FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWENTIETH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Monday, 11 April 1960, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. ORMSEY-GORE (United Kingdom)
PRESENT AT THE TABLE

**Bulgaria:**
- Mr. M. TARABANOV
- Mr. K. CHRISTOV
- Col. K. SAVOV

**Canada:**
- Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
- Mr. A.G. CAMPELL
- W/Cdr. R.J. MITCHELL

**Czechoslovakia:**
- Mr. J. NOSEK
- Lieut.-Gen. J. HECKO
- Mr. Z. TRHLIK

**France:**
- Mr. J. MOCH
- Mr. M. LEGENDE
- Col. L. CONVERT

**Italy:**
- Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
- Mr. L. DAINELLI
- Mr. D. PHILIPSON

**Poland:**
- Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
- Mr. M. LACHS
- Brig.-Gen. J. SLIWINSKI

**Romania:**
- Mr. E. MEZINCESCU
- Mr. C. BOGDAN
- Col. C. POPA

**Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:**
- Mr. V.A. ZORIN
- Col.-Gen. A.A. GRIZLOV
- Mr. A.A. ROSHOCHIN
PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:
Rt. Hon. D. OMRSBY-GORE
Miss B. SALT
Maj.-Gen. RIDDELL

United States of America:
Mr. F.M. EATON
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Rear-Admiral P.L. DUDLEY

Representative of the Secretary-General:
Dr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General:
Mr. W. EPSTEIN
The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): The twentieth meeting of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament is called to order. I have some remarks to make in my capacity as representative of the United Kingdom delegation, but I will gladly give the floor to anyone else who wishes to speak first.

As no one indicates a wish to speak first, I shall proceed.

At our eighteenth meeting we heard an interesting speech from Mr. Zorin, in which, after indulging in what I might term some not very constructive criticism of the Western plan he concluded that a state of deadlock had been reached. The Western delegations had, for the reasons which Mr. Moch had so ably expounded in his speech at the sixteenth meeting, felt bound to reject as a basis for our negotiation the Soviet plan presented by Mr. Khrushchev to the General Assembly and reintroduced by the Soviet delegation at this Conference. Mr. Zorin had just made a parallel rejection of the Western plan for reasons which, as indicated by Mr. Eaton in his speech at the nineteenth meeting, seemed to reveal considerable misunderstanding by the Soviet and East European delegations of that plan. It was therefore reasonable to ask in what direction we should now proceed. For my part, I was ready to consider any proposal which the Soviet delegation wished to make in the circumstances.

The proposal, when it came, was a simple one -- to take as a starting point the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly with which, as Mr. Zorin said, everyone is in agreement, and to proceed thereby, and I quote:

"... taking in the General Assembly resolution the general formulae regarding general and complete disarmament and from them working out and agreeing upon basic principles of general and complete disarmament." (TNCD/PV.18, page 27)

Unfortunately the effect of this apparently new approach was promptly spoiled by the presentation the very next day by the Soviet and East European delegations of a set of so-called "Basic principles of general and complete disarmament".

TNCD/4) The twist which this document gave to Mr. Zorin's suggestion of twenty-four hours before was, when I heard of it in London, a profound disappointment to me, a disappointment which I find on my return to Geneva is shared by all the other Western delegations. As Mr. Moch at once pointed out, the "new" Soviet paper had nothing new in it at all. Apart from a frill or two it was identical with the statement made to the press by Mr. Zorin on 25 March and repeated in essence by the representative of Czechoslovakia on 30 March in our Conference. It was, moreover, based very largely on the preamble to the Soviet plan as it had appeared in
the declaration of the Soviet Government of 19 September 1959, which in its turn was merely a paraphrase of stage III of that plan. In other words Mr. Zorin, having observed that the Western delegations were unwilling to accept further discussion of the Soviet plan as such, has attempted to smuggle its contents into our Committee room through the back door. How in these circumstances could he seriously have reproached the representative of France on Friday for what he called "a hasty reaction" to this attempt? Everyone in this room -- and indeed many in the world outside as well, -- has known all about the ideas now being solemnly presented to us as "new" for weeks, if not for a full six months. Surely Mr. Zorin cannot have thought that the sheep's clothing with which he sought to clothe them in his introductory remarks could for an instant disguise the familiar wolf within.

Can it be then that Mr. Zorin is really still unable to understand the reasons for which the Western delegations are unwilling to accept the Soviet plan as a basis for discussion? Can he not see, for instance, that it completely ignores the hope expressed in General Assembly resolution 1378 that we should seek to agree on "...measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control"? What are the measures leading towards the goal? They are not mentioned. The measures are in fact those to be taken in the remotest future at the very last stage of even the Soviet plan.

This leads me to make a further comment. It is obvious that these so-called "basic principles" are, most of them, not in fact principles at all but specific long-range measures. Perhaps there is a radical difference between the Russian and English use of the word "principles"; I do not know. Perhaps "measures" and "principles" are synonymous words in Russian.

But in any case I do not intend this morning to address myself in detail to the points which appear in the text of the Soviet proposal. I will only touch briefly on one as an illustration. In his speech last Friday the Soviet representative suggested that the question of time-limits was a subject on which there had been some rapprochement between the Western delegations and his own. I wish I could agree. At our ninth meeting on 25 March, I was most careful to make plain the difference in our eyes between "time-limits" and "forecasts". I explained that if a measure of, say, reduction of force levels was agreed, it would of course be necessary to set a limit to the period in which it must be carried out and verified. In all other respects time-limits either for a particular stage
or for a programme as a whole were quite unacceptable to us because they were quite unrealistic. Forecasts were a different matter, and any would-be prophet who wished to do so was naturally at liberty to make them. This position is as far from the proposal contained in point 2 of the text of the Soviet proposals as it ever was, since that paragraph continues to talk about "a strictly defined time-limit -- four years". It is as if all the admissions which we have dragged during the past few weeks from the lips of the Soviet and East European representatives about steps which would have to be taken before the beginning of their four-year time-limit had been completely forgotten. We had hoped that the admission of the need for these preparatory measures would have made the Soviet representative recognize the impractical nature of the proposal for a rigid time-limit.

The truth is that the whole character of this document is such that we are reluctantly bound to wonder whether it can seriously be regarded by the Soviet Government as a contribution to progress in our negotiations. If the need for disarmament were not so urgent and so serious, one could almost admire the skill of this attempt to pretend that only a few high-sounding phrases need to be exchanged between Governments for all the complexities of a problem which has vexed mankind for centuries to melt away.

I have before me another document which I can only interpret as another attempt by the Soviet delegation to distort the truth regarding the situation and to content itself with propaganda. On 4 April a memorandum was submitted to the Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Europe by the permanent Soviet representative to the European Office of the United Nations. In this memorandum -- circulated by the Economic Commission for Europe as document E/ECE/335 -- the Soviet delegation propose that there should be a study within the framework of the ECE of the economic aspect of disarmament. This starts with the following words:

"Given the United Nations' approval in principle of the Soviet Union proposal" -- I repeat, of the Soviet Union proposal -- "for general and complete disarmament..." (E/ECE/335, page 3)

When, I ask Mr. Zorin, did the General Assembly ever give such approval to the Soviet plan, in principle, in practice, or in any other way? Never, of course, but this has not prevented the Soviet representative here from making the claim. The document before me goes on to suggest that the ECE should make a study of the question of the economic consequences of disarmament from three angles:
"(1) the effect of disarmament on the development of intra-European and world trade;

(2) the provision of assistance to under-developed countries by apportioning part of the resources which will be released by disarmament;

(3) the effect of disarmament on the development of the economy of European countries and on the improvement of the living standards of the peoples." (ibid.)

This Soviet proposal to the ECE can have no purpose other than propaganda. It is clear that no study of the economic effects of disarmament could mean anything until agreement had been reached within our own Conference on the form disarmament was to take. It is also, in my opinion, grossly misleading to state that the United Nations has given its approval to the Soviet Union's proposals on disarmament.

I am very sorry if these words I have felt bound to speak this morning should have offended the Soviet representative or his partners, but their document on basic principles has disappointed me greatly. However, I should like to end what I have to say on a more hopeful note.

In reading Mr. Zorin's speech of last Friday I was struck by his attempt to find points of agreement between us, even though I cannot in all cases agree with him as to the nature of these points. I was particularly encouraged by three passages in his speech. First, on page 15 of the verbatim record of that day (TNCD/FV.19) I find that Mr. Zorin thinks there is a possibility that the differences between East and West on time-limits might be narrowed. I indeed hope that this is so, for they are at present a grave obstruction and have already consumed many hours of our time at this Conference.

Secondly, I see that he believes an understanding is possible on the question of ensuring the security of States in a disarmed world. I agree with him, for the smaller nations of the world who value their freedom would be most reluctant to sign a treaty which would leave them defenceless against an attacker when their present powerful allies were no longer in a position to come to their aid. They would need the protection of some impartial and international force such as the Western plan envisages.

Finally, and this point struck me with especial force, I noted with pleasure Mr. Zorin's statement that:
"It would certainly also be important if we now agreed upon some concrete measure that would show the whole world, which is following attentively the course of our negotiations, our determination to ward off the threat of nuclear war." (TNCD/PV.19, page 16)

He then went on to say:

"That would strengthen confidence between States and facilitate agreement on general and complete disarmament." (ibid.)

These remarks sound much nearer to the Western position than anything which I have yet heard in this Conference. They are in tune with that section of General Assembly resolution 1378 which records the Assembly as:

"Being convinced that any progress towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control will contribute to the achievement of these high aims".

The Western delegations have already suggested three ways to achieve this aim of making a start on the real problems which lie before us, of getting down to detailed discussion of concrete proposals. We have already offered a wide choice covering the preventive, the conventional and the nuclear fields. We think our suggestions practical and constructive. They have the advantage of being comparatively easy to approach, and any success achieved in them would reassure public opinion throughout the world as to the reality of the work this Conference is doing.

But if the Soviet delegation has something else to suggest, I am sure I can speak for all my Western colleagues in saying that we are eager to hear of it, that it will receive our closest attention and that we most earnestly hope we can agree and get down to business right away.

That concludes the remarks I wish to make on behalf of the United Kingdom delegation.

Mr. NOSK (Czechoslovakia): Mr. Chairman, I have listened very carefully to the statement you have just made as representative of the United Kingdom. Your statement will, of course, be studied very carefully and we shall come back to it at a later stage of our negotiations if this should prove necessary.

However, I should like at once to emphasize the astonishment of my delegation at your intervention today, which was made in the same spirit as the brisk reaction
of Mr. Moch last Friday. In our view, the negative approach of the Western
delegations to the new document (TNCD/4) submitted by the Socialist delegations
is not in compliance with the results achieved so far in the discussions of our
Committee. We think that if our Committee is to make progress it should at
certain stages confirm the rapprochement achieved or the agreements outlined and
on their basis continue its further work.

The new joint proposal of the delegations of the Socialist countries takes as
its starting point the situation which, in our opinion, has arisen after four
weeks of discussion in our Committee.

I would like, first of all, to summarize briefly the circumstances which in
our opinion create this new situation. In the course of the discussion which has
taken place in our Committee during the past four weeks the delegations of the
Western countries have continued to insist on taking the Western plan as the sole
basis for our negotiations on general and complete disarmament. The delegations
of the Western countries have persisted in their rigid standpoint despite the fact
that the delegations of the Socialist countries, in discussing various concrete
questions, have clearly stated that in their view the Western plan in no way
represented a programme of general and complete disarmament and that therefore it
did not meet the requirements of resolution 1378 (XIV). In this situation the
question arose, how should our Committee continue its discussions? I would like
to say that the delegations of the Socialist countries considered thoroughly all
relevant circumstances and all relevant aspects, and they arrived at the
conclusion that, despite all differences in approach to an understanding of various
questions of the task as a whole which has to be solved by our Committee, it was
possible to find a new common starting point, a new common point of departure, for
our further negotiations; and, in our view, this common starting point is the
rapprochement and even the unanimity achieved on certain points and certain
questions.

As was very correctly stressed by the representative of the Soviet Union,
Mr. Zorin, at our meeting last Friday, it is now important, in order promptly to
overcome the difficulties which have emerged in our work, to ascertain, first of
all, everything that brings us closer together, and not what divides the positions
of States participating in the Committee, and so to determine a possible common
basis for our further work aimed at achieving general and complete disarmament.
We consider as a positive result of our negotiations so far the fact that, as we see the situation, an agreement has been reached that the resolution of the General Assembly 1378 (XIV) is the basis of our work. The delegations of all the Western countries also have repeatedly expressed during the past days their opinion that the final goal of our work should be general and complete disarmament.

For instance, the representative of the United States, Mr. Eaton, in his intervention at our sixteenth meeting stated:

"I repeat again that my Government supports this resolution as strongly as any delegation here." (TNCD/PV.16, page 6)

Previous to Mr. Eaton, we heard the words of the representative of the United Kingdom, who said at our fifth meeting that the delegation of the United Kingdom accepted this resolution in toto. (TNCD/PV.5, page 25).

At our ninth meeting the representative of France, Mr. Moch, said: "We, too, want general and complete disarmament, under effective control..." (TNCD/PV.9, page 39)

Likewise, the representative of Italy explained at our tenth meeting that resolution 1378 (XIV) is in all its parts in accord with the wishes of the Italian Government, and he went on:

"We fully share the hope expressed in that resolution and are desirous that measures leading to the goal fixed should be worked out and form the subject of a common agreement in the shortest possible time." (TNCD/PV.10, page 101)

Finally, the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, confirmed at our eleventh meeting that the objectives of the Canadian delegation -- and I quote General Burns also:

"... are those laid down in the resolution -- all of them -- and in the precise terms of the resolution." (TNCD/PV.11, page 13)

In our view, all the statements account for the fact -- and I hope we are not wrong in this interpretation -- that the Western delegations agree that general and complete disarmament under effective international control is our common goal, and that resolution 1378 (XIV) of the General Assembly is the basis of the work of our Committee.

In our opinion it is necessary now to take this agreement as the starting point for our further negotiations and to do our utmost to ensure that our work moves forward, because our discussions so far have proved that for the time being it has not been possible to reach such a rapprochement of views of all members.
of our Committee as would enable it to work out practical provisions for an agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control in detail. It is necessary now, therefore, to explore a new approach to our main task and to explore new ways leading to its successful conclusion.

Starting from the view that the new approach to our negotiations on general and complete disarmament in the present stage of our deliberations can be based on the rapprochement of positions reached so far and on a certain unanimity of view on some points and on some questions, the delegations of the Socialist countries have submitted a proposal on basic principles of general and complete disarmament which represents a new point of departure for the discussions in our Committee and a new basis for further rapprochement of our respective positions. We think that if we reach an agreement on this proposal we shall be able to make a further step towards the more detailed elaboration of particular provisions and measures for a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. We consider the new proposal by the delegations of the Socialist countries, which is based on the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV), to be a new approach to our negotiations. As I have already pointed out, it takes as its starting point the agreement which exists on some questions, and it further develops this agreement. We deem this method to be reasonable and realistic.

We appreciate that the Western delegations wish to proceed with our work through the application of the method of rapprochement of views, which after all is the only practicable way for any negotiations, and in this connexion I would like to recall what was said in this regard by the representative of the United States, Mr. Eaton, last Friday.

"The reconciliation of differences is the essence of negotiation..."

(TNCD/FV.19, page 5)

We expect the delegations of the Western countries, in spite of the brisk negative reaction of Mr. Moch last Friday and in spite of today's intervention by the representative of the United Kingdom, to approach the proposal of the delegations of the socialist countries from the standpoints which I have just enumerated, to study thoroughly our new proposal and to tell us frankly and openly what, in this proposal, is acceptable to them, what is not acceptable, and why, what they would like to change or amend and what they would like to delete. We want to stress once again that the delegations of the socialist countries have submitted their new joint document as a basis for negotiation and that they do not exclude the possibility of proposals or
amendments which might be helpful for the achievement of the goal laid down by the United Nations resolution — that is, the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Our joint document emanates from the discussions in our Committee, which have already shown some major or minor rapprochement of positions on certain questions. The new proposal by the delegations of the socialist countries defines, first of all, the scope of measures — or, to meet the wishes of our Chairman, the scope of provisions — to be undertaken in order to achieve general and complete disarmament. At our twelfth meeting, the Czechoslovak delegation introduced, on behalf of the delegations of the Socialist countries, a list of the disarmament measures which in our opinion would constitute a programme of general and complete disarmament. These measures are enumerated in paragraph 1 of the new proposal of the Socialist delegations. In this connexion, we asked the Western delegations ten days ago whether they agreed with this list of disarmament measures; we still lack a direct answer to this question. Does this mean that the Western delegations have no amendments to this list? If the Western delegations have some amendments or some proposals to make, and it seems that they have, then let them tell us clearly what, in their view, the programme of general and complete disarmament — of which everyone is in favour, as has already been said — should include. Let the delegations of the Western countries submit a list of the measures or provisions the implementation of which, in their opinion, will bring about the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Last Friday, at our nineteenth meeting, the representative of the United States, Mr. Eaton, stated that the delegation of the United States was ready

"... to go as far along the road towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control as any delegation here." (ibid., page 4)

The delegations of the Socialist countries indicate in the newly submitted document TNCD/4 how far they are willing and ready to go along the road towards general and complete disarmament. Our goal is quite clear, our goal is to liquidate completely the military machinery of all States, to ban all kinds of war production, to liquidate all military bases on foreign territory, to withdraw alien troops from these territories and to disband them, to ban nuclear, chemical bacteriological and rocket weapons, to ban the production and destroy the stockpiles of these weapons to eliminate all institutions and establishments designed for
organizing military affairs of States, to ban all military training, to liquidate military schools and to ban the appropriation of funds for military purposes. These are the principles, these are the provisions and the measures which in our opinion will really lead to general and complete disarmament. It is up to the delegations of the United States and of other Western countries to tell us whether they are ready, as they have declared, to go as far along the road towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control as are the delegations of the Socialist countries.

The delegations of the Socialist countries propose in their new document that general and complete disarmament should be accomplished in an agreed order by respective stages. We believe that it has already been agreed generally in our negotiations that this programme should be accomplished progressively and in stages. In the view of the delegations of Socialist countries, the total accomplishment of general and complete disarmament, because of its urgency, should be carried out within a fixed time-limit. Therefore they are proposing — and I would stress this word "proposing" — the period of four years.

The delegations of the Western countries have pointed out in regard to the time-limit, in the discussions so far, that the realization of the Soviet proposals would take more than four years, because it would be necessary, before the entering into force of the agreement of general and complete disarmament, to discuss the reduction of armed forces, and armaments levels, of States which are not members of this Committee, at an extraordinary session of the General Assembly or at a world conference.

With regard to the duration of these preliminary negotiations, we are convinced that they would not take a long time because all Members of the United Nations not only voted in favour of resolution 1378, but were also all co-sponsors of the resolution. It was not only a question of Members desiring this at the last General Assembly, but it was also a fact that it was quite clear all Members were co-sponsors, because this resolution was submitted by 82 Powers. This is a very well-known fact.

Let us put this question aside for the present time and concentrate on the time-limit itself for the accomplishment of general and complete disarmament. Taking as a basis a realistic appraisal of the time needed for the accomplishment of general and complete disarmament, the Socialist countries propose a time-limit of four years. If the delegations of the Western countries have in mind another concrete time-limit I think it would be useful in our discussions if they declared frankly what time-
limit they would propose. I deem it unnecessary to recall that an eventual answer to the effect that such a time-limit cannot be fixed would be extremely unsatisfactory because of the fact already pointed out here, that if there were no time-limit set down for the accomplishment of general and complete disarmament, an effective control of its implementation would become impossible.

Already there has been reached a certain rapprochement of standpoints in our Committee on the question whether it is possible to determine an exact time-limit for the accomplishment of particular disarmament measures. If the possibility of setting down a time-limit for the accomplishment of concrete disarmament measures is admitted, already stated by Mr. Ormsby-Gore at our ninth meeting, or eventually even for whole particular stages, we believe that it should not be difficult to arrive at an agreement on time-limits for the accomplishment of the programme of general and complete disarmament as a whole, because this programme is, strictly speaking, the sum-total of particular concrete disarmament measures. It is just a question of adding together the separate time-limits for the various disarmament measures.

In the course of our discussions so far, it has been impossible to reach an agreement on the division of the particular measures of general and complete disarmament into particular stages. Therefore, as was already explained here by the representative of the Soviet Union last Friday, the delegations of the Socialist countries have not yet included this question in their new proposal, and they believe that it is possible to postpone its solution to a later date.

The proposal of the Socialist countries contains the basic principles of an effective international control which should be established for supervising the implementation of all measures provided for in the programme of general and complete disarmament. Even in this respect, our discussion has proved so far that an agreement on some essential aspects, and a rapprochement of views on other aspects, of control has been reached. First of all, full agreement has been reached on the basic principle that there must be no control without disarmament as well as that there must be no disarmament without control. Further, there is a provision in the new document of the delegations of the Socialist countries that the control should be international and that an international control organ should be established, with the participation of all States. We believe that there is agreement in this respect. This agreement was confirmed by the intervention of Mr. Eaton at our ninth meeting and of Mr. Moch at our eighth
meeting. In their new document, the delegations of the Socialist countries propose that the scope of control shall correspond exactly with the scope and character of the disarmament measures being carried out at each stage.

In all these questions, there is in our opinion no dissension, as -- to quote Mr. Eaton again -- the Western delegations themselves admit that disarmament and control must be commensurate.

Therefore it can be said that the third point of the Socialist countries' proposal does not contain any questions other than those on which agreement has been achieved already in principle. Our discussions so far have proved that the field of agreement on the question of control could be extended further.

In its next part, the new joint document of the delegations of the Socialist countries contains basic principles concerning the safeguarding of the security of States after the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament. We believe that it is possible, after all, to reach a rapprochement of views also in this question, in spite of the existing differences of opinion, if there is enough goodwill.

The argument often introduced by the delegates of the Western countries, that the whole military organization cannot be liquidated because of certain obligations assigned to Member States by the Charter of the United Nations, is based on an untenable conception completely disregarding the positively new situation which will be brought about in the world after the completion of general and complete disarmament. The Articles of the Charter concerning armed forces were formulated at a time when the world, at the end of World War II, was fully armed, and a potential threat to the peace by an act of aggression was foreseen. After the accomplishment of general and complete disarmament it will be impossible for such threats to peace and security, and such acts of aggression, to occur. On the contrary, those articles of the Charter which provide for the solution of controversial questions in relations among States by negotiation not involving use of armed forces -- as, for instance, article 41 of the Charter -- will fully come into application.

In this connexion I would like to remind the Committee of the words the representative of France, Mr. Moch, pronounced at our first meeting on the 15 March. If my recollection is correct it was the last sentence of Mr. Moch's statement:
"Let us all try to keep abreast of the times and deal with the problems as they arise in 1960, not according to the obsolete lessons of 1957."

Likewise we cannot look at the situation after the accomplishment of general and complete disarmament through the eyes of today. We cannot apply to that situation the teachings of the present time.

The document of the delegation of the Socialist countries further sets forth the principle that the implementation by States of the programme of general and complete disarmament cannot be interrupted by or made dependent on the fulfilment of any conditions not anticipated in the treaty. We believe that this standpoint is quite well founded and realistic and therefore the Western delegations will raise no objections against it. The proposal of the delegation of the Socialist countries is fully based on the Charter of the United Nations and on the powers of its organs for enforcing the implementation of the treaty on general and complete disarmament as well as for applying measures against any potential violation.

In the course of our negotiations so far the delegations of the Western countries repeatedly required our Committee to discuss concrete measures. In their new document the delegations of the Socialist countries propose such a measure which could be adopted immediately, without any delay. It is a solemn obligation by States possessing nuclear weapons that they will not be the first to use such weapons. This measure requires neither difficult preliminary negotiations nor control measures. The only thing needed for its implementation is the goodwill of the States concerned.

We cannot agree with the opinion expressed at our last meeting by the delegate of the United States, Mr. Eaton, who underestimated the importance of a similar step. We are of the view that the proposed measure in the form of an international obligation solemnly assumed by the Governments of the States concerned would have a far-reaching importance in the public opinion of the world. It would undoubtedly contribute to the strengthening of confidence in relations between the States; it would lead to the lessening of international tension and would create favourable conditions for negotiations on general and complete disarmament.
Mr. Chairman, we believe that the new proposal submitted by the delegations of the Socialist countries at our last meeting is a proof of serious endeavour aimed at a new constructive approach to further negotiations in our Committee. We are convinced that for all those who have set forth as the final goal for our discussions the achievement of general and complete disarmament, and who recognize as the basis for our resolution 1378 (XIV), the principles contained in our new document could serve as a starting-point for further negotiations on general and complete disarmament.

The proposal of the delegations of the Socialist countries intentionally puts aside the questions in regard to which there is still no basis for reaching agreement. At the present stage of our negotiations we consider it useful and profitable to look first of all for agreement on those questions which would serve as a basis for agreement. Therefore, the delegations of the Socialist countries in their new proposal concentrated, first of all, as I have already pointed out, on those questions of general and complete disarmament in which such rapprochement of standpoints have so far been reached in the course of our discussions. Nevertheless we are bearing in mind that it will be necessary for us to come back at a later stage to other questions on which differences of opinion still exist.

The delegations of the Socialist countries submit their new document as a serious basis for further discussions and, as I have already said, they are ready to discuss all amendments and all suggestions from the delegations of the Western countries aiming at the implementation of the task assigned to us by resolution 1378 (XIV).

The goal of the delegations of the Socialist countries is to reach the most extensive agreement possible on a text which would be acceptable to all of us. We expect that the Western delegations, if they really wish to accomplish general and complete disarmament, will approach the discussion of the document now submitted with all the seriousness it deserves. If Western representatives really consider General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) to be the foundation for our work, and strive for the achievement of general and complete disarmament, in our view it will not be difficult to make progress on the basis of the new document which has been submitted jointly by the representatives of the Socialist countries.
Mr. MOCH (France) (translation from French): You replied so well to the latest proposal made to us, Mr. Chairman, that I should not have asked to speak, as I agree with all that you said, if I had not been accused at our last meeting, by Mr. Zorin and other representatives of the communist States, of a "hasty" reaction. I did not like that word, and I wish to show that my first reaction has been fully confirmed by a careful reading of the text submitted to us.

Paragraph 1 of this text contains principles in conformity with which a treaty on general and complete disarmament should be worked out. Now these are all exactly the same principles as were already listed in the preamble to the Khrushchev plan of 18 September 1959 and put in a more condensed form at the press conference of 25 March 1960.

Thus there is no change here.

Paragraph 3 on international control already occurs in the preamble to the plan of 18 September and again in the plan itself, at the end of the third stage, where the provisions were more detailed than in the latest document.

Paragraph 4 on the composition of militia is already included in the preamble to the plan of 18 September.

Paragraph 5, to the effect that implementation of the disarmament programme may not be interrupted, is included in full at the end of the plan of 18 September.

Lastly, paragraph 6 — it is unnumbered, but it is the sixth paragraph nevertheless — on the undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, is a well-known provision to be found in a great many previous Soviet plans.

All that remains in paragraph 2, which I passed over. There is something new here. The stages have in fact been emptied of their substance, so that the elements can be reassembled differently if we choose; but I repeat that the elements are the same and that the overall time-limit for the three stages is four years, as in Mr. Khrushchev's original plan. Hence there is no now offer whatever, no willingness to compromise, but a mere propaganda device. As to the principles we reject in this text, we have already replied when examining the previous texts, and there is no need for me to prolong this statement, which I wish to keep short, by recalling our earlier replies and the reasons for our rejection.
Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Today's statements by Mr. Ormsby-Gore, the United Kingdom representative, and by Mr. Moch, the representative of France, who succeeded him, require consideration and, later, an answer. But in order that our discussion may become business-like and positive, I should like to draw attention to one point near the end of Mr. Ormsby-Gore's speech.

He said that he could strike a hopeful note in connexion with some of the views put forward by the Soviet delegation at our last meeting. He enumerated three points which gave him ground for that hope. He said, if I am not mistaken, that the Soviet delegation considered a rapprochement of our positions possible on time-limits for the implementation of the disarmament plan, on the security of States, and lastly on measures for averting the threat of nuclear war. Unless I am mistaken, those three points raised in the mind of Mr. Ormsby-Gore, the United Kingdom representative, some hope of a possibility of further fruitful discussion aimed, so far as I understand, at the working out of some acceptable agreements.

As I listened to Mr. Ormsby-Gore's remarks I involuntarily asked myself why he picked these three points out of the proposals submitted on behalf of all the socialist countries. In other words, why did he give his attention to paragraph 2 of these proposals, and then to paragraph 4, and to the unnumbered paragraph which Mr. Moch called paragraph 6? Why does Mr. Ormsby-Gore see no possibility of a rapprochement in our respective positions first of all on the ideas contained in the preamble to our proposal? That preamble contains in particular the following statement:

"The Governments of the States participating in the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament, being guided by the resolution on 'General and complete disarmament' adopted by the Fourteenth session of the General Assembly on 20 November 1959, accept as an urgent practical task the implementation of general and complete disarmament of all States ...." (UNGCD/4)

Does not the United Kingdom delegation agree with this provision? In pursuance of the General Assembly resolution, are we not bound to set ourselves the urgent and practical task of implementing general and complete disarmament? Do we disagree upon that question? It seems to us that on this point there should not be any disagreement between us. But if there are differences, we should like to know what they are and how they arose. This is my first point.
Further, the first paragraph of our principles of general and complete disarmament enumerates the most important measures which, taken all together, constitute in our opinion general and complete disarmament. Do not the United Kingdom delegation and the other Western delegations consider that general and complete disarmament must include such important elements as disbandment of all armed forces, liquidation of all armaments, cessation of all kinds of military production, liquidation of all bases on foreign territories, prohibition of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and missile weapons, cessation of their production and destruction of their stockpiles, abolition of military organs, prohibition of military training and so forth? Can there be no rapprochement of our positions on this matter, and cannot we arrive at a joint definition of what must be counted in when the formula of general and complete disarmament is spelt out? It seems to us that upon this question there is a basis for rapprochement and for a joint definition by all the delegations of the whole body of measures which must be included in the concept of "general and complete disarmament".

Mr. Hocch merely touched upon this matter in passing, and lightly brushed it aside, by pointing out that views on it had been put forward by the Soviet delegation on 25 March. The representative of Czechoslovakia has today recalled, however, that in the statement of the Czechoslovak delegation at our twelfth meeting, the elements of general and complete disarmament were described in detail.

Mr. Hocch simply said that, since the proposal was made on 25 March, it was not, properly speaking, a new proposal and there was therefore no need to discuss it. This is a very facile approach to things. We, too, can say that you made a number of statements at the beginning of our Conference and that, if you repeat them, those statements are no longer new and there is therefore no need to discuss them. We have come here, however, to try to find a common basis for our decisions.

Moreover, I must say plainly that, as the representative of Czechoslovakia quite correctly remarked, you have said nothing, my dear sirs, about this list of essential measures. You just said that it would not do; but why it will not do remains unexplained. If you are in favour of general and complete disarmament, will you state why you consider that general and complete
disarmament need not contain such elements as disbandment of all armed forces, liquidation of all armaments, cessation of all kinds of military production, liquidation of military bases, prohibition of nuclear weapons, and so on? Why? We fail to understand. And I believe we are not alone in not understanding it. We thought we could find points of contact on this question because, since we recognize that our objective is general and complete disarmament, I take it we must come to agreement on what constitutes general and complete disarmament. If we adopt this as our objective, we must be able to see where we are going, in what direction we are moving. It therefore does not seem altogether clear to me why Mr. Ormsby-Gore failed to mention this paragraph among those on which he saw a hope of a narrowing of our differences.

Lastly, in regard to stages of general and complete disarmament, Mr. Ormsby-Gore left that paragraph out also. He did not refer to this paragraph as one upon which rapprochement was possible. We do not quite understand why. You also repeatedly proposed at our meetings that the whole process of general and complete disarmament should proceed by stages. Is not the principle of stages for the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament acceptable to you? It seems to us that it is an acceptable principle. We proceeded from your own statement that there must be certain phases, certain stages. Why can we not agree to lay down that this is a principle on which it will be possible to base a concrete programme of general and complete disarmament?

Another paragraph which the United Kingdom representative failed to mention is paragraph 3, dealing with control. Why did he not mention this paragraph as one on which there might be hope of narrowing our differences and of adopting a formula common to us and acceptable to everybody? We have just proposed our formula in paragraph 3. You did not mention that formula; and for some reason, when enumerating the paragraphs upon which rapprochement was possible, you did not include this paragraph. Mr. Moch, desiring perhaps to amplify your statement, let fall one or two sentences on this matter, saying that here was a paragraph which formed part of the Soviet Government's proposal and which had been expounded at meetings of the General Assembly, so that it was not a new item and therefore was not to be discussed. This is pretty strange logic,
It is quite natural that our new proposals should contain a number of items which were stated in the General Assembly at its meeting of 18 September. This is quite natural, because what we are discussing is general and complete disarmament. When we deal with this problem, it is natural that a number of items relating to it should be repeated. Are there no repetitions in your proposals? Any number of them. You have today stated and repeated propositions which you put forward at our earliest meetings. There is nothing surprising in that.

We consider that, just by basing ourselves on our aim of general and complete disarmament, we can get together on a number of provisions flowing directly from the General Assembly resolution, including the provision on control. Why can we and you not agree upon a common point of view on the principles of control? What is unacceptable to you among the things we propose in paragraph 3? Tell us. If you want to alter anything, tell us. We are prepared to discuss it. We have put forward a proposal on the principles of control. We suppose that any agreement that may be reached will state the principles of control. This, I think, is perfectly clear, and it seems to me that you have emphatically insisted on it yourselves. If you insist on it, let us discuss what principles of control you deem acceptable for inclusion in the future treaty, in any agreement on general and complete disarmament. It is somewhat strange that the United Kingdom representative, when he spoke of the paragraphs in connexion with which he foresaw the possibility of a rapprochement of our positions, for some reason did not mention this paragraph, although it would seem that our positions concerning it are quite close. I should say that upon our main, initial positions there are no particular differences between us.

So I will sum up my misgivings about the United Kingdom representative's speech. He enumerated a number of paragraphs on which he saw some hope of rapprochement of our positions, but he failed to enumerate a number of paragraphs to which I have just referred:

First, the paragraph stating that general and complete disarmament was an urgent practical task.

Secondly, the enumeration in paragraph 1 of the basic elements of this general and complete disarmament at which we aim — the spelling-out of the concept of general and complete disarmament.
(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

Thirdly, the principle of stages for solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament.

Lastly, the principles of control in connexion with the implementation of general and complete disarmament.

Those are the four paragraphs which we believe to constitute a basis for a possible rapprochement of positions but for some reason were not mentioned by the United Kingdom representative. If there is a difference of approach to the substance of these paragraphs, then we would request an explanation of this approach, so that we may discover upon what basis we could agree and what are the outstanding differences to be overcome. We will put our heads together and try to overcome those differences.

These were the preliminary remarks which I wanted to make on the speech of Mr. Ormsby-Gore, the United Kingdom representative.

Mr. Eaton (United States of America): Mr. Zorin, over the last month I have come to see that all around this table there are men of considerable intelligence, and yet you put this forward as something new and novel. I do not believe any of us are fooled by your statement. Had you put this forward saying "We have not changed our position at all since last September; we still believe what we believed then and we want to go on talking about it", then I do not think there would have been any problem. We would just recognize that you are still where you were then. But to put this forward as something new does not, I think, deceive any of us because it is not new and novel. I have no objection, but it is the presentation of it as a novelty that comes as a surprise because I am not sure that there is anything new in it. That is all I have to say.

Mr. MOOH (France) (translation from French): In so far as Mr. Zorin alluded to the few remarks I made just now, I should like to reply.

Mr. Zorin asks us what we criticize in the principles enumerated in paragraph 1. Allow me to reply, entirely without malice, that we have already given our answer more than once, and that I cannot do better than read out again part of a statement I made on behalf of the five Western delegations on 5 April. On that day, I first said:

"We cannot agree to restrict ourselves to a hard-and-fast time-limit, for experience teaches us that even the simplest negotiations invariably last much longer than anyone foresees." (TNOD/PV.16, page 23)
We find that the hard-and-fast time-limit is retained, and is four years, in the new text as in the old.
I said, a little later:

"We cannot accept the drastic conclusions in the Soviet plan. Neither can we do away with all military organizations, because the United Nations Charter imposes upon us obligations which we cannot disavow without violating the Charter. Moreover, before the complete abolition of national armies, we must set up an international organization equipped with all necessary means of stating the law and of enforcing its decisions." (ibid., page 24)

We find that, in the new text as in the old, all military organizations are to be abolished within four years, before any international organization capable of really ensuring peace is set up.
I added:

"We cannot agree to base nuclear disarmament on solemn but completely uncontrollable declarations such as a prohibition of such weapons or of keeping stocks of them." (ibid.)
I should like to know how we could proceed under this system of total abolition -- which is not new -- apart from unilateral declarations of that kind.
I also said:

"We cannot at any time, either during the preliminary discussion, in the agreement to be concluded, or yet during its subsequent implementation, separate a disarmament measure from its corresponding effective control." (ibid.)
I am bound to point out in this connexion that Mr. Eaton put forward precise proposals for the discussion of control in a concrete case, that the representative of Italy made a statement on the proposed international disarmament organization, that I myself asked a number of questions about control, and that so far we have had no reply, except perhaps this morning when Mr. Zorin said, if I heard correctly, "Let us discuss control". But he added: "... within the framework of general and complete disarmament"; in other words, he implied "in the context of my proposals".
Finally, I added, by a kind of premonition:
"Lastly, we cannot agree to include in the preamble to our future agreement measures regarding which none of us knows when or how they can be put into effect. Their inclusion at the beginning of the treaty would be interpreted outside this conference room as committing our Governments, and we will only enter into commitments which we know we can fulfil." (ibid.)

Those are some of the considerations, among many others, which answer the question Mr. Zorin put to me just now. Of course, if in order to make progress he is today prepared to do what he refused to do before, namely, to discuss paragraph 3—the control principles—we are willing to do so. But he must not think that discussion of paragraph 3 means approval of paragraph 1.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): In my capacity as representative of the United Kingdom I would like to make a few brief remarks in reply to some of the statements made by Mr. Zorin who developed, if I may say so, a rather novel attack upon my speech earlier this morning.

The main criticism he seemed to have was of the points over which I was prepared to agree with him. Broadly speaking, my criticism this morning was that the proposals put forward by the Soviet Union and its allies last Friday were not new or novel—as has already been stated by Mr. Moch and Mr. Eaton. Having said that, however—and that was my main criticism—I thought it useful to examine Mr. Zorin's supporting speech, in which there did appear to me to be signs of hopeful developments in our negotiations. For instance, I picked up his remarks about time-limits, because the exact words which he used on Friday are of importance. I find that he then said:

"We think these discussions have shown that our positions have to some extent come closer together in our recognizing that some time-limits can be fixed, if only for certain disarmament measures, has been recognized."

(TNCD/FV.19, page 15)

That, of course, comes very much nearer to our own point of view, because we have always said that if there were agreement on a specific measure of disarmament there would have to be a date and a time when that measure came into operation. Therefore, in the closing parts of my remarks, while having expressed my acute disappointment at the lack of anything new or novel in the proposals which the Soviet Union had actually tabled, I said that nevertheless there were remarks in Mr. Zorin's supporting statement which did give me more hope with regard to the progress we might make in these negotiations.
It was interesting to listen to Mr. Zorin this morning after we had listened to the representative of Czechoslovakia, because Mr. Zorin really made no attempt to defend the new proposals as new or novel. He said, in fact, that we should not have expected them to be new or novel, that we knew the position of the Soviet Government and it was therefore quite natural that the proposals put forward were exactly in line with the previous position of the Soviet Government. He therefore very much agreed with us, and that is exactly the attitude we have to these proposals. We would not criticize them because they are not novel. We criticize them because they are in fact an almost verbatim re-statement of the proposals of last September and yet are being put forward as new and novel proposals. It is that which we criticize, and that is what I criticized in my remarks, but I hope I indicated in my later remarks that there were nevertheless hopeful developments in the speech which Mr. Zorin made last Friday.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): This morning we have heard numerous explanations by representatives of the Western Powers, though given only in summary form, concerning the proposals we submitted to the Conference last Friday. I certainly do not intend to make a statement on these explanations. It should be noted, however, that a rather strange method of criticism is being applied to the proposals we have submitted. A facile attitude is being adopted, which consists in denying everything summarily, accepting nothing, and simply saying: that is all propaganda, so we cannot agree to these proposals.

A second argument, which was put forward only a few minutes ago, first by the United Kingdom representative and then by the representative of the United States, is that these proposals are not new. I think that when the representatives of the Western countries talk about new proposals, or ask for new proposals, they undoubtedly wish the socialist countries' proposals to be in line with their own. But this is rather difficult to achieve and is certainly asking rather a lot of the representatives and delegations of the socialist countries. Why? First, our proposals cannot have that novel aspect which certain delegations here are seeking, because our position is based on the resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly over six months ago, and because we still uphold the general principles embodied in that resolution.
We have, however, attempted to give our proposals a new look by presenting them — together with certain changes we have introduced — not as a plan, but rather as principles which we could follow in drawing up a plan, in taking measures.

In his statement last Friday, the United States representative said that his country's attitude was flexible, and that since the reconciliation of differences is the essence of negotiation, the United States was prepared to discuss any proposal which showed promise of agreement, and its delegation was ready to sit until agreement had been reached. We now find that the Western delegations are rejecting our proposals out of hand. Indeed, to claim that what Mr. Moch read out just now from his statement of a few days ago does not amount to summary rejection of our proposals would not be in accordance with the facts.

The Western delegations have not criticized our proposals point by point and they have not shown that these proposals do not provide for general and complete disarmament. Secondly, which is even more important, they have not submitted their own proposals on those points. The Western delegations have merely asked that the Committee set to work by their method, which is to take one by one the disarmament measures proposed in the first two parts of their plan, to discuss these measures in detail — starting with the control measures — and then to fix the time-limits for putting them into effect.

But what will this lead to? The Committee will have to discuss, one after another, all the measures proposed by the Western delegations, and it will take dozens of years before disarmament can be effected. To examine the proposed measures in detail would require discussion for such a length of time that, as Mr. Martino, the representative of Italy, said the other day, it would amount to postponing any specific disarmament measures sine die.

We therefore consider that the new proposals we are presenting, the concrete measures to which Mr. Moch has just referred, should be examined not as separate measures, but in the context we have indicated. We all know that this does not mean only the context of the Soviet plan — which is also the plan of the other socialist countries — but also the context of the resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly.

Thus I think the Western delegations should make an effort to explain their specific objections to our proposals and try to discuss the measures we are putting forward as conducive to the adoption of certain rules through which general and complete disarmament, the goal of our discussions, could be achieved.
Mr. BURNS (Canada): What I wish to say may possibly appear to lead away slightly from the discussion we have had up to the present, but it seems that we have agreed — and this has been said by speakers both for the West and for the Eastern countries — that the proposals which were put forward on 8 April have nothing very new in them. I therefore think it would perhaps not be inappropriate to go back to some of the matters that were being discussed before 8 April, last Friday, and try to get some clarification on the Eastern position on certain points: I am encouraged to do this because the Chairman, in his remarks when opening the meeting this morning, referred to his being encouraged by three passages in Mr. Zorin's speech of last Friday on areas on which there were possibilities that the viewpoints of the Western delegations and of the Soviet and other Eastern delegations might come together. One of these was the question of time-limits, and today Mr. Zorin has mentioned another possible area where delegations from East and West might come to hold closer views — that is, the question of stages. What I have to say, which arises out of some remarks made by Mr. Zorin at our eighteenth meeting, relates to both the question of timing and that of stages.

At our eighteenth meeting Mr. Zorin said (cf, TNCD/PV, 18, pages 15 and 16) that I had misunderstood the procedure to be followed in implementing the Soviet plan for general and complete disarmament. I acknowledge that what Mr. Zorin subsequently said considerably changed the idea that we, the representatives of the Western nations, had held of the process intended for carrying out the Soviet plan. I should therefore like to place on record, as a result of Mr. Zorin's speech, what I now understand the Soviet Union proposes in this regard. Our previous understanding, or misunderstanding, was derived from statements made by the representative of Poland. At our eighth meeting he said:

"In agreement with other delegations of the socialist countries represented on the Ten Nation Committee, I should like to clarify certain matters. Our delegations are of the opinion that preliminary talks will be necessary in order to prepare an international treaty on general and complete disarmament. In the course of those talks it should be possible to arrive at an agreement on the contents of the disarmament plan, procedure, the order to be followed and the time-limits for the implementation of the various measures of disarmament, and the scope and character of the control measures. Agreement of that kind should apply to all stages of the plan for general and complete disarmament."
"Those talks should take place, according to the Soviet disarmament plan, before a start is made with the implementation of the plan for general and complete disarmament.

"It is envisaged that there would be a special session of the General Assembly or a disarmament conference as proposed in the Soviet plan before the signature of the treaty on general and complete disarmament. Once agreement with regard to the treaty had been reached among the ten Powers represented in this Committee, there would be no difficulty with regard to such a conference or session of the General Assembly. All questions concerning other States would, of course, have to be settled with their agreement and participation." (T3CD/PV.3, page 7)

I draw your attention particularly to the sentence which I have just read. We took it to mean that all States would have to agree to participate in the plan for general and complete disarmament. What is meant by "all States"? The clause in the Soviet plan says, "... a special session of the United Nations General Assembly or at a world conference on general and complete disarmament". (A/4219, page 14) Clearly this implied that the authors of the plan had in mind that the conference would include at least all the members of the United Nations, and presumably other States as well.

In support of this interpretation we may quote the definition of "general and complete disarmament" given by the representative of Czechoslovakia, and I quote from page 14 of the verbatim record of the third meeting:

"The term 'general disarmament' means that disarmament measures include all States. General disarmament means that it is impossible to approach disarmament measures which involve only certain States or a group of States while other States stand aside ..."

"'General disarmament' means further that it includes all armed forces and all weapons. What do we mean by 'complete disarmament'? ... the carrying out of such measures as would lead to the complete liquidation of armed forces and armaments as well as of all military institutions and organizations in all States without exception." (T3CD/PV.3, page 14)
Then, again, in the eleventh meeting, the representative of Poland said:

"... that there would be a special session of the United Nations General Assembly or a disarmament conference 'before' - I repeat 'before' - 'the signature of the treaty on general and complete disarmament'. So I fail to see what grounds certain representatives have ... for continuing to maintain that we require the four-year period to include not only the execution of the plan, but also the preliminary discussion and the special session of the United Nations General Assembly or the disarmament conference." (TNCID/FV.11, page 28)

So we, the Western delegations, understood that there was to be a special session of the General Assembly, or a world disarmament conference, to discuss the plan of general and complete disarmament proposed by the Soviet Union, followed by the signing of a treaty by all States without exception, after which implementation of general and complete disarmament could begin.

However, in the eighteenth meeting Mr. Zorin, after referring to my apparent misunderstanding of the Soviet Union plan, said that it clearly states what would be the task of the special session of the United Nations General Assembly or the world disarmament conference and that one of the measures to be taken would be a reduction of the strength of the armed forces of other States to levels to be agreed on at a special session. Mr. Zorin went on to say:

"Only one question is raised here so far: reduction of the strength of the armed forces ... to levels which must be agreed upon." (TNCID/FV.18, page 16)

After some remarks on the explanation given by Messrs. Martino and Cavalletti as to how they thought that States other than those represented here might adhere to a treaty or agreement for a new disarmament organization, Mr. Zorin suggested that a similar method could be followed in regard to an agreement on force levels. He said:

"... why should it be inconceivable that we, the ten States, should agree on the main stages of general and complete disarmament, on all the stages and measures concerning us ten, and that as regards the force levels of certain other States, these would then be able to associate themselves with this treaty in a manner similar to that which you propose or at a world conference which would discuss a limited range of questions on which it would be possible to agree?" (ibid., page 17)
This appears to be something very different from Mr. Naszokowski's previous statement which we interpreted as indicating that the special international conference or the special session of the General Assembly would discuss the whole plan for general and complete disarmament, which was then to be put into a treaty.

It further seems that we can infer from a passage in Mr. Zorin's speech that the levels of forces referred to would be those which would obtain at the end of the first stage of the Soviet plan. It is true that Mr. Zorin said, and I quote from the verbatim record of the eighteenth meeting:

"This will relate to the levels in both the first and the second stages". (ibid., page 16)

I can scarcely believe that Mr. Zorin could have meant to include the words "and the second stage" because at the end of the second stage of the Soviet plan the national armed forces retained by States would have been completely disbanded, and the States would only retain the police forces for internal security purposes. If this measure, with related measures, were proposed so far as other States were concerned, it would hardly come under the head of "a limited range of questions on which it would be possible to agree" such as Mr. Zorin said might be discussed at the conference.

If indeed Mr. Zorin's meaning was that the discussion at the world conference could relate to measures, including the reduction of forces, to take place up to the end of the first stage of the Soviet plan, this certainly brings the procedure which they propose much closer to that proposed by the five Western Powers, that is, for the second stage of our plan, clause F, which provides for

"... a disarmament conference with other States having significant military capabilities, called to consider their accession to the disarmament agreement, including their acceptance of appropriate reductions or limitations of their respective force levels and armaments". (TNCD/3, page 4)

I cannot be sure that the interpretation I have given to Mr. Zorin's remarks which I have quoted from the eighteenth meeting is correct; I certainly hope that it is so, as it would mean that the respective views of the Western and Eastern delegations on this point are coming closer together.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I do not propose to go into any detail just now concerning the remarks that have been made in reply to mine. I think it would be more useful if I did so at later meetings. I should just like to draw attention to two points: one in Mr. Mook's statement, and one in Mr. Ormsby-Gore's.
The following passage occurred in Mr. Moch's statement:

"... Mr. Zorin said, if I heard correctly, 'Let us discuss control'. But he added '... within the framework of general and complete disarmament'; in other words, he implied 'in the context of my plan, of my proposals'. That is what I understood from the simultaneous interpretation.

If this really is what Mr. Moch meant when he spoke just now, I am obliged to say that it is a quite incorrect approach. We are indeed proposing that all questions, including questions of control, should be discussed within the framework of general and complete disarmament. That is correct. But why should this be in the context of Mr. Zorin's plan only? Why should the plan of general and complete disarmament be the context of the Soviet delegation only? Why? After all, you too voted that general and complete disarmament should be the goal of our work. Is a plan for general and complete disarmament not your context? That is something we have to know. To enable us to go on with our work we have to know whether you want to work on a plan of general and complete disarmament or not. We are very proud to hear it said that it is our context, but it seemed to us that it is your context too. If that is not the case, please explain.

My second remark is about Mr. Ormsby-Gore's speech. It seems to me that Mr. Ormsby-Gore altered my idea--this may perhaps be some sort of parliamentary way of doing things--in order to show that it corresponds with the view the Western delegates have of it. When we spoke about our proposal we said that it represents a really new approach to our future work. In that sense it is of course new. To make out that I declared and agreed with your view that this is an old proposal and that I too consider it an old proposal is not in accordance with the facts. I must disappoint you: I do not agree with you there. Nor, probably, do you agree with me. But you have tried to make out that we, the Socialist countries, agree with you in your estimate of this proposal we have submitted. We consider it a new approach to a solution of the problem before us. What we consider old in this proposal is that it is a proposal for general and complete disarmament. That really is old. But if you are against this old element, then you are fighting against the very resolution for which you voted.

That is all I wanted to say.
The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): Does anyone else wish to speak? Then shall we turn to the communique:

"The twentieth meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament was held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 11 April 1960 under the Chairmanship of the representative of the United Kingdom.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 12 April 1960 at 10.30 a.m."

All agreed? The communique is adopted and the meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.