FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE SIXTEENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Tuesday, 5 April 1960, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. MARTINO (Italy)
PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Bulgaria: Mr. M. TARABANOV
Mr. K. CHRISTOV
Col. K. SAVOV

Canada: Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. A.G. CAMPBELL
W/Cdr. R.J. MITCHELL

Czechoslovakia: Mr. J. NOSEK
Lieut.-Gen. J. HEČKO
Mr. Z. TRHLÍK

France: Mr. J. MOCH
Mr. M. LEGENDRE
Col. L. CONVERT

Italy: Mr. G. MARTINO
Mr. L. DAINELLI
Mr. D. PHILIPSON

Poland: Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
Mr. M. LACHS
Brig.-Gen. J. SLIWINSKI

Romania: Mr. E. MEZINCESCU
Mr. C. BOGDAN
Col. C. POPA

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mr. V.A. ZORIN
Col.-Gen. A.A. GRYZLOV
Mr. A.A. ROSSHCHIN
PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:
Rt. Hon. D. ORMSEY-GORE
Miss B. SALT
Maj.-Gen. RIDDLE

United States of America:
Mr. F.M. EATON
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Rear-Admiral P.L. DUDLEY

Representative of the Secretary-General:
Dr. D. PROSTICH

Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General:
Mr. W. EPSTEIN
The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): The sixteenth meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament is called to order. I call first upon the representative of the United States.

Mr. Eaton (United States of America): I want again to thank Mr. Zorin for his remarks yesterday. Having said that, I should like to say that I am afraid that we were treated to an example of misrepresentation which can hardly be expected to advance the serious, important negotiations in which we are engaged here. I refer to the inferences which Mr. Zorin chose to draw from a speech made by the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Harrer, at the Press Club in Washington on 18 February, 1960.

In any negotiation, it is to be expected that Governments will differ as to what plan of action is best. The essence of negotiation is to reconcile differences, if possible. This end cannot be served, however, by misrepresenting the motives of the Governments represented around this table.

I would like to discuss very briefly the thesis which Mr. Harrer was presenting in his speech on 18 February. I do this not merely to correct the misinterpretation of that speech but also because we at this table are attempting to communicate to each other the views of our Governments. It is important that the Soviet delegation understands clearly what was meant by the United States Secretary of State in a serious address on the problems of arms limitation and progress towards general disarmament, and there is no more serious problem than this.

If I may once again try your patience I will re-read the opening remarks of Mr. Harrer, because of their significance and of my further reference to them in my statement this morning. The Secretary of State said:

"I would like to talk today about a very important element of American foreign policy -- our search for safeguarded arms limitations and progress towards general disarmament. As you know ..."

he was talking to the Press --

"... we are about to make a new effort in the Ten Nation Disarmament Commission that will meet in Geneva about the middle of March.

"This effort is designed not only to strengthen international peace and avoid wasteful use of the world's resources, but also to promote our national security, in the real sense of that term."
I insert parenthetically, please note the words "in the real sense of that term."

Mr. Hertor then continued:

"It complements the national military programmes and collective security arrangements that we carry out to this same end.

"America's deep commitment to a policy of arms limitation and disarmament is of long standing."

Mr. Hertor later referred to the risk which nations faced with a continuation of the arms race, and said he had some hope that the Soviet leaders also recognized these risks and would thus "attach a high priority to progress in arms control, as being in their own national interest."

Mr. Zorin and his Government should understand that it is precisely because the United States believes that there is a mutual interest in disarmament -- I repeat, a mutual interest, a contribution to the national interests of both the United States and the USSR, as well as those of other States -- that my Government believes there is an increased hope of progress. With this understanding we would then be able to proceed, through appropriate steps, towards the goal of general disarmament. If there be any illusions that my Government will take any steps not in consonance with its own national interest -- any more than that the Soviet Government or any of the Governments here would take any steps not in consonance with their own national interest -- those should be dispelled; but we feel that in the field of disarmament we have a merger of the common national interests of all of us so that we can approach those discussions at this table secure in the feeling that the common interests of all of us in our national security and in the security of the international community, the security of the world, is what has impelled us to be here and which, we hope, will permit of real progress in our effort being made.

Mr. Hertor's point -- which seems to have escaped Mr. Zorin -- was that the United States would seek through disarmament negotiation to enhance international security, because disarmament under effective control is a better means of achieving security for us all than merely continuing to produce more and more weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. Hertor concluded:

"If the Soviet Union wishes to achieve such progress in an effort to find a better way than the spiralling arms race to try to maintain peace and security, it will find us responsive."

Surely, Mr. Zorin, this is not what you represented Mr. Hertor as saying, and I ask you to consider carefully the future of our negotiations, and understand the true meaning of his words.
In his remarks on 4 April Mr. Zorin also endeavoured to picture United States policy as being opposed to disarmament because American spokesmen had expressed scepticism about the Soviet use of various slogans such as "Ban the bomb", "Do away with foreign bases", "Reduce forces by one-third". I hope that by now it is clear that my Government does not consider it necessary to endorse Soviet terms in order to demonstrate our own devotion to genuine, safeguarded disarmament in a free and peaceful world. What we have found cause to criticise is the endless reiteration of slogans -- the endless reiteration of slogans as a substitute for concrete and specific discussions of ways and means to work out our mutual problems which must be solved in order to achieve real progress toward safeguarded disarmament.

Judging by Mr. Zorin's comments yesterday, he still entertains doubt as to our support of resolution 1378 of the United Nations General Assembly; he said:

"In the discussion of various specific questions at the Committee's meetings the Soviet delegation and the delegations of the other socialist countries have pointed out that the Western plan in no manner constitutes a programme of general and complete disarmament, and therefore does not comply with the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly."  

I repeat again that my Government supports this resolution as strongly as any delegation here.

In the interests of precision I wish to point out that, together with our support of this resolution, we are not unmindful of the document that furnished the terms of reference under which this Committee was created -- the Four Power Communiqué on Disarmament Negotiations. This provides that:

"The four Governments conceive of this committee as a useful means of exploring through mutual consultations avenues of possible progress toward such agreements and recommendations on the limitation and reduction of all types of armaments and armed forces under effective international control as may, in the first instance, be of particular relevance to the countries participating in these deliberations. Furthermore" -- the communiqué goes on to say -- "it is the hope of the four Governments that the results achieved in these deliberations will provide a useful basis for the consideration of disarmament in the United Nations."  

We wish to emphasize that the assignment of this Committee was not to endorse a certain phrase appearing in any particular plan, let alone an endorsement of any such plan, it is to achieve controlled disarmament — that is its purpose; and a major difference between the Western plan and the plan of the Soviets is that we consider this effective control to be an essential element in any comprehensive disarmament plan.

The inadequacy of the control provisions described by the Soviets marks, in our view, a primary failure to conform to the objectives contained in the United Nations resolution, namely, that disarmament shall proceed under effective international control. We also think that disarmament must take place under conditions which will ensure a world where nations live in peace with each other and live in freedom rather than live in a state of international anarchy without any adequate peace force, which could so easily result in the enslavement of small nations by their larger neighbours. This requires an international peace force. An international peace force must come into being as national armaments are diminished, otherwise we shall have anarchy, chaos, and the enslavement of the small by the large. The Soviet plan, in addition to its other shortcomings, makes no provision for any such force. Its absence indicates another of the primary shortcomings and the total unreality of the Soviet plan.

I should like to say here that I hope my remarks will not be treated as destructive criticism. My intentions are the reverse, to try as best I can to point out some of the major differences which exist between our view and the Soviet proposal. This is not, to me, a debating exercise. This is not an effort to discredit in any way. It is a serious effort on our part — and I think I can speak on behalf of my Western colleagues following upon the remarks which they have made here over the last several weeks — to make clear what we believe to be the shortcomings of the Soviet plan. I hope my comments will be taken in that vein.

Another fundamental difference between the position of the Allied Governments and that of the Soviet Union is that the Soviet Union is trying to reach general agreement on the end product of our talks without any agreement on specific early measures and on commensurate control. This is a fruitless effort unless specific measures with adequate verification can first be agreed. It is perfectly futile for us to agree on some desirable objective unless we first determine whether all of us can come to an agreement on some of those simpler matters which lie close to our common interest and to the interest of the world as a whole.
So that I may be clear I will reiterate this in another fashion. We are prepared to sit here and to negotiate the early measures of disarmament with commensurate control, and when these have been agreed a concrete foundation will have been laid for moving on to those final measures necessary to attain our objective. This is consonant with both the resolution and the Four-Power communiqué which together instruct us to explore, and I quote with omissions,

"... through mutual consultations avenues of possible progress toward ... agreements and recommendations on ... limitation and reduction of all types of armaments and armed forces under effective international control ..."
(DC/144, page 2)

and

"... to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution" to the question of "general and complete disarmament under effective international control ..."
(General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV)

The Soviet representative, in stressing the virtues of the Soviet plan, charged yesterday that the United States delegation had "made no serious comments on the substance ... in all the three weeks of the Committee's work." (TNCD/PV.15, page 5) I have commented in general terms on this and I would, in addition, direct his attention to the fact that we have sought consistently to focus discussion on specific and concrete issues, and we have done this in areas where the Soviet plan and the Western plan seemed to offer promise of early agreement. I would also point out that comments on the substance of the Soviet proposal were offered in very great detail by Mr. Ormsby-Gore and by my other Western colleagues as well as by me.

Let me, in closing, repeat what I said on 1 April, because it is important that this be understood. My Government yields to no peoples in the world in its desire to find an answer to this problem which haunts all of us today (see TNCD/PV.14, page 9). I repeat that because it is the fundamental policy of my Government and is the basis of my instructions as I come here to Geneva.

Mr. Mezincescu (Romania) (translation from French): I should like to make a few comments on the specific problem before us. Before discussing the substance of the matter, I wish to point out to our United States colleague that to propose trying to reach agreement on the definition of general and complete disarmament, on the scope of the disarmament measures it comprises, on the stages to be completed in order to achieve it, on control measures, etc., is, precisely,
to invite the Committee to perform a concrete task. All these are concrete proposals which the socialist countries have made since the beginning of our work and which have been rejected by the representatives of the Western countries — by Mr. Eaton first and foremost.

It is hard to believe that our Committee can make any progress in a specific direction so long as it has not specified what that direction should be. If the first steps are to be taken, we must at least begin by agreeing on the direction to be followed. That is a matter to which we shall revert later.

I shall now go on to the statement I had prepared for today's meeting.

It has become necessary to make a closer examination of the first two stages of the Western plan and I shall explain the position of my country and that of the other socialist countries with regard to these stages.

It is justifiable to ask what contribution the execution of the measures provided for in these two stages of the Western plan could make to reducing the danger of nuclear war and halting the armaments race. We are entitled to ask ourselves whether they will bring us closer to the goal of our work, i.e. to general and complete disarmament.

What are the measures in the first two stages of the Western plan which, in one way or another, affect, or seem to affect, the economic and military potential of States, armed forces, armaments of all kinds, the preparation of the theatre for strategic operations and so forth?

In the first stage of the Western plan there is only one measure which might come into that category, and that only from the strictly formal point of view. It is the measure in paragraph D.1, fixing force level ceilings for the Soviet Union and the United States at 2,500,000 men. But, as the representatives of the socialist countries have already shown several times, the adoption of this measure would have virtually no effect on the force levels of the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviet Union has taken a unilateral decision to reduce the level of its armed forces within a short time to below the level proposed in the Western plan. The military forces of the United States are said to be already very near the proposed level.

Hence, if paragraph D.1 of the first stage of the Western plan were adopted and put into effect, no fresh reduction of the armed forces of the Soviet Union or those of the United States would result; the contrary would rather be the case.
As to the other States, for example the other great Western Powers represented here, the Western plan speaks -- I quote -- of "agreed appropriate force levels". (TNCD/PV.3 page 2)

It should be noted, however, that the Powers concerned have not so far made any reference to the possibility of making any reduction whatever in their armed forces during the first stage of the Western plan.

What, then, can be the purpose of mentioning, in the first stage of the Western plan, the level soon to be reached by the armed forces of the Soviet Union as a result of the unilateral decision of the Soviet Government? Obviously, the purpose is to use this decision, taken by the Soviet Government unilaterally in the interests of peace, as a pretext for trying to institute international control over armaments.

The argument that the level fixed for the armed forces by the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union could be attained within a shorter time than that prescribed if the measure formed the subject of another decision, this time a multilateral one taken within the framework of our Committee, seems to us particularly illogical. Moreover, it sounds rather curious coming from the Western representatives who have not only cast doubt on the value of the unilateral measures taken by the Soviet Union and the value of Soviet experience in this field, but have also shown themselves very sceptical as to the general possibility of fixing a time-limit for disarmament operations. The other provisions in the first stage of the Western plan relate to the establishment of an international disarmament organization which would start exercising control over the launching of space vehicles, the level of armed forces, armaments and military budgets before any effective disarmament measures had been agreed on.

Contrary to the actual statements made during our discussions by almost all the Western representatives, the first stage of the five-Power plan provides solely for the establishment of control over armaments, without any agreement on disarmament measures. It is obvious that this cannot affect the military potential of States, save to the extent that the inspection teams would furnish a possible aggressor with additional information for making his aggressive strategic dispositions.

The first part of the Western plan is so devoid of effective disarmament measures that its authors themselves have thought it necessary to inform us that they regard the first and second stages as being really only one stage, that they are no more than two scenes of the same act and that there will be no foreseeable interval between the two scenes.
But, in fact, the transition from the first to the second stage does not seem to be as smooth and continuous as the Western delegates would have us believe. First of all, it depends on the success of the preparatory studies provided for in section I, paragraph F, sub-paragraphs 1 to 8, the duration of which is not laid down. We must also bear in mind the duration of the negotiations needed to conclude the various arrangements between the States which would have to apply the measures advocated. It has been said that these studies could be carried out within about a year and a half. Mr. Ormsby-Gore, who kindly volunteered this estimate, retired directly afterwards behind his reputation as a bad forecaster, which does not seem to us to be very auspicious.

We have, therefore, a first stage that does not include any disarmament measure, then an interval of indefinite duration, for the negotiations needed in order to pass on to the second stage.

This interval could easily be taken advantage of by opponents of disarmament — as past experience has amply shown — to equivocate and, finally, to bring our discussions to nothing.

But suppose that despite all difficulties we still get as far as putting the second part of the Western plan into effect. We must then put the same question: Which of the provisions are calculated to affect the military potential of States? I do not know what answer the representatives of the Western Powers will give to this question, but it seems evident to us that the second part of the Western plan, itself, contains no provisions of that kind.

The reduction of armed forces and armaments proposed for the United States and the Soviet Union is all the more insignificant, since we are concerned with the second stage of a programme which should aim at general and complete disarmament.

It should be noted that there is still no mention of the force levels of States — and here I quote from the plan — "having significant military capabilities", some of which are represented on this Committee.

As the reduction in forces is so small, the aggressive strategic equipment of States will remain unchanged.

After making the reductions provided for in their plan, the Western Powers could still keep their bases on foreign territory intact. They have, moreover, made this quite clear to us by their statements during our discussions.
The representative of Italy, for instance, in answer to a question put to him by our Czechoslovak colleague about military bases on foreign territory dispelled any remaining doubt on the matter. He said:

"We consider that each State, within the limits agreed at each phase, is free to use its remaining forces and armaments in whatever manner it deems necessary for its security." (TNCD/PV.5, page 15)

Moreover, the force levels to be attained by the reduction have been fixed at a higher level than in previous Western proposals, precisely in order not to affect the forces required for foreign bases.

These bases for land, sea and air forces on foreign territory still play an important part in aggressive strategy.

According to Senator Fulbright, Chairman of the United States Senate Foreign Affairs Committee -- I quote in English -- (continued in English):

"All the world knows that our foreign bases pose a threat for the Soviet Union."

(translation from French)

Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, United States Chief of Naval Operations, declared in April 1959 -- I quote in English again -- (continued in English)

"...The United States has the ability right now, in being, to destroy the Soviet Union. We can do it in several ways, and several times over, with our powerful Strategic Air Command of the United States Air Force, with carrier striking forces of the United States Navy, with tactical air forces, and with intermediate range ballistic missiles, which are now being installed on certain European sites."

The Admiral, surprisingly, by-passed submarines -- a course rather strange for a highly placed naval officer.

(translation from French)

We also consider very significant the fact that on the eve of the Conference of NATO Defence Ministers, the Defence Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany thought it necessary to make a statement from which I quote the following:
"The Bundeswehr must clearly know whether, and to what extent, their supplies can be integrated in NATO or whether this is not possible. If a general agreement is not possible, the Federal Government will take the necessary steps to acquire supply bases and training grounds by negotiations with different States."

Coming as it does from a representative of the German revenge-seekers, the statement by the German Defence Minister leaves no doubt as to the nature and role of military bases abroad.

As recently as yesterday the Deputy Defence Minister of Greece made it known that his Government would give an affirmative reply to requests for German military bases in Greece if such requests were made through NATO.

The references in the Western plan to measures concerning fissionable materials can in no way be regarded as disarmament measures.

The cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes (Section II, paragraph 0) and the transfer of agreed quantities of fissionable material from past production to non-weapons uses would not affect the nuclear striking power of States. I do not wish to repeat what I have already said on this subject on another occasion.

During our meeting on 1 April, the representative of France himself agreed that the stocks of nuclear bombs would remain intact at the end of the second stage of the Western plan (TNCD/FV.14, page 17).

Here is the true picture of the situation: All the nuclear weapons so far produced, which are already amply sufficient for incalculable destruction, and those which will be produced between now and some future date which no Western representative has been willing to specify, and which is therefore indeterminate -- all these nuclear weapons will remain intact after the measures comprised in the second stage of the Western plan have been carried out. The cessation of production or the beginning of the transfer of fissionable material to peaceful uses cannot put a stop to the nuclear arms race, since almost unlimited quantities of fissionable material intended for military purposes would remain. Nor can this cessation of production and beginning of the transfer of fissionable material to peaceful uses eliminate or even reduce, to however small a degree, the danger of a nuclear war with all its attendant disasters.
On this point I could adduce the opinions of numerous military experts from the Western camp, and, if I may say so, they are rather talkative on this subject. I shall confine myself to quoting only the latest statements by President Eisenhower, who, no later than 30 March, said:

"... the (nuclear) power which at present exists in our arsenals (that is, those of the United States) and certainly in those of the Soviet Union is a thing so tremendous that I do not believe that new tests necessarily make the destruction ... of any nation, including our own (the United States) more probable".

In reviewing the measures envisaged for the second stage of the Western plan, the representative of France asserted the other day that after these measures had been put into effect "... the terrible threat of today" (probably the threat of war and particularly of nuclear war) "will have receded and be tending to disappear". (TNCD/PV.14, page 13)

For pertinent reasons, we cannot share this optimism. We cannot think that the threat and risk of nuclear war can recede or tend to disappear so long as not only stocks of nuclear bombs remain intact, but the manufacture of these bombs is continued with more and more improvements from stocks of fissionable material intended for military purposes, of which every nuclear power has accumulated considerable quantities.

Moreover, neither "the prohibition against placing into orbit or stationing in outer space vehicles capable of mass destruction" (TNCD/3, Section II, paragraph A) nor the "prior notification to the International Disarmament Organization of proposed launches of missiles according to predetermined and mutually agreed criteria" (ibid., Section II, paragraph B) seem calculated to make the danger of nuclear war "recede" or "disappear".

The representative of France stated at the fourteenth meeting of our Committee that "at the end of the second stage the most formidable vehicles for delivering nuclear weapons, the satellites, would be totally eliminated from national arsenals". (TNCD/PV.14, page 12)

At the same meeting he stated that a "disarmament measure will in this case" (in the Western plan), "for the first time, have been taken before passing the point of no return" (ibid., page 11). That is to say, if I have understood him correctly, before outer space has been taken over by the arms race or the launching of destructive missiles.
Thus it clearly appears that the satellites would be eliminated from national arsenals before being introduced into them.

But are the most dangerous vehicles for the transport of nuclear weapons those that do not yet exist, or are they those that do exist, with which the Western Powers have abundantly equipped their land, sea and air force bases on foreign territory?

How would the danger of nuclear aggression be reduced by the abolition -- which is in any case highly improbable -- of vehicles yet to be developed, when there are enough vehicles now standing ready to carry atomic and hydrogen bombs to any part of the world?

As a measure of control without disarmament, the control of rocket launching tests will not contribute to anything as far as security is concerned.

I now revert to an aspect of the provisions of the Western plan relating to conventional armaments; I am still referring to the second stage of this plan.

The representative of France thought that the difference between the figure of 2,500,000C men, envisaged in the Western plan, and that of 1,700,000 was not significant.

The reason for this obvious error is that in making this assessment he overlooked the fact that the figure of 1,700,000 men put forward in the socialist countries' plan is for the first stage, which would precede the complete disbandment of armed forces, whereas the figure of 2,100,000 men in the Western plan is for the second stage, which would precede no one knows what -- at least we have not received any answer to our questions on this point.

In the opinion of the representative of France, "the main purpose of that reduction is to measure the reduction of conventional armaments, which we regard as much more important than the reductions of force levels". (TNCD/PV.14, page 13)

Let us look a little closer at this aspect of the question. If the reductions in armaments corresponding to the reductions in forces were to be made, we could hope, in the second stage of the Western plan, for a reduction of 16 per cent. in conventional armaments. This reduction really does not seem very impressive, particularly as Mr. Jules Moch himself has several times been at pains to convince us that the development of nuclear weapons and vehicles for them has considerably diminished "the importance of conventional weapons, and, still more, that of the size of the forces operating them". (cf. A/C.1/SR.1030, paragraph 19)
The representative of France stated at the fourteenth meeting that "at the end of the second stage a general mobilization will no longer be of any use, because it would not allow equipment of troops in excess of the agreed force levels". (TNCD/FV.14, page 14)

We do not find this very reassuring either, at a time when the military experts of NATO advocate giving up armed forces raised by conscription and replacing them by a professional army which, according to these experts, could carry out its allotted tasks with considerably smaller forces.

Mr. Jules Moch, himself, has not ti re least reminding us that "the unilateral reductions of forces... show clearly enough that this is meaningless from the point of view of disarmament" (TNCD/FV.9, page 40) and that a reduction of armed forces, far from indicating an effort toward disarmament, is today evidence of the modernization of weapons and of an increase in the power of destruction (cf. A/C.1/SR.1030, paragraph 19).

It is not logical to represent the reduction of armed forces and armaments as being of no importance in the case of unilateral decisions by the Soviet Union and of the socialist countries' plan, but to represent it as a factor increasing international security in the case of the slight reductions provided for in the Western plan. It is all the less logical, in that the difference between the Western proposals and those of the socialist countries is that of one to two, and, in regard to implementation, that of the unforeseeable to the definite.

The execution of the measures provided for in the first two stages of the Western plan could not in any way increase the security of nations, but, on the contrary, would increase the risks and dangers of war, and particularly of a nuclear war.

Consider the position. The reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments by 16 per cent. would, from the strategic point of view, be largely compensated by the increase in stocks of nuclear weapons and in the means of delivering them to any distance. Furthermore, the number of nuclear military Powers would certainly have increased in the meantime.

The chain of military bases encircling the socialist countries would not only remain intact, but would have acquired other aggressive links, such as those which Federal Germany is now negotiating for in the territory of various countries, some of them very close to my own.
The establishment of a system of control over armaments without any real disarmament measures would only serve to provide possible aggressors with additional information on objectives at which to strike.

We are a long way from the optimistic picture painted by the representative of France at the fourteenth meeting.

The reason why application of the measures envisaged in the first two stages of the Western plan can have no effect on the arms race of the risks of a nuclear war, lies in the fact that the Western plan does not aim at abolishing armed forces and armaments of every kind, i.e., at attaining the goal proposed by the United Nations resolution. And as further proof, I shall quote what the United States Secretary of State said only yesterday about the discussions which have taken place in the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. Horder said that, to avoid the possibility of an armed conflict and to facilitate the settlement of questions in dispute between East and West, American policy was using the following methods: (1) the strengthening of collective security agreements against aggression (I do not wish to go into detail on this subject, as I do not think it necessary at this point in our discussion, but these security agreements place outposts for the defence of the United States at thousands of kilometres from the US frontiers, at the frontiers of the socialist countries); (2) the endeavour to conclude a treaty on arms control. Arms control! That says everything. It is clearly specified in the latest statements by the US Secretary of State that the goal which the United States regards as that of our Committee is not to reach an agreement on general and complete disarmament, but to obtain a treaty on the control of armaments.

Once the final objective has been abandoned, it would be rather surprising if the first two stages of the Western plan, or the Western plan as a whole, could bring us any closer to it.

The Socialist countries' plan, on the contrary, was drawn up with a view to gradual, but sure progress towards the final objective and its attainment.

The first stage of the socialist countries' plan includes fixing the armed forces of the Soviet Union, the United States and the People's Republic of China at 1,700,000 men, and a corresponding reduction in armaments and military
equipment. For the United States and the Soviet Union the reduction would be over 32 per cent. in the first stage, i.e. double what the Western plan envisages for the second stage.

The levels of the armed forces of the other States would be fixed by the special session of the United Nations General Assembly or by the world conference on general and complete disarmament, which the socialist countries' plan provides for at the beginning of the first stage, and which the Western plan relegates to the second stage — i.e. to a period which is indeterminate and, according to what the Western representatives themselves say, indeterminable.

In the second stage of the socialist countries' plan, the armed forces of States are to be completely disbanded and bases for land, sea and air forces situated in foreign territory are to be eliminated. Troops and military personnel are to be withdrawn from foreign territories to within their own national frontiers and disbanded.

In examining the situation which will be created in the world by putting the first two stages of the Soviet plan into effect, Mr. Ormsby-Gore thought he had found "a puzzling inconsistency in ... the proposal for the destruction of nuclear weapons and missiles in the third stage, that is to say, at a time when under the Soviet plan the military manpower to handle them will no longer exist", and "in the relegation to the third stage of the destruction of air force equipment". (TNCD/PV.13, page 15)

I should like to make two comments on Mr. Ormsby-Gore's remarks.

The first is this: the fact that at the end of the second stage of the socialist countries' plan there would no longer be any military manpower to handle nuclear weapons, missiles, aircraft or any other kind of nuclear arms or weapons of mass destruction is eloquent proof that by the end of that stage the risks of nuclear war and of surprise attacks would be practically eliminated.

My second comment is this: the destruction of all the weapons of mass destruction and armaments, missiles, military aircraft, fighting ships and all other arms or weapons still existing at that time could be carried out under international control by civilian engineers.
One does not need to have "a very odd definition of civilians" (TNCD/FV.13, page 15) to think that they could, in the third stage of the socialist countries' plan, finish off the task of destroying the nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, devices, arms and armaments existing at the time. It must not be forgotten that it is, in fact, the civilians who develop, make and deliver all kinds of armaments and military devices to the armies.

What appears to us much more difficult, in view of the Western Powers' frame of mind is to reach agreement in a short time on the need to carry out, by progressive stages, the disbandment of armed forces and the destruction of all weapons and armaments. That, however, remains the essential task of our Committee.

**Mr. MOCH (France) (translation from French):** Mr. Zorin made a statement yesterday which I do not wish to discuss in detail; certain criticisms in it aimed specifically at the United States have just been answered by Mr. Eaton.

The Soviet Union representative states that our plan contains no measures of disarmament but only of control. For this purpose he ignores the description I gave on 1 April of the state of the world after the completion of the second stage and before the beginning of the third. Doubtless it was thought better to pass this over in silence.

Mr. Zorin also maintains that those first two stages -- and I repeat that they are not separate at all but dovetailed into a single whole -- contain by way of disarmament only an insignificant reduction in the level of armed forces. I wish to reply to him on this point as well as to Mr. Mezincescu, who seems delighted to use me as a target and reiterates his criticisms of 1 April without taking much notice of my own remarks of that date.

In order to develop his argument yesterday, Mr. Zorin has to overlook a number of measures, and division of labour has enabled the Eastern side to fill this gap today. But I repeat once again that these measures are effective and controllable. Let me recall them. They involve first the elimination of excess armaments and therefore the impossibility of future mobilizations, which is not a negligible feature. They further involve prohibition of the launching of satellites for military purposes. To this I am given the answer that such satellites do not yet exist, whereas rockets do. I beg your pardon, but the satellites of two
countries have already performed remarkable feats, and we are on the eve of the day when, instead of carrying cameras, they will be able to have nuclear warheads on board and means of re-entering the atmosphere at a chosen point in order to drop to the ground.

I am not going to start a discussion here on the relative usefulness of rockets and satellites, although it would be highly interesting. One might hesitate to launch a rocket knowing that 20 minutes or so later it will drop on the target. One will not hesitate to place in orbit for all eternity a satellite carrying nuclear material and circling our globe perpetually every 20, 25 or 30 minutes according to a plan that is strictly determined and can be amended if necessary. And satellites can be launched with certainty in peacetime, while your rocket launching pad can be destroyed just when you would like to use it.

Consequently the idea of not passing the point of no return should commend itself to us all if we are logical. Let me remind you of this expression, which may seem enigmatic to some: the point of no return, in the historic and heroic days of aviation, was the moment after which, in case of mechanical trouble when crossing the Atlantic, the pilot could no longer turn back but had to go on.

Having passed the point of no return in nuclear matters, we have a chance of being able to avoid passing it with satellites. We must therefore not under-value this idea.

The measures I have mentioned also include discontinuance of the manufacture of fissionable materials, and conversion of stocks. In reply to this I have been told that this allows stocks of weapons to remain. That is not so. Let us stop and think for a moment. It would depend upon the rate of conversion. If governments were asked to bring to the international organization ten kilogrammes of fissiable material a year, then, of course, you would be right. But it is for us to determine the amounts to be converted each year. We can therefore set them at a level corresponding to a reduction in aggressive potential.

These measures include extension of the reductions to all the Powers having significant military capabilities, the strengthening of international law and its sanctions — so readily overlooked — and control over rocket launching sites.
Mr. Zorin was allowed in his statement yesterday to criticize certain measures -- such as the declarations to the international disarmament organization -- while omitting to recall that those measures were included in various past Soviet plans which I could list. The Soviet Government should therefore not view them with excessive hostility.

I do not, however, wish to be drawn into a controversy: first, because I should have to take up certain polemical statements directed at me which, out of long experience in political life as well as on principle, I prefer to ignore completely; and secondly because, though Mr. Zorin has once more stated his previous arguments without any semblance of modification or prospect of flexibility, I am above all anxious to emphasize that the fundamental difference between us relates essentially to the philosophy of disarmament, to our two concepts of a "general and complete" plan.

Speaking now on behalf of the five Western delegations, I should like once more to define clearly our common position on this essential concept.

First let me recall how these three words "general and complete" entered the vocabulary of the United Nations during the last session of the General Assembly. They were not yet current, you will find, on 17 September 1959.

The report of the Assembly's General Committee (A/4214) indicates that, during discussion at its one hundred and twenty-first and one hundred and twenty-second meetings, there was included under item 66, bearing the simple heading of "Question of disarmament", a sub-heading (a) entitled "Report of the Disarmament Commission"; sub-headings (b) (c) and (d) dealt with specific questions. Inclusion of sub-heading (a) was approved by 16 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.

The foregoing wording was subsequently reproduced by the General Assembly in the decision concerning the allocation of items included in the agenda to various committees.

It was not until two days later, on 19 September 1959, that the head of the Soviet delegation, Mr. Gromyko, asked the Secretary-General by letter to include a new item entitled "General and complete disarmament", this title being that of the Soviet proposal previously formulated by Mr. Khrushchev before the General Assembly.
At its meeting on 22 September the General Committee submitted the Soviet proposal to the Political Committee under its own title of "General and complete disarmament".

At its one thousand and twenty-fifth meeting on 8 October 1959, the Political Committee adopted its agenda including no longer four, but five questions transmitted by the General Committee, of which the Soviet proposal on general and complete disarmament was the first.

Finally, the Political Committee and later the Assembly unanimously passed the resolution we all know, the preamble of which in fact states that the question of general and complete disarmament is the most important one facing the world today, and by which the General Assembly called upon Governments "to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of this problem". (A/RES/1378 (XIV)). Then, transmitting to our Committee all -- I emphasize all -- the proposals or suggestions made during the session, the Assembly expressed the hope that "measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control will be worked out in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time". (ibid)

Neither the French delegation nor any of the four other Western delegations wishes to abstract anything from these texts. We think, like our Soviet colleagues, that the question of general and complete disarmament is the most important of all; we are determined to make every effort to resolve it; we are ready to study measures "leading towards the goal" in question.

But nowhere in the United Nations has it been proclaimed that the only plan satisfying the requirements of all delegations is the Soviet plan. If that idea had been included, explicitly or implicitly, in the draft resolution, this would certainly not have been adopted unanimously.

Besides, if that had been what the representatives thought, they would have transmitted to us for our examination Mr. Khrushchev's proposal alone, whereas they transmitted simultaneously all the others made during the session.

This comprehensiveness of the matter transmitted to us proves that we are free to adopt whatever text we wish. Furthermore, how could the United Nations restrict the authority of a body created by four Foreign Ministers and placed by them outside the framework of the United Nations?
Mr. Eaton has just recalled the quadripartite communique of 7 September 1959 which sets up our Committee and establishes its terms of reference. It is worth recalling again. It reads:

"The four governments conceive of this committee as a useful means of exploring through mutual consultations avenues of possible progress towards such agreements and recommendations on the limitation and reduction of all types of armaments and armed forces" -- I stress these words -- "under effective international control as may, in the first instance, be of particular relevance to the countries participating in these deliberations."

(DC/144, page 2)

We have wasted enough time on this academic debate which can lead nowhere. And now, having cleared up the constitutional point regarding our freedom of choice, I come to the practical issue.

We cannot accept as a basis for discussion either the Soviet plan or any other similar text.

In fact:

- We cannot agree to restrict ourselves to a hard-and-fast time-limit, for experience teaches us that even the simplest negotiations invariably last much longer than anyone foresees. What, moreover, would be the purpose of these rigid time-limits if, according to the statements made here by the representatives of the Eastern countries, they do not begin to run until the end of the world Conference on disarmament, of which no one can foresee the duration but which, judging by much less ambitious attempts, will be a pretty lengthy business? We can at present agree to previously-set time-limits only for simple operations, and only as reasonable estimates, not imperative obligations.

- We cannot agree to give priority over nuclear disarmament, which alone can relieve the fears of the world, to conventional disarmament only, which is of little consequence in this aera of rockets and satellites. The conventional disarmament would in any case have to be applied to armaments as well as to armed forces, so as to provide means of preventing the immediate re-arming of reservists who have been demobilized.

Besides, on certain of these points our Conference now has before it a number of United States proposals.
We cannot accept the drastic conclusions in the Soviet plan. Neither can we do away with all military organizations, because the United Nations Charter imposes upon us obligations which we cannot disavow without violating the Charter. Moreover, before the complete abolition of national armies, we must set up an international organization equipped with all necessary means of stating the law and of enforcing its decisions.

- We cannot agree to base nuclear disarmament on solemn but completely uncontrollable declarations such as a prohibition of such weapons or of keeping stocks of them. At great cost to ourselves we learned that a pact of this nature that outlawed war on 27 August 1928 -- the famous Briand-Kellog Pact -- did not prevent a fresh outbreak of slaughter eleven years after it was signed.

- We cannot accept, in this uncertain world in which we live among so many political disputes, the idea that we should append our signatures to a document which would determine ne varietur all the stages of general and complete disarmament from the present situation until all the operations are completed.

- We cannot at any time, either during the preliminary discussion, in the agreement to be conclude, or yet during its subsequent implementation, separate a disarmament measure from its corresponding effective control.

- Lastly, we cannot agree to include in the preamble to our future agreement measures regarding which none of us knows when or how they can be put into effect. Their inclusion at the beginning of the treaty would be interpreted outside this conference room as committing our Governments, and we will only enter into commitments which we know we can fulfil. If, therefore, you think a preamble is necessary, it should do no more than paraphrase the General Assembly resolution.

For all these reasons, and because of our concern that these negotiations, to the success of which we are deeply committed, should be effective, we feel compelled to state here quite frankly that we cannot regard the Soviet plan of 1959 as an acceptable basis for discussion.

Simultaneously with this plan, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union advanced a number of other suggestions. Those relating to simple regional measures would be no more acceptable to us, because they do not represent real disarmament measures but only tactical or strategical modifications.

We remain convinced that the Western plan affords the best approach towards our goal of general and complete disarmament, and the most satisfactory basis for
our negotiations. However, we are prepared to consider amendments to it intended to take account of certain considerations advanced by the representatives of the Eastern countries, provided that they do not conflict with the fundamental principles I have just enumerated.

All the Western delegations therefore express the hope that delegations of the Eastern countries will agree to renounce a plan which, even with amendments not affecting its substance, does not offer any basis for an acceptable compromise.

The path which the Conference has been following can lead to no concrete result. In order to work profitably we must renounce opposition based on ideological differences, and speeches which get our discussion no further. We must undertake a methodical comparison of the initial measures which either side can accept, in the hope that we may thus arrive at decisions acceptable to us all. When we agree on a first set of measures, we shall be able to discuss others that would follow while the first are being implemented.

That is the wise and realistic solution we propose.

The Western delegations are as anxious as the Eastern countries to follow a road leading towards general and complete disarmament. They are prepared to travel along that road as far as is reasonable and realistic in the troubled and mistrustful world of today. They are convinced that the first move forward will relax general tension, help to settle differences, and thus enable us to make further progress towards our common goal.

Mr. NASZKOWSKI (Poland) (translation from French): We shall carefully study the statements just made by the representatives of the United States and France; but our first impression is that they make no difference to the substance of the essential problem before us. The situation we are in requires us to state clearly and unambiguously whether we want general and complete disarmament or not. Despite what the Western delegations have told us about their accepting the well-known resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, one cannot fail to notice that their proposals and their attitude during the discussion are entirely contrary to their statements.
The French representative has, moreover, just made another attempt — he did this before, at the beginning of our work — to give this United Nations resolution an interpretation that minimises it and reduces its importance. His analysis of what is called the preparatory work, referred to in the resolution that constitutes the basis of our terms of reference, alters nothing. That resolution still constitutes our mandate. It is not enough to present a plan and say, as the Western delegations do without any justification, that it corresponds to the objective of general and complete disarmament. The Western plan does not provide, even after the completion of its third stage, for the elimination and destruction of all types of armaments, including nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Nor is that all. Is it not clear that the Western delegations now appear to be trying to confine their plan to the first and second stages only, and to put off the third stage till the Greek Calends? By placing all the emphasis on control, which is the main objective of the first and second stages of their plan, the Western delegations are making this an end in itself, whereas it is obvious that control must be considered in conjunction with disarmament. It appears that, when the Western delegations talk about the concrete nature of disarmament measures, they mean first and foremost, the concrete nature of control measures. This has moreover been confirmed by the United States Secretary of State, as the Romanian representative pointed out today.

Thus, according to the clarifications supplied by the Italian representative at the meeting on 28 March, the interim commission would already have quite a number of control functions to perform, although no disarmament measures would yet have been taken. We have had further evidence of this in Mr. Eaton's latest proposal, in which he recommends the establishment of a system of control over space vehicles. He confirmed it more strongly today. If the Western Powers really wish to free the world from the atomic threat, they need only propose that nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction be prohibited, instead of confining themselves to control of the means delivering such weapons — all the more so since their proposals relate only to space vehicles and not to aircraft, surface ships, submarines, etc., which can also carry nuclear charges. That is what particularly interests the countries that are surrounded by a network of hostile military bases.
Where, then, does the United States representative see the mutual advantage of his proposal? To any objective observer, only the Soviet plan ensures the achievement of general and complete disarmament, despite the assertions we heard just now from Mr. Moch. Even the criticisms of this plan made by the Western representatives during these last three weeks of discussion do not justify drawing a contrary conclusion, as the French representative did today, quite unjustifiably. The Soviet plan in fact provides for concrete and very real disarmament measures from the outset — and the United States representative himself noted this in regard to the first stage, in his statement at the thirteenth meeting of our Committee. Yet Mr. Eaton has seen fit to speak of "slogans", and he explained today what he had in mind when he used that expression. According to him, the elimination of military bases and other concrete disarmament measures are worthless slogans. On that interpretation the expression "general and complete disarmament" is a slogan too.

If the word "slogan" is being used, we think it ought rather to be applied to the proposal that a detailed control system be worked out without any real disarmament — the intention being to give the world the impression that we are being asked to discuss general and complete disarmament seriously, whereas that is not so at all.

As the representative of Poland, a country that has known all the horrors of war, I must stress that we are particularly interested in the early achievement of general and complete disarmament, which is the only way to abolish war for ever. I must inform you, therefore, that we note with concern that the Western Powers do not seem resolved to carry it out. We Poles have special reasons for being uneasy. For the continuation of the world arms race is strengthening the militaristic tendencies of Federal Germany. It must be remembered that, while our Committee was sitting the Defence Ministers of the member States of NATO met in Paris, not to discuss the prospects of disarmament, but, on the contrary, to talk about the prospects of "a short nuclear war in Europe" — in the words of Mr. Watkinson, the United Kingdom Minister — as reported in the press, of course. Furthermore, the NATO Defence Ministers agreed in principle to leave it to General Norstadt to decide whether numerous sites on the territory of their countries should be assigned to the Federal Republic of Germany for the establishment of military bases. Mr. Strauss was thus able to say that he was very pleased with the results obtained in Paris.
It thus appears that while our Ten Nation Committee is discussing disarmament and the world is expecting concrete results from us, the territory of the Federal Republic is no longer large enough for the plans of the German militarists, and Mr. von Morkatz, the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic, is reiterating the request that the Federal Republic should have nuclear weapons. We hope that the Western Powers represented on this Committee will understand the gravity of this situation, will realize the dangers of the arms race, and will accordingly enter upon a concrete and realistic discussion on general and complete disarmament.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): It is not my intention today to dwell in detail upon the speeches made at our meeting this morning by the United States representative and Mr. Moch, the representative of France. It seems to me that quite a number of the points they made will require additional consideration.

Today I should like to limit myself to a few remarks, since the interventions of both Mr. Eaton and Mr. Moch contained references to our statement of yesterday, and, as it appears to me, attempts were made to assert that in a number of places that statement had distorted or incorrectly represented the facts and the policy of the United States and generally of the Western Powers.

I should like to make only three short remarks.

First. Mr. Eaton opened his statement by accusing me of mis-representing the facts and distorting Mr. Hertor's speech. However, what Mr. Eaton said later merely confirms what I said yesterday. Indeed, everyone will remember -- you all have the text -- that yesterday we made three points characterizing the position of the United States and of Mr. Hertor in particular.

First of all we said that the Secretary of State of the United States declared that the effort which must be made in the Disarmament Committee "complements the national military programmes" of the United States and of other countries. He also spoke of the collective security of those countries. Mr. Eaton's quotation did not disprove this. The same point appears in the passage quoted by Mr. Eaton, who merely explained that the interests of the United States naturally required that the security of the United States should be strengthened in the field of disarmament. We do not object to this.
security, however, is not the same thing as national military programmes. National military programmes do not by any means invariably concord with the interests of national security alone. It is to be regretted that in Western States these national military programmes, as is well known, stimulate the arms race. For this reason, when Mr. Herter states that our object, the object of the Committee, is to make efforts which would complement "national military programmes", we do not agree to this. We do not intend in this Committee to do work tending to increase the arms race in a number of countries. We do not wish to deal with matters which would help to solve the military programme of any particular State. That is not our object. I think everybody must agree that the Committee, which was set up to solve disarmament problems, cannot deal with military programmes which, for the Western States, are essentially arms programmes.

The second point we made yesterday was that Mr. Herter had implied that the United States military programme needed complementing by the establishment of universal control over armaments. Mr. Eaton did not and cannot refute this, because it appears in black and white in the statement, quoted today by the whole Press, which Mr. Herter made yesterday at the Association of Broadcaster's Conference. The representatives of Romania and of Poland have already referred to this. In that statement, according to a communication from Chicago quoted in the "Journal de Genève", Mr. Herter said that the United States policy employs the method of strengthening agreements on collective security against aggression. We know, however, that these agreements mean military blocs organized by the Western Powers. I will not discuss this question now, but that is the fact. Later on Mr. Herter said that efforts should be made to arrive at an agreement. Do you think that this refers to an agreement for general and complete disarmament? Nothing of the kind: it refers to an agreement on control over armaments. What is Mr. Eaton trying to disprove? He cannot disprove anything, because that is the fact. Mr. Herter says that an agreement or treaty should be concluded on control over armaments. We openly state that we are against this. We do not want in this Committee, which was set up for disarmament, to seek to conclude an agreement or treaty on control over armaments. That is not our object. We said so yesterday when we quoted Mr. Herter, whose statement was set down in
writing and has now been repeated. That statement has not been refuted in any way by Mr. Eaton.

The third point upon which we spoke yesterday, quoting Mr. Herter, was that Mr. Herter had declared himself opposed to the repetition or endorsement of "hollow slogans" such as "banning the atomic bomb", "giving up foreign bases", and "cutting armed forces by one-third". What explanations did Mr. Eaton produce to-day? He explained, or so it could be understood, that the United States "does not consider it necessary to endorse Soviet terms" on a number of questions. Are we asking for Soviet terms to be endorsed? Use your own terms and say that you are in favour of the banning of atomic weapons, that you are in favour of giving up foreign bases, that you are in favour of a reduction of armed forces. Use your own terms. We do not object to that.

The important thing is not Soviet terms, but the essence of the measures expressed in those "slogans", as Mr. Herter calls them. They are not "slogans", but very concrete measures. Abolition of foreign bases, banning of atomic weapons, reduction of armed forces -- all these are concrete disarmament measures. Use your own terms: we will consider them. But to all appearances that is not the point; this is not a question of terms. The point is that you do not wish to discuss the substance of these questions. You do not wish to examine a ban on nuclear weapons as such, abolition of foreign bases, or even reduction of foreign military bases. You object also to discussing a concrete reduction of armed forces, the matter with which Mr. Mezineescu dealt this morning in detail. The point is therefore not "slogans" in Soviet terms. That is not the issue between us. We are prepared to use any terms; but let us examine concrete questions and proposals which will lead to real disarmament measures. This, however, is just what you do not wish to discuss. What I said about Mr. Herter's speech has not been refuted by Mr. Eaton this morning. He only wished to explain it; but that explanation clearly does not and cannot satisfy us, because it means in substance that the United States has no desire to deal with real disarmament measures, saying that all this is expressed in Soviet terms, in "slogans". You may regard them as slogans, but we do not. If you do not like this form of words, we are prepared to consider any other
form you may propose. So far, to our regret, you have not proposed anything.

Mr. Eaton’s statement has not therefore disproved what I said yesterday about the United States position. What Mr. Eaton said does not in any way bear out this general conclusion that we have distorted something or misrepresented facts. It may be seen from what I have just said that the facts have been correctly stated and there has been no distortion: but your explanation of those facts is another matter. Your explanations are to our mind unsatisfactory. They do not refute the basic points made yesterday in our statement. That concludes my first remark.

My second remark. Mr. Eaton, and in somewhat greater detail Mr. Moch, have today reminded us of the communique of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Four Powers. I do not think they did so accidentally. What they said on this subject makes us reflect once more on the real attitude of the Western Governments represented in the Committee towards the objects of our work. Why did they remind us of that communique, which, as everyone knows, referred to the setting up of the Committee before general and complete disarmament was ever discussed? Mr. Moch himself told us this morning in great detail of the manner in which the question of general and complete disarmament was included in the General Assembly’s agenda: at first the question was simply entitled disarmament, but that later a new item was introduced — so he said, quite correctly — the new item of general and complete disarmament.

But this question was not discussed by the four Ministers either on 7 September or in August. It was not discussed because it did not exist, because it had not yet been proposed by anyone. It would have been strange, therefore, if the Ministers of the Four Powers who on 7 September or a little earlier discussed the communique had included in the Committee’s terms of reference a question which they had not yet discussed, and which had not been submitted by anyone. The resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 20 November, that is two and a half months after the communique, dealt in fact with the new question, and not only with the new question but with a new approach to the solution of the disarmament problem generally.
What is your object in recalling this communique, which was superseded by the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly for which you yourselves voted and which, you say, you continue to support? If you do support that resolution, why do you want to pull us back to a communique which reflects a period before the adoption of that resolution and which could not have expressed the new approach to disarmament questions which was worked out by the United Nations General Assembly and expressed in its resolution of 20 November?

If you wish to take us back to the old period, the period of all the disarmament negotiations which took place before the examination of this matter at the fourteenth session of the General Assembly, we tell you that we do not agree to that. We want to move forward, not backward, and you are pulling us back. And you cannot justify your position by saying that you support the General Assembly resolution adopted on 20 November after discussion of the new question on general and complete disarmament introduced by the Soviet Union, and after its detailed discussion in the First Committee. You cannot pull us back to the forms of words which were drafted at an earlier stage and did not reflect the new approach.

That is why your references to the Four Ministers' communique can only be understood to mean that you wish to pull us back, whereas we wish to move forward in accordance with the resolution which was adopted after a detailed discussion and for which you voted. When Mr. Moch twice in his speech stresses that the communique dealt with limitation and reduction of all kinds of armaments, what does he mean? He means that this is our task. Why does he stress this? In order to substitute that task for the task set us by the General Assembly resolution.

The General Assembly resolution, you see, does not speak of limitation or reduction of armed forces, but of "general and complete disarmament". What, then, is your object in stressing the "limitation and reduction of all types of armaments"? Your object is to go back, and to take us back, to a stage of our disarmament negotiations which has been left behind and to which we have no desire to return. This is the issue between us, though you have slightly confused it. You wish somehow to combine the General Assembly resolution, which contemplates general and complete disarmament and from which you cannot escape because you voted for it, with the old formula expressed in the communique of the Four Ministers, which reflects an earlier stage of disarmament negotiations. We wish to comply with the General Assembly resolution, and you also have declared
your wish to comply with it. If you are sincere, then do not pull us back; let us move forward together towards a genuine general and complete disarmament.

From these remarks there seems to flow a last remark on the line our work should follow.

The line of our work is determined by the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly. It is work on all measures which ought to ensure the implementation of general and complete disarmament.

Regarding the documents upon which the negotiations should be based, I should like to note that Mr. Moch seems to have shown today more flexibility than Mr. Eaton did in his statement. True, Mr. Eaton did not insist today on his old formulae, stated in the six points about which we talked yesterday. But he did not say anything new either; whereas Mr. Moch said something slightly new. He said that it was necessary to compare positions, that it was necessary to endeavour to find an acceptable basis for the solution of the problem; that is, in other words, that it was necessary to seek some compromise. We do not oppose this. We are in favour of seeking a mutually-acceptable basis for negotiations, and from the beginning we have maintained that we consider the Soviet Union's plan for general and complete disarmament to be a truly realistic basis for an agreement. If you consider it necessary to amend something in this plan or to introduce something new into it, we are prepared to discuss that. It seems that our positions are not so far apart. You think, however, that your plan is an acceptable basis for an agreement on general and complete disarmament. But we demonstrated yesterday in our statement that this plan is not an acceptable basis, and a more acceptable one must be sought. We consider the Soviet Union's plan to be such a basis, but we do not refuse to seek a mutually-acceptable solution of these questions. It is necessary to ponder what mutually-acceptable solution can be found; but that solution must proceed from the main problem; that is, it must settle questions of general and complete disarmament, not separate questions of limitation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, nor questions of control over armaments. That is the difference between our approach and yours.

We shall find an opportunity to speak upon the other questions later.
Mr. MOCH (France) (translation from French): I have often been blamed for being uncompromising. Seldom have I been called flexible; I thank Mr. Zorin for doing so. I was surprised myself. But I should like to say two things in reply to Mr. Zorin.

In the first place I would ask him to read once more resolution 1376 (XIV). I know he has read it many times already, but he has always read just part of it. He always forgets to mention the second operative paragraph, which "transmits ... for thorough consideration" the United Kingdom Declaration and all the other suggestions which were made at the same time as the Soviet proposal -- which shows that the Assembly has not given a ruling on that proposal. And he also forgets to read us the third paragraph, although it might provide common ground for agreement -- you see I am still being flexible, Mr. Chairman! -- in which the Assembly "Expresses the hope that measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control will be worked out". That is acceptable to everyone. It does not say that general and complete disarmament must be worked out immediately. We know that is impossible. It speaks of working out "measures leading towards" -- our old friend the Soviet 'k' -- "towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control".

So I am asking Mr. Zorin to give as much thought to those two paragraphs of the resolution as to the first.

Secondly, since I suppose Mr. Zorin will be reading through my statement, he will perhaps, after thus going through it a second time, accuse me of being less flexible than he thought I was originally; because, when I spoke of methodical comparison and about taking account of certain considerations advanced by the representatives of the Eastern countries, I added: "provided that they do not conflict with the fundamental principles I have just enumerated" (page 25 above) -- those principles which cause us definitely and frankly to reject the Soviet plan.

If, then, Mr. Zorin will think over these two aspects of the problem, we shall find ourselves in approximately the situation for which I said at the end of my statement that I hoped: that is, we are prepared to travel along that
road as far as is reasonable and realistic in the troubled and mistrustful world of today. In that case I shall be glad to have given Mr. Zorin an impression of flexibility while my own impression, from listening to myself, was precisely the opposite.

Mr. NEZINCESCU (Romania)(translation from French): At this point in our discussion I will not embark on a detailed examination of the statements made by Mr. Moch earlier this morning and again a moment ago; but I wish to say that to impose prior conditions for the continuation and the advancement of our discussions, which must be accepted by countries that are equals in this Committee, seems to me to be a very strange line to take. I intend to revert to this matter, because it brings out what I regard as an essential aspect of the Western plan, a concept which is one of the basic concepts of the plan proposed by the five Western Powers: that plan is constructed on the principle that progress in instituting some very cautious measures of reduction of force levels or armaments must be made subject to conditions previously accepted by the Eastern countries. I think the countries which have based their plan on this concept -- and the representative of France told us as much for the second time this morning -- should certainly consider the strangeness of such a concept in a body called upon to negotiate.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)(translation from Russian): I have only one remark to make on Mr. Moch's statement.

I should like to point out to representatives that Mr. Moch said that in comparing the positions of various delegations, including those of the delegations of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, with those of the Western Powers, he was willing to be guided by one principle only: the condition must be accepted that our position shall correspond with the principles of the Western plan. That is what Mr. Nezinescu meant just now -- and I entirely agree with him -- when he said that of course no progress can be made on that basis.

I should just like to point out that Mr. Moch is making a condition which we have nowhere made ourselves. What is the one thing that we say? That we want to work in accordance, not with the principles of any particular delegation,
but with the resolution we have all adopted. That is the difference. You are proposing that we work in accordance with the principles of your group of countries; while we are proposing that we work in accordance with the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly which was adopted by all our countries. That is the difference of approach.

I believe that this difference of approach testifies to the correctness of our position, since our position arises out of general principles adopted by all countries. If you really wish to act in accordance with this position for which you have voted, then we have a basis for agreement. If you do not wish to do so, then of course there is none. But that will mean you are departing from a resolution for which you have voted.

Mr. MOCH (France) (translation from French): I do not intend, at this late hour, to speak at length. I am glad to hear what Mr. Zorin says and should like to ask him just one question: by which paragraph of the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly does he wish us to be guided by — the first, second or third and last?

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I am very willing to reply to Mr. Moch: by all three paragraphs of the resolution. He, however, wants to base himself solely on the third.

The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): As no other member of the Committee has asked for the floor, I shall read the draft communique:

"The sixteenth meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament was held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 5 April under the chairmanship of the representative of Italy.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Wednesday, 6 April, at 10.30 a.m."

If there are no objections, I shall consider the communique adopted.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.