FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE EIGHTEENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Thursday, 7 April 1956, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. E. Măzărescu (Romania)
PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Bulgaria:  
Mr. M. TARABANOV  
Mr. K. CHRISTOV  
Col. K. SAVOV

Canada:  
Mr. E.L.M. BURNS  
Mr. A.G. CAMPBELL  
W/Cdr. R.J. MITCHELL

Czechoslovakia:  
Mr. J. NOSEK  
Lieut.-Gen. J. HEŠKA  
Mr. Z. TRHLIK

France:  
Mr. J. MOCH  
Mr. M. LEGENDRE  
Col. L. CONVART

Italy:  
Mr. G. MARTINO  
Mr. L. DAINELLI  
Mr. D. PHILIPSON

Poland:  
Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI  
Mr. M. LACHIS  
Brig.-Gen. J. SLIWINSKI

Romania:  
Mr. E. MEZINCESCU  
Mr. C. BOGDAN  
Col. C. POPA

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:  
Mr. V.A. ZORIN  
Col.-Gen. A.A. GRYZLOV  
Mr. A.A. ROSCHIN
PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:
Rt. Hon. D. ORMSBY-GORE
Miss B. SALT
Maj.-Gen. RIDDELL

United States of America:
Mr. F.M. EATON
Mr. G. McMURTRIE GODLEY
Rear-Admiral P.L. DUDLEY

Representative of
the Secretary-General:
Dr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Representative of
the Secretary-General:
Mr. W. EPSTEIN
The CHAIRMAN (Romania) (translation from French): The eighteenth meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament is called to order.

The first speaker on the list is the representative of Poland, and I now call on him to speak.

Mr. NASZKOWSKI (Poland) (translation from French): During the discussion we have had in the Committee so far, the representatives of the socialist countries have shown and are still showing that the Soviet plan ensures general and complete disarmament. Our plan not only embodies general principles, but also provides for all the essential concrete measures, the sum total of which will produce general and complete disarmament.

While we regard the Soviet plan as a logical and consistent programme of general disarmament, we have at the same time stressed — and we still stress — that we are prepared to discuss constructive amendments and additions to it, as well as concrete suggestions and proposals.

What is, in this respect, the attitude of the Western delegations?

Last Tuesday we heard a categorical statement by Mr. Moch, who told us that he could not accept any other solution of the disarmament problem than that which, in his view, is contained in the Western plan. Speaking on behalf of the five Western countries, Mr. Moch said, inter alia:

"We cannot accept as a basis for discussion either the Soviet plan or any other similar text". (TNCD/FV.16, page 22)

That statement by Mr. Moch is very significant in the light of the latest comments by certain organs of the Western press, which until then had doggedly maintained that the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries were unwilling to examine any plan other than the Soviet plan.

Mr. Moch's statement, which I have just quoted, shows that in point of fact the Western delegations are unwilling to discuss the Soviet plan and will only accept the Western plan as a basis for discussion.

Such an arbitrary attitude seems, to say the least, very far behind the times. It has never been acceptable to, or accepted by, the socialist countries. But today it is particularly anachronistic. It openly contradicts the spirit of the decision of the four Ministers who set up this Committee on a parity basis -- i.e. a basis of equality for the positions and proposals of all the States.
participating in it. Does the fact that Mr. Moch yesterday emphatically reiterated his position as being either the Western plan or nothing, mean that he does not desire any progress in our Committee's work? Is that really the intention of the Western delegations at a time when the world is expecting general and complete disarmament?

The position stated by Mr. Moch is also in conflict with the unanimous resolution of the United Nations, which recommended the Soviet plan to our Committee and at the same time set as the goal of the Committee's work the conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament, that is to say on a matter which forms the content of the Soviet plan. As Mr. Moch himself recognizes, it is, precisely, owing to the Soviet proposal that the programme of action on disarmament has received the title it bears.

Moreover, the Ten Nation Committee's obligation to take a position on the Soviet plan does not derive from formal considerations alone. It derives from the fact that, of the plans submitted to this Committee, only the Soviet plan reflects the spirit and the letter of the United Nations resolution on general and complete disarmament — only the Soviet plan is a plan for general and complete disarmament. It is quite obvious — as we have repeatedly shown — that the Western plan lacks this attribute. Nevertheless, we are prepared to prove it once again.

I will take as an example the proposal to establish control over space vehicles, made at the end of last week by the United States representative. I should like to compare it with the statement made the same day by the United States representative on the subject of Western intentions. In point 5 of his statement, Mr. Eaton said that he was prepared "to discuss and negotiate ... balanced and safeguarded measures of disarmament". (TNCD/FV.14, page 2)

I would therefore recall that in presenting the Western plan as being carefully balanced, Mr. Ormsby-Gore said, at the second meeting of our Committee:

"... the plan must not at any stage give a significant military advantage to one country or group of countries over others". (TNCD/FV.2, page 5)

But, in practice, the proposals of the Western Powers depart from the statements quoted, and the proposal of the United States representative concerning outer space is a convincing example of this. It is in fact an isolated measure
relating to control. That fact cannot be invalidated by Mr. Eaton's assertion on two occasions that his proposal is not an isolated one and that it forms part of a whole group of proposals in the Western plan.

The essential point is not that the proposal on outer space should be considered by its authors in conjunction with other parts of their own plan. The fault we find with this proposal is not that it is isolated from the Western plan, but that it is isolated from the whole programme of disarmament, and hence from the context of existing real problems concerning the security of all States. We criticize it for taking these problems into consideration in a unilateral manner only. We criticize the Western plan because it does not contain any other appropriate proposals which would free this proposal of its unilateral character—which exists, in spite of the statements I have just quoted regarding the need to balance the disarmament plan.

The Western proposals concerning outer space were discussed as early as our second meeting. In presenting the plan of the Western States, Mr. Ormsby-Gore then explained its various points and sounded the alarm on the danger of reaching the point of no return, while stressing the need to avoid that point. The United Kingdom representative referred in that connexion to the fact than an opportunity had been missed as regards nuclear weapons, and said that we must not now reach another of these points of no return.

That argument was also taken up later by Mr. Eaton and by Mr. Moch, at our fourteenth meeting.

Two questions thus arise: the first is, whom do the Western delegations reproach for the lost opportunity? Was it not the Soviet Union which from the outset asked that nuclear weapons be prohibited?

The second question is this: do the Western Powers believe that as regards nuclear weapons we have already passed the point of no return?

Against this background, the intentions of the Western Powers in regard to nuclear disarmament become even more dubious. That, moreover, is in keeping with the Western plan, which does not provide for nuclear disarmament even in its third stage.

It is difficult to understand the fatalistic premises of these warnings on the danger of reaching the point of no return. For all armaments are in the hands of governments; reversal of the trend of events which we regard as disastrous depends only on the desire and will of governments which possess
nuclear weapons to reach an agreement. The Soviet Union has long declared itself in favour of total abolition of such weapons, and the Soviet plan likewise provides for their complete elimination. The Western plan, on the other hand, does not.

I have dealt at somewhat greater length with the problem of nuclear disarmament because it is closely connected with the proposal concerning outer space. The prohibition of nuclear weapons would automatically dispel all anxiety regarding the possibility of using outer space for military purposes.

Let us now examine more closely the question of missiles, as dealt with in the Western plan. Part II, paragraph B refers to the control of launchings of certain categories of missiles "according to pre-determined and mutually agreed criteria".

In his statement on 1 April, Mr. Moch tried to decipher this vague formula and said that the definition of the missiles subject to such control would be based on agreed criteria — for instance, their diameter or range — and that it would include all weapons of intercontinental or intermediate range.

Let us therefore see once again what the first two parts of the Western plan amount to: an insignificant reduction in the armed forces of the two greatest Powers only; the storage, under international control, but on national territory, of certain weapons not further defined; control over certain types of missile in accordance with the criteria suggested by Mr. Moch; and, in addition, a broad system of control over existing armaments. That is all. This account is, moreover, confirmed by the statement made yesterday by Mr. Martino, the representative of Italy.

There still remain, however, armies of several million men stationed not only on national territory, but also at bases on foreign territory, which it is not proposed to abolish. Those bases would retain their nuclear weapons, which are not to be eliminated from armaments and the use of which is not to be prohibited. To deliver these nuclear weapons the bases would retain, in addition to aircraft and other means, the missiles covered by the definition given by the representative of France.

It must be added that the placing of armaments in storage does not constitute any great obstacle to an eventual aggressor. Anyone who wishes to violate international law and the United Nations Charter by aggression and has the necessary strength to do so, is hardly likely to heed the protests of the international control officials. The history of German militarism has taught us an unforgettable lesson on that point.
That is the situation in which, according to Mr. Moch, no sword of Damocles would remain hanging over the nations.

If I had to speak of the interests of my own country, I should have to say that an isolated control of disarmament, when there are still bases equipped with nuclear missiles, would not constitute any reduction of the danger of war for us — especially as Federal Germany is arming itself with nuclear missiles. Many other countries are in a situation similar to that of Poland, among them the socialist countries represented on this Committee.

The authors of the proposal certainly saw some advantage for themselves in it. I must state, however, with all necessary emphasis, that we cannot accept the term used by Mr. Eaton, namely that the proposal is "to mutual advantage". We regard it, on the contrary, as being to the advantage of one side.

From the point of view of the security of States, which we wish to ensure by means of disarmament, it matters little, if at all, whether the nuclear warhead has to pass through outer space to reach its target or not. As long as it remains possible to deliver the warhead through the atmosphere by the use, among other things, of bases situated near the target, the security of States will not be safeguarded.

As we consider it necessary to bring about general and complete disarmament, we are obviously also in favour of prohibiting the use of outer space for any military purpose, while also prohibiting nuclear weapons and missiles.

The Soviet plan provides explicitly for the destruction of all kinds of nuclear weapons and missiles. There can therefore no longer be any question of the possibility of using outer space for military purposes.

The need to ensure complete security for all States on an equal footing can only be fulfilled, at the present stage of history, by general and complete disarmament.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): A good deal of what I shall have to say today is perhaps, a repetition of what has already been said by other speakers. However, it would seem necessary in this Conference to repeat and underline the positions of various delegations, and groups of delegations, because they do not always seem to be completely grasped by some at first telling. What I shall have to say today has perhaps been referred to by the distinguished representative of Poland, who has just spoken. In the early portion of his remarks he spoke of the attitude of
Western representatives here, and of the way we should proceed with our deliberations. Mostly, at that stage of his speech, he quoted statements made by Mr. Moch. I do not intend to reply on behalf of that gentleman, who is supremely capable of doing so for himself. I understood the representative of Poland to say that Mr. Moch had declared that what we discuss here must be "ou le plan occidental ou rien du tout". I do not think — that was certainly not my understanding of it — that Mr. Moch said such a thing at any time in his speech on Tuesday that shut off discussion to that extent. Later in my remarks I will quote what Mr. Moch did say; in my view, he said something considerably different.

We have listened attentively to a great number of speeches which have emphasized the importance of achieving general and complete disarmament and, in support of this proposition, General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959 has been cited many times. The Western delegations have reaffirmed here the position which their countries held when they subscribed to that resolution. We have also heard repeated many times the claim that the best way of reaching the goal of general and complete disarmament is to adopt the Soviet plan put forward on 18 September 1959 by Mr. Khrushchev in his speech to the United Nations General Assembly. The Western representatives, including myself, have addressed quite a number of questions about this plan to the representative of the Soviet Union and to his colleagues, and we have studied their replies with care in order to judge this claim.

It now seems clear that the Soviet Union intends that the four-year period for the execution of its plan would begin only after all States had met in a world conference and had agreed upon all measures of complete disarmament and recorded their agreement in a treaty which had universal approval. The Soviet representative has invited us to say specifically why we think his plan is unrealistic. If I may pursue further one of the themes discussed by the United Kingdom representative at our thirteenth meeting, I should like to suggest that this provision represents one reason. A few governments — or even one government of a country whose armed forces and armaments might be unimportant — could hold up the signing of this universal treaty and prevent any progress in disarmament. In other words, many governments of countries not represented here could virtually veto any steps towards disarmament — if the Soviet programme for achieving general and complete disarmament, as we understand it, were followed. This danger seems inevitable if there is to be a single treaty including all the far-reaching provisions in the Soviet proposals for the abolition of all military and para-military establishments before even a token step is taken by the great Powers.
It is the view of the Canadian delegation that while general and complete disarmament is highly desirable and we should work towards that goal, as we undertook to do in co-sponsoring and voting for the General Assembly resolution, we should not let enthusiasm for the goal blind us to the great difficulties and complexities in the way of achieving it. Not all of the problems are such that the major Powers can settle them among themselves.

In a previous speech I referred to the Middle East to illustrate another point. I wonder if the representative of the Soviet Union would care to forecast the probable date by which Israel and its Arab neighbours would agree to abolish their armed forces and all their defence establishments, especially if there is no provision for any peace-keeping machinery. Canada, and I believe nearly all the Members of the United Nations, would be only too pleased if such an event were to take place. However, we are not of the opinion that all disarmament measures should wait upon that event.

The Soviet Union and the East European States insist upon all measures leading towards general and complete disarmament being written into a single treaty. This treaty will then have to be submitted to a world conference of all States with armed forces or armaments, States which must all accept the treaty and sign it. Only then can any concrete measure of disarmament begin under the Soviet plan. This means a long delay of unpredictable duration. The Western plan avoids this difficulty. It provides for certain actions to be taken by the great Powers without waiting for all nations to agree on how to dispose of every last soldier and every weapon not classed as small arms. Certain representatives have deplored these measures which are contained in stage I of the plan of the Western Powers. We have never denied that they are modest. Indeed that is one of their advantages since it should make their implementation much easier and thus permit the beginning of the process of disarmament. However, the main advantage which they have over any of the provisions of the Soviet plan is that the agreement of only the Governments represented in this room would be sufficient to set them in motion. I refer here to the provision contained in section 1.3 of fixing force-levels for "certain other States". Implementation need not await the solution of the unification of Korea, where substantial forces exist north and south of the dividing line, or of a settlement in the Middle East, as I have mentioned, or of the several other problems in the world today the parties to which include governments which maintain substantial armed forces precisely because of these problems.
In addition to the possibility of getting under way without the need for
universal assent, the Western plan does not require every last measure to be
agreed from the outset. We have set out in stages I and II the measures which
in our view should be negotiated and put into effect as rapidly as possible.
The representative of France discussed in some detail at our fourteenth meeting
the situation which would be created if those measures were put into effect.
We also set out under stage III of our plan certain other measures which we
regard as necessary for reaching the ultimate goal. These are for negotiation
after agreement has been reached on the measures contained in stages I and II
of our plan, but only then — and of course implementation of stage I and II
measures does not depend on agreement being reached on those in stage III. It
seems unsound to us to hold up the stages of disarmament upon which agreement can
be reached in this Committee and to debate at length measures which in all
probability would not be accepted by various governments not present here.

I may have laboured this point unduly, particularly as I have spoken before
about what seems to me to be the impracticable nature of the proposal to make
everything in the way of disarmament dependent on universal acceptance of a
complete treaty. Other representatives have also discussed this problem,
especially the representatives of France and the United Kingdom. However, we
were asked to do more than merely assert that the Soviet plan was impracticable
and I have tried to illustrate my point.

Our Soviet colleague may say that I am dealing in this argument merely with
a matter of procedure and with the form of the agreement and that I have not
discussed the concrete proposals contained in the Soviet plan. In our view,
however, the question of what nations must agree before disarmament can begin
is most important. Every measure contained in disarmament proposals must be
carefully scrutinized from the viewpoint of what nations must agree to it before
it can be effectively implemented.

In a previous statement I said that I did not understand the resolution of
the General Assembly, resolution 1378 (XIV), as giving this Conference a mandate
to negotiate a treaty for general and complete disarmament. As the representative
of the Soviet Union took up this point rather sharply and challenged my
interpretation, perhaps I should explain further. By "mandate" I meant an order,
or instruction. There is nothing, I repeat, in the language of the resolution
that orders or instructs or even requests this Conference to elaborate a treaty on general and complete disarmament which all the nations of the world are to sign. No, what the resolution says is:

"Expresses the hope that measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control will be worked out in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time."

Speakers of the Eastern European countries here have asked how we can effectively work out and agree upon measures except in the framework of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The answer of the Western representatives has been that we should make a start on working out in detail and agreeing in the shortest possible time on the measures which are proposed in stages I and II of our plan — and stage I of the Soviet plan. Our Soviet and Eastern European colleagues will probably say that that would not be general and complete disarmament. Of course not, but it would be a practical measure leading towards the goal. When those stages were fully agreed and consolidated, so to speak — that is to say, stages I and II of our plan which correspond to some extent to stage I of the Soviet plan — this Conference could go on to negotiate the measures proposed in stage III of our plan. Meanwhile there would be a conference of all nations having significant military capability, that is to say, military power which would be important in relation to the measures of disarmament proposed up to stage II. At this Conference the views of nations not represented here could be taken as to the practicability and timing of the further stages of disarmament required to reach the ultimate goal.

The representative of the Soviet Union has drawn attention to the fact that some of the operations in stage II of our plan would take place only after a world disarmament conference. That of course is correct. However, the Western plan neither makes all measures in stage II dependent on the conclusion of the agreement which would emerge from that conference nor would that agreement require universal assent.

I am afraid I made a slip in reading. I said "world disarmament conference". It is not, of course, in our stage II that there should be a world conference but only a conference of those nations having significant military capability.

Our proposals are more limited, and we think they are more practicable. For the reduction of armed forces envisaged under paragraph G of stage II of our plan
and the related reductions of armaments there would not be any necessity to secure the assent of all governments: we should need only the agreement of those governments whose forces could be described as militarily significant. Thus, even to the extent that measures in stage II would be dependent upon the successful outcome of a disarmament conference, including nations not represented here, they would be more easily achieved because fewer local and relatively minor security problems — minor if judged by the standards of the principal powers — would inhibit the readiness of governments to accept the proposed measures.

I should observe here that if the far-reaching measures proposed in the final stage of the Soviet plan — or the five Western nations' plan — are to be achieved, universal assent is necessary. This we do not dispute. If all modern armaments are to be eliminated we cannot afford to except those of any State or we might have some would-be Alexander of Macedon seeking to conquer the world with an armoured division or two and a few squadrons of aircraft. Of course, the execution of the measures under stage III of our plan would require the accession of far more States than the measures in stages I and II. This is one of the important reasons why we consider it desirable not to attempt to seek that assent as a condition of the initial measures which would not directly involve many States affected by later measures.

It is conceivable that the plan proposed by the Soviet Union might, after a sufficiently long period — measured in tens of years — bring about general and complete disarmament. However, it is not sufficient to assert that all members of the United Nations have subscribed to resolution 1378 (XIV) to show that they are all prepared now to agree to abolish all their defense establishments within four years. That is not the meaning of the resolution. Indeed, the resolution does not imply that the definition of general and complete disarmament which is given in the Soviet proposal was endorsed by the United Nations. Therefore, we see no guarantee — or even probability — that all Members of the United Nations would be prepared promptly to sign a treaty for general and complete disarmament, modelled on the Soviet Union proposals.

Examination of the proceedings of the debate on general and complete disarmament in the First Committee last year shows that while nearly all nations favoured the lofty ideal, most speakers made reservations as to the time required
to bring it about and as to whether detailed study and discussion would show the plan presented by Mr. Khrushchev to be practicable or not.

There is another thought which comes strongly to mind when one examines United Nations resolution 1376 (XIV), and the speeches in the debate which gave rise to it. That thought is whether the other members of the United Nations consider that we, the ten nations here on whom this heavy responsibility lies, have done what they expected of us if we merely come forward after months of deliberations with a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament to lay before a world conference which may accept or reject it. Or will they expect this Committee to have produced some concrete agreement between the ten of us? Our number includes the most heavily-armed Powers in the world, and all the Powers possessing nuclear weapons. Should we not work towards achieving concrete agreement to begin actual measures of disarmament and particularly nuclear disarmament? Is it not essential that as soon as possible experts begin on the studies or supplementary negotiations -- call them what you will -- which are indispensable if effective measures of disarmament are to be established in this age of complex, highly-technical weapons systems? The feeling of the Western delegations is that we should be judged to have failed in our task if we reported back to the United Nations with nothing more than the draft of a treaty of grandiose design but of doubtful acceptability.

I would ask the Soviet representative and his colleagues to reflect on whether they would insist further that their plan must be negotiated as a whole -- complete from the first stage to the last -- before anything concrete can be done about any specific measure of disarmament. If they do, it seems to me that they will be failing to observe the resolution of the General Assembly which calls upon us to get on with measures leading towards general and complete disarmament with the least possible delay.

In closing, I should like to refer to the statement made at our meeting on 5 April by the representative of France on behalf of the Western delegations. Mr. Moch set forth very clearly the features of the Soviet plan for general and complete disarmament -- as it has been presented to us -- which we find unacceptable. These objections are set down on pages 23 and 24 of the verbatim record of our sixteenth meeting (TNCD/FV.16). I feel sure that all delegations here have studied this declaration with the attention which its importance deserves.
In his concluding paragraphs, Mr. Moch called for a new approach in our proceedings here, and I should like to read these paragraphs over to you:

"The path which the Conference has been following can lead to no concrete result. In order to work profitably we must renounce opposition based on ideological differences, and speeches which get our discussion no further. We must undertake a methodical comparison of the initial measures which either side can accept, in the hope that we may thus arrive at decisions acceptable to us all. When we can agree on a first set of measures, we shall be able to discuss others that would follow while the first are being implemented.

That is the wise and realistic solution we propose.

The Western delegations are as anxious as the Eastern countries to follow a road leading towards general and complete disarmament. They are prepared to travel along that road as far as is reasonable and realistic in the troubled and mistrustful world of today. They are convinced that the first move forward will relax general tension, help to settle differences, and thus enable us to make further progress towards our common goal."

(TMCD/PV.16, page 25)

The Western delegations are waiting hopefully for a definite and authoritative reply to the statement of our position by Mr. Moch, which I have just recalled to you.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Before passing to the basic statement which I propose to make on behalf of the Soviet delegation, I should like to devote a few words to the statement we have just heard from the distinguished representative of Canada, who must be taken to have been supplementing the remarks of Mr. Moch and developing certain arguments which appear to underlie the position also of the other Western States represented on our Committee.

Mr. Burns's statement will, of course, require further study, since it included a number of provisions calling for analysis. At this stage, however, I should like to dwell only on two points made by the distinguished representative of Canada.

In the first place, I should like to clear up what seems to me to be an obvious misunderstanding, or lack of understanding, reflected in the
remarks of the representative of Canada on the Soviet plan for general and complete disarmament and the procedure for its execution. He told us that it is now clear that the four-year period would begin after a disarmament conference. Further, he spoke at length to the effect that this world disarmament conference might hold up the whole disarmament process, the whole process of execution of the treaty, and that the government of some small country -- he mentioned in particular Israel and the Governments of certain Arab States -- could veto the whole disarmament plan and the whole disarmament treaty.

There seems to me to be some misunderstanding or lack of understanding here. The Soviet plan -- which, one would have thought, has been studied closely enough -- clearly states what a special session of the United Nations General Assembly or a world disarmament conference would be dealing with. It reads:

"The reduction of the strength of the armed forces of other States to levels to be agreed upon at a special session of the United Nations General Assembly or at a world conference on general and complete disarmament." (A/4219, page 14)

Only one question is raised here so far: reduction of the strength of the armed forces of other States to levels which must be agreed upon. This will relate to the levels in both the first and the second stages.

But, gentlemen, you yourselves, in speaking of a treaty on the International Disarmament Organization, proposed a similar method of solving the problem of the other States which are to participate in that treaty. Mr. Martino, and later Mr. Cavalletti, told us that this treaty might be agreed here among the Ten Nations, and subsequently referred to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the accession to it of other States which, in the opinion of the Western delegations, should participate in the whole of the International Disarmament Organization.

This means that the Western representatives estimate that the problem of participation of other States could be solved by their accession to a treaty agreed among the ten of us and referred to the United Nations Secretariat for the purpose of accession. Moreover, this relates to an organization which, as its very name implies, would be a world organization by virtue of the accession of those very ninety States which have been mentioned time and again by Mr. Ormsby-Gore and a number of other representatives.
But if the Western delegations can estimate that such a solution of the problem of participation of other States is possible, why can they not contemplate an identical solution for certain categories of measures relating to a plan of general and complete disarmament? Why should it be inconceivable that we, the ten States, should agree on the main stages of general and complete disarmament, on all the stages and measures, concerning us ten, and that as regards the force levels of certain other States, these would then be able to associate themselves with this treaty in a manner similar to that which you propose, or at a world conference which would discuss a limited range of questions on which it would be possible to agree? Why is such a solution of the problem not possible? We think it is possible.

We are not proposing it now, because you have not even got as far as detailed discussion of our plan. But if you think that this will be the only cause of delay, the only obstacle to your uniting your efforts to ours for the achievement of such a treaty, we are prepared to discuss any possible proposal in this connexion in order to make it easier for you to join with us in making efforts to work out a treaty of a kind which would also be acceptable to you. The whole question now is not really whether other States will accede or not. We have not so far succeeded in getting your accession -- that of the representatives of the five Western countries -- to this treaty. This is the main point at issue. If the only reason you cannot join us is that you fear others will not join, let us discuss how to get over this difficulty.

We do not claim at all that everything in each of our plans is faultless and not subject to correction or addition. We are prepared to discuss everything in detail, if you wish; but surely the crux of the matter is not here, but rather -- and this is my second comment -- that you do not want to work on the drafting of any document or plan for general and complete disarmament at all. This is the essential question, not whether any particular State will accede to the plan. That is only a secondary question.

In his statement today Mr. Burns made what I regard as a valuable admission, which helps us to understand the position of the Western Powers participating in this Committee. He said, first, that the Soviet plan might actually lead to general and complete disarmament. Well, we must be thankful for small mercies,
for your telling us for the first time that our plan might lead to general and complete disarmament. Incidentally, this seems to be at variance with the views of Mr. Eaton, who voiced the opinion that our plan did not meet the objective of general and complete disarmament.

But Mr. Burns went on to say that the delegations of all the eighty-two States who took part in the discussion on general and complete disarmament at the United Nations General Assembly did not state that they were prepared to proceed now to carry out this task. Nor, however, did they say the contrary. They did not say that they did not wish to start tackling this task forthwith. We heard no such statement; if you did, tell us who made it. Yet now we begin to hear it said at meetings of this Committee that the Western delegations represented here are not in fact prepared to begin tackling the task for which they voted. This, in my view, is the important admission made by the representative of Canada.

He said further that we have no mandate to work out measures or a programme or a treaty which would amount to a complete programme of general and complete disarmament. He explained a little further his first statement to which we referred recently.

Mr. Burns made yet another admission: that what is now being proposed by the Western Powers "would not be general and complete disarmament". This is what he told us this morning.

Obviously it is here that our difference lies.

We want to work on general and complete disarmament, while you want us to work on something which of course will not be general and complete disarmament.

This is our main difference.

If we now ask what is in accordance with the United Nations resolution and what is not, I believe there is no question here at all.

The resolution itself states -- even in the third operative paragraph, on which you are so insistent -- that we must work on measures leading to general and complete disarmament. I say nothing about the plain words of the first operative paragraph of the resolution, for which you also voted, in which the Assembly calls upon Governments to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament.
I believe this is where the crux of the matter lies.

We wish to work on something which would be a programme of general and complete disarmament, while you wish to work on something which would not be general and complete disarmament.

Those were the preliminary remarks which I wanted to make on the statement by the representative of Canada. They will help, I think, to clarify the general conception of the Western Powers which have produced their plan and insist that we should work upon it.

At a number of recent meetings the representatives of the Western Powers in our Committee persistently attempted to prove that the truest way to implement the United Nations General Assembly resolution on general and complete disarmament must be our taking the Western disarmament plan as a basis for our negotiations. Mr. Eaton, Mr. Moch and Mr. Martino, and today Mr. Burns, have appealed to us to do so. The insistence with which they have attempted to prove to us the necessity of adopting the Western plan as a basis for negotiations on general and complete disarmament compels us today to state more fully than hitherto our point of view on the Western plan. Before doing so, however, I should like to stress that we approach the evaluation of the Western plan from a very definite angle: by enquiring how fully it satisfies the demands of the General Assembly resolution on general and complete disarmament. We deem it necessary to stress this, not only because we ourselves stand for strict compliance with that resolution, but also because the Western delegations too have declared their intention to satisfy fully in our negotiations the requirements of the General Assembly resolution.

The General Assembly resolution expresses an approach to the disarmament problem based on new principles. It calls upon us to work out a programme of measures aimed at general disarmament, that is the disarmament of all countries possessing armed forces and armaments, and at complete disarmament, that is the complete elimination of armed forces and armaments of all categories, kinds and types.

Let us see first of all whether the plan of the five Western Powers is indeed a plan for general disarmament. To study the Western Powers, plan carefully is to be satisfied that, although it is called a plan for general disarmament, actually it is not one.
The first part of that plan does not provide for any disarmament measures at all, and only establishes ceiling force levels of 2.5 million men each, for the USSR and the United States, mentioning some undefined "agreed appropriate force levels" for some other States not named in the plan. If we leave out those unnamed States -- and until they are named their mention ignobly, so to speak, in the Western plan adds nothing to the disarmament programme -- it becomes clear that the first stage concerns only the USSR and the United States and does not even extend to such States as the United Kingdom or France.

The second part of the Western plan, after providing for numerous and various control measures for different States, establishes another exact force level, again for the USSR and the United States of 2.1 million men. In regard to other countries -- including presumably the United Kingdom and France -- it merely says vaguely that "force level ceilings for all militarily significant States should be established". Consequently the second part of the Western plan too does not envisage any general disarmament measures.

True, the third part of the Western plan mentions measures for the reduction of national force levels and armaments which seem to apply to all States. The authors of the Western plan do not say, however -- and, more than that, categorically refuse to say now -- how and when these measures can actually be implemented. The third part of the plan, therefore, can only be taken to express vague desiderata.

The inference is that the five Western Powers' plan does not satisfy the requirement of the United Nations General Assembly resolution that the disarmament plan to be based on that resolution shall be a plan for general disarmament.

The Western plan is not a general disarmament plan; neither does it satisfy the General Assembly resolution's requirement that the disarmament shall be complete, whatever aspect, whatever component of the military machinery of States we take, the Western plan either does not affect it at all or affects it only partially, stopping not even halfway but at the very beginning.

Let us first examine nuclear armaments, for they are the most destructive and dangerous type of armaments, and without the complete liquidation, including cessation of their manufacture, prohibition of their use, their exclusion from the arsenals of States and destruction of their stocks, there can of course be no complete disarmament. What does the Western plan offer us in respect of nuclear disarmament?
It strikes the eye at once that the plan does not provide a radical solution of the problem of nuclear disarmament. True, the third part of the plan contains a phrase to the effect that at some indefinite future time there would be taken "further steps, in the light of the latest scientific knowledge, to achieve the final elimination" of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. This provision is so ill-defined and vague that it is quite clearly only a phrase with no real meaning behind it, expressing no real readiness to come to an agreement upon the complete prohibition and liquidation of nuclear weapons. In fact, the representatives of the Western Powers have themselves stated openly at meetings of this Committee that they consider this object unrealistic and practically unattainable under present-day conditions, and that they have no intention of examining it as a concrete task, as a subject suitable for negotiation and agreement.

Instead of a radical solution of the nuclear disarmament programme, the Western plan proposes that we should examine the question of setting up control over cessation of the manufacture of fissionable materials for military purposes and the gradual conversion of part of them to peaceful purposes. It should be clear to everybody, however, that, since States have now accumulated enormous quantities of fissionable materials, as some statesmen of the Western Powers frankly admit, the proposal to discontinue manufacture of fissionable materials for military purposes has no practical meaning as a disarmament measure. If this proposal were accepted, the stocks of States would not be reduced by a single atomic or hydrogen bomb. On the contrary, their stocks of nuclear weapons might even be increased, for there would remain at their disposal the necessary reserves, previously accumulated, of fissionable materials. The gradual conversion to peaceful purposes of some part of the accumulated fissionable materials produced for military purposes would not, of course, alter the situation. After all, it would not lead to a reduction of stocks of atomic and hydrogen bombs, and therefore would not lead to removal of the threat of the use of nuclear weapons.

We see, therefore, that the Western plan does not contain provisions for complete nuclear disarmament.

Nor does it contain provisions for the complete liquidation of armed forces and conventional armaments. We have already mentioned that the first part of the plan does not propose any measures for the reduction of force levels; that its
second part provides for an insignificant reduction in two countries only, the USSR and the United States, whereas its third part, which we may call the "desiderata section", once again provides for a reduction at some unspecified future date of national armed forces to "levels required by international security and fulfilment of obligations under the United Nations Charter to the end that no single nation or group of nations can effectively oppose enforcement of international law". It is quite clear from this provision: first, that what is contemplated is merely a reduction and not complete liquidation of armed forces; and secondly, that after that reduction there is provision for the retention of very considerable armed forces, for the Western plan says that they must be sufficiently powerful to ensure that "no single nation or group of nations can effectively oppose enforcement of international law".

The position seems to be no better in respect of conventional armaments. The first and second parts of the Western plan only provide for storage of a certain quantity of conventional armaments of certain types on the territory of the States to which those armaments belong, not for the material destruction of appropriate quantities of armaments. The representative of Poland has this morning dealt with this matter in detail. Can this be considered a step towards complete liquidation of conventional armaments and towards the achievement of what Mr. Moch spoke about yesterday -- guarantees that those armaments will not be used for reservists, of whom he stands in great fear? Destruction of arms stores is not mentioned even in the third part of the Western plan. They are retained by your plan for some purpose. Is it not for use by those reservists of whom Mr. Moch spoke? Moreover, this part of the Western plan says nothing of prohibition of military production; on the contrary, it appears from the concluding provisions of the plan that what is contemplated is merely a reduction of manufacture of armaments.

Let us now take the question of military bases on foreign territories. From a large number of statements by United States military leaders it is obvious that United States military circles regard United States bases on territories of foreign States as an important integral part of their armed forces. Let me cite, for instance, the United States Secretary for Defence, Mr. Gates, who said on 1 February, referring to military bases on foreign territories, that the tactical air forces of the United States and its allies deployed in a wide area around the Soviet periphery added considerably to their combined strength.
How, then, does the Western plan propose to deal with the foreign bases which represent a highly important integral part of the military strength of the Western Powers? Why, not at all. They are simply not mentioned in the plan. In other words, the Western plan provides not only no radical approach in this respect — such as would effect the complete abolition of military bases on foreign territories — but not even any partial measures. Evidently the Western plan is based on the premise that military bases on foreign territories are to remain intact forever.

Neither does the Western plan provide for the abolition of war ministries, general staffs, military educational institutions, for cessation of military training and so on. It says nothing about discontinuance or even reduction of the appropriation of funds for military purposes. Yet, obviously, without these features no plan can be considered to be a plan for complete disarmament.

From what I have said it will be seen that the five-Power plan cannot from any point of view be acknowledged as a plan for complete disarmament. Even the Western Powers themselves cannot bring themselves to call it a plan for complete disarmament, although — and here they contradict themselves — they propose that it should be used as the basis of negotiations in pursuance of the General Assembly resolution on general and complete disarmament. They have called it a plan for "comprehensive" disarmament, that is to say disarmament which would in some measure affect all types of armed forces and armaments; though it would not lead to the complete abolition of those armed forces and armaments. However, this plan cannot even be considered comprehensive, since it leaves intact many important integral parts of the military machines of States, including military bases on foreign territory.

In this connexion I should also like to say a few words about the statement made by Mr. Moch on behalf of the five Powers at our meeting on 5 April. In that statement Mr. Moch told us what the Western Powers could not accept in the process of disarmament negotiations. We understood Mr. Moch to say that the Western Powers could not draft or sign a document that would provide for the abolition of the whole military establishment of States, that is to say the disbandment of armies, the destruction of nuclear weapons and conventional armaments, and the abolition of foreign military bases. If this is so, it means that the Western Powers have in fact no intention of solving the problem of general and complete disarmament now. The Canadian representative's statement this morning supports this conclusion of ours.
Furthermore, it follows from the Western plan and from the commentaries upon it offered by the Western representatives that, besides retaining national armed forces, it is also proposed to create a new, international, armed force under the pretext of ensuring international security. Mention is also made of establishing a special international organization to preserve peace and security — as a counterweight, shall I say, to the United Nations. As we understand it, the intention is to create an international force that would be fairly heavily armed, since it is meant by the Western Powers to be more powerful than the armed forces of any single nation or even group of nations.

It is quite obvious, however, that a plan providing, in addition to national armies, for the creation of an international armed force cannot be called a disarmament plan at all, let alone a plan for general and complete disarmament.

We proceed from the opposite point of view. We hold that we should work out a plan for the complete liquidation of the armed forces and armament of all States. That is what we call general and complete disarmament. That is how we interpret the requirement of general and complete disarmament contained in the United Nations General Assembly resolution. If, as Mr. Moch said, the Western Powers have indeed no intention of joining with us in working out such a disarmament programme, then what is the meaning of their declarations that they support the General Assembly resolution? Surely that resolution, even in the third paragraph of the operative part, to which Mr. Moch draws our attention whenever he takes the floor, speaks of working out in detail and agreeing in the shortest possible time upon measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control and not any separate, isolated measures relating to disarmament.

Is the Western plan in keeping with this resolution? Of course not.

It is the Soviet plan that meets the requirements contained in all the operative paragraphs of the resolution — paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 — because it provides in fact for the implementation of general and complete disarmament. That was indirectly confirmed this morning by the representative of Canada. The Western plan, on the other hand, has a quite different character. N.S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, in one of his conversations with newspaper men during his recent visit to France, said that:

"...the West has submitted proposals on disarmament which have nothing in common with the proposal on general and complete disarmament which we submitted to the United Nations General Assembly".
N.S. Khrushchev then pointed out that the proposals on disarmament put forward by the Western States did not provide a basis for reaching agreement. "In these proposals", he said, "there is a negation of the principle of genuine and radical disarmament".

Thus we are being offered, as a basis for negotiations on implementation of the General Assembly resolution on general and complete disarmament, a plan rejecting the principle which is the very essence of the resolution.

Another striking feature of the Western plan is the provisions obviously intended to give certain States unilateral military advantages. The Polish representative spoke in detail, and convincingly, about that today. We have already pointed out that no other construction can be placed on the establishment, provided for by this plan, of control over missiles and certain other modern means of delivery of nuclear weapons, while at the same time military bases on foreign territory, and stock-piles of nuclear weapons, are retained. The impression given is that some States calculate on obtaining, as a result of the execution of the Western disarmament plan, what they cannot obtain by means of their national military programmes. This means that the Western disarmament plan merely complements these States' national military programmes -- a point we made at the meeting of 4 April.

The same applies to the numerous measures of control over armaments provided for by the Western plan. These indeed abound in the plan. If particular control measures in the Western plan were directly linked with corresponding disarmament measures, it would be quite a different matter. We ourselves consider it necessary to establish strict and effective international control over disarmament on the principle that there should be no control without disarmament and no disarmament without control. But the Western plan proposes precisely measures of control without disarmament -- in other words, arms control measures.

Take, for example, the control measures provided for in the second part of the Western plan. There it speaks of control over the placing into orbit of space vehicles, over launching-sites and the places of manufacture of missiles, over plants, producing fissionable materials, and over the financial systems of States; and of carrying out aerial inspection, stationing ground observers and despatching mobile ground inspection teams, establishing overlapping radar installations and so
on and so forth -- none of these having any connexion with disarmament measures, of
which in this part of the Western plan, as we have already pointed out, there is
only one: the reduction of the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the United
States from 2.5 million to 2.1 million men.

This line adopted by the Western Powers on control matters is no less clearly
apparent also in other parts of their plan. It is also expressed in their demand
that any measures of disarmament and even of limitation of armaments should be
preceded by the setting-up of an international disarmament organization with
multifarious and wide functions, far in excess of what is really necessary for
verifying States' fulfilment of their disarmament obligations. We understand from
some particulars given by the Italian delegation on the setting-up of the
international disarmament organization that, for example, this organization will,
as was pointed out yesterday by the Romanian representative, be required to prepare
and install systems of surveillance not only before the disarmament measures
themselves are carried out, but even prior to the conclusion of agreements on the
carrying out of such measures.

Thus the Western plan is not a plan of general and complete disarmament, but
a programme for establishing comprehensive control without disarmament -- arms
control.

But it is clear to everyone that the establishment of arms control without
the execution of real disarmament measures cannot give States genuine security. It
can only create an illusion of security, which a potential aggressor retaining armed
forces and powerful armaments would of course be quick to exploit. Nor must we
forget that establishment of control without execution of disarmament measures would
become a source of fresh suspicions and would lead to an increase in tension and
a growth of mistrust in relations between States.

From all I have been saying it is clear that the Soviet delegation, and the
other delegations of the socialist countries, cannot take the Western plan as
a basis for further negotiations, because to take this plan as a basis for
negotiations on general and complete disarmament would be to foredoom the negotiations
to failure and to reject in advance implementation of the General Assembly resolution
on general and complete disarmament. We are not going to do that.

What, then, is to be done next?
The Western delegations have not been able and have not even tried to produce any serious arguments in support of their view, expressed in Mr. Eaton's statement of 1 April, that the Soviet programme does not meet the objective of general and complete disarmament. The arguments adduced this morning by the Canadian representative are, as I indicated previously, based in our opinion on an obvious misunderstanding or a lack of understanding that there may be different ways of solving the problem of participation of particular States in a general programme of general and complete disarmament or in individual parts of such a programme. They have not produced such arguments, because no such arguments exist anywhere in nature. In point of fact the Soviet programme of general and complete disarmament fully satisfies the requirements of the General Assembly resolution. The Canadian representative himself said this morning that it might lead to general and complete disarmament.

If the Western delegations are not prepared to take the Soviet programme of general and complete disarmament as the basis for our future work, what then are they prepared to take as its basis? It goes without saying that the Western plan cannot be a basis for negotiations on general and complete disarmament, for the reasons I have already given today. It is not a plan for general and complete disarmament — that was confirmed today by Mr. Burns — and it is not the kind of plan envisaged by the United Nations General Assembly resolution.

That being the case, it appears to us that in order to make headway we must, at this stage of the negotiations, take as the point of departure for our work the document with which everyone seems to agree, namely, the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly on general and complete disarmament, and try to develop it and to find acceptable basic provisions arising directly out of this basis we have in common.

This means taking the general formulae in the General Assembly resolution regarding general and complete disarmament and from them working out and agreeing upon basic principles of general and complete disarmament. If we could agree on these basic principles, we should undoubtedly be taking a stride forward — towards the preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, and towards agreeing on the main disarmament measures and appropriate control measures at each stage of such disarmament. This would be something concrete, and would bring us closer towards working out specific disarmament measures and achieving a constructive solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament, which is
what we are called upon to do by the General Assembly resolution of 20 November 1959, which was adopted unanimously by all Member States, including the States represented in our Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): I thank the representative of the Soviet Union for his remark that my statement this morning will call for additional study and analysis. However, I think that when he reads this statement in the verbatim record he will find that there has been a misunderstanding on his part of two of the points to which he subsequently referred in his address.

He did seem to misunderstand — I do not know whether this was due to the processes of interpretation or not — what I said in explaining that there was nothing in the language of the General Assembly resolution that orders, instructs, or even requests this Conference to elaborate a treaty on general and complete disarmament which all the nations of the world are to sign. That is not at all the same thing as saying that there is no request for us to work towards general and complete disarmament.

The other point on which I was apparently misunderstood was when I said that it is not sufficient to assert that Members of the United Nations who subscribed to that resolution are now prepared to agree to abolish all their defence establishments within four years.

I would be glad if the representative of the Soviet Union would refer to those two points in order to compare what I actually said with what he thinks I said because I think he will find there is a substantial difference.

There is another point. I said it is conceivable that the plan proposed by the Soviet Union might, after a sufficiently long period measured in tens of years — that means twenty, thirty or forty years — bring about general and complete disarmament. My statement was not to the effect that it could be brought about in four years.

The CHAIRMAN (Romania) (translation from French): Since no other member of the Committee wishes to speak, I shall read out the draft communiqué:
"The eighteenth meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament was held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 7 April under the chairmanship of the representative of Romania. The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 8 April, at 10.30 a.m.".

If there are no objections, I shall consider the communique adopted.

The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.