FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE SEVENTEENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Wednesday, 6 April 1960, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI (Poland)
PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Bulgaria:  Mr. M. TARABANOV
          Mr. K. CHRISTOV
          Col. K. SAVOV

Canada:    Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
          Mr. A.G. CAMPBELL
          W/Cdr. R.J. MITCHELL

Czechoslovakia:  Mr. J. NOSEK
                 Lieut.-Gen. J. HECeko
                 Mr. Z. TRHLIK

France:    Mr. J. MOCH
          Mr. M. LEGENDRE
          Col. L. CONVERT

Italy:     Mr. G. MARTINO
          Mr. L. DAINELLI
          Mr. D. PHILIPSON

Poland:    Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
          Mr. M. LACHES
          Brig.-Gen. J. Sliwinski

Romania:  Mr. E. MEZINCESCU
          Mr. C. BOGDAN
          Col. C. POPA

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:  Mr. V.A. ZORIN
                                      Col.-Gen. A.A. GRYZLOV
                                      Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom: 
Rt. Hon. D. OSMBY-GORE
Miss B. SALT
Maj.-Gen. RIDDELL

United States of America:
Mr. F.M. EATON
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Rear-Admiral P.L. DUDLEY

Representative of
the Secretary-General:
Dr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Representative of
the Secretary-General:
Mr. W. EPSTEIN
The CHAIRMAN (Poland) (translation from French): I declare open the seventeenth meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Two members of the Committee have so far put themselves down on the list of speakers for this morning. The first is the representative of Bulgaria, and I give the floor to him.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): Yesterday we witnessed the efforts of the United States representative to prove to us that his Government, too, is in favour of general and complete disarmament, the goal set before our Committee by United Nations General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959. At the same time he tried to convince us that in order to reach that goal we must abandon the idea of defining the general principles and specific measures which should form part of an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

It is, of course, not easy to prove that we shall arrive at general and complete disarmament by giving up the idea of concluding an agreement which would lead us towards that goal. And so it is easy to understand why Mr. Eaton's efforts have not yielded the expected results. In the same statement the United States representative complained that the delegations of the socialist countries were unwilling to understand the position of his country, which was also in favour of general and complete disarmament. True, in his statement on Friday, 1 April -- that is to say after three weeks' laborious discussion -- the United States delegation felt obliged to state that it was in favour of general and complete disarmament, and also that the United States intended "to sit here patiently and work our measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control". (TNCD/PY.14, page 2) This statement was, however, supplemented by a significant and disconcerting formula appearing in point 4 of the same declaration. In point 4 of his statement the United States representative explained:

"My delegation is not prepared to accept any sweeping, meaningless, age-worn slogans as a guide for our work in Geneva in the days to come." (ibid.)

What does this really mean? The slogan that the United States delegation is not prepared to accept, is it not the need to get down to work in order to reach an agreement on the rapid elimination of all armaments, an agreement which could
ensure general and complete disarmament? Is that the slogan the United States representative is not prepared to accept? To find the precise meaning of the expression used by the representative of the United States, we must re-read his statement of 18 March, in which he said:

"In the past three days those noble words ‘general and complete disarmament’ have been mouthed 135 times in a lesser number of minutes by certain of the delegations. They have as a result become hollow words — words shorn of all meaning." (TNCD/PV.4, page 15)

Is it necessary once again to stress that this term "general and complete disarmament" appears as the title of resolution 1378 (XIV), proposed and unanimously adopted by the Members of the United Nations, including the United States of America and the Western countries represented at this Conference? The peoples of the world have, in that unanimous resolution, expressed their hope that the work of disarmament will be accomplished, and that the present and succeeding generations will thus be saved from the disaster of a new war.

That being so, it is easy to see why, instead of proposing that we should agree on real disarmament measures such as would ensure general and complete disarmament, the United States representative suggested in his statement of 25 March that the Ten Nation Committee should deal in the days to come only with control measures applicable to abstract cases. After suggesting that such questions as elements of control and various aspects of verification should be considered, he continued:

"I would therefore suggest that, if the other delegations agree, we should turn our attention to this point next week, as a matter of first importance."

That was the matter of control. He continued:

"We have devoted considerable time to a general discussion of it this week. As has been indicated, it is a matter about which the world is greatly concerned ...". (TNCD/PV.9, page 25)

Is it not significant that at the very time when we ought to be dealing, under the terms of the United Nations resolution, with the most important question facing the world today — that of general and complete disarmament — we should be invited to start with a discussion on control, which is not an aim in itself but only a consequence of disarmament, a means of verification?
The General Assembly resolution is nevertheless clear. When it defines the task of the Ten Nation Committee, it "calls upon Governments to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of this problem". *(A/RES/1378 (XIV)*

It is true that other Western delegations do not consider that this resolution has a precise meaning. For instance, in his remarks at the end of the meeting on Friday 26 March, Mr. Jules Moch, the representative of France, said:

"The text adopted by the General Assembly is sufficiently vague for us all to be able to support it". *(TNOD/PV.9, page 39)*

Is the necessary inference that this is why the United States supported it? Is the necessary inference that the United States supported it because it would allow disregard of what are called slogans? Is it really meaningless and age-worn, as the United States representative put it, to consider that the question of general and complete disarmament is the most important one facing the world today? We think, on the contrary -- and we are certain that we are expressing the opinion of the great majority of the delegations which voted for the resolution -- that the United Nations, in calling on governments to agree on this question, gave proof of clear-sighted realism. There is not a shadow of doubt that the General Assembly was guided by a highly realistic view of the situation when it urged governments to work to bring about general and complete disarmament. The accumulation of weapons, both conventional and nuclear, is such that a spark might easily be struck by mistake, accident or miscalculation. It is for that very reason that disarmament cannot be a process of study of control measures, or of fixation of force levels which represent no reduction, but must comprise measures likely to lead to general and complete disarmament in the shortest possible time.

Mr. Eaton's statement gives the impression that the United States delegation is in no hurry to reach general and complete disarmament, or at least can only regard it as a distant objective, an objective in a future world, or a mirage, and not as a necessity of today.

In order to get an approximate idea of how and when the United States delegation intends to arrive at general and complete disarmament, we might perhaps usefully draw on its own observations concerning the probable development of this matter.

Speaking at our first, inaugural, meeting, the representative of the United States of America, it will be recalled, did not seem very enthusiastic about the tasks assigned to our Committee by the United Nations resolution. For example, he said:
"... the initial steps must not be overly ambitious"; and

"We would only deceive ourselves ... if we were to place our names on
some grand, but hollow, design, some ambitious but unenforceable scheme,
some unrealistically timed programme of disarmament". (TNCD/FV.1, pages 34–35)

That pessimism about the solution of the most important problem of our age
comes out particularly clearly a little later in the same statement by the United
States representative, which continues as follows:

"For although in the time of those now alive general disarmament may
be achieved, differences among nations will remain". (ibid, page 36)

Thus Mr. Eaton doubts whether general and complete disarmament will be
achieved in his lifetime. It is not very encouraging to think that the United
States delegation does not believe that the problem of disarmament can be solved
before the end of our century -- for we think that Mr. Eaton will live a long time
yet.

The impression obtained from the discussions of these past few days is
therefore that, in spite of one apparent agreement in principle on the objective
of our Conference -- namely, general and complete disarmament -- views differ on
the methods of reaching that objective. There is a basic difference of opinion
concerning the objective itself.

In his speech of 30 March the representative of Czechoslovakia explained why
the delegations of the socialist countries could not begin to discuss details of
control, as the Western delegations had proposed. We should like to add some
further considerations to the pertinent arguments he put forward on the subject.

What actually is the position adopted by the Western delegations?
In his remarks of 25 March the United States representative said:

"Rather than embark on a discussion at this juncture on what the figure
for the United States and Soviet force levels and related conventional
armaments should be, the United States delegation proposes an approach which
can be used as a non-controversial basis for concrete discussion of control
arrangements". (TNCD/FV.9, page 28)

Mr. Eaton added:

"Let us take as an example of a concrete disarmament measure the force
level figure of 2.1 million men which represents a substantial reduction of
presently declared Soviet force levels, as well as a considerable reduction
of the already lower levels reached by the United States". (ibid.)
On the following Friday, 1 April, Mr. Eaton made another proposal concerning control over the placing in orbit of artificial satellites. The method advocated thus consists of isolating and treating separately, outside the whole framework of general and complete disarmament, one single question, and that only in relation to control.

Objections to that method are met by asserting desire to proceed more rapidly, to get beyond general discussion and start on allegedly concrete measures of disarmament. Of course it is necessary to move quickly, and of course concrete disarmament measures must be studied, but only within the framework of the desired objective, general and complete disarmament; and the concrete measures studied must be disarmament measures.

Nobody here could underestimate the importance of a reduction in armed forces and armaments, measures for which provision is made in both the plans; but what requires to be emphasized once again is this characteristic feature of the disarmament problem at the present time: that no measure of disarmament, however important, is sufficient to achieve disarmament if taken separately. However substantial it may appear to certain delegations, reduction of forces — which moreover the Western plan also terms "coordinated limitation" — as envisaged in the Western plan and Mr. Eaton's proposals cannot be said by anybody, as far as we can see, to be capable alone of opening the way to general and complete disarmament; still less can control of satellites.

Examined in the light of present realities and of the proposals which we have mentioned, the situation as we see it if the method proposed by the Western countries were adopted would not be conducive to progress towards, or to achievement of, the general and complete disarmament which we all have taken as the goal of our Committee. In the opinion of the Bulgarian delegation, the method recommended by the Western delegations tends to establish control without disarmament, for there would be no use in trying to claim that it comprises disarmament. The control bodies would then control armed forces and armaments.

We shall be told in reply that it is not intended to stop there and that reduction of armed forces would be pursued. That may be so, but the question is, when? This leads us once more to the conclusion that no control system can be conceived or brought into effect except within the framework of an agreement on
the basic principle of general and complete disarmament. It also leads us to speak again about a second controversial point on which we should like to make some remarks. I mean the problem of time-limits.

It has been said here that to fix a time-limit in advance is impossible. As the Western delegations did not explain why fixation of time-limits for disarmament measures was impossible, let us endeavour to explain why, to our way of thinking, it is utterly essential to fix them.

From what has been said by certain representatives of the Western countries, it is clearly not any given time-limit for any given measure of disarmament that is considered impossible. Nor do they think the time-limits laid down in the Soviet plan inadequate. The point at issue is the very existence of the time-limits. If we have understood correctly, the reason does not lie in the practical difficulties of carrying out the disarmament measures, but is essentially that the time-limits are linked with subsequent undertakings.

Why do we consider the time factor so important? It has been amply demonstrated in these debates that disarmament has now become an imperative need. We only wish to revert to this point in order to point out that if that need is acknowledged by all here, as we sincerely believe, and if that acknowledgment is not a purely verbal concession to the anxiety of the peoples of all nations, then it must be said that what seems impossible to us is to separate the concept of disarmament from the concept of time and time-limits. If disarmament is to take place, it will take place within a given lapse of time, and I should like to stress that point. It applies both to disarmament as a whole, that is to say to general and complete disarmament, and to any given measure of disarmament. If the time essential for implementing any particular disarmament measure is not specified, how is that measure to be put into effect?

At the meeting of 31 March the United Kingdom representative explained at length the advantage he saw in proceeding with reduction of armed forces in conformity with the Western plan. The advantage was, he said, that the reduction of armed forces could be carried out immediately.

Let it be said in passing that there will not be a reduction, but simply a state of fact, when the reduction of forces decided on by the Soviet Government has been carried out.
I would not go so far as to say that Mr. Ormsby-Gore thereby supported our views on time-limits, but he did nevertheless recognize the importance of the time factor. In so doing he wished to show that the Western plan was more realistic and took greater account of the need to work at disarmament in terms of time.

Reverting to certain statements that the four-year period laid down in the Soviet plan is impracticable because it would itself be preceded by an unknown period to be devoted to a world disarmament conference, the United Kingdom representative concluded that the time-limit proposed in the Soviet plan was therefore not really four years, but X plus four years. We cannot refrain from observing that the Western countries which sponsor a plan containing no time-limit and entirely ignoring the time factor, have on several occasions found fault with the Soviet plan because of that alleged gap of the world conference preceding the implementation time-limit of four years. Mr. Moch said this again yesterday.

In so doing the representatives of the Western countries undoubtedly show, in regard to the duration of that conference, the blackest pessimism. Speedily forgetting the unanimous resolution of the United Nations and the desire of the peoples of the whole world to get rid of the armaments factor and its threat, some representatives are saying that the Conference will certainly go on for years and years. Why are the Western delegations displaying concern over this unreal problem? The point now at issue is not the duration of the future world conference on disarmament; nor is it to the point to make pessimistic forecasts about the supposed attitude of other countries. The first question is, what is the attitude of the countries represented here at this Conference? While nobody may be able to foresee the duration of a future disarmament conference, one thing is certain: it will mainly depend on the attitude adopted by the Powers represented in this Committee; and it will depend on the work done here, the results achieved by our Conference, and the contents of the agreement to be worked out here. It is not showing groundless optimism to believe that any agreement reached by the Ten Nation Committee on a plan for general and complete disarmament would have a positive effect on the whole subsequent course of the disarmament problem and on the attitude towards it of the majority of countries.

It is therefore not the duration of a future conference which constitutes the main obstacles. If one had to express oneself in formulae, it would be necessary to recognize that the Western plan comprises two indefinite, or rather unknown, elements. One is the time factor: no time-limit is laid down in the Western
plan; the second is the wilful lack of precision in respect of the disarmament measures to be undertaken. Those two elements added together make an equation with two unknowns which leads us nowhere.

Whatever may be said about the way in which our discussion is proceeding, it is absolutely essential to be quite clear about two points of capital importance.

First, the task assigned to our Committee is to consider general and complete disarmament with a view to reaching an agreement on that objective.

Secondly, it is clear that the work cannot be done in the midst of ambiguity and misinterpretation.

Now, in the past few days we have been witnessing a most curious phenomenon. The more the Western delegations endeavour to show that their objective is general and complete disarmament, the further they move away from that objective; and they do so in two ways: either by suggesting the study of proposals which are supposed to be concrete but from which all disarmament measures have been excluded so that they no longer contain anything but control measures, or by indulging in contradictory statements, both in this Committee and outside, made by eminent leaders of Western policy.

Only yesterday the United States representative in the Ten Nation Committee endeavoured to show us that his Government was in favour of general and complete disarmament. On the previous day, in a statement to the convention of the National Association of Broadcasters at Chicago, Mr. Harter, the United States Secretary of State, implied that the aim of United States disarmament policy was to reach a general and controlled limitation of armaments and that, to achieve that aim, United States policy would endeavour to arrive at a treaty on control of armaments and not of disarmament.

These contradictory statements by Western statesmen and representatives give rise to uncertainty and a very serious doubt concerning the true intentions of the Western Powers and consequently the prospects for our work. In his remarks of 5 April Mr. Moch expressed regret that we should have lost so much time in an academic discussion which could not get us anywhere. Is it a waste of time to seek to clarify the question whether the representatives of the Western and the socialist countries here are all in favour of general and complete disarmament? It is certainly not the fault of the representatives of the socialist countries if we have not yet managed to agree on the general principles we should follow in our future work.
The position of the socialist countries has been clearly stated by their representatives. It is based on a sincere desire to arrive at general and complete disarmament, and on the United Nations General Assembly resolution.

On the other hand, we heard the representative of France tell us — also in his statement yesterday — that the Soviet plan for general and complete disarmament is not acceptable to the Western delegations and cannot serve as a basis of discussion for the preparation of an agreement on general and complete disarmament. That is a serious and entirely groundless statement by the French representative. Why should the Soviet plan not be acceptable to the delegations of the Western countries as a basis of discussion? Because it contains fixed time-limits for the implementation of the various stages and for the various disarmament measures; and because the Western Powers would not wish to confine themselves within precise time-limits.

Why should their plan be more suitable and more acceptable? Because it does not contain fixed time-limits for the various disarmament measures. That is really an astonishing way of representing matters. Yet there is every reason to believe — and there can be no mistake about it — that what renders the Soviet plan unacceptable to the Western delegations is precisely the concrete disarmament measures it contains, the fixed time-limits for their implementation, and the abolition of all armed forces and of all armaments, both conventional and nuclear, within fixed time-limits agreed between the Powers — namely the features which make the plan a real plan for general and complete disarmament.

And that is why this plan advocated by the socialist countries, which has received the approval and support of world public opinion and has been described by the Prime Minister of India as reasonable and meeting the needs of mankind today, can bring about a real and speedy solution of the problems of disarmament; and why it is rejected by the Western delegations as a basis of discussion. But that being so, the time is past for saying that any given measure or any given time-limit in the Soviet plan does not suit the Western Powers. What will have to be said is that it is general and complete disarmament which does not suit them.

Mr. MARTINO (Italy) (translation from French): The discussions last week and during the last few days have further clarified our respective positions, and I think that has been useful for our work, even though it has not brought the two contrary views closer together.
It would, in any case, be very naive to imagine, after nearly fifteen years of fruitless negotiations, that two or three weeks of discussion could suffice to solve the problem which constitutes one of the main obstacles to the establishment of real peace in the world.

I should like to emphasize the need for both sides to recognize that it would be irresponsible, highly dangerous and even contrary to the most elementary truth, to give the public the impression that it is easy to solve the problems of disarmament.

Where do we stand now?

On the Soviet side, the following procedure has been suggested:

(A) An immediate understanding on the general lines and essential principles of an agreement. In the first place, the general scope of the measures of general and complete disarmament would have to be decided.

According to our Eastern colleagues these measures would be:

Disbandment of all armed forces; destruction of all forms of armaments; complete prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons; cessation of the manufacture of these weapons, and their elimination; destruction of stockpiles of these weapons; complete cessation of manufacture, and destruction of, all types of war missiles irrespective of their range, including military space vehicles; abolition of military bases of all kinds on foreign territory, and of all missile-launching installations.

(B) A world conference for the drafting and signature of the treaty by all States, it being recognized that the conference itself will have to solve all the special problems of interested States which are not among the ten nations represented here.

(C) Ratification of the treaty.

(D) Implementation of the treaty, it being understood that the famous four years are for this part of the procedure only.

Even leaving out of account the time needed for us to reach a preliminary agreement here, and even supposing that the period of four years for implementing the treaty is long enough, several years are certain to elapse between the beginning of the Ten Nation Committee's work and effective disarmament.

As I understand it the disarmament plan, in the form of a preamble on the general scope of the disarmament measures and a draft prepared by the Ten Nation
Committee, would be a plan for the future, the negotiation, execution and completion of which would take place at a certain interval of time after the plan itself had been drafted in its initial form and general outline.

Now plans of this kind should be based on the future situation we are trying to foresee, rather than on the present situation. Naturally, the more accurate the forecasts on which it is based, the more effective such a plan will be. It is, however, useful to remember that the more remote the period to which it applies, the more difficult and less probable a good forecast becomes.

As regards our work here, I feel bound to point out that it is quite possible that a plan drawn up at this conference on the lines suggested by Mr. Zorin might, in the course of the lengthy procedure envisaged by our Eastern colleagues, become wholly or partly impossible to execute.

After this brief initial examination I feel, for the second time, a certain misgiving.

Have we met here to draw up a list of principles and measures of a general nature, postponing indefinitely the time when disarmament will really begin? To be sure, we should not like to think that our Eastern colleagues are inclined to abandon, for the time being, any real will to disarm; but we are bound to note that certain proposals and statements of theirs are tantamount to postponing any start on effective disarmament measures sine die.

We cannot subscribe to the idea that the hopes unanimously expressed by the United Nations General Assembly can be interpreted as relating to a goal dissociated from any immediate measure aiming at least to stop the arms race.

Following the Italian delegation's statement regarding the international disarmament organization, Mr. Zorin, the representative of the Soviet Union, asked for clarification of our views on the procedure to be followed in order to make headway with the Committee's work. This information was given to him on 30 March. But as he seems to have ignored it completely I should like to add a few words now.

The Italian delegation, true to resolution 1378 (XIV) of the United Nations General Assembly, is convinced that we are called upon to obtain concrete results as soon as possible.

We consider that these results should be such as would stop the arms race and set in motion a gradual and continuous process leading towards a disarmed world governed by very sound and well-established political, legal and moral principles. In this context I consider the proposals submitted by the United States representative to be logical, practical and realistic.
Can we seek ways of bringing the Soviet position closer to what world opinion and our terms of reference require us to do, i.e. to initiate, as soon as possible, measures leading gradually towards the goal of general and complete disarmament? Naturally this would not prevent us from seeking — and reaching — agreement at the same time on the fundamental principles which should govern negotiations on general and complete disarmament.

The Italian delegation is in no way opposed to these general principles of disarmament being formulated, provided that they are not propaganda slogans. Indeed, Italy's Minister for Foreign Affairs said at the last session of the General Assembly that it would have been well to recall them. Disarmament must be balanced, gradual and controlled; at each stage it must safeguard the security of all the countries of the world. The Western plan contains a preamble which might be used, if necessary with additions and amendments. It is clear, however, that it is not a preamble that our peoples are expecting — that it is not to produce a preamble that we have met here. What our peoples are expecting is first and foremost the formulation of concrete and immediate measures for the reduction of armed forces and armaments, which could first stop the arms race and then lead us towards the supreme goal of general and complete disarmament. Now the Western plan offers us a very well conceived body of just such concrete measures for balanced and guaranteed disarmament.

The same applies to the proposal made by Mr. Eaton last Friday. This offers us a prudent method and opens a possible way to early agreement. These measures are concrete, from a technical point of view, and fit into the complex disarmament process at the proper place and time. They can be put into effect without there being any obstacle to their execution, and they can be easily controlled.

In the first two stages of our plan we have provided for measures which may be classified as follows:

1. Preparatory measures:

   These measures constitute, not a prior condition, but a practical starting point necessary for giving effect to the successive measures. Examples are: the collection of information on present force levels and armaments; joint technical studies; establishment of the international disarmament organization, etc.
2. Indirect measures:
   These are measures to prevent a future increase in the military potential of
   States. Examples are: the cessation of production of fissionable materials for
   weapons purposes, and conversion of those materials for peaceful uses; prohibition
   of the placing into orbit of satellites carrying weapons of mass destruction, etc.

3. Direct measures:
   The immediate effect of these measures is the reduction of armed forces and
   the corresponding armaments: for example, the reduction applying to the two greatest
   world Powers, to be followed by reductions for certain other States. Measures of
   this kind — which are in fact real disarmament measures — could be carried out
   very quickly and would not be subject to agreements to be reached between eighty
   States at some undetermined future time.

4. Control measures:
   As we have often said before, control measures are closely linked with
   disarmament measures. This is not the time to explain in detail the principles we
   have followed in defining control measures. Suffice it to say now that Mr. Zorin's
   accusation in his statement yesterday that we are seeking "arms control" — an
   accusation repeated today by the Bulgarian representative — is merely a new political
   propaganda slogan.

   In the Five Power plan there is no control without disarmament; but neither
   is there disarmament without control, for we cannot believe it realistic and
   feasible to hope for honest implementation of a disarmament agreement without
   guaranteeing security for one and all.

   The Italian Government cannot subscribe to an agreement which would commit it
   to disarmament measures without effective control specified in advance. It cannot
   betray the vital interests of its people by making itself a party to an action that
   might undermine the very foundations of a security so painfully acquired, at the
   same time holding out hopes to the world which have no basis in reality.

   A few days ago Mr. Zorin said that he regretted a statement I had made about
   Soviet views on the problem of controls, which was published by the Giornale d'Italia
   and reprinted in a German newspaper. (cf. TNCD/PV.13, page 24). I can easily
   repeat that statement here and illustrate its content:
"One of the restrictions which the Soviet Union still seeks to apply to controls is this: they must not be such that they can be used for espionage purposes. This means in practice that controls can be accepted and are even regarded as necessary complements of a disarmament plan, provided that they are not effective."

And I added:

"It is difficult to accept the principle of such a proposition. The good faith of all parties is, in fact, a necessary condition for the execution of a disarmament agreement. But when the suspicion arises that the international inspectors responsible for verifying the execution of agreements may engage in espionage, every doubt as to this good faith is justified. Does not mistrust of the international inspectors perhaps justify mistrust on the part of others, concerning good will in the execution of agreements and good faith in accepting them?"

That is the essential part of the article criticized.

What particularly displeased Mr. Zorin — if I understood him correctly — was the statement that the Soviet Union can accept controls provided that they are not effective. But is not this statement justified by what the Soviet Union representative has so often said on the subject?

On 23 March Mr. Zorin spoke as follows:

"... we further pointed out that — "it would be ... unrealistic, while the disarmament programme is being implemented, to endow the control organ with powers for controlling armaments which still remain at the disposal of States under the terms of the treaty, for these powers could be used for intelligence purposes and could, naturally, not be accepted by States jealous of their own security."

"I should like in this connexion to give an explanation to Mr. Martino, the representative of Italy, who seemed displeased, it would appear, at our mentioning the possibility of spying. We are realists. We understand that, if inspectors are sent to verify armed forces and armaments which are not subject to reduction or abolition, this can only be attributed to a desire to learn what those armed forces are, and that cannot be regarded as other than ... spying ..."

Let us agree on forms of control which cannot be qualified as espionage. These would be precisely those forms of control which will ensure observation and verification of the execution of
disarmament measures, i.e. control of the types of troops and armaments which are to be reduced or, in the case of armaments, destroyed. Go ahead and verify it. Then it will not be represented as a form of espionage or military intelligence activity ..." (TNCD/FV.7, pages 16 and 17)

Those were Mr. Zorin's own words.

However, under the Soviet plan, the agreement does not apply to the armed forces and armaments that are reduced or limited, but to those that remain. What would have to be established under the Soviet plan, in the first stage, for example, would not be the number of soldiers to be demobilized or the quantities of arms to be destroyed, but the upper limit for the armed forces and armaments of each State. For the Soviet Union, the United States and China, this would be 1,700,000 men and corresponding quantities of armaments. That is the subject of the agreement; hence, that is what has to be controlled. If we are unable to verify this ceiling, control is obviously ineffective.

Now the control proposed by the Soviet representative, while making it possible to verify what is reduced, eliminated or destroyed, does not make it possible to verify what remains at the disposal of States. It does not permit control of what is the real object of the agreement. It is therefore an ineffective control.

That is why the representative of France has placed such emphasis on the idea that it is not enough to know what has been deducted, but that at least one of the other two factors must also be known — either the starting point or the final result.

The Soviet plan envisages the possibility of establishing an aerial inspection network, with photographic surveys covering the entire territory of each State.

Mr. Zorin has told us that such inspection of the territory of all States should be authorized only when disarmament has been completed — in other words when there is nothing left to control. This, however, is not specified in the Soviet plan and logic would seem to rule out such an interpretation.

The Soviet plan also provides that while the programme of general and complete disarmament is being carried into effect and until the final disbandment of all armed forces, States shall maintain the same ratio among the various services of their armed forces as existed at the time of the entry
into force of the disarmament agreement. This measure seems to me to be a very useful one, because if the ratio were changed it would be easy to keep a country's military potential intact or even increase it. But how could we make sure that the measure was carried out unless checks and verifications of existing armed forces and their armaments could be carried out at any time? The plan obviously presupposes that such checks and verifications can be carried out. If this were not so we should be forced to believe that Mr. Khrushchev, in expounding his plan in that form on 19 September 1959, had misled the United Nations as to his intentions.

Having thus clarified the meaning of my statement published in the Giornale d'Italia, I cannot refrain from mentioning that Mr. Zorin, too, wished to give the Italian public his views, and that he did so through a Communist opposition newspaper, which is particularly willing to publish the views of the Soviet Union. Mr. Zorin has, of course, a great advantage over me: for I could not make so bold as to explain my ideas freely to the people of the Soviet Union by applying to a liberal opposition newspaper, for the simple reason that no such newspapers exist in the Soviet Union.

In his interview, the Soviet representative set out to explain, tendentiously, and with little regard for the truth, the attitude of the Western Powers participating in this Conference and of Italy in particular. I will not oblige my colleagues to listen to the text of Mr. Zorin's statement or to the comments it would call for. I shall merely point out that Mr. Zorin obviously tried to use his interview to discredit the work of my delegation in the eyes of the Italian public, for purposes of ideological propaganda.

In the important statement in which the representative of the Soviet Union, at the beginning of our Conference, described the main lines of the plan for general and complete disarmament submitted to the United Nations by Mr. Khrushchev, he took particular care, if I remember rightly, to emphasize the realistic nature of the plan. He even asserted that there was clear evidence of that realism in the fact that the "socialist countries" were prepared to conclude an agreement on the basis of the Soviet plan. By that, Mr. Zorin probably meant that the policy of the "socialist countries" as such must necessarily be realistic and can only be understood in terms of Realpolitik. But this does not only apply to the socialist countries, which we certainly cannot recognize as enjoying a monopoly of
political realism. It obviously holds good for all countries and all peoples. International politics is and must always remain, for everyone, something firmly anchored in realism, in other words Realpolitik. It is the policy that every people must pursue in order to safeguard and, if possible, to improve its living conditions and opportunities for development within the international community. It has always borne, and will always bear, a typical stamp of realism, without which it would never have been possible and would never be possible for any people to make its own way of life and ensure its own security. To this end every people needs to know and to assess its own strength and qualities precisely, and to know just as precisely on whom and on what it can rely in carrying out the programme of its national life. If this realism has often manifested itself in a brutal manner, that is due to the nature and organization of the international community, in which might has prevailed over the rule of law. For hundreds and thousands of years nations have confronted one another just as individuals did before the birth of States. Bellum omnium contra omnes War by all against all. This is why international politics have so often been characterized by brutal realism.

If I go out into the street and am the victim of an assault or an attempted assault, I may possibly be protected better and more promptly by the police than if I use my own strength. But in the international community there have never been, and are not yet, such prompt and vigilant police; consequently it has always been and unfortunately still is essential for everyone, in order to ensure his position and discharge his duties in the world with the minimum of risk, to take account of what is known as the balance of forces or balance of power.

It is precisely in order to escape from this brutal realism and from dependence on this balance of power, from which the arms race necessarily follows, that mankind has so long aspired to establish a system for settling international disputes by legal means. This is the great alternative to bloodshed. Law is also power; it is even the monopoly of power in the hands of the recognized authority. But the power of law serves precisely to prevent disputes from being settled by violence. That is why we want an international institution to be provided with means of enforcing the law by the exercise of power. We realize that this may not be liked, just as policemen usually are not liked. The anarchist in each
of us is always protesting against them. But the human spirit really longs for the establishment of such a police force in international life, and in providing for the general and complete disarmament of States we cannot ignore the fact that the time has now come when, even in relations between nations, the law of power should be replaced by the power of the law.

Mr. MEZINOESCU (Romania) (translation from French): I wish to make a few brief comments on some of the ideas just expressed by our Italian colleague, subject to a more careful study of them from the verbatim record.

I must say, first of all, that I consider it something positive that Mr. Martino, before rejecting some points in the socialist countries' plan should have gone to the trouble of studying them, which is a departure from the methods of other Western representatives. I would also stress that his omission of any further reference to prior conditions which the socialist countries must accept would also appear positive, had it not been contradicted by other factors to which I shall refer presently.

Having said that, I come now to the substance of my remarks. In the first place, the representative of Italy claimed that the balanced, matched and guaranteed measures comprised in the first two stages of the Western plan could be calculated to stop the arms race.

I must say that the arguments advanced by Mr. Martino in support of his views have by no means convinced me that he is right. I shall follow the order and the classification proposed by Mr. Martino himself.

He spoke first of preparatory measures without prior conditions. It is clear that these measures can have no influence on the arms race, and certainly could not stop it.

He went on to speak of indirect measures relating to fissionable materials and the reconversion of stocks. As I said yesterday, these measures can have no effect on the arms race, least of all the effect of stopping it. Like all the other representatives of Western countries -- and I am not thinking only of those who are present here -- you are well aware that the States with some nuclear, or I might say military, experience have enormous quantities of fissionable materials at their disposal and that these quantities are sufficient for the manufacture of new types and new quantities of nuclear weapons to be continued, without being affected by slight reductions or even by the cessation of production of fissionable materials for military purposes. Consequently this indirect measure, as it stands, cannot affect the arms race, let alone put a stop to it.
I now come to the third category, that of direct measures. So far as reduction of force levels in the first stage is concerned, there is no real reduction; there is merely a statement of the position. The Western plan merely states that the force levels of the two Great Powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, would, within a foreseeable time — and a much shorter time than the discussions of our Committee will take — be brought below the figure of 2,500,000 provided for in the Western plan. Even with a corresponding reduction of armaments, this measure cannot affect the arms race, still less arrest it.

As regards the reductions of force levels and armaments provided for in the second stage to bring the armed forces of the two Great Powers down to 2,100,000 men, I have already had occasion to show, in my statement yesterday that these are very small reductions and that they would be made, according to the Western plan itself, at some future time so indeterminate and, according to the statements of the Western representatives, I would even say indeterminable, that we cannot seriously consider them capable of influencing the arms race and, still less, of stopping it.

My next comment concerns control. At first I understood that Mr. Martino did not share the views expressed on this subject by Mr. Eaton or even those expressed only the day before yesterday by the United States Secretary of State. I should be very glad if that were the case, for the views on control stated by Mr. Eaton, echoing the words spoken by the United States Secretary of State two days ago, are unacceptable and can in no way facilitate the progress of our work.

Mr. Martino affirmed just now that he did not want control without disarmament, that he was not in favour of control over armaments and that the control he asked for and which, according to him, was called for by the Western plan, was control over concrete disarmament measures.

Unfortunately, the facts do not bear out this position which Mr. Martino took the trouble to explain to us. The Italian delegation may have had some internal difficulty — that is no concern of mine — but in Mr. Martino's absence here is what Mr. Cavalletti told us on 28 March, when explaining in detail the structure and functions of the international disarmament organization. His words were as follows:
"(e) To install and to prepare, prior to the conclusion of an agreement prohibiting the placing into orbit of vehicles bearing weapons of mass destruction, the functioning of an agreed system of surveillance;"

(TNCD/PV.10, page 11)

I may be the victim of an error, but the error is not ours. We have here the establishment of control, not merely over armaments, but even "prior to the conclusion of an agreement" on disarmament, which seems to me to constitute a certain nuance, further to the right, I should say, than Mr. Eaton and Mr. Herter have gone themselves.

Here, unfortunately, we have this matter of a prior condition. The problem of control is raised by the words: "to install and to prepare ... the functioning ..." These are significant words; they are not devoid of meaning. "To install and to prepare ... the functioning of an agreed system of surveillance ...". When "prior to the conclusion of an agreement prohibiting the placing into orbit, etc., etc." We thus have control before a measure, shall we say, of disarmament -- actually it is not a measure of disarmament, but that point has already been discussed and we have given our views on it -- "prior to the conclusion of an agreement ...". In fact, a prior condition.

With your permission I shall also read sub-paragraph (g). I might perhaps have thought there was a typing error, which would have proved an expensive error for the typist, but the same story is repeated in sub-paragraph (g) which reads:

"(g) to install and to operate, prior to the conclusion of an agreement, an agreed system of surveillance relating to the discontinuance of the production of fissionable materials for military uses;" (ibid)

That is a proposal submitted to us as being calculated to stop the armaments race: prohibition of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes. Such an assertion is quite groundless, for a measure of this kind cannot influence the arms race, still less put an end to it. Yet this measure, which can have so little effect on the arms race, is proposed to us on condition that we agree, prior to the conclusion of an agreement, "to install and to operate ... an agreed system of surveillance ...".

Thus, before the conclusion of an agreement, we have control, quite apart from any disarmament measure. We have control divorced even from negotiation of the
measures proposed in the Western plan. We have acceptance of an agreement on
control, on the establishment and the organization of international control, and of
all those teams which are, in fact, to make good the deficiencies of the intelligence
services. We must have all this as a prior condition for willingness to negotiate and
to conclude an agreement on an alleged disarmament measure. I shall not look for an
explanation, but the facts prove that the statements made by Mr. Martino just now are
contradicted by the concrete proposals made a few days previously by the Italian
delegation, and that instead of dissociating himself, in this matter of control,
from his colleague Mr. Eaton and from the position explained by the United States
Secretary of State, to take a constructive attitude, Mr. Martino actually went even
further in a wrong direction — a direction which cannot lead to any kind of
agreement on disarmament and can certainly not help towards the goal set for us by
the resolution of the General Assembly. 1/

Mr. CRUMBY-GORE (United Kingdom): I am bound to say that, listening
to the interpretation, I found some difficulty in understanding the relevance of
some of the remarks made by the representative of Romania and I will have to study
them in more detail in the verbatim record. But I understood him to say in the
early part of his statement that the reconversion of existing stocks of nuclear
material used for weapon purposes to peaceful uses would have no effect on the
armaments race. Now we have heard this kind of statement before, I cannot follow
the reasoning behind it because, if we look at the Soviet plan we find that at one
stage it includes both the cessation of manufacture of all types of nuclear weapons,
and the destruction of stockpiles. The destruction of stockpiles is the re-conversion,
to peaceful uses, of existing stocks, built up for military uses. We also read in
the Soviet plan that:

1/  The following is inserted at the request of the delegation of Romania:
"The items (e) and (g) in the representative of Italy's speech to which
the representative of Romania referred appear in the provisional edition of
TNCD/IV.10 (original French) as they were quoted by the representative of Romania.
"In the final edition of TNCD/IV.10, at the request of the Italian
dlegation, the words "prior to the conclusion of an agreement" in the original
version of items (e) and (g) have been deleted".
"The international control organ shall have at its disposal all the facilities necessary for the exercise of strict control." (A/4219, page 14)

So, presumably, the Soviet plan envisages strict control of the cessation of manufacture of nuclear weapons, and strict control of the destruction of existing stocks. Now the difference between the Soviet plan and the Western plan in this respect is, of course, that we make provision for this process in the first two stages, whereas the Soviet makes it only in the third stage. But I understood that we were all in agreement that where a measure of this kind was undertaken appropriate control measures should be applied. We have heard this stated by the Soviet representative again and again. If suitable control measures are to be applied, we must know what they are, and so far we have heard nothing whatever from the Soviet, or Eastern delegations, about the control methods they would employ for the cessation of the production of nuclear material. Not a word has been said but, clearly, control measures have to be worked out. We make provision for that. As for our saying that the control measures must be ready before the obligation is undertaken, we had always thought it was exactly in line with the statements of Soviet leaders and other Eastern delegations: that they wished to have effective control. If it is to be effective it must be ready to go into operation at the moment the obligation is undertaken. That is why we simply do not understand the Romanian delegate when he suggests that we should not even consider the control measures until after we have undertaken the obligation.

He also had something to say about the timing of the reductions of armed forces. He said that even if one looked at the second stage reductions in the Western plan it was not clear when these reductions would take place, but that is also perfectly true of the Soviet plan. We have been told again and again that no measure in the Soviet plan can be put into operation until after a world conference on disarmament has been held; and has reached agreement on force levels. So we have no definite time period within which the first Soviet reductions would take place. We have been told again and again that this is not taken into account in the four year period, so the first reductions are at an indefinite date in the future and, as we have already explained, in view of the difficulties that would face a world conference on this subject, they are postponed to the rather distant future.
The same problem of the timetable was raised again by the representative of Bulgaria, who said that I had reproached the Soviet delegation over the period that would be required for the summoning of this world conference and the reaching of conclusions by that conference: that I had referred to the period of disarmament as X plus four years, not four years. He seemed to think that I was trying to elicit from the Soviet delegation a more precise timetable of disarmament, but that was not my intention. I did not wish to press him for a more precise timetable because I believe it is not possible to give such a timetable; and that was the whole sense of my remarks. All I wished to point out was that it was wholly misleading to tell this Conference, or the public outside, that the Soviet plan was a plan to bring about disarmament in the next four years because, from the explanations that we have had round this table, it is quite clear that that is not true; that the period required is X plus four, and no member of an Eastern delegation has been able to indicate to us how long the period X might be.

The representative of Bulgaria also once again attempted to make out that the General Assembly resolution constituted a mandate for the Soviet plan of general and complete disarmament, but this again is very misleading. As the distinguished delegate knows very well, from having been at the General Assembly and, indeed, as he could equally well discover from reading the record of the First Committee of the Assembly, there was by no means unanimous approval of the Soviet plan for general and complete disarmament. If, indeed, there had been a vote on that particular topic it would not have been a unanimous vote. The General Assembly resolution does not anywhere indicate that a treaty based on the Soviet plan is the only way in which we can take steps towards the goal of general and complete disarmament. Indeed, if that had been the intention of the General Assembly it would hardly have included in the resolution a reference both to the United Kingdom plan and to other proposals that had been made during the course of our discussions. If it included these other proposals, and in particular the United Kingdom proposals, that can only have been done because the nations as a whole thought that they would be useful in leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament. The General Assembly resolution is not a commendation of the Soviet plan, and no phrase of it could possibly be interpreted in that manner.
The representative of Bulgaria, following in the footsteps of the Soviet representative yesterday, also reproached the United States representative concerning certain remarks that had been made by Mr. Herter in a speech the day before. It is not, of course, for me to put any interpretation on Mr. Herter's remarks, but Mr. Zorin quoted one of them yesterday as follows:

"...the United States policy employs the method of strengthening agreements on collective security against aggression". (TNCD/FV.II...page 29)

The apparent intention of the Soviet and Bulgarian representatives was to imply that a statement of this kind was not in keeping with a desire to bring about disarmament, but what in fact was Mr. Herter saying? He was saying something that many people in my country have said on numerous occasions: that until a disarmament agreement has been signed it is important for us individually, as countries, to maintain our defence forces and to strengthen our security arrangements. Is that an unusual thing to say? What is wrong with it?

Statesmen in every country have made similar statements — that until such time as we have an orderly reduction of armaments under effective international control we have each to look to our own defences. That is a perfectly reasonable statement. I could quote many statements by British ministers that had exactly the same sense. Indeed I can quote a similar statement from Mr. Khrushchev in his speech of 14 January. Here is what he said:

"Naturally we shall do everything to make use of the time we have gained in developing rocket weapons and to keep our lead in this field until an international agreement on disarmament is reached."

It is precisely the same position, and of course it is a perfectly reasonable position.

While I am on the subject of this speech made by Mr. Khrushchev on 14 January, I should like to quote certain other extracts from it because I think they do put a rather different light on the Soviet Union's decision to reduce its armed forces from the very high level at which they are today, 3.6 million men. Through the courtesy of the Soviet Union Embassy in London I have a full account of that speech, and I will now read from the official Soviet version what Mr. Khrushchev said:

"The Party, the Government, the entire Soviet people warmly thank the scientists, engineers, technicians and workers whose knowledge and labour have brought about great successes in developing atomic and hydrogen weapons, rocketry and all the other things that have made it possible to raise the defence potential of our country to such a high level and which in turn are enabling us now to carry out a further reduction of our armed forces."
"Our State possesses powerful rocketry. With the present development of military technique, military aviation and the navy have lost their former importance. These arms are not reduced but replaced.

"The Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government are able to inform you, Comrade Deputies, that although the weapons we now have are formidable weapons indeed, a weapon we have today in the hatching stage is even more perfect, even more formidable; the weapon which is being developed and is, as they say, in the portfolio of our scientists and designers is a fantastic weapon.

"I think that you will all agree, Comrade Deputies, that the question of the strength of the armed forces cannot be approached today as it was approached only a few years ago. It is enough to say that beginning with 1955 the strength of the armed forces in our country has been reduced by a third, while their fire-power has increased many times over during the period owing to the development and introduction of new military techniques.

"In our time, a country's defence capacity is not determined by the number of men under arms, by the number of men in uniform. Apart from the general political and economic factors of which I have already spoken here, a country's defence capacity depends decisively on the fire-power and the means of delivery it possesses.

"The proposed reduction will in no way reduce the fire-power of our armed forces, and this is the main thing."

I think that those extracts put a rather different interpretation on the acts of the Soviet Union Government from those that have been put before the Committee by Mr. Zorin. We really cannot regard this as a disarmament measure; to make such a claim is really very hollow. But Mr. Zorin has asked that this action on the part of the Soviet Union should be regarded as an example to us all. We are asked to regard it as an example that fifteen years after the end of the war the Soviet Union is prepared to reduce its forces to the same level as the United States of America. If we are to speak of examples, one can only say that the Soviet Union has been an example of a country which has preserved vast and swollen armed forces longer than any other country in the world.

Mr. MOGH (France) (translation from French): First of all, I should like to thank Mr. Ormsby-Gore for reading the statement by Mr. Khrushchev, with which we have all, of course, been familiar since it was made; it is a statement
of considerable importance on which I should also like to congratulate Mr. Khruschev. It is true that in a modern war force levels no longer mean anything and it might almost be said that the fewer men an army has the stronger it is, provided its generals know their job.

But this justifies the position constantly taken by the French Government, which urges that in order to avert the danger that hangs over the world, we should tackle the vehicles for nuclear weapons, which are still controllable.

It is not on that subject that I asked to speak, however; indeed, I did so before Mr. Ormsby-Gore read the quotation. I asked to speak for quite another reason. Yesterday I made a statement which I venture to think is of some importance for the future course of our discussions. That statement consists of two parts: the first part, on pages 19, 20 and 21 of the English verbatim record (TNCD/PV.16), was an answer to two previous speakers, extemporized during the meeting; the second part which begins in the middle of page 21 with the words: "Speaking now on behalf of the five Western delegations ..." had been considered at length during the preceding week and was prepared jointly by the five Western delegations. It thus represents a firm and precise position against which no attempt at dividing us, like the one made this morning, has any chance of success. This part of the statement should therefore be considered as a joint Western position, in the full sense of that term. I think it is clear, if you will kindly refer to the six paragraphs each beginning with the words: "We cannot accept". (or "agree to").

Mr. Zorin said yesterday, after I had finished speaking, that he believed he saw a possible basis for discussion in my statement: indeed, much to my astonishment, he referred to my flexibility. I am not in any way pressing him to give us a reply. I quite understand that he needs time and will have to get in touch with Moscow. I shall therefore wait most patiently. I do not know whether I have learned flexibility here, but in the last nine years I have certainly learned patience. I will wait! But I still believe that until we have that answer — I am sorry to quote myself again — "The path which the Conference has been following can lead to no concrete result". (TNCD/PV.16, page 25)

I said elsewhere, moreover, that the time had come to give up ideological antitheses, and statements that do not answer or take account of previous statements, and begin a comparative study on the basis of the six principles jointly submitted by the five Western delegations. I believe any alternative course may waste a good deal more of our time.
Mr. MARTINO (Italy) (translation from French): Allow me to add just a few words in reply to the representative of Romania, who referred to a contradiction in the views of the Italian Delegation. The words I used this morning with regard to the preparatory measures were as follows:

"These measures constitute, not a prior condition, but a practical starting point necessary for giving effect to the successive measures."

(See page 15 above)

This is clearly true as regards control in the case referred to by the representative of Romania, since it is obvious that unless control machinery were set up and functioning well, it would be impossible to control disarmament, especially as the treaty would have to come into force immediately.

Mr. Ormsby-Gore has already made an adequate reply on this matter, and I shall not add anything to what he said. I should merely like to observe that in his statement of 28 March — the one quoted by the representative of Romania — Mr. Cavalletti used precisely the following words:

"Nobody denies that the undertaking to disarm and the undertaking to accept methods of verification should be simultaneous and complementary; they should be two parts of one and the same legal instrument, two sides of the same coin." (TNCD/FV.10, page 5)

It is clear that Mr. Cavalletti's opinion is not exactly the same as the representative of Romania stated it to be. The misunderstanding, if any, seems to be due to the method — in my view a bad one — of reading only part of a statement made here, and omitting the rest. There is thus no contradiction in the views of the Italian Delegation.

Mr. MEZINCESCU (Romania) (translation from French): I should like to point out first that my quotation from the statement made on 28 March by Mr. Cavalletti was taken from page 11 of TNCD/FV.10. The passage which Mr. Martino has quoted from the same statement by Mr. Cavalletti is on page 6 of the same document. I conclude from what Mr. Martino has just said that there is no contradiction between the views of different members of the Italian Delegation; but there is a contradiction in one and the same statement made by the Italian Delegation. These things happen, I agree.

2/ The reference is to the provisional text of TNCD/FV.10
I should like to raise another question, and I think it will answer some of the remarks made just now by Mr. Ormsby-Gore, to which I shall reply if necessary after I have read the verbatim record. Do the Western delegations think that an agreement on control should be negotiated separately from the agreement on disarmament measures? If not, how do they explain the statements made by Mr. Cavalletti on 28 March, on behalf of the five Western Powers, which I quoted a little while ago?

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): I shall certainly read the verbatim record of the remarks made today by the representative of the United Kingdom, and I reserve the right to speak later on this subject if necessary. But I should like to make a few comments on Mr. Ormsby-Gore's statement immediately.

First, when speaking of time-limits, we simply said that the Western Powers had not laid down any time-limits in their plan at all, let alone time-limits for its first stage. We wish to make this point because in the first stage, as you can see — and I repeat it — there are no disarmament measures. For the fixing of force levels cannot be seriously represented as a disarmament measure.

It should be noted that so far as the first stage of the Western plan is concerned, we are told that it would come into force immediately before a disarmament conference, and it is stressed that this would take place within one year. In view of the attitude of the Western delegations here, we do not know how long our discussions will continue, or whether the time they take will be included in the one-year period. The Soviet plan is criticized for not laying down a time-limit for reaching agreement at the disarmament conference.

To judge from their attitude and from the nature of our discussions so far, it does not seem that we are near to reaching agreement. I stressed this point in my statement.

My second comment is as follows: the United Kingdom representative endeavoured to show that the resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly last year did not give a precise mandate with regard to the Soviet plan. True, the resolution did not specify that the Conference should adopt the Soviet plan, but the Soviet text submitted to the United Nations in the form of proposals made by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union bore the title: "General and complete disarmament". Moreover, the resolution of the
United Nations General Assembly on the disarmament question is also entitled "General and complete disarmament". Yet it must be emphasized that the most eminent men of the Western countries and the delegations of the Western Powers sitting here, although declaring themselves in favour of general and complete disarmament, are trying to lead us not towards such disarmament, but towards particular measures which would not only delay, but would prevent the achievement of general and complete disarmament.

**Mr. Ormsby-Gore** (United Kingdom): I would like to make it clear -- because apparently it is not clear still in the mind of the representative of Bulgaria -- that I do not blame the Soviet Union for not including any timetable with regard to the holding of the world conference. I do not blame them; I think they are extremely wise not to include any such timetable because I believe it is quite impossible to lay down such a timetable.

**Mr. Zorin** (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) *(translation from Russian)*: The Soviet delegation has no intention of starting a discussion today on all the questions which have been touched on in the many speeches that representatives have made. I should like merely to dwell on one small question which nevertheless is important from the standpoint of principle: on a question touched on by Mr. Ormsby-Gore. He read out quotations from a speech made by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, N.S. Khrushchev, at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Mr. Ormsby-Gore quoted certain parts of this speech in order, evidently, to prove one general conclusion which he drew at the end of his speech: that this speech means that a reduction of the armed forces of the Soviet Union by 1,200,000 men is not a disarmament measure. I must say that with the best will in the world I do not think it possible to interpret N.S. Khrushchev's speech at the meeting of the Supreme Soviet in this way and draw an inference of this kind. Even in the excerpts quoted by Mr. Ormsby-Gore one idea was emphasized: the idea that the defence potential of a country depends in a decisive degree on the fire-power and means of delivery at that country's disposal. The defence potential of the country -- that is what was emphasized in the excerpts quoted by Mr. Ormsby-Gore. Owing to the development of technology and the success achieved in this direction in the Soviet Union, we have become really able
drastically to reduce our armed forces.

But in another part of his speech, which Mr. Ormsby-Gore did not quote because these excerpts would have completely refuted his general conclusions, N.S. Khrushchev said:

"The reason why we are going to reduce our armed forces is because we do not want war and because we do not intend to attack anyone, because we do not wish to threaten anyone, and have no aggressive plans."

Further, N.S. Khrushchev explained:

"The inflated armies of today, just as the military bases far outside national frontiers, are meant for attack. They are not needed for defence. In reducing the strength of our armed forces we show that our country's intentions are most peaceful and in no way aggressive. Indeed, no country contemplating an attack on another nation or group of nations would venture to undertake a unilateral reduction of its armed forces, because it would not only have to use its firepower, including nuclear weapons and rocketry, but would also have to increase the army's strength." 3/

Now Mr. Ormsby-Gore did not read out these excerpts, because if he had done so he would not have been able to draw the conclusion which he did draw, and which I would say he drew artificially.

On the contrary we can say that those who maintain their military bases, those who do not want to reduce their armed forces even though this would not lead to the weakening of their fire-power, seem to have intentions which are not peaceful. That is the conclusion which can be drawn.

If you, Mr. Ormsby-Gore, say that a reduction in the armed forces of the Soviet Union by 1,200,000 men is not disarmament, then why do you regard your Western plan, which proposes to reduce the force levels of the United States to 2,500,000 and then to 2,100,000 men, as a disarmament plan? Please explain to us why you do this. Where is your logic? Indeed, we do not know whether you are going subsequently to maintain or increase your fire-power. Most probably you will

increase this fire-power, for up to date everything is being done to this end in the plans of the Western Powers and of NATO. In the Western plan you propose to keep the armed forces at 2,500,000 men, and then you propose to reduce them to 2,100,000 men, and you say, here is a real disarmament measure. But why do you regard it as a real disarmament measure to make a reduction of 400,000, and not as a real disarmament measure to make a reduction of 1,200,000 men?

Go to any meeting of your constituents, Mr. Ormsby-Gore, and explain this logic to them. They will not believe you. In any case I cannot understand it. I do not know what other representatives think, but I cannot understand such logic. Therefore the conclusion drawn by Mr. Ormsby-Gore does not follow from the quotations which he read out, and does not fit in with, and indeed is completely contradicted by, the excerpts from the same report which I read out. The view I have just expressed in connexion with the reduction of force levels in the Western plan shows incontrovertibly that the reduction of the armed forces of the Soviet Union by 1,200,000 is a real disarmament measure, a measure to reduce tension, a measure to facilitate general and complete disarmament. N.S. Khrushchev said in the same speech:

"This will strike a responsive chord in the hearts of the peoples of all countries. Not even the most hard-shelled exponents of the cold war will be able to prove that this is being done with a view to preparing for war".

I believe that these words are sufficient to explain the basic idea which I have been trying to express here.

Mr. MOCH (France) (translation from French): As a veteran of both wars my soldier's soul has been stirred by this discussion of strategy. In speeches by strategists, whether they are civilians or soldiers, one always finds antitheses, or if you prefer, both good and bad. I hope Mr. Zorin will not be vexed when I say that in the speech in question Mr. Khrushchev placed himself among the strategists, and that in the first part of his speech -- the part quoted by Mr. Ormsby-Gore -- having to reassure the Deputies in the Supreme Soviet, he told them: "we shall be far better armed when we concentrate our efforts on missiles and satellites, rather than on armed forces". I have no doubt he is right. But another part of the speech -- again I do not wish to offend Mr. Zorin -- rather
gave the impression of the belated strategist who is one war behindhand and reasons about a future conflagration from the lessons of the last one. One lesson to be drawn from past wars is indeed, that land forces are needed to occupy the ground. I do not quite see how one would occupy ground that had become highly radioactive, and on which, after all, there would be no one left alive. That is the contradiction I noted in this speech, which I read with interest, underlining certain passages, when it was first published.

But Mr. Zorin's reasoning is not quite correct either, or at least it is and it isn't. It would be perfectly correct if the Soviet Union were starting from a force level approximately equal to that of the United States today. In that case, yes, a reduction of 1,200,000 men would at least mean that an act of aggression, if attempted, would not be followed by a landing, but would consist solely in the use of missiles or satellites. But before the last unilateral reduction the Soviet Union was, in fact, much more strongly armed than the United States, since after this unilateral reduction -- which, incidentally, let us not forget, is the third, to my knowledge -- it will be roughly at the same level as the United States has been for many years.

Under these conditions I really do not see how accusations of aggressive intentions can be made against States whose forces have long been at the level to which the Soviet Union is now going to come down, and what is more, without control; moreover we do not know whether the reduction is to be accompanied by the destruction of the corresponding armaments. We do not think so. But it would be interesting to know, because in my opinion this reduction by 1,200,000 men would not be real disarmament on the part of the Soviet Union unless it were accompanied by the scrapping of a number of tanks, guns, aircraft and ships corresponding to the 1,200,000 men who had been sent home. Control would enable us to find out. At present there is no control; and we have not been told. We are therefore justified in assuming that it is simply a matter of sending back to the land or the factory a certain number of soldiers, who could be recalled within a week and whose arms, light and heavy, are being kept, carefully oiled and covered in the barracks and arsenals of the Soviet Union.

To sum up, the strategic question is open to discussion. The reduction of force levels, which is an excellent thing in itself, will bring the Soviet Union to the same level as the United States, which makes it difficult to say that the
United States has aggressive intentions if the Soviet Union has not. Lastly, the arms for the men sent home are being kept in serviceable condition -- which is not significant disarmament either.

Mr. ORMSBY-GORE (United Kingdom): I will take only a minute or two because Mr. Moch has already made many of the points I had intended to make in my reply to Mr. Zorin.

Mr. Zorin invited me to go and explain all this to my constituents -- which of course I am quite prepared to do. I see them on many occasions. If they disagree with my views on the subject they will vote against me at the next election and I will no longer be either a Member of Parliament or a Minister. I do not know whether Mr. Zorin finds himself in the same position, and whether he proposes to go and explain both the Western plan and the Soviet plan to his constituents and ask them for a free expression of their views on the two plans. I, however, am very glad to do it, and indeed will be doing it within the next few weeks.

Mr. Zorin asked me in particular to explain how it was that we did not feel that a unilateral reduction in the level of armed forces by the Soviet Union of 1,200,000 men was a real measure of disarmament whereas in our plan we ask for the reduction of armed forces to specific levels. This is what he found very hard to understand. But I thought we had made it perfectly clear in our plan, that our future levels would be accompanied by force armament reductions, that at the same time as you reduce to a specific force level you would reduce your armaments. Why I do not consider that the Soviet proposals put forward by Mr. Khrushchev on 14 January constitute disarmament is because, at the same time as he said that there was a reduction in the level of forces, he said that the power of their armaments was substantially increased. This is the difference.

Of course, there is the additional difference that in one measure you would have a control over the level both of the armed forces and of the armaments, whereas in the Soviet action you have a purely unilateral decision which is not controlled in any way.

The CHAIRMAN (Poland) (translation from French): If no one else wishes to speak I will read out the communique, which is as follows:
"The seventeenth meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament was held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 6 April under the chairmanship of the representative of Poland.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 7 April, at 10.30 a.m."

If there are no comments, the communiqué will be taken as adopted.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.