FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE SECOND MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Wednesday, 16 March 1960, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria)
PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Bulgaria:  Mr. M. TARABANOV  
           Col. K. SAVOV  
           Mr. K. CHRISTOV  

Canada:  Mr. E.L.M. BURNS  
          Mr. A.C. CAMPBELL  
          W/Cdr. R.J. MITCHELL  

Czechoslovakia:  Mr. J. NOSEK  
                 Lieut.-Gen. J. HECKO  
                 Mr. Z. TRHLIK  

France:  Mr. J. MOCH  
         Mr. M. LEGENDRE  
         Mr. L. PERILLIER  

Italy:  Mr. G. MARTINO  
        Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
        Mr. L. DAINELLI  

Poland:  Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI  
        Mr. M. LACHES  
        Brig.-Gen. J. SLIWINSKI  

Romania:  Mr. E. MEZINCESCU  
          Mr. N. MELINESCU  
          Mr. C. BOGDAN  

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:  Mr. V. A. ZORIN  
                                     Col.-Gen. A.A. GRYZLOV  
                                     Mr. A. A. ROSCHEIN
PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Rt. Hon. D. ORMSBY-GORE
Sir Michael WRIGHT
Miss B. SALT

United States of America:

Mr. F.M. EATON
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Rear-Admiral P.L. DUDLEY

Secretariat:
Personal Representative of the Secretary-General:

Dr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Personal Representative of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN
The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from French): As no objection has been raised to the methods of procedure previously agreed between the delegations, I shall consider them adopted. The text is as follows:

"Agreement on Procedural Arrangements

Agreement has been reached by the representatives of the ten Nations on the following matters. Modifications may be made by agreement of the ten Nations.

1. **Nature of Meetings**
   
   All meetings will be private, except when agreed otherwise by the ten Nations.

2. **Time of Meetings**
   
   There will normally be one meeting per day at 10.30 a.m. Mondays through Fridays. If experience proves that this time creates difficulties for any Delegation the matter may be raised again for further discussion.

3. **Publicity and Communiqué**
   
   Publicity by or on behalf of the conference will be limited to the communiqué following each meeting. The draft communiqué will be prepared by the Chairman of the day and approved by the ten Nations. It will normally refer to the chairmanship of the meeting, any new documents tabled, agreements reached and the time of the next meeting. Delegations reserve the right to brief the press as regards their own positions.

4. **Languages and Records**
   
   The languages of the conference will be English, French and Russian and there will be simultaneous interpretation into each of these languages. The right is reserved for delegations to request consecutive interpretation, but wherever possible advance notice of the request should be given to the Secretariat. Verbatim records will be furnished in the three languages.

5. **Seating and Chairmanship**
   
   Delegations will be seated in English alphabetical order and the chair will be taken in rotation by the ten Delegations in English alphabetical order.

   The first speaker on my list for this meeting is the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Ormsby-Gore, and I now call upon him to speak.

Mr. ORMSBY-GORE (United Kingdom): I have been asked by my fellow representatives from Canada, France, Italy and the United States to present to the first working session of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament the plan which
represents the proposals for comprehensive disarmament of the five Western members of this Committee. I will have copies of the plan circulated to all delegations and I would like to ask the Secretariat to issue this document as a Conference document.*

It is usual on these occasions to start with a history of previous negotiations. This time I shall dispense with anything of the kind, not only because I do not think that such a retrospect would contribute much to the success of our discussions but also because I do not wish to revive old controversies at a moment when the thoughts of us all should be fixed on the future. I would only like to say that whatever the results of the work done by my Government and other governments associated with us today on the disarmament question it has always been our sincere intention and resolve to achieve real and comprehensive disarmament as soon as humanly possible. Quite apart from moral considerations it is a matter which I believe is in our common interest. There is no reason either of ideology or of national advantage why we should wish the present state of horror armed half-peace and recurrent international tension to continue. Nor is our aim to tilt the balance of force in our favour so as to dominate or intimidate the rest of the world.

Everyone is agreed that disarmament is in itself a most desirable and necessary development. Why? What are its fundamental objects? As I see it, they are two-fold. To start with, the present level of world armaments is fantastically expensive. As I said at the General Assembly of the United Nations last year, "there are innumerable projects which would benefit our own country and the whole of humanity if some of the resources at present devoted to armaments were available to us." Even more important, disarmament is necessary to create confidence among the nations -- confidence that they will not be attacked by other nations or groups of nations, and thus prevent panic measures or miscalculations which might lead to war.

It is above all towards this need to create confidence that the plan which I shall have the honour to present today is directed. As we see it, any disarmament plan which is to provide a solid foundation for the process of building up confidence must be based on three essentials.

Firstly, the plan must not at any stage give a significant military advantage to one country or group of countries over others. From this it follows that disarmament must be comprehensive, world-wide, and must embrace all kinds of

* Subsequently circulated as document TNCD/3.
forces and weapons, the so-called conventional forces and weapons as well as modern nuclear forces and weapons. No one who has considered the horrors which would result from nuclear war -- and which of us has not? -- can fail to sympathize with the feeling that it is above all nuclear weapons which we must succeed in eliminating. But nuclear disarmament by itself would merely leave certain countries with an overwhelming superiority in conventional forces and weapons, and this lack of balance between forces of different groups of countries would accentuate suspicions, heighten tension, and thus increase the risk of war. And once a war had broken out -- even if it started as a conventional war -- it seems certain that it would eventually become a nuclear war in spite of measures which might have been taken to prevent this ultimate disaster. What scientists have constructed before they can construct again and next time much more quickly. We have therefore to control and eventually get rid of the power of nations to wage war of any kind, and to do so in such a way that while the process of eliminating armaments is going on no one nation or group of nations acquires a dangerous military preponderance over another.

The second essential element required for the maintenance of international confidence during and after the process of disarmament is that of effective control. It is no use blinking the fact that suspicion exists between nations, and they will not be convinced that their neighbours have in fact reduced their forces until they have proof of it. It must be the object of a control system to furnish such proof. Disarmament must at all stages be effectively verified. I entirely agree with what has often been said, that control is a means to an end, not the end itself. Control without commensurate measures of disarmament is not our objective. But, equally, disarmament without control could not produce the confidence at which we are aiming. I am glad to note the advance that there has been over the last few years towards the acceptance of the idea of effective control. It is our very earnest hope that we shall be able to agree during the course of this conference on satisfactory measures to supervise each step of the disarmament process so that all those concerned can be assured that disarmament is really increasing their security.

The third essential element needed for the creation of confidence is that of steady progress towards a definite and openly declared final goal. Confidence is like a living organism, it is something which must grow gradually; it cannot be established in a flash of time, from one day to the next. This means that any
disarmament which is to produce confidence must proceed by stages. Incidentally, this steady advance towards the final goal should also help us in advancing towards the settlement of outstanding political problems, the confidence created by steady progress in disarmament will help us to find solutions to those problems, and the new confidence created by these political advances will in its turn aid the disarmament process. This interaction could bring us most important benefits.

To these three essential elements of disarmament — that it must be comprehensive, under effective control, and carried through steadily by stages — I wish to add one other which though not strictly part of the disarmament process is yet necessary to establish and maintain the confidence between nations which must be one of the mainsprings of disarmament. This is that there must exist at the end of the disarmament process some machinery for maintaining international law and order in a disarmed world, some international body charged with keeping the peace and able to do so. I shall be saying more of this, and of our proposal for dealing with this aspect of the matter, in the detailed explanation of the Five-Power plan to which I shall now turn.

Turning from the general to the particular, that is to the presentation of the plan which the five Western delegations jointly propose as a practical means of approaching and solving the vast and complicated problem of disarmament, before I comment on the details of this plan, it might be useful if I explained the basic principles upon which the plan is founded. These arise from our philosophy with regard to disarmament, of which I have already been speaking.

The first basic principle is that the plan is a complete and comprehensive one, providing for complete and comprehensive disarmament. It covers all types of weapons, conventional, non-conventional including nuclear weapons, and the means of delivering them; the production of weapons; the accumulation of military stocks; and all armed forces. The final aim of the plan is stated in its third section. This is to reduce "... national armed forces and armament ... to levels required by internal security and fulfilment of obligations under the United Nations Charter ..." It requires nations to dispose of the armaments thereby rendered surplus, finally to eliminate all nuclear, chemical, biological and other weapons of mass destruction; to ensure the use of outer space for peaceful purposes only; to establish control of the production of agreed categories of military missiles and existing stocks and their final elimination; to introduce effective international control over
military budgets; to complete the establishment of international organizations and arrangements to preserve world peace; and to control the production of all types of armaments which still remain in being.

The second basic principle of this plan is realism. It is a practical plan. We do not ask that in the present state of international relations countries should make a great act of faith and subscribe to far-reaching commitments before there is some practical demonstration of goodwill on all sides. The consequence of this is that the measures we propose in Stage I are modest measures which do not call for elaborate verification and inspection. By way of illustration I would draw your attention to paragraph 6 of Stage I which provides for the collection of information on present force levels and on armaments pertaining to land, sea and air forces possessed by the various Powers, to be "based mainly on declarations by States according to predetermined and mutually agreed criteria". We believe that this approach, which only demands the installation of minimum verification machinery, should be acceptable to all concerned and should contribute to the building up of confidence between us. The illustration I have given deals with force levels, but on examination of the plan you will find that the same principle of the progressive installation of control is observed throughout. This runs from Stage I into Stage II and thus we hope that the whole of Stages I and II can be regarded as a composite and practical programme on all items in which parallel progress can be made. The modest control machinery provided for in Stage I calls for little more than the creation of the International Disarmament Organization to receive, collate, and verify the declarations provided for, and the installation of some form of physical control over the depots into which specified arms are to be placed.

Another principle which springs from that which I have just mentioned is that the measures of progressive control proposed at each stage of disarmament should be effective in practice. This is achieved by the gradual building up, throughout the plan, of the International Disarmament Organization, until it eventually achieves complete capability to supervise all the measures of disarmament.

Thus the plan which we propose is comprehensive in its objective, realistic because modest in its beginnings, carefully balanced with regard to conventional and nuclear disarmament and practical. Indeed it is because of our desire to be
practical that we have omitted any specific reference to the timing of the various stages. We do not lay down in advance a hard and fast programme which takes no account of the difficulties which may arise on the way. We recognize, however, that there must inevitably be a gradual advance through stages of increasing disarmament and the introduction of progressively more far-reaching controls before the means of achieving the ultimate goal of the plan can be determined. But let it not be thought that because we have set no specified time limit we seek to postpone effective decisions. That is not the case. As soon as the necessary foundation has been laid we wish to embark on practical measures. In this connexion I would draw your attention to the introductory paragraph of Stage II which states that: "The following measures will be undertaken as rapidly as possible upon successful completion of relevant preparatory studies outlined in I". Without in any way limiting ourselves or tying ourselves down we think it might be reasonable to try and complete the measures in Stage I in say one year.

It might now be useful if I seek to trace, by reference to the details of the plan, the manner in which we suggest some of our problems should be dealt with.

Since the threat and cost of nuclear weapons are perhaps uppermost in the minds of us all, I will start with them. First, you will notice in Stage I, in paragraph F.2, that a joint study will be undertaken immediately on measures to assure compliance with an agreement on prior notification of missile launchings; parallel studies will be undertaken on measures to assure compliance with an agreement to discontinue the manufacture of fissionable materials for weapons purposes — the so-called cut-off — and on arrangements required to transfer fissionable material from past production to non-weapons uses.

Then, in paragraph A of Stage II it is prohibited to place into orbit or station in outer space vehicles capable of mass destruction. In paragraph B of Stage II the International Disarmament Organization must be notified according to predetermined and mutually agreed criteria before missiles are launched and the location of launching sites and places of manufacture of such missiles must be declared. In paragraph C of Stage II the "cut-off" of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes takes place, immediately after the installation and effective operation of an agreed control system; but this measure, I must point out, is conditional on satisfactory progress in conventional
disarmament; otherwise we risk the nuclear and the conventional getting out of balance. In paragraph D of Stage II it is provided that, in parallel with this, agreed quantities of fissionable material shall be transferred to non-weapons uses under international supervision and control. And in paragraphs B.1 and 2 of Stage III the final goal is set out: prohibition of production of nuclear weapons, further transfer of fissionable materials to peaceful uses and, finally, elimination of nuclear weapons altogether. Paragraph B.4 of Stage III envisages, in a similar way, the final elimination of military missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

A similar gradation can be traced in disarmament insofar as it affects conventional armaments. Paragraph D of Stage I provides for immediate limitation of the level of armed forces and for the storage under international supervision of certain armaments once the International Disarmament Organization has started to function. On the basis of a study provided for in paragraph F.8 of Stage I, paragraph F of Stage II, recognizing that a few States cannot be expected to disarm below a certain level whilst other States retain conventional armaments and armed forces without restriction, provides for a general disarmament conference with all other States having significant military capabilities. As a result of this conference, under paragraph G of Stage II, force level ceilings for those other States will be fixed and it will also be decided what types and quantities of armaments they should place in storage depots. Finally, again, in paragraphs A and B.8 of Stage III, the plan sets out the ultimate goal of reduction of armed forces and armaments to the minimum, and total control over all armaments production.

As I have said, the plan is realistic in that it strikes a necessary balance between disarmament in conventional weapons and disarmament in nuclear weapons. It links them together in paragraph C of Stage II, where, as I have noted already, it is provided that the nuclear "cut-off" shall take place — and I quote — "conditional upon satisfactory progress in the field of conventional disarmament".

In parallel with the steps of physical disarmament proposed in the joint plan, the all important International Disarmament Organization, which is to supervise and enforce the whole process, grows in authority, stature and complexity. In paragraph A of Stage I, the International Disarmament Organization is established. In paragraphs B and C of Stage I the Organization starts to
receive information about space vehicles and conventional armaments. In paragraph D, the Organization verifies the immediate initial limitations proposed on the level of armed forces. In paragraph E the Organization starts to receive information about the military expenditure of states.

Turning to Stage II, in paragraph A the Organization polices the prohibition against placing vehicles capable of mass destruction in outer space. In paragraph B the Organization is notified of proposed launchings of missiles. In paragraph C the Organization undertakes control of the nuclear "cut-off" and in paragraph D supervision of the transfer of fissionable material to non-weapons uses. In paragraph E the functions and work of the International Disarmament Organization include the supervision of the measures agreed upon to reduce the dangers from surprise attack. In paragraph G the Organization expands those of its functions which concern the control of conventional armaments to include all militarily significant states. In paragraph H the Organization also establishes measures to verify information about military expenditure already received from states.

Then, in paragraph B of Stage III, the International Disarmament Organization ultimately becomes responsible for supervision and enforcement of comprehensive disarmament throughout the world.

I have already referred to those provisions of the plan which cover control of missile launching sites and the adoption of measures against surprise attack. Whilst not perhaps measures of disarmament in the strict sense, these provisions are important. They are relevant to disarmament in the period during which comprehensive disarmament will not yet have been achieved. They also bear directly upon the question of international confidence, which affects the readiness of states to undertake disarmament obligations. There is no doubt that the installation of an effective system to protect states against a sudden attack by missiles or more conventional armaments would make it much easier for us to agree on how we should disarm.

Finally, the joint plan provides, in stage I, F.7, stage II, J, and stage III, B.6 for the progressive establishment of an international organization to prevent aggression, to preserve world peace and security and to enforce international law as purely national armaments are reduced. In our opinion it is essential to the achievement of our final goal of comprehensive disarmament that such an organization should exist and function effectively. As paragraph F.7 of stage I
suggests, this organization should be established within the framework of the United Nations. It is perfectly clear, however, that if it is to function satisfactorily and to do the things which it is intended to do it must not be frustrated and rendered impotent by the actions of a single power or group of powers. It is unrealistic, we think, to talk about disarming to the point of having internal security forces only, lightly equipped, without providing any machinery to consider and decide disputes between states.

For this first presentation I have perhaps said enough on the detail of the plan. However, there are two points on which I have already touched to which I should like to return because, to my mind, they are very striking and of considerable importance to us.

The first of these is referred to in paragraph F.1 of stage I and also in paragraph A of stage II, that is, provisions to ensure that weapons of mass destruction -- particularly, of course, nuclear weapons -- are not placed in orbit above the earth. This may seem to be legislating for the fantastic and to be more appropriate, perhaps, to a schoolboy's space fiction magazine than to serious international consideration, but I do ask my colleagues most earnestly not to treat the matter lightly.

To-day it is unquestionably possible to put very large weights, which could embrace nuclear weapons, into orbit round the world. It is not yet possible to bring them back to earth at a precisely selected spot. Let us be thankful for that, but let us not assume that it will remain impossible for long. We have ample evidence of the speed of scientific research and we should be very unwise to assume that the technical problems will not soon be mastered. Then we shall have reached a point of no return. We passed one such point in 1947 when we missed the golden opportunity to ensure that nuclear energy was not used for any but peaceful purposes. We do not want to miss another such point of no return. We must ensure that nuclear weapons are never put into orbit round the world by anyone. Then, even when the scientists devise the means of bringing orbiting bodies back to a predetermined point on the earth, the fact need cause us no alarm.

It is for this reason that we have attached great importance to measures dealing with outer space and have introduced them at an early stage in our plan.

The second point I would like to stress in this plan for comprehensive disarmament is the provision it makes for the gradual building up of an organization to keep world peace as purely national armaments diminish. For
peace is our aim and it is as a contribution to the preservation of peace that our disarmament proposals are designed. Reduction of the means of making war can reduce the chance of war happening, but it does not entirely eliminate that possibility. It would be foolish not to recognize that, at the end of the road, the forces that would be quite legitimately retained to maintain the internal security of a large and powerful country could still constitute a threat to a smaller neighbour with no protection except its much smaller internal security forces. We seek to cater for this situation, and in doing so we seek no selfish advantage. We are convinced of the need for the gradual development of some authority before which all nations would stand equal and in which all could trust to ensure that their sovereign rights and integrity were protected.

Such an organization, working within the framework of the United Nations, would need to develop effective conciliation machinery to help in the settlement by peaceful means of disputes between nations. It would require judicial machinery to dispense justice and to uphold international law. Clearly, too, such an international peace-keeping organization must be equipped with some form of final sanction to ensure that justice can be enforced and that the law-abiding are protected from the law-breakers. Our plan does not attempt to set out the details. We look forward to working these out with all our colleagues round this table. However, I must emphasize our conviction that a disarmed world without an international peace-keeping authority would not necessarily be a secure world, a peaceful world, or a just world. The recognition of this truth is vital if we are ever to achieve our ultimate goal of comprehensive disarmament.

Finally, I should like if I may to say one or two words in my capacity as the United Kingdom representative at this Conference.

You will recall that the United Nations resolution on disarmament, adopted by the General Assembly on 20 November 1959, transmitted to our Conference "for thorough consideration" the declarations, made in the Assembly, by the United Kingdom on 17 September and by the Soviet Union on 18 September. Some of you may, therefore, be wondering why I have not introduced a purely United Kingdom plan. It is because my Government considers that this five-power plan embodies all the essential features of the proposals outlined by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd last year. That outline has been filled in and developed, and it now takes the much more detailed form you see before you. My delegation considers it is acting in complete conformity with the spirit of the United Nations resolution in lending its wholehearted support to this five-power plan.
Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):

We have listened with attention to the comments and explanations just given by the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, speaking on behalf of the five Western delegations, in connexion with the proposals on general disarmament submitted by them to our Committee.

I shall heed the advice given yesterday by Mr. Ormsby-Gore to a number of delegations not to evaluate those or other proposals too hastily, and I shall refrain from making comments of any kind today either on the substance of the Western Power's proposals or on the explanatory comments made this morning by the representative of the United Kingdom. Like the representatives of other delegations, I hope to give patient study to all the details of the plan, and to express at the proper time the views of the Soviet delegation about the proposals. I hope that this study will not be so protracted as the study that is being given to the Soviet Union's plan, which was submitted six months ago. I trust that the representative of the United Kingdom, and the representatives of other countries also, will very soon express themselves in concrete terms on our plan, which will facilitate its consideration, more especially since it was for this very purpose that the proposal was transmitted to our Committee by the United Nations General Assembly.

Today we should like to make a few additional explanatory remarks upon the programme of general and complete disarmament, which was submitted in September last by Mr. Khrushchev, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union.

As you will recall, on 18 September 1959 the Soviet Union put before the General Assembly of the United Nations a broad programme for general and complete disarmament, which envisaged such disarmament being carried out by all States over a four-year period. May I remind you that under that plan, all armed forces must be disbanded, all armaments abolished, and all military production brought to an end within four years. Finally, and for all time, nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and rocket weapons will be prohibited, and stocks thereof destroyed. All
military bases on foreign territories will be liquidated, and foreign troops located there will return to the confines of their national territories. War ministries will be done away with, as will general staffs and all other military bodies and organizations. No one will any longer be taught the arts of war, and a halt will be called to the expenditure of wealth for military purposes. As a result of the execution of such a programme of general and complete disarmament, States will be left with no more than small contingents of police or militia of agreed size, armed with small arms only, for the maintenance of law and order and the security of civilians. All these measures will be carried out under strict and effective international control.

This Soviet programme of general and complete disarmament was, as I have had occasion to say already, referred by a decision of the United Nations General Assembly to this Committee for thorough consideration. In order to facilitate the Committee's task, the Soviet delegation finds it necessary to offer some additional explanations of the programme submitted.

The Soviet disarmament programme envisages the realization of a whole series of measures for general and complete disarmament in three stages, covering a four-year period, under appropriate international control. What has been the guiding motive in constructing this plan? What will be the time limits within which each of the three stages is to be carried out? How is control of the implementation of the proposed disarmament measures to be ensured at each stage?

In developing this programme of general and complete disarmament, we took into account, first and foremost, the fact that, neither technically nor politically, would it be possible at one fell swoop, as it were, to carry out such an immense undertaking -- simultaneously to abolish all armed forces, destroy all armaments and all the stocks of weapons. That would, of course, create serious technical problems, inasmuch as States nowadays possess powerful and large armed forces and armaments, the elimination of which would demand a certain amount of time. Similar difficulties would be experienced on the political plane for under the conditions of the distrust still prevailing between States, no State obviously would agree to dispense immediately with all its armed forces and armaments. We also took into account the further important consideration that a programme of general and complete disarmament must not be dragged out over too long a period, for excessively tardy implementation of the programme would not remove in
the immediate future the fearful threat of a nuclear missile war -- a threat which hovers over mankind, which grows daily, and which could help the opponents of disarmament to disrupt the realization of the programme proposed. We believe that not a single day should be allowed to go by without concrete and specific steps being taken in the field of disarmament.

Taking all these considerations into account, we came to the conclusion that for the achievement of a programme of general and complete disarmament it was quite feasible and practicable to set a limit of four years. This, we consider, gives quite sufficient time to carry into effect the necessary measures for the liquidation of all armed forces and armaments and, at the same time, it would not be too long a period of time.

As we see it, a programme of general and complete disarmament must start off with some concrete measure whose realization would by itself constitute a serious step towards the elimination of the military apparatus of States. In expressing this view the Soviet Union bases itself on the fact that, even before beginning to carry out a programme of general and complete disarmament, agreement will be reached on complete discontinuance of the testing of nuclear weapons of all types, which will in itself be a first step towards a cessation of the arms race and the beginning of nuclear disarmament.

As a significant measure in the first stage of the programme of general and complete disarmament it would seem advisable to provide for the reduction of the armed forces of the Soviet Union, the United States of America and the Chinese People's Republic to a level of 1,700,000 men, of the United Kingdom and France to a level of 650,000 men and of all other States to levels that would be agreed upon at a special session of the United Nations General Assembly or at a world-wide conference on general and complete disarmament. The figures proposed for the reduction of the armed forces of the great Powers were, as will be remembered, listed earlier in documents presented also by the Western Powers, and even in the programme for partial disarmament measures, and therefore, in our view, should not evoke any objections from those Powers. It goes without saying that, parallel with the reduction of armed forces, it is necessary to reduce also the conventional armaments of States in corresponding proportions.
What would the execution of this measure mean? As a result of the reduction of the armed forces of States to the above levels, a total of up to 700,000 men in the military formations of the United States and the Soviet Union respectively and proportionate numbers of troops in other States would be disbanded.

The experience of the Soviet Union and of a number of Western States shows that hardly more than one year or at the most one and a half years would be needed to reduce armed forces to such an extent. In this connexion, I may remind you that the reduction of the armed forces of the Soviet Union between 1955 and 1958 by 2,140,000 men required about three years; in other words, we reduced our armed forces annually by about 700,000 men.

This means that from the organizational point of view a reduction of armed forces by about 700,000 men is quite feasible over a period of twelve or eighteen months. We consider this to be quite feasible also from the political point of view. Such a significant reduction of armed forces would be evidence of the serious intentions of the great Powers in the matter of removing international tension, and of their determination to carry out a policy of peace and to create real confidence between States. Consequently, organizational and political considerations favour the possibility of carrying out significant reductions in armed forces during the first stage which can be fixed as covering one to one and a half years.

With regard to controlling the reduction of the armed forces of States in the first stage of the programme of general and complete disarmament, we believe that such control must guarantee the execution by all States of the commitments respectively undertaken. How is such control to be organized? We can envisage such control as taking the following form. When the measures embodied in the first stage of disarmament begin to be put into effect, an international control organ will be established to which States will supply information about their armed forces and conventional armaments. The control machinery will begin to operate simultaneously with the disbandment of the troops which are to be reduced in the first stage, so that the international controllers can be sure that States are complying exactly and strictly with the agreed measures for such reduction.

At the second stage of general and complete disarmament it is also proposed to carry out large-scale measures of disarmament, to complete the disbandment of the armed forces left in the States, to abolish all military bases on foreign territories, to repatriate within national boundaries and to disband all foreign
forces that are today located on foreign territories. Since the result of carrying out the measures in the first stage will be to strengthen confidence between States and since useful experience will also have been obtained in effecting the disbandment under international control of armed forces, we expect that measures in the second stage can be carried out at a somewhat faster rate than in the first stage.

In practical terms we believe that the complete demobilization of the armed forces of, for instance, the United States and the Soviet Union, which, at the beginning of the second stage, would each have 1,700,000 men, would not need more than one and a half or, at most, two years. During this same period it would be quite possible to take such steps also as the liquidation of bases on foreign territories, the withdrawal of foreign troops from these territories to within their own national frontiers and the disbanding of such troops, as well as the cessation of all types of conventional armament production.

Naturally, the measures taken during the second stage will be subject to the same strict international control as those of the first stage. For instance, in order to ensure that States fulfil their obligation to destroy their military bases on foreign territories, international inspectors will have to be sent to such bases and given the opportunity of supervising all measures taken for the liquidation or destruction of these bases.

In the third stage the Soviet programme for general and complete disarmament provides for the destruction of all types of nuclear weapons and missiles, and the final complete elimination of the whole military apparatus of States. As a very great deal of work will have been done during the two earlier stages in connexion, first, with the reduction and then with the complete liquidation of armed forces and armaments, as the control system will already be functioning smoothly and there will now be an immeasurable increase in confidence between States, the third stage will not be very difficult to carry out and will require about one year.

Here, then, is the substance of the Soviet programme for general and complete disarmament. We consider that it is a programme for solving the disarmament problem, in the shortest possible time, which is not only radical in content but also thoroughly realistic.

What, in fact, are the essential pre-requisites for a programme of general and complete disarmament if it is to be realistic?
First of all, such a programme must provide for a system of concrete practical measures to ensure the gradual but complete liquidation of all the armed forces and armaments of States. The Soviet programme embodies precisely such measures. Each stage of the programme provides for absolutely specific measures: the reduction to relatively low levels, and then the complete abolition of armed forces, the prohibition of particular types of weapons, coupled with the destruction of existing stocks of such weapons, the liquidation of various elements of the military apparatus of States. Each of these measures is a practical matter and an integral part of the operation to eliminate completely from our planet all means of waging war.

We consider that this approach to the problem of what kind of measures are required for disarmament at each stage is the only correct one and is most important. Any other approach, for example, as the inclusion in a programme of general and complete disarmament of such "measures" as the study or discussion of various problems and aspects of disarmament, would mean that this programme would immediately lose all its reality and concreteness and could be used by the opponents of disarmament to drag out discussion endlessly and to stave off the practical achievement of disarmament indefinitely.

The realism of the Soviet programme for general and total disarmament lies in the fact that it provides for concrete action by States in the sphere of disarmament from the very first day of the first stage. This is another point on which we set great store, since any departure from the concrete, practical character of the measures to be taken in order to bring about disarmament, even for the first stage of the programme, would raise doubts about all the later steps also.

From our point of view it is also highly important that time-limits be fixed for the completion of both the overall programme of general and total disarmament and also of each of its stages. It is self-evident that no disarmament programme can serve as a guide to action in this direction unless a time-limit is fixed for its implementation. A refusal to set a time-limit for completing the disarmament programme and for the various measures envisaged as part of it would give the disarmament programme an entirely indeterminate character and would create favourable conditions for one State or another to evade carrying out the programme. Moreover, it would be impossible to keep a check on such a programme, for no one would know within what time-limits any particular part of it must be completed.
But the fixing of definite time-limits for the implementation of the disarmament programme as a whole, and for each of its stages severally, is precisely what gives the Soviet programme an entirely realistic and business-like character.

If a programme of general and total disarmament is to be realistic, it is obviously essential to maintain the principle that no one State must gain any advantages whatsoever over another State when implementing the programme. It would be impossible, for example, to call a programme realistic if that programme envisaged, let us say, a substantial reduction in the armed forces of some States while at the same time other States were permitted to maintain their armed forces at the former levels. Such a proposal would, of course, suit some States but not others. How can a disarmament programme be called realistic in such circumstances?

The same could be said too of a programme which obliged some States to renounce, for example, the means already at their disposal for delivering intercontinental nuclear missiles while it allowed other States to maintain very advanced military bases in foreign territories from which nuclear missiles could be delivered to the target by other forms of carrier. This, too, would indicate a complete lack of realism in such a disarmament programme.

No one can fail to see that the Soviet programme for general and total disarmament gives no State any advantage at any stage. Therein lies its obvious realism.

Another factor of immense importance is a realistic approach to the question of control over the implementation of the general and complete disarmament programme. Our view is that realism must here take the form of control which is, on the one hand, effective and, on the other hand, appropriate to the disarmament measures which are being taken at any particular stage. It would be unrealistic to make control ineffective for this could lead to individual States evading compliance with their obligations in the sphere of disarmament, and such evasions would endanger peace. It would be just as unrealistic, while the disarmament programme is being implemented, to endow the control organ with powers for controlling armaments which still remain at the disposal of States under the terms of the treaty, for these powers could be used for intelligence purposes and could, naturally, not be accepted by States jealous of their own security,
A characteristic feature of the Soviet programme for general and complete disarmament is its completely realistic approach to the control question. The programme provides for the establishment of effective international control, at all stages, over the fulfilment by States of their obligations in the sphere of disarmament, but does not give the control system any other functions whatsoever which are not directly related to disarmament measures. It is self-evident that the Soviet programme is based on the possibility of giving control a comprehensive character as regards the achievement of general and complete disarmament when States will not need to hide anything from one another and intelligence activities will no longer have any point.

What we have said justifies us in concluding that the Soviet programme for general and complete disarmament, which in its content corresponds to the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly on this question, is at the same time entirely realistic, practicable and feasible. It must be added that an indication of the realism and feasibility of the Soviet disarmament programme is the readiness of the Soviet Union and the other socialist States to conclude a general and complete disarmament treaty on the basis of this programme and to implement the provisions of such a treaty with unswerving strictness.

Mr. ORMSBY-GORE (United Kingdom): I only wish to make one small point because if I can clear up this matter now it may prevent misunderstandings later on.

I believe it was the Romanian representative who yesterday referred to the absence from the plan now put forward by the five Western Powers of any reference to the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. He indicated that this was something which had been changed since the introduction of an outline plan by Mr. Solwyn Lloyd at the United Nations. The Soviet representative to whom we have just listened also made some reference to the question of nuclear weapon tests. In view of this I should like to make the position of my Government quite clear. If my colleagues will look at the speech which the British Foreign Secretary made at the United Nations they will find that he used these words: "If, as we very much hope, agreement is reached at the present conference between the Governments of the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, that agreement should be endorsed by other nations" (A/PV.798, para. 49).
That was the first measure he mentioned in his outline disarmament plan. Of course, it will be readily apparent to all my colleagues that it will not be possible for other countries sitting round this table to endorse a plan which is not yet agreed upon. Therefore, that particular measure does not feature in the disarmament plan which I have submitted to the Conference today.

That is the explanation and I would add, of course, that my Government will continue to work diligently in the three Power Conference to bring about an agreement for the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests.

Mr. NWZINGIJSCU (Romania) (translation from French): I shall certainly follow the advice of the United Kingdom representative and shall re-read, say between now and tomorrow, the speech the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom made at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly.

From what the United Kingdom representative said, I understand he was confirming what I said yesterday, namely, that the plan submitted by the five Western Powers does not mention an extension of the agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests which, we all hope, will be concluded on this question. That is exactly what I meant when I spoke yesterday. The plan submitted to the fourteenth session of the General Assembly in its first stage included precisely such a measure -- if I remember correctly, and I shall also verify that point.

I venture to hope that now, three or four months after the end of the General assembly's session, we really are a little nearer to an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests than we were at the time when the United Kingdom plan was submitted to the General Assembly -- on 17 September 1959.

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from French): If no one else wishes to speak I should like, before adjourning the meeting, to read the communique we propose to issue:

"The meeting of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament was held on 16 March 1960 at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of the representative of the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

"The representative of the United Kingdom presented the general disarmament plan submitted by Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States of America."
"The next meeting of the Conference will take place on Thursday, 17 March 1960, at 10.30 a.m."
Are there any objections?

**Mr. Ormsby-Gore (United Kingdom):** I think the normal procedure is for the communique to state the actual title of the document submitted. It is quite a small point but could the communique not state that "the United Kingdom delegation introduced the document" and then the title of the document would appear in the communique.

**The Chairman (Bulgaria) (translation from French):** As I understand it, the United Kingdom representative thinks that the title of the document submitted is not given in full in the communique. The French text of the document distributed is exactly as mentioned: "Plan de désarmement général". It only says "désarmement général". Perhaps we should go by the English text. We could also say "Joint Five-Power Disarmament Plan". Would that be satisfactory to the United Kingdom representative?

**Mr. Ormsby-Gore (United Kingdom):** The document which we circulated and which we have asked the Secretariat to circulate as a Conference document is entitled: "A Plan for General and Comprehensive Disarmament in a Free and Peaceful World submitted by Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America".

**The Chairman (Bulgaria) (translation from French):** Does anyone else wish to raise objections with regard to the communique to be issued?

If there are no objections we will, I think, embody in the communique the title mentioned by the United Kingdom representative.

The meeting tomorrow will be at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12 noon.