FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWENTY-FIRST MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Tuesday, 12 April 1960, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: MR. EATON (United States of America)
PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Bulgaria:
Mr. M. TARABANOV
Mr. K. CHRISTOV
Col. K. SAVOV

Canada:
Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. A.G. CAMPBELL
W/Cdr. R.J. MITCHELL

Czechoslovakia:
Mr. J. NOSEK
Lieut.-Gen. J. HEČKO
Mr. Z. TRHLIK

France:
Mr. J. MOCH
Mr. M. LÉGENDRE
Col. L. CONVERT

Italy:
Mr. L. DAINELLI
Maj.-Gen. D. FANALI
Mr. D. PHILIPSON

Poland:
Mr. M. LACHS
Mr. J. GOLDBLAT
Brig.-Gen. J. SLIWINSKI

Romania:
Mr. E. MEZINGESCU
Mr. C. BOGDAN
Col. C. POPA

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
Mr. V.A. ZORIN
Col.-Gen. A.A. GRYZLOV
Mr. A.A. ROSCHCHIN
PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:
Rt. Hon. D. ORMSEY-GORE
Miss B. SALT
Maj.-Gen. RIDDELL

United States of America:
Mr. F.M. EATON
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Rear-Admiral P.L. DUDLEY

Representative of the Secretary-General:
Dr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General:
Mr. W. EPSTEIN
The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I declare the twenty-first meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament called to order, and I call on the representative of Bulgaria as the first speaker.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): In their statements yesterday morning the representatives of France and the United Kingdom defined the attitude of the Western Powers to the document submitted last Friday by the representative of the Soviet Union, which was distributed under the title: Basic Principles of General and Complete Disarmament'.

That document, containing a proposal by the delegations of the five socialist countries, was submitted for the Committee's attention, as was explained in detail by the Soviet Union representative when introducing it, and by the Czechoslovak representative in his remarks yesterday, in the sincere desire to clear a new way for our efforts to get our discussion out of the difficulties in which it is in danger of being bogged down.

Moreover, any examination of the document, however cursory, will certainly show that it is conceived and drafted in a spirit of rapprochement, on the basis of the General Assembly resolution. It might therefore have been expected that the Western delegations would adopt a positive attitude to the document and to the proposals it contains.

We have to note, however, without concealing our disappointment, that the opposite has happened. In the statements made by Mr. Ormsby-Gore and Mr. Moch, we have been unable to find any trace of an objective attitude or the slightest concern for a constructive method. Let us recall, in this connexion, that in his statement on 8 April and in other previous interventions, Mr. Eaton, the United States representative, repeatedly emphasized that the United States position on disarmament was a flexible position, that "the reconciliation of differences is the essence of negotiation", and that the United States delegation had come here "for the purpose of achieving the broadest possible common areas of agreement ... ".

"... to reach agreement and not to continue a dispute".

After such statements we felt justified in assuming that an attempt should be made to bring our views on the various problems of disarmament closer together and that the intention of all delegations was to work out a body of measures which would ensure general and complete disarmament.
Indeed, in his statement on 8 April, the United States representative said:

"In conclusion, ... I reaffirm our recognition, as a Member of the United Nations, of the cardinal importance of the problem of general and complete disarmament under effective international control". (TNCD/FV.19, page 13)

And later:

"I desire to sit here and negotiate until we have justified the hopes with which this Committee was agreed upon and convened; and, as I stated last Friday, my country yields ground to none in the world in its desire to find an answer to this problem". (ibid., page 14)

Such it appears, are also the intentions of the other Western delegations, which have repeatedly stated that the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) on general and complete disarmament form the basis of their Governments' policy. For example, on 29 March, the representative of Canada said:

"Our position with respect to the resolution is like that of the United Kingdom: we accepted the resolution as a whole and that is our continuing position. We find no difficulty in reaffirming that our objectives are those laid down in the resolution — all of them — and in the precise terms of the resolution". (TNCD/FV.11, page 13)

Only the position of the French delegation remains in doubt. It thus appears — though there is still doubt as to the position the French delegation will take — that the Western delegations are in favour of the resolution unanimously adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 20 November 1959, and that they are resolved to work for general and complete disarmament.

We apologize for recalling those statements once again; but how can one refrain from comparing the attitude to the document submitted by the five socialist countries — what was said yesterday — with what was affirmed a few days ago? Let us try to analyse that attitude and the criticisms of the document made by Mr. Ormsby-Gore and Mr. Moch.

In tone and in substance, the attitude is purely negative. It is a refusal to consider the socialist countries' proposals as a basis for rapprochement, and the speakers do not even take the trouble to soften that refusal by more moderate language. We should like to point out that we are not denying the right to criticize our proposals. That is not the case. For there are no criticisms in the statements by Mr. Ormsby-Gore and Mr. Moch. Their comments take no account
of the statements I have quoted. They make no effort to find the points in our proposals which could help to bring our respective positions closer, or to bring out what, in those proposals, corresponds to the position of the Western delegations. Consequently, at the stage we have now reached, we really do not know what it is in our proposals that the Western delegations do not like. Is there something which they would be willing to say is acceptable, or do they find everything unacceptable? The method adopted by the representatives of the United Kingdom and France consists -- if we have understood correctly -- of isolating some particular point, stating that it is unacceptable, and that consequently the entire document, as a whole, is unacceptable. We have heard paragraph 2 of the document submitted by the socialist delegations spoken of in the following terms, with regard to time-limits:

"This position" -- the Western position is meant, and the words are those of Mr. Ormsby-Gore -- "is as far from the proposal contained in point 2 of the text of the Soviet proposals as it ever was, since that paragraph continues to talk about 'a strictly defined time-limit -- four years'. It is as if all the admissions which we have dragged during the past few weeks from the lips of the Soviet and East European representatives, about steps which would have to be taken before the beginning of their four-year time-limit, had been completely forgotten. We had hoped that the admission of the need for these preparatory measures would have made the Soviet representative recognize the impractical nature of the proposal for a rigid time-limit". (TNCD/PV.20, page 6)

But what are the statements by the delegations of the socialist countries which could have led to the belief that the four-year time-limit proposed in the Soviet plan and in the new proposal by the socialist countries is not practical? It would indeed be interesting to know when the socialist countries are supposed to have implied "the impractical nature of the proposal to fix a rigid time-limit".

We are really astonished to see that the answers to certain questions put by Mr. Ormsby-Gore have been interpreted as implying that the socialist countries have recognized that the time-limit they proposed is impractical. On the contrary, we have asked the representatives of the Western countries often enough to tell us what is their objection to fixing a four-year time-limit, not including preparatory measures, as the period needed to arrive at the signature of a treaty, since this preliminary period doubtless also depends on the duration of our discussions. Arguments based on the time necessary to solve problems which are not connected with
the implementation of real disarmament measures certainly cannot prove that the necessary time-limit for real disarmament is impractical. Furthermore, when the Western delegations state that the four-year time-limit proposed by the socialist countries is impractical, they do not even take the trouble to put forward arguments in support of their assertions. Mere statements are not enough to carry conviction, and if the time-limit we propose does not suit them they must tell us why, and what time-limit they propose.

Or are they going to go on asserting that disarmament should be carried out in an unspecified time, that is to say, practically without regard to time? We expect an answer on this question of the time-limit. Such assertions are not sufficient grounds for refusing to discuss and settle the time-limits within which general and complete disarmament should be carried out.

In his statement yesterday, the United Kingdom representative reproached the socialist countries with having completely ignored the hope expressed in General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV), that we should seek to agree on measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Mr. Ormsby-Gore expressed himself in the following terms:

"What are the measures leading towards the goal? They are not mentioned. The measures are in fact those to be taken in the remotest future at the very last stage of even the Soviet plan.

"This leads me to make a further comment. It is obvious that these so-called 'basic principles' are, most of them, not in fact principles at all, but specific long-range measures."  (TNCD/PV.20, page 5)

I do not wish to stress the fact that when asking what were the measures in the Soviet countries' new proposal leading toward the goal, namely general and complete disarmament, the United Kingdom representative himself supplied the answer a little later in the same passage. I would rather ask why the principles stated in the document we have submitted are not agreeable to him. Are they principles with which his Government, after having voted for the General Assembly resolution, is not in agreement now? Why is the United Kingdom Government unable to accept carrying out of the general and complete disarmament of all States as a practical and urgent task? What are the British delegation's objections to the principles and measures formulated in the first paragraph of our proposal, namely, that general and complete disarmament includes disbandment of all armed forces and liquidation of all armaments? What are its objections to cessation of all kinds of
military production, and liquidation of all bases on foreign territories? What are its objections to withdrawal from these territories and disbandment of foreign troops, prohibition of nuclear, chemical and bacteriological and missile weapons, cessation of their production and destruction of their stockpiles, abolition of organs and institutions designed for organizing military activities in States, prohibition of military training and cessation of appropriation of funds for military purposes?

We had thought, up to now, that the Western countries agreed to accept the General Assembly resolution on disarmament, as their representatives in the Committee have repeatedly stated. On 21 March, Mr. Ormsby-Gore, the United Kingdom representative, said, in particular:

"I should like to say, on behalf of the United Kingdom delegation, that we voted for that resolution. We accept it in toto. All paragraphs of it represent the policy of the United Kingdom Government in this sphere". [TNCD/PV.5, page 25]

If the position is different now, after the submission of our proposal defining the basic principles of general and complete disarmament, the fact should be stated, so that we may know where we stand.

Moreover, the idea of defining basic principles showing the goals to be attained as regards the different problems of general and complete disarmament as a whole, has already been mentioned here by a number of delegations. In his statement on 6 April, Mr. Martino, the representative of Italy, regarded such a definition as a form of preamble to a future treaty on disarmament, and expressed himself as follows:

"As I understand it the disarmament plan, in the form of a preamble on the general scope of the disarmament measures and a draft prepared by the Ten Nation Committee, would be a plan for the future, the negotiation, execution and completion of which would take place at a certain interval of time after the plan itself had been drafted in its initial form and general outline". [TNCD/PV.17, pages 13 and 14]

Thus Mr. Martino considers it possible to draft such a preamble, though he thinks it would not be of any use in the immediate future. In the same statement he said:
"Have we met here to draw up a list of principles and measures of a general nature, postponing indefinitely the time when disarmament will really begin? To be sure, we should not like to think that our Eastern colleagues are inclined to abandon, for the time being, any real will to disarm; but we are bound to note that certain proposals and statements of theirs are tantamount to postponing any start on effective disarmament measures **sine die**." *(ibid., page 14)*

Of course we cannot agree with Mr. Martino there, for is it not postponing general and complete disarmament **sine die** to try to concentrate attention on a single disarmament measure? Moreover, it is easy to see that the method of studying and carrying out isolated disarmament measures one after the other would, according to the authors of this proposal themselves, take an extremely long time, and that if it ever did lead to general and complete disarmament it would, according to their own estimates, only do so after several decades. This method is not consistent with either the spirit or the letter of the United Nations General Assembly resolution, which calls upon governments to reach agreement in the shortest possible time, or with the rapid technical progress of our time which, as Mr. Moch himself said:

"... makes faster progress than our negotiations: when we meet again after an interruption of our deliberations, our previous work is out of date and we are faced with fresh difficulties." *(TNGD/FV.2, page 16)*

Not only is an agreement on the basic principles that should govern negotiations on general and complete disarmament not tantamount to postponing effective disarmament measures **sine die** as Mr. Martino would have us believe, but it requires us to formulate those principles as early as possible.

If we do not want effective measures and any general and complete disarmament postponed **sine die**, if we wish to achieve general and complete disarmament, we must not start with partial measures without having laid down in advance the guiding principles for such a great task as that set us by resolution 1378 (XIV) of the United Nations General Assembly.

In view of the difficulties we have met with in agreeing upon the practical plan for general and complete disarmament submitted by the Soviet Union to the United Nations General Assembly, and the impossibility, for the delegations of the socialist countries, of accepting the idea that we should resign ourselves to
never seeing disarmament achieved, as we should have to do if we adopted the method the Western countries propose, we have been obliged to decide on a step which could enable us to reach agreement on certain basic principles and thus to advance towards the goal set for this Committee.

We had hopes — which we have not yet lost — that the document submitted by the delegations of the socialist countries would be given earnest and careful consideration by the delegations of the Western countries. Thus we hope that this document which we, together with the other socialist countries, have placed before the Committee, will provide a new opportunity of seeking and achieving agreement on the problem which is exercising all our minds.

Mr. Dainelli (Italy): At last Friday's meeting we heard two interventions of great importance. First you, Mr. Chairman, answering questions put by the Soviet delegation, gave a detailed and complete illustration of the Western plan. You made an effort to clarify the misunderstandings which seem to exist between us and our Eastern European colleagues on our general intentions and on certain points of our plan. What you said and the way you chose to say it — and may I add that you were speaking for the five Western delegations — was intended to prove how open our mind is and how strongly we wish to reach an agreement, how flexible our methods and our approach are, provided the essential in our concepts remains untouched. That was a speech to which our Eastern European colleagues should give attention, and I sincerely hope that Mr. Zorin's intervention of last Friday was not an answer, or at least not a final answer.

It is true that the representative of the USSR in that same speech — and that is the other important intervention I have mentioned above — made an optimistic effort to underline the points of agreement between us, while wanting to lay aside our differences. Mr. Zorin seemed to go even further when he said that our agreement on some concrete and immediate measures of disarmament could be useful, because this would prove to the world our goodwill. Mr. Moch on Friday and Mr. Ormsby-Gore yesterday pointed out the contradiction between this part of Mr. Zorin's speech and the proposition which was later tabled by him, for the four other communist delegations also. Indeed there is a contradiction, but we do not intend to add anything more to what has been said by our Western colleagues in this respect. However, the Italian delegation prefers today to try to get clarification as to
whether Mr. Zorin, by recognizing the importance of tackling concrete measures, was interpreting our lines of thought. It is, I believe, quite clear that when we have suggested looking into one particular problem, we have never intended to separate that particular measure from the general framework of our plan, which has been conceived as one logical and technically realistic whole. I might answer Mr. Tarabanov's intervention this morning by adding that therefore we have never considered one measure only, one isolated measure or partial measures.

The Italian delegation has always felt very strongly that this Conference of ours, in order to respond to what public opinion expects and what the United Nations resolution has indicated — that is, an immediate détente in the world — should endeavour to examine immediately certain concrete problems of disarmament. Moreover, we feel that it is not advisable to take into consideration at the start of a disarmament programme anything which may not be useful in laying the foundations of further fruitful work or in setting the pattern for honest, serious and concrete results. The Eastern European representatives have over and over again felt it necessary to claim that the measures contained in our two first phases are practically worthless from the point of view of our work here at the Conference. The Italian delegation, frankly, cannot help but question this insistence on the part of Mr. Zorin and his colleagues. We have followed very attentively what has been said around this table. As newcomers to disarmament negotiations we have chosen to speak not very often, but, frankly, we have come to a perhaps simple conclusion. The communist delegations have a different pattern of work in mind which in our opinion, however, is not necessarily the straight way to reach our common goal. We, in fact, are inclined to feel that discussing concrete measures and trying to find an agreement on each of them is the more direct and practical line of approach to the problem with which we have been entrusted.

Mr. Martino, in his intervention on 6 April, pointed out that we should agree as soon as possible to discuss those measures which would help at least to stop the armaments race. What he called "indirect measures" may be as valuable as any statement of principles in creating the détente which may really lead us to swift progress in the work of our Conference. The Italian delegation wishes to underline that there is probably more to it than that. Let us in all fairness look at the problem from the point of view of the world, which is looking with concern upon an armaments race which threatens today to exploit for its purpose
even the great scientific conquest of outer space. Here is a field which men of all countries, of all races, of all ideologies, may I add, are hoping to see reserved for peaceful uses.

The Eastern European delegations, after Mr. Eaton's far-reaching and generous proposal on outer space, among other criticisms pointed out the following: (1) the measures described in the Western plan would not be consistent with general and complete disarmament; (2) they would consist only of controls; and (3) they would give unilateral advantage to the Western side.

We fear that such criticism is inspired by what I have described above as a different approach from the Soviet side to our problems as, frankly, it appears very difficult to accept the allegations of our Communist colleagues. How is it possible to refuse to give the measures concerning outer space in paragraphs I.F.1, II.A and III.B.3 of the five-Power plan their rightful standing in a programme of general and complete disarmament? Obviously, this is not the removal of existing armaments, but it certainly will prevent armaments -- and the very worst of them -- from invading a new field of unpredictable vastness and consequences.

Let us pass on to the second criticism which concerns control. We really fear that in this matter polemics have carried away our Eastern colleagues because, in this specific case control is by far more simple, easy and, allow me to say, less objectionable than that relating to other measures of disarmament.

Mr. Chairman, you explained that thoroughly. If further technical clarification seems necessary the Western delegations surely would welcome questions from our Eastern colleagues; and why not get together on this subject in a joint working group?

The last criticism, the one concerning the unilateral advantage, -- would you mean for the West? -- may imply in the minds of our Eastern European colleagues that the USSR is ahead of the United States in this particular field. We wonder whether this is actually a correct appraisal. Without attempting to argue here the question of the relative achievements of various countries in space, it may be appropriate nevertheless to point out that the unfavourable comparison which the Eastern European representatives have sought to convey seems not to be borne out by the facts. Granting fully that the great scientists in the Soviet Union have accomplished space feats of historic importance, the record shows that the United States also has made strides of great significance in the field of space technology.
The record shows that the United States to date has put into orbit or into
deep space a total of 20 scientifically instrumented space vehicles of which
9, I am told, are still aloft. By comparison the Soviet Union, I understand,
has launched a total of 6 space vehicles, 3 earth satellites and 3 other devices
which go under the name of space probes, one of which impacted on the moon. Let
me repeat, the achievements of both countries in space are of great historic
significance and I am far from trying to compare one at the expense of the other.
Rather it is my intention simply to correct the impressions which the Eastern
representatives have sought to create, namely, that the Soviet Union alone has made
significant progress in space.

The Eastern European representatives, having made the claim -- which we believe
unfounded -- that the ban on mass destruction weapons in space would confer a
one-sided advantage of the United States, seemed themselves to be employing what
I would be tempted to call a one-sided logic. They assert that the United States
favours such a ban because the United States allegedly lags in the space field.
However, we only need to recall that when two great scientists and a great
statesman laid down in 1947 a plan to halt the further development of nuclear
weapons at a time when the United States held an undisputed monopoly, the opposite
logic was applied. The United States was accused of favouring such measures in
order to protect its nuclear advantage. As an Italian, my logical mind fails to
follow this line of thought.

The Soviet side cannot have it both ways and must make up their minds which
logic they prefer. Leaving past history aside, the fact is that the five Western
delegations making the present proposals to prohibit mass destruction weapons
from orbiting in space are not motivated by a desire to secure one-sided advantages
for anybody. They are motivated by a desire to secure the same advantage for
everybody and this is the advantage frequently referred to in this Conference,
namely, to spare the whole world the great dangers that would grow out of our
failure here to stop the spread of mass destruction weapons into space before the
point of no return -- as Mr. Moch has so well defined it -- has been reached.

The Italian delegation, in all earnestness, feels that in this field the
Powers having scientific knowledge, technical capability and adequate resources
for putting space vehicles into orbit should at once renounce the use of such
vehicles for the purposes of destruction. This would not be a hollow declaration;
this would not entail complicated studies, costly inspection machinery, intelligence complications, but merely good will, and would not fail to bring about immediate, concrete results.

The only thing which would receive advantage from such an agreement would be, allow me to say, humanity.

Mr. LACHS (Poland): Mr. Chairman, may I first of all apologize for the absence of the head of my delegation who was suddenly taken ill. I shall therefore, with your permission, take the floor this morning.

Today I wish to make some additional observations concerning the reasons which prompted the socialist States represented in this Committee to submit to you on 8 April the proposals which are designed, to our mind, to reach an agreement concerning basic principles on general and complete disarmament. I believe that I cannot do better than try, at the very outset, to summarize what we believe is the result of the four weeks' discussions and deliberations in our Committee.

Is it not true that the main divergences between the Western and Socialist delegations lies in a different approach to the tasks of this Committee? The socialist States have maintained that, after a general exchange of views and the clarification of the positions of the parties concerned, we should embark on the formulation -- or should I say drafting -- of an agreement on general and complete disarmament. This agreement should, of course, include the whole process of disarmament and embrace all its essential points concerning time-limits, the sequence of implementation of particular disarmament measures, as well as the means of effective control concerning the latter.

Through no fault of ours, I submit, that was not to be. In view of the refusal to discuss the Soviet proposal in detail, and the demand of the Western Powers that the decisions of this Committee should be based exclusively on their plan -- which for reasons already explained at length could not possibly be accepted by us -- we could not proceed to the drafting of a detailed disarmament agreement.

It was exactly at that point, and in this situation, that the socialist delegations, guided by a desire to break through the difficulties which had thus arisen, thought it useful, and serving a constructive purpose, to suggest a
different approach. Let me make clear again the fact that what we are suggesting is that we should take as a point of departure General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) -- an uncontested document which has been accepted by all States that are members of this Committee, and by all States that are members of the United Nations. It is on this basis precisely that we suggest we should elaborate and develop those principles to which the future agreement on general and complete disarmament should correspond.

This, indeed, is a resolution which, to use the words of the head of the Indian delegation during the last session of the General Assembly, ought to be "the charter of that Committee." He was referring to this Committee. Our proposal is based on that resolution exactly.

The representative of Italy, who has just spoken, referred to what he called our pattern, which he felt was not a straight way towards disarmament. In the same breath he referred to what he described as the indirect approach to disarmament, and quoted certain measures suggested by Mr. Martino. I would humbly suggest that indirect measures can hardly be regarded as a direct way towards a solution. Therefore, I believe that our direct measures could more properly lead towards disarmament than the indirect measures suggested by the representative of Italy. To my Polish mind, at any rate, this is the difference between straight and indirect courses. On the other hand, if we compare the principles contained in the declaration of the five socialist States with those put forward by the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Ormsby-Gore, at the second meeting of our Committee, as arising from what he called "our philosophy with regard to disarmament", we shall find indeed that they coincide on certain points, and to a certain extent. This is why the principles submitted by us could form the subject of our discussion. To deny these principles would, I submit, be tantamount to denying the very purpose of general and complete disarmament.

Let me now say why we view this procedure as useful. We do so because it is essential to stress those points which are commonly agreed upon, taking these as a basis rather than matters which are not commonly agreed upon, which merely emphasize divergencies of view still to be resolved. In this connexion I should like to quote Mr. Schurmann, the representative of the Netherlands, when he
spoke during the discussion on disarmament at the fourteenth session of the
General Assembly.\footnote{1} He was referring to what Members of the United Nations,
not represented at our present meeting, expected of our Committee:

"In the first place, one may hope that the parties to the
negotiations will look for the binding and common elements in their
respective proposals rather than stress the dividing elements."

He added:

"It was precisely because of the failure to do this that in 1955
agreement between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers on measures
of real disarmament was not reached, although the parties then seemed
to be very near to a consensus."

I hope it will not be out of place if I recall the situation to which the
representative of the Netherlands referred, because it bears some resemblance to
the one which confronts us here and now. It was at that time the Soviet Union
submitted new proposals -- I have in mind those of 10 May 1955 -- which had much
in common with the proposals of the Western Powers. However, the Western
representatives refused to discuss the Soviet proposal in detail. It is obvious,
and of the essence, that such a situation should not recur in the course of our
present discussion; indeed, it is essential that during the discussion we should
come gradually and steadily nearer to one another. This is indeed our goal.
As a matter of fact, we find that the elements of our proposal reflect a series
of undeniable principles, on which we could reach agreement. I would appeal to
the Western delegations not to evade discussion on this proposal.

In this connexion, I should like to take as an instance paragraph 2 of our
proposal and dwell upon it for a while. In order to refresh the memories of
members, I will read it out again:

"2. General and complete disarmament shall be carried out in an agreed
sequence by stages, and be completed within a strictly defined time-limit --
four years." (TNOD/4)

There seems to be no doubt in this Committee as to the principle concerning
stages in the disarmament programme. As a matter of fact, the principle that
the disarmament programme should be carried out in stages and, as such, should be

\footnote{1} At the 1031st meeting of the First Committee.
put into practice has become a common one since 1954. If we did agree on this principle, with regard to disarmament proposals much more modest in their scope at the time they were discussed, then even more I believe we should accept that general and complete disarmament ought to be carried out by stages. What is it that we propose? For the time being, while we are formulating those principles, we suggest that we should not deal with either the number of stages or the division of particular disarmament measures amongst the stages; nor do we finally propose the order of the disarmament measures within the particular stages. I submit that it is here that there exists an essential difference between the way the matter was dealt with in the proposal on general and complete disarmament on the one hand and the way it is treated in the basic principles submitted on 8 April on the other hand. I suggest it is undeniably clear that this constitutes a transition to a more general premise, on which it would be easier to reach an agreement at this phase of our negotiations than would be the case with regard to detailed plans.

I should like to make one more point. In paragraph 2 it is suggested that the implementation of these stages is to take place within a strictly defined time-limit. This suggestion has been met with objections and had been the subject of several interventions in this Committee. However, I frankly confess that I cannot believe this problem should give rise to such controversies as might have been conveyed by those interventions.

I should like to make an interjection at this point and say a word about the statement made yesterday by the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns. I wish to emphasize that there is no contradiction in the explanations given by the head of the Polish delegation, who spoke on behalf of the five Socialist States as to the timing of the special session of the General Assembly on the disarmament conference, and the explanation which was given by Mr. Zorin, the head of the Soviet delegation concerning the scope of problems to be dealt with by the conference and the part to be played by it.

The head of the Soviet delegation, speaking after the Polish representative, simply developed certain concepts concerning that conference and indicated certain aspects which might facilitate agreement. Thus, I believe, these two statements far from being in contradiction, rather indicate flexibility in their approach to the same problems.
Let me return to the question of what has been called the time-limit. Mr. Ormsby-Gore drew our attention to the difference between what he called "time-limits" and what he called "forecasts". It seems to me that the difference between those two terms is with regard to their applicability to the different stages of our work. At this stage of negotiations, each time-limit is a forecast and is being suggested as such. As soon as a treaty is signed, every forecast becomes a time-limit. Obviously, such dates are defined with regard to what one foresees as the possibility of carrying out certain obligations to be entered into. However, it remains unquestionable that some dates have to be fixed when it comes to the time that the agreement is to be signed. In every national code and law an indication of the time factor is considered as one of the essential elements of agreement, and as essential to the negotiations. Similarly, international relations know of no agreement in which no date is fixed with the exception, rare indeed, of obligations of a perpetual character.

In the case of a disarmament treaty we shall of course face obligations of two types. One kind will be those obligations which concern defined reductions, liquidations, eliminations and similar things. Those are the obligations which will obviously call for time-limits as to individual performance and as to stages as a whole, otherwise I submit that it might be possible that the agreement would never be put into effect; as a result, producing a situation of non-compliance on the part of one of the parties concerned but at the same time making progress in disarmament impossible. In such a situation even the first stage might never be implemented and, what is more, it could lead to absurdity, because — not to perform them within a fixed time-limit would not even constitute an infringement of treaty obligations, for the treaty itself would not provide time-limits for this very implementation.

I submit that the same applies to the disarmament programme as a whole. In the disarmament agreement we shall of course have certain obligations of a continuous character, for instance, the maintenance of this state — or situation, whichever way it is described — brought about as the result of general and complete disarmament after the carrying out of all disarmament measures. This obligation will be a permanent one because it will be the crowning of the process of disarmament. This obligation needs no time-limit because it will be perpetual, as opposed to the other obligations which need time-limits and in regard to which time-limits are of the essence of the treaty itself.
In the light of what I have said, it seems to me that the controversy concerning the fixing of time-limits should cease to divide us. Therefore, this principle should also be considered as being acceptable to all of us represented in this Committee. I suggest that the elements of our proposal, which I have discussed briefly in my intervention this morning, are among those on which we can easily reach agreement. This would indeed help us to advance our work and to reconcile our views on other principles concerning general and complete disarmament. That is why we expect the delegations of the Western States to present their suggestions and proposals concerning possible changes or amendments, whatever the case may be, to the document submitted by the socialist countries represented here. We hope so; in spite of some intimations made yesterday. May I reiterate, in the light of what I have said and what I have cited by way of example, that the document presented to this Committee is a proposal and as such it is open to amendment, changes and suggestions. Therefore, we are anxious to hear, and I can assure you that we shall carefully study, whatever constructive remarks and amendments the Western delegations would be prepared to make. But may I say at once that we can hardly move forward if declarations of a purely negative character are made, declarations such as those dismissing beforehand this proposal which has been presented in a spirit of goodwill.

It was suggested yesterday that we should embark on a discussion of paragraph 3 of our proposal on the issue of control, but it was said in the same breath that this would not imply acceptance of paragraph 1. Inasmuch as no alternative proposal to paragraph 1 was suggested, and still less agreed upon, then control of what is to be discussed? The question, of course, remains without reply. We should have thought that the Western delegations had accepted the principle of "no control without disarmament and no disarmament without control". Yet a proposal to discuss control without disarmament is made.

To conclude my remarks, I should like to stress once again that we are unable to agree with the statement to the effect that there is no difference between the document submitted by the Socialist delegations last Friday 8 April and the Soviet plan of 18 September 1959. Indeed it is not only a question of form -- which, by the way, would also be not without importance -- but also, I suggest, a difference in substance. After all, it is essential that we do not propose here and now the elaboration of a draft treaty on disarmament. What we are
proposing is only a concise preliminary document, a document of principles. As you have seen, we do not define in this document the order of consecutive disarmament measures; we do not define the substance of the particular stages nor do we indicate the levels of the armed forces after consecutive reductions nor do we define many other details which would obviously be included in the treaty.

It is worth noting, by the way, that the practice of presenting documents on principles which should become the basis of future agreement is not without precedent. Indeed it was the Western Powers themselves which on more than one occasion availed themselves of that form of presentation. In this connexion I should like to mention the United States proposal on essential principles for a disarmament programme submitted to the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations on 24 April 1952 and the "Declaration" of Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, of 4 May 1956, submitted to the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission. Thus we have some precedents concerning the form of presenting documents as subjects of discussion and deliberation.

In the light of what I have said, I believe that it is of the essence that the discussion on this document submitted by us should proceed by way of presenting proposals or amendments and that an effort be made by all concerned to reconcile our views as to the task we are called upon to fulfil, a task which, I submit, this Committee should not fail to fulfil.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): As there are no further speakers now, I will speak in my capacity as the representative of the United States.

I was distressed at our sixteenth meeting when Mr. Zorin seemed to repudiate the Four-Power communique which is the foundation of our Conference. At that time he said that the United Nations resolution had superseded that communique and therefore: why did we wish to go backwards?

Now after studying the document that was submitted last Friday, I wonder whether the Soviet delegation is now leaving the United Nations resolution. That resolution never mentions the word "principles". It instructs us to come here and work on "measures" — "measures leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control". It is now being suggested that we work not on measures but on principles. If it is the intention of the Soviet delegation that we should abandon not only the communique of the four Foreign Ministers but also the
resolution of the United Nations then I think that this should be stated to us. The adoption of these principles, which certainly cannot be considered to be measures, would not result in the return of a single soldier to his home, would not result in the abandonment of a single weapon and would not result in the reduction of the production of weapons.

As far as going backward is concerned, I believe that the language contained in the document presented to us last Friday is almost word for word the language contained in the statement made by Mr. Khrushchev last September. Thus in fact we are being asked to go backward rather than to go forward. When Mr. Moch stated that he saw nothing new or novel in the proposals submitted last Friday, it seemed to me that perhaps he was right in saying so, but I wanted to study further the document which was submitted to us. I have now done so. I fear that Mr. Moch was correct, that there is not anything new or novel in it other than perhaps the novelty of leaving the discussion of measures, which we were instructed to take up here, and beginning now a discussion of principles.

Mr. Nosek (Czechoslovakia): Mr. Chairman, I wish to comment briefly on the statement you have just made as United States representative. If my understanding is correct, you raised the same question as Mr. Ormsby-Gore raised yesterday, that is, the question of the difference between principles and measures. It seems to me that since this point was raised yesterday by Mr. Ormsby-Gore and again today by you, Sir, our new document is not completely understood by the representatives of the Western States. In my statement yesterday I enumerated some provisions and principles, and those principles are proposed by our delegations as those to be agreed upon as concrete disarmament measures which will lead to our goal—the accomplishment of general and complete disarmament. That is the purpose of our document. We are proposing a list of principles which should be agreed upon and which should become, as I said before, the concrete disarmament measures which, in our opinion, will lead to the achievement of a programme of general and complete disarmament. That is all I have to say now.

Mr. Zorin (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I had no intention of speaking this morning, but I feel it necessary to say a few words on the remarks made by Mr. Eaton, the United States representative.
In order to remove any uncertainty over Mr. Eaton's question whether our proposal did not amount to a departure from the resolution, I must say I am surprised that he asked it. A careful examination of the principles which we have submitted for consideration will show clearly that they flow directly from the concept of "general and complete disarmament" in the resolution which was adopted by us all and on the basis of which we propose to develop these principles. The question of our attitude towards the General Assembly resolution therefore does not arise. I consider it a purely artificial question. It is quite beside the point. In fact, I think Mr. Eaton, in his remarks this morning, himself directly contradicted this approach to our proposal, since later in his speech he asserted that these principles did not contain anything new in comparison with Mr. Khrushchev's plan.

I take it he spoke from the standpoint of an approach in principle to the question of general and complete disarmament.

If this is so, if Mr. Eaton himself considers that the principles we have put forward do not differ essentially in principle from what was proposed by Mr. Khrushchev, why does he regard these principles as a departure from the General Assembly resolution? This is incomprehensible, because it was precisely Mr. Khrushchev's proposal that constituted the basis for the adoption of the resolution on general and complete disarmament.

Thus a simple comparison between Mr. Khrushchev's proposal and our principles shows not only that we have in no way departed from the General Assembly resolution but, on the contrary, that we are trying to provide a basis for further progress, for the spelling-out of the General Assembly resolution for which we have all voted. We wish to spell out the concept of "general and complete disarmament"; and it is our wish that our Western colleagues should take part in this work.

Yet Mr. Eaton's mention today of the four-Power communique shows that he intends to drag us back, because the four-Power communique, as Mr. Eaton knows, does not mention general and complete disarmament, but deals only with specific measures for limitation and reduction of armed forces. Why does it disappoint you if we take as a basis for our work, not the four-Power communique, but the General Assembly resolution? If you stand by the General Assembly resolution you should not feel disappointed, because what the General Assembly resolution speaks of is general and complete disarmament, whereas the four-Power communique to which you referred speaks of partial disarmament measures.
It turns out, therefore, that it is not we but Mr. Eaton who is attempting to drag us back. He wants to drag us back to the four-Power communiqué, while we wish to move still further forward from the General Assembly resolution, that is, to spell out the General Assembly resolution on general and complete disarmament and to point out the way we should go to achieve general and complete disarmament, to establish the principles of general and complete disarmament on the basis of which it will be possible to work out a concrete programme of general and complete disarmament.

This was the short clarification which I thought necessary to put forward because of Mr. Eaton's question.

Mr. MEZINCESCU (Romania) (translation from French): I, too, should like to say a few words, Mr. Chairman, regarding the statement you made just now. Mr. Zorin has just shown that the proposal submitted by the five socialist countries on 8 April should not and cannot be considered as a step backward from resolution 1378 (XIV) of the United Nations General Assembly, as you stated. But I should like to add that the Western delegations and you yourself ought to take into account the circumstances which led the socialist countries to make the proposal contained in the document submitted last week.

During the first three weeks of our discussions we heard, first, the Western delegations proposing that we should abandon the recommendations of the United Nations General Assembly as formulated in resolution 1378 (XIV). Next, these same delegations thought fit to reaffirm their support for the recommendations contained in that resolution, while at the same time proposing that we should shelve the problem of general and complete disarmament and devote our discussions to examining partial control measures and the establishment of control without disarmament.

We have also witnessed something that becomes evident every time we compare our views, namely, the very different interpretations given to a great part, if not the whole, of the General Assembly resolution.

In these circumstances, if the socialist countries, in an effort to advance our discussions have thought they should bring together all the points discussed on which there do not seem to be any basic differences and to put before the Committee a document which will help us to define the purpose of our discussions, their character and the scope of the disarmament measures required for general and complete disarmament -- at least according to our interpretation of that idea; if they have thought they should lay down certain principles as to the manner in which general
and complete disarmament should be effected, eliminating all controversial aspects of the question of stages and the agreed number of stages; if they have referred to principles of effective international control for the purpose of verifying and guaranteeing that a programme of general and complete disarmament is carried out; and if they have proposed certain highly important measures which could have a very marked influence in increasing the security of nations throughout the world — can this action be described as a retreat or a step backward from the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly or as abandoning that resolution?

Is it not rather a constructive effort to facilitate comparison of the positions being taken here and, by thus comparing specific and precise points of reference, to try to arrive at common ideas and at mutual understanding of certain essential points — I will not even say principles — such as the goal of our work, the content of the concept of disarmament, the principle of control, the principle of stages and so forth?

Is this not a constructive effort to get our negotiations past one stage and prepare for the next?

To contrast the word "principle" with the word "measure", as Mr. Eaton did just now, seems to me an odd way of interpreting the General Assembly resolution, for if we do not succeed in reaching agreement, or if we do not make the necessary effort to reach agreement, on what we mean by "general and complete disarmament", on what we understand by "effective international control", or on how the programme of general and complete disarmament is to be executed, we can hardly expect to reach agreement on any disarmament measure whatever. How shall we be able to start examining any disarmament measure at all if the representatives of the Western countries refuse to join in the efforts made by the delegations of the socialist countries to arrive at a common understanding of the task we are called upon to accomplish here together.

Mr. MOCH (France) (translated from French): I wish to try to break the record for brevity this morning. And I should like to tell Mr. Zorin that Mr. Krushchev's proposal was not, as he said just now, the basis of the United Nations resolution. That is a fact we have often pointed out and shall no doubt point out again more than once. The proposal was not the basis of the resolution, but one of its bases and it was not even the first, for the text reads:
"Transmits ... to the Ten Nation Disarmament Committee for thorough consideration."

What?

"\textquote{1} the declaration of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of 17 September 1959,
\textquote{2} the declaration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of 18 September 1959,
\textquote{3} and the other proposals or suggestions ..." etc.

Hence, it cannot be said that Mr. Khrushchev’s proposal was the basis of the United Nations resolution, as is maintained by the representatives of the communist countries or, since the expression shocked one of them, the representatives of the States tending towards communism.

But in the course of this rather academic exchange of views I think I have understood at least one definition. According to Mr. Zorin — unless, of course, I have misunderstood him — a principle is a measure that does not dare to give its name, and a measure is a principle that has managed to get itself put into effect. Now if this double definition is correct, as I believe it is, how do you expect us, when we are opposed to putting some particular idea into effect, to accept it as a principle after having rejected it as a measure?

\textbf{The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): Does any other representative wish to speak? If not, I will read the communique:}

"The twenty-first meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament was held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 12 April 1960 under the chairmanship of the representative of the United States.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Wednesday, 13 April 1960, at 10:30 a.m."

If there are no objections the communique is adopted.

\textbf{The meeting rose at 12:15 p.m.}