FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWENTY-THIRD MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Thursday, 14 April 1960, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. BURNS (Canada)
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<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:
Rt. Hon. D. ORMSEY-GORE
Miss B. SALT
Maj.-Gen. RIDDELL

United States of America:
Mr. F.M. EATON
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Rear-Admiral P.L. DUDLEY

Representative of the Secretary-General:
Dr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General:
Mr. W. EPSTEIN
The CHAIRMAN (Canada): The twenty-third meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament is called to order. The first on my list of speakers for today is the representative of the Soviet Union, upon whom I now call.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): A proposal by the delegations of the five socialist States entitled "Basic principles of general and complete disarmament" (TNCD/4) has been under our Committee's consideration for several meetings past. In submitting that proposal on 8 April 1960 we foresaw that it would require detailed discussion at our meetings; more than that, we thought, and we still think, that its detailed consideration, including exchanges of views on its basic provisions and perhaps discussion of its actual wording, was precisely the way towards mutually acceptable, agreed decisions.

However, the turn which the Western delegations are trying to give to the discussion on our proposal cannot be regarded as ordinary or as consonant with a constructive approach to the questions under discussion. Instead of advancing specific arguments, making observations or suggesting additions to particular paragraphs of the proposal, the Western delegations are in fact evading a business-like consideration of it, being evidently unwilling to state clearly their attitude to its substance.

In doing so the Western delegations resort to the most diverse and sometimes patently artificial pretexts in order, so to speak, to "substantiate" this attitude of theirs towards our proposal.

Mr. Ormsby-Gore said on 11 April that the United Kingdom delegation could not discuss the "Basic principles" because they "are ... not in fact principles at all but specific long-range measures" (TNCD/PV.20, page 5).

Next day Mr. Eaton, the distinguished representative of the United States, expressed his generally negative attitude to the "Basic principles" but gave as his reason for it that -- in his words -- they were not concrete measures but principles. (TNCD/PV.21, page 20)

Some of the Western delegations say that the basic principles of general and complete disarmament proposed by us cannot be accepted because they are directly connected in their substance with the Soviet proposals for general and complete
disarmament submitted at the fourteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly. Others assert that they depart from the subject before the fourteenth session of the General Assembly.

All these contradictory and wholly unconvincing arguments are used by the Western delegations in order somehow to justify their generally negative attitude to the proposal of the five socialist countries on the "Basic principles of general and complete disarmament" without actually considering the substance of these. The question arises whether this negative attitude is not based on an unwillingness of the Western Powers to advance towards a practical solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament.

We cannot help recalling that at one of our recent meetings Mr. Ormsby-Gore went so far as to call our "Basic principles" the "sheep's clothing" with which we seek to disguise the "familiar wolf within" — in other words, as we understood it, the programme of general and complete disarmament which we uphold. (TNCD/FV.20, page 5) Of course, if the Western Powers really fear the programme of general and complete disarmament as a wolf, we can hardly count even on coming anywhere near a solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament. There is a Russian saying: "Those who fear wolves do not walk in the woods".

We are reluctant, however, to conclude straight away that the Western Powers have decided not to follow the path of general and complete disarmament; that is to say, that they support the General Assembly resolution on general and complete disarmament in word only and really occupy a position directly conflicting with it. But if the position adopted by the Western Powers towards this proposal is to some extent due to their inadequate or incorrect understanding of it, we are in that case prepared to supply additional explanations concerning our proposal.

We should like to stress once again that our proposal expresses a new approach to our negotiations on general and complete disarmament, arising from the results of four weeks of our Committee's work. These four weeks of our Committee's work have shown, first, that although the Western delegations have declared their support of the General Assembly resolution on general and complete disarmament, they are not at present prepared to proceed to the concrete preparation of a treaty on such disarmament; secondly, it has become clear by now that between the positions of the socialist States and the Western Powers there nevertheless exist certain points of contact which leave some hope of progress in our work. We have already spoken of such points of contact in the statement by the Soviet delegation on 8 April 1960.
In the circumstances which have arisen, the delegations of the Socialist States have reached the conclusion that, while it does not appear possible at present to proceed to the preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, at least a first step in that direction should be made by agreeing on the basic principles of general and complete disarmament. The socialist States' proposal on the basic principles of general and complete disarmament takes the fullest possible account of everything that draws us together, and does not at present put forward for discussion those questions on which, in view of our differences, there is as yet no prospect of prompt agreement.

The preamble to the "Basic principles of general and complete disarmament" says:

"The Governments of the States participating in the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament, being guided by the resolution on "General and complete disarmament" adopted by the Fourteenth Session of the General Assembly on 20 November 1959, accept as an urgent practical task the implementation of general and complete disarmament of all States on the basis of the following principles, in conformity with which a treaty on general and complete disarmament should be worked out." (TNCD/4)

We believe that this wording is fully consistent with the United Nations resolution and takes into account the demands of the peoples that the problem of general and complete disarmament should be solved in the very near future. That is precisely why we have included in our text a statement that the implementation of general and complete disarmament is an urgent practical task. We shall, of course, be only too glad if the Western delegations will join us in this matter. But if they do not consider general and complete disarmament an urgent practical task, let them say so in so many words.

Paragraph 1 of the proposal by the delegations of the socialist countries contains a definition of general and complete disarmament. We think it essential to agree on this definition, because we cannot conduct negotiations on general and complete disarmament unless we have first reached agreement on the actual nature of such disarmament -- that is to say, on the ultimate goal. After all, the Western delegations, by reaffirming their support of the General Assembly resolution, have admitted that general and complete disarmament is precisely our ultimate goal.
We assume also that the Western Powers themselves appear to think it necessary to give some kind of a definition of general and complete disarmament. This is evident both from the preamble of the Western plan, which speaks of an "ultimate goal", and from the statements of a number of Western delegates. For example, at the meeting on 23 March Mr. Eaton, the distinguished representative of the United States, said:

"The definition of general and complete disarmament which has been adopted by the Soviet Union and which is reflected in Mr. Khrushchev's plan is not a definition to which we subscribe, but the objective is certainly one to which all of us here subscribed last autumn." (TNDC/PV.10, p.22)

We understood this remark of Mr. Eaton to mean that while the United States delegation does not agree with our definition of general and complete disarmament, it does appear to recognize the importance of having a definition of general and complete disarmament.

That being so, we should like to hear some specific comments from the Western delegates on our definition of general and complete disarmament, as well as any proposals they themselves may have on that subject. Which specific features of our proposal are acceptable to the Western delegations, and which are not? Do they agree, for instance, that general and complete disarmament must include disbandment of all armed forces, liquidation of all armaments, cessation of all kinds of military production, liquidation of all bases on foreign territories, prohibition of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and missile weapons, cessation of their production and destruction of their stockpiles, prohibition of military training and the other measures listed in our definition? If any of this is not acceptable to the Western delegations, let them say so and state their reasons. If they have their own proposals for a definition of general and complete disarmament, let them submit those proposals.

Only in that way -- by discussing actual wordings -- can we make progress and agree on a definition of general and complete disarmament that will be common to us all.

The delegations of the socialist States further consider it necessary to agree on the principle of carrying out general and complete disarmament by stages, and the principle of establishing a definite time-limit for completing the entire programme of general and complete disarmament. There do not appear to be any
serious difficulties between us over the principle of stages. The principle of stages lies at the base of both the Soviet plan for general and complete disarmament and the Western plan. Mr. Ormsby-Gore, the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, also spoke of the need to carry through the disarmament process by stages when he submitted the Western plan for our Committee's consideration on 16 March 1960 (TNCD/FV.2, page 7), and many other delegates have also spoken of it.

It seems to us, therefore, that there is every possibility of rapid agreement between us upon an approach by stages to general and complete disarmament. At the same time we realize that there are serious differences between the points of view of the socialist and of the Western delegations on the exact contents of each stage and the sequence of the implementation of disarmament measures. We therefore considered it inexpedient at this time to concentrate our discussion on the contents of the individual stages, and we did not include in the "Basic principles" any list of disarmament measures for individual stages. The socialist States' delegations consider that, after the "Basic principles of general and complete disarmament" have been agreed, it will be easier to agree also upon the scope of measures and the sequence of their application within the limits of each stage. Is there in all this anything unacceptable to the Western Powers?

On time-limits for the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament, we gather that there is a distinct difference between us. The delegations of the socialist countries consider it desirable and necessary to agree precisely on a time-limit for the implementation of the whole programme of general and complete disarmament, and accordingly on a time-limit for each stage of that programme; whereas the Western delegations think it possible to fix time-limits only for individual disarmament measures. It is obvious, however — and the representative of Poland showed this conclusively at our meeting on 12 April (TNCD/FV.21) — that there exists a definite basis for a rapprochement of our positions in this matter. This was recognized by Mr. Ormsby-Gore, the United Kingdom representative, in his speech of 11 April (TNCD/FV.20).

Our proposal is to establish a time-limit of four years for the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament. That, I repeat, is our proposal.
We have already heard objections to this proposal from the Western Powers, although they did not give any convincing reasons. Only yesterday Mr. Moch again declared:

"... Four years' forced march towards total disarmament could not wipe out the traces of thousands of years of fighting or, in particular, decades of mutual distrust." (TNCD/PV.22, page 10)

The establishment of some time-limit cannot, however, be evaded by making such declarations. We have come together here precisely for the purpose of conducting businesslike negotiations upon concrete questions. The question of establishment of time-limits for the implementation of a programme of general and complete disarmament is one such concrete question. We are therefore asking the Western delegations, if the four-year period does not suit them, what time-limit do they consider realistic?

The delegations of the socialist States consider that, among the "Basic principles of general and complete disarmament", considerable importance should be attached to the principle that all measures envisaged by the programme of general and complete disarmament should be implemented under international control. In connexion with this we postulate that the scope of the international control shall correspond to the scope and character of the disarmament measures implemented at each stage.

This approach to the control problem is based on the formula upon which all the States represented on the Committee apparently agree, namely that there must not be control without disarmament and no disarmament without control.

The discussion of control questions has demonstrated a definitely real rapprochement between our position. I should like to recall in this connexion that at our meeting of 25 March Mr. Eaton said:

"Both sides agree upon the necessity of effective inspection and control of disarmament measures." 1/

Other Western delegations expressed similar views. For this reason we think that our formulation of the principle of international control over disarmament should not call forth any objections from the Western delegations. If there are objections, we are prepared to consider them.

Obviously an agreement upon a general wording on control questions would facilitate further agreement upon concrete measures of control over concrete

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1/ Translation from the Russian provisional record of the ninth meeting, i.e. the unrevised interpretation into Russian. Cf. the final verbatim record (TNCD/PV.9, page 27).
disarmament measures. When we come to the consideration of such concrete measures within the framework of general and complete disarmament, we shall naturally have to agree all the details of the control system in the same way as, for instance, is now being done at the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests. We shall at that stage of the talks be prepared to consider all those questions about which the United States representative spoke at one of our meetings, namely the composition of inspection groups, the manner of access of international controllers to objects of control, and so forth.

At the very beginning of our Committee's work, when we still considered it possible to begin at once to draft a treaty on general and complete disarmament, we actually defined to a certain extent our position on the control to be applied at the first stage of the Soviet programme of general and complete disarmament. We mentioned in particular the necessity for States to supply the international control organ with information relating to the size of their armed forces and conventional armaments, and verification of the implementation of each disarmament measure by international controllers from the very beginning of its implementation to its completion.

It goes without saying that the Soviet Union also envisages the establishment of appropriate control over the disarmament measures in the subsequent stages of the programme of general and complete disarmament. For instance, after we have agreed at which stage the manufacture of tanks, guns and military planes would be discontinued, we shall, I believe, be in a position to agree upon the manner in which the international control over the conversion of tank, gun and aircraft factories should be carried out.

At present, however, we consider it important to agree upon the principle itself of international control over the implementation of general and complete disarmament, without going into the details of control, because the actual disarmament measures have not yet been worked out and we have not even agreed upon the contents of the main stages of general and complete disarmament.

We consider that the question of the international control organ should be approached similarly. At this stage it would be important to agree that for the organization of control and inspection over disarmament, an international control organ will be set up with the participation of all States, and will operate in virtue of a special provision constituting an integral part of the disarmament treaty.
Details of the international control organ's organization, structure and operation — referred to by the representative of Italy at one of our recent meetings, should be examined in detail at the stage of our negotiations when we examine the details of disarmament measures.

The delegations of the socialist countries consider that, in addition to agreement upon a definition of general and complete disarmament, the stages principle, time-limits, and the principle of international control, it is quite as important to reach a common point of view on what the States will retain at their disposal for the maintenance of internal order and the protection of the personal security of citizens after the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament. Our proposal is based on the premise that, after the disbandment of all armed forces and the liquidation of all armaments, the States will only retain strictly-limited contingents, agreed for each country, of police (militia) equipped with small firearms. This principle is thus closely connected with the definition of general and complete disarmament.

Some speeches by Western delegates seem to show that we can reckon upon a certain rapprochement of positions in this matter. The United States representative mentioned, for instance, at our meeting on 8 April that "it is not envisaged that States would retain considerable armed forces after the implementation of the disarmament programme." (TNOD/PV.19, page 12)

It is true that Mr. Eaton spoke of "armed forces", whereas we said "militia" or "police". These of course do not mean the same thing. All the same, we perceive in Mr. Eaton's words a certain possibility for reaching mutual understanding. We should of course like the Western delegates to express their views on our proposal in more specific terms.

Lastly, the socialist States' delegations hold that the principle that the implementation by States of the programme of general and complete disarmament may not be interrupted or made dependent on the fulfilment of any conditions not stipulated in the treaty must be accepted as one of the principles of general and complete disarmament. We have here in mind, first, that the procedure of implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament, including the procedure of passage from one stage to the next, must be laid down in the treaty on general and complete disarmament; secondly, that no conditions not
stipulated in the treaty may serve as a pretext for anyone to interrupt or completely to abandon implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament. We deem it important that we should agree upon this principle in order to remove beforehand the possibility that the treaty on general and complete disarmament might be wrecked by any one State or group of States. We should like to know the views of the Western States on this matter.

Closely connected with this is the question of measures to be taken against a possible violator of the treaty on general and complete disarmament. We suggest we should agree that, if any State attempts to circumvent or violate the treaty on general and complete disarmament, the question of such violation should be submitted for immediate consideration by the Security Council and the United Nations General Assembly for the institution of measures against the violator in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. We should like to have the views of our Western colleagues upon this principle also.

These are some further particulars of the basic principles of general and complete disarmament which we thought necessary to provide during the discussion in our Committee. The delegations of the socialist States are firmly convinced that agreement in our Committee upon these basic principles would clear away many obstacles to the practical solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament in conformity with the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly.

It is because the socialist States are anxious that a practical solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament should be reached as rapidly as possible that they also propose that States which possess nuclear weapons should now solemnly declare that they will not be the first to use such weapons, thereby attesting their desire to avert the threat of nuclear war.

As many examples show, every act of goodwill in international relations contributes to general improvement of the international atmosphere and the strengthening of mutual confidence in relations among States, and thus facilitates the solution of complicated international problems. We could cite as examples of such acts of goodwill the relinquishment by the Soviet Union after the war of all its bases upon the territories of foreign States, the repeated reductions in the numbers of Soviet armed forces, and the reduction of the military budget of the USSR. All these measures have produced wide positive reactions in all countries of the world, and been greeted as steps attesting the deeply peaceful intentions of the Soviet Union.
Up to now the Soviet Union has performed such acts of goodwill unilaterally. The time has now come to integrate in an act of goodwill the efforts of all States possessing the most powerful weapons of our era -- nuclear weapons. A solemn declaration by States possessing nuclear weapons that they renounced the use of those weapons would constitute such an act of goodwill, the importance of which could not be overestimated. All the peoples of the world would welcome it.

We deem it necessary in conclusion to stress that the delegations of the socialist countries, in submitting to the Committee their "Basic principles of general and complete disarmament", were anxious to lay thereby a foundation for rapprochement of the positions of the two sides, based on points of contact already noted. Agreement upon the basic principles of general and complete disarmament would mean agreement upon an approach to such disarmament common to all our ten delegations.

It is quite true that, by accepting these basic principles as the basis of our further work, States would not assume treaty obligations to implement any concrete disarmament measures. We assume, however, that this would be an important and substantial step towards the drafting of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

It is not accidental that we speak of agreement. We submit to all the delegations for their consideration everything contained in our proposed "Basic principles of general and complete disarmament". This means that we regard this document, not as a final text which must be either accepted or rejected, but as a proposal upon which it is now necessary to have a businesslike and concrete discussion so that, having taken into account all relevant remarks, considerations and proposals, we may agree upon a final text of "Basic principles of general and complete disarmament". This is the same approach to negotiations as Mr. Eaton, the United States representative, mentioned on 8 April in these words:

"A basic premise of successful negotiation is the usefulness of building upon areas of agreement ...". (TNCD/PV.19, page 8)

We have already expressed complete agreement with that remark of Mr. Eaton's, and we expect that our further discussion of the socialist States' proposal "Basic principles of general and complete disarmament" will have just that effect of building upon an area of agreement.
In order, however, that our discussion may have positive results it is necessary that the Western delegations should express concrete views upon the concrete provisions of the "Basic principles of general and complete disarmament", instead of rejecting this proposal without argument, as many of them have done at our recent meetings.

Mr. Moch, the representative of France, quoted in his statement yesterday extracts from the speech which General de Gaulle, President of the French Republic, made on 6 April in the British Parliament. In that speech General de Gaulle advocated a practical solution of the disarmament problem. We attach especial importance to this because of the fact that N.S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and General de Gaulle, President of the French Republic, in the joint Soviet-French communiqué published as a result of the talks they held during N.S. Khrushchev's recent visit to France, expressed:

"... the wish that the negotiations now in progress at Geneva between the ten States should lead to the development of certain agreed points of view on general and complete disarmament under effective international control".

The Soviet delegation hopes that a businesslike discussion in our Committee of the "Basic principles of general and complete disarmament" will indeed advance our work towards the development of agreed points of view on general and complete disarmament.

Mr. Eaton (United States of America): I shall speak at some length this morning. First, I should like to assure Mr. Zorin that his statement this morning will be given the most careful consideration during the next few days by all of the Western delegations. It is our desire to reach agreement with our Soviet colleague.

If I understand Mr. Zorin correctly, he has said in effect that the Western nations were opposed to the United Nations resolution on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. This is not the case. We are against the Soviet plan, as it does not, in our view, conform with this resolution. We do not evade discussion as Mr. Zorin has stated. We have said forthrightly that we will not discuss the Soviet plan further for the reason that we do not believe that it will advance the work of this Conference. This is not evasion. We have commented in detail concretely and specifically on the Soviet plan during the past
five weeks, and we have indicated our reasons for its unacceptability at some length. We are not prepared to go into an unknown forest until we have passed through the quieter woods so that we may have an opportunity to look through into the denseness to determine whether the wolves have in fact disappeared.

I should now like to turn to another specific, concrete measure of disarmament included in the Western plan. As everyone at this table is aware, the Western delegations believe that the discussion of concrete measures is the realistic, the hopeful and the only way of clarifying the problems which face us and of opening the road to the disarmament process, to progress toward the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which we came here to discuss and which we will remain to discuss to its very end. The United States delegation believes that this approach offers more promise of progress than rigid insistence on talking in the abstract only about broad general principles without meaningful content.

I propose to address my remarks this morning to the important problem of nuclear disarmament. During our conference thus far we have heard discussions from both sides concerning this problem. Various Western delegations have given their reasons for the phasing used in the Western plan with regard to nuclear disarmament measures, and we have pointed out that the prohibition of use and the prohibition of retention of weapons containing fissionable materials are not controllable within present scientific knowledge. We must, however, make every effort to regroup, to reduce the growing stocks of nuclear weapons. This means the prompt cessation of production as quickly as a study of relevant scientific means will permit the establishment of an adequate system of verification and control, and upon the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, the beginnings of conversion of existing materials to peaceful purposes. These steps are included in the first stage of the Western plan.

There seems to be agreement in our Conference on the principle that effective control shall exist for each disarmament measure. This principle explains why we cannot endorse measures related to the uncontrollable aspects of nuclear disarmament. This also explains why we consider it quite irresponsible to press for measures such as the prohibition on the first use of nuclear weapons so long as there is no known way of verifying compliance. We hope that in the course of our discussions as well as in the years that lie ahead science may improve this condition, but I can say now that both we and the Soviet Union have been in
agreement for some years that the detection of the last weapons -- and the last weapons could be sufficient to cause great destruction -- is not now feasible as there is no known method for determining their existence. We are prepared to make an agreement on those aspects which appear to be susceptible of control. We hope that the Soviet side is similarly prepared to move ahead in this important area of concrete disarmament measures. The people of the world are deeply concerned about nuclear weapons. We should start serious negotiations at once on the cut-off in order that we may bring the build-up of nuclear weapons to a halt. We should also address ourselves to measures designed to decrease the stockpiles of weapons.

In making our proposal we are not unmindful of the remarks of various delegations that the cut-off of the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons is not disarmament. Although the Western nations strongly disagree with that view, I will not indulge today in any lengthy debate on this question but rather discuss some aspects of the cut-off and the conversion and transfer which this Committee must inevitably consider before an agreement on such measures can be implemented.

The Western nations consider the cut-off to be important in two major respects. Firstly, it represents a first step in reversing the present build-up of armaments; secondly, it provides a concrete measure on which we can mutually attempt to work out both substantive details and verification requirements to ensure compliance. We see two main aspects of the production cut-off. The first concerns the plants which are now producing fissionable materials. We must determine which of these shall be continued in operation and then consider what arrangements are necessary to ensure that these plants are used exclusively for peaceful purposes. The second main aspect concerns production of fissionable material as a by-product for peaceful purposes. For example, a nuclear reactor which produces electrical power also produces, as a by-product, more fissionable material. We must decide how to ensure that such fissionable material is not diverted for use in weapons. Implementation of the cut-off would follow immediately upon installation and effective operation of the system to ensure compliance with the measures.

Now, as to the verification system, we envisage that it would in part -- and I will not here go into detail -- include the following. For those plants which can be shut down as not being required for peaceful uses, there would be the inspection necessary to assure that they were not placed back into operation. This type of inspection would be relatively simple to implement. For production plants
(Mr. Eaton, United States)

continuing in operation for peaceful purposes, effective inspection would require freedom of movement for the inspectors throughout the entire plant, the right to sample materials, measures to control the flow and movement of materials, etc. Inspection of an operating plant will, in our opinion, require technical competence comparable to that needed to operate the plant. The verification requirements for peaceful use activities, such as the production of electrical power, would be substantially similar to those for fissionable material production plants. As we see it, this verification system would be applied initially to the nuclear industries of countries which are nuclear Powers. The location of all the plants in the nuclear industry in my country are well known. We do not feel that our security or the security of the world requires that we keep these locations secret. The five major installations which produce fissionable material in the United States are located at Oak Ridge, Tennessee; Hanford, in the State of Washington; Aiken, South Carolina; Portsmouth, Ohio; and Paducah, Kentucky. The Soviet Union, to my knowledge, has never made comparable information available to the world concerning the number and location of the installations of its nuclear industry that would come under inspection in the event of a production cut-off, and this of course would be necessary before a verification system could be drawn up which would not have potential loopholes built into it.

This brief sketch of the verification measures is intended only to provide the very rough dimensions of the problem. Detailed consideration and exchange of views, which are welcome here on both sides, will of course be necessary to develop a specific system.

We look upon nuclear disarmament as a series of actions in which we first must deal with those measures which appear verifiable, before attempting the resolution of those that presently do not. The production cut-off, together with conversion of fissionable materials to non-weapons purposes, is a practical way in which to begin bringing nuclear weapons under control.

Under the Western plan we are prepared to negotiate an agreement to cease the production of fissionable material for weapon purposes and to transfer material in mutually agreed amounts -- existing material -- to peaceful uses. We are prepared to work out these measures and their related verification provisions not at some indefinite time in the future, but now.
I would like to re-emphasize, as evidence of our desire to get on with the business before us, that the United States stands ready to transfer agreed quantities of fissionable material to peaceful uses from past production which includes material contained in weapon stocks. These are disarmament measures.

In closing, it may be appropriate to note again that the United States has already made a not inconsiderable commitment of fissionable material for peaceful uses to the International Atomic Energy Agency. This amount of material -- in excess of 5,000 kilograms -- means in essence the equivalent of hundreds of nuclear weapons. This has already been voluntarily earmarked by my Government for peaceful uses. This is an amount greater by one-hundred-fold than that which has been committed by the Soviet Union. The United States is prepared to make further transfers to peaceful uses at any time that agreement can be reached.

That concludes my remarks related to a specific and concrete measure of disarmament which we are prepared to take at this time.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): We have listened attentively to the statement which Mr. Eaton has just made on behalf of the United States delegation. This statement, of course, calls for some examination at a later stage of our work, but I should just like to make two basic comments on it now.

First: Mr. Eaton has today touched on the problem of atomic disarmament. I shall not now examine all the details of this problem, or the points made by Mr. Eaton this morning; but one thing becomes more or less clear from what he has said. We have understood that the United States takes a negative attitude towards any proposal containing an express prohibition or renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons. The reason given is that there would be no means of control over that prohibition or renunciation of use, and therefore, according to Mr. Eaton, these measures would be irresponsible. We believe that this approach to this important question is wrong.

In point of fact a renunciation -- I prefer to say "renunciation" rather than "prohibition", and I will explain why in a moment -- of the use of the nuclear weapon would be a moral and political act imposing definite moral and political obligations on every State performing it. Because of its very essence this moral and political obligation would not require any control at all, except self-control by the State undertaking it. Why, if any of the atomic Powers -- the Soviet Union,
the United States of America or the United Kingdom -- made a separate declaration, or those Powers stated in a joint declaration, that they would not be the first to use atomic weapons, this would mean that each of these States undertook an obligation not to use these weapons. Here the control problem does not arise at all, because if you violated this obligation no sort of control would be of any use; you would simply be violating a moral and political obligation which you yourself had assumed. You would thus display complete disrespect for your own commitments and for the world at large which believed in them.

Where does control come into the picture at all? Nowhere. The whole question now is not whether this provision is controllable, but whether you want to assume this obligation before the whole world, whether you are capable of assuming this moral and political obligation or not? That is the point now.

Therefore the argument that such an obligation would not be controllable is completely irrelevant.

It would be exactly the same as concluding some kind of non-aggression treaty between two States or among several States.

Do you really deny the possibility of signing such treaties? I have not heard that the Western Powers have in general denied the possibility of any non-aggression treaty. I do not think that any of the Western representatives is in principle denying the possibility and usefulness of a treaty of this kind. But does the question of control in fact arise in such a treaty? It never has arisen and never will arise, because this is a moral and political commitment: I bind myself before the whole world, and before the country with which I am signing the treaty, not to commit aggression.

You will say that this gives no complete guarantee, so to say that there will be no aggression. Of course it gives no complete guarantee. Whoever said it did? But it does deter aggressive forces; it does bind every State to take measures against aggressive forces within itself. It does compel every State sometimes to moderate its own aggressive intentions before the eyes of the world at large.
In the present circumstances, now that the international climate has begun to improve, such an act would have immense political value, especially in the field of nuclear weapons. For what now threatens ordinary people throughout the world? The main threat is the threat of atomic attack.

If, then, we and you -- the Soviet Union, the United States of America and the United Kingdom -- said openly before the whole world that we would not be the first to use atomic weapons, this would only mean that we were openly declaring that we had no aggressive intentions. We should thereby be binding ourselves before the whole world to pursue a policy which would not lead to atomic war.

Would this really be valueless?

I think no one would dare to assert that a commitment of this kind, especially in the present circumstances, would have no serious political value. It would have value, immense value.

If a nuclear Power refused to undertake such a commitment, the question would inevitably arise: why? Would this State's refusal to use nuclear weapons really weaken its defence? Nothing of the sort.

The wording we propose is: not \( \frac{\text{first}}{\text{to use}} \) be the first to use such weapons. This means that, if you were attacked with nuclear weapons, this obligation would not bind you. You would be free to use all types of weapons for defence. But if you say that you refuse to assume this obligation, then it follows that you are keeping nuclear weapons for aggression. Why? Why do you keep nuclear weapons for aggression when you yourselves have all along said that you hold them only as a deterrent? If they are a deterrent, what stops you from committing yourself not to be the first to use them? Or do you mean to be the first to use them as a deterrent? An odd kind of deterrent! That would not be a deterrent at all; it would be aggression by means of atomic weapons.

So are you against aggression, or are you for aggression with nuclear weapons? Why do you refuse to assume a commitment of this kind? For the sake of your defence? This would not undermine your defence. What would it undermine then -- your capacity for attack? But is that what you are really doing -- preparing to make an atomic attack?
All these questions inevitably come into our minds when we hear the United States declare through its delegation that it is against assuming such commitments and even regards them as irresponsible. Why irresponsible? If you sign such an undertaking, we consider that you will be acting very responsibly, not irresponsibly. That at any rate is our attitude to such commitments, and we think that the statesmen of other States must have the same attitude to commitments of this kind.

Thus, so far as renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons is concerned, we have unfortunately found no answer, in the statement which Mr. Eaton made specifically on the problems of nuclear disarmament, to the question why the United States is in essence refusing to assume a commitment of this kind.

It is clear from these brief remarks of mine that to do so could not possibly prejudice the defence of the United States, but would indeed prejudice its capacity for attack. The basis for the commitment would be that the United States does not intend to attack with nuclear weapons.

Therefore all the views on atomic disarmament put forward today by Mr. Eaton cannot make a good impression when set against the United States' refusal to assume any obligations whatsoever in respect of a declaration that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons.

That was the first comment I wanted to make.

My second comment concerns that part of Mr. Eaton's speech in which he implied that the socialist delegations were refusing to work out concrete measures of disarmament and were proposing that instead of this we should start to work out basic principles of general and complete disarmament, whereas the Western delegations desired to examine concrete disarmament measures. He spoke today in detail about considerations relative to nuclear disarmament as one of these concrete measures. He even said today that the broad principles, the general principles which we are proposing, are without meaningful content. That is what he said.

That Mr. Eaton should express himself in this way is bound to cause us justifiable misgivings. The fact is that the Soviet delegation and the delegations of the other socialist countries have in the last few weeks of the Committee's work persistently tried to get the Committee to start at once to draft a treaty on general and complete disarmament, that is, an agreement on the concrete disarmament measures which would have to be put into effect within the framework of that treaty.
In their desire to facilitate the fulfilment of this task, the socialist delegations have given full particulars of the Soviet programme for general and complete disarmament submitted to the General Assembly by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, N.S. Khrushchev. No one can deny that in clarifying our position we have shown a flexible approach on a number of important problems of general and complete disarmament, including that of the sequence in which the different major measures of disarmament would be put into effect. All representatives will recall that we have declared our readiness to put into effect the complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons at any stage in the programme of general and complete disarmament.

In this context Mr. Eaton's statement today on nuclear weapons amounts to extremely little and is beside the point, since in the Soviet disarmament programme we speak of the complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons and their elimination from the armaments of States, and of our agreement to solve this problem at any stage in the programme of general and complete disarmament.

The discussion in our Committee, however, has shown that the Western delegations are firmly against the suggestion that the Committee should now start the practical drafting of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. In any case, all the Western delegations have declared directly or indirectly in their speeches that they consider it impossible to start at once to draft a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

As a result of this position of the Western delegations, certain difficulties have arisen in the work of our Committee to hamper our progress in fulfilling the task set us by the General Assembly resolution on general and complete disarmament.

The delegations of the socialist countries, in view of the situation that has arisen, have proposed to try a different approach to this task, a different method, which as you know has won wide international recognition and has more than once been used successfully. I mean the method of first working out basic principles, in this case the basic principles of general and complete disarmament, which could later be embodied in the precise language of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.
Past experience of working out a number of important international agreements and treaties shows that this method of first agreeing on basic principles is most useful, since it can make easier the drafting of the final text of any such agreement.

It is enough to recall that such important international agreements as the Charter of the United Nations, the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Antarctic Treaty of the twelve States and other agreements were worked out in precisely this way.

We all remember, too, how difficult it was to approach detailed examination of the question of discontinuing nuclear tests until the nuclear Powers had agreed on the basic principle that the question of discontinuing nuclear tests must be settled independently of other disarmament questions.

In proposing that we first agree on the basic principles of general and complete disarmament, we also had in mind that this course would enable us to concentrate our attention first on those points on which some rapprochement of our positions had already been achieved, and to leave aside for the moment those questions which were still giving rise to serious differences. After concentrating our attention on those questions on which there was already some prospect of making progress, we should be best placed to seek ways of reconciling our positions as a whole for the purpose of reaching a constructive solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament.

If, however, you are now ready to move on directly to the drafting of a treaty on general and complete disarmament based on the General Assembly resolution, we shall only welcome such an approach. Unfortunately, the whole experience of our Committee's work shows that you reject this approach. It is really impossible to regard Mr. Eaton's proposal, that we should proceed to study the measures set out in the first and second parts of the Western plan, as a proposal for a practical solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament.

We have already shown in our previous statements that not only can the measures proposed in the first and second parts of the Western plan have no real value whatsoever for solving the problem of general and complete disarmament, but they are not even steps which could bring us closer to that goal. The analysis of the Western plan made by the delegates of the socialist States at earlier meetings of the Committee showed that this plan does not contain any concrete measures of general and complete disarmament, and in fact does nothing more than establish
control without disarmament -- arms control. The views Mr. Eaton expressed today are along these same lines, for none of the measures which he has proposed today would reduce either the number of bombs or the quantity of other nuclear equipment in any country.

That is why the statement in which Mr. Eaton attempted to represent the Western plan as a disarmament programme does not help us in the slightest degree to make progress towards implementing the General Assembly resolution on general and complete disarmament.

We are glad that Mr. Eaton said after our statement today that the United States delegation will give it most careful consideration, and we hope he will let us have his delegation's specific comments on the points made in it. We hope that the Easter break, which will enable each of us to give some thought to what has been said at our meetings, will make our future work easier for us, and that after we have rested a little we shall be fresh and able to continue our work more successfully than in the last five weeks. With this hope we should like to conclude our statement today and express the desire that our Western colleagues will discuss the points we have made and will try, as we are doing, to find common ground on which our positions can be brought closer together, so that we may prepare recommendations for our Governments, which will be meeting in the near future to discuss in particular this problem on which we have been working during the last five weeks.

**Mr. Eaton** (United States of America): Mr. Zorin has completely lost me now.

A third alternative is being suggested, that we -- each of us -- piously and sanctimoniously agree here that we will renounce the use of nuclear weapons -- and, I would add, all weapons -- and then we could go home with the knowledge that the world would live in peace. This is quite contrary to earlier statements that we should have no disarmament without control.

It is now suggested that we abide by statements of intentions, and in this connexion I repeat part of what I said last week, when I quoted Mr. Zorin:

"Mr. Zorin has frequently asserted that agreement by nations to refrain from the use of nuclear weapons would be an important index of peaceful intentions. But what the world wants and needs is not statements of intentions. Intentions may change or may be deliberately deceiving. What the world wants and needs is evidence of performance, not statements of intentions. ... We all have bitter memories of past expressions of intentions, in the form of non-aggression pacts, on matters affecting the security of free nations. We cannot and will not place our reliance on intentions: we must have evidence of performance."  *(TNCD/FV.19, page 10)*
We are today completing the fifth week of our discussions. During these weeks the Allied delegations have patiently sought to focus discussion on specific and concrete measures of disarmament in the hope that we might pass beyond generalities and move into the real purpose of this Conference, the drafting of an agreement on specific measures of disarmament and on effective means of verification of such measures.

We have also endeavoured to show — and at some length, as I indicated earlier this morning — why the scheme presented in the General Assembly by the Soviet Union in September last is not a practical, and therefore not an acceptable, basis for discussion. We believe the Western plan, on the other hand, does represent a practical basis for our discussions because it deals with specific measures which can be verified, and because it deals with those first steps which it is necessary for us to take if we are ever to stop talking about disarmament and start doing something about it.

The proposals that we have made constitute a programme of actions aimed at making steps forward towards our ultimate goal.

(1) Action to establish immediate ceilings for force levels of the United States and the USSR, and to make substantial reductions in force levels of the United States, the USSR and other militarily significant States.

(2) Action to bring about reductions in armaments bearing a relation to the agreed force levels.

(3) Action to stop the build-up of nuclear weapon stockpiles, and to start the reduction of existing stockpiles by diverting fissionable material for the benefit of humanity.

(4) Action to prevent mass destruction weapons from ever being placed in outer space, and thus to save mankind from the threat of this potential means of mass destruction.

(5) Action to give advance notification of the launching of space vehicles, and communication of data obtained by existing tracking facilities. Also, action to ensure prior notification of missile launchings so as to prevent miscalculation, and thus lessen the danger of war.
(6) Action to institute agreed measures to increase protection against surprise attack and thus create an atmosphere of trust and confidence in the world.

(7) Action to establish an international disarmament organization to assure all parties, and the world at large, that commitments assumed will be fulfilled.

(8) Action to exchange data on military establishments, including military expenditures, to facilitate verification.

(9) Action to begin the improvement of international machinery to assure that no State can impose its will upon another so as to create conditions which would facilitate further reduction of national military forces.

While these actions, having been agreed upon, are being implemented, we can here be preparing the further steps to follow. But while we are doing so, we shall not be where we have been for the past fifteen years -- at a dead stop. We shall be moving together toward the goals set forth by General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV).

Let me, as we close for our Easter recess, restate the position of my Government. So far as our principles are concerned, we believe that disarmament should be general and complete, under effective international control, in a world where man can live at peace with himself without fear of invasion from within or without -- a world of peace under law.

We came here, and will remain here, to negotiate and reach agreement on the concrete measures of disarmament that would lead to this goal, with attendant measures of international control. We have offered a number of such measures in the first stage of our plan. I refer to those which I have just enumerated. We have invited the Soviet delegation to choose any one of them as a basis for initial discussion and negotiation. We now invite them again. Can it be that they have so little interest in disarmament that they are not prepared to choose a single measure from the many that we have included? What deduction can we here, or the world, draw from this refusal by the Soviets to discuss disarmament, other than that they have decided not to enter upon real disarmament? We hope that we are wrong in this; that this will not prove to be the case. We hope that when we meet again next week the Soviet delegation will be prepared to leave the abstract and begin discussion of the concrete. We could then, together, make progress towards an agreed programme of action which would satisfy the hopes of peoples everywhere.
Mr. MEZITOCSCU (Romania) (translation from French): I only wish to say a few words about certain passages in Mr. Eaton’s last statement. Mr. Eaton quoted a relatively long passage from his remarks at the Committee’s nineteenth meeting. He thought it necessary to repeat what he said then concerning the value of statements of intentions. He again told us that intentions may change or may be deliberately deceiving.

I should like to remind the United States representative that at our meeting yesterday I, too, quoted part of the passage to which he referred today, and I added a question which he has not answered today. Even if the United States representative is pessimistic about statements of intentions and mistrustful of the value of the moral undertakings and statements of intentions of the other party or parties, we should still like to know what are his own intentions, and the intentions of the Government he represents on this Committee, in regard to a matter of considerable importance raised in the document submitted by the five socialist countries represented on the Committee, namely, the solemn undertaking by the nuclear Powers not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

To say that such an undertaking would entail no obligation seems to me to be a statement bearing a particularly grave responsibility. It would, in my opinion, be very useful for the progress of our work to know whether the United States representative considers that such an undertaking would not be compatible with the aims of the policy and military programme of the United States.

I shall certainly study the list of problems enumerated just now by Mr. Eaton. I am not sure under what heading he spoke of measures to create an atmosphere of trust, to develop an atmosphere of trust, or to strengthen trust between the nations — I no longer recall the exact words used by the United States representative. But does Mr. Eaton not believe that a measure such as a profession of faith or undertaking by the nuclear Powers not to be the first to use nuclear weapons would in fact be a gesture of immense significance in helping to re-establish trust, to restore trust to the nations, and to strengthen that trust between nations in the future.

According to the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Mr. Eaton, after yesterday’s meeting, alluding to the concrete measure proposed by the socialist countries, which, in our view, could have a great influence on the international atmosphere and in consolidating the security of nations — namely the undertaking by the nuclear Powers not to be the first to use nuclear weapons — said:
"Such a measure could only disappoint the world and further expose the weaker States to attack by the aggressive Powers."

On the contrary, it seems to me that such an undertaking by the nuclear Powers would have a most constructive and most favourable effect on the international atmosphere, and would undoubtedly increase international security and the feeling of security of the nations. Only if some nuclear Powers were to rely on its nuclear arsenal for aggressive purposes would such a measure have a "disappointing" effect.

In my opinion, we cannot acquit ourselves of the task entrusted to our Committee by the General Assembly unless we unite our efforts to find the common ideas which may emerge more clearly in the course of our negotiations, and try thus to progress towards the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. At the same time we should do something which would, indeed, have a "disappointing" effect on those who favour aggression, and particularly on the circles which advocate nuclear aggression.

**Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French):** Before our parting for the Easter holidays, Mr. Eaton and the United States delegation have once again tried, as on most Fridays, to give us food for thought on the Western plan.

I should like to emphasize, however, that as I understood him, Mr. Eaton definitely stated at the beginning of his remarks that he refused to discuss the Soviet plan and the proposals of the socialist countries contained in the document entitled "Basic principles of general and complete disarmament", because, according to him, that would lead nowhere.

We are rather disappointed at this, after the statement made by Mr. Eaton at the meeting on 8 April, when he said:

"I can only repeat that we are prepared to go as far along the road towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control as any delegation here. We are prepared to go along that road until we reach our ultimate goal, and as far as we can see our ultimate goal differs from that of the Soviet Union in a few ... respects." **(TNCD/FV.19, page 4)**

Mr. Eaton has since refused to discuss all the proposals we have submitted here.
I cannot refrain from further quoting another passage from this statement of 8 April. Referring to the method followed by the American delegation in the discussions here, he said:

"The reconciliation of differences is the essence of negotiation, and we have come here for the purpose of achieving the broadest possible common areas of agreement on concrete disarmament." (ibid., page 5)

That is excellent; but Mr. Eaton added another sentence:

"We are prepared to discuss proposals that are in line with our proposals." (ibid.)

How does the United States delegation hope to reconcile differences if it only discusses measures that are in line with its own proposals? It absolutely refuses to discuss the point of view of others. Why? In these circumstances, what differences are we going to reconcile? When it is merely a matter of making a few slight drafting amendments, that can, of course, be done among allies. But we are here to reconcile serious differences, and one cannot help thinking that the United States delegation has a rather peculiar way of reconciling differences by flatly refusing to discuss the problems that arise.

After the remarks of the Soviet Union representative, who criticized some of the comments made, I should like to emphasize a second point. At the end of his statement I understood Mr. Eaton to say that the United States had given other countries a quantity of fissionable materials for peaceful purposes that would, as it were, constitute proof of peaceful intentions. I merely wish to point out that having made all those gifts they have not stopped manufacturing nuclear weapons, which shows once again that certain quantities of fissionable materials can be set aside while still continuing to manufacture weapons, and while still possessing weapons.

As to the matter of undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, to which Mr. Eaton also referred -- the representative of Romania has given enough details on this point -- we have heard that the United States regards these statements of intentions as useless, non-controlled measures, and that consequently it will not give such an undertaking. But why will it not do so? We wish to know. Is it preparing to launch a nuclear attack first, and is that why it does not wish to declare that it undertakes not to be the first to use nuclear weapons? It is really important for our Conference to know this.
The CHAIRMAN (Canada): If no other representative wishes to speak at this time I should like to bring to the attention of the Committee a matter of procedure.

A proposal has been put forward in regard to the publication of the verbatim records of this Conference which I think has already been placed before you in a preliminary way, but which I should like to read out. The proposed agreement is the following:

"It has been agreed between all the delegations represented at the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament that the official final verbatim records of plenary meetings of the Conference should be released for publication in batches of one month or part of a month at the end of the ensuing month. The first release will, if there is no objection, be made at the end of April and will consist of the March records. After publication, sets of the papers will be available for public consultation at United Nations Headquarters in New York, and Geneva. Governments will be free to use the records as they please. The United Nations Secretariat in Geneva is invited to draw up a list of records and documents to be considered for release at the end of each month and, if there are no objections, publication shall be carried out in accordance with this agreement."

I should welcome the expression of opinion of any delegation that has any objection to this proposed draft agreement on the publication of the verbatim records.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): During our preliminary discussions on this question the delegations of the socialist countries expressed their general agreement with the draft decision which you, Mr. Chairman have just read out. The only request we made was that the first sentence of this decision should include the words "as a rule". Our intention in this is that the records for the preceding month should as a rule be published at the end of each month.

This addition, which was not however accepted by our Western colleagues, was designed to meet one contingency. We all know that our work has considerable importance of a preparatory kind for the discussion of disarmament questions at the Conference of Heads of Governments, who will be meeting in Paris on 16 May;
it therefore seemed to us quite natural that the records of our Conference for April should be published in time for the meeting or for the beginning of the work of the Conference of Heads of Governments. This seemed to us quite natural because at the Conference of Heads of Governments disarmament questions will obviously loom large, and it would naturally be useful if that discussion could take into account the debates which have taken place in our Committee.

We therefore suggested that the expression "as a rule" should be used in our resolution, and that the practical question of publishing the documents for April should be settled in such a way that they would be available by 16 May at the latest. We believe this is technically quite possible and in regard to the substance perfectly reasonable. We do not see at all what objections there can be to this.

Unless, therefore, the Western delegations do object, we should like the adoption of this resolution to be accompanied by a proviso that the April documents shall be published by 16 May.

That is the addition that we should like to see included in this draft.

Mr. ORMSEY-GORE (United Kingdom): Having listened to what the representative of the Soviet Union has said, perhaps I should now make clear the position of the five Western Powers on this topic.

We have always believed that the discussions which take place in this Committee should be confidential. I am not sure how successful we have been up to now in putting that into practice, but nevertheless we do feel that our speeches in this Committee should be clearly directed to the work immediately in hand, and that they should not have within them an element of propaganda, an element of appeal to the general public outside this Committee room. This has always been our feeling about conferences of this kind. Nevertheless, we have recognized that other countries not taking part in this Conference have a legitimate interest in knowing what has taken place in our Committee, and we also believe that sections of the general public in our countries would wish to know precisely what had been said in our Committee. Taking these various considerations into mind we came to the conclusion that an agreement to release for publication batches of the verbatim record covering a whole month, or a part of a month, at the end of the ensuing month gave a fair balance between these two rather differing considerations. We personally do not see why an exception should be
made next month, as has been suggested by the representative of the Soviet Union. This is particularly true because, of course, the Heads of Governments who will be meeting in Paris will all of them have the verbatim records of this Conference because all their Governments are in fact taking part in this Conference, so the particular difficulty to which Mr. Zorin drew our attention, that they might be without a full record of our Conference, will not in practice be the case; they will all have the verbatim records. It is just a question whether the general public and other countries should have released to them the full verbatim records of our discussions. I repeat that the Western Powers feel that this particular agreement strikes the right balance between keeping our talks here confidential and nevertheless meeting the desires of other countries and the general public outside to be informed of what we have been doing here.

In the light of these considerations, speaking on behalf of myself and I think on behalf of the other Western delegations, we could not agree to an exception being made as regards publication before 16 May.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (Translation from Russian): We have listened with close attention to Mr. Ormsby-Gore's remarks on behalf of the Western delegations, and we must say that they really contained no grounds for the rejection of our proposal. What Mr. Ormsby-Gore said regarding the desire of other Members of the United Nations to be kept informed of how problems of general and complete disarmament are being discussed and solved applies especially to the forthcoming meeting of the Heads of Governments.

I do not think anybody doubts that the consideration of disarmament questions at the Conference of the Heads of Governments will be of very great importance for the whole subject of disarmament and general peace. It is therefore natural that the attention of literally all peoples of all the countries of the world should be riveted on those discussions. It would therefore quite naturally be important that at the time of the Summit meeting all the countries not participating in the work of the Committee, and the public and parliaments of all the countries participating in it, should be fully informed on what questions have been considered and what conclusions we have reached, because that would help them to understand the problems which will be dealt with at the Conference of the Heads of Governments.
I seem to remember that actually in the United Kingdom some responsible voices have been raised, some of them publicly, in dissatisfaction that the public and Members of Parliament were not being kept informed of the discussions taking place in our Committee. The motive here was not the propaganda mentioned by Mr. Ormsby-Gore, but a desire to further understanding of the substance of the problems which have been discussed in fair detail by our Committee.

Concerning the propaganda element, it seems to me that what is going on in the Western Press, and the manner in which news of our Committee’s work is presented in the Western Press, do not testify to any desire in the representatives of the Western Press, or perhaps in those who stand behind them, to give an objective account of what takes place in the Committee. A fairly detailed record of the proceedings at every meeting of our Committee appears regularly in all the Western newspapers. This has happened since the first days of our Committee’s meetings. The Western Press obtains news from some source, and what it publishes is mainly to the advantage of the Western delegations, whereas what is to their disadvantage it does not publish. I do not wish to go into the details of this matter, and am merely mentioning it in relation to Mr. Ormsby-Gore’s remark about propaganda.

I think that we must base ourselves on purely practical considerations, and these suggest that it would be expedient if all States interested in disarmament, the most important international question of the present day, could acquaint themselves with the state of our work and its results — especially because at the end of April we shall be interrupting it — before the problem is discussed at the meeting of the Heads of Governments.

If, however, the Western delegations do not favour this solution of the problem, we naturally can do nothing about it. This is a case where unanimity is necessary. We can agree to what has just been proposed, provided that we may return later in our proceedings to the question of the dates when any records or documents shall actually be published in accordance with this decision. For the time being we must be satisfied with a decision to which neither side objects; but we regret that we have been unable to reach agreement even on such a small procedural matter.
The CHAIRMAN (Canada): I understand the statement of the representative of the Soviet Union, who was speaking for the other Eastern European countries also, to mean that although, for the reasons he gave, he is not very happy about the proposed draft agreement and reserves the right to take up again at a later date the question of the precise date of publication of the records in the ensuing months, he is nevertheless prepared to agree on behalf of his delegation. I think there are no objections from other delegations. If that is the case, I would therefore propose that this agreement form part of the records, with the reservation specified by the representative of the Soviet Union.

If there is no dissent and as there are no other speakers I will proceed to the question of the communique for this meeting. Before reading it I should like to say that it has been proposed and, I think, generally agreed, that the next meeting of the Conference should take place not in the morning of Tuesday, in the usual way, but in the afternoon at 3 o'clock. Is there any objection by any delegation to having our next meeting at 3 p.m. on Tuesday, 19 April? There appear to be no objections so I will read the proposed communique:

"The twenty-third meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament was held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 14 April 1960, under the chairmanship of the representative of Canada.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 19 April 1960, at 3 p.m."

If there is no objection to the terms of the communique I declare it adopted and the meeting adjourned.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.