FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE NINETEENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Friday, 8 April 1960, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)
PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV
Col. K. SAVOV
Mr. K. CHRISTOV

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. A.G. CAMPBELL
W/Cdr. R.J. MITCHELL

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. NOSEK
Gen. J. HEČKO
Mr. Z. TRHLÍK

France:

Mr. J. MOCH
Mr. M. LEGENDRE
Col. L. CONVERT

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. L. DINELLI
Mr. D. PHILLIPSON

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
Mr. M. LACHS
Mr. J. SLIWINSKI

Romania:

Mr. E. MEZCINGESCU
Mr. C. BOGDAN
Col. C. POPA

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.A. ZORIN
Gen. A.A. GRYZLOV
Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:
Sir Michael WRIGHT
Miss B. SALT
Maj.-Gen. RIDDELL

United States of America:
Mr. F.M. EATON
Mr. G. McMURTRIE GODLEY
Rear-Admiral P.L. DUDLEY

Representative of the Secretary-General:
Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General:
Mr. W. EPSTEIN
The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I declare the nineteenth meeting of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament open. The representative of the United States, Mr. Eaton, is on the list of speakers, and I call upon him to speak.

Mr. EATON (United States of America): To begin with, I am certain that all the representatives here would like to join me in expressing to our host, the Swiss Government, our condolences and deep regret at the news of the death last night of a great Swiss soldier and public servant, General Henri Guisan, a man who had a full life and who led his country with honour and distinction during many difficult years. General Guisan was a man above political parties, and a great patriot. I would like to propose that this Conference request that an expression of our regret at his passing be transmitted by the head of the secretariat to the Swiss Federal Council, if that proposal meets with the general agreement of the delegations here.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian). Are there any objections? If not, silence gives consent.

Mr. EATON (United States of America): Now I would like to say that Mr. Zorin's statement of yesterday will be carefully studied. We shall not reply to the second portion of this statement until it has received the consideration which it merits. In the meantime, however, I would like to address myself to the first section of Mr. Zorin's intervention in which he indicated that there were still certain misconceptions regarding the Western plan, and these I will try today to clarify.

We have again heard the allegation that the United States and its Western associates are unwilling to carry out the terms of the United Nations resolution. I can only repeat that we are prepared to go as far along the road towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control as any delegation here. We are prepared to go along that road until we reach our ultimate goal, and as far as we can see our ultimate goal differs from that of the Soviet Union in a few, but a few every important, respects. The first and the major difference is the complete lack in the Soviet plan of any effective international control
and international peace-keeping organization. Our ultimate goal must include an organization capable of carrying out adequate inspection and control to determine whether agreements are violated, a means of deterring or redressing violations if they occur, and means to ensure that a disarmed world is not a world of anarchy where small States are at the mercy of their larger neighbours.

Now I fear, from Mr. Zorin's remarks of yesterday, that he has still not entirely understood our position, either in respect of its basic aims, as outlined above, or in respect of its more detailed provisions. I shall try again to explain some of the latter, those to which he referred yesterday.

On the question of our flexibility, his interpretation of the attitude of my delegation towards the method of proceeding with our work was completely erroneous, and I think that when I say that I can speak for all of the delegations on the Western side.

Mr. Zorin implied that though his Government was prepared to discuss other plans, my delegation was insisting that only the Western plan, in its present form and without change or discussion, was the only one that we were prepared to discuss at this Conference -- at least, that is what I understood from his remarks. This is completely erroneous. If that had been our attitude, there would have been no purpose in our coming here. We could simply have sent along the plan and said: "Adopt it, or do not adopt it". We could have saved ourselves the journey. The reconciliation of differences is the essence of negotiation, and we have come here for the purpose of achieving the broadest possible common areas of agreement on concrete disarmament. We are prepared to discuss proposals that are in line with our proposals. We have discussed the Soviet proposal and have said that it is not acceptable as a basis for negotiation because, among other reasons, it would bog us down in endless discussion of general concepts, in various stages of disarmament, from beginning to end, before we could proceed with the important matters lying immediately before us -- specific discussion of concrete measures and their verification.

The United States delegation is prepared to explore various concrete measures. We have said that the only way to determine whether we can get on with the job is to find out if we can agree on the concrete measures, and their verification, that can be taken first: then, after we have sorted out and agreed to those measures which lie immediately before us and can be undertaken immediately, we can proceed to define the next set of concrete measures and their verification, and so on.
Within this context and this approach we are now prepared to discuss any specific disarmament measures which show promise of early agreement and verified implementation, and which fall within the general scope of the first stage of our plan, which is included under paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Allied proposal. When these first stage measures have been agreed we are prepared to continue sitting here to discuss further measures leading towards our ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under adequate and effective international control. I repeat these last words, because I have gone through Mr. Zorin's statement of yesterday and, although doubtless he did not want to lengthen it by including them, they are included in the resolution which has been referred to here so many times. It does not say, "general and complete disarmament" and stop there: it says, "general and complete disarmament under effective international control."

I fear that this is one of the basic differences between our two plans. The Soviet plan does not envisage any effective international control. In the early stages there are statements that there will be an international control organization, but we are unable to find out what that means. We are unable to determine of what it will be constituted. We are unable to determine where it will be set up, or what its powers will be. We have just the bald statement, and an unwillingness to tell us more about it.

Further, we feel that when these first measures have been taken, and we move into the final stages, effective international control will demand some form of peace-keeping machinery sufficiently effective to prevent large nations from running over their smaller neighbours.

These matters are absent -- completely absent -- from the Soviet plan and therefore it is, perhaps intentional that the Soviets, in addressing themselves to the resolution, neglect to mention those words, "under effective international control."

I turn now to the matter of force levels and armaments, which is dealt with in the first stage of our plan and is part of a complement of measures. Mr. Zorin said that the first stage of the Western plan

"does not provide for any disarmament measures at all, and only establishes ceiling force levels of 2.5 million men each for the Soviet Union and the United States, mentioning some undefined 'agreed appropriate force levels' for some other States not named in the plan." (TNCD/PV.18, page 20)
In referring to the reduction to 2.1 million men for the United States and the USSR, Mr. Zorin indicated that this too did not envisage any general disarmament measures. Speaking of the third stage of the allied plan, he conceded that this did contain measures for reducing force levels and armaments of all States, but complained that we had refused to say when and how those measures could be implemented.

I would like to make this comment in further explanation of the Western plan and in order to try to disabuse the Soviet Union representative, and perhaps others here who labour under some misconception. Mr. Zorin indicates that an initial agreed ceiling of 2.5 million men for his country and mine has no disarmament significance. At the same time, we have frequently heard from the Soviet side that Mr. Khrushchev's announced intention to carry out a unilateral 1.2 million troop reduction is of great significance to disarmament, although Mr. Khrushchev goes to some pains to indicate that he is building up his military capability and the totality of his armaments. At the present time there are no ceilings to prevent either the United States or the Soviet Union or any other country from increasing its forces. We are proposing the establishment of troop level ceilings initially for the United States and the USSR at 2.5 million men, with appropriate armament reductions; I wish to point out again that these are tied together, ceilings beyond which we will not go and armament reductions as a part of the same measure. This, in our view, is a disarmament measure and certainly of more significance than a mere announcement of a unilateral intent to reduce force levels without any mention of armaments and without any agreement that they could not at any moment be increased. I shall not labour the unilateral action which the United States has taken during the past fifteen years. We had forces of 12 million men; we have reduced those forces to 2.5 million men. If you take Mr. Khrushchev's figures, in 1955 the Soviet forces numbered 5.7 million. The United States forces were only 2.9 million men, about half the size of the Soviet forces. In 1960, according to Premier Khrushchev, the Soviet forces now number 3.6 million men; the United States forces number 2.5 million men.

I believe the record bears out that the United States has consistently taken the lead and consistently taken the initiative in the matter of reducing the level of its forces under arms. Therefore we grant very little credit to the Soviet Union for following in our wake. We are prepared to agree with the Soviet Union on the figure of 2.5 million just as soon as they are prepared to tell us what
kind of verification procedures they are willing to accept. We are not asking that
that figure should be verified at this point; this will not take any length of
time; all we have to do is to begin discussion of the disarmament organization and
its functions in terms of this one measure only, and then we will agree that we
would not exceed this figure, while we are working out the other steps in the plan.
We will agree now that if this figure can be agreed upon, if the armament levels
can be agreed upon and if the other parts of Stage I can be agreed upon, we will go
ahead without any verification of the figure of 2.5 million men. When this figure
has been established and the verification procedures have been agreed upon and put
into force, we will agree to reduce our forces to 2.1 million men if the Soviet Union
agrees, together with other militarily significant States. This would not be a
unilateral reduction; this would be an agreed reduction with an agreed ceiling
which thereafter we would not exceed.

It is our view that in line with the Western plan this provides concrete
measures which are tied up in the totality of our first stage — and you will note
in that stage that all the measures there are relatively easy to accept and
relatively easy to implement, and the force levels and armaments reductions are a
part of our first stage — and which we believe we can go on with quite promptly.

I was a little surprised at Mr. Zorin's criticism of the fact that the
Western plan did not spell out in detail when and how the measures on forces and
armaments contained in the third stage were to be implemented. This vagueness in
the third stage, so far as we are concerned, must be so because so much discussion
will have to take place before either of us could define it; we are very specific
in the first stage of the plan, while vagueness pervades the Soviet Union plan
throughout. Therefore I was a little surprised that we were attacked — because
we had not been very specific in the last measures, those measures which are further
down the road.

Regarding the depots, in his speech yesterday Mr. Zorin was critical of the
provisions in the first and second parts of the Western plan for placing agreed
types and quantities of conventional armaments in internationally supervised
depots. This is particularly surprising and raises a question as to the willingness
of the Soviet Union delegation to discuss any concrete proposals. A basic premise
of successful negotiation is the usefulness of building upon areas of agreement,
and we had attempted to do this in connexion with our proposal for placing armaments
in depots as a very early step in disarmament. We thought that we had gotten a favourable response to this because at the last disarmament negotiations in 1957, the Soviet delegation, headed by Mr. Zorin, accepted this approach. Subsequently, in a memorandum of the Soviet Union Government on measures in the field of disarmament, submitted to the United Nations General Assembly on 18 September 1958, it was stated:

"The Soviet Government is ready to consider yet another approach to the reduction of armaments -- namely the exchange of lists of armaments to be reduced, as suggested in the proposals submitted by the Governments of the United States and other Western Powers." (A/3229, paragraph 15)

We were somewhat surprised at Mr. Zorin’s about face when we placed this measure in the early stages of our plan.

As regards the cut-off and the reconversion of fissionable materials, Mr. Zorin seemed to feel that the proposal for a cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and the transfer of stocks from past production to peaceful purposes, as he said, "has no practical meaning as a disarmament measure", and he added that the transfer of materials from past production to internationally inspected peaceful uses does not lead to the reduction of the stockpiles of atomic and hydrogen bombs, and consequently does not lead to removing the threat of using nuclear weapons. These statements, being completely erroneous, can only be based upon a misunderstanding. Therefore, I will comment on what is intended by the inclusion of these provisions in the Allied plan.

The Soviet approach to disarmament is based upon a ban on the use of weapons, as we know all too well from frequent remarks made at this Conference. And yet it has been generally agreed for the past four years, now nearly five, that a truly effective assurance that nuclear weapons will not be used can only come with a verified reduction and elimination of nuclear weapon stocks. You must start at the beginning, you cannot start at the end. As my United Kingdom and French colleagues have pointed out -- and Mr. Moch pointed this out again quite recently -- there is at present no known way of assuring total elimination of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, this was stated in the 10 May 1955 proposals of the Soviet Union. It may be that in these five years Soviet scientists have found means of detecting clandestine stocks of nuclear weapons. We sincerely hope this is so, and this is one of the matters that we feel should be taken up in connexion with the studies which our plan suggests be made so that we can reach our final goal.
Unless means have been found to detect clandestine stocks of nuclear warheads, I see little justification for insistence by the Soviet Government on a prohibition if, as Mr. Zorin says, the Soviet Government stands for no disarmament without control and no control without disarmament.

One additional remark is in order, I believe. Mr. Zorin has frequently asserted that agreement by nations to refrain from the use of nuclear weapons would be an important index of peaceful intentions. But what the world wants and needs is not statements of intentions. Intentions may change or may be deliberately deceiving. What the world wants and needs is evidence of performance, not statements of intentions. Tell me not what your principles are, tell me of your practices. We all have bitter memories of past expressions of intentions, in the form of non-aggression pacts, on matters affecting the security of free nations. We cannot and will not place our reliance on intentions: we must have evidence of performance.

It is unfortunate that agreement was not reached on the control and elimination of nuclear weapons before the growth of stockpiles and refinements and enlargements in production facilities made accounting for past production and detection of nuclear stocks such a difficult task. I believe that it was Mr. Moch who, as early as 1952, used the expression which was repeated here the other day -- "the point of no return". I may be in error, but that is my recollection. It does not serve our purpose at this Conference to recriminate about the fact that the Soviet Government did not accept the nuclear control plan approved by the United Nations in 1948. This would have accomplished the task while there was still time and before the problem of accountability for past stocks became so difficult. But this does not mean we cannot begin to reverse the nuclear arms race by stopping the growth of stockpiles and by reducing them, as our scientists seek means of inspection that would enable us to achieve the final elimination of these weapons. This is a desirable goal, it is a goal towards which all our scientists should work in common. Let us proceed with those measures in the nuclear field that are enforceable at present.

The Soviet delegation has had a great deal to say regarding its claim that the USSR has reversed by unilateral action the growth of conventional forces. This is classed as an historic step. Yet the reversal of the growth of nuclear stockpiles and the reduction of those stockpiles by international agreements is treated by the Soviet Government as insignificant. The logic of this escapes me.
In recent discussions around this table two other erroneous inferences have been drawn concerning these parts of our first stage. The language of paragraph II. D. of the five-Power plan, which refers to the cut-off and stockpiling at international depots, has been interpreted as dealing only with fissionable materials which are not encased in warheads. There is nothing in the language that indicates this, and from this false assumption it has been inferred that the measures in our first stage, as indicated in paragraph II. D., would not affect nuclear weapons. This is not so.

Secondly, the term "stockpiling" as used in the Western plan has been interpreted to mean the stockpiling of fissionable materials which are designed for military use.

In both cases, these interpretations are incorrect. With regard to the first point, it should be recalled that proposals for the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapon purposes, and transfer of such materials to non-weapon uses, have been made on a number of occasions as a practical way in which to bring nuclear weapons under control.

The President of the United States, in a letter to Marshal Bulganin on 1 March 1956, noted that such measures, if carried out adequately, would reverse the present trend towards a constant increase in nuclear weapons overhanging the world. On 4 August 1956, in another letter to Marshal Bulganin, President Eisenhower again urged careful consideration of this proposal.

Again in January 1956, the President wrote that the present proposals in the Allied plan had not altered -- and I would like to emphasize "had not" -- the previous position of the United States on this matter, and that the United States stood ready to transfer agreed quantities of fissionable materials to non-weapon uses from past production, including materials contained in weapon stocks.

It may be appropriate to note that the United States has already made a not inconsiderable commitment to the International Agency, the amount being in excess of 5,000 kilograms, which is the equivalent of hundreds of atomic weapons. The United States is prepared to make further transfers to peaceful uses at any time that agreement can be reached.

I hope the delegations here will forgive me for the length of this statement, and for my constant reiteration of matters to which each one of the representatives on the Western side have had occasion to refer on a number of occasions, but there
still seems to be some misconception and I feel that I should make an effort to clarify what the Western Powers mean by their plan.

With regard to the second point relative to paragraph II.D. on the stockpiling of fissionable materials transferred under international supervision to non-weapon uses, I wish to make it entirely clear that it is not intended to transfer to the International Agency quantities of fissionable material in weapon form to be held as weapons for future use; they are to be transferred there for peaceful purposes.

As to the peace-keeping machinery, Mr. Zorin states:

"... after that reduction there is provision for the retention of very considerable armed forces, for the Western plan says that they must be sufficiently powerful to ensure that "no single nation or group of nations can effectively oppose the enforcement of international law."" (TNCD/FV.18, page 22)

This also disturbs me, for in spite of our efforts here he obviously does not understand this very important element of the Western plan. It is not envisaged that States would retain considerable armed forces. According to the Western plan, they must be powerful enough to ensure that no single nation or group of nations can effectively oppose the enforcement of international law. It is not meant that sufficiently large numbers of men will be retained under arms, but that a sufficiently small number of military personnel will be retained to ensure that no State can violate international law -- and this will be ensured by adequate peace-keeping machinery.

What we mean, furthermore, is that the international peace force envisaged by the Western plan -- and not the armed forces of individual Powers -- will be strong enough to ensure a situation where no nation will be able to impose its will on another.

We further believe that there should be continuous development of world law in the field of preserving peace in order to provide a framework for the operation of this force.

I come now to the International Disarmament Organization and Mr. Zorin's reference to the United Nations. In reply to General Burns, Mr. Zorin stated that the Allied proposal provides for:

"an international disarmament organization alongside and, one might say, opposed to the United Nations Organization." 1/

1/ Quotation from the unrevised interpretation in the English provisional record of the eighteenth meeting. Actually the USSR representative had referred not to the international disarmament organization but to "a special international organization to preserve peace and security". See the final verbatim record of the eighteenth meeting (TNCD/FV.18, page 24).
The Allied plan specifically states that this organization should be established by progressive steps following a joint study of the composition and functions of such an organization and it relation to the United Nations. How could this be interpreted to mean an organization which is "opposed" to the United Nations?

On outer space, Mr. Zorin yesterday continued a theme which some of his colleagues had voiced earlier, that somehow the Allied proposal to prohibit the placing in outer space of vehicles carrying weapons of mass destruction was a proposal designed to bring some special benefit to the Western nations, and to the United States in particular. Here again there has been some misunderstanding. We are certainly aware that the Soviet Union is not going to agree to measures which place it at a disadvantage. Therefore, we have not proposed any such measures. We have come here to reach agreement and not to continue a dispute. We are also aware of the difficulty of agreeing on measures in each stage which each side would feel brought advantage to itself as well as to the other side. It is for this reason that we advanced this prohibition against sending vehicles of mass destruction into outer space. It was for this reason that we put it early in the plan. I need not spend any time emphasizing the importance of it to all of us here and to the world. Obviously, if the world continues and we have above it vehicles of mass destruction it will be a very unhappy place. The importance of our putting it in the early stages is that we do not believe that it will give advantage to anyone. If the Soviets have vehicles of mass destruction in outer space now, we have not been so advised, and I am sure that they have not. In simple terms we are proposing to prevent a future development which, once it comes into being, will be as difficult to stop or reduce as the matter of the destruction of nuclear weapons is at this time.

Must we wait until threats are full-blown, ominous and complex, before efforts to deal with them are worth while?

I urge Mr. Zorin and his Government to consider this proposal to see if there are ways by which an accommodation in this area can be reached.

In conclusion, Mr. Zorin, I re-affirm our recognition, as a Member of the United Nations, of the cardinal importance of the problem of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

I re-affirm our strong desire to give substance here to the hope of the General Assembly and of the world that measures leading toward that goal will be worked out in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time.
I desire to sit here and negotiate until we have justified the hopes with which this Committee was agreed upon and convened; and, as I stated last Friday, my country yields ground to none in the world in its desire to find an answer to this problem.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Does anyone else wish to speak? Do I understand that no one has asked for the floor? Since no one wishes to speak, I venture to address you as the representative of the Soviet Union.

Fellow representatives, we have just listened with close attention to the intervention of Mr. Eaton, the United States representative, and I must say that a large number of questions raised in it require further study and appropriate explanations and answers. With much of what has been said by Mr. Eaton we are unable to agree, but today I should not like to stress our differences.

We note with satisfaction that Mr. Eaton's speech contained two propositions with which we can agree entirely.

One of those was put forward by Mr. Eaton at the very beginning of his intervention. He said that "the reconciliation of differences is the essence of negotiation". This is perfectly true, and we fully agree with that proposition. The Soviet delegation, and I hope the delegations of the other States, have come here to seek ways of reconciling our positions where they differ.

Mr. Eaton advanced his second proposition at the very end of his speech. He said that the United States delegation admits and recognizes the cardinal importance of general and complete disarmament under effective international control and will spare no effort to reach that important goal. We can also subscribe fully to that, since indeed it is our purpose also.

All this leads us to believe that at the present stage we ought to make new efforts to find a common basis for our work and for its advancement.

In the discussions that have taken place in the four weeks of our Committee's work, we have dealt both with the main problems of general and complete disarmament and with questions of the direction of the Committee's work. Upon a number of important questions different points of view have come to light, and there have emerged different opinions on the way we should take towards achievement of the Committee's task.
In spite, however, of all differences of opinion and of understanding of specific aspects of the problem, we have been able to note that during the Committee's work there have undoubtedly appeared some points of contact. First of all, unanimous agreement seems to have been reached, as Mr. Eaton confirmed today, that the goal set by the United Nations General Assembly resolution of 20 November of last year on general and complete disarmament is the common goal of us all. The delegations of all the States participating in the Committee have here declared that they would strive to attain this goal, set by life itself, which is general and complete disarmament under effective international control. We have not yet achieved a rapprochement of our positions sufficient to enable us to begin forthwith to work out the specific provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. Upon a number of important matters, however, a certain degree of mutual understanding has, we think, been achieved.

Thus the speeches of both socialist and Western delegations have stressed the special importance of nuclear and rocket disarmament, and also radical disarmament measures in respect of conventional armaments and armed forces. A certain amount of effort is still necessary, of course, in order to reach concrete agreement upon these questions of general and complete disarmament. We consider, however, that such agreement can be reached.

The progress of our discussions has also shown a certain rapprochement of points of view towards the proposition that all measures directed towards general and complete disarmament should be implemented by certain phases, by definite stages, even though we have not yet been able to agree upon the actual content of those stages or upon the sequence in which disarmament measures should be implemented. We have also discussed at length time-limits for the implementation of various measures, and whether definite time-limits can be fixed at all. We think these discussions have shown that our positions have to some extent come closer together in our recognizing that some time-limits can be fixed, if only for certain disarmament measures. Upon this question also we see a possibility of further rapprochement of our positions and of reaching a certain amount of agreement. We have also reached during debate a considerable measure of mutual understanding upon some essential principles of control over disarmament, based upon the rule that there must neither be control without disarmament nor disarmament without control.
We have discussed how to ensure the security of States after general and complete disarmament has been achieved. Although considerable differences have been noted, we do not exclude the possibility of reaching mutual understanding on this matter also.

For all those reasons I am instructed to declare that the delegations of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Polish People's Republic, the Romanian People's Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of Czechoslovakia have concluded that, for the advancement of our Committee's work towards the goal set by the United Nations General Assembly resolution of 20 November 1959, it is necessary to formulate the basic principles of general and complete disarmament in conformity with which a treaty for general and complete disarmament should be drafted. The delegations of the socialist countries consider that, in order more speedily to overcome the difficulties which have occurred in our work, it is now important to put on record, in the first place, what brings together the positions of the States participating in the Committee and not what separates them, and thus to define a possible common basis for our further work towards achievement of general and complete disarmament, the goal we have all recognized as our Committee's principal mandate. If we all endeavour, taking as our point of departure the essential wording of the United Nations General Assembly resolution, which we have all accepted, to arrive at the basic principles of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, we shall also thereby facilitate agreement upon the whole programme of general and complete disarmament and upon its details stage by stage.

During our Committee's work frequent mention has been made of the need to carry out some disarmament measures even before we reach final agreement on general and complete disarmament; although preparation of the agreement must not, of course, be delayed. A very early agreement on cessation of nuclear weapon tests would be a serious, an important advance towards general agreement. It would certainly also be important if we now agreed upon some concrete measure that would show the whole world, which is following attentively the course of our negotiations, our determination to ward off the threat of nuclear war; that would strengthen confidence between States and facilitate agreement on general and complete disarmament.
On behalf of the delegations of the socialist States, the Soviet delegation submits to the Committee the draft of a document entitled "Basic Principles of General and Complete Disarmament". We hope that this proposal will serve as an acceptable basis for negotiations and for agreement among all the States members of the Committee, and will ensure progress towards the drafting of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, for which the peoples of all countries are waiting and in which they see the true embodiment of the idea of a world without weapons and without wars.

Allow me to read the document which we request should be distributed as an official document of our Committee.

"The Governments of the States participating in the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament, being guided by the resolution on General and complete disarmament adopted by the Fourteenth session of the General Assembly on 20 November 1959, accept as an urgent practical task the implementation of general and complete disarmament of all States on the basis of the following principles, in conformity with which a treaty on general and complete disarmament should be worked out.

1. General and complete disarmament includes disbandment of all armed forces, liquidation of all armaments, cessation of all kinds of military production, liquidation of all alien bases on foreign territories, withdrawal from these territories and disbandment of foreign troops, prohibition of nuclear, chemical bacteriological and missile weapons, cessation of their production and destruction of their stockpiles, abolition of organs and institutions designed for organizing military activities in States (general staffs, war ministries and their local organs), prohibition of military training, liquidation of military training establishments, and cessation of appropriation of funds for military purposes.

2. General and complete disarmament shall be carried out in an agreed sequence by stages, and be completed within a strictly defined time-limit — four years.

3. All measures envisaged by the programme of general and complete disarmament shall be implemented under international control of scope corresponding to the scope and nature of the disarmament measures implemented at each stage. For the organization of control and inspection over
disarmament, an international control organ shall be set up with the participation of all States and shall operate in virtue of a special provision constituting an integral part of the Treaty on Disarmament.

4. After the implementation of the programmes of general and complete disarmament, States shall retain at their disposal only strictly limited contingents of police (militia) agreed for each country, equipped with small firearms and designed exclusively for the maintenance of internal order and the protection of the personal security of citizens.

5. Implementation by States of the programme of general and complete disarmament may not be interrupted or made dependent on the fulfilment of any conditions not stipulated in the Treaty.

If a State attempts to circumvent or violate the Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament, the question of such a violation shall be submitted for immediate consideration by the Security Council and the United Nations General Assembly for the institution of measures against the violator in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

The Governments of the States participating in the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament express their confidence that the implementation of general and complete disarmament in accordance with the outlined principles will forever remove the threat of war and ensure to mankind durable peace in the lifetime of the present generation.

As an act of good will for the purpose of creating appropriate conditions for the early conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, those States participating in the Committee that possess nuclear weapons solemnly declare that they will not be the first to use such weapons."

That is the document we would request the Secretariat to circulate as a Conference document.2/

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Mr. MOCH (France) (translation from French): I do not intend to improvise a complete reply to the statement we have just heard. I feel it my

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2/ Subsequently circulated as document No. TNCD/4.
duty, however -- without having been able to consult my Western colleagues -- to tell you what I think of the turn our discussion has taken since yesterday.

Yesterday evening, Mr. Chairman, after having re-read your statement, in particular the last page, I wondered what you were aiming at, and I hesitated between two solutions which seemed to me equally likely. One was that the Soviet delegation had made concessions in order to come closer to an agreement with us; and in that case we should have been glad to note the fact. The other hypothesis -- less favourable -- was that the Soviet delegation was engaging in a kind of operation, which consisted in saying: let us start from the United Nations resolution which we have all accepted, and then take up again, point by point, what each of us has said, to see how it can all be adjusted to the resolution itself. In other words, the second hypothesis meant that you were making a concession that was purely one of form, that you were taking your plan and cutting it up into little pieces, as one takes a puzzle apart, in order to show us that all these little pieces must be put together again round the United Nations resolution, and thus to return to the original plan without any change at all.

I thought -- and my Western colleagues thought -- that next week would show us which of these two hypotheses was right. Well, we were mistaken. It has not been necessary to wait until next week. Today, only twenty-four hours after your first statement, Mr. Chairman, we know.

Your second statement, that of this morning, comprises what I shall call the warm douche part, preceding the cold douche. The warm douche is pleasant. You indicate that we wish to attain a common objective, that some agreement, some understanding, has been achieved, and you emphasize the primordial importance of nuclear disarmament, which we have particularly at heart. You think that it is possible to reach agreement. You reaffirm your opinion that the measures must be put into effect in specified stages although, you add, we are not in complete agreement on the content of those stages and on their order. You suggest that we can discuss the question whether the time-limits are precise or rather elastic ones; you did not use that term, I hasten to add, but the idea is there in your statement. You stress that it is possible to bring the positions closer, that we have understood each other on the subject of control, that it is necessary to ensure the security of States after general and complete disarmament, and that you do not exclude the possibility of an understanding between us on this grave problem.
Then you point out, with very evident good will, that it is better to specify what brings us closer than what separates us. Finally, you propose taking the United Nations resolution as a starting point.

All that is what I call the warm douche; and if you had confined yourself to it, we should have remained in uncertainty until some time next week, as we expected.

But then you turned off one tap and turned on the other, and told us which measures, in your opinion, should form the preamble following necessarily from the United Nations resolution, as you conceive it.

Unfortunately, at that moment, my colleague passed me a document you had given me yourself, which is the record of the press conference you gave on 25 March to journalists in Geneva -- you remember the circumstances in which you yourself gave it to me -- so that, from that moment, on the one hand I went on listening to you, while on the other hand I was reading the document, and I found that the measures which you considered directly, immediately and imperatively necessary, as following from the United Nations resolution, were the very measures you had enumerated to those journalists, without a single exception and without a single change. This means that apart from the pleasant words and the sugar coating round the pill, your position is exactly the same as it was at the beginning of these negotiations; that is to say, it is precisely the position which led us to tell you that we could not accept it, for the reasons I explained myself on 5 April.

We do not accept the enumeration you gave on 25 March and have since repeated, and we do not accept the principles you claim to deduce from the United Nations resolution. We simply note that, except for the form and apart from this subtle enveloping manoeuvre and friendliness, your position now is strictly the same as it was on the first day. You must understand that, in these circumstances, the position of the Western countries remains as already stated to you.

Mr. MEZINCESCU (Romania) (translation from French): With regard to what has just been said, I think that reactions to the document submitted by Mr. Zorin on behalf of the socialist delegations here present should not be so prompt. That might give the impression that as soon as representatives of the Western countries hear talk of general and complete disarmament they fall back on their hedgehog position and resist the very idea.
Mr. EATON (United States of America): Like Mr. Moch, I want to examine Mr. Zorin's statement at greater length, but I am disturbed, as Mr. Moch intimated that he was, to find that the Soviet position seems to be the same as it was when we began. I will leave the matter there, because I would very much like to consider the statement further before replying to it fully.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Does anyone else wish to speak? Before passing on to the communique I should like to say a few words.

I think I shall be expressing the common opinion of all the socialist countries taking part in our Committee when I say that in putting forward this proposal we are making a sincere effort to help to overcome the difficulties which have arisen in the work of the Committee, particularly during the last few days, and to find a common basis for continuing our work so that we can reach the goal which all delegations have declared that they accept.

I can also associate myself with the statement made by the representative of Romania when he said that a hasty reaction to a move of this kind from our side would not help matters. I think that when they study our proposal carefully, the Western delegations will see that we have taken a step towards the attainment of this common goal we are speaking about, and that we are proposing to move forward towards its attainment by some other method than we have proposed up to the present.

I believe that a careful study of our proposal will help the Western delegations to see the basis on which we can bring our positions closer together. The United States representative has said that the reconciliation of differences is the essence of negotiation, and I believe that is the task we should set ourselves, bearing in mind the new, and in our view more favourable, basis for such a task.

That is all I wanted to say for the present.

Mr. MOCH (France) (translation from French): I should like to say once more than none of us is refusing to study carefully the document that Mr. Zorin has just submitted, and I should be sorry if he were to interpret my first reaction in any other sense. But it could help us in our
work if he would show us exactly where the difference lies between his original plan, his statement to the press of 25 March — which was in conformity with his original plan — and the document which he has just read, in which he has included, word for word, his statement of 25 March.

With this clarification the study which we are going to undertake would be greatly facilitated.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): Mr. Zorin has just repeated that the document which he has submitted brings out the desire of the socialist delegations to see the work of our Conference make progress. I think that instead of immediately refusing to study this document unless we point out all the differences between it and the previous one, it would perhaps be better if the French and other delegations here present were to make the effort necessary to discover the differences which do exist and to state precisely where they are not in agreement with the document we have just put before the Conference.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Since Mr. Moch has asked me for some explanations to facilitate his work and that of the other Western delegations, I should like to comply with his request at once and to point out one extremely important respect in which the document we have now submitted differs from the document we have been discussing for the last four weeks.

Paragraph 2 of our document refers only to the principle of carrying out measures in an agreed sequence of stages, and to the principle of a time-limit, without specifying the content of all these stages. Up to now we have been discussing the content of all the stages of general and complete disarmament. That content in our plan — the one proposed by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, N.S. Khrushchev, on 18 September last year — differs from that in the plan proposed by the Western Powers. We were unable, as I said in my earlier statement today, to agree on either the content or sequence of these stages. In the present document we have deferred this controversy for the time being: we have set aside the apparently controversial questions in order to find a basis for reconciling our positions on questions which appear to us non-controversial.
If you do not agree with any particular points in the various paragraphs of this document, which embody provisions that are in our view non-controversial, we ask you to inform us why. We are prepared to listen carefully to what you say. We believe that these provisions follow directly from the General Assembly resolution; but if you have any other proposals to make in this connexion we are prepared to go into them very thoroughly.

I am giving you, then, at any rate one indication of where to look for the difference. We have set aside for the time being consideration of the content of the stages of disarmament, which is controversial. Of course we shall have to come back to that question eventually. But in order to help us to take it up again on the basis of reconciliation of certain premises, we are proposing that the basic principles of general and complete disarmament be discussed. We feel this will facilitate our work. I repeat, careful study will perhaps enable you to find which forms of words and which elements in these principles fail to satisfy you, and what you propose should be done to correct them in what you regard as the requisite spirit; we are prepared to consider that most constructively.

Those are the preliminary explanations I wanted to give Mr. Moch in reply to his request.

Mr. MOCH (France) (translation from French): I apologize for taking the floor again. I now have the actual text before me — which is a help — instead of the notes I took, and I quite agree that the stages are not specified. But paragraph 1 of this document, submitted on behalf of the five communist States, reproduces word for word the document I referred to just now:

"... disbandment of all armed forces"... etc. So the content as a whole is exactly the same. The ingredients of the salad are identical in both documents. It is still a Russian salad, so to speak.

Then, you tell us that the stages are now of indeterminate duration, that they are not specified. Very well. But I see from paragraph 2 that all the stages must be completed "within a strictly defined time-limit", which is four years, as before.

Thus precisely the same measures must be carried out completely, within precisely the same time. All that we are permitted is not to carry them out in exactly the same order as was laid down before — but all these measures must be
carried out, without a single exception, and they must all be carried out within exactly the same time as before. You will admit that if there is any concession it is a small one, and does not dispose of the objections we have repeatedly raised.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Does anyone else wish to speak? No one? In connexion with Mr. Moch's last remark, I cannot miss the chance of suggesting that we pass on to the productive job of preparing a good dish.

Mr. Moch said that we are serving a Russian salad; but this is surely quite natural. We are all accustomed to it, and we want to put a good Russian dish before our colleagues. Still, we realize French cooking is very good, and we want to ask Mr. Moch if perhaps he can offer us a better salad; we shall not refuse it. Let us get to work on a good dish which will please all palates, both yours and ours. We are ready to roll up our sleeves and work on this.

That was the brief remark I wanted to make so as to bring a little optimism into our work.

Mr. MOCH (France) (translation from French): Although I am no nationalist when it comes to cooking, and like Russian cooking very much, I am ready to roll up my sleeves as Mr. Zorin says, but perhaps not quite in the same sense.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): If there are no further remarks, I shall read out the draft communiqué:

"The nineteenth meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament was held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 8 April 1960 under the chairmanship of the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics submitted for the consideration of the Committee, on behalf of the delegations of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Polish People's Republic, the Romanian People's Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Republic, a proposal on 'Basic Principles of General and Complete Disarmament'.

The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Monday, 11 April 1960, at 10.30 a.m."

If there are no objections, the communiqué is considered adopted.

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.