduction of weapons of mass extermination as basic equipment for the modern army thus means that any war would become a tragedy with incalculable and unimaginable results. And that is irrespective of whether the stocks of such weapons increase still further, remain intact or are even somewhat reduced. It is, indeed, common knowledge that even part of the nuclear weapons now stocked in arsenals would be enough to wipe out life on the earth. Having reached a certain level, the quantity of weapons of mass extermination has ceased to be a decisive factor, so that the situation we have to face today is qualitatively different, especially as the latest advances in the technique of war do not permit any country to entertain the illusion that it is privileged to be beyond the range of weapons of mass destruction.

The absurdity of war as an instrument of policy is becoming increasingly evident. That applies equally to the arms race intended to give one party an alleged superiority over some potential enemy -- as much in time of peace as in a possible war. It is time to view the whole problem of disarmament from a new angle, just as it is time to stop thinking and approaching problems according to obsolete classifications.

That, it seems, was how the States Members of the United Nations understood this new situation when they voted in favour of the resolution which definitely set the task of general and complete disarmament -- the task of totally eliminating war from the life of the nations. That is why the insistence with which the delegations of the Western Powers are now reverting to the old ideas is causing us both astonishment and concern. We are astonished and concerned at being presented with proposals which are fragmentary, isolated and incapable of fully solving the problems of the modern world.

In this connexion I should like to say a few words on the remarks made here yesterday by Mr. Burns, the representative of Canada, to our Committee (TNCD/PV.24) General Burns said of the programme of nuclear disarmament contained in the Soviet plan that it was vague and gave no idea of how concrete measures might be implemented. Gentlemen, are we speaking in different terms? Is it not,
precisely, vagueness that is the distinguishing characteristic of the proposals submitted by the Western States, which tend primarily to provide for studies and, where concrete measures are concerned, speak mainly of indirect methods and measures which can have only an indirect effect on the cessation of the arms race?

We agree with Mr. Burns that

"we would indeed bitterly disappoint the hopes of the peoples of our own countries and of the many more States which are not represented here if we were not at all times to keep the question of nuclear disarmament well to the forefront in our minds". (TNCD/Pv.24, pages 4 and 5)

But there again Mr. Burns is not drawing the appropriate conclusions from his own words, for in that field too, the Western States are mainly proposing studies and exchanges of information. The proposals of the socialist States, on the other hand, are aimed at action with real and concrete prospects of disarmament. It is, precisely, by carrying out our programme that it would be possible to do what Mr. Burns mentioned, namely "demobilizing soldiers, sailors, and airmen, and letting them go to work in industry or agriculture."

(ibid., page 8)

When speaking of disarmament, some politicians have only military matters in mind. They completely overlook the other aspects of the problem, which in our view are of essential importance. I refer to the political and economic aspects of disarmament, and it is on them that I wish to dwell a little longer in my remarks today.

Let us start with the political aspect. In the Western countries, it is quite commonly believed that armaments are directly governed by international conflicts, and that complete disarmament will only be possible after those conflicts have been resolved. We have also heard echoes of these ideas in the remarks of representatives of the Western States present in this room. In our view, the position is different. It is, precisely, the arms race which has now become the major political problem and which underlies the maintenance and origin of many political conflicts; it has become a factor which exerts a baneful influence on the international atmosphere. It is, precisely, the arms race which helped to start and to aggravate the "cold war" between former allies, giving rise to and deepening mistrust and fear. It is, precisely, the arms race which hastened the division of the world into opposing military groups and led
to the installation throughout the world of military bases situated thousands of
kilometres from their country of origin and constituting a threat to the security
of many States. It is, precisely, the arms race which has subordinated the
whole of international politics to considerations of military strategy.

It is obvious that the elimination of this main problem of the contemporary
world must lead to the disappearance of all political problems arising out of
intensive armament.

In a disarmed world, in which no States would have the means to use threats,
pressure or blackmail, the atmosphere of distrust must needs disappear and make
way for international confidence and co-operation. The mere fact of having
made the settlement of disputes by recourse to arms impossible, makes it
obligatory to negotiate and to seek settlements by peaceful means alone. For
conflicts cannot be resolved by means which are no longer available.

The abolition of armed forces would in itself do away with all military
blocs and groups, because the very purpose of military alliances would cease to
exist. The state of insecurity and threat, so characteristic of the world of
today, would, in the new circumstances, be replaced by a state of general
security. The possibility of exerting any form of pressure on the policy of
governments would disappear. It is only under such conditions that the principle
of sovereign equality of all States recognized by the United Nations Charter can
be fully applied.

It would be difficult to deny that such a political climate, in which
military rivalry would give place to the peaceful co-existence and co-operation
of all States, large and small, without distinction as to political, economic
or social system, can only be created after general and complete disarmament has
been carried out.

On the other hand, application of the measures proposed by the Western
Powers could not provide such a climate.

The economic effects of general and complete disarmament would also be very
great. I venture to remind members of the Committee of the familiar figure of
100,000 million dollars spent by the world on armaments each year. By itself,
isolated from the other factors and indices of the economies of the different
countries, this figure may not perhaps enable one fully to appreciate the great
resources squandered for purposes entirely alien to the welfare of mankind. However, we need only divide the amount among the approximately 2,000 million men whose standard of living is low -- this figure was mentioned by President de Gaulle in a speech to the British Parliament which was quoted by Mr. Moch, our Chairman for today -- to arrive at the result of 50 dollars a year per person. Now that figure exceeds the annual per capita income in many underdeveloped countries.

It may also be useful to add here that certain countries, in which per capita incomes are among the lowest in the world, have been caught up in the arms race to such an extent that they are devoting about one third of their budgetary expenditure to armaments.

Moreover, in 1951, a group of experts, acting on a request by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, estimated that the economically underdeveloped countries needed 19,000 million dollars a year to meet the minimum of their most urgent needs, i.e. a sum that is one fifth of present world expenditure on armaments. If even a part of the sum saved throughout the world as a result of general disarmament were used to help underdeveloped countries, the poverty prevailing there, which is the disgrace of the twentieth century, would be entirely wiped out. Furthermore, expenditure on armaments has become a heavy burden even for the highly industrialized countries, and makes it difficult, or sometimes even impossible, to improve the standard of living of their people. According to the calculations of experts published in American periodicals, every dollar saved on armaments and spent on public works would provide from one and a half to two times more employment than a dollar spent on arms production.

The characteristic feature of the modern world is its over-increasing number of reciprocal economic ties. The development of international trade and economic co-operation is today of capital importance; but it is only under the conditions resulting from a disarmed world that international commerce can become a fully effective instrument for bringing the nations closer together. It is only in a completely disarmed world that the various forms of international economic organization could be fully exploited to promote an international division of labour which would be rational and mutually advantageous.
Another result of creating an atmosphere of trust would be to eliminate all discrimination in foreign trade and all the barriers of the "cold war."

I will not speak here of the great prospects of cultural and scientific co-operation which would open up in a world free from armaments, in which the concept of military secrecy would have disappeared, and wide exchanges of ideas and experience would make it possible to reap the maximum benefit from the achievements of human genius.

Poland is one of the countries which desires to concentrate the whole of its national effort on continuous improvement of the people's standard of living and on constantly raising the economic, cultural and scientific level of the country. In the existing circumstances we must, however, devote part of our resources to defence, and at the same time we still have to allocate large sums to the reconstruction of our cities which were destroyed in the last war.

That is why we long so ardently for general and complete disarmament, and, as you know, we are not the only ones with such aspirations. Complete disarmament should create a new and qualitatively different situation, in which now and tremendous energies of the nations will be liberated and exploited for the benefit of all countries.

That is why, in the first phase of our discussion, we proposed the consideration of a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament, and why, in view of the familiar difficulties which arose through no fault of ours, we are now proposing that we should first agree on the basic principles of general and complete disarmament.

Mr. Eaton (United States of America): I would like to call the attention of the Soviet delegation to the fact that on Thursday last (TNCD/PV.23) I indicated nine specific measures which would lead towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. I suggested that they choose one of them for our discussion here and I hope that a choice will be made this week so that we can get on to the discussion of specific measures.

The Chairman (France) (translation from French): If no one else wishes to speak — I should not like to adjourn — Mr. Zorin is getting us out of the difficulty.
Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The Soviet Union has more than once got people out of difficulties.

I should like to say a few words about the remark just made by Mr. Eaton, and to take up one of the questions which he has been so kind as to offer for our choice from among the measures proposed by the Western Powers during our discussions in this Committee.

I must say that the recommendations which Mr. Eaton made in connexion with the "nine measures" -- Mr. Eaton speaks modestly about these measures, without naming them or saying what they are -- raise no enthusiasm in us, since the goods presented for our choice in the Western Powers' shop are not attractive. Despite recommendations and wishes, we are not inclined to make a choice in this shop from among the measures proposed by the Western Powers, because these measures unfortunately do not bear on our Committee's tasks, which in general we are all speaking about in apparently similar terms.

In point of fact all the measures referred to by Mr. Eaton -- except one, about which I shall speak in more detail -- are in essence measures of control -- and not of control over disarmament but of arms control.

We have repeatedly said that we cannot go this way, for the task which has been set us is a totally different one -- the task of general and complete disarmament. We therefore intend to discuss measures which will lead to the fulfilment of this task -- but not measures which would divert us, for that would contradict the basic task before us.

The Soviet delegation and the delegations of the other socialist countries have already explained in sufficient detail their attitude to the measures proposed by the Western Powers in a great many fields, including that of armed forces and conventional armaments. In our statements we have shown that these measures cannot be regarded as real disarmament measures which, if put into effect, could make any substantial contribution at all towards solving the problem of general and complete disarmament.

To us it is perfectly clear that to set ceilings for the force levels of the Soviet Union and the United States at, for example, 2.5 million men does not entail any reduction of force levels at all; while the contemplated further lowering of these ceilings to 2.1 million men again does not bring us substantially nearer to solving the problem for which we have met here in Geneva, the problem of
general and complete disarmament. A reduction to 2.1 million men would, taken alone, be extremely unimportant; moreover, in the Western plan this reduction is linked to the fulfilment of a good many conditions. I pass over the point that no force level ceilings for the other great Powers are proposed at all.

Nor does the Western plan settle the question of reducing conventional armaments. It is not really possible to regard as a real disarmament measure the storing of some quantities and types of conventional armaments, which would not be physically destroyed, in the territory of the States owning them.

This being so, what are the real idea and intention behind the Western Powers' proposals on force levels and conventional armaments? This, incidentally, is the only proposal which can be regarded as an attempt of any kind to solve the disarmament problem even to a limited extent. But what is the real idea of this proposal? Is it not to find some pretext, some sort of "ground", for establishing a wide control over existing armaments and forces without actually reducing them? The supposition is very well founded. That is why we consider the measures relating to force levels and conventional armaments in the first two parts of the Western plan unsuitable as a basis for agreement.

For these reasons we suggest that further discussion of these measures would not really do anything to advance our negotiations.

At the same time we hold that, in order to take a really serious step towards fulfilling the task of general and complete disarmament, it is essential that the very beginning of a programme for such disarmament should make provision for a major reduction in force levels and conventional armaments which would make it possible to lay a firm foundation for the implementation of further measures leading to the attainment of general and complete disarmament.

The representative of Poland, Mr. Naszkowski, spoke today in detail about the new approach which results from the situation that has developed in recent years, and which the United Nations General Assembly and all of us take as the approach to general and complete disarmament. If we are really going to start on this new approach, we cannot busy ourselves with separate minor measures which would not substantially change the existing armaments situation or form a basis for rapid advance along the road to general and complete disarmament.

A major reduction of force levels and conventional armaments is exactly what the Soviet Union is suggesting for the first stage of our programme for general and
complete disarmament. I should like to stress that for the first stage of our programme we propose not only a major reduction, under appropriate international control in the force levels of the USSR, the United States of America and the People's Republic of China to 1.7 million men, and those of the United Kingdom and France to 650,000 men, but also a corresponding major reduction in the conventional weapons and military equipment at the disposal of States. In addition we propose that the conventional armaments which are to be reduced should not be stored, but destroyed under international control. This is a really practical measure for reducing armaments and force levels, which would really lead us along the road towards general and complete disarmament.

What we propose is in our opinion fully realistic and could be achieved in a relatively short time, not more than 12-18 months. Our confidence in this is based on our experience and the experience of a number of other States. Seeing that it is possible to reduce Soviet force levels unilaterally by 1.2 million men in a year and a half or at most two years, it is obviously possible to reduce the force levels of, say, the United States of America and the USSR by 700,000 to 800,000 men in a year to a year and a half, as we propose should be done in the first stage of general and complete disarmament.

The main thing is to have the will to solve this problem; if there is the will, there is no great difficulty.

But it seems that the will to make a major reduction of force levels and conventional armaments at the very beginning of a programme for general and complete disarmament is just what the Western Powers lack; so they stubbornly refuse to talk about anything more substantial than their own limited proposals. As a result their representatives, obviously finding themselves short of arguments with which to give some show of conviction to their negative attitude towards this question, continually try to distort the character and belittle the significance of the measures which the Soviet Union has carried out unilaterally in considerably reducing its force levels and conventional armaments.

Let us take, for example, the assertions made by the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Ormsby-Gore, and the representative of France, Mr. Moch, that although the Soviet Union was reducing its force levels, it was not simultaneously reducing its conventional armaments. At the meeting of our Committee on 6 April the representative of France said:
"... in my opinion this reduction by 1,200,000 men would not be real disarmament on the part of the Soviet Union unless it were accompanied by the scrapping of a number of tanks, guns, aircraft and ships corresponding to the 1,200,000 men who had been sent home".

At the same meeting Mr. Ormsby-Gore fully associated himself with that assertion.

Yet this is a direct misstatement of the Law for a Further Considerable Reduction in the Armed Forces of the USSR, which was adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on 15 January 1960 and of which you are of course aware. The text of this Act, I may mention in passing, has been sent to Mr. Ormsby-Gore by the Soviet Embassy in the United Kingdom, with the pamphlet whence he took the quotation from N.S. Khrushchev's statement which he used in his speech on 6 April. It cannot be unknown to the representatives of the United Kingdom and France that the Act clearly lays down:

"In connexion with the reductions of the armed forces of the USSR by 1,200,000 men to disband an appropriate number of units, formations, and military schools of the Soviet Army and Navy, to make a corresponding reduction of armaments, and to reduce the military expenditures of the Soviet Union in the USSR State budget".

In the appeal of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the parliaments and governments of all States in the world -- which was officially transmitted to the Governments of the United Kingdom and France, and which Mr. Ormsby-Gore and Mr. Moch must have read -- it is written in black and white:

"Reductions are to be made in the armaments of the Army and Navy and in military expenditure." (A/4356, page 2)

Why, then, do you pass over these facts in silence, and distort facts known to your Governments?

It is also well known that when in the past the Soviet Government has decided on unilateral reductions in the armed forces of the USSR, these reductions have invariably been accompanied by a corresponding reduction in armaments and military equipment. For example, in the Soviet Government's decision of 14 May 1956 to reduce the force levels of the USSR by 1.2 million men, provision was made for the disbanding of 63 divisions and special brigades, the closing of
a number of military training establishments, a corresponding reduction in armaments and military equipment and in the Soviet Union's military expenditure.

You may perhaps wish to know how, in practice, reductions in our military equipment are effected simultaneously with a reduction in the force levels of the USSR. This has been explained in some detail in the Soviet press. For example, I could hand over to Mr. Ormsby-Gore and to Mr. Moch, who has some knowledge of Russian, the reports on the scrapping of one of the cruisers of the Soviet Navy, which was published on 25 March in the newspaper Izvestia. Here is the paper, and if you are interested you may have a look at it. There is a detailed account of how the cruiser is being dismantled and the metal taken from it used for peaceful purposes. I cannot recall any public report from the United Kingdom about the utilization of British cruisers or aircraft carriers for peaceful purposes. Perhaps I am ill-informed and Mr. Ormsby-Gore can fill in the gaps in my knowledge. So a reduction in military equipment, a reduction in armaments is really being made alongside the reduction in armed forces.

The further major reduction in the armed forces of the Soviet Union which is being made at present is enabling us considerably to reduce the military expenditure of the USSR — by roughly 16 or 17 thousand million roubles a year. Again, I have heard nothing about a reduction of military expenditure in the United Kingdom, France or the United States. In recent years the Soviet Union has more than once reduced the appropriations for military expenditure. These appropriations amounted to only 12.9 per cent of total State budgetary expenditure in 1960, against 19.9 per cent in 1955.

In their efforts to belittle the importance of the Soviet Union's measures reducing force levels and armaments, the Western delegations also say that under the conditions of today a reduction in force levels has no serious meaning at all. But if this is so, it is impossible to understand why there is no provision in the Western plan, for example, for any reduction at all in the armed forces of the United Kingdom and France; at any rate, nothing definite is said about this. If force levels are indeed losing their value nowadays, as the Western representatives are trying to make us believe, why not accept our proposal to reduce the force levels of the United Kingdom and France to 650,000 men at the first stage of general and complete disarmament?
The truth is that the Soviet Union's unilateral reduction of force levels and conventional armaments has immense positive international significance, no matter how hard the Western representatives try to cast doubt on this by resorting to arguments which, to put it mildly, are dubious.

The peoples of the world evaluated the Supreme Soviet's historic decision of 15 January 1960 in precisely this way. The communique issued jointly by the Soviet Union and India on 16 February 1960 contains the following passage:

"The latest reduction of armed forces in the Soviet Union, following similar reductions in the recent past was recognized by India as a notable contribution towards the fulfilment of the age-long dream of turning swords into ploughshares."

The joint communique issued by the Soviet Union and Indonesia on 23 February 1960 contains the following:

"The Government of the Republic of Indonesia supports the proposals of the USSR regarding general and complete disarmament and expresses the hope that this plan will be put into effect. The Government of Indonesia considers the Soviet Union's action in further reducing the Soviet army by 1.2 million men a step towards the realization of this ideal."

Similar statements have been made by many other eminent statesmen and leaders of political and public life in all countries.

Unfortunately none of the Western States has so far responded to the Supreme Soviet's appeal, or followed the Soviet Union's example in unilateral reduction of its armed forces. It is therefore rather strange, to say the least, to hear Mr. Eaton asserting:

"... the United States has consistently taken the lead and consistently taken the initiative in the matter of reducing the level of its forces under arms".

(TNCD/PV.19, page 7)

That this assertion bears not the slightest relation to present reality, when the USSR is reducing its armed forces and the United States is not, is obvious to everybody. If Mr. Eaton had in mind the postwar demobilization, I would answer that this certainly did not take place in the United States alone, but in all the countries that took part in the war, and that the Soviet Union was one of the first in this respect. Mr. Ormsby-Gore too must surely know this; nevertheless he asserted here:
"... the Soviet Union has been an example of a country which has preserved vast and swollen armed forces longer than any other armed country in the world". (TNCD/PV.17, page 28)

I would recall that immediately the war ended the Soviet Union carried out a large-scale demobilization of its armed forces. The force levels were reduced from 11,365,000 men in May 1945 to 2,874,000 by 1948. This major reduction was made even though the Soviet Union had then no nuclear weapons while the United States already had them and was stockpiling them. The reason why we proceeded in those circumstances to reduce our own armed forces to what for our country was a comparatively low level was our hope that the friendship and co-operation established between us and the Western Powers during the war would be maintained in time of peace. Unfortunately, however, our hope was not fulfilled. The Western Powers rejected a policy of friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union and entered into a "cold war" against the socialist countries. As a result, and in particular as a result of the creation of the North Atlantic military bloc and the attempts of certain circles in the West to blackmail us with the atomic bomb when we did not yet possess that weapon, the Soviet Union was compelled, in order to strengthen the country's defences in case of provocation, to increase its force levels. Since 1955, however, that is five years ago, the Soviet Union has unswervingly followed the policy of reducing its force levels, and as a result of the further reduction now in progress the level of Soviet forces will in the very near future be only 2,423,000 men.

The Soviet Union is proceeding to reduce its armed forces unilaterally because it is not nurturing any aggressive plans and is not intending to attack anyone. After all, it stands to reason that no country thinking about attacking other countries could proceed to reduce its armed forces unilaterally on such a scale.

In the light of all these facts, what remains of the attempts made by certain representatives of the Western Powers in our Committee to distort the character and belittle the importance of the new major reduction in force levels and armaments unilaterally carried out by the Soviet Union? It can be said directly that nothing remains, unless it be an ill-concealed reluctance of the Western Powers to follow the noble example of the Soviet Union and take unilateral steps if only to reduce force levels and armaments, and thereby help to create the most favourable conditions for a very rapid solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament.
So if we are to deal with one of the questions touched on by Mr. Eaton when he listed the nine measures in the Western plan which he spoke about at one of our recent meetings and referred to again today, the questions selected -- reduction of armaments and force levels -- shows clearly that the Western Powers are not in fact now proposing any real step towards a really serious reduction of the armaments and force levels either of the United States and the Soviet Union or of other States, including the United Kingdom and France, for which they do not even mention the modest figures which were proposed some time ago.

The programme proposed by the Soviet Union speaks of a really serious step in reduction of armaments and force levels and is a serious and major contribution to general and complete disarmament.

The unilateral steps undertaken by the Soviet Union indicate its serious intention decisively to reduce its force levels and conventional armaments, which is evidence of its intention to pursue further the policy of reducing armaments and armed forces and preparing to carry out real general and complete disarmament.

Mr. ORMSBY-GORE (United Kingdom): I wish to make only a very few remarks in reply to Mr. Zorin's statement. Naturally, I shall carefully study what he has said, but I should like at this time to correct what seemed to me to be a misunderstanding of the position which I took up at the meeting held on 6 April.

I of course welcome -- as I assume others do -- the reductions in Soviet armed forces. The impression I wished to give on 6 April was that those reductions were rather belated; that, as an example of unilateral disarmament, the reduction in Soviet armed forces from 3.6 million to 2.4 million over a period of time was not very inspiring, when we know that the armed forces of the United States were reduced some years ago to 2.5 million. That was the burden of my remarks. Of course, we very much welcome the fact that the Soviet Union has followed the example of other countries and has reduced its armed forces to the present level.

Mr. Zorin also suggested that in my statement I had assumed that there would be no corresponding reductions in armaments. That was not the impression I intended to give by my remarks. What I wished to make quite clear by quotations from Mr. Khrushchev's speech was that, although there might be some reductions in the quantity of obsolescent conventional armaments, these were more than made
up for by the new weapons which were coming into service. Perhaps I should again quote from Mr. Khrushchev's speech, in order to make my point perfectly clear:

"Our State possesses powerful rocketry. With the present development of military technique, military aviation and the navy have lost their former importance. These arms are not reduced but replaced."

These are the words of Mr. Khrushchev, and this is the reason for the breaking up of the cruisers. Obviously, it is a very sensible thing to do. If Mr. Zorin has not read about the breaking up of cruisers in the United Kingdom, I can assure him that that has been taking place on a very considerable scale. Indeed, constantly I am being written to by distinguished naval officers and ex-naval officers to say that we are breaking up cruisers rather too fast. However, I do assure him that this natural process is taking place; older and more obsolescent armaments are being destroyed and they are being replaced by much more powerful modern armaments. Here again I should like to quote Mr. Khrushchev:

"I think you will all agree ... that the question of the strength of the armed forces cannot be approached today as it was approached only a few years ago. It is enough to say that beginning with 1955 the strength of the armed forces in our country has been reduced by a third, while their fire-power has increased many times over during the period owing to the development and introduction of new military techniques."

He went on to say:

"Apart from the general political and economic factors of which I have already spoken here, a country's defense capacity depends decisively on the fire-power and the means of delivery it possesses.

The proposed reduction will in no way reduce the fire-power of our armed forces, and this is the main thing."

I use those quotations from Mr. Khrushchev's speech to show that this was in fact a replacement of old-fashioned weapons by newer weapons of greater destructive force. I quite appreciate that when the armed forces are reduced by 1.2 million men, there will be less necessity for military schools, for production of obsolescent armaments and I am quite sure that those kinds of reductions are taking place under the law which Mr. Zorin has mentioned to us. Therefore, I do not think there is really much misunderstanding between us over this particular matter. We welcome the reductions, and all I can say is that they are an
indication that the Soviet Union has followed the example of the other States in reducing their armed forces. If he wishes to look up the figures for the United Kingdom, which we publish for the world to see every year, he will see that the percentage reductions in our armed forces over the last five years have in fact been rather greater than the reductions of the forces of the Soviet Union.

The CHAIRMAN (France) (translation from French): If no one wishes to speak, I should like to say a few words myself in reply to the statements we have just heard. I was struck by the content and tone of the speeches by the two Eastern representatives we have heard this morning. They are two documents which merit careful re-reading on our part, so that they can then be thoroughly and very seriously discussed. I shall therefore confine myself, like Mr. Ormsby-Gore, to rather secondary comments—those which strike one as one listens, without subsequent reflection.

I shall start, if I may, at the end, that is to say with the statement of the Soviet Union representative.

I should like to ask Mr. Zorin, very amiably, to be rather less exclusive in his classifications. When he begins his statement by saying that "we therefore intend to discuss measures which will lead to the fulfilment of this task [general and complete disarmament] but not measures which would divert us" from it, and implies that the only measures leading towards general and complete disarmament are those proposed by the East, we are in a vicious circle if he assumes a priori, as he did, that the measures proposed by the West will lead nowhere.

His conception of the General Assembly resolution adopted, as he stressed, by all of us, is not the same as ours. We believe we have a mission to reach an agreement on measures leading towards general and complete disarmament, but I, for my part, refuse to embark once again on a discussion of the little word "towards".

As regards the reductions made in the Soviet Army, Mr. Ormsby-Gore has just given an excellent reply. If he had not done so, I, too, should have quoted the statements of Mr. Khrushchev, and I should have drawn two conclusions from them. One is that it is a great pity those reductions were decided on and carried out unilaterally, because they would have been of much greater
psychological and political value if they could have been verified internationally. The other conclusion I draw from this little debate, is that we must not confuse the replacement of obsolete weapons by more modern ones -- even when accompanied by a considerable reduction of forces -- with true disarmament. And in that conclusion I find support for the French position, which places the main emphasis on nuclear disarmament.

Mr. Zorin went on to speak of a reduction of 16 to 17 thousand million roubles a year in the Soviet military budget. I do not wish to follow him onto that ground. I have not got the figures of the Soviet military budgets over the last ten years before me today. If he can give them to me I shall be glad to have them. I have a recollection that -- except perhaps this year -- that budget has been fairly constant in the neighbourhood of 100,000 million roubles a year. But not having the figures, I do not wish to embark on a discussion of this point. I should merely like to say that in this connexion, too, verifications add much to the value of affirmations, for we all know how easily, even in all good faith, appropriations for military purposes can be shown under civil department headings. For example, how can one distinguish in the budget of a single atomic research establishment, the expenditure to be charged to the military budget from that for pure scientific research? Here again, verification would be highly desirable.

Finally, as regards the reduction of Soviet forces from 11,000,000 men, in May 1945, to 2,800,000 in 1948, I must point out -- as Mr. Ormsby-Gore did -- that the reduction in Soviet forces at that time had been preceded by reductions by the other Allies, those of the West, which had gone much further -- particularly in the case of the United States -- than the Soviet Union ever went. Furthermore, the very fact that the Soviet Union -- unless I am mistaken -- will tomorrow, after its third unilateral reduction, arrive at the level at which the United States has been for several years, is sufficient proof that the Soviet Union had retained forces very much greater than those of the West.

I would add that I should have preferred Mr. Zorin not to have dwelt too much on the fact that, according to him, the Western Powers started the cold war. If we awaken all those memories -- if we revive the fire which is smouldering under the embers -- we shall get nowhere. I could reply to Mr. Zorin that a number of events took place in Europe in 1948, particularly in February 1948 --
he is better acquainted with them than many of us -- that other events occurred in Asia, starting in 1949 -- of which he, like us, is aware -- which explain the tension that gradually developed. But, in any case, I think that if we wish to achieve a practical result, we must score out all recriminations on the past. If you say "that is the fault of the West because the West did this", the West will reply "No! We did this because you had previously done that". And, little by little, we should get nowhere. So I think it would be wise not to invoke such memories, but simply to look towards the future.

Moreover, I personally am convinced that the Soviet Union has no aggressive intentions. That is why I am rather surprised that it should confine itself to unilateral reductions in the conventional field, and that it does not inform us that it has also unilaterally abolished its long-range missiles or its stocks of nuclear weapons, which would be the complement of the unilateral disarmament indicated by the reductions in the conventional field.

I now come to Mr. Naszkowski's speech, which I also intend to re-read very carefully. I wish to tell him that I agree -- here I am speaking for myself alone -- with the description he gave of a future conflagration, and I therefore agree on its impossibility; that is why I am still optimistic in spite of so many years spent in trying to negotiate. The present balance of terror removes the risk of a deliberately declared war, because those who might declare it know perfectly well that there would be neither victors nor vanquished, but only the dead. On that starting point of Mr. Naszkowski's argument I am in full agreement. I also readily admit the insanity of a balance of terror based on 100,000 million dollars a year of military appropriations, particularly when this balance of terror does not eliminate the main risk -- that of a war declared in error or through miscalculation.

I also agree with the economic part of the analysis, regarding the stupidity of such expenditure when a fifth of the amount -- as Mr. Naszkowski reminded us just now -- would make it possible, if not to abolish, at least to alleviate the distress of the underfed two-thirds of mankind, which is, I agree with him, a disgrace to the modern world. And I would remind you that since 1955, and as lately as the Westminster speech I referred to the other day, France has always asked that a substantial proportion of the savings on military expenditure should be paid into an international fund for assistance to under-developed countries.
I also agree on the advantage of using any capital productively to create new wealth and generate new capital, rather than using it for things that are non-consumable, such as guns, or economically useless, such as wages paid to men who stand guard and produce nothing.

But here is where I no longer agree with Mr. Naszkowski. We, too, want general and complete disarmament; but we want it in reasonable, realistic and controlled stages, not by unilateral and non-controllable declarations. And I think that is the heart of the matter. We do not believe that unverifiable prohibitions, such as prohibitions of the use or possession of atomic weapons, will open the way to general and complete disarmament, or that announcement of the total abolition of armies and of all forms of military organization, without the simultaneous establishment of a body for the preservation of peace, is a means of reaching our goal. That is probably the basic difference between Mr. Naszkowski and me -- I apologize for speaking only for myself.

I now add a rather secondary point of disagreement -- which I have already mentioned in connexion with part of Mr. Zorin's speech -- with Mr. Naszkowski's contention that the arms race caused the cold war and hastened the cleavage of the world. Here again, we get into this endless tangle of causes and effects. I could reply that the cold war came before rearmament, and that it was because the cold war had been started that countries which had disarmed almost completely hastened to rearm in 1950. I would therefore say, in reply to Mr. Naszkowski -- as previously in reply to Mr. Zorin -- that we should not discuss causes on which we shall not agree, but that we shall note today, without reverting to the past, that there is an interdependence between two phenomena: that of the accelerated arms race, and that of the subsisting political tensions and disputes, and that by some means, which we are seeking, we must manage to go-forward pari passu, if I may so express it -- that is to say that for each step towards general and complete disarmament there must be a corresponding renewal of the feeling of trust, hence a slackening of the cold war and hence a possibility of reaching settlements for existing political disputes.

I think that is the only way; all the more so since I am not at all sure that Mr. Naszkowski was correct in something he said -- though I should be glad it he was. He told us, near the end of his statement -- but here again I should like to re-read it carefully -- that means of exerting pressure would disappear if there were no more armies, and that the nations would be free and happy. I take leave.
to doubt that, because we should then have achieved only a theoretical equality of nations, which would be superimposed on a great number of inequalities without reducing or eliminating them. First of all, economic inequality would remain, with all the means of pressure deriving from it — the proximity of the economically strong to the economically weak, which would jeopardize the real independence of the weak. And certain subversive operations would be possible, on which I do not wish to dwell.

I have said this to show once again that the problem is infinitely complex, and that our aim should not be to accuse each other of wanting too much or too little, that it should not be to attribute the most sinister designs to each other, but to work together in good faith to find how we can endeavour to set out on the road we all wish to take.

I now call on the Czech representative.

Mr. Nosek (Czechoslovakia): Mr. Chairman, first of all I should like to point out that I am representing Czechoslovakia and that therefore I am the Czechoslovak representative.

Mr. Chairman, in your speech you mentioned some historical events which took place during the past few years, and you particularly pointed out the month of February 1948. I was happy to hear that date because February 1948 is very significant to the people of one country, to the people of Czechoslovakia, because in February 1948 the free people of a free and independent Czechoslovakia celebrated a historical victory over reactionary forces which wanted to sell the freedom and independence of Czechoslovakia in the same way as that freedom and that independence were sold in 1938 in Munich. I am sure that you, Mr. Chairman, know by whom that independence and that freedom were sold.

The Chairman (France) (translation from French): To that statement I prefer not to reply either as Chairman or as a Frenchman.

Mr. Zorin (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I should like to say a few words about the remarks made by you, Mr. Chairman, and by Mr. Ormsby-Gore in connexion with my speech which preceded your remarks.
First of all, I note that Mr. Ormsby-Gore has, in contrast to what he said in his speech on 6 April, to which I referred, today welcomed the unilateral reduction of force levels and armaments of the USSR. This welcome was regrettably absent from his speech of 6 April, which was entirely negative towards this measure. That today Mr. Ormsby-Gore, as representative of the United Kingdom, should deem it necessary to welcome this step taken by the Soviet Government, I am bound to express my satisfaction.

My second remark refers to what Mr. Ormsby-Gore said about replacement of obsolescent arms. Reverting to this matter, he again quoted N. S. Khrushchev's speech to which he had previously referred on 6 April. He went on to say that this process of replacement of obsolescent arms by new arms was being carried out not only in the Soviet Union but also in the United Kingdom and in the other Western countries. This enables me, therefore, to note that the charge against us, so to speak, has now been withdrawn. At any rate it has been recognized that the process of replacing old and obsolescent arms by new arms is going on in all countries. So it seems that in this regard we have done no wrong. I believe it also to be a positive factor in our discussions that the charge that we are rearming our troops with new arms has been withdrawn. It turns out that this is true of all countries.

I must, however, point out that the process referred to by Mr. Ormsby-Gore differs in the Soviet Union from what is going on in the Western countries. The Soviet Union replaces old armaments by new in the same way as the Western countries, but the Soviet Union carries out a reduction of force levels simultaneously with that of armaments, whereas for some reason this does not happen in the Western countries. The reason why this does not happen is not clear to us. It would seem logical that, since old arms have become obsolete and are being replaced by new, old armaments could be completely scrapped and the level of forces for which they were intended reduced at the same time. We cannot make out why this is not taking place in the United States, in France, and in the other countries of the Western bloc. This surprises us. Why are large conventional armed forces retained by the countries of the Western bloc while the Soviet Union is drastically reducing its force levels and armaments?

I do not think this comparison is in favour of the Western Powers. This is precisely what we want to demonstrate: The Soviet Union is in this sense ahead of the Western Powers; the Soviet Union sets a good example which should be
followed; but Mr. Ormsby-Gore proposes that we should follow the example of the Western Powers. How, then, should we follow that example? By not reducing our force levels and armaments?

I do not think we shall follow that example. It is not a good example; and we propose that you should follow our example, which in our view is a good example: that all States should reduce their armaments, armed forces and expenditure on armaments. I think this is a good example which should be followed.

My third remark concerns Mr. Jules Moch's statement. He expressed regret that the Soviet Union was carrying out a reduction of armaments and armed forces unilaterally. "It is a great pity," said he, "that those reductions were carried out unilaterally". We also regret this, but then you do not wish to join us. What can we do? We should like France also to start reducing its force levels and armaments, or at least to set as a target the ceiling figure established before; and we should also like the United Kingdom to establish the old ceiling. I observe that Mr. Ormsby-Gore is looking at Mr. Moch. No doubt there is some reason for that.

Apart from this, however, we should like measures for the reduction of armaments and force levels to be written into our treaty. We searched the Western Plan for the figures relating to the reduction of the armed forces of France and the United Kingdom, and could not find them. Then we proposed our figure, and you said: "No, this is not suitable". But why it was not suitable you did not explain. Why is it not suitable?

You assert that we propose only our plan. Had your plan contained figures, we should have taken up your plan. But your plan contains no figures. This is why we put forward our plan. There are figures in our plan, for we have provided for the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, the United States and the People's Republic of China. So let us discuss our figures, since you do not propose any. Why do you refuse to consider them? You give no reasons and cannot adduce any argument to support your refusal. That, we think, is the great weakness of your position and your plan: you do not give a direct answer to a simple elementary question which is perfectly plain to millions of people: why do you object to a reduction of force levels and armaments to 1.7 million men, why? I have never heard a single argument against this. Why are you against the United Kingdom and France reducing their force level to 650,000 men?
You bring no arguments, simply a refusal, a bare refusal without any reason.

So Mr. Moch's regret that this is a unilateral measure recoils on himself and the French Government. We are prepared to adopt a joint and not a unilateral decision; but give us a figure: tell us the figure by which you want armed forces reduced. You do not give these figures, yet you find fault with us and say "It is a great pity that you did it unilaterally".

I must mention in passing that Mr. Moch's attitude is not consistent. He is sorry that we made a unilateral reduction of conventional armaments; but he says it is a pity that there is no unilateral reduction of nuclear weapons as well. Where is your consistency? If you are against unilateral measures generally, why do you consider that unilateral measures should be taken in respect of nuclear armaments. Apparently you take more interest in them. But you cannot pursue a policy by which you take up one position in matters of direct and immediate interest, and an opposite position when you have no such interest. This sort of policy is not sound. It is necessary to adopt a single position of principle on this matter. But we are prepared to reduce nuclear armaments as well. We have declared this: prohibition of atomic weapons and their complete elimination from the armaments of States; and we are prepared to consider it at the first stage of disarmament. Mr. Moch said that we want general and complete disarmament to be carried out by previously agreed and controlled stages, and for that purpose he proposed the Western plan as a pattern. The Western plan does not, however, provide for the complete banning of atomic weapons and their complete elimination from the armaments of States. Our plan does, and we are prepared to transfer those measures from the third to the first stage. Why do you refuse to discuss this plan?

Mr. Moch has told us that he was under the impression that the Soviet Union was proposing only its own plan. We stated at the outset that, though naturally we considered it the best plan, we were prepared to consider in connexion with it any proposals aiming at general and complete disarmament. But you refuse altogether to discuss our plan, although it provides for the nuclear disarmament of which you speak. Why will you not discuss our plan, which provides for full-scale nuclear disarmament as well?

All this shows that Mr. Moch's argument is somewhat artificial. It contains no evidence that the representative of France is concerned that we should actually succeed in solving the problem of general and complete disarmament, even through what he calls controlled stages, which might lead to a true solution of the problem.
both of conventional and of nuclear disarmament. The truth is, apparently, not
that our plan is a bad one, but that there is no desire to pass on to general
and complete disarmament, and there is a desire that we should limit ourselves to
some minor measures which would create the appearance that we are moving towards
general and complete disarmament.

We are against illusions. We think it necessary to do one of two things:
either to discuss a plan of general and complete disarmament -- we are prepared to
discuss it, especially the concrete measures which we are proposing; we are
prepared to listen to your arguments upon the concrete measures provided for in
our plan in regard both to conventional armaments and to nuclear disarmament --
or, if you are not prepared to consider this overall plan of general and complete
dismament, then let us consider the basic principles of such disarmament. But
you do not wish to do either. What do you want, then? Mr. Eaton said that you
want us to choose what suits us out of nine measures. We did not come here to
choose goods in some shop or other. We may add that in our view the goods are
shop-worn and do not suit us. We are not prepared to choose from these goods.

We came here to negotiate on general and complete disarmament, and we are
prepared to discuss all matters relating to it. The matter does not rest with us.
It rests with the Western representatives, who do not wish to discuss a plan of
general and complete disarmament, for you have yourselves admitted that your plan is
not a plan for general and complete disarmament.

I have one more remark to make about the "cold war", past events in Europe,
Asia and so forth.

I also have no wish to revert to the past, and in my speech today I referred
to it only because Mr. Eaton attempted in his last intervention to revive and
evaluate the past when he mentioned the reduction of armed forces immediately after
the war. I therefore felt obliged to remind you of the facts, and to explain what
really happened. But I do not want to speak of the past, even though it contains
many things not at all favourable to the Western Powers and very favourable to the
Soviet Union. I do not intend to revert to this now, because I think -- and in
this Mr. Moch is right -- that we must think of what we have to do now, of how to
direct our future work so that our past differences on a number of matters shall
not hamper us. The course we prefer is to consider disarmament problems in a
practical way, so as to avoid in the future all that was bad in the past.
Lastly, about a remark by Mr. Ormsby-Gore. In his intervention this morning he said that he wished to correct the impression we had formed from his speech, and that he did not say what I said he did when I criticized his position in my speech. I do not agree with Mr. Ormsby-Gore. May I remind him that on 6 April he said:

"I will take only a minute or two because Mr. Moch has already made many of the points I had intended to make in my reply to Mr. Zorin".  

(TNCD/PV.17, page 36)

What did Mr. Moch say? Mr. Moch said:

"... this reduction by 1,200,000 men would not be a real disarmament on the part of the Soviet Union unless it were accompanied by the scrapping of a number of tanks, guns, aircraft and ships, corresponding to the 1,200,000 men who had been sent home".  

(ibid., page 36)

That is what Mr. Moch said; and Mr. Ormsby-Gore said he agreed with Mr. Moch.

I explained this morning how this "unless" condition was being fulfilled: that the reduction applied not only to the men but also to the armaments: tanks, ships, aircraft, and so forth. If we take Mr. Moch at his word, he considers that if this were actually happening it would be a different matter and could be regarded as disarmament. It is true that Mr. Moch did not say so today, but it could be understood that if, simultaneously with the reduction in the number of men, there were a reduction of tanks, ships, aircraft, etc., then it could be regarded as disarmament. That is how I understand him. But if Mr. Ormsby-Gore agrees with Mr. Moch, he also must regard this as disarmament. Is not this true? Yet on 6 April Mr. Ormsby-Gore did not regard it as disarmament. I therefore had to remind him today that the Law on the reduction of the armed forces of the Soviet Union also speaks of "reduction of armaments". If, however, Mr. Ormsby-Gore now welcomes our reduction of armaments and force levels, I may take him to be admitting that a process of disarmament is actually going on: that elements of disarmament are present in the Soviet Union in the shape of a reduction of force levels and armaments, even if this is accompanied in a certain measure by the replacement of old arms by new. That does not change the substance of the matter, because, as Mr. Ormsby-Gore said this morning, this process is going on in other countries as well. In the Soviet Union, along with this process of replacement of one weapon by another, there is 'taking place a true reduction both of arms and of force levels; and it is to be regretted that the same thing is not taking place in the Western countries.
This is why I think that Mr. Ormsby-Gore, when he said this morning that we
did not understand him quite correctly, was wrong, because I understood him
according to what he had said on 6 April. What he said today differs somewhat from
what he said on 6 April. We welcome this progress in Mr. Ormsby-Gore’s understanding
of our measure of reduction of force levels and armaments.

The CHAIRMAN (France) (translation from French): If I may give myself the
floor, I should like to reply very briefly to Mr. Zorin. I wish to say that he did
not interpret what I said about my regrets very accurately. My regrets relate not
to the fact of reduction itself, but to the fact that these reductions could not be
controlled. And Mr. Zorin understands me very well.

Similarly, as to nuclear disarmament, I was surprised that the Soviet Union,
in earnest of its pacific intentions, should reduce its obsolete armaments without
mentioning any reduction of its modern ones. Mr. Zorin has just dwelt on this point
which, as Mr. Ormsby-Gore reminded us, Mr. Khrushchev had already strongly emphasized,
and this enables me to state, perhaps rather flippantly, the following rule which now
seems established in our Conference: the process of replacing obsolete arms by
modern arms and the corresponding reduction of forces is an act of disarmament when
carried out in the Soviet Union and a symptom of the arms race when carried out in
Great Britain. I think we are all agreed on this theorem.

Now I should like to reply more seriously to Mr. Zorin that the reason why we
do not wish to discuss the Soviet plan is, precisely, because it is based mainly on
non-controllable measures. What Mr. Zorin proposes in his plan and, more recently,
in his short statement of doctrine, are general measures which are mainly Utopian and
non-controllable, partly impracticable, and incapable of ensuring the security of all
nations. That, we believe, is the principal difference between us, and I think we
should do well to reflect on it during the few days which remain before our recess.
We are prepared to make very great efforts. We may perhaps be able to confirm this in
other ways in the days to come. We are prepared to make very great efforts whenever
we are sure that they are being made on both sides, that is to say whenever we are
sure that there is complete and effective control.
I should also like to say, in conclusion, that though I have drawn up a calendar of events of past years I shall refrain from quoting it, inasmuch as Mr. Zorin has refrained from recalling those events. He said just now that he could do so because he thinks they are largely creditable to the East. I might reply to him that I too could do so, because I think they are largely creditable to the West. But I agree with him, and he agrees with me, as he has just said, that that would be doing a disservice to this Conference, and that we must draw a final stroke through everything that is past and only look towards the future.

If no one else wishes to speak, I shall read out the draft communique:

"The twenty-fifth meeting of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament was held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 20 April 1960 under the chairmanship of the representative of France.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 21 April at 10.30 a.m."

If there are no objections, I shall consider the draft communique approved.

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m."